Vandyck Pinxt

C. Vale Sculpt

Gustavus Adolphus the Great, King of Sweden

Published 12th August 1807, by J. J. Stockdale, 41 Pall Mall.

THE

# HISTORY

OF

# GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS,

## *KING OF SWEDEN,*

## SURNAMED THE GREAT.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

*AN ESSAY ON THE MILITARY STATE OF EUROPE,*

CONTAINING

THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS

IN THE EARLY PART OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

BY THE REV. WALTER HARTE, M. A.

CANON OF WINDSOR.

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THE THIRD EDITION,

With great Alterations and Additions; including The APPENDIX;

Revised, Corrected, and Improved,

By *JOHN JOSEPH STOCKDALE,*

Translator of Voltaire's Charles XII. Encyclopædia for Youth, &c.

ILLUSTRATED WITH A PORTRAIT, AND PLANS.

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IN TWO VOLUMES.—VOL. I.

London:

*Printed by Luke Hansard & Sons,*

FOR JOHN JOSEPH STOCKDALE, No 41, PALL-MALL.

1807.

HIS ASHES IN A PEACEFUL URN SHALL REST;
HIS NAME A GREAT EXAMPLE STANDS TO SHOW,
HOW STRANGELY HIGH ENDEAVOURS MAY BE BLEST,
WHERE PIETY AND VALOUR JOINTLY GO.

*Dryden.*

TO

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS

# THE DUKE OF CUMBERLAND,

&c. &c. &c. &c.

SIR!

ALTHOUGH I am fully aware that a young man of my humble ſituation, may ſubject himſelf to cenſure for taking ſo great a liberty as to intrude, unſought and even unknown, an addreſs to a perſonage of your illuſtrious rank, yet my choice has been governed by the admiration I entertain for thoſe virtues ſo eminently conſpicuous in your conduct, which, while their practice would in private life have an irreſiſtible claim to our affection, in your exalted ſituation command at once every emotion of the mind, that can bind the inclinations of inferiors to thoſe whom birth and fortune have placed ſo far above them. Happy, indeed, is it for the Com-

munity, when perſons who are born or called to ſuch elevated heights, prove indeed a beacon to the anxiouſly inquiſitive eyes of the lowly traveller.

In the duties which have hitherto been called into action, it is not adulatory to ſay, that you have followed the Hero of the following Hiſtory *paſſibus equis*—A GOOD SON, AN AFFECTIONATE BROTHER, A LIBERAL PATRON, A WARM FRIEND, A GENUINE PATRIOT, and AN HONEST MAN—theſe are the attributes with which the world is acquainted by your actions.

I have the Honour to be,
With the moſt reſpectful Attachment,
YOUR ROYAL HIGHNESS'S
Obliged, obedient, and
faithful Servant,

*John Joſeph Stockdale.*

London,
October 1807.

# THE EDITOR'S

## PREFATORY REMARKS.

*IT is a caſe by no means uncommon, that works of the moſt genuine authority and value fall into neglect, if not into oblivion, from the non-occurrence of circumſtances of a temporary nature to direct the public recollection to the ſubject of their narratives. This is an obſervation which particularly applies both to the preſent work, and to Voltaire's Hiſtory of Charles XII, a new tranſlation of which has juſt made its appearance by the ſame editor, who having recurred to the only accurate, and in fact re-written edition of the celebrated original, has given, it may be preſumed, a more valuable tranſlation, at leaſt for fidelity, than before exiſted in England. Indeed, the Hiſtory of Charles XII made his ideas naturally turn to that of Charles's predeceſſors, and at once decided him on making, he truſts, another acceptable addition to the libraries of thoſe who were not previouſly*

*viouſly in poſſeſſion of this admirable Hiſtory, rendered doubly intereſting too by the war now waging, by France, againſt Sweden, &c.*

*It was perfectly fit that the learned author ſhould dedicate his work to a patron of ſuch univerſal celebrity; and that this edition may not ſuffer even in ſo immaterial a point, the editor has copied to that very epiſtle, which is here ſubjoined.*

To the Right Honourable

## PHILIP DORMER STANHOPE,

### EARL OF CHESTERFIELD,

Knight of the Moſt Noble Order of the Garter, one of His Majeſty's Moſt Honourable Privy-Council, &c. &c.

MY LORD,

IT muſt be a peculiar happineſs to every author, (and not the leſs ſo for being uncommon) that choice and judgment ſhould direct him to a Patron, as well as obligation and gratitude. It is moreover an addition to my good fortune, that theſe imperfect labours have been peruſed, protected, and encouraged by One, whoſe ſingle approbation is a ſort of univerſal paſsport throughout all Europe.

With what pleaſure could I indulge myſelf in painting a character that is *amiable*, and *illuſtrious* at the ſame time? But, my LORD, the delicacy of your caſt of mind deters me. It may ſuffice therefore

fore to remark with brevity, that I have raiſed this little monument, as a teſtimony of my private eſteem and affection; and if the duration of *it* proves ſhort and tranſitory, it is not from want of zeal and ſpirit in the perſon who erecteth it: but from the inability of the artiſt, and the unſubſtantiality of the materials he uſes. I know my bounds;—and ſhall proceed no farther than to aſſure your LORDSHIP that I am, with the higheſt regard,

Your moſt obliged,
and moſt faithful Servant,
W. HARTE.

*THE Nobleman above addreſſed, in his* UNFORTUNATELY *elegant and celebrated Letters to his ſon, ſpeaks of the preſent work as indeed valuable on account of its important information; but that its value was much deteriorated by the ſingular and unaccountable vulgarity of the language in which it was written. In regard to this point, however forcibly the editor may have felt the truth of the aſſertion, yet he has not ventured upon new modelling the work, leſt he ſhould inſenſibly be led into deviations from accuracy, but has confined his corrections principally to verbal alterations, with a view to relieve ſome ſmall portion of the monotony of frequent repetition, which pervaded the whole. Although he is aware that his efforts cannot be entitled to praiſe, he is alſo ſatisfied that they are at leaſt not ſubject to cenſure. The Index has been compared,*

*compared, revised, and corrected throughout, and he has restored the Appendix, which the author omitted in his octavo edition.*

*For the translation of the Ode at the end of the Appendix, the editor is indebted to the celebrated pen of the youthful author of* All the Talents, *a Politico Satirical Poem, which, within six months, has passed through eighteen editions!*

*As most readers approve of receiving some information, however slight, concerning the authors whose works they peruse, the editor, for their satisfaction, states, that Mr. Harte, besides this History, published* Essays on Husbandry, *and* a Poetical Collection, *entitled,* The Amaranth, *the former in* 8vo. *the latter in* 12mo.; *that he was born and educated at Marlborough, and died in* 1773.

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## LIST OF PLATES.

Portrait of GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS—*to face* The Title to Vol. I.
Plan of a Brigade of Pikemen, &c. - - Vol. II. p. 21
Plan of the Battle of Lutz - - - - - - - - - p. 22
Plan of the Passage of the Lech - - - - - - - p. 203
Plan of the Battle of Leipsic - - - - - - - - p. 362

# GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

## PREFACE

### TO THE FIRST EDITION,

### IN 1759.

MOST perſons of moderate learning and abilities, after finiſhing, what is commonly called the tour, of travelling into foreign countries, have been induced, either from ſelf-love, or the partial ſolicitations of their friends, to make a preſent to the public of ſome performance, which took its riſe from a cloſer and more intimate acquaintance with diſtant ſtates and kingdoms than uſually falls to the ſhare of ſuch people as are born in an iſland, and rarely leave it. As the Perſon who did me the honour to accept of my poor and imperfect ſervices, exhorted me rather to be profuſe than ſparing in ſuch expences as tended to the acquiſition of knowledge, whether in hiſtory, politics, antiquities, laws of government, manners of courts, &c. I had once thoughts of reducing my obſervations of that kind into form; but upon mature reflection, it appeared to me, that the relative ſituations of kingdoms and ſtates were diſquiſitions merely of a periodical nature; and as to antiquities, buildings, paintings, national characters, and ſo forth, they had been deſcribed already, even to tedioufneſs. The inaccuracies and errors of other travellers ſoon taught me to ſuſpect my own; for many or moſt of them depend principally, not through indolence and inattention, but, on the contrary, from want of time and proper opportunity, upon the relations of natives, which are uſually partial and inſincere; or on ſuch extracts as they are enabled to compile from books in vogue among the reſpective people

through whoſe countries they paſs. For theſe reaſons I threw my materials aſide; and after ſuch a frankneſs of confeſſion, it is natural to conclude that I ſhall procure my pardon from the public on eaſy terms. Yet the die was caſt, that I ſhould diſturb the tranquillity of readers by ſome means or other, and enter their cloſets, unſought for, with my literary preſent: That I do ſo is certain; but it is with reſpect and diffidence; and the part of hiſtory I here offer them carries this ſlight recommendation with it, that it is an original ſketch, and not an imitation.

Now as part of the commiſſion I was entruſted with induced me to renew my acquaintance with the modern hiſtory of other nations, I applied myſelf a ſecond time to an undertaking that had been ſuggeſted to me in the earlier parts of life, by my firſt friend and protector the late EARL of PETERBOROUGH, and which I then declined, merely through deficiency of materials, and from want of that intercourſe with learned hiſtorians of other nations, which it has, ſince, been my good fortune to acquire and cultivate. For theſe reaſons I have *reſumed* the hiſtory of Guſtavus Adolphus more properly than *undertaken* it; and far from wanting materials, had rather more materials than I could make uſe of.

At firſt ſight, without reflection, it may appear to ſome, that I have engaged myſelf in an undertaking which ſeems to be foreign from the ſtudies of my own profeſſion, and that the life of a warrior, interſperſed with matters of civil hiſtory, bear no connection with the pen of an eccleſiaſtic: but the life of *that* warrior, which I am now drawing a ſketch of, happens by a rare and unparalleled felicity to be the life of an hero, who, not contented to perform the greateſt actions in the field and cabinet, ſuperadded to his glory, in order to make the figure of it truly circular and perfect, the grand accompliſhing perfection of an *honeſt*, a *moral*, and a *religious man*; in all which laſt-mentioned lights he appears to me as great and amiable as in the two former. For theſe reaſons, I had ever a ſtrong inclination to make this illuſtrious and extraordinary perſonage better known to poſterity; and if in the execution of ſuch an undertaking I ſhall happen to acquit myſelf without commendation, the fault muſt lie at my own door; for I write, with pleaſure, upon an earneſt deſire of becoming uſeful.

Amongſt other things, it has been my ſingular good fortune to provide and amaſs materials to ſuch an abundance,

dance, that I found myſelf plunged into an ocean of hiſtory, as full and redundant as that of the poet,

*Omnia pontus erant, deerant quoque littora ponto*;

ſo that my principal difficulty lay in the grand ſecret of ſelecting and rejecting; and what is equally extraordinary, but more to my diſadvantage if I ſucceed ill, I have from a ſtrange concurrence of accidents, but one competitor, properly ſpeaking, as a biographer*.

Under this head there appears to me a further circumſtance which is worth mentioning: namely, that the life of Guſtavus could never have made its entrance into the world at a period more intereſting than the preſent, for the counterpart of the thirty years war, after a revolution of more than *one hundred years*, is now rekindled in the ſelf-ſame countries.

Yet what induced me principally to write the life of Guſtavus, was the character he will be found to bear as a man of *honeſty, magnanimity, morality*, and *religion:* as to your mere fighting heroes, I reſign them to other hands. But after having long ſtudied my inimitable example in the various ſituations of piety and honour, and indulged a cloſe examination into all that has been publiſhed partially or peeviſhly concerning him by the ſeveral writers of the *two* religions, I find no breach of truſt, no habitual immorality, no infraction of religion, no inattention to public virtue or private devotion, which can ſtrictly and with propriety be laid to his charge. I can diſcover but one habitual fault in the whole of his conduct, and that too may be alleviated, as it ſeems to be a conſtitutional frailty, interwoven with the warmth of his nature, which is, that he was ſubject on certain occaſions to a momentary tranſport of paſſion; which, far from concealing, I have touched upon, and that boldly, in more places than one. We never find him in the character of an encroaching or inſolent king; we never diſcover him falſe or diſhonourable in any one of the relative or ſocial duties: he preferred no man,

* *Hiſtoire de Guſtave Adolphe*, A Par. 12°. 1695. pag. 167.

Profeſſor Menke, whoſe collection in hiſtory was well known to all Europe, has pictured this book to the life: PEU DE CHOSES. *Catalogue des Principaux Hiſtoriens*, p. 413.

but for merit and probity; he broke his faith neither with potentate nor with ſubject; and as to military and ſtate-favourites, they were a ſort of regal trifles, which paſſed through his mind as tranſiently as they entered accidentally. He had no recourſe to diſſimulation; becauſe as a brave man he *deſpiſed* it, and as an able man he did not *want* it: for though it may ſeem a paradox to the generality of readers, yet numberleſs people are diſhoneſt merely for want of courage, or want of parts.

What has been here ſlightly ſketched out is not intended to paſs upon the public by way of a character, but ſerves only as a plain enumeration of ſome few individuating circumſtances, which induced me, as an eccleſiaſtic, to write Guſtavus's life preferably to that of moſt other perſons. For were I to delineate him in the other various appearances of the warrior, the politician, and private man of virtue, all which I chuſe hereafter to leave the reader to combine from the ſeveral facts of hiſtory, it were impoſſible for me to confine myſelf within the common bounds of a ſlight Preface; ſince upon the whole he appears to me, in every ſhape, to be one of thoſe great and fortunate human beings, whoſe reputation is neither to be advanced by encomiums, nor depreciated by obloquy. *Quem vituperare ne inimici quidem poſſunt, niſi ut ſimul laudent.*

My main view, therefore, in compoſing this work, is an attempt to enforce the ideas and practice of virtue and religion upon that large body of men called the *military*. The object and moral of my book being only *this, That the religious and good man,* all other circumſtances being ſuppoſed equal, *ſtands the beſt chance to be the braveſt too*; and if, in putting together the warlike parts of this work, I have employed no ſmall degree of exactneſs and attention, it was merely from a ſincere and earneſt deſire of conveying *the doctrine of my moral* more dextrouſly into the human mind. Moderation, humanity, decorum, order, and, above all, the grand efficacy of a good example, are the ſalutary ingredients preſcribed to the warrior; the deſcription of war itſelf being only the vehicle, artfully contrived in order to convey down, leſs perceptibly, the doſe of virtue, which men have perſuaded themſelves to be more unpalatable than it really is, merely from the prevalence of cuſtom and influences of prejudice. My hope is, that I ſhall keep the reader's attention awake through the whole courſe of my hiſtory;

hiſtory; and that the military youth of this kingdom may find the *uſeful* intermingled with the *amuſing*;

——*Interea perpotet amarum*
*Abſynthî laticem, deceptaque non capiatur:*
*Sed tali potius tactu recreata valeſcat.*

If, therefore, from the force of an example like that of Guſtavus, I can diſplay, in new lights, any freſh inducements, tending towards the promotion of virtue and religion, to that valuable part of the human ſpecies, the *brave* and *magnanimous*, I ſhall think my labours repaid to me with conſiderable intereſt: and with all the fervour which the mind of man is capable of expreſſing towards the Supreme Being, I ſincerely pray, that my intentions may be anſwered in this important particular! On the king's piety I ground the whole of my undertaking: otherwiſe, *Totum hoc indictum volo.*

The two greateſt heroes * in the courſe of the preſent hiſtory, were the moſt moral and religious perſons in the two reſpective armies; and though it may be objected, that many *wicked* and *fiery men* have been *very brave*, which point I no ways controvert, yet the *former* can never contemplate death ſeriouſly and compoſedly; and it may be doubted of the *latter*, whether they poſſeſs that *cool* bravery, which preſerves itſelf the ſame without the help of the iraſcible or vain-glorious appetites to urge it on: for, if courage be prompted by paſſion, in any degree, and not by principle, it muſt be hurried and agitated more or leſs, which is a misfortune: the fire will be fierce, but not clear; and the tranſport counterworks that preſence of mind which performs ſuch wonders in the moments of danger, and without which, bravery in war, with reſpect to ſuperior commanders, is little more than animal ferocity. All the *great* and *magnificent* that is performed in the field, is effected by that intuitive glance of the judgment, which our neighbours denominate neither inelegantly nor improperly the *coup d' œil*, though that idea falls far beneath the Greek expreſſion Αγχίνοια; and I think it is plain to a demonſtration, that the moſt tranquil and compoſed man ſtands always the beſt chance for ſnatching theſe critical and momentary opportunities. Nothing is ſo rapid as the flight of fortune; and if ſhe is not ſeized by the wing, the very inſtant ſhe paſſes by, the coy and capricious deity returns no more.

* Guſtavus and Pappenheim.

It grieves me likewiſe to ſay, that ſome military men vainly and heedleſsly ſuppoſe, that a contempt of religion, and of a virtuous life, argues a certain greatneſs and intrepidity of ſoul. Little, alas! in this reſpect do they know their own hearts, or thoſe of their neighbours! For the preſumption being, that a man of *ſervice* is likewiſe a brave man, it is then manifeſt that this ſort of conduct calls the owner's courage into queſtion: for the coward, when danger is remote, is always moſt intrepid in his talk, moſt noiſy, moſt inſolent, and moſt profane; nor is it an uncommon character to find the ſame man an hypocrite in valour, and an atheiſt in religion. Lord *R.* in the laſt age was an undeniable proof of this aſſertion, and daily obſervation confirms it more often than one would wiſh to mention. The true hero has no recourſe to ſuch artifices.

There is another circumſtance in the life of Guſtavus which deſerves the attention of men of *ſervice*. It is natural to imagine that the king's high ſpirit and perſonal courage can ſcarcely be diſputed, yet he thought it beneath *no* warrior to decline a *duel*, and make his applications to the court of honour. He denounced death againſt all deciſions of quarrels ſword in hand; and upon one occaſion ſhewed great preſence of mind and inflexibility towards a couple of officers whom he reſpected extremely*. Theſe circumſtances being premiſed, can any perſon be uneaſy concerning a common challenge, when the great Guſtavus deſpiſed the practice, and conſidered it more as matter of peeviſhneſs, and impotent paſſion, than any true mark of reſolution and fortitude? Was not that prince jealous of the affairs of honour beyond all imagination? And if rejecting a duel upon ſome occaſions denoted cowardice, it is pretty certain that hardly any ſubſequent conduct could have reſtored that man to his maſter's favour. But to return from this digreſſion.

It may ſeem to ſome men, that during the courſe of this work, I place the elector Palatine in too favourable a light: not that I have omitted to ſpare him upon many occaſions, and excuſe him no where, but for contrary reaſons that amount to greater probability; but be that as it will, if in the courſe of my narration I appear to ſpeak of this unfortunate perſon with more reſpect and greater compaſſion than the common hiſtorians are apt to do, I may aſſert truly and without vanity, it is becauſe I know him better:

* See this ſtory in the account of the campaign 1628.

nor

nor can I allow a king to be branded with infamy, or hurried down the ſtream of hiſtory without notice, when he made ſuch an *effort* in the cauſe of religion and liberty; upon the *effects* of which effort the political laws of Europe have ſtood confirmed for more than a century, and from whoſe illuſtrious great-grandſon, our preſent Sovereign*, I now enjoy the privilege of imparting my ſentiments to the public with the ſpirit and impartiality of a proteſtant truly born, and bred up in a free country.

Some people again may think that I have rather been too ſevere upon Charles I. and the miniſters that ſerved him; whereas, if they could but ſee how much I have expunged or paſſed ſlightly by, they would readily accuſe me of inclining to the compaſſionate ſide. To ſay truth, I love to diſturb *no* man's *aſhes*, eſpecially *thoſe* of a king: he had a *better* criterion to appeal to, than the cenſure or praiſes of a modern hiſtorian; and by *that* criterion I leave him to *ſtand* or *fall*. Upon this account I have related things ſimply, without deſcanting upon them; nor can I charge my memory with having played the rhetorician upon any fact, or indulged the leaſt acrimony or petulance of ſtyle. Had I reaſoned only upon the ſeveral falſe ſteps, to ſay the leaſt of them, then taken, with reſpect to the continent, or explained at full the various circumſtances relating thereto; I might have ſwelled that ſingle article to half the ſize of the hiſtory before us. It may ſuffice to have cut a ſample off by way of preſent to my readers, and to have kept the remainder of the piece in my own hands.

Enough however is ſet forth to convince the public, how little our hiſtorians know with regard to the affairs of the Palatinate; though in truth they were the ſecret ſprings that gave motion to all the politics of the latter part of James's reign, and the beginning of his ſon's.

It may appear alſo from the courſe of this work, that numberleſs important truths, facts, and anecdotes, may be collected from the archives of foreign courts, from the negotiations of miniſters then concerned with England, and from the hiſtorians of various nations who wrote upon the memoirs of thoſe very miniſters, or had been allowed acceſs to the reſpective *cancellarius* of their own country. A part of what lay within my power I embraced with thankfulneſs,

* This Preface was written in the late King's reign.

and might have lived perhaps to have ſeen *more* done in this way, and *better* done likewiſe; but the perſon who undertook the taſk, and had made conſiderable extracts from papers in foreign courts, thoſe of Ruſdorf particularly, was cut off in the flower of his life *. The reader alſo may eaſily perceive, that every man is neither able to bear the expences of ſuch an undertaking, nor ſucceſsful enough to procure the recommendations neceſſary.

Carte boaſts of executing wonders in this reſpect; we have the rhodomontade, but not the performance. His deſign was to ſacrifice Frederick, and aggrandize the two Engliſh kings. He faggoted together juſt ſo much as made for his purpoſe, and left the reſt in the ſtate he had mangled it.

I have cautiouſly abſtained from attempting to draw high-laboured characters, though perhaps no writer hath reſiſted greater temptations in that reſpect; ſince the very outlines of Guſtavus, Pappenheim, Walſtein, or Oxenſtiern carry with them their own magnificence and individuating originality. Beſides, there was alſo another circumſtance which withheld me. I had reaſons to expect the character of Guſtavus, and that ſingle incident might have ſaved the reputation of my hiſtory, completely drawn by the firſt Hand in the kingdom; but ill health rendered it impoſſible to make good that generous and moſt friendly engagement. Of courſe I ſhall modeſtly decline to touch the Ceſtus which Entellus had thrown down to the public. Characters dawbed at random are only mere glare and falſe painting; they are the *copy* of a fantaſtic writer's thoughts, and *thoſe* are but a *copy*. Nevertheleſs, care has been taken to place the King's actions, *religious, moral, political* and *military*, in ſuch ample and diſtinct lights in the *Index*, that the reader may be enabled with moderate judgment and little difficulty to combine a much better idea concerning him, than I can pretend to give. Every writer cannot do juſtice to the character of an Hero, who was ſo brave, ſo generous, and ſo modeſt.

—— *tenor idem* animo; *moreſque modeſti*
FORTUNA CRESCENTE, *manent.*——

Therefore to proceed onwards in our Preface.

We flatter ourſelves, that our *plans* of battles are more clear and exact than have hitherto appeared: The place not

* M. George Grierſon, who died at Manheim.

only

only of every column and regiment, but of each ſmaller group of forces being expreſsly denoted; the ſquares bearing always a proportion to the number of fighting men therein contained: and as no one can comprehend a battle, particularly thoſe fought by Guſtavus, where the *foot* were intermingled amongſt the *horſe* upon a new principle, without knowing preciſely where the infantry and cavalry were placed, we have thought it proper, and the idea may not be uſeleſs in future plans, to diſtinguiſh a body of the *latter* thus  , and of the former thus . Nor do we owe this idea to Maréchal de Saxe; ſince many of my friends remember to have ſeen this ſort of *notation* in my drawings ſome years before the memoirs of that officer were made public.

As to the diſtances of places, and ſums of money, we have calculated throughout the work by Engliſh meaſurement and computation; and have ſubjoined here and there an hiſtorical note, which contains ſome few ſtriking particulars relating to perſonages of more immediate importance; and this I was induced to do, partly to give the reader a clearer idea of the ſubject in queſtion, and partly becauſe ſome circumſtances did not intermix well with the ſeries of my narration, or happened to fall out before or after the period I have confined myſelf to. Some other notes are interſperſed ſparingly up and down, relating to laws and terms in *jus-publiciſm:* the change of property ſince the peace of Munſter; or other matters not unworthy of obſervation. It is true, the death of Walſtein did not happen till two years after the death of Guſtavus; but as this perſonage was the ſecond character in the drama, I thought myſelf obliged to ſtep a moment out of my way in order to ſhow more of him to the reader; and the rather, becauſe the world had acknowledged itſelf to be quite unacquainted with ſo remarkable an event as his tragical exit, though it happened only about one hundred and thirty years ago *.

* Theſe particular deficiencies in hiſtorical knowledge often happen, till time unfolds ſome printed book or MS. papers which treat expreſsly on the ſubject. Thus Carve's *Itinerary* lays open the death of Walſtein; and Kevenhuller's *Annals* give a minute account of Prince Charles's journey to Spain, with the negotiation in reſpect to his marriage; a point wherein our hiſtorians have wanted information. For Kevenhuller was at that time Imperial ambaſſador at Madrid, and the emperor and king of Spain went then hand in hand in political matters. Kevenhuller's *Annals* make 10 vols. in fol. two of which conſiſt of portraits.

Nor

Nor may it turn to my diſadvantage, that I have examined the ground-plots of the principal ſcenes of action, eſpecially the three great battles of the Lech, Leipſic, and Lützen, with all poſſible attention and diligence. And though theſe aſſiſtances may be reckoned purely of a caſual nature, yet thus much is certain, that no hiſtorian can deſcribe a battle to his own ſatisfaction, except he has examined the ground-plot in perſon, or received his informations from people of veracity and ſkill.

Another circumſtance has been fortunate; ſince few hiſtorians have had the advantages of a *chronological* diary whereby to regulate and adjuſt their narration; and yet except things follow one another in writing by the ſame order as they really took upon the ſtage of human life, it is impoſſible to behold them in their due proportions. But by the aſſiſtance of the journal alluded to, it has been in my power to arrange every action in its right ſituation, which gives the whole a propriety of nature extremely beautiful, *Quodcunque rei proprium eſt, id pulchrum eſt*; a circumſtance moſt hiſtorians may wiſh for earneſtly, but without ſucceſs. Nevertheleſs it becomes not me to boaſt much of an advantage which took its riſe from mere accident, and from whence no reputation can redound to me, except that of being a laborious and diligent ſearcher. Yet thus much is certain, that amidſt ſuch a maſs of combined incidents and events, as the preſent work evidently contains, there will be nothing of that hiſtorical and chronological magic,

*—Quæ modo nos Thebis, modo ponit Athenis*;

By the help of ſuch a *diary* to direct me, all things will ſucceed each other in their due periods, and at proper diſtances. What happened at one time will not be recounted as falling out at another: an embarraſſment, in caſes not ſo fortunately circumſtanced as ours, which every hiſtorian who writes at a century's diſtance muſt *feel* much more than it is *his intereſt* to acknowledge; for he diſcovers in the cool reviſion of the cloſet that his incidents are more connected by proximity of page and paragraph than by the once really exiſting order of nature; and of courſe, at leaſt to eyes of nicer diſcernment, wherever the chronology of facts cannot be aſcertained, there will always be ſome untoward aukwardneſs in the ſituations and connexions; ſomething

*—Quod nequeo monſtrare, & ſentio tantum.*

If *truth* be the grand object of hiſtory, which I think no man will care to deny, though in his choice of hiſtorians he may ſeem careleſs about the matter, then that writer is happieſt who has the good fortune to be ſupplied with the *moſt* and *beſt* materials. A great Man whom I had the honour to be known to, uſed to ſay upon theſe occaſions, "That *induſtry* to collect, and *good ſenſe* to reject, made "an hiſtorian—wit, elegance, and fine writing, as it is "called, came in by the bye;" being *ornamental*, and highly ſo in certain caſes, but not *eſſential*. From whence it ſeems to follow, that hiſtorical compoſitions, *when they are not ſupported by authorities*, may be compared to an human body that has neither muſcles nor bones; the ſkin may be fair and the fleſh well coloured, but the misfortune is, that the poor *idol* can neither walk nor *ſtand*.

As this work is the reſult of carefully peruſing near three hundred volumes, it can no ways be expected, that it agrees preciſely in all circumſtances with any ſingle writer; yet, as it is hoped, more uniformly with the correct, than thoſe that are leſs corrected. I have alſo had abundance of original memoirs as well as uſeful emendations *communicated* to me; and it is plain the intelligences conveyed to England at that period by lord Reay, Hepburn, Aſtley, and others, are more exact and ſcientifical than the German hiſtorians can pretend to give; for few or none of them were men of ſervice, and they knew little of the actions they attempted to deſcribe. In a word, abundance of errors are to be rectified, if a man be commonly maſter of the ſubject he undertakes. For example, when the whole herd of hiſtorians aſſure us, that Guſtavus Horn performed wonders at Lützen, we know by the *military table* publiſhed by us, that he then conducted an army in Alſatia, and had juſt concluded the ſiege of Benfelden. Galas is repreſented as uncommonly active in the above named battle, when, at the very time, he had a ſeparate command on or near the frontiers of Luſatia. He is numbered likewiſe among the ſlain, yet gained the battle of Nordlingen in 1634, and died not till two years before the peace of Munſter. Pappenheim, for the ſake of verifying an old woman's prophecy, is reported by many to have killed Guſtavus hand to hand; whereas the king expired at eleven in the morning, and Pappenheim did not reach the plains of Lützen till near four in the afternoon. Theſe few examples, relative to one ſingle day's ſervice, are ſufficient, in order to ſhew, that if I depart from any man,

it

it is for cogent and juſtifiable reaſons; and yet in ſpite of all precaution, vigilance, and induſtry, ſome errors will for ever obtrude themſelves upon us;

*——Quos aut incuria fudit,*
*Aut humana parum cavit natura—.*

Upon the whole, if my work approach not to my own ideas, I am ſenſible it muſt ariſe from wanting every day the kind aſſiſtance and reviſal of my two friends, Maſcou and De Voltaire; the *one* would have opened the quarry for me, and the *other* would have taught me to have placed my materials like an architect.

In a word, every day of the king's life, after he entered Germany, has coſt me more than a treble day in recording its performances; for Guſtavus conquered the empire in thrice leſs time than I compoſed the hiſtory of his conqueſts. So difficult it is with a king of Sweden in the laſt age, or a king of Pruſſia in the preſent century, to make the pen keep pace with the ſword.

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# PREFACE

## TO THE SECOND EDITION.

I HAVE at length beſtowed upon the Life of GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS all the retouches it was in my power to give it, after it had lain by me five years; and I the rather examined it with ſome attention, becauſe upon a cool reviſion of words, phraſes, and military expreſſions, ſome part of the ſtyle did not ſatisfy my own judgment; and becauſe likewiſe it was the opinion of my beſt friends, that the preſent work is the only thing I ever wrote which deſerves, in any degree, the conſideration of the public.

Whoever takes the pains to peruſe this hiſtory, will, I flatter myſelf, ſoon diſcover, that the author had many more materials at his command than could in all probability have been procured, if he had remained at *home*; for during the courſe of his travels aſſiſtances were given him by moſt foreigners who had turned their thoughts towards the ſame hiſtorical ſubject; acceſs was allowed him to *public* papers; all *proper* books were put into his hands; and laſtly, he had a Maſcou and a Firmian to recur to, whenever he found any thing that was perplexed, contradictory, or of dubious authority.

A Life

A *Life* of GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, ſuppoſing it to be written with common accuracy and fidelity, was certainly a *deſideratum* in the learned world; and if ſomebody had not had courage to break the ice, too much time might have elapſed, and hiſtorical certainty would have diminiſhed year by year. Beſides, till ſomething of this kind was done, there was a *chaſm* in modern hiſtory; and what was more unfortunate, it was a chaſm in one of the moſt *intereſting*, *uſeful*, and *important* parts of it. The military and political actions of Guſtavus laid the foundation for the *peace* of *Munſter*; and a right underſtanding of that general pacification, and its final ſettlement, may be called the key that opens the door and leads us to the knowledge of the preſent relative ſituation of almoſt every nation in Europe.

As far as verbal criticiſm extends, I am conſcious that in my firſt edition I admitted too many words of foreign growth, and others that were rather too elevated for plain proſe; the uſe of which, to confeſs the truth, ſavoured a little of affectation. My friends likewiſe, to whoſe corrections I referred myſelf in this particular, amongſt others, attended to *matter* rather than *words*; whereas in the preſent age, an author that aims at popularity ſhould attend to the *perpetuo tenore fluere*, and leave the matter and authorities to ſhift for themſelves. However, I have taken care to draw my pen over all theſe exceptionable words and phraſes.

The truth is, the firſt edition of this work was chiefly written in foreign countries; and my long and cloſe acquaintance with books relating to the hiſtory of Guſtavus, made many phraſes and terms of war ſound common to my ears, that may ſeem barbarous or affected to other men's ears. However, I thought it right in ſome reſpects to *keep the language of the Time*.—One may alſo venture to affirm, that if any man lives five or ſix continued years out of his native country, he will find himſelf at ſome loſs to expreſs his thoughts with grace and due eaſe even in his mother-tongue.——Nay, to give a more common and familiar inſtance, I dare appeal to our beſt authors now living, whether, if they were to diſcontinue writing for five or ſix years, even though they ſtaid at home and talked their native language every day, they would not feel a certain uncouthneſs and awkwardneſs when they took up the pen, and engaged in a new work; for *one* beauty, at leaſt, out of the *many* beauties

beauties that are to be found in a good writer, depends upon *conſtant practice*. A great poet ſays,

*That thoſe move eaſieſt who have learn'd to dance*;

and he might have continued to add with equal propriety, that thoſe move eaſieſt who never *diſcontinue* their dancing.

Upon the whole, I think it may ſafely be aſſerted, that the *verbal Critics*, in my firſt edition, carried me off here and there a *ſtraggling ſoldier*, and now and then a *ſentry* from an *advanced poſt*, which decides no great matter in war, yet they never had courage to attack *my lines*. It was my good fortune, or prudence, to keep the main body of my army, or, in other words, my matters of fact, ſafe and entire. The late E of G. was pleaſed to declare himſelf of this opinion; eſpecially when he found that I had made Chemnitius one of my principal guides; for his Lordſhip was apprehenſive I might not have ſeen that valuable and authentic book, which is extremely ſcarce. I thought myſelf happy to have contented his Lordſhip, even in the loweſt degree; for he underſtood the Swediſh and German hiſtories to the higheſt perfection.

It is alſo incumbent on me here to return my acknowledgments to her Royal Highneſs the *Princeſs Dowager of Wales*, who had the condeſcenſion to ſupply me with Cyprianus's Life of Duke Bernard of Saxon Weymar, which I had long ſought for, but without ſucceſs.

I have likewiſe many thanks to pay to that moſt excellent hiſtorian, the preſent earl of Hardwicke, who had the goodneſs to communicate to me, by the hands of my ingenious friend the late Reverend Dr. Birch, ſome of the moſt valuable materials in this hiſtory; namely, *all the extracts that relate to Roe's and Vane's negotiations.*

In the next place I ſhall only obſerve, that in this Edition I have ſuppreſſed the *Appendix*, but referred conſtantly to the *Authorities* in my *notes*; care being taken to name the title of every piece referred to; by which means, as well as by altering the ſize of my book, I have reduced the preſent work to near *one third* of its original price.

Appendixes in the *firſt edition* of a work are the author's juſtifications; and in that ſenſe, and at that time, may be conſidered as indiſpenſably neceſſary; but after they have been publiſhed in one edition, it appears to me ſufficient, at

leaſt according to my own private judgment, to refer thoſe few readers who are *very* curious to the above-named firſt edition. For theſe reaſons, having made an extract of what was thought neceſſary, I have omitted printing a curious MS. that I concluded to have been loſt at ſea, when the firſt impreſſion of this work was made public; but which afterwards came ſafe to my hands. It is entitled, REGIMINIS SUECICI CONSTITUTIO.——QUAM REX INVICTISSIMUS GUSTAVUS SECUNDUS ET MAGNUS REGNO POPULISQUE SUIS STATIONE HAC MORTALI FUNCTUS EXHIBENDAM VOLUIT. This MS. which is moſt beautifully written, contains ſixty pages in 4°. and is depoſited by me in the library of the church of Windſor, where thoſe that are curious may have recourſe to it.

Laſtly, in order to render this *Octavo Edition* more uniform, I have added a New Head of Guſtavus in octavo, from a painting of Vandyke; and have cauſed the plans of the Battles to be engraved *in the ſame ſize.* With regard to Maps, I refer my readers to *Homan*'s map of Guſtavus's Campaigns, and The Seat of Action in the Thirty Years War, inaſmuch as it was taken from actual ſurveys, and is far ſuperior to any thing I can pretend to in the *chorographical* way.

# A List of the Books made use of in composing The Life of GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

*A Delzreiteri* Annales Bavarici, fol. Lipſ. 1710.
Ambaſſadeur de *Wiquefort*, 4to. 2 tom. 1681.
*Angeli* Hiſtoire de la Ville de Magdeburg, 12mo. 1714.
*Arlanibæi* Arma Suecica, 4to. 1631.
*Arndii* Vita Walſtenii, 8vo. Roſtochi. 1668. [This is a tranſlation from Gualdo.]
Arcana Dominationis Hiſpanicæ, 12mo. ſine anno.
Azioni Egregie da Generali e da Soldati Italiani dall' anno 1600, ſino al 1700. 4to. in Venet. 1742.
*Barre*; Algemeine Geſchichte von Deutſchland, 4to. 7 tom. 1752.
*Bayle*'s Diſcourſe of Guſtavus Adolphus.
*Bernard*; Hiſtoire de Louis XIII. fol. à Par. 1646.
*Bertii* Comment. Rerum Germanarum, 4to. Amſt. 1632.
*Blanc* (Le) Hiſtoire de Baviere, 12mo. 4 tom. à Par. 1680.
*Bougéant*; Hiſtoire des Guerres & Negotiations qui precédérent le Traité de Weſtphalie, 6 tom. 12mo. & 3 in 4to.
*Brachelii* Hiſtoria noſtr. Temp. 8vo. 6 tom. Col. Agrip. 1672.
*Braunius* de Tormentis Coriaceis G. Adolphi, 4to.
*Brief but Authentic Relation of the Siege of Magdeburg, in High Dutch*, 4to. 1633.
*Burgi* Mars Sueco-Germ. 12mo. Leod. 1633.
*Caraffæ* Comment. de Germania Sacra Reſtaurata, 12mo. Col. 1639.
*Carlton* (Sir Dudley's) Letters, 4to. London.
*Carve* (Thom. Tripperarienſis) Itinerarium, 12mo. 2 tom. Mogunt. 1639, 1641.
Character of Guſtavus Adolphus, 4to. Lond. 1633.

*Chemnitii*

*Chemnitii* Bellum Sueco-German. 2 tom. fol. 1 Alt Stetin. 1648. 2 Stock. 1653.

*Chriſtiani* Spicilegium, 8vo. 2 tom. 1724.

Conſideratio Cauſarum Belli Bohemici, 4to. in Libertate, 1647.

Cords Diplomatique par *Dumont*. fol. 12 tom. 1725.

—— Hiſtoire des Traitéz de Paix, & autres Negotiations du XVII. Siècle, qui peut ſervir d'Introduction au Corps Diplom. fol. 2 tom. 1725.

*Cypriani* Vita Bernardi Ducis Vinarenſis, fol.

*Dankaertz*, *Hiſtorical but authentic Relation of the thirty years Wars, in Low Dutch.* With abundance of portraits, ſieges, battles, plans, &c. by Mat. Merian, 3 vol. fol.

Diet of Leipſic, 4to. Lond. 1633.

Diſcours de l'Etat, & la Couronne de la Suede, 8vo. 1633.

*Diſcours ſur les Moyens qui tiennent les Eſpagnols pour parvenir à la Monarchie de l' Europe & que l'on peut faire pour les empêcher, circa annum* 1631. *MS. penes Autorem.*

Ephemeris Expedit. in Bohemiam, 4to. cum fig. Monach. 1621.

Epitome Rerum Germanicarum, 12mo. Lipſiæ, 1750. [By Pappus, a canon of Conſtance.]

*Eremitæ* Epiſtolæ & Iter Germanicum, 4to. 1637.

*Folard.*

*Fowler* (ſecretary) his Hiſtory of the Troubles of Suethland and Poland, fol. Lond. 1656.

*Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato* Hiſtoria, 4to. In Venet. 1643.

—— Hiſtoria della Vita d'Alberto Walſtein. Lione, 1643, 4to.

—— Vita di Mazarini, 4to.

Genealogy of Guſtavus Adolphus, MS. Sion College Library.

*Gaudentio* (Paganino) Singolarità delle Guerre di Germania, 4to. 1640.

*Helvici Hiſtoria*, fol. Francof. 1666.

*Heydmanni* Leo Arctoüs, 4to. Lipſ. 1703.

Hiſtoria Perſecutionis Boemicæ, 12mo. ſine loco et anno.

Hiſtory of the Diet of Leipſic, 4to. Lond. 1632.

Hiſtoire Generale des Guerres & de Mouvemens dans le Monde depuis l'an 1610, à l'an 1637, 8vo. 3 tom.
Hiſtoire de Pologne & Lithuanie, 12mo. 1698.
——— Politique du Siècle, 4to. à Londr. 1757.
*Hübner*; Sa Geographie, Baſle, 8vo. 6 tom.
——— Ses Genealogies in German. fol. 2 tom. 1727.
*Imhoff*; Notitia Principum, &c. fol. Tubing. 1699.
Invaſions of Germany, with Portraits, 12mo. Lond. 1638.
*Kevenhuller*'s Annales Ferdinandei. In German. 10 vol. fol. with fine cuts. Leipſ. 1726.
*Kobierziſki* Hiſtoria Vladiſlai, 4to. Dantz. 1655.
*Laboreur*; (Jean de) Hiſtoire du Maréchal Guebriant, fol. à Par. 1648.
*Lanſpergii* Guſtavi Magni Bellum German. 12mo. 1650.
Laurea Auſtriaca per N. Bellum. fol. Francof. 1638.
——— Continuatio, fol. Ibid.
Letter to the German Church in Lond. 1634.
Lettre du Comte de Tilli à un ſien ami, 1631.
Life of Prince Henry of Orange, in Low Dutch, fol. with fine prints, Dankaertz.
*Loccenii* Hiſtoria Suecana, 4to. Lipſ. 1676.
*Londorpii* Acta Publica, fol. 19 tom. Franc. 1668, 1721.
*Lotichius* de Rebus Germanicis ab anno 1617, ad annum 1648, 2 tom. fol. cum fig. 1646, 1650.
*Ludolfs* Schau Bühne der Welt, 4 vols. fol. Francf. 1699, 1701, 1713, & 1718. cum fig.
Memoirs of the Houſe of Brandenburg, 12mo.
——— of the Dukes of Hamilton by Burnet, fol.
——— of a Cavalier, 8vo. Printed at Leeds, in Yorkſhire, about the year 1740.
Memoires d'Electrice Palatine Louiſe Juliane, par Fr. Spanheim, 4to. à Leyde, 1645.
——— De *Sirot*, 12mo. 2 tom.
——— du *Maurier*, 12mo.
——— du Maréchal le duc de *Grammont*, 2 tom. 12mo. 1717.
——— Hiſt & Polit. d' *Amelot la Houſſaye*, 12mo. 2 tom. Amſt. 1722.
——— De *Beauveu*, 12mo. Col. [*à la Haye*] 1687.

Memoriale

Memoriale al Duca di Savoya nel 1636, MS. penes Autorem.

*Menke* de dubio Guſtavi Adolphi Mortis Genere, 8vo.

*Merian* (Mat.) Theatrum Europæ, with fine Portraits, Maps, and Plans. In German, fol.

Mercure François, 21 tom. 8vo. à Par. 1619, &c.

—— Suiſſe, par François Spanheim, 8vo. 1634, ſine loco.

*Monro's* Two Expeditions into Germany. Lond. fol. 1637.

Monumenta Paderbornenſia, fol.

Motifs pour la Guerre d'Allemagne, 12mo. à Col. 1664.

*Nani* Hiſtoria della Republica Veneta, 4to. Part 2. 1663, 1679.

New Star of the North, 4to. Lond. 1633.

*Piaſeccii* Chronica Geſtorum in Europa Singularium, Cracov. fol. 1646.

*Pietro Pomo*; Guerre di Germania; dell' Invaſioni del Re di Suecia, 4to. in Ven. 1640.

*De Prade*, Hiſtoire de Guſtave Adolphe, 12mo. à Par. 1695.

Proceedings in Bavaria, 4to. Lond. 1633.

*Puffendorf* Comment de Rebus Suecicis, fol. Ultraj. 1676.

——— Introduction du Même.

——— Differtat. ſur les Alliances entre la France, & la Suede, 8vo. 1709.

Recueil des Traitez & Confederation & d'Alliances entre la France, & Princes & Etats etrangers de l'an 1621, à l'an 1672, 12mo. ſine loco.

Relation de la Bataille de Leipſic à Halberſt. 1631.

Reveries du Marechal de *Saxe*, 4to.

*Riccio* de Bellis German. 4to. in Venet. 1648.

Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illuſtriſſimi, 4to. in Roma, 1646.

*Ritterſthuſii* Genealogiæ, fol. Tubing. 1661.

*Ruſdorf* Vindiciæ Cauſæ Palatinæ,
——— Cancellaria Bavarica, } fol. 1640.

——— Concilia et Negotia Politica, fol. 1725.

*Santa Cruz de Marzenado*; Reflexions Militaires & Polit. 12mo. 12 tom.

*Sarraſin*, Conſpiration de Walſtein, 12mo. 1635.

*Schannat*, Hiſtoire Abregée de la Maiſon Palatine, 8vo. Francf. 1740.
*Scheſſeri* Memorabilia Suecicæ Gentis, 12mo. Amſt. 1671.
*Serres* (de) Inventaire Generale de l'Hiſtoire de la France, fol. à Par. 1640.
*Siri*; Memoire Recondite dall' anno 1601 ſino all anno 1640, 8 vols. 4to. locis et annis variis.
—— Mercurio, overo Iſtoria de correnti Tempi, 4to. 14 vols. locis et annis variis.
Soldat Suedois par François Spanheim, 8vo. 1633. ſine loco.
—— Part II. [This is written by the Sieur de Grenaille]
Spaniſh Relation of the Battle of Leipſic. Liſbon, 1633.
Stella Nova. Uranop. 1610.
Status Regiminis Ferdinandi, Part II. [A ſort of Court Calendar] 12mo. Viennæ, 1637.
Swediſh Diſcipline, 4to. 1632.
Swediſh Intelligencer, 4to. Lond. 1631. &c. 1638. Many parts, but not divided into vols.
Succiæ Reſpublica, 12mo. 1631.
Supplement to *Foreſti*. Italian.
*Terſeri* Chronicon in Vitam Guſtavi Adolphi, ad annum 1631.
*Vaſſor* (le) Hiſtoire du Regne de Louis XIII. 12mo. 10 tom. cum fig. Amſt. 1601, 1711.
*Vernulæi* Bellum Sueco-Germanicum, 4to. Col. 1643.
Vita R. P. Joſephi Capuchini, fol. MS. *penes Autorem*.
*Voltaire* (M. de) Annales de l' Empire.
*Waſſenbergii* Florus Germanicus ab anno 1617 ad 1640. Francof. 12mo. 1640. [To which muſt be added the Count de *Furſtenburg*'s Commentary.]
*Wallin* de Gladio Guſtavi Adolphi. Lipſ. 1749.

AN

# ESSAY

*On the Military State of Europe in the former part of the Seventeenth Century;*

CONTAINING

THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE AGE;

*And relating particularly to the Hiſtory of the Life of*

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

THE ſtate of War and cuſtoms of Life were ſo different in the century I am treating of, from what they are at preſent, that it appears neceſſary for me to give the reader ſome previous intelligence, before I conduct him into an immenſe and perplexed labyrinth of hiſtory; great part of the ſcene whereof lies in a country which knows England much better than England is acquainted with Germany.

Some ſlight Eſſay of this kind may not be improper, inaſmuch as I am deſcribing a war and negotiations as thoroughly intereſting as any that are to be found either in ancient or modern hiſtory; and yet the more conſiderable portion thereof took its riſe from an imperceptible, and, as ſome thought, a very contemptible beginning; from an obſcure potentate in the North; a prince unheard of, or unnoticed in the European ſyſtem; *a king of ſnow*, as the language then ran at the court of Vienna, *whoſe diſſolution was pronounced unavoidable long before the expiration of the ſummer heats* *.

* He landed in the month of June.

Yet this ſeemingly unexiſting monarch, at the head of thirteen thouſand virtuous and well-diſciplined men, created and modelled to the very form they afterwards appeared in, ventured not only to croſs the ocean, but to invade an immenſe hoſtile country, and oppoſe himſelf to a vaſt quantity of the beſt troops then in the world; a ſet of warriors whom an habit of twelve years uninterrupted victory had rendered fierce and terrible; ſharpened by hardſhips, long-practiſed in all the arts of military diſcipline, and rendered cruel and inſolent by accuſtomed exactions, depopulations and military executions; conducted by a general whoſe fires the froſt of age could not extinguiſh, tho' grown grey in experience and the arts of ſtratagem; one who in a word had ſhaded his aged temples with the laurels of thirty-ſix remarkable victories, and who had in his army a ſet of illuſtrious commanders, whoſe very names infuſed reſpect and caution even into Guſtavus himſelf. Yet prudence, patience, order, moderation, humanity, benignity, morality, and religion, all ſupported by the cleareſt courage that can be imagined, ſoon penetrated and overturned this mighty maſs of men and things; and though the emperor, at firſt, could have marched againſt Guſtavus four or five conſiderable armies, for he and the Catholic Leaguers had then no leſs than *nine*, including the troops before Mantua, not to mention more than one hundred garriſons placed in various cities and fortreſſes, yet our monarch, in the ſpace of twenty-nine months, poſſeſſed all that immenſe tract, which extends from the borders of Hungary and Sileſia to the banks of the Rhine, and from the lake of Conſtance to the Baltic ocean.

The *diſcipline* between the reſpective contending forces was widely different, for the Imperialiſts had been corrupted by long proſperity. In a word, making the ſingle exception of courage, *they* were juſt the reverſe of the Swedes. One uniform undiſturbed ſucceſſion of conqueſts had rendered them audacious, avaricious, and cruel; and, which was ſtill worſe, juſt before Guſtavus's arrival, no inconſiderable part of the veteran infantry had been diſbanded for reaſons of ſtate, and that was a loſs which future induſtry could never, poſſibly, recover. Thoſe who remained, affected terror in their looks, and cruelty in their actions; and though they had ſeen and performed great things, yet were obliged to ſubmit to younger and leſs experienced men, merely becauſe they were more moral, more virtuous, and better diſciplined; for the camp of Guſtavus was a ſchool of order, decency, and religion. The little fort of

a court that was kept in it, knew nothing of ſervility, flattery, intrigues, or low meanneſſes. The king lived well with all his ſoldiers, and knew them all. No cavalier came into his ſervice, but he demanded of his officers a full and exact account of their opinions concerning him, and did the ſame again and again after they had tried him.

When he invaded Germany, he had his eyes fixed on all the ſoldiers in Europe who were then retired from ſervice, and, amongſt others, wrote to the Baron de Sirot with his own hand. He was temperate in food, and rather abſtemious than otherwiſe in reſpect to wine, often declaring, with a ſmile on his countenance, *That he came not to conquer the Germans by hard drinking.*

*Luxury* was a ſtranger in his camp, and ſo was *gaming*. The nobility and the rich made no expences but for the honour of the ſervice, and the younger officers, in point of dreſs, never went beyond neatneſs and propriety. The common men had a full confidence either of overcoming the enemy by dint of valour and diſcipline in the field of battle, or wearying them out and reducing their numbers by virtue of judicious encampments and marches, and by being able to ſupport themſelves with greater moderation and frugality; for they could continue three months in thoſe very quarters where the Imperialiſts could but barely ſubſiſt themſelves one third part of the time. Their hardneſs of conſtitution was ſuch, that they could extend the duration of a campaign almoſt equal to that of the year, being alike patient of ſummer-heat and winter-cold. Their camp was their home, their inn, their farm, their city, and their country. In the courſe of the thirty years war, numbers came to bear arms, who had been born and educated in the field, and had ſeen no other profeſſion than that of the ſword and muſquet. One would think an army no very excellent ſchool either for learning to read, or apprehending one's duty to God; yet Guſtavus, and the Swediſh generals after his deceaſe, paid particular attention to theſe points. Public ſchools were opened every day with the ſame regularity and quiet as in a country town; and the moment the forces began to intrench themſelves, the children went to a ſafe and peaceable quarter, marked out for their ſchool. One day, contrary to the expectation of the general, who allotted them their ground, a cannon-ball happened to pierce through the ſchool, and killed two or three young people at a ſingle ſtroke; but the reſt, far from quitting their places, neither changed colour nor dropped a pen or

a book from their hands*. Thus they became habitually intrepid from the cradle, and had an education far ſuperior to that of the Lacedemonian youth.

In the *exerciſe of the field*, neither ſerjeants nor corporals could be more vigilant or leſs ſparing of their labour than Guſtavus. One thing is remarkable, he was ſtrict to his officers and mild to the private men. It was a principle with him, that even a common ſoldier ſhould, rarely, if ever, receive corporal puniſhment; fully perſuaded that ſuch a diſgrace caſt a damp afterwards upon his vivacity, and agreed not well with the notions which an high ſpirit ought to entertain of honour. It was his idea, that a man of bravery would ſooner forgive a ſentence of death, inflicted upon him by a court-martial, than paſs by the ſcandal of corporal chaſtiſement. His general rule therefore was to degrade or baniſh.

In *field-reviews* or *private exerciſes* he choſe always, as much as poſſible, to be preſent. There was ſcarce a private man, of uncommon reſolution, in his whole army, which conſiſted of combined troops from various nations, whom he could not call, readily, by his name. The attention of his eye was ſo exact, though his eye-ſight was none of the beſt, that in a general muſter of a regiment he hardly paſſed by a ſingle individual without notice; and, if the meaneſt of the performers happened to be deficient in their exerciſes, he would diſmount from his horſe various times ſucceſſively, and, without peeviſhneſs or upbraiding, ſet them right in their buſineſs.

Theſe *troops* were never apt to deſert, the world being an immenſe wilderneſs unknown to them; and beſides they could gain a ſubſiſtence in no profeſſion but that of arms. The horſe-boys of the cavalry, who were uſually ſome years in their apprenticeſhip, and ſerved in an inferior manner during the time of action, were generally choſen to replace their maſters. Thus every man roſe by degrees, and perfected himſelf by ſubordination and long experience. Hence it happened that the loſs of the commanding officers in ſome ſharp engagements rarely diſcompoſed a Swediſh regiment, a thing frequent enough in other armies, for half the corps was juſt as capable to take the command as thoſe who had given them laws. There were but two means of advancement, *ſeniority*, which was ſometimes ſuperſeded, and merit. Birth, quality, and court friends availed nothing; ſo that the world can hardly expect to ſee ſuch another

* *Motifs pour la Guerre d'Allemagne*, p. 176. 12°. à Cologne, 1664.

army

army but very ſeldom; an army formed by a monarch equally brave, moral and religious, and nurſed by him for twenty years with all the care that a parent educates a ſingle child. The ſame plan was obſerved, more or leſs, by his generals till the concluſion of the peace of Weſtphalia; and this body of troops from the year 1612 to 1648 had hardly ever taſted a ſingle month's repoſe. The regulations, order, and diſcipline of Julius Cæſar can bear no compariſon with the correct emendations, harmonious adjuſtment, and religious decency of Guſtavus.

Every regiment had *two chaplains*, who received, then, forty pounds a year apiece in our preſent money. They were governed by a conſiſtory of their own order; and, being men judiciouſly choſen, were reſpected by the principal commanders and beloved by the ſoldiery; their authority was ſuch, that they diſcountenanced and ſuppreſſed all profane ſwearing and drunkenneſs; nor was the camp filled with vagrants, thieves, and proſtitutes, as uſually happened in the Imperial ſervice.

Thus by a habit of diſcipline, morality, and piety, adjoining thereto a conſtant experience in matters of war, the Swediſh army, at leaſt in Guſtavus's days, was rendered next to invincible, and became the moſt reſpectable body of troops then in Europe. Not long before Guſtavus's death the Swedes poſſeſſed nearly three hundred ſtrong towns and fortreſſes in the empire; and it was poſſible to dine in one of them and ſleep in another, from the middle of Sileſia to the weſtern banks of the Rhine, and from the lake of Conſtance to the Baltic ocean.

It no where appears that the troops of Guſtavus *wanted pay*, though that prince was extremely moderate and merciful in the affair of contributions; inſomuch that the *conquered*, if we ſet aſide their prejudices to the Romiſh religion, uſually preferred the Swediſh government to their own hereditary conſtitution. Yet the aſtoniſhing point ſtill remains; how, for example, and by what methods, Guſtavus maintained and raiſed his numerous armies? Nor is it in my power to explain fully, and not ſuperficially, from whence this monarch derived his reſources; for moſt readers may conjecture what the riches of Sweden might be under his adminiſtration; nor can they be ignorant that the king had been engaged in an uninterrupted *invaſive war* from the ſeventeenth year of his age to his dying moments; ſo that his ways and means of acquiring money will be ever inexplicable to poſterity more or leſs; as will be likewiſe his economy and punctuality of payments; and ſo much the more

more as it no where appears that his ſoldiers once mutinied for want of pay.

It may be objected, that in the courſe of the war he received great ſupplies from neighbouring princes, and others who laid farther off; but though this may be ſaid, it is not ſo capable of being demonſtrated; the amount of their ſubſcriptions being, to a certain degree, determinable without much difficulty. Nevertheleſs, ſuppoſing that to be as it will, what ſhall we ſay of his conduct the very Chriſtmas after he invaded Germany, having then received, ſo far as we know, only ſixty thouſand pounds from England; whilſt France conſented to allow him a ſtipend of ſeventy-five thouſand three hundred pounds; but as De Charnacé had retarded the ſignature of articles at leaſt a year, it was agreed by parole of honour, which whether verified or otherwiſe, we cannot aſſert, to throw in twenty thouſand pounds by way of ſupplement*.—Yet at the very time in queſtion, he had, beſides a conſiderable marine, in which were five thouſand enrolled and regular ſailors, an excellent army, in Germany only conſiſting of thirty-four thouſand four hundred infantry, and eleven thouſand eight hundred horſe, with commiſſions to levy ten thouſand ſix hundred freſh men†.

In addition to the *economy* of ſupporting an army, it may be remarked further, that his majeſty was alſo an exact and punctual obſerver both of public and private devotions; and ordered a ſet of military prayers to be drawn up and uſed conſtantly at the head of each regiment every day. I have ſeen about two and twenty of them, and many amongſt them are of no inconſiderable length.

His *rules of diſcipline* were admirable both in a moral and military ſenſe: they are a perfect code or ſyſtem. He compoſed this work as early as in the twenty-eighth year of his age, when he made his expedition againſt Riga. Theſe regulations he enlarged and rendered more complete when he invaded Germany, and added to them occaſionally, according as the inſolence and irregularity of his ſoldiers rendered freſh proviſions neceſſary; as particularly happened when he took New Brandenburg by ſtorm; for he then inſerted twenty freſh articles relative to that tumultuous affair.

In the *perfective* parts of war Guſtavus made a greater

* *Chemnitii* Bellum Sueco-Germ. Fol. p. 96. *Swediſh Intelligencer*, Part I. 4°. p. 79.

† *Arma Suecica*, 72—3—4. 4°. 1631.

progreſs

progreſs than any general before or ſince his time. The world had never ſeen a fine field-diſpoſition till the day the battle of Leipſic was fought. His idea was, that every army ſhould be conſidered like a fortified town; ſupplied in ſuch manner with aſſiſtances and reinforcements as to be enabled to act offenſively or defenſively; that there ſhould be ſupports behind ſupports, and paſſages of communication and relief, to be fed regularly with as much exactneſs as the circulation of the blood is diſtributed through the canals of the human body; his grand object being, that, though particular diviſions might be thrown into diſorder, yet that no confuſion ſhould prove *univerſal*. It was he who had the firſt notion of cloathing men well, and keeping them clean and warm; whereas Tilly's doctrine was, *A ragged ſoldier and a bright muſket*, following a falſe maxim of the ancients, *Horridum militem eſſe decet*. In military architecture and the duties of an engineer he exceeded all his cotemporaries, and deſpiſed the Low-Country method of drawing up great incoherent bodies of troops in ſquare maſſes, commonly called *Tertius*; foraſmuch as originally they made up a third of the main body or center*. He reduced the huge regiments, which conſiſted formerly of two or three thouſand men, to twelve hundred, and afterwards to one thouſand and eight, in order to diſtribute more officers among the ſoldiery, and multiply the poſts of preferment for brave men. He allotted alſo four ſurgeons to every regiment; but there is reaſon to think that the Imperialiſts had none; ſince Tilly himſelf, after the battle of Leipſic, was obliged to have his wounds dreſſed by the town-ſurgeon of Halle†.

* I apprehend the more correct uſe of the word to be *Terzi*. *Terzo*, in the *Vocab. della Cruſca*, is explained *una ſquadra di ſoldati, compoſta d'un certo determinato numero*. But, to the ſingle authority there adduced, I beg leave to ſubjoin, for your conſideration, the following, from Card. *Bentivoglio*, a writer of military hiſtory you muſt, for propriety of ſtyle at leaſt, approve.

" *Queſta cra la Fanteria; alla qual mancava un Terzo di 2000 fanti* " *Italiani*. (Relaz. della moſſa d'Armi per le coſe di Cleves e di Juliers, Ediz. di Liege, 1635, page 174.)

" *Si riduſſe l'Eſercito dunque a dodici mila fanti incirca, e 1600 cavalli,* " *Tre ſono* i Terzi degli *Spagnuoli*; due degli *Italiani*, uno di *Borgognoni*; " uno *d'Irlandeſi*; e tre di *Valloni*; *e* 18 ſono le compagnie di Cavalli, " diſtinte in lance, corazze, ed Archibugieri." (*Id. ibid.* page 168.) This latter paſſage ſeems to prove, beyond doubt, that the *Terzo* is not intended to denote a *third* part of a larger body.

Dr. G. Aldrich's private communication.

† I have been informed the Auſtrians had no regular ſurgeons in their regiments till about the year 1718.

In

In the *creative* or *inventive* branches of war, we muſt attribute to Guſtavus the diſcovery of the *brigade* or *column*, the doctrine of firing in *platoons*, and the uſe of *leathern portable artillery*; ſince diſcontinued, for reaſons to us unknown. To him we owe likewiſe a new *partizan*, long loſt in oblivion, but thought by many to be more uſeful and leſs cumberſome than the bayonet, the *ſea-boom*, the inſtitution of *dragoons*, and the uſe of *pouches* in the place of *bandileers*. The infinite variety of *evolutions* took its riſe from him; and to him we owe the demonſtration that a *ſhort cannon* will give the ball a larger range. It was he that firſt divided his men into little diſtinct *pelotons*, now called *platoons*, and gave them officers accordingly. He conſidered ſpace as the parent of order, and always allowed ſufficient groundplot for rectifying confuſions. He was the firſt who *intermingled* infantry in the intervals betwixt the horſe, which broke the formidable impreſſion of the ponderous Auſtrian cuiraſſiers, a ſet of men then deemed irreſiſtible; and, as brave regiments were often cut to pieces, almoſt to a man, and as *choſen* men were thought neceſſary for carrying on more particular deſigns, he deviſed the expedient of draughting ſoldiers from ſeparate corps, who were then called *commanded men*, which firſt gave riſe to the formation of brigades and battalions. It was his original idea, probably, that a body of infantry could reſiſt an equal number of cavalry upon moſt emergencies: and it was he firſt thinned the immoderate depth of ranks, and conſequently brought more hands to engage in the hour of battle.—Yet one thing is very extraordinary: though each of his generals was, properly ſpeaking, a favourite pupil, educated by him; and though his enemies were conſtant eye-witneſſes to every branch of his military conduct; yet the art of war *declined* from his death, till the time that Montecuculi and Turenne revived it *in part*, conformably to the principles of the great inventor.—Nor muſt we neglect the extraordinary advantages he extracted from *winter-campaigns*; which may be conſidered, partly, as a new military practice; and it was from the ſame principle, that he gave little or no countenance to councils of war; for it was his reſerved, private ambition, that every operation ſhould paſs upon the ſoldiery for his own invention.

Amidſt the *perfective* branches of his warlike profeſſion, may be mentioned his excellent methods of cloathing and ſubſiſting armies, and the punctuality of his payments; his exact diſcipline, ſobriety, induſtry, and perpetual reviewing his troops; the great improvement of his marine forces, and

and the manufacture of arms which he erected in Sweden; to which may be added, his new and uncommon ſkill in all ſorts of military architecture, as likewiſe in conſtructing bridges, erecting batteries, and in all the arts of entrenchments, ſieges, mining, encampments, debarkations, and battles. It was he who firſt improved the field-ſervice of the horſe, and tranſported infantry behind the cavalry. It was he who firſt reduced war to a ſyſtem of tactics and religion; and, laſtly, it was he who regulated the fire of the cavalry, and ſhortened their muſquets into carbines. It was he who changed the incumbrance of armour into head and breaſt-pieces, reformed the matchlock, and aboliſhed the long pike and pike reſts.

I may digreſs a moment, to obſerve, that, as to the king's peculiar notions and practices in politics, his great abilities in treaties, manifeſtoes, ſpeeches, and letters, his perſonal bravery, preſence of mind and firmneſs, his juſt ſpirit of reſentment and ſenſe of honour, his generoſity and bounty, politeneſs and courteſy, his humanity, moderation, compaſſion, and, above all, his religion and piety; if, I ſay, we were to give the reader a true delineation of him, in all theſe illuſtrious particulars, we could do little leſs than tranſcribe the numberleſs paſſages which he will peruſe more at large in every part of the enſuing work. One thing however is inconteſtable, and muſt never be forgotten; there is a certain *extemporaneous ſpirit and pointedneſs* in his ſpeeches and replies, which always carries its own authenticity therewith, and can never belong to another man. Wit he had none, or affected to neglect it: nevertheleſs, he had all the livelineſs of a refined and forcible imagination, tempered by juſtneſs and ſolidity.

The *ſtate of war* in thoſe days differed in many reſpects from what it is at preſent. Moſt conflicts of conſequence were decided by the ſword, an implement in the preſent age almoſt entirely uſeleſs. The ſcience of fortification was then in its infancy. Towns were beſieged and defended with fewer cannons than are made uſe of now; being in general protected only from the inſults of plunderers. The art of a campaign therefore conſiſted in giving deciſive battles and poſſeſſing the *paſſes and navigable rivers*; by which means the fortified towns ſubmitted of courſe; nevertheleſs, all parties confided much in their artillery. Tilly and Guſtavus battered ſome places with incredible fury, and made uſe of pieces of a very conſiderable ſize. The former erected many large batteries at the battle of Leipſic, and Walſtein was not ill provided at that of Lützen.

The

The generals *marched* their troops with greater ſpirit and expedition than has been cuſtomary ſince. The common march of the infantry was ſixteen and eighteen miles a day. In a journal of each day's marching, which a Scottiſh regiment made for ſix years ſucceſſively, I find *that* quantity to eſtabliſh the medium; and, to calculate more favourably, allow the German mile to be only four Engliſh miles and an half. In caſes of emergency and importance, it was uſual to ſtretch the journey to twenty-two miles; thus by the above-mentioned diary one corps of troops, which reſted three months after Guſtavus's death, marched in four years three thouſand five hundred and fifteen miles; and, by the way, it muſt be obſerved, that the fire-arms at that time were much heavier than they are at preſent. Amongſt ſome particulars, in the age we are ſpeaking of, it may here be noted, that the loſs of the colours in a reſpective regiment or company, abſolved the military oath to the laſt maſter. Generals ſent romantic challenges for themſelves and armies by a trumpeter, with invitation to meet each other on equal ground; and war was denounced by an herald, conformably to the ancient laws of chivalry. Eccleſiaſtics cloathed themſelves in ſteel without ceremony; excommunicated by the Pope when againſt him, and laden with benedictions when they ſerved on his ſide. No European general, from the time Charles V. beſieged Metz till Walſtein lay encamped near Nuremberg, had ſeen himſelf at the head of fifty thouſand fighting men. Armies were then of a more manageable ſize, and ſubdivided into ſeparate ones, which of courſe gave riſe to a plentiful harveſt of generals, and afforded men, from the higheſt to the loweſt, an opportunity of ſeeing as much ſervice in one campaign, as they now behold in all their lives. The operations in theſe little tranſactions are more in detail, yet comprehended at the ſame time with greater facility.

It was a ſaying of Guſtavus, that he never deſired to place himſelf at the head of more than *forty thouſand men*; paying no regard to a military maxim equally profane and fooliſh, namely, *that the Supreme Being always favours the greater ſquadrons**; that a larger number of troops was only matter of parade and incumbrance, inaſmuch as no general could compel him, in the aforementioned circumſtances, to accept a battle except he choſe it, whilſt in the interim he could diſpoſe of ſuperfluous forces to better advantage elſewhere. Concurrently with what is here aſſerted, it was the opinion both of duke d'Alva and Turenne, that no

* A conſtant ſaying of Walſtein.

army

army ought to conſiſt of more than fifty thouſand men; and the former uſed always to ſay, that veteran troops were the bones and muſcles of the military body, and that new-raiſed recruits only filled up the interſtices with ſhape and plumpneſs.

On the contrary it was the cuſtom, in the laſt war which England was engaged in, and we may thank our neighbours the French for preſcribing the faſhion, who know their men to be leſs robuſt than ours, and perceive likewiſe, other circumſtances being ſuppoſed equal, that the ſuperior weight and preſſure of troops will decide the day by ſqueezing the ranks into diſorder, to bring two immenſe armies into the field, who gaze at each other for a whole ſummer; of which the event is, if each general be endued with parts, that it is next to impoſſible to bring on a deciſive engagement, without incurring extreme hazard; and, what is ſtill more, matters will be brought to a concluſion, not by the men, but by the bare machinery of the artillery. Thus only one general is formed in a country, and if he dies the loſs is irreparable.

It may be objected, that if our opponents have an inclination to act this part, the party aſſailed muſt then be obliged to face them with an equal body of troops; but this, with ſubmiſſion, is a miſtake of the ſtate of the queſtion. Great commanders are tied up to *no ſuch* rules, and his Pruſſian majeſty, not diſſatisfied to imitate Guſtavus in moſt things, has ſubdivided his armies in the ſame manner as *that* prince would do were he now living. If one general portions out his troops with proper precaution, the other will be compelled to follow the example. Walſtein, who firſt invented this method of waging war, played the artifice upon Guſtavus; for he wanted, like our dextrous nighbours, to protract the time, and plunge his enemies into enormous expences, which is true policy with reſpect to oppoſing any army that carries on a war out of its own country; but Guſtavus deſpiſed the futility of this ſtratagem, and though he had only eighteen thouſand men, wherewith to confront above fifty thouſand, he allowed three ſeparate bodies of his own troops to range freely throughout the empire, and intrenched himſelf under the beard of the Imperial general, who in the event was obliged to decamp, and take ſuch cards as the Swediſh monarch was pleaſed to deal him.

Nevertheleſs, ſuch readers as examine the hiſtory of Guſtavus with attention and correct obſervation, will ſoon perceive, that whenever any overgrown and enormous potentate

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on the continent aims at nothing less than absolute dominion over the whole European system, that it then becomes indispensably necessary, even for remote princes, separated from the affair in question by the intervention of the ocean, to support the balance of power in the greater world; for the evils and incroachments of universal monarchy resemble the undulations caused by a large stone thrown into a cistern of water, whose surface is of a certain diameter,—they will touch the extreme rim at last. Had Gustavus allowed the Imperialists to make themselves masters of Pomerania, Mecklenburg, and such sides of the Baltic as lie opposite to Sweden, it is certain that Walstein would soon have rendered himself supreme arbiter of the northern ocean; so that if Sweden had not acted the *offensive* part in 1630, she might have felt a raging war kindled in her own vitals long before the year 1640.

For these reasons we are at a loss which to admire most, the bravery or the prudence of Gustavus in forcing the war to rekindle itself upon the continent with a fresh degree of fury. His senators, almost to a man, approved after some little reflection this glorious effort, and the common people embarked in the expedition with as much zeal and promptness as if it had been another crusade. But, as this subject may appear to many as a sort of disquisition *ad invidiam*, it may suffice for me to have transiently touched upon it, inasmuch as it gives a high finishing to the king's character, and leave the rest to work its way on the reader's better judgment

Yet one thing shall not be passed over unnoticed; nor had the knowledge thereof been useless to our *jus-publicists*, when the French exclaimed so outrageously against our commencing hostilities in Europe without some declaration of war in form. Gustavus, in a parrallel case, after long and sedate reflection, determined to enter Germany without sending any denunciation of war to the Court of Vienna *; for he considered the Imperial actions as a very forcible sort of language; nor hath posterity ever decried the propriety or justice of his majesty's conduct.

I am obliged to a clear-sighted and excellent author † for some other reasons, not taken notice of by historians, which induced Gustavus to enter Germany. "It must "be remembered," says he, "that as the English and Ve- "netians in ancient times laid claims immemorial to cer-

* *Loccenii* Hist. Suec. 4to. 567. Lipsiæ 1676.

† *Pagamna Guadentio* Singolarità delle Guerre di Germ. 4to. 1640. p. 174.

"tain

" tain portions of ocean, ſo likewiſe the Swediſh nation " formed uncontroverted pretenſions to a large part of the " Baltic ſea;" and when the irreſiſtible progreſs of the Imperial forces, ſupported at all times by a Spaniſh navy more conſiderable in thoſe days than ours, had poſſeſſed the whole tract of ſhore from Dantzic to Lubec; when mariners were enrolled, ſhips built, and Walſtein himſelf had requeſted to be declared high admiral of the north:—ſurely it was due time and ſeaſon for a ſpirited and magnanimous prince like Guſtavus, removing, for the preſent, all other ſeparate conſiderations and inducements, to reſtrain the audacious incroachments of the houſe of Auſtria, and vindicate the then expiring rights and commerce of his faithful ſubjects.

But to return from a ſlight digreſſion, not unpardonable in an Engliſhman. The reader will be ſurpriſed when I tell him that the *pay* of thoſe days was more conſiderable than one may be apt to imagine. Nor muſt we diſſemble, that here and there the commanders, on the Swediſh ſide, to the great regret of their royal maſter, contrived to levy ſome ſeparate contributions for their own uſes, and now and then filtered away a little from what had been collected, by them, under the ſanction of public authority. Theſe examples were rare, and reſented with ſeverity whenever diſcovered.

Whilſt the king's officers lived decently and comfortably, the Imperial commanders led lives of magnificence. Thoſe of prime diſtinction, eſpecially before Guſtavus arrived, affected the expence and grandeur of princes, and had very often a company of cuiraſſiers or infantry, by way of guards, of which ſome ſupplied the place of aids de camp; many colonels kept their coaches in the camp, eat on plate, had an ambition to poſſeſs abundance of ſervants and horſes, and commonly maintained a ſecretary, partly for *ſtate* and partly for *uſe*. As to contributions, they raiſed them unmercifully and immeaſurably.

In the *Swediſh* camp, it is true, matters were conducted with greater frugality; yet I have ſeen an account of a funeral proceſſion, performed for a Bohemian colonel in that ſervice, which was expenſive and pompous enough for a crowned head, and that in the very infancy of the war.

A colonel of a Swediſh regiment of infantry, when Guſtavus entered Germany, received about three hundred and eighty pounds per annum; the lieutenant-colonel was paid in the half proportion, and a captain was allowed one hundred and twenty-eight pounds a year. To the officers,

military and civil, were allotted one hundred and forty-two ſervants, who all did duty, but received ſeven-pence a week leſs than the common ſoldiers, whoſe pay amounted to a ſmall matter under ſix-pence a day; and, in caſes of emergency, if the ſervice required, it was Guſtavus's cuſtom to advance them a third of their monthly pay, one payment being made on the eleventh, another on the twenty-firſt, and the reſidue at the end of the month; and what is remarkable, there was an officer, or a ſort of ſuperior at leaſt, allotted to every corps of five or ſix men throughout the infantry.

It is true the *Imperial pay*, at leaſt amongſt the generals and colonels, ran much higher than the Swediſh; but then it was ſubjected to extraordinary defalcations, retardments, and ſtoppages; ſo that upon the whole the leſſer annual ſtipend was moſt convenient and moſt profitable. Here I ſpeak of the Imperial troops at the period when Guſtavus, by his excellent diſcipline, had forced the emperor to take ſome new meaſures, in conſequence of the opinions given by the electoral college at the diet of Ratiſbon; for before that time every general and ſoldier, without having regard to the ſalary of the ſervice, extorted from the poor citizens and peaſants all that could be amaſſed by rapine and cruelty. Upon the footing of the new regulation*, a colonel of cavalry, the regiments being extremely large, was allowed near eight hundred pounds a year, and the lieutenant-colonel two hundred pounds. The pay of the ſame officers, amongſt the infantry, was near one fourth leſs; the ſtipend of a common cuiraſſier was about eleven pence per day, and the moiety of that ſum was allowed to a foot-ſoldier.

Thus the *wages* of the common men, in both ſervices, being pretty near the ſame, Guſtavus, who knew how to ſeize every advantage, contented himſelf with giving his officers leſs ſtipend and eaſier duty, and creating juſt double the number that was to be found amongſt his enemies. Hence it was that he appeared to be better ſerved, and had more frequent opportunities of paying attention to merit. Nor muſt we forget here, that a common foot ſoldier, amongſt the Swedes, beſides ſome allowance for bread, and with no deductions from his pay, ſo far as we can learn, received three ſhillings and three farthings per week, or thereabouts. It was a *cuſtom* in the Imperial ſervice, and not a bad one, that when a young man of rank and family

* Publiſhed at Ratiſbon November 9, 1630. Vid. Arlanibæi Arma Succica, 4to, p. 67.

ſerved

ſerved his apprenticeſhip in the art of war, he was recommended to, or choſen by, ſome officer of great repute to be his *camerado*, or military companion; and in this reſpect he was to his friend and patron a ſort of *aid de camp*. This ſerves to account how a young duke of Lerida was concerned in the death of Walſtein. He accompanied ſome one of the officers whoſe diſciple he was; and probably was not participator of the ſecret.

The generals and colonels, in thoſe days, made no great ceremony of paſſing *from one ſervice to another*, which happened more frequently, as it was difficult to do themſelves juſtice by way of duel. We do not find that kings or princes demanded that theſe officers ſhould be ſent back; nor were they put to death when the fortune of war threw them into the hands of their former maſters, provided nothing could be laid to their charge except declining the ſervice.

*Priſoners* were exchanged but very rarely, there being no eſtabliſhed cartel of conditions; and as the ranſom belonged to the party ſeizing, exchange in this caſe was conſidered as a robbery; which made the emperor pay Verdugo four thouſand pounds in order to get the young prince of Anhalt into his own hands. Men of conſequence were detained *ratione convenientiæ*: this happened particularly to Guſtavus Horn and John de Wert, whom the Imperialiſts and French kept in their power many years, not chuſing to diſcharge them till the peace of Munſter appeared to be in ſome forwardneſs. Officers leſs renowned always paid their ranſom: that of a colonel amounted ſometimes to about one thouſand pounds, and of the higher and lower commanders in proportion.

To repeat the *ſeveral depopulations* of fire and ſword, the plunderings and extortions, the acts of cruelty and inhumanity, the maſſacres and violations, during the period of the thirty years wars, would be an endleſs as well as diſguſting taſk. It may ſuffice to obſerve in general, that the party who dealt moſt in thoſe deeds of ferocity proved likewiſe the moſt unproſperous, and rendered themſelves more odious to thoſe of their own religious profeſſion than their adverſaries could be; whereas it was a maxim with Guſtavus, to which his practice was always conformable, that the truly brave ſoldier had no need to commit any acts of cruelty *in terrorem*. He conſidered war as dreadful enough in its own nature and conſequences; and thought it became the man of ſervice and the Chriſtian to mollify its ſeverities rather than to heighten them. It was

his turn of mind and earneſt deſire to mix as much religion and benignity with the courſe of a campaign, as the circumſtances of the thing could admit of; he made humanity and generoſity, the *two* criterions of bravery; and it was a doctrinal point with him, that ſomething of the *liberal* man muſt complete the character of the *warrior*; for which reaſon he had the laſt-mentioned diſtinction always upon his lips, which he laboured inceſſantly to infuſe into his troops from the higheſt to the loweſt, and ever drew a *line of partition* between puniſhment and barbarity, contributions and extortions, legal reſtrictions and perſecutions; and, in a word, between the ſoldier and the ruffian, the civilized being and the aſſaſſin.

The Swediſh army had two regular *courts martial*; one for each regiment, and one in general for the examination of ſuperior commanders: yet the officers had acquired ſuch an habitude of performing their duty, that in the courſe of twenty-eight years, namely, from the ſiege of Riga till the peace of Munſter, one can hardly diſcover the traces of any trials on account of military miſbehaviour, excepting thoſe of the colonels Horneck and Mitzval, one of whom Guſtavus ſpared, contrary to Oxenſtiern's inclinations; though he thought fit to puniſh the other, notwithſtanding the queen made great interceſſion in his behalf.

In *campaigns* that conſiſted merely or principally of incampments, marches, and countermarches, the Swedes, in the long-run, always ruined the Imperialiſts, being more patient of fatigue, and accuſtomed to greater frugality. Upon theſe principles Guſtavus made the famous encampment againſt Walſtein near Nurenberg; and hence it aroſe that Galas ſaw three or four fine armies moulder away to nothing. From the ſuperiority of the Swedes, Melander, one of the ableſt generals in Europe, would have been undone, in the year 1646, if the elector of Bavaria, contrary to all faith of treaties, had not brought him off, by allowing John de Wert to deſert at the head of four thouſand cavalry.

There were *very few generals* then in an army.—The power and place of a commander in chief, all men comprehend at the firſt ſound: under him ſerved one *lieutenant-general*, being properly ſpeaking his vicegerent, who received orders from him in the day of battle, and in his abſence took the ſupreme command: but this poſt of employment ſeems to have been conſidered as partly ſuperfluous, about the time Guſtavus entered the empire. Next ranked the veltmaréchal, whoſe buſineſs it was to receive the plans of engagement

gagement from the generaliſſimo, and ſelect the ground. And here I muſt make a little remark on my neighbours the French, who, copying ſervilely the German, or rather the German hiſtorians who wrote in Latin, hiſtorians ſuppoſe the Velt-maréchal, in the Thirty Years Wars, and Commander in chief, to be terms convertible; whereas Velt-maréchal *(Campi Magiſter, vel Marechallus)* denoted *then* no other commander than what I have deſcribed. Next came the *general of artillery*, the *ſerjeant-major di battaglia**, the *general of horſe*, the *general of infantry*, the *commiſſary-general*, the *quarter-maſter-general*, and the *muſter-maſter-general*. Now, few points in the preſent hiſtory have given me more vexation than this arrangement; for in ſhort the cuſtoms of the two ſervices were different, ſince it is certain that Pappenheim, after the king of Sweden's landing, acted in the character of *lieutenant-general* to Tilly; and Holk, not to diſoblige the former officer, was appointed *deputy lieutenant-general* under him. Nor do I recollect to find any equivalent in terms for the *watch-maſter-general* †, who occurs ſo frequently on the Imperial ſide; and of courſe the diſpoſition here alluded to muſt be conſidered as Swediſh; ſince, having no other lights, I was obliged to derive my rank of precedency from the preſcribed form of ſitting in one of Guſtavus's grand councils of war.—Next came the eldeſt colonels, with a reſerve of giving place to thoſe of the guards; and in the Imperial eſtabliſhment it muſt be obſerved, that the Croatians had always a general of their own chuſing.

Yet it does not appear that the *rank of honour* took place indiſpenſably in the time of action; for every general, the two firſt excepted, was conſidered partly as a perſon mechanically adapted to the machinery of a battle; one was ſuppoſed to be the beſt cannoneer, another to underſtand beſt the marſhalling of the infantry, a third the drawing up of the cavalry, and ſo in other departments: but the fighting part was ſometimes committed to the beſt hands; and many colonels in the hour of engagement took the command of honour before ſeveral generals; and this may be ſlightly remarked in the battles of Leipſic and

* We are told that this officer had command over all the colonels; was inveſted with the power of raiſing recruits; and helped to diſpoſe and arrange the troops in day of battle. *Hiſtoria del Conte Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato.* Libr. II. p. 59. In Ven. 4to. 1643.

† See an inſtance, Vol. I. p. 393.

Lützen*. Not that ſuch practices were very frequent: nevertheleſs, an experienced colonel in thoſe days was a very powerful and reſpectable perſonage. Nor did the command of a ſeparate army neceſſarily conſtitute a general. Pechman had the ſole management of ſeven thouſand men againſt the Daniſh and Weymarian forces; Holk conducted eight thouſand troops in the firſt irruption he made into Miſnia; Arnheim commanded a body of ten thouſand ſoldiers in the Poliſh war; and yet each at that time, though inveſted with the ſupreme authority, was only a colonel.

Turenne made Guſtavus and Walſtein his models in this reſpect; he could not bear to ſee a general of horſe at the head of a body of infantry, merely becauſe he was the ſenior commander; and ſo *vice verſa*, when an officer of foot was transferred for the ſame reaſons to the conducting a wing of cavalry; and of courſe he baniſhed from his army all diſputes concerning rank and priority of commiſſion. If talents are not thus analyſed, at leaſt now and then, and their point of activity well directed; the ſelf-ſame man may ſucceed in matters of aſtoniſhing difficulty, and miſcarry in others, which demand what may hardly merit to be called mere common capacity: "and thus," ſaid the chevalier de Folard on the occaſion, "an inferior "general, to whom every thing is made a department by "the mere mechaniſm of age and rank, may be compelled "at length to imitate the lawyer, who, perceiving he loſt "every juſt and reaſonable cauſe, undertook for the future "none but what were notoriouſly defective both in title "and equity."

I have not mentioned theſe facts by way of invidious compariſon, but purely to render the knowledge of the hiſtory more intelligible. Some readers may be pleaſed with the remark, as moſt men have vanity enough in reſerve to ſuppoſe themſelves poſſeſſed of merit capable to counterbalance all pretenſions of ſeniority. Nevertheleſs, my own private opinion is, if it can be of any weight, that ſeniority of command, in general, is the moſt ſafe, quiet, and prudent method of conferring honour, being leſs liable to exceptions and inconveniences than any other rule which human wit can deviſe upon the occaſion.

To paſs from a ſubject which may be ſuppoſed, though very unjuſtly, to carry with it ſome tincture of malignity. *Quitting one ſervice for another* was not conſidered then ſo much in the light of an action of baſeneſs as it is at pre-

* See a note on the battle of Altenberg, Vol. II. p. 285.

ſent;

ſent; and the reaſon was, that as officers received frequent injuries, real and imaginary, from their ſuperiors, and had not power to make their cauſe good at their reſpective courts, nor opportunity nor means to appeal to that falſe deciſion of juſtice called a duel, they retired from the ſervice in high diſguſt, the enemy being always ready to receive them with open arms, and ſometimes diſpenſed with themſelves from the ceremony of taking a formal leave. The manners and circumſtances of the age gave a ſanction to this ſort of practice; and few or none were ever called to an account for it, except ſome manifeſt treachery or treaſon could be laid to their charge, as was the caſe of colonel Farenbach, Velt-maréchal Cratz, and ſome others.

To advance to a ſubject equally intereſting; moſt of the great men in thoſe days, for ſome from the very condition and nature of the ſervice we find to be wholly illiterate, were alike equal in the field and in the cabinet. Guſtavus never once gave Oxenſtiern the lead in matters of politics. Nay, it was his private delight in hours of amuſement to engage the politician with an hoſt of arguments, and diſpute the field with him inch by inch. When the ſtateſman, meeting his maſter at Mentz, made him the invidious and venomouſly refined compliment of telling him, that he expected to have paid his court to him on the occaſion at Vienna, ſure, as he thought, in this one circumſtance, to have caught the king in a falſe ſtep, Guſtavus convinced him, in an inſtant, that he had ill-comprehended the point in queſtion, and forced him to acknowledge his miſtake in ſilence and bluſhes. The moſt difficult, delicate, abrupt, and important treaty, during Guſtavus's appearance in Germany, was that which paſſed between him and the elector of Saxony, ſome days before the battle of Leipſic; yet it was concluded in the abſence of the miniſter, and without his knowledge; and though Oxenſtiern got great fame from his conduct at the convention of Hailbrun, 1633, yet he only executed a plan which Guſtavus had ſketched out a few weeks before his death. Not that I would be thought to depreciate the reputation of the great Riks-chancellor*; he did enough after his maſter's deceaſe to merit the character of the firſt prime-miniſter in the world.

* *Riks-Chancellor*, according to the Swediſh way of writing, and *Reichs Chancellor* according to the German, ſignify the *Chancellor of the Kingdom*: who, in the times we are ſpeaking of, was prime miniſter. In the reign of Charles IX. the title was ſuppreſſed, and the buſineſs executed by an *Office*, conſiſting of more or fewer perſons. *Memoir communicated.*

But to return to this age of politics and war. The politician I am ſpeaking of commanded ſeveral armies with great prudence, and gave laws to Poland with a handful of ſoldiers. In the only good picture I ever ſaw of him, he is cloathed in armour from head to foot; and there is ſomething in his eyes which, though the painter has deſcribed, I cannot; and the very print of him from Mierfelt is ſuperior to moſt things I ever obſerved in the engraving way. He had the *ſciolto viſo* to a degree that is inexpreſſible. Richelieu took upon him to be a ſoldier too on certain occaſions; he took Pignerol, and conquered all the province round it. The duke d'Angoulême was general of horſe. The ambaſſadors De Charnacé and De Breze were both colonels of regiments; they attended Guſtavus in the field all day, and conferred with him at night on matters of politics. Torſtenſon was concerned at Stockholm in civil employs, and yet Banier bequeathed his army to him, as the only perſon capable to conduct it. On the other hand, Mansfelt overreached the Ditrichſteins, the Olivares, and the Gondamars, more than once. Walſtein had ſerved in both capacities; and Tilly in effect held the pen at the peace of Lubec. Gabriel Bethlem and Arnheim had more reſources and artifices than two attornies. Horn and Banier concluded the treaty at Bernwalt, and the former of the two was afterwards ſent ambaſſador to Louis XIII.

Old Thurn divided his life betwixt war and embaſſy: at the head of troops in the ſummer; in winter either at Venice or Conſtantinople. Pappenheim could never be ſpared from the field; but in dexterity of parts was thought equal to the very beſt of his cotemporaries; and the letter he wrote to the duke of Bavaria, after the defeat of Leipſic, which I have read by chance, but where or how has eſcaped my memory, ſhews him to have been a perſon thoroughly able upon the greateſt emergencies, and that he underſtood the relative ſtrength of Guſtavus and the empire far better than the *interior* council at Vienna could pretend to do. Aldringer was in effect political hiſtoriographer of the empire; the *manifeſtos, deductions, juſtificatory pieces,* and *little flying ſatires* and *invectives,* chiefly flowed from his pen. Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar's project of ſecuring Alſatia from the paws of France, eſpouſing the landgravine of Heſſe Caſſel, and giving down to his poſterity the glory of poſſeſſing a dominion that made the barrier between the French and Germans, which, from the very nature of its ſituation, muſt have forced his deſcendants to be men of

of parts, was an effort of politics, the inventive work of a ſoldier, which the great people of the cabinet muſt not deſpiſe, and the rather, ſince the bare apprehenſion of it threw Richelieu into inexpreſſible diſquiet. Not to tire my reader with more examples, I ſhall only obſerve, that Piccolomini, after growing grey in the ſervice of thirty campaigns in Germany only, worn out with hardſhips, weakened by wounds, and approaching, as may be imagined, to a decline of life and parts, was yet conſidered, by the miniſtry at Vienna, as the only perſon capable of putting the peace of Munſter into execution; by adjuſting all the difficulties that might ariſe upon diſbanding an immenſe army to whom war had been a trade, and plunder a ſubſiſtence; and to effect the evacuation and repoſſeſſion of countries, cities, diſtricts, ſignories, church poſſeſſions, &c. almoſt beyond the power of calculation to ſpecify; and yet *all* this was effected without any one remarkable impediment, and, as far as I can remember, without bloodſhed.

In a word, the fact is this: *Trying times* make great men, either in the field or in the cloſet; and though war takes the lead, negotiation is the child of it; for there muſt be trials of art as well as ſtrength. Of this we have a clear proof, ſince greater generals were never beheld than in the courſe of the Thirty Years Wars. Such for example were Mansfelt, Tilly, Guſtavus Adolphus, Walſtein, Horn, Banier, Pappenheim, Merci, Guébriant, Bernard duke of Saxe-Weimar, Torſtenſon, Condé, and Turenne. The miniſters of ſtate were equally famous, as Kleſel, Dietricſtein, Olivares, Oxenſtiern, Richelieu, Camerarius, Ruſdorf, Salvius, and de Rache. For the general and the ſtateſman are reciprocally formed to call forth each other; inaſmuch as wherever there is war, there muſt likewiſe be negotiation.

The times we ſpeak of had ſuch a power to awaken what is called a genius, that the very *ladies* put in for their ſhare of heroiſm and treaty-knowledge. The firſt and laſt ambaſſadreſs extraordinary and plenipotentiary was the wife of a general at this period.—The queen of Bohemia poſſeſſed her preſence of mind the moſt of any perſon, after the defeat at Prague; and when an offer was made her in the very ebb of her fortune, at a time when the unhappy exile ſubſiſted upon charity, and had hardly a place to repoſe her head, that matters might then be accommodated, upon condition that her eldeſt ſon was permitted to receive his education and religion at Vienna, with a promiſe of eſpouſing

eſpouſing one of the emperor's daughters; Her anſwer was, *That ſhe would ſooner cut his throat with her own hands.*—Eleonora, queen of Sweden, left the pleaſures of Stockholm to attend her huſband in Germany, and marched to him at the head of a little army which ſhe conducted to his relief. The electreſs of Brandenburg made a perſonal treaty with Guſtavus at a time when her conſort and all his *Hoffraths* could effect nothing.—And as to Amelia of Hanau, the landgravine of Heſſe Caſſel, no encomiums can do her juſtice. I own myſelf loſt in aſtoniſhment, when I conſider that unparalleled princeſs, who acted only for a minor, and conſequently was circumſcribed in power; always Great, and almoſt always fortunate; in the moſt critical ſituations of diſtreſs on every ſide!—As her life, on this ſide the water at leaſt, may be conſidered as almoſt an anecdote, the public will hardly believe me when I ſay, ſhe was her own prime-miniſter, her own ſecretary, and her own general. What is ſtill more, her courage, her ability, her honeſty, went ſo hand in hand, that ill principles never tempted her to be unfaithful to her allies; and paſt ill conduct never called upon her to play a ſecond game by way of ſelf-preſervation!—Though this account of her be only momentary and incidental, yet a few ſlight touches may ſerve to give the reader ſome idea of an heroine who is not to be met with in every page of a common hiſtory. In a word, ſhe fulfilled that extraordinary character, worthy to be tranſcribed in letters of gold, which was drawn by a cotemporary poet in her own neighbourhood; for the incomparable Amelia was preciſely, in a political and military ſenſe;

MOLLIOR CERA MULIER FLUENTI,
DURIOR SAXIS EADEM MARINIS——
FLECTIT, AUT FRANGIT; VIOLENTA DURUM:
LUBRICA MOLLEM.

The *generoſity* of kings and chief commanders in thoſe days was very great. Guſtavus, though far from being rich, never promoted a common ſoldier for his merit, but always gave him bountifully at the ſame time. Walſtein ſeldom preſented an officer of conſequence with leſs than five hundred pounds. The cardinal Infant, after the battle of Nordlingen, ſettled a penſion upon Gamba-corta, made him knight of St. Jago, and procured him a ſecond annual ſalary from Madrid; he gave Piccolomini a fine diamond on the ſame occaſion, and a *commandery* worth more than

one thouſand pounds per annum. Nor did he forget any ſingle officer that behaved well. The emperor paid Verdugo near four thouſand pounds, by way of ranſom for the young prince of Anhalt, and allowed him for a creſt to his arms, a right-hand ſupporting the Auſtrian eagle. Several rich *ſignories* in Lower Saxony were conferred on Tilly. Walſtein was firſt gratified with the duchy of Sagan in Sileſia, and afterwards with that of Mecklenburg, whoſe annual revenue is well known to be very conſiderable. Tilly bequeathed ten thouſand pounds to the veteran Walloons; and the great diamond the Infanta gave him, with money alſo, to found a chantry for the holy Virgin of Oetinghen. The duke de Weimar deviſed about the ſame ſum to his ſeveral colonels, and ordered a month's pay to be advanced to every ſoldier, which might make a donation amounting to above twelve thouſand pounds more.

Something remained in that age which reſembled the old *chivalry taſte* of *impreſe* and devices. The little victory of Oyta informed the Imperialiſts that Mansfelt was a man of elegance as well as courage; for his colours were all new, and of the richeſt materials; exquiſitely blazoned, the emblems admirably choſen, and the mottos extremely pertinent. A regiment in thoſe days valued itſelf as much upon its *lemma* or motto as its colonel. I once ſaw an illuminated collection of all the emblems and inſcriptions that had been carried on ſtandards during the Thirty Years Wars; but it was only tranſiently, and without the power of making a drawing from them. What ſurpriſed me was, that thoſe belonging to the Croatians were the beſt imagined of any, which made me conclude at the time, that having little fancy and leſs learning, they purchaſed their deſigns of ſome man of parts, who gladly exchanged his claſſical learning againſt their plunder.

The *romantic* taſte alike prevailed in the very names of their horſes; for I have ſeen a liſt of ſome of the principal ones that belonged to Walſtein and other generals; they were ſurnamed, *Amaranto, Bellochio, Focoteſta, Inamorato, Bellpello, Stabene, Allegramente*; as likewiſe *Donna Biancha, Balurina, Donzella, Fanciulla, Vittoria, Fortuna*, &c.

In the times we are ſpeaking of, almoſt each city, and every town about the ſize of a good Engliſh market town, had its caſtle. Moſt princes and noblemen's ſeats were alſo caſtles. The continuance of ſome with little injury, and the remains of others, give Germany to this day a ſolemn and romantic appearance. Here and there, villages were walled

walled in and fortified, eſpecially if they commanded a paſs in hilly and rocky roads that were narrow and full of precipices. Of theſe villages, or *dorps** rather, I have ſeen three, which if defended by an hundred valiant ſoldiers might ſtop an army forty-eight hours. The firſt is Ilmenau, where the one-eyed Walloon captain ſtopped Guſtavus†. The ſecond lies in that mountainous part of the Lower Palatinate called the Bery-Straſs, or Strada Montana, in the high road from Francfort to Heidelburg; and the third ſtands between Stiria and Carniola, commanding the great road from Venice to Vienna. This laſt, which is the ſtrongeſt of the three, has the appearance of being placed where it is by magic. For to clear the paſſage with a light poſt coach, you muſt have four horſes and ſix yokes of oxen, and ſtop, to breathe the cattle, once a minute, or every two minutes at moſt, for a good hour, as the Germans expreſs themſelves.

It was found out likewiſe in the courſe of theſe wars, that there was no *hiring foreign troops* to any conſiderable purpoſe, except the power that contracted for them ſent a *commiſſary-general* of its own to pay them; ſince to levy armies upon other principles was nothing more than profuſe and uſeleſs ſquandering of public money; which, after it had paſſed through the canal of a foreign prince, and the little aqueducts of a few court-favourites and general officers beneath him, underwent ſo many filtrations, that hardly a drop eſcaped for the conſolation and ſupport of the poor fighting ſoldier. This meaſure was thought ſo ſalutary and ſelf-evident, that, except my memory deceives me greatly, it was practiſed under the miniſtry of James I.

As to *contributions* and *military exactions*, it was cuſtomary with a commanding officer to collect them according to his muſter roll; the conſequence of which was, that he put that portion into his pocket which was claimed by virtue of non-effective men. This abuſe ran ſo high in the Imperial army, that Tilly, for fear of diſobliging the powers that were his maſter's friends, publiſhed a ſtrong manifeſto againſt it in the year 1627, denouncing nothing leſs to all delinquents than the forfeiture of their lives and fortunes; concluding with aſſuring them, that the infliction of this

* *Dorp* is a German word, and ſignifies a little village or hamlet dependent on a greater village. Thorp is an old Engliſh word, and ſignifies the ſame. As Biſhopſthorp, &c. &c. Dorp may be called a *claſſical* Engliſh word, for Dryden uſes it *twice*.

† Vol. II. p. 58.

puniſhment

puniſhment was, and ſhould be, *indeprecable*, to uſe his own word.

An illuſtrious author* obſerves, that the contributions raiſed by generals, and the pillage extorted by ſoldiers, conſtituted at that time, namely, juſt before the arrival of Guſtavus, the principal military art among the Imperialiſts; that the two regiments of Pappenheim and St. Julian, quartered in the middle *Marche*, drained the country of ſixty-two thouſand pounds in ſixteen months; and Walſtein is ſaid to have pillaged the whole electorate of Brandenburg to the amount of two millions ſterling; but that calculation can hardly be admitted. Two millions of dollars ſeem to me more probable.

It is remarkable, at leaſt in the Imperial ſervice, that the generals and colonels gained immenſe ſums we know not how; and ſome amaſſed great fortunes on the other ſide of the queſtion; but not ſo much in the times of Guſtavus as in the former and latter parts of the Thirty Years War. Of Walſtein we ſhall ſay nothing: for he was more magnificent than any king or emperor. A thouſand pounds were a common preſent from him, and he rarely kept leſs than one hundred thouſand pounds in the bank at Hamburg for ſudden emergencies. Tilly died very rich; and Aldringer, of whoſe origin we ſhall ſpeak in the next page, left large ſums in the funds at Venice. Duke Bernard of Saxon Weimar, who was the eleventh ſon, and had a title with very little patrimony, bequeathed, as we have already obſerved, two and twenty thouſand pounds to his officers and ſoldiers only. Erneſt Count Mansfelt, who fed himſelf entirely from the point of his ſword, maintained for many years, with little help from foreign or German potentates, an army of twenty thouſand men, and died rich; and laſtly, John de Wert, who was of as poor an extraction as man could be, bought a fine caſtle in Bohemia, and a vaſt eſtate in land.

The *nature of the times* was then ſuch, that Aldringer and Merci, which laſt I ſuppoſe to be one of the greateſt generals ſince the days of Guſtavus, with numbers more whom I could eaſily mention, all roſe to high commands merely by ſuperiority of genius; for in a courſe of thirty years long and ſerious ſtruggle, the favourites of princes and miniſters, and the children and relations of people of quality, ſuch excepted as had truly great abilities, were all ſupplanted, caſhiered, or deſtroyed by the fate of war. On the other

* *Memoirs of the Houſe of Brandenburg.*

hand,

hand, merit was its own patron, and forced the public to accept it; ſo that hardly can a general be found, in theſe times, who had not originally carried a muſquet. Oxenſtiern, though in that reſpect I think him blameable, had a mortal averſion to admit men of great rank and condition into high commands. Tilly and Walſtein were gentlemen born, with little more than a titular patrimony; as were Dampier and Bucquoy. Mansfelt and another illuſtrious commander had nothing to feed themſelves with but the point of their ſwords: John de Wert was a peaſant; General Beck a ſhepherd; Stalhaus a ſerving-man; Aldringer a valet de chambre, an amanuenſis, a velt-maréchal.

Guſtavus had ſome generals who were no great maſters of *writing* or *reading*; and it was partly for this reaſon, as I have hinted elſewhere, that moſt commanders of conſequence kept a ſecretary. I have heard a pleaſant anecdote upon this head, which may be worth relating; not that I intend to become ſurety for its authenticity. One evening, at a council of war, ſome intercepted letters were brought to the king; his majeſty, whoſe eye-ſight was not the moſt perfect, ordered a venerable grey-headed general, who ſtood by him, to break them open and read them aloud. The officer ſhewed an inclination to obey, but complained he had loſt his ſpectacles. *Read you,* ſaid the king haſtily to another; but that great commander complained grievouſly of an inflammation in his eyes. *Piſh,* ſaid Guſtavus, a little provoked, *my thoughts were abſent upon other matters,* and then reducing his countenance to a ſmile; *General Banier,* ſaid he, *pray read; you have been uſed to it*.*

The *military dreſs* of thoſe times was curious enough; for the heroes were a ſort of fine gentlemen in their way. Ruffs were worn in all varieties, and frilled and tortured into every kind of ſhape: nevertheleſs, the flat ſort which fall down on the ſhoulders was preferred for convenience ſake upon moſt occaſions. But then we muſt except the practices of the Spaniſh commanders and Tilly; which latter followed the mode of Bruſſels, where he firſt grew acquainted with courts. Wigs were then hardly known; moſt wore their own hair, managed careleſsly enough, but cut ſhort, *à la ſoldateſque.* Pappenheim, Piccolomini, and even Oxenſtiern, affected a high bold foretop, which had a martial air, for it ſeemed to ſtand half upright. The

* Banier was a nobleman of faſhion, and had received an excellent education. His letters to the maréchal de Guébriant may be conſidered as maſterpieces in war and politics. They are preſerved by *Jean de Laboreur. Hiſt. du Maréchal Guébriant.* Fol. Par. 1684.

reſt

reſt ſmoothed down the front part with a milder appearance; and Chriſtian duke of Brunſwic, Bernard duke of Saxe-Weimar, Dewbatel, and John de Wert, ſpread the hair half down their foreheads, in the manner Vandyck's young men are painted. Whiſkers were thought as neceſſary as ſwords. I remember no picture without them, excepting duke Chriſtian's of Brunſwic; which prince was ſo very young that perhaps he arrived not to the happy hour of wearing the muſtachio. Their diſtinguiſhing vanity made its appearance in a gold chain, which each officer of diſtinction wore round his neck, faſtened behind with a loop and button. Some of theſe chains were decorated in ſuch a manner as to amount to a very great expence; yet it is thought, by many, that affectation was not the pure motive of wearing them, ſince they ſerved to ſecure the owner from the fury of the enemy, in caſe of being taken priſoner, and proved a ſort of retaining fee, engaged for the payment of a future ranſom. The colour of their military ſcarf was arbitrary, and ſo were the materials; but nothing was ſpared in the magnificence and richneſs of the embroidery. Their ſwords were large and heavy, not extremely ornamented; their piſtols very long; the temper of metal in both incomparably perfect. Their boots were large, thick, and wrinkled, with high tops cut ſlant-ways, and made ſtrong enough to reſiſt a common piſtol-ball, except it came in a particular direction. The oddneſs of their ſpurs is ſcarce to be accounted for: it is thought they were made to *jingle**, in order to animate the horſes and keep them up to their duty without goring their flanks unmercifully. Many generals armed themſelves cap-a-pie: their breaſt-plates, helmets, and the junctures of their armour were often inlaid with gold and ſilver, richly diapered with the ſame materials: and ſome few, but this muſt be reſtrained to the Swediſh ſervice, wore only back and breaſt plates, with an upper ſuit of perfumed leather, prepared and ſtiffened ſo as to be a covering of reſiſtance.

* I have ſeen one of theſe *jingling* ſpurs, which was found in the *Star Park*, on the famous *White Mountain*, near Prague, where the battle was fought between the Imperialiſts and troops of the Union; by the event of which the Elector Palatine loſt the crown of Bohemia. The ſpur was large and ſtrong: it was made of braſs, and had a ſhort curved neck. The box, from the center of which the rowels came, was as broad as an half-crown piece; hollow, and ſomething more than a quarter of an inch thick. It was of bell-metal gilt, and contained three or four metal balls about the ſize of a ſmall field-pea. The rowels, which were generally four or ſix, paſſed through the ſides of the box, and meaſured near three inches from oppoſite point to point.

His

His Majeſty himſelf wore nothing of the defenſive nature, except an elk-ſkin waiſtcoat, which ſeems to me (notwithſtanding the excuſes alleged by him) to be matter of inclination and pure choice.

That we may judge better of the dreſs of warriors in the former part of the preceding century, hiſtory hath preſerved us a curious portrait of the count de Tilly. He was a little man, and affected ſomething of the Spaniard in his dress and manners, having received his firſt education at the court of the Infanta. Maréchal Grammont* found him at the head of his army on a march, mounted on a ſmall white Croatian pad, in a green ſatin doublet with ſlaſhed ſleeves, and trowſers of the ſame ſtuff; a little cocked hat, with a red oſtrich plume in it, reaching down to his reins; and a belt round his waiſt of two inches breadth, to which hung his fighting ſword, with a ſingle piſtol only in one of his holſters. This general, when the Frenchman paid his compliments to him, ſaid, "Sir, perhaps you may find my "accoutrements ſomewhat extraordinary, and not wholly "reconcileable to the mode of France; nevertheleſs, it is "my humour, and that's ſufficient. I am perſuaded likewiſe, that my little hackney and ſingle ſolitary piſtol ſurprize you as much as my habit; but that you may not "entertain an unfavourable opinion of the count de Tilly, "to whom you have done the honour of paying a viſit of "curioſity, permit me to inform you, that I have gained "ſeven deciſive battles, without being obliged to diſcharge "the piſtol now under conſideration; nor hath the little "pad in queſtion ever failed me, or heſitated in performing "his duty." In a word, ſaith Grammont, he had the look of the old duke d'Alva, ſurnamed *Caſtigador de Flamencos.*

*Duels* were not extremely faſhionable in thoſe days; we hardly find half a dozen in the ſpace of thirty years continued war; every hour affording better proofs for valour, than ſuch irrational appeals to public opinion. Nor were ſuperior commanders ill thought of by their adherents and followers in caſe they refuſed to refer themſelves to ſuch ſort of deciſions. Cratz, in the tranſports of reſentment, challenged Walſtein when he was generaliſſimo and abſolute; yet nothing reſulted from the provocation; it was paſſed by with neglect. John de Wert killed Merodé, but the affair was purely a rencounter. Young Pappenheim, it is true, loſt his life in a real duel, but that

* *Memoires* du Maréchal Grammont. 2 Tom. 12°. 1717. Tom. i. p. 12, 13, 14.

happened

happened merely becauſe he had eluded the vigilance of his general, who had locked the city gates, and planted ſpies to watch the combatants. Aldringer never forgave Sirot for drawing his ſword in his preſence, though he himſelf ſet the example, and inſiſted upon making his life the forfeiture for the offence. Greater precautions ſtill were taken in the Swediſh ſervice. Count de Souches challenged general Stalhaus, but firſt reſigned his commiſſion. Duels before this time had been ſeverely prohibited in France, and the French king declared, with an oath, that he would reward ſuch military perſons as had ſpirt enough to refuſe a challenge. By Guſtavus's laws all private quarrels were decided by the officers of the regiment, and all challenges referred to a court-martial. If an inferior officer allowed the common ſoldiers to engage hand to hand, he was to be caſhiered *ipſo facto*, and ſerve as a private man, being anſwerable alſo for all the miſchief that ſhould be committed in ſuch engagements. The beſt and moſt remarkable ſwordſman in the courſe of theſe wars was the count de Forgatz; yet we find nothing concerning him in the public field of action. As to the cuſtom of ſeconds, I think it appeared as early as the year 1570.

Judicial aſtrology was the reigning paſſion of that age. Nothing great was undertaken without conſulting the ſtars. Tycho Brahè, Grebner, Braunborn, Herlicius, Baptiſta Seni, &c. were all reverenced, as far as men could reverence them, on this ſide of idolatry. Princes dreaded, reſpected, and bribed them. Theſe *predicting ſages* were of both religions; and each of them read the book of the heavens his own way. In the regions of the north, Guſtavus was the *Arctic Lion*, the *vis vivida* of the *reformation*, and the *new luminary* in Caſſiopéa: again, in the dominions of the ſouth, he was *another Alaric and Attila*, the *ſcourge of God*, and *the genuine Antichriſt*.

Every prince was eſteemed who had the happineſs to retain in his ſervice one or more well-inſtructed *aſtrologers*; for the explanation of an horoſcope half determined Frederic to accept the crown of Bohemia, and partly induced the emperor to depoſe Walſtein; who, on the other hand, that he might keep pace with his maſter in point of intelligence, allowed his philoſopher an extraordinary equipage and penſion magnificent enough to be called *royal*. When Herlicius died, the princes and generals in Germany became quite bewildered; but Guſtavus ſaw through theſe weakneſſes, and conſidered them as alike impious and

childiſh. France in this reſpect was as little enlightened as the empire. The grave hiſtory of De Thou, and the ſage memoirs of Sully, breathe much of theſe doctrines. Louis XIII. was ſurnamed *The Juſt*, becauſe born under *Libra:* and Ann of Auſtria had a mathematician concealed in her cloſet, in order to calculate the fortune of Louis XIV. with uncommon accuracy. William Lilly, in England, did Cromwell more ſervice than a regiment of cuiraſſiers. Nay, it was with great obſtinacy and reluctance that the ſcience expired even in our iſland; for, amongſt many others, Dryden himſelf relied partly thereon, and underſtood horoſcopes and aſtral culminations with no contemptible exactneſs. The taſte for prodigies was likewiſe very ſtrong in the times of Guſtavus; they are even treated with great deference by Chemnitius, the beſt inſtructed and moſt ſenſible hiſtorian of that period; for he was ſuppoſed to compoſe his works, or a part thereof at leaſt, on the memoirs of Oxenſteirn. Boys born with boots and ſpurs, ſhowers and rivers of blood, black rainbows, pitched battles in the air, and a thouſand ſuch other prodigies* were ſuppoſed to happen every year. The king of Denmark concluded the peace of Lubec in conſequence of a flaſh of lightning. Not that I take upon me to doubt but that the Supreme Being, in ſuch extraordinary times, may give uncommon indications of his diſpleaſure, and that many circumſtances related, were or might be *preternatural*; yet, as they cannot be preciſely diſtinguiſhed at this diſtance, I have thought fit to paſs them all by, except one or two that fell neceſſarily in my track, and bore ſome reference to the tenor of the hiſtory.

*Predictions* had their weight too. The arrival of Guſtavus in the empire was no ſecret to the *Illuminati* many years before it happened. Tycho Brahè foretold, with reference to the new *ſtar that appeared in Caſſiopéa* 1572, *that a prince ſhould riſe in the north, from whom much happineſs ſhould be expected by thoſe who made profeſſion of the evangelical religion*; and this prediction was made public twenty years before Guſtavus entered Germany.

Amongſt other examples of this kind, Pappenheim boaſted, or others, more probably, in his behalf, that, conformably to a prophecy recorded in the archives of his family, a certain Pappenheim *Balafré**, mounted on a

* Some of the Imperial troops, to this day, would cut a man to pieces who denied the exiſtence of Vampyres.

† Hacked, gaſhed, cicatrized: for he carried the marks of one hundred wounds on his body.

white

white ſteed, ſhould kill a king of Sweden hand to hand; and hiſtorians have thought themſelves ſo much obliged to give authenticity to the completion of this event, that one third of them introduce him ſome hours ſooner than he really arrived at the battle of Lützen, merely for the ſake of fulfilling the prediction.

*Omens* and *dreams* were ſtudied, explained, and believed with great attention and reſpect. The fall of a triumphal column was one of the arguments the Auſtrian miniſters uſed to perſuade their maſter to depoſe Walſtein. A viſible damp ſpread itſelf through the Imperial army, becauſe the council of war preceding the battle of Leipſic chanced to be held at a grave-digger's houſe; decorated then, and, if I miſtake not, till this moment, with an Arabeſque freſco of ſhank-bones croſſed, ſkulls, and hour-glaſſes. The leſſon for the Sunday* preceding the battle of Prague, Mat. vi. 22. *Render to Cæſar the things that are Cæſar's*, broke the ſpirit of the Palatine party all at once, foraſmuch as *Cæſar* is the German and Bohemian word for *Emperor*. On the other hand, the Swedes gained a part of their victory at Leipſic by the interpoſition of a ring-dove, and a part by virtue of a dream which Guſtavus had the preceding night; of which the ſubſtance was, that in a ſtruggle with Tilly he never quitted the hold he had of his hair, but received a bite from him in his left ſide; which Frederick Spanheim, one of the moſt ſenſible and exact writers of that period, interprets thus: That Guſtavus ſhould keep the field of battle, and obtain the advantage; but that the Saxons, in the left wing of the army, ſhould retire with infamy.

Many military men believed that their armour and bodies might be rendered impenetrable by *enchantment*. When a perſon was ſublimated to this pitch of being invulnerable, he was pronounced, with great elegance of ſpeech, to be *gefrorn*†, and it is thought the Italian aſtrologers who attended the army, carried on this trade in order to eke out their other profeſſion. Tilly himſelf was ſuppoſed, by the common Swedes, to have tampered with theſe ſorts of practices. An honeſt Engliſhman tells us, that the town-ſurgeon of Halle having dreſſed his wounds after the battle of Leipſic, and diſcovering nothing but horrible contuſions, a thing not uncommon in wounds received under a well-tempered ſuit of armour, pronounced his body to be *gefrorn*. *But*, ſaith my countryman, *very loth I am to leave ſo baſe an im-*

* Twenty-third Sunday after Trinity.
† *i. e.* Frozen.

*putation on ſuch an honourable commander**. Nevertheleſs, Peruſi was ſuppoſed by the multitude to have been rendered invulnerable beyond diſpute, as was alſo the Auſtrian ſhoemaker†, who ſucceeded one Fadinger an hatter, and conducted a rebellion, at the head of 60,000 ruſtics, ſince the ſtroke of a cannon ball, ſaith a grave and ſerious hiſtorian‡, made him recoil ſeven paces without killing him, till at length a colonel of Pappenheim's put an end to his life by a piſtol-ſhot. Is it not amazing, that the ſame author ſhould recite theſe two ſtories, and believe them both? Be that as it will, this doctrine in general was chiefly believed by the common ſort of people; and ſo far it was a real object of public notice; for the firſt article of Guſtavus's diſcipline is directed againſt enchanting the human body, ſo as to render it invulnerable; as alſo againſt enchanted armour and ſwords; all delinquents to be prohibited from converſing with their fellow-ſoldiers, and to

* *Swediſh Diſcipline*, Part iii. p. 32. Lond. 4°. 1632.

† This extraordinary phenomenon made his appearance in the European hemiſphere, Anno 1626. His predeceſſor had ſent an embaſſy to Ferdinand II. conſiſting of one nobleman's ſteward, two tradeſmen, and three farmers. He himſelf, on aſſuming the reins of authority, and this may ſhew how finely Shakeſpear painted human nature, in the character of Cade, on a like occaſion, publiſhed ſomething between an *edict* and *manifeſto*, which ran preciſely thus:

"We Achaz Willenger, elected upon the death of Stephen Fadinger, "ſupreme commander of the three evangelical armies in Upper Auſtria, "ſend greeting to all colonels, lieutenant-colonels, captains, &c. acting "under our authority. Whereas ſeveral ſhips, filled with ſoldiers and "military ſtores, have been conveyed by the duke of Bavaria to our capital "enemy Adam, who calls himſelf count Herberſdorf, and governor of "Lintz, and that more ſupplies of the ſame kind, whereof We have "certain knowledge, are daily expected, to the entire deſtruction of the "Proteſtant religion, except ſome remedy be adminiſtered thereunto; de-"termine, in our great wiſdom, to aſſault the town of Lintz with re-"doubled violence, and reduce the pretended governor to reaſon by fire "and ſword.

"Wherefore, in order to overcome a commander ſo artful and de-"ſigning as this our adverſary is, in a caſe where force and numbers may "happen to miſcarry, it ſeemeth highly expedient that you recommend to "us men of diſtinguiſhed capacity and experience, men who love their "country, and have a ſincere zeal for the liberties and ſalvation of their "fellow chriſtians.

"We alſo convey the ſame inſtructions in military matters to all the "officers ſerving under us in our ſeveral armies, and requeſt them to "ſend us ſelect and approved men: it being highly reaſonable, that all "ſhould exert themſelves in an emergency, where all, if unſucceſsful, are "equally liable to the ſame irreverſible ſentence of deſtruction."—(*Laurea Auſtriaca*, p. 836, 837.)

‡ *Lotichius ad annum* 1626. *Laur. Auſtr.* p. 840.

be

be ſtrictly puniſhed according to the laws of the land, and thoſe of ſcripture. Yet ſo ſtrong, then, was the power of deluſion, that the Maréchal de Grammont tells us*, that being taken priſoner by a German officer at the ſiege of Mantua, and carried to that commander's tent in a fainting fit, occaſioned by the loſs of blood; the ſaid officer being as much wounded as himſelf; an Imperial colonel requeſted his friend, there being no ſurgeons in the army, that he might pronounce a few words of myſtical importance over him. Immediately the orifice of the wound cloſed, though it had poured out blood in a full ſtream. The enchanter then begged leave to perform the ſame kind office to Grammont; but, ſays the latter, my anſwer was, "That, "as I truſted in God, I would hold no correſpondence "with the devil; and if I was to die, my exit ſhould be "ſuch as truly became the man of honour." From whence it is plain that Grammont believed the fact.

Nay, further, with reſpect to incantations, whilſt the life and actions of Guſtavus have long lain forgotten, Diſſertations † have been publiſhed on his *very ſword*, which, from the extenſive nature of his conqueſts, was ſuppoſed to be *magical*. Freſh debates have likewiſe ariſen from the ſame ſubject; as whether, for example, the ſword he uſed at the battle of Lützen be ſtill preſerved at Stockholm or Leipſic‡; or, if it is not more probable to be found at Vienna; for an Imperial ſoldier ſeized it. Neverthleſs,

*Non noſtrum eſt tantas componere lites.*——

We may extend our remarks by obſerving, that as the ſoldiers, at leaſt in the Imperial ſervice, were generally *ill cloathed*, and not over careful in point of cleanlineſs, being obliged to content themſelves ſometimes with the worſt of diet; peſtilential and petechial fevers raged abundantly; and the latter are ſtill very rife among thoſe nations who ſupply the Auſtrian army with irregulars; as I obſerved myſelf in the year 1749, when I paſſed a ſummer on the confines of Croatia.

The *famine*, during the greater part of theſe wars, kept pace with the *peſtilence*. Wheat was ſold, more times than once, at a price I dare not give credit to; namely, three

* Memoires, tom. I. 27.

† Three Diſſertations by Dr. *Wallin*, Profeſſor at Upſal, publiſhed in the years 1722 and 1729.

‡ That it is preſerved in the arſenal at Stockholm, is denied by Glaſſey *in Diſſert. de Gladio quocum Guſtavus Adolphus Rex Sueciæ in prælio Lutzenenſi occubuit. Lipſ.* 1749.

pounds

pounds eighteen ſhillings a buſhel *. Guards were poſted to protect the newly-buried from being devoured †. There were inſtances of children being ſeduced, maſſacred, and eaten up. Two women fought for a ſlice of a dead horſe, and one killed the other. A ſtraggling beggar decoyed away a poor woman's child, and began to ſtrangle it, in order to eat it; but the vigilant mother ſurpriſed her in the fact, and killed her ‡. The face of the earth was ruined for want of agriculture, and every eatable animal was ſo greedily ſearched after, that the beaſts of prey miſſed their daily food. When lord Arundel paſſed through the empire, in return from his embaſſy to Vienna, a fox crept out of a brake, and ſeized one of his attendants by the leg; the fellow took it up, for it was ſo weak it could not eſcape; its eyes were haggard, and ſunk in its head, and it weighed juſt nothing. If I remember right, there was another remark in the ſame relation, namely, that almoſt every houſe contained nothing but a famiſhed dog.

But, by this time, it may be highly proper to draw a veil over the more melancholy productions of a war which raged much and continued long; for though its ſubſequent effects may be conſidered as the re-eſtabliſhment of peace, order, religion, and property, throughout all Europe, more or leſs; yet the ſufferings of thoſe poor wretches, to whom Providence then gave their period of exiſtence, muſt be ever looked upon, by an humane and compaſſionate man, as a very ſharp and ſevere trial; and of courſe, one may ſafely infer, with Guſtavus, for the remark is as juſt as if it had proceeded from a profeſſorial chair, that be the advantages of war as great as it is poſſible to imagine, yet that *war* itſelf is an *evil*, permitted by Providence,

## PROPTER DELICTA HUMANA §.

* Some of my friends objected to this particular, which had been confirmed to me by the beſt hiſtorians in Germany, from the Market Books kept in ſeveral cities. Looking back into the firſt rough draughts of my hiſtory, I find Carve tells us, that in the year 1634, when he was chaplain to Walter Devereux's Iriſh regiment at the ſiege of Augſburg, that aſs's fleſh ſold for thirteen pence halfpenny a pound; that a buſhel of coarſe flower mixt with bran ſold for three pound ſix ſhillings a buſhel; the German buſhel contains nine gallons; and a quart of ordinary wine coſt about ſix ſhillings and eight pence. *Itin.* tom. I. p. 134.

† *Continuatio Lauræ Auſtriacæ.* fol. p. 46.

‡ *Letter to the German Church* in London, 8vo. 1634.

§ See the Letter to Oxenſtiern. vol. ii. p. 351.

# PRINCES

COTEMPORARY WITH

# GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS;

*And concerned with, or againſt him.*

## EMPERORS.

| | |
|---|---|
| MATTHIAS - - - - - - - - - - | 1612—1619 |
| FERDINAND II. - - - - - - - - - - | 1619—1637 |

## POPES.

| | |
|---|---|
| PAUL V. - - - - - - - - - - - | 1605—1621 |
| GREGORY XV. - - - - - - - - - - | 1621—1623 |
| URBAN VIII. - - - - - - - - - - - | 1623—1644 |

## KING of FRANCE.

| | |
|---|---|
| LOUIS XIII. - - - - - - - - - - - | 1610—1643 |

## KINGS of SPAIN.

| | |
|---|---|
| PHILIP III. - - - - - - - - - - - | 1598—1621 |
| PHILIP IV. - - - - - - - - - - - | 1621—1665 |

## KINGS of ENGLAND.

| | |
|---|---|
| JAMES I. - - - - - - - - - - - | 1603—1625 |
| CHARLES I. - - - - - - - - - - - | 1625—1648 |

## KING of DENMARK.

| | |
|---|---|
| CHIRISTIAN IV. - - - - - - - - - - | 1588—1648 |

## KING of POLAND.

| | |
|---|---|
| SIGISMOND III. - - - - - - - - - - | 1587—1632 |

## ELECTORS of MENTZ.

| | |
|---|---|
| JOHN SCHWEICKARD, of Cronenberg - - | 1604—1626 |
| G. FREDERIC, of Grieffenclau - - - - | 1626—1629 |
| ANSELM CASIMIR WAMBOLD, of Umſtadt | 1629—1647 |

## ELECTORS of TRYERS.

| | |
|---|---|
| LOTHARIO, of Metternich - - - - - - | 1599—1623 |
| PHILIP CHRISTOPHER Van SOETTERN - | 1623—1652 |

ELECTOR of COLOGN.

FERDINAND Duke of Bavaria - - - - - 1612—1650

ELECTOR of BAVARIA.

MAXIMILIAN - - - - - - - - - - - 1623—1651

ELECTOR of SAXONY.

JOHN GEORGE - - - - - - - - - - - 1611—1659

ELECTORS of BRANDENBURG.

JOHN SIGISMOND - - - - - - - - - 1572—1619
GEORGE WILLIAM - - - - - - - - 1619—1640

ELECTOR PALATIN.

FREDERIC V. - - - - - - - - - - - 1617—1632
Chosen King of Bohemia - - - - - 1619

PRINCES, &c. of TRANSYLVANIA.

GABRIEL BETHLEM - - - - - - - - 1603—1629
CATHARINA, of Brandenburg, who resigned 1629—1631
GEORGE RAGOTZKI - - - - - - - - 1631—1648

THE

U.S. INSTITUTION
C. IV.
65
Sir Bowring
1
OF INDIA.

# THE HISTORY OF

## *THE LIFE OF*

# GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

IF a perſonal valour of the cleareſt and moſt diſtinguiſhing ſort; if a firmneſs of mind rendered more active upon the approach of dangers and difficulties; if a capacity in politics equal, to ſay the leaſt of it, to that of the greateſt prime miniſter whom Europe hath ever ſeen; if an abhorrence of diſſimulation and ſubterfuge; if a generous, open, and undiſſembled ſpirit of reſenting national injuries; if a *perfective* and *inventive* genius in all the branches of military knowledge; if generoſity and humanity, moderation and courteſy, public and domeſtic affection, and above all, a ſincere and vital ſenſe of religion and piety, are ſufficient outlines to give force and character to the portrait of a true Hero; allowances being ever to be made for the frailties and errors incidental to mere human nature; it ſeems, to me, highly probable, that the reader will not be diſſatisfied with the delineation I propoſe to make of the life and actions of The Great GUSTAVUS*; and if, more or leſs, in all, or various inſtances, it is my misfortune to write beneath the truth, and even below my own ideas, yet thence it can never follow with ſtrict juſtice that the original object is void of luſtre; but that it ſhines on a body made up of broken and unequal ſurfaces, neither capable to receive the brightneſs itſelf, nor to tranſmit it to others.

The hero of my preſent hiſtory, born December 9, 1594, was grandſon of Guſtavus Ericſon, whoſe family name was Vaſa †, the great deliverer of Sweden. A writer more ſuperſtitious than myſelf, might be inclined to think, that there was ſomething in the name of Guſtavus co-natural, if I may ſo ſay, to the proſperity of that kingdom, whenever he conſiders the reigns and illuſtrious actions of theſe two renowned princes; ſo that the northern wits are not to be looked upon as determined triflers by profeſſion, when they anagrammatized the letters which form the word GUSTAVUS into the name of AUGUSTUS.

* Oxenſtiern firſt named him The GREAT GUSTAVUS in the ſpeech he made at the opening of the diet of Heilbrun 1633.

† Vaſa ſignifies a ſheaf of corn.

It is well known to the generality of readers, that the grandfather of Guſtavus Adolphus had been deputed by Sweden as one of the ſix hoſtages of ſtate to Chriſtian II. king of Denmark; a prince equally faithleſs and deſpotic; who, in contradiction to his own royal promiſe, removed them all into his own country, and confined them there as priſoners of war. Thence, Guſtavus Ericſon, having obtained permiſſion to amuſe himſelf with a morning's hunting, contrived means to eſcape in diſguiſe, and after various dangers, making his firſt retreat to Lubec, reached his native ſoil in the year 1520; at which the tyrant Chriſtian conceived ſuch extraordinary offence, that, contrary to his expreſs promiſe of an univerſal amneſty, ſworn by him four days after his Swediſh coronation, he made the city of Stockholm an ocean of blood, ſparing neither biſhops, nor nobles, amongſt which the father of Guſtavus Ericſon was one, nor magiſtracy, nor gentry; denying them likewiſe the common rights of religious ſepulture. Upon this, Ericſon, tranſported with the warmth of a true patriot, collected ſome few companies of armed men during the winter ſeaſon, and making freſh and freſh efforts of vigour as his party increaſed, arrived in the year 1523 to the honour of being elected king by the ſtates of the country; but with a modeſty and magnanimity almoſt peculiar to himſelf, he refuſed the form of coronation, and conſented only to be called governor of the kingdom. Veſted with this authority, he convened the ſeveral orders of ſtate, having chiefly in his eyes the great work of religious reformation; but untoward and unſurmountable obſtacles preſenting themſelves, he reſigned his title, and left the nation in the ſtate he found it. Nevertheleſs, the Orders of Sweden at length perſuaded him to accept the throne in good earneſt, and in 1528 he paſſed through a coronation in form; being the firſt proteſtant prince that the world had ever ſeen adorned with the regal diadem.

This great deliverer of his country died in the year 1560, having reigned more than one half of his life; and it was his ſingular fortune to govern with prudence and virtue, what he had conquered by induſtry and magnanimity. He left behind him three ſons*, Eric the eldeſt, who ſucceeded his father in 1560, and having reigned eight years died without iſſue; John, the ſecond, who ſucceeded his brother in 1568, and enjoyed the throne four and twenty years; and Charles duke of Sudermania, the father of the great Guſtavus Adolphus.

Here it muſt be remembered, that on the death of John, the ſecond ſon of Guſtavus Ericſon, in the year 1592, Sigiſ-

* We ſhall ſay more of this ſucceſſion when we ſettle the pretenſions between Guſtavus Adolphus and Sigiſmond.

mond,

mond, John's elder ſon*, who had been elected king of Poland ſeven years before, was admitted to aſcend the throne of Sweden on certain conditions, of which the principal were, being all confirmed by ſolemn oath, that no ſtranger ſhould be introduced into the kingdom; and that the confeſſion of Augſburg ſhould be the ſole model of religion:—but as this prince notoriouſly violated, more or leſs, all his engagements, and ſtrove to make Sweden a province to Poland, he was rejected and depoſed by the ſtates in full aſſembly, anno 1599, and his ſon Vladiſlaüs, then an infant, appointed to ſucceed him, with this ſtrict proviſo, that in ſix months he ſhould be removed to Stockholm, and there educated in the religion of Luther. The conditions mentioned being never obſerved, Charles duke of Sudermania, the father of Guſtavus Adolphus, was conſidered by all the orders of ſtate as the man marked out by Providence for the preſerver of their civil and chriſtian liberties; and of courſe they diſqualified young Vladiſlaüs, and elected Guſtavus their king in the year 1601; he being at this period only ſix years old.

We ſhall mention but few particulars with relation to Charles IX. for ſo that prince was ſurnamed, excepting ſuch paſſages as bear a reference to our youthful hero: concerning whom, in the year 1609, a circumſtance, if we miſtake not, omitted hitherto by the Engliſh hiſtorians, he diſpatched two ambaſſadors to the court of London †, with inſtructions, amongſt other matters of negotiation, to propoſe a marriage between his ſon Guſtavus, who had then attained his fifteenth year, and the princeſs Elizabeth; who, to her great misfortune, both in point of glory and happineſs, was unluckily pre-engaged to the elector Palatine. She was a young heroine formed by nature to be a conſort worthy of Guſtavus Adolphus; for ſhe was intrepid beyond her ſex, and remained miſtreſs of herſelf under all the preſſures of poverty and miſeries of exile. Yet Providence ſupplied her place with a ſecond heroine, inaſmuch as Mary Eleonora princeſs of Brandenburg appeared equal to Elizabeth in greatneſs of ſoul, and attained likewiſe a much happier and more fortunate ſituation.

Guſtavus, from a child, ſhewed great marks of a military genius; and indeed he poſſeſſed ſo many ſhining, good, qualities from the indulgence of nature, that his father 1610. was tempted to beſtow the finiſhing ſtroke on his education, in every poſſible reſpect; ſo that beſides the tour he made through Germany incognito, of which we ſhall ſpeak

* He had another ſon, John duke of Oſtrogothia, who perſevered ſincerely and ſteadily in the Lutheran religion. He died in 1618. *Carleton's Letters*, p. 265.

† *Loccenii Hiſtor. Suecan* 4°. 476.

in the proper place, there is some reason to conclude he travelled when he was quite a youth *, but of this nothing can be ascertained with any tolerable degree of certainty †. Sure, however, it is, that he talked Latin as a mother-tongue, with uncommon energy and precision; and was made master of mathematics and tactics in the very early parts of life. As to the French, Italian, and German languages, it is well known he spoke them fluently; and with respect to English, the only remaining language of reputation, wherein we can discover him to be deficient, he had so many officers of Great Britain who bore commissions under him, that he never could be puzzled for want of interpreters in any negotiations with that kingdom.

As to his manner of living, he was taught to feed wholesomely, but not luxuriously; and inured to hardships from the first beginnings of his infancy. Heats and colds were rendered indifferent to him; and he learned the duties of a common musqueteer, before he had strength to carry a musquet. Thus was Bucquoy, Tilly, Piccolomini, Merci, Montecuculi, and all the greatest generals formed in that century; and perhaps Turenne was one of the last who passed through this school of gradual probation.

In a word, it may be fairly said of Gustavus Adolphus, and as properly here as in any other place, that he was the first prince who taught the public, that there was a region buried in the depths of northern snows and ice, named Sweden; and a race of men in the world called Swedes, who had some business with the grand continent of Europe: of which we shall hereafter give various proofs, not merely with reference to Poland and Muscovy, but countries and kingdoms far more important; since, without mentioning the terror, admiration, and jealousy excited by him, in the courts of Madrid and Versailles, particularly at or near the death of that prince, and many years before the conclusion of the peace of

* *Swedish Intelligencer*, part iv. 183.

† In *Viviani*'s Life of the great *Galileo* is the following passage: "*Sovviemmi aver inteso*, (*Viviani* was his favourite disciple, and lived with "*Galileo* the last thirty months of his life) *che il gran* GUSTAVO *Re di* "*Svezia, che fu poi fulmine della guerra, nel viaggio, che da giovane fece in-*"*cognito per l'*Italia, *giunto a* Padova *vi si fermò con la sua comitiva per molti* "*mesi, trattenutovi principalmente dalle nuove e peregrine speculazioni, e* "*curiosissimi problemi, che giornalmente venivano promossi e risoluti dal Sig.* "Galileo *nelle pubbliche lezioni, ne' circoli e congressi, con ammirazione de'* "*circostanti; e volle nell' istessa casa di lui (con l'interesse d'esercitarsi* "*insieme nelle vaghezze della lingua* Toscana) *sentire l'esplicazioni della* "*sfera, le fortificazioni e la prospettiva, e l'uso d'alcuni strumenti geometrici* "*e militari, con applicazione ed assiduità di vero discepolo; discoprendogli* "*in fine con amplissimo dono quella Regia Maestà, ch'egli s'era proposto* "*d'occultare.*"—Dr. G. Aldrich's private communication.

Munster,

Munſter, the Swedes poſſeſſed 132 ſtrong towns and fortreſſes in the Germanic empire; ſo that it was poſſible to ſleep in one of them every night from the lake of Conſtance to the Baltic ocean. Yet they were obliged at laſt to ſacrifice all theſe great acquiſitions for half Pomerania, Wiſmar, the archbiſhopric of Bremen and Verden, and ſome other trifles *.

Prince Guſtavus in the ſeventeenth year of his age made a campaign againſt the Danes, being appointed by his father, a colonel of cavalry. His firſt expedition, and therein he had the command in chief, was to ſecure Blechingen, and ſtorm the important town of Chriſtianopel, which the young hero effected ſword in hand, having burſt open a gate by the application of a petard. Nevertheleſs, in approaching the city with too much eagerneſs, for a letter of the governor's being intercepted, wherein he requeſted his party to ſend him a reinforcement of 500 cavalry, he was obliged to uſe all poſſible expedition in order to prevent diſcovery, having cloathed the ſame number of Swediſh ſoldiers in the Daniſh uniform, and advancing under Daniſh enſigns; when lo! all in an inſtant it was his misfortune to ſink into a moraſs covered with ice, but not ſufficiently frozen, yet in that ſituation he ſtill kept fighting againſt his enemies, whilſt his horſe lay beneath him almoſt ſuffocated, and ſtruggling in mire and water; at length one of the Baniers brought him off at the head of his company of cavalry, and received for this generous aſſiſtance the order of ſenator. The perſon here mentioned was not the Banier who made ſo great a figure afterwards in the thirty years wars; that officer being junior to Guſtavus. Towards the concluſion of the ſame campaign, the young prince at the head of 2000 muſqueteers made a deſcent ſecretly at night into a little nameleſs iſland, and cut to pieces a conſiderable body of Daniſh troops who had there encamped themſelves. 1611.

As to this war with Denmark, it is well known to all the world, that there had long ſubſiſted a ſort of hereditary jealouſy and animoſity between the Danes and the Swedes; for the latter began to grow formidable in more reſpects than one, ever ſince Guſtavus Ericſon had changed not only the religion, but the warlike and commercial notions of Sweden. His Daniſh majeſty Chriſtian IV. diſpleaſed and mortified to contemplate the figure which his neighbours began to make in the ſyſtem of the North, and exaſperated likewiſe to find his ſubjects prohibited from trading with Riga, Courland, and Pruſſia, and their ſhips ſubjected to the capture of the Swedes, of courſe diſpatched a herald to Stockholm, and declared peremptorily a freſh war in all the ſolemn ceremonies conformably to the practices of that age.

* *Motifs pour la guerre d'Allemagne*, p. 176.

Charles IX. finding himſelf engaged againſt the Poles and the Moſcovites, had certain prudential reaſons for preferring a peace, and made various plauſible advances towards an accommodation, which was to be managed by the ſtates of the reſpective kingdoms, or by the interpoſition and mediation of neighbours and allies; but Chriſtian had a ſecret inclination to embroil matters, right or wrong, and of courſe opened the campaign by laying ſiege to Calmar and Elftſburg. Charles, enraged at ſuch an inſtance of irreconcileable obſtinacy, and being tired heartily with Daniſh wars from time to time, conceived a whimſical thought, correſpondent with the humour of the age, of ſending a challenge to this troubleſome and intermeddling adverſary, propoſing to decide the fate of the field in the compendious manner of ſingle combat. Chriſtian treated the propoſal as it ſeems to have juſtly merited, and in a very polite manner told him, that ſuch an enthuſiaſtic ſcheme ſavoured more of the knight-errant, than of the monarch; and that it was an inconſiderable object of glory for a middle-aged man to put to death an old one, whom nature would take care to remove out of the way very ſoon. Charles was then extremely infirm, having, about two years before, had a ſtroke of an hemiplegia, which put an end to his life ſome few weeks after he had ſent this letter of defiance to his antagoniſt. At firſt ſight, the behaviour of his Daniſh majeſty carries with it the appearance of greatneſs of mind, and perhaps the anſwer was truly heroical; yet the Swediſh nation formed other concluſions with reſpect to Chriſtian's magnanimity. Be that as it will, it is at this diſtance impoſſible to pronounce upon what grounds he declined the combat, whether from timidity or generoſity of ſpirit; or whether he conſidered a deciſion by duel as a raſh and unlawful action; or as matter of chivalry unbecoming the dignity of crowned heads. Thus much is certain and undeniable, that the gallantry of the propoſal touched and hurt him at the very moments he made it the ſubject of ridicule and raillery; for he attacked the Swediſh camp, where the king then lay, ſome few days afterwards, not without inconſiderable diſadvantage to the party attacked. Upon the death of Charles, he ſtill conceived more ſanguine expectations, for it was thought a long interregnum might prove very prejudicial to the affairs of Sweden; and the rather, as the kingdom at that juncture was involved in a diſagreeable war, not only againſt Denmark, but likewiſe with Poland and Moſcovy.

Here we may juſt obſerve as we go on, that it was the lot of Charles, Guſtavus's father, to be more concerned with propoſals of duels than had happened to any perſonage of his rank in that age; for about eleven years before, an

angry letter had been ſent to him by Zamoſki, firſt general to Sigiſmond king of Poland, a ſpirited old man, who was then high chancellor of the republic, to which Charles returned this ſhort note in Latin; *Non es mihi par; ſi par eſſes, non armis te, ſed fuſte depexum & unctum darem.* To which Zamoſki replied in a ſtyle more extraordinary, as it paſſed from a Poliſh nobleman to a perſon of Charles's rank and elevation; *Audiebam te hominem cerebroſum, &c.— Si non ſint in Polonia, per Dei gratiam proditores; in aula veſtra quærendi ſunt. Quicquid in me contumelioſum ſcripſeris aut dixeris, prorſus te* MENTIRI *dico, & dicam & ſcribam.— Jam deſino.*

Nevertheleſs, Charles, the father of the great Guſtavus, was brave in war, faithful in alliances, and ſincere to his friends; active to reward, and equally active to puniſh; for it was obſerved of him, even to a proverbial expreſſion, that the thunderbolt always ſucceeded the flaſh of lightning. True it is, that his temper took fire upon ſome occaſions to an eminent degree, and a part of this infirmity Guſtavus received from him, but the torrent ſoon ſubſided and grew calm, if nothing oppoſed it; and even in the tranſports of an impetuous paſſion, there always appeared an opening for better information and reconcilement. No king ever hated popery with more firmneſs, or upon better principles; and as to his plain good ſenſe, ſolidity and ſagacity, let thoſe preſages be a proof which he uniformly conceived from the young Guſtavus; for whenever the chiefs of the miniſtry and himſelf were puzzled upon any foreign or domeſtic difficulties, it was his cuſtom to call the child, who choſe always to play in the father's apartment, and laying his hand tenderly on his head, *There, gentlemen,* ſaid he, *this is the perſon who muſt unravel the intricacy, or repel the danger*; ILLE FACIET*.

Charles likewiſe gave Guſtavus an example of cultivating the arts of peace and war with equal application; for he took care to ſee juſtice ſpeedily and impartially adminiſtered; he exhibited annual penſions to thirty ſtudents, and levied all taxes with caution and delicacy; he applied himſelf aſſiduouſly to agriculture, mines, and commerce, in which latter inſtance he ſhewed ſo peculiar a fondneſs, that it was his conſtant cuſtom to go aboard all foreign ſhips on the ſummer evenings, and if the captain imported corn, ſalt, and ſuch like uſeful merchandizes, "Friend, ſaid he, you ſhall lade "back with good exchangeable commodities of iron and "copper;" but if the maſter of the veſſel brought matters of luxury and ſuperfluity, he uſed to ſay aloud to his attendants;

* *Loccenii Hiſtoria Suecana*, 4°. pagg. 502, 503. From this book M. Bayle has chiefly taken that ſketch he hath given us of the former part of the life of Guſtavus, which he never finiſhed; breaking off at the invaſion of Germany.

" Take care that this man be refreighted with Swediſh tur-
" nips *, and nothing elſe."

This illuſtrious prince arrived to the age of ſixty-one. It was told him on his death-bed † that general De la Gardie ‡ had obtained great ſucceſſes in the Ruſſian war, and ſettled various preliminaries concerning the advancement of his younger ſon Charles Philip to the ſtation of Czar; to which he replied with an air of compoſure, *That he reſigned all worldly cares into better hands*§, caſting an affectionate and earneſt look upon our Guſtavus. He married two wives, Anna Maria, daughter of Louis elector Palatine, who bore him two ſons and four daughters, all of whom died before they arrived to years of maturity, except the princeſs Catharina, who eſpouſed the count Palatine of the Rhine, and gave to the world Charles Louis, crowned, afterwards, king of Sweden under the title of Charles X. By his ſecond wife Chriſtina, daughter of Adolphus duke of Holſtein and Sleſwic, he had Guſtavus Adolphus, and Charles Philip lately mentioned, which latter prince was born in the year 1600, and died at Narva, January 25, 1622; as likewiſe Maria Elizabeth, who married John duke of Oſtrogothia; and by an illicit amour Charles Carolſon count de Gildenheim, high admiral of the Swediſh fleet when his half brother entered Germany.

Immediately on the death of Charles IX. all perſons ſeemed inclined to favour Guſtavus; and at the expiration of two months the queen dowager and John duke of Oſtrogothia, who, with Oxenſtiern and ſeveral ſenators, were the young prince's guardians, convened an aſſembly of the ſtates at Nicoping, where the right of ſucceſſion was firſt examined into, and ways and means afterwards conſidered whereby to propoſe a peace or truce with the Danes, Polanders, and Moſcovites, or continue the war with ſucceſs and vigour. Under the firſt head ſome few difficulties aroſe of no great moment. At length it was reſolved, unanimouſly, to remain by the hereditary *diſpoſition* which had been agreed upon at Norcopen in 1594; and with regard to a future war, which moſt people foreſaw and expected, it was determined to ſupport the young prince with reputation and ſpirit, and infuſe new activity into agriculture and commerce. Nor were the mines forgotten. Meanwhile it was thought expedient that duke John ſhould reſign all pretenſions to the throne of

* The bulb of this northern pine-apple, for the natives eſteem it as a ſort of delicacy, is ſomething of the ſize and figure of a ſoup-plate, but thicker at bottom. It is a vegetable I do not remember to have ſeen in our Engliſh gardens.

† He died Oct. 30, 1611.

‡ Guſtavus Adolphus always acknowledged to his dying day, that he learnt the art of war under this excellent preceptor. *Schefferi Memorabilia.*

§ *Loccenii Hiſt. Suec.* p. 301.

Sweden,

Sweden, being half brother to Sigiſmond king of Poland, and firſt couſin to Guſtavus; but more nearly related to the throne by the laws of conſanguinity, inaſmuch as he was the ſon of Guſtavus's father's elder brother; of courſe the kinſman generouſly added a part of Weſtergothia to his former appendage of Oſtrogothia. On the other hand, the dowager queen Chriſtina made a full reſignation of her regency, partly as her ſon had attained the age preſcribed by law *, and partly as they diſcovered in him talents and capacity which made him, in effect, a perſon of mature years and diſcretion †. It may be matter of ſome aſtoniſhment, why a youth of parts and courage, circumſtanced like prince John, who had arrived to due and lawful age conformably to the regulations of the Swediſh conſtitution, himſelf a ſoldier and not diſliked by the army, ſhould freely and voluntarily without a ſigh or a murmur reſign a throne, to which his pretenſions were not only juſtifiable, but ſtrictly legal! It is true the ſucceſſion had been ſettled, when John was a minor, upon Guſtavus, but that was no argument to a prince of ſpirit and magnanimity, inaſmuch as the ſame people had once ſettled the like political entail upon him ‡; and with reſpect to age and experience, according to the common courſe of things, he had the advantage over his couſin by five years, being at this very period twenty-two. Yet John, to the amazement of us at preſent, and all Europe in thoſe days, neither advanced his claims, nor retired from court, nor formed cabals and factions there, nor in the country, where he had great property, but on the contrary bore a command under his kinſman, and ſerved him in war and peace faithfully, cordially and vigorouſly, to his dying moments; and yet this prince was not void of ambition, as appears by the figure he choſe to make at the head of an army.

Now whether it was, that Guſtavus was ſo beloved by the people that nothing could give a man the chance of ſetting aſide the decrees of the ſenate; or whether John had the ſame prepoſſeſſions with the Swediſh nation in his behalf, diſcovering abilities in him which made him alone worthy to conduct the affairs of Sweden at that juncture, are matters we cannot preſume to explain diſtinctly at this diſtance from the fact itſelf. That he ſhould act likewiſe in perpetual oppoſition to his brother's, Sigiſmond, meaſures, deſcended indeed from another mother, appears to be a ſort of conduct that carries with it an air of particularity; nevertheleſs it may be reſolved into his ſincere and warm zeal for the Lutheran religion. Yet Sigiſ-

* It muſt here be obſerved, that in Sweden and Denmark the kings come to age in their eighteenth year, not concluded but commencing.

† *Introduction de Puffendorf*, tom. iv. 80, 81.

‡ *Secretary Fowler's Hiſtory* of the troubles of Suethland and Poland, Lond. fol. 1656, p. 111.

mond

mond was ſtill more nearly related to him than Guſtavus, nor did he want for ſolicitations, promiſes and temptations, as his Poliſh brother bore a determined hatred to the young king of Sweden.

In ſhort, John was either a prince of heroic gallantry, who preferred *that* ſyſtem, to his own prejudice, which appeared *beſt* for his country; or elſe dreaded to diſpute a ſucceſſion with one in whom he diſcovered abilities of all kinds far ſuperior to his own. But ſometimes great events are directed by private and ſcarcely perceptible motives; and perhaps the paſſion he bore for Guſtavus's ſiſter, whom he married the year enſuing, made him naturally eſteem the brother of his beloved object, whom, a war, concerning the ſucceſſion, might have ſeparated from him for ever. It is probable from the great expediency of a good underſtanding in this point, that the queen dowager talked in ſo high a ſtrain of authority and firmneſs to the Swediſh clergy when they made attempts to propoſe difficulties concerning the marriage.

This act of John, conſidered in whatever light we pleaſe, carries with it a fine ſpirit of heroiſm; for the ſame ſenators that ſettled the ſucceſſion upon Guſtavus had fixed it upon him ſome few years before. Yet he made a voluntary and cheerful reſignation of all pretenſions; except Guſtavus died without male or female iſſue; to his own immortal honour, and the perpetual advantage of Sweden. By all I can learn, he had no deſcendants.

Notwithſtanding all theſe favourable conceſſions, Guſtavus behaved himſelf with great moderation, and aſſured the ſenators in a public ſpeech, that his youth and inexperience on the one hand, and the great difficulties of ſtate affairs on the other hand, made him wiſh to decline ſuch a dangerous pre-eminence; *nevertheleſs*, continued he, *if the ſtates perſiſt to make me a king, I will endeavour to acquit myſelf with honour, magnanimity, and fidelity.* Before his inauguration he delivered to the Orders of ſtate what the Swedes call a paper of aſſecuration, whereby he declared *to preſerve the reformed religion till the laſt moments of his life; to maintain the rights of ſenator and ſubject; and reſpect his mother and relations with all that tenderneſs which conſanguinity is ſuppoſed to dictate.—Engaging and ſtipulating at the ſame time, to make no infraction on the laws of his anceſtors, nor offer new propoſals in reſpect to war, truces, treaties, or general taxes, except with the full and free conſent of the ſtates aſſembled.—That he would preſerve the received and eſtabliſhed formulary of church-ordination; protect and encourage the univerſity of Upſal, and the ſtate of learning in general,* of which he gave ſtrong proofs that very year; *that he would reform all common abuſes in the courts of judicature; and not only declare the names of ſtate-informers, if properly requeſted, but*

*but puniſh them, whenever in the courſe of trial they appeared guilty, according to the crimes and injuries they had committed.*

Theſe great conceſſions conveyed in effect much more power to the Swediſh nation than it could preſume to aſk; but a prince like Guſtavus, who determined always to act honeſtly and magnificently, preferred rather to depend on the generoſity and gratitude of the people, than on his own authority and political artifice. In conſequence of this declaration, ſigned at Nicoping, December 31, 1611, he received the ſacred communion, and paſſed through the ceremony of inauguration.

At the opening of the year 1612 the newly appointed king ſummoned a public convention of the ſtates, where the methods of adminiſtering the government at that juncture were firſt conſidered, as likewiſe ways and means whereby to eſtabliſh a truce or declare war againſt Poland; a reſumption being next made of all crown grants, which was confirmed afterwards by regal ſanction. He then publiſhed a memorial, this was towards the concluſion of the year, ſetting forth the uncertain returns of tythes* and feudal lands; that an account of the annual income ariſing from them ſhould be delivered every twelve months into the royal exchequer; and laſtly, that all grants which his majeſty propoſed not to reſume, ſhould receive, from his hand, a further confirmation before the concluſion of half a year. 1612.

The ſituation of Guſtavus was truly critical. Is it not amazing, that a youth who had but then turned the ſeventeenth year of his age, ſhould be able to confront on the one hand an indefatigable pretender to his throne and dominions, like the king of Poland, and two profeſſedly avowed opponents, the Dane and the Moſcovite; and have ſtrength likewiſe on the other hand to ſettle the interior parts of a kingdom but juſt rendered hereditary, and where every perſon of a certain birth and rank had equal claim, at leaſt according to the repreſentations of human partiality, and ſimilar pretenſions with himſelf? But the character of Guſtavus was unſhaken firmneſs†, and by his ſpirit he kept all his nobles in profound ſubjection, though at firſt, till they knew him better, they ſecretly repined to ſee a grandſon of a ſubject raiſed to a throne, and that throne appropriated to the family of Vaſa. Having thus made mankind acquainted with his ſteadineſs, he gave the world a new inſight into his character, as a prince of uncommon judgment and ſagacity, by one of the firſt ſteps he took after his inauguration; for he filled all the

* The tythes in Sweden make a conſiderable part of the crown revenue.

† *Memoirs communicated.*

public

public poſts civil and military with perſons of the moſt diſtinguiſhed merit in their reſpective departments, and placed Oxenſtiern, one of the ableſt ſtateſmen perhaps that ever appeared in the political world, at the head of domeſtic and foreign affairs. This was one of thoſe maſterly ſtrokes that determined the character of a man's life; and yet the idea was conceived by Guſtavus about the eighteenth year of his age; ſo that Oxenſtiern being then but twenty-eight or twenty-nine*, the diſproportion appears not ſo very extraordinary betwixt the ſovereign and the miniſter.

Oxenſtiern was a ſtateſman whom poſterity conſiders in the character of a man that has never been rivalled! and yet it is more than probable that Guſtavus was at leaſt his equal in political ſcience. Not that I would hereby manifeſt any inclination to depreciate the merit of the great and illuſtrious Riks-chancellor, whom I regard as highly as man can do on this ſide of that partiality which borders upon implicit veneration. He had fame enough from his own fund, not to ſtand in need of borrowing from another man's. Nevertheleſs it is my duty to do all poſſible juſtice to Guſtavus, ſince this ſingle circumſtance will hand him down to poſterity adorned with a double portion of ability and glory.

But omitting theſe conſiderations, the king had ſtill great demands for the aſſiſtance of Oxenſtiern; and, in truth, he had ſo much buſineſs upon his hands, whether as a warrior or as a ſtateſman, that it was neceſſary to admit a partner in the fatigues and honour both of government and war. Thus a king, of a caſt peculiar to himſelf, ſupported by ſuch a fellow-labourer in a life, alike, military and civil, produced ſuch a rapid and uninterrupted ſeries of great events, as neither ancient nor modern hiſtory can parrallel, if all difficulties and obſtructions come to be conſidered attentively and effectually, and not partially and ſuperficially. Laſtly, it muſt be obſerved, that the perſon taken into participation of employments with Guſtavus was not only a politician of the firſt claſs, but no inconſiderable general beſides. Nor muſt the reader blame me for beſtowing my encomiums ſo profuſely on Oxenſtiern, when at the ſame time we aſſure him that Urban VIII. one of the moſt clear-ſighted and ſenſible perſonages then in Europe, always conſidered the chancellor as a being of ſome ſuperior order.

Soon after the interval between the death of Charles IX. and the acceſſion of Guſtavus, the pacificator-general of Europe diſpatched Sir James Spence on an embaſſy into Sweden,

* By Miervelt's excellent print of him, engraven from life, he was but fifty-three years old in 1636.

exhort-

exhorting the young prince to manifeſt the ſame inclinations towards peace which his father had always diſcovered*. Guſtavus received the interpoſition of his Britannic majeſty with an air of frankneſs and cheerfulneſs, as likewiſe the kind interference of the ſtates-general; for, by the way, England and Holland wiſhed much to ſee the navigation of the Baltic free and undiſturbed. Of courſe a congreſs was appointed, where much diſquiſition paſſed between the chancellors of Sweden and Denmark, who ſuſtained the two principal characters in the debate. But though it might be matter of conſcience in a German hiſtorian to recite religiouſly every circumſtance in the whole tranſaction, of which the objections and ſolutions, the tergiverſations and overreachings, the ſuſpicions of a king's good faith, paſſed in days of minority, the punctilious ceremonies and chicaneries, were alike endleſs and inſignificant; yet it may ſuffice for us to leave theſe miniſters during a ſeaſon in their political ſtate of warfare, till the deputies of England in particular had time to adminiſter their gentler anodynes. The king their maſter had always a firm perſuaſion, grounded on his ſuppoſed ſkill in logic and ſchool-divinity, that he could compoſe the reſentments of two contending nations as eaſily as Virgil does the battles of the bees;

*Hi motus animorum, atque hæc certamina tanta*
*Pulveris exigui jactu compreſſa quieſcunt.*

Nevertheleſs, we fancy his Britannic majeſty pauſed a little upon the above-mentioned ceremonial difficulties, for a ſenſible foreigner aſſures us†, that he was very ſcrupulous in matters of form and precedency, refuſing to ſtand godfather to madame Elizabeth of France, in conjunction with the infanta Clara Eugenia, daughter and ſiſter to a king of Spain, and ſovereign of the Low Countries. Yet Anne, mother of Louis XIV. condeſcended to appear at the font with cardinal Richelieu, who was her ſubject.

Guſtavus, which was very extraordinary, if one conſiders the youthful fire and impetuoſity of a temper like his, gave ſtrong indications of acquieſcing cheerfully under all ſafe and honourable propoſals; but as the king of Denmark ſeemed to diſcover an unbecoming eagerneſs for cruſhing or overreaching a young inexperienced monarch, he ſoon gave that artful prince to underſtand, that he feared him no more in a field of battle, than at a table of conference. Here from the

* The letter, dated Whitehall, May 5, 1612, is to be ſeen in *Loccenius*, p. 516.

† *Memoires Hiſt. & Pol.* d'Amelot de la Houſſaye, tome i. 378.

very

very firſt beginning of war, he convinced the public, that great as his natural courage and vivacity were, and ſure a larger ſhare never became the portion of a human being, yet that his reaſon and good ſenſe ſtill maintained the aſcendancy over them; and therefore though it was natural for all byſtanders to conclude, that a young prince full of enthuſiaſtical gallantry, deſpiſing the objections of friends, and the obſtructions of enemies, would have began the campaign againſt Denmark by undertaking the ſiege of Calmar, an important place ſurrendered baſely the year preceding, on the contrary, revolving the enterpriſe long in his mind, and more particularly the ſtrength of the new fortifications, his correct judgment ſoon got the better of his vivacity; foraſmuch as he foreſaw the hazard and diſappointment that might attend ſuch an undertaking; and for theſe reaſons he carried the ſeat of war into Schonen, to which Chriſtian had retired, and commanded his couſin John, who had raiſed an army in his own duchy, and wanted to co-operate againſt the Danes, to make a diverſion in Oſtrogothia, and ſuccour Elfsburg. He then invaded the Daniſh territories a ſecond time, though the ſenate requeſted him not to hazard his perſon too far, and made repriſals, with great advantage, notwithſtanding his enemy had received a reinforcement of ſome German troops under the command of George duke of Lunenburg*; but whether theſe forces were diſpatched by the emperor's connivance or not, that being a point of great conſequence in the hiſtory of Guſtavus, with reference to his future invaſion of the German empire, is more than I can take upon me to determine in a ſatisfactory manner. Leaving theſe things therefore in the doubtful ſtate we find them, Guſtavus laid ſiege to Elſenberg; wiſely foreſeeing, that in rendering himſelf maſter of this paſſage and harbour, he ſhould prevent the arrival of freſh ſuccours from Denmark, and obſtruct the retreat of ſuch Danes and Germans as had entered into Sweden; having placed garriſons to hinder their march, in all the for-

* *Hiſtoires generales des guerres & mouvements arrivéz en divers eſtats du monde ſous le regne de Louis* XIII. *depuis l'an* 1610 *juſqu'à l'an* 1637, en trois tomes 8°. *Loccenii Hiſt. Suec.* p. 507. This prince was afterwards general of the proteſtant troops in Lower Saxony, and elected protector of the circle: but being diſplaced by the artful inſinuations of the king of Denmark, ſubmitted to the emperor on the defeat of his Daniſh majeſty at the battle of Lütter 1626, and joined the Imperial army with his own regiment. He had, for a time, in the next year, the chief command of Walſtein's troops before Stralſund, but on ſome diſguſt joined Guſtavus, who replaced him in his old employment. He gained a ſignal victory over Merodé and Gronsfelt at the battle of Oldendorp, 1633; but quitted the Swediſh ſervice in 1637, and died in 1641.

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tified towns that laid between them and their native country. During this expedition the Danes ſurprized a part of the king's troops by night*, and a report was ſpread, that took its riſe from the enemy, that Guſtavus was killed, which threw his mother into agonies of affliction; but an expreſs from her careful and affectionate child ſoon reſtored her to her former tranquillity. He then marched the reſidue of his army into Norway, and made a furious irruption into thoſe parts. To relate every ſingle event of this campaign againſt the Danes would only prove minute and tedious. It may ſuffice to obſerve, that the king had three little armies on foot; the firſt led by himſelf, the ſecond in Halland, conducted by his couſin John, and a third on the confines, under the command of general Cruſe. Duke John received a ſlight repulſe in a ſkirmiſh with Chriſtian king of Denmark, and the duke of Lunenburg and Cruſe took Nyloſia, where 300 of the garriſon enrolled themſelves under the Swediſh enſigns, but wanted ſtrength to reduce Marſtrand. Meanwhile Guſtavus collected together ſeveral regiments of infantry in the Low Countries, with a ſmall body of mariners; and gave public commiſſions to various Dutch privateers to interrupt the naval commerce of Denmark †.

For all this our young monarch laboured under ſome difficulties highly diſagreeable; for though his enemy on the other hand, Sigiſmond king of Poland, whom of all his adverſaries he moſt diſliked perſonally, and that for reaſons which may eaſily be conjectured ‡, had employed himſelf this year in oppoſing the Moſcovites, yet he contrived to create freſh buſineſs for Guſtavus in the province of Livonia, where he was obliged to maintain a conſiderable body of veteran troops, having a diſtrict to defend of 180 miles long, and 90 broad, ſurnamed by the Swedes Carelia, as it had been conquered by Charles their late king. Guſtavus having half finiſhed his irruption into Norway, found himſelf obliged to make his perſonal appearance in Carelia. At that inſtant Chriſtian reimbarked his troops, and invaded Weſtergothia a ſecond time, where he rendered himſelf maſter of Elfen-

* In the firſt edition, inſtead of a *ſurprize by night* it was called a CAMISADO, which Dr. Johnſon in his *Dictionary* derives from *camiſa, Ital.* a ſhirt. Now the Italian word is *camicia*, and, by analogy of formation, its derivative muſt be *camiciata*. Though ignorant of the Spaniſh, I rather ſuſpect the word *camiſade* to come immediately from that language, though by an origin common to both languages in queſtion. There is no ſuch a word as *Camiciata* in the beſt *Ital.* Vocabularies, nor any word like it.—Dr. G. Aldrich's private communication.

† *Introduct. de Puffendorf*, tom. iv. 81.

‡ *Schefferi Memorab. Suec. Gentis*, 42.

berg

berg and Goltzberg; and having penetrated above ſixty miles into the country, commenced, at length, the ſiege of Jencop, which gave him an entrance into the heart of Sweden. This new and unexpected invaſion threw Guſtavus into great perplexity; he had two games to play, both, not in themſelves, but as circumſtances then ſtood, equally intereſting. At length not caring to ſacrifice his army by a long and precipitate march, the moſt troubleſome difficulty that can befal a general who is to defend an invaded maritime territory, he ordered the governor of Jencop to ruin the town and adjacent diſtrict, and retire with his garriſon into the caſtle. This grand ſtroke of ſuperior judgment ſoon carried its advantages with it; yet in ſpite of all theſe arts of management and precaution, our young hero, though he conſidered Sigiſmond as an imperfect warrior to a certain degree, ſoon found Chriſtian* to be a ſoldier that had acquired a correct judgment, by a ſeries of misfortunes and ill ſucceſs; for Chriſtian not only intrenched himſelf judiciouſly, and declined fighting, but took his meaſures, upon ſuch principles, that he created obſtructions and delays, and made them ariſe from the very nature of his own plan. Thus, by perpetual checks, he blunted the impetuoſity of our young aſſailant, mortified his hopes, and wearied out his patience; ſo that Guſtavus finding he could not act in the way he choſe, nor ſhine in that ſort of military character he was ambitious of appearing in, equally great in every thing, great in repulſes and diſappointments, as well as in proſperity and victories, dropped his ſcheme, and made a peace, principally by the mediation of England, to the aſtoniſhment of all Europe. Indeed it cannot but ſurprize poſterity too, that a prince in the eighteenth year of his age, as perſonally brave perhaps as any ſoldier that ſerved under him, not to mention the rage and deſpair that diſappointment produces in young impetuous minds, that ſuch a prince, I ſay, in ſuch circum-

* Chriſtian IV. king of Denmark, ſucceeded his father in 1588, being then about twelve years old. He died, turned of ſeventy-one, having reigned, in effect, near threeſcore years, though not crowned till 1596. He told d'Avaux the French ambaſſador, that he was not only, at that time, the oldeſt king in Chriſtendom, but that he had ſeen three changes of ſovereigns in almoſt all the kingdoms and principalities of Europe. The ſame remark might have been made afterwards by Louis XIV. He had three horſes killed under him at the battle of Lütter. There is a good picture of him at Hampton-Court, painted by Vanſomer.

Nor may it be amiſs to tranſcribe what a Spaniſh author ſays concerning him. *Rey que en ſettenta annos de edad fatiga lo que otros a veynté, y que eſtos ultimos ſolre tantas preuvas de ſu valor, en diſgracia tubo dicha de accreditarle con un ojo perdido de un cannonazo, paleando en ſus naves.* *Epitome of Cæſar's Commentaries by the Baron d'Auchy.*

ſtances

ſtances ſhould make a free ſacrifice of what he then thought his only fame, and liſten with the cooleſt attention to the ſtrict doctrine of good ſenſe and right reaſon. Other warriors are ſo fortunately circumſtanced as to enter upon the theatre of action, ſurrounded and adorned with a blaze of glory; nor does their character, in general, increaſe proportionably to the more important ſervices they are afterwards engaged in. On the contrary Guſtavus began the military life, if not unproſperouſly*, at leaſt in a manner that was neither ſhining nor triumphant. Yet ſedate and ſenſible people ſoon perceived the young man's merit, for they diſcovered in him equal mixtures, both in the higheſt degree, of judgment and bravery; and thence prefigured to themſelves great events at their proper period. From this moment the clear-ſighted Spinola †, as far removed from Sweden as the Low Countries, aſſumed, in right of his age and experience, the gift of preſaging, and foretold that Guſtavus might become one day or other the firſt commander in Europe ‡. He had three adverſaries driving furiouſly § at his ruin in one ſtrict confederacy, all his ſeniors in point of war, and more experienced, and each his equal, if we conſider their riches, poſſeſſions, and quantity of troops;

* *Bayle*'s diſcourſe on Guſtavus Adolphus.

† This great man was originally a Genoeſe merchant. His ſiege of Breda was an illuſtrious action. Fearful of ruining his fair reputation, he was very unwilling to undertake it; but the king of Spain's remarkable letter determined him:

"Marquis;
"Take Breda.
"I the king."—

And this by the way is the origin of thoſe brief military letters which have been ſince ſo greatly admired.

He was appointed governor of Milan a little before his death; but, notwithſtanding all his ſervices, the Spaniards looked coldly upon him for concluding the truce with Mazarine, as alſo for want of ſucceſs in the ſiege of Caſal, and upon ſuſpicion that he held a criminal correſpondence with Richelieu. He died of a broken heart in great agitation, at a fort of his own erecting, called Scrivia, September 15, 1630, graſping the king's, his maſter's letters in his hand, and crying out day and night, *M'hanno levato l'honore, m'hanno levato l'honore!* Indeed Philip IV. and the Spaniſh miniſtry behaved towards him with unparalleled ingratitude, for they refuſed to defray the debts he had contracted for the ſupport of the army; and, on the contrary, ſequeſtered, to that purpoſe, the eſtates he had purchaſed; ſo that his ſon thought it beſt œconomy to decline all attempts of taking poſſeſſion. *Hiſpanicæ Dominationis Arcana*, p. 115. Yet in favour to his memory as a ſoldier, and in confirmation of what occaſioned this note, he had ſagacity enough to declare again, namely, immediately after the battle of Prague in 1620, *that Guſtavus was the only proteſtant prince who ought not to be provoked. Heylmanno Leo Arctoüs*, 4°. 1703. See more in the *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illuſtri.* 4°. in Rom. 1646, p. 264, &c.

‡ *Heylmanni Leo Arctoüs*, 4°.

§ *Memoriale al Duca di Savoya nel* 1636. *MS. penes authorem.* pagg. 21. fol.

ſo that negative glory, in a caſe circumſtanced like his, was equal to poſitive glory in the general ſituation of others. What therefore the fire of paſſion could not effect, and warmth of temper was the only conſtitutional infirmity interwoven with his nature, the cool reflection of reaſon quickly brought to a fortunate concluſion. Then to make manifeſt, to the world, his generous ſentiments concerning religion, he eſtabliſhed a church at Stockholm, for the comfort of ſuch Germans as had left their country on account of religion.

An extraordinary event, which happened in the courſe of this year, made it plain that Guſtavus inherited a portion of his firmneſs from Chriſtina his mother; for when John duke of Oſtrogothia, who was then but twenty-three years old, conceived the idea of eſpouſing Maria Elizabetha, the young king's ſiſter, and his own firſt couſin, the principal eccleſiaſtics of Sweden oppoſed this marriage violently in the aſſembly of the ſtates, as contradictory to the laws of Scripture *; but the queen told them with an air of deciſion, That ſhe had held private conferences with various learned and pious churchmen on the ſubject in queſtion, and finding nothing therein repugnant to God's word, had made her mind and conſcience entirely eaſy; adding, moreover, that their oppoſition was alike unſeaſonable and improper, ſince they all knew that the young people had publicly exchanged their promiſes two years before. "You give me," ſaid ſhe, "advice, which "I no ways aſk; for when popiſh power, and popiſh ſubtle-"ties are once aboliſhed, it ſeems to me that the affairs of "marriage appertain to the ſecular as well as to the clerical "governors;" I am here reciting the queen's own words, agreeable to the memoirs that lie before me, "and therefore," concluded ſhe, "give me no farther trouble concerning the "preſent difficulty; for your retardments proceed more from "a ſpirit of perplexing matters than a love of peace."

Perhaps the reader may doubt how a prince of John's age could be brother to Sigiſmond king of Poland, there being twenty-three years difference between their reſpective dates of birth. But their father, after having lived in marriage twenty-one years with Catharina of Poland, eſpouſed at her death a young Swediſh woman of quality, and John was the produce of theſe ſecond nuptials †.

Whilſt the congreſs lately mentioned was very buſy about mere nothings, two other eminent perſonages, for Sir
1613. John Merrick had been diſpatched ſome months before, preſented themſelves on the part of England, namely,

* *Introduct. de Puffendorf*, tom. iv. 88.
† *Genealogiæ Ritterſhuſii*, fol.

Sir

Sir John Merrick, and Anſtruther*; the firſt was ſent expreſsly to Guſtavus, the other only the Britannic ambaſſador at Copenhagen; the former a good Swede, the latter a well-wiſher to the Danes, and who, of courſe, created delays, and deferred his journey to the very laſt moment. On his arrival he ſent his ſecretary to Spence, who was favourable to the cauſe of Sweden, with intimations to him, that his majeſty of Denmark would no ways allow him, Anſtruther, to make the firſt viſit, and of courſe, requeſting Spence to come to his tent without heſitation. The latter informed, immediately gave information of this extraordinary meſſage to Oxenſtiern, who broke forth into a flame all at once, proteſting loudly that it was amazing inſolence on the part of Denmark to demand precedence over Sweden from pleas of dignity and ſuperiority; and that the contrary practice had ever been well underſtood in all public communications between the two kingdoms. At length, it was agreed that the two Britons ſhould meet at a place appointed, which was ſituated half way between their reſpective tents. Merrick and Spence both acted with great caution and impartiality towards the contending parties, ſo that Guſtavus opportunely and dexterouſly lent a willing ear to all their propoſals, and after a ſtrange variety of delays, obſtructions, and punctilios, the treaty was ſigned January 19, 1613†. For particular reaſons it had no preamble, nor was any guaranty admitted, for the king of Denmark could not bear to hear the Hollanders mentioned‡.

What privately diſpoſed Guſtavus to liſten to an accommodation, was the deplorable and wretched ſtate of the Swediſh marine, at the time he contended with a prince not contemptible for naval forces. As he knew the extraordinary advantages of maritime ſtrength, ſo he foreſaw, likewiſe, that ſuch a power could not be created but by perſeverance and induſtry, and he therefore choſe to obtain a little intermiſſion with reſpect to Denmark. Indeed he had ſtrong reaſons to ſupport a project of that nature; nor did he ever ſwerve, to the hour of his death, from this firſt idea; for Chriſtian, the preceding ſummer, had made a deſcent near Stockholm, and miſſed little of deſtroying the capital; which indeed may be conſidered as the fineſt military performance in that prince's life; but Guſtavus took care to render the attempt abortive. His next buſineſs was to procure the beſt officers and mariners he could from the dominions of the States General and the Hanſe towns.

* *Loccenii* Hiſt. Suecan. 521.

† The treaty may be ſeen in *Loccenius. Hiſt. Suecan.* p. 522.

‡ *Introduct. de Puffendorf.* tom. iv.

But to return to the treaty, which was long and tedious; for half the debate turned upon matters of heraldry and titles. At laſt the concluſion, which alone carried with it the leaſt glimmering of good policy and ſound ſenſe, was, that his Daniſh majeſty ſhould reſtore Calmar, &c. and keep poſſeſſion of Elfsburg, till Guſtavus refunded ſome ſatisfactory equivalent. In a word, the Danes demanded one hundred and eighty thouſand pounds by way of indemnification; allowing the Swedes to call the payment of that money either a reimburſement, or a gratuity, as beſt pleaſed them; referring the full and ultimate deciſion to James I. who was to ſign the treaty in the character of a perſon intereſted. By the unwearied interpoſition of the Britiſh miniſters, it was however concluded to make a very ſmall part of the demand ſupply the place of the whole, and aſſign the delivery of certain fortreſſes by way of hypotheque or ſecurity. Terms of very hard and difficult digeſtion! But Guſtavus was well diſpoſed and tractable, and the ſenate without farther delay deviſed means and expedients for diſcharging the debt. In conſequence of this, the principal reſult was, that both kings were allowed to bear the three crowns for their arms. Chriſtian was to make no pretenſions to Sweden by virtue of this conceſſion, and Guſtavus on the other hand was not to take the title of king of Lapland.

From all that has been ſaid, it will appear plainly to the reader, that reaſons of prudence induced Guſtavus to conclude this peace, though at that very time he had made a progress in war which ſurprized all Europe: for it may be worth obſerving here, once for all, that he, Condé, and his own diſciple Torſtenſon, were the only three generals who at twenty years of age ſhewed the public all the effects of long experience. Nevertheleſs, the king concluded this peace *ſub clypeo tantum*, according to the advice of his ſenate upon another occaſion, for he levied, juſt before, two good regiments in Scotland and the Low Countries, and hired likewiſe from the Scottiſh nation fifteen ſhips, which plundered the town and diſtrict of Drontheim, and ſailed afterwards to the ſouthermoſt ſhores of Sweden *.

The demands of Denmark being thus ſatisfied, it was thought expedient in the next place, to enter into a
1614. fifteen years treaty of commerce and mutual guaranty with the States General; and for this purpoſe Guſtavus diſpatched Van Dyck, a favourite miniſter with his father, in an embaſſy to Holland, where the whole affair was concluded both effectually and ſpeedily. As to the interior management

* *Introduct. de Puffendorf*, tom. iv. p. 84.

of

of Sweden, due and ſufficient care was taken both of cities and countries, and better means were deviſed for exerciſing trade and commerce, as well by natives as foreigners. The farmers and peaſants were excuſed from ſupplying horſes and carriages gratis to the king's armies; nor muſt it be forgotten, that, though Guſtavus from a principle of ſincere religion, as well as ſolid policy, had an earneſt deſire to make his dominions the aſylum of all virtuous and induſtrious emigrants, from other countries, whether papiſts or proteſtants, yet ſtill one remarkable reſtriction was intermixed with the royal edict, namely, that no foreigner nor baniſhed perſon ſhould preſume to enter the kingdom without bringing with him teſtimonial letters concerning his religious and moral deportment from perſons of character. After this a ſociety of trade was eſtabliſhed at Stockholm, where each party, who enrolled himſelf voluntarily, undertook to advance the king certain ſums, none leſs than twenty pounds, at 12 *per cent.* and to encourage this ſubſcription, the perſons contributing were exempted from taxes for three years. 1614.

Deliberations had been held likewiſe, and royal conſtitutions made public, with reſpect to money, impoſts, and certain immunities from taxes, diſtinct from thoſe already mentioned. All poſſible precautions were taken to eſtabliſh a peace with Moſcovy and Poland; nor did this great and good king, amidſt all his perplexities and difficulties, forget to regulate the lectures, diſcipline, and morality of the univerſity of Upſal. It was then concluded that his majeſty ought to propoſe a peace with Moſcovy ſword in hand; after which enſued a royal edict relating to the jeſuits, whom the king diſliked more than any ſet of men in the Chriſtian world; and the buſineſs was cloſed with, what ſome hiſtorians miſcall, the *famous edict againſt metaphyſics*, upon ſuppoſition, as they falſely imagined, that he had conceived an averſion to theſe trifling ſtudies. But the truth of the matter appears to me in another light. Guſtavus had his political reaſons for taking this ſtep; Poland was the fountain-head of ſuch ſort of reveries; and a tribe of refining ſchoolmen had given philoſophical laws to all Europe in that reſpect. The Swedes for theſe reaſons flocked in great numbers to the univerſities of Warſaw and Cracow, and imbibed ſentiments favourable to Sigiſmond, and conſequently adverſe to Guſtavus. Hence it was that the metaphyſical ſcience was made only the poor ſcape-goat upon which our monarch wreaked his juſt reſentments, condemning it in the character of a politician, and not of a philoſopher. In conſequence of this, a ſubſequent law was made public, whereof the purport was, that no young man of quality or condition ſhould quit the kingdom without a paſſport firſt obtained from

the crown, with proviſo not to ſolicit leave to proſecute his philoſophical ſtudies and military exerciſe in a ſuſpected place*.

To reſume the affairs of Sweden and Denmark. Guſtavus having embraced, in the critical moments, a flying and caſual incident, which ſerved to throw his Daniſh majeſty into a ſtate of inaction, the perſon of his three aſſailants he diſliked the moſt, for he was cool and reſerved, and likewiſe beſt underſtood the profeſſion of war, found ſtill more work than he choſe, in being obliged to carry on a ſort of barbarian campaign againſt the great duke of Moſcovy and the king of Poland. To underſtand this ſituation more clearly with reſpect to the former, we muſt go back a little, and obſerve, that Guſtavus's father had ſent troops to aſſiſt the czar Baſil againſt the enterpriſes of Sigiſmond, by which aſſiſtance the Swedes privately hoped to procure prince Charles, Guſtavus's brother, to be choſen grand duke. The Polanders on the other hand expected that Sigiſmond might happen to be elected, or Uladiſlaüs, his ſon. The Moſcovites overlooked the pretenſions and expectancies of both parties, and, following their own free choice, relied entirely upon a genuine deſcendant of the Demetrian race; upon which the new czar, by way of gratitude, declared war immediately againſt Sweden.

Here it is thought by many, for diſſimulation will not become a faithful or accurate hiſtorian, that Charles Philip, Guſtavus's brother, might have been elected great duke of the Ruſſias; yet though the king loved him tenderly, he was at the ſame time too good a politician to wiſh to ſee that event accompliſhed, being well apprized that certain elevations to power and dignity might remove a brother beyond the reach of brotherly friendſhip. Of courſe he retarded Charles's journey by ſo many imperceptible delays, having, it is imagined, ſome thoughts of being elected himſelf, till at length the Moſcovites fixed their choice upon another object†.

Notwithſtanding the laſt-mentioned opinion, which has been ſuggeſted to me, it appears highly probable, from hiſtory, that Guſtavus, who had then other affairs of ſtill more importance upon his hands, never truly and actually impeded the election of his brother or of himſelf. The fact was, that the people of Novogrod had entered into a negotiation with Charles's agents, and theſe perſons were ſincerely in earneſt, for they made him an offer of their own duchy, without preſuming to become anſwerable for the reſt of the Moſcovites; but the prince preferred a quiet and well ſettled appennage at home, for he enjoyed four duchies and the Valenſian territory, &c. to a litigious and turbulent poſſeſſion amidſt a multitude of

* Anno 1620. † *Memoirs communicated.*

barbarians.

barbarians. *Carolus ſe ab illis vana ſpe lactatum eſſe ſentiens, & rem juſtæ vindictæ a rege fratre & ſe ſuo tempore in mobilem gentem exercendæ committens, inde abiit**.

The life of a prince like Guſtavus, may be juſtly divided into two portions, the one civil, and the other military; ſince we can hardly diſcover a ſingle moment aſſigned 1615. for relaxation or amuſement; and as to pleaſure there was neither room to receive, nor time to indulge it. Nevertheleſs, if Guſtavus had at any time leiſure to caſt his eyes on books of politics and hiſtory, for, in fact, we find him eminently converſant not only in theſe ſtudies, but in claſſical learning, tactics, and mathematics, it muſt have been principally in the years 1615 and 1616; and yet, notwithſtanding this remark, a period may be very buſy, and not void of occupations and perplexities, though nothing appears ſufficient to make a ſhining figure in future annals. This is certain, that the king paſſed whole nights in reading the military hiſtory of the antients, and often uſed to ſay, that the invention of fire-arms, and the art of fortifying places, made a wide difference between us and them, yet that a man who poſſeſſed the courage of the heroes of antiquity might perform actions as illuſtrious as theirs. The continuation of Foreſti produces the example of Guſtavus upon this occaſion to ſhew, that much may be learnt from the antients in point of war, though the manner of attack and defence, at preſent, be widely different from what was practiſed by the Greeks and Romans. There is reaſon for entertaining the reader with this remark, for the knowledge of plans of battles and fortifications makes but half the ſcience which belongs to a general: it is military and civil policy that help to complete the other half, and theſe the antients knew as well as the moderns†.

It may ſuffice therefore to obſerve, that in the beginning of the year 1615 he convened the ſtates and orders of the realm at Helſingford‡, where, amongſt many other important tranſactions, he introduced and finiſhed one of the greateſt acts that a king can perform in times of peace: he publiſhed an edict to abridge the tedioufneſs and expence of law-ſuits, eſpecially in matters of regal judicature, and preſcribed the form and manner how theſe proceedings were to be ſhortened. The glorious conſequences of this have been enjoyed by Sweden, more or leſs, to this preſent hour, for no king, as the Swedes

* *Loccenii Hiſt. Suec.* lib. viii. 523.

† *Reflexions Militaires & Politiques traduites de l'Eſpagnol de M. le Marq. de Santa Cruz de Marzenado*, tom. i. 27. A valuable work, 12 tomes, 12°.

‡ January 19.

acknowledge to this very day, ever deviſed more ſalutary or more ſenſible laws, than Guſtavus Adolphus *.

His majeſty then, to give every action of his life the faireſt and moſt candid appearance, deputed Oxenſtiern ambaſſador to Chriſtian IV. king of Denmark, with inſtructions to explain to him, amongſt other things, the ſincere and honourable intentions that Sweden bore with reſpect to Moſcovy and Poland, and particularly in regard to a permanent, ſubſtantial, and well-concerted peace; and, as a proof thereof, diſpatched on the ſame errand, though without ſucceſs, Everard Horn, general De la Gardie, and a third deputy to the court of Ruſſia; but the czar remained inflexible, and of courſe a war could not be avoided. This reſolution did not greatly diſcompoſe Guſtavus; and, in this one inſtance, the king of Poland thought fit to join him. Nor did he much diſlike the military abilities of his new opponent, being a warrior far inferior to his late Daniſh adverſary; and indeed his great object in the preſent expedition was not making conqueſts, but ſecuring to his ſubjects a firm and laſting peace, and fixing the affairs of public good faith upon ſolid foundations. The cauſe of this quarrel on the part of Sweden, was a refuſal the Moſcovites made of reimburſing to the ſtates of Sweden a very conſiderable ſum of money, which they had generouſly advanced to ſupply their neceſſities.

Provoked at ſuch an act of ingratitude, his Swediſh majeſty ſoon rendered himſelf maſter of the vaſt province of Ingria, and took, by ſtorm, the ſtrong fort of Kexholm, till then looked upon impregnable. In the next place he formed the ſiege of Pleſko, of which the event appeared doubtful to all, but men of great and enterpriſing genius; and ſo much the more, as the wintry ſeaſon was approaching †; but his majeſty of Great Britain, at the requeſt of the Moſcovites, graciouſly interpoſed his pacific offices, and, in conſequence, Guſtavus wrote Sir John Merrick an extremely civil and generous letter ‡, remarking here and there caſually, "That "he beſieged Pleſko, not from the ambition of taking a "fortreſs ſuppoſed impregnable, but with a view to force "the enemy into conditions of peace, by an unexpected "ſtroke, which carried with it the appearance of performing

* Introduction de *Puffendorf*, tom. iv. 94. Theſe regulations were publiſhed by authority.

† During this difficult and perilous ſiege, his majeſty defeated an army of 24,000 Moſcovites, near the confines of Livonia and Ruſſia. *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illuſtri.* 4°, in Roma, 1646.

‡ The whole letter, dated from Narva, November 30, 1615, is preſerved by *Loccenius*, p. 525.

"ſome

" ſomething in the art of war.—All the former part of which, " ſaid he to Merrick, you have known to be true, and have " beheld likewiſe the obſtinacy of the Ruſſians, and their in- " fidelity.——Hearing no propoſals with reſpect to an ac- " commodation, I had reduced the place to the very point of " capitulating: but notwithſtanding all my fatigues, ex- " pences, and military loſſes, upon proviſo the Moſcovites " be duly and juſtly reſtrained for times to come, I lay my " glory a ſacrifice at the feet of England, with a view to con- " vince mankind in general, that I waged this war not from " motives of ambition, for my territories are ſufficiently " large and powerful, but from the mere compulſion and ne- " ceſſity of things.——It ever has been, and is ſtill my incli " nation to cultivate peace and friendſhip with all my neigh " bours.——This upon juſt and honourable terms is moſt " agreeable to my natural temper. But if a lawful war is " not to be healed by conciliatory and reputable meaſures; " *We can embrace it with reſolution.*" Thus the king contented himſelf with reflecting coolly, even in the earlier parts of life, That the greateſt generals are not indiſpenſably obliged to render themſelves maſters of every town they think fit to beſiege*.

Nevertheleſs it muſt be obſerved in regard to the momory of James I. *O ſi ſic omnia feciſſet!* that the conditions of agreement were good and honourable; for the enemy refunded to the Swedes a conſiderable ſum of money, under appearance of making amends for the expences of the war, and ceded a large part of the continent of Moſcovy; ſo that thoſe who loved to foretell events, even then, ſaid, ſo promiſing were the beginnings of our hero's life, that he had made good in *one* part that line of conqueſt on earth which correſponded with the draught firſt ſketched out for him by Tycho Brahè in the celeſtial regions †. Nor ought we to forget, that it was in this campaign he firſt formed and ſeaſoned that invincible body of troops called the Finlanders, and at the concluſion, having brought the national ſoldiers in general to a more ſteady and regular ſort of diſcipline, he diſbanded a

* *Bayle*'s Introduction to the Life of Guſtavus Adolphus.

† This calculation was made in 1572. See *The new Star of the North*, Lond. 4°. 1632. page 1 to 23. The following may be added from the *Pattniana*, p. 7. La Vie de Tycho Brahé à été compoſée par le bon M. Gaſſendi. Ce fut ce Tycho Brahé qui dans le traité qu'il fit de la comete l'an 1674 (qu. if not 1672) qui diſparut à la mort de Charles XII. apres avoir duré depuis le maſſacre de la S. Barthélemi, a dit qu'en vertu de cet etoile naitroit vers le nord dans la Finlande un prince qui ebranleroit l'Allemagne & qui diſparaitroit en fin de l'an 1632. Voilà preciſement GUSTAVE ADOLPHE, roi de Suede. See alſo *Pietro Pomo*; Guerre di Germ. lib. v. p. 5.

large

large corps of foreign veterans, partly to redreſs the ſilent murmurings of his ſubjects, and partly becauſe he ſtood leſs in want of their aſſiſtance.

It was likewiſe during the military operations of this ſummer, if after all my enquiries I am not greatly miſtaken *, that Guſtavus in the twenty-firſt year of his age gave an extraordinary proof of his enterpriſing genius, declaring to all his officers, that he would lay ſiege to Notteberg-caſtle, a place, by each of his generals, looked upon to be impregnable, being ſituated on a ſmall iſland at the mouth of the Narva, more than cannon-ſhot from either ſhore; the conflux of waters on all ſides being extremely rapid and violent. Repreſentations on repreſentations were offered, but our young hero, like another Joſhua, landed his forces, and took, by capitulation, the fortreſs, in which were found proviſions and ammunition abundantly ſufficient to ſupply the garriſon for a twelvemonth's ſiege.

Upon this Guſtavus returned home: and enjoying, for a ſhort ſpace, a moderate repoſe, which may be called almoſt the only one he ever taſted from the early parts of youth to the laſt moments of his life, applied himſelf with uncommon diligence to comprehend the true nature of commerce, and rendered himſelf maſter of that grand monarchical ſcience, the art of eaſing, as much as in him lay, the taxes of his people. No where appeared he greater than in the ſpeech † he made to his ſenators at the commencement of the year, when it was neceſſary to explain his private ſentiments in the debate concerning the Ruſſian war. This he performed with all that attractive grace and dignity which eloquence could inſpire or reaſon confirm; obviating and overturning the charge of ambition which ſome of his ſubjects tacitly brought againſt him in their own breaſts; and explaining, and anſwering at the ſame time, the inſinuations of certain malevolent libels, which his couſin Sigiſmond had taken care to get diſperſed through Sweden. Thus he at once charmed his ſubjects, and convinced them, that his ambition extended no farther than a brave and prudent prince ought to point it. Of courſe one uniform univerſal aſſent enſued, and the ſtates and orders granted him all the ſupplies that could be thought neceſſary.

Whoever carefully peruſes the ſpeech I have mentioned, though it is rather too long to be inſerted, will find a difficult

* The author of the *Swediſh Intelligencer* places this event in 1617, which appears to me improbable. *Character of Guſtavus*, Part iii. p. 184.

† This maſter-piece of good ſenſe and oratory conſiſts of eight pages in quarto, and may be peruſed in *Loccenius*, pagg. 526—533. See alſo the APPENDIX, Art. I.

taſk to abſtain from admiring the eloquence of Guſtavus, which muſt have ſuffered greatly by being tranſlated into Northern Latin. Yet mere oratory being little more than one of the *ſpecioſa miracula* in the art of reaſoning, we ſhall not fix our principal encomium upon that topic. It is the *clear judgment* of Guſtavus which we moſt admire; the poſſeſſing an object in the ſingle point of view which is *alone material*. As to *wit*, it no where appears that he aimed at it: though he ſeems to have had a natural turn to *repartee* and *humour*; but there is a poignancy and propriety in all his ſpeeches, replies and rejoinders; and ſuch I may ſay, as ſerve to mark him from every other man. Not but that upon particular occaſions he could expatiate with all the charms of the moſt perſuaſive eloquence, of which no farther proofs need be alledged than the ſpeech now before us, and thoſe ſpoken at Erford and Nurenberg; but the cloſer the engagement was, the more the *vis vivida* of his genius ſhone forth; and therefore he always choſe to diſcuſs matters perſonally with foreign miniſters, and dictate all important inſtructions to his own ambaſſadors. Conſcious of his abilities in private conference, he ſolicited an interview with Chriſtian of Denmark, one of the moſt ſubtil politicians of that age, and obtained the effect deſired; he made the ſame propoſal to Louis XIII. but that prince had juſt ſenſe enough to dread the experiment, and of courſe he declined it.

The year enſuing was entirely employed in treaty litigations between the Swedes and the Moſcovites, as likewiſe in contriving further means to leſſen the taxes, and adminiſter eaſe and plenty to the ſubjects of Sweden. 1616.

At laſt Guſtavus, in order to give the world freſh inſtances of his generoſity and ſincerity, allowed a peace to be concluded at Stolba, after the obſtruction of ten thouſand ceremonies of precedence and titles, which a proud and ignorant nation, like the Moſcovites, is always ready to make. In moſt, if not all treaties, the grand object is ſooner ſettled, becauſe better foreſeen and underſtood, than the incidental and collateral ones. 1617.

It muſt now be obſerved, that the great duke had required permiſſion from the States General and James I. to raiſe recruits in their reſpective dominions, which his Britannic majeſty made no difficulty of granting, upon condition the men were not to be employed againſt Guſtavus. This damped the czar's ardour not a little; and Sir John Merrick, gentleman of the bed-chamber, who had diſcharged a commiſſion to Guſtavus at Narva ſome years before, was ſent ambaſſador from England, to give all the aſſiſtance he could towards an accommodation; by which it was at length ſtipulated,

"That

"That a general amneſty ſhould be ſettled between the "two nations, the pretenſions of Charles Philip be ſet aſide, "and free intercourſe of commerce eſtabliſhed; that the "Swedes ſhould reſtore all their conqueſts, and the great "duke in return give back Livonia, renounce the title he "derived from it, ſurrender four towns in the *prefecture* of "Novogrod, and refund the Swedes £.9000 in good and "ſterling money. The concluding article was, that neither "party ſhould aſſiſt Poland in any attempts againſt the two "crowns*."

Holland as well as England interpoſed ſincerely in this mediation: yet the treaty was not effectually ratified till the year enſuing. All parties wiſhed earneſtly for this event, and rejoiced in its completion. His majeſty of Great Britain, in particular, ſhone now in the full meridian of peace-making.

——— *Quod optanti Divum promittere nemo*
*Auderet, volvenda dies en attulit ultro.*———

It was about this time that Guſtavus borrowed a very conſiderable ſum of the States General, in order to reimburſe the king of Denmark according to the articles of peace lately concluded between them: but as this money arrived not at Hamburg in due time, his majeſty (who piqued himſelf on his exactneſs) ſpared neither application nor pains to procure it in good ſeaſon from another quarter; nevertheleſs he received it afterwards on due ſecurity, and paid it back in copper ore †. Nor did the friendſhip and humanity of the Hollanders ſtop here; for they gave him permiſſion at or near the ſame time to levy a body of 2000 men in the United Provinces, and allowed him likewiſe the year enſuing, 1618, to raiſe a complete regiment of infantry, and a certain definite number of ſeamen ſufficient to equip five ſhips of force againſt the Polanders: and as an apprehenſion then prevailed over all the northern parts of Europe, that the court of Madrid, in order to facilitate the future conqueſts of Sigiſmond and the emperor ‡, propoſed to ſend a ſtrong fleet into the Baltic ocean,

* This treaty, not to be found in the grand collections, was compriſed in xviii articles, and may be peruſed in the *Laurea Auſtriaca*, lib. i. p. 30, *&c. a book*, which affords the beſt accounts extant with reference to England and the courts of Vienna and Munich in regard to the Palatinate, a circumſtance that directed the meaſures of the Britiſh miniſtry more or leſs during the reigns of James and Charles I. contains numberleſs things which are not to be found in our own hiſtorians, and has been ſuppoſed, by ſome, to be compoſed from the memoirs and ſtate-papers of cardinal *Ditrichſtein*, ſucceſſor to Kleſel, and prime miniſter to the emperors Mathias and Ferdinand II.

† *Carlton*'s Letters, p. 95. ‡ *Laurea Auſtriaca.*

they

they generouſly ſupplied Guſtavus with ſix men of war, which actually ſailed under the command of Obdam, vice-admiral of Holland *.

Nor muſt we omit here that Chriſtian, in conſequence of the late accommodation between Sweden and himſelf, made the king a very genteel and plauſible offer of ſending a body of Danes to augment his army; which propoſal was accepted with thankfulneſs, but for certain private reaſons politely declined, for Guſtavus knew to perfection the addreſs and artifice of his neighbour, and deſired nothing from him but a bill of acquittance. He therefore diſcharged the debt with all imaginable diligence, and employed the moderate overplus that remained in puzzling the fidelity of the governor of Dunamond, which important place ſoon admitted a Swediſh garriſon †.

During this ſhort pauſe from military tranſactions, his majeſty, having firſt convened the ſtates, paſſed through the forms of a coronation at Upſal, and then proceeded to reduce his kingdom more and more to one uniform and well-connected ſyſtem; ſettling the interior ſprings and movements of it upon ſuch a principle of regulation, that no great inconveniences or obſtructions ſhould ariſe during his abſence in whatever wars he might chance afterwards to undertake. To effect this, he made ſome very ſenſible alterations in the manner of convening the ſtates and in the diſpatch of buſineſs, and eſtabliſhed five public offices of great extent, namely, a court of juſtice, a chamber of exchequer, a *cancellaria* ‡, as the Swedes and Germans call it, and two councils of war, one for land and one for naval affairs; in each of which departments he appointed himſelf, abſent or preſent, ſupreme judge and ultimate referee. This being ſettled, he in the next place augmented and confirmed the privileges of the ſtates and orders; and to encourage what is uſually called the fair and ſettled trader, publiſhed an edict againſt all vagabond and itinerant merchants, ordering likewiſe, in expreſs terms, that matters of trade, huſbandry, &c. ſhould be tranſacted in well known and public markets.

As a war had by this time commenced againſt him on the ſide of Poland, he next caſt his eyes in good earneſt on his couſin Sigiſmond, concerning whoſe quarrel and pretenſions, in order to ſee their groundwork, we muſt make a ſmall retroſpect into the Poliſh and Swediſh hiſtories. Nor can this digreſſion be looked upon as improper, foraſmuch as the war laſted, excepting only ſome few ſhort intermiſſions, till within three years of our king's death.

* *Carlton*'s Letters, 96. 101. 126. 186. † Ibid. 180.

‡ A ſort of ſecretary of ſtate's office.

Guſtavus

Guſtavus Ericſon, or Vaſa, our hero's grandfather, having reigned two and thirty years with the character of another Titus, left behind him three ſons. Eric, who had been propoſed by his father to queen Elizabeth of England, married a young woman of mean parentage, merely from a romantic turn of love; but growing diſcontented, vicious, and cruel, was depoſed by his own ſubjects, and thrown into priſon. Upon this, John, who had been confined for reaſons of ſtate in his brother Eric's reign, but fortunately contrived his eſcape, was declared ſucceſſor to the throne. He died in 1592, after having governed four and twenty years; and Charles, duke of Sudermania, the younger of the three ſons, and father of Guſtavus Adolphus, the poſterity of John being ſet aſide by the ſtates, was appointed to ſucceed him. John by Catharina his wife, daughter of Sigiſmond II. king of Poland, left two ſons, Sigiſmond, on whom our hiſtory particularly turns, and John duke of Oſtrogothia, which latter prince, a minor of three years of age when Charles was made king, died without iſſue in 1618. In imitation of his father he kept firm to the *Evangelical* or *Auguſtan* confeſſion but Sigiſmond, converted by his mother's means, had been privately admitted into the Romiſh communion. Charles was a bold and ſincere Lutheran; of courſe his brother John, by his laſt teſtament, made him a ſort of pledge to the people with regard to the proteſtant religion, and appointed him governor of Sweden till Sigiſmond ſhould return from Poland. During the interregnum he acquitted himſelf with the cleareſt honour, exhorting Sigiſmond to haſten immediately to Stockholm and accept the regal title which lay open for him, exhorting and conjuring him at the ſame time to preſerve the proteſtant religion inviolably to his ſubjects. Sigiſmond took no notice of this latter paſſage, nor gave the leaſt ſatisfaction concerning it when his ſubjects preſented a particular remonſtrance to him. Charles preſſed him a ſecond time, and in the interim refuſed the crown which the ſenate had offered him. At length Sigiſmond was enthroned in the year 1594, and took the coronation oaths, from the obſervation of which he ſcholaſtically abſolved himſelf with all the dexterity of a Popiſh metaphyſician. "This oath," the juror declares, "I religiouſly promiſe and vow to keep to all my ſubjects, "young and old, born, and to be born, beloved, or not "beloved, abſent or preſent, no way infringing, but rather "improving the ſame by royal affection: ſo God be propi- "tious to my ſoul and body." At the ſame time it was ſtipulated likewiſe, that Sigiſmond ſhould profeſs the Lutheran religion, and introduce no foreigners into the king-

dom,

dom *; and ſome time afterwards, upon his diſmiſſal from Sweden into Poland, his once-electors ſhewed ſo much juſtice and generoſity to him and his family, as to keep the ſucceſſion open upon eventual proviſion that his ſon Uladiſlaiis, then a youth of twelve years old, ſhould receive his education at Stockholm, and there admit himſelf into the Proteſtant religion †.

Nevertheleſs during this interim, after full proof given to the public of various breaches of truſt, equivocations, tergiverſations, perſecutions, and violations of property on the part of Sigiſmond, duke Charles by the univerſal voice of the people was, October 22, 1595, invited to accept the crown, which honour, in hopes of ſome accommodation, he declined heroically for ſeveral years; but in the year 1600 the ſtates of the kingdom loſt all patience; and an act was paſſed, not only to incapacitate Sigiſmond and his heirs, but to eſtabliſh Charles as king, and appoint the young Guſtavus, then ſix years old, for his ſucceſſor. Nay, ſuch was the extraordinary zeal of the people in behalf of their civil and religious liberties, that a declaratory clauſe was added, to this effect, that regal obedience and allegiance ſhould be paid Charles, though he declined to aſſume the title of king, and though the coronation ceremonies had not been performed. Therefore, let hiſtorians ſay what they pleaſe, it is poſſible Charles had ſome doubts with reſpect to John, prince of Oſtrogothia, a youth at that period eleven years old, and bred a Lutheran, who had an hereditary title antecedent to his own, being his brother's, the late king's, ſecond ſon, who by way of compenſation had been created duke of Oſtrogothia, &c. But however that affair might ſtand, Charles, one way or other, was reaſoned and compelled, as it were, into the acceptance of what others not only paſſionately long for, but commit ſo many crimes in order to obtain! So at length he ſubmitted to be crowned in form in 1607; upon which event popery was declared a religious and political incapacity in all future kings; no hereditary princes were allowed to marry a wife who profeſſed an erroneous religion; and all ſeducers of princes from the doctrines of the eſtabliſhed church, were to be puniſhed as traitors and conſpirators againſt their country. On the other hand, the Swediſh reaſons for depriving Sigiſmond and incapacitating his heirs were as follows, namely, that he, Sigiſmond, had departed from the received eſtabliſhed Chriſtian religion then profeſſed in Sweden; contradicting the intent of his grandfather's laſt teſtament, and violating the oath taken

* MS. relating to the genealogy, &c. of Guſtavus Adolphus in Sion College library. † Ibid.

at

at his coronation, and neglecting the promiſe made by him to his late father never to infringe the rights of Sweden, nor ſubſcribe, when removed to another country, to any deciſions relative to that kingdom, without previouſly applying to the ſtates, and requeſting their advice and concurrence therein. He was accuſed further of leaving the realm at ſeveral junctures, without due and legal notice given; of removing ſundry papers of great importance out of the national *cancellaria*, of exciting war againſt his own country, and againſt his beſt friend and adviſer, duke Charles his uncle. It was objected moreover, that he had allowed Denmark to inſert the *three Swediſh crowns* in the regal arms; that he had employed a naval force againſt his country, turned a deaf ear to the remonſtrances of a free people, and refuſed to educate his ſon at Stockholm, in order to render him capable of inheritance.

Nevertheleſs, in ſpite of all theſe alledged incapacities and diſqualifications, Sigiſmond, who was a prince of a reſtleſs, turbulent, caballing, and ambitious ſpirit, employed all the time he had to ſpare, in projecting and executing a number of attempts in order to repoſſeſs the crown. To this end he poſted a ſet of political miſſionaries throughout the kingdom of Sweden, aſſigned them their ſeparate incendiary departments with equal judgment and dexterity, and cauſed remonſtrances, defamatory libels and manifeſtos of war, to be diſperſed every where in great abundance. As they all took their firſt riſe from the Polanders, and not from native Swedes, Guſtavus determined, partly to mortify Sigiſmond, and partly to prevent conſiderable ſums of money from being ſpent out of his country, not to mention ſome other inconveniences, to publiſh an edict which prohibited his ſubjects from purſuing their ſtudies in Poliſh univerſities; paying viſits to the court, or holding any correſpondence with the inhabitants of that kingdom. Now though Guſtavus managed the pen with the ſame addreſs as the ſword, yet he in no ways conſidered a paper war as a deſirable ſort of conteſt; eſpecially as it was conducted by a nation formed by nature for ſchool diſtinctions and empty refinements; where the jeſuits likewiſe preſided in council, and mixed the politics of Loyola with the ſophiſtry of Smiglecius, and the plauſible elegance as well as ſpecious method of Socinus. Theſe circumſtances determined him to cut the knot of controverſy with *that magical ſword*, concerning which the Swediſh and German profeſſors have produced more diſſertations than one.

Yet ſtill the unquiet and malicious Sigiſmond continued to publiſh freſh defamatory libels, and new-deviſed pretenſions and claims upon the crown of Sweden. That he breathed revenge

revenge and war appeared manifeſt to all men; and it is ſuppoſed by the more clear ſighted and * judicious, that the hopes of this deſperate and hazardous enterpriſe were founded upon Auſtrian promiſes of ſupplying the Poliſh army with a body of troops ſufficient to reconquer the dominions of Sweden. From this hardly viſible embryo, from this diminutive ſpark of latent fire, aroſe afterwards thoſe amazing flames which burnt with inextinguiſhable fierceneſs for eighteen years, and reduced the empire to a heap of ruin. Guſtavus from a youth never truly reliſhed any interpoſition which took its riſe from Vienna, as we ſuggeſted before in the ſuppoſed aſſiſtance under the duke of Lunenberg ſent by the emperor to the king of Denmark, and as he knew the Imperial court to be of a phlegmatic temper in carrying her projects into execution, Sigiſmond at that time being counſelled and governed by *Hiſpaniolized Germans*, as the language then ran, and not native Polanders, which was a ſingular overſight, he ſeized the flying opportunity to a moment, having firſt ſummoned a ſlight convention at Orebroy, and embarked for Livonia under the protection of eighteen ſhips, well foreſeeing, that by ſurprizing this province he could obſtruct all attempts from Poland during the remaining parts of the campaign. He then took Dunamond, having paved the way to that incident, as we hinted before, and Windau. The former place was the key to Riga.

No prince ever made a better choice as to the time and manner of invading Poland. Gabriel Bethlem, prince of Tranſylvania, exaſperated to the higheſt degree againſt Sigiſmond, who had aſſiſted the emperor in the Hungarian war, for Bethlem had lately invaded Hungary, formed a deſign to conquer Moldavia, part of which then belonged to his Poliſh majeſty, and drew into the project the Turks and Tartars, who aſſiſted him with a great number of forces †; but as the king of Poland appeared to be quite embarraſſed in the laſt inſtance, Guſtavus ſeized only what he thought barely reaſonable and convenient, though the whole province of Livonia lay expoſed to his mercy; a moderation rarely to be found in a victorious prince. Thus he generouſly concluded a two years truce with Sigiſmond, upon that monarch's humble requeſt and ſupplication; under the reſtriction however, that the intermediate ſpace ſhould be employed in projecting means to eſtabliſh a permanent and ſolid peace; all which may be conſidered a piece of conduct

* *Loccenii* Hiſt. Suecan p. 534.

† *Hiſtoire de Pologne*, 12° p. 323. *Laurea Auſtriaca*, fol. p. 64.

truly heroic, and not to be paralleled in common hiſtories; for which Sigiſmond made him afterwards very unkind and ungenerous returns.

Guſtavus allowed his adverſary this parentheſis of repoſe, if the expreſſion may be permitted me, in order to 1618. be enabled to chaſtiſe the barbarians who ſo furiouſly invaded him, and give him ſcope likewiſe, provided he was ſincere, to ſettle amicably, and by mutual conſent, the differences that ſubſiſted between the two kingdoms. This he did for his own honour, merely to diveſt Sigiſmond of all plauſible pretenſions of undertaking a ſecond war at conjunctures and opportunities more convenient. Still Guſtavus had ſome private miſgivings, and time afterwards proved how very juſt his ſuſpicions were, that an unfair and inſidious adverſary, like the perſon in queſtion, having once freed himſelf from ſuch troubleſome enemies as Turks, Tartars and Tranſylvanians, might create freſh objections and delays, and ſet himſelf to renew hoſtilities againſt Sweden with double vigour. A few months ſoon realized this conjecture; and as Guſtavus piqued himſelf upon acting openly and with ſpirit, he demanded the promiſe of a perpetual peace or a good truce; and receiving no categorical aſſurances on the part of Poland, renewed the war without any farther meſſages or declarations: having firſt obtained the full approbation of his ſenate, and ſolemnly confirmed the peace with Moſcovy, on the feſtival of St. Peter and St. Paul, in the great church at Stockholm.

Princes of leſs genius would have commenced this unexpected invaſion, under the appearance of feeling the pulſe of Poland by an accommodation, making proteſtations one way, and acting another way. Timorous and weak men always ſhelter themſelves in dark and ſerpentine bye-paths; for it requires great parts to be at the ſame time prudent and brave; ſucceſsful and explicit! There was the like difference between Guſtavus and Sigiſmond, as betwixt Oxenſtiern and Mazarin; the one executed what he determined, nobly, firmly, and inſtantaneouſly; the other brought to paſs, what he had combined together after a million of reflexions, with a certain meanneſs, timidity, and heſitation. One performed the moſt momentous actions by that glance of judgment which preciſely ſeizes the critical object and occaſion, without allowing the mind to wander a moment under the influence of any by-conſiderations; the other, making up by philoſophy and inductions what he wanted in preſence of mind and ſtrength of parts, puzzled himſelf by multiplicity of political knowlege, ſaw too little, by ſeeing too much; was often, by caution, betrayed into danger, and fell

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into real fears at the ſame moment he avoided ſuppoſable ones.

To return to Guſtavus, concerning whom we ſhould remark as we proceed, that this cautious, juſt, and ſenſible young man did not think it conſiſtent with prudence and equity to make Poland the ſeat of hoſtilities, till he had firſt diſcharged the reſidue of arrears due to Chriſtian king of Denmark. In the beginning of the autumn therefore, for the campaign, this year, commenced no ſooner, he paid the remaining ſum due for the redemption of Elfsburg, and by his readineſs, as well as dexterity of conduct, kept the rear of his dominions free from a troubleſome interferer and invader, who acquieſced with reluctance; but was precluded from all poſſible means of deviſing a pretext for renewing hoſtilities.

About this time it was that Guſtavus obtained ſeveral valuable territories and poſſeſſions by the death of his couſin John duke of Oſtrogothia*: and in the ſame year one of his caſtles, where he lodged, during the night, took fire, which ſpread with ſo much vehemence, that the doors and ſtaircaſes were all in flames; ſo that he and his chancellor were obliged to throw themſelves out at a window, by which extraordinary attempt he ſuffered inconſiderably, but Oxenſtiern received ſome contuſions. Nor did the danger ceaſe here, for as the caſtle was ſurrounded with a moat, which almoſt touched the edifice, his Majeſty was obliged, ſo great was the violence of the fire, to croſs that moat by venturing up to the ſhoulders in ooze and filth †.

During the courſe of the enſuing year, the Poliſh war began to grow languid on either ſide; nor was more fewel adminiſtered to the fire than what juſt ſerved 1619. to preſerve it from going out. Meanwhile Guſtavus returned to Stockholm, and having well reformed and improved his navy, rendered it reſpectable throughout the whole European ocean. He then examined into the duties and buſineſs of every particular land officer and private ſoldier, and reduced not only the art of fighting and ſieges, but the whole military diſcipline, to one regular ſyſtem of his own invention ‡. The very inſtruments of war were conſidered and improved; the management of large artillery was rendered more dexterous and practicable; the incumbrance and other defects of the matchlock were rectified; the reſt of the pike was aboliſhed, and the pike was ſhortened; and

* Genealogiæ *Ritterſhuſii*, fol. † *Carlton*'s Letters, p. 265.

‡ *Loccen.* Hiſt. Suec. p. 535.

perceiving that Sweden, though it abounded in the very materials with which thoſe inſtruments are made, ſent large ſums annually to Spain, Lombardy, and Venice, for a man of ſervice in thoſe days could uſe only the piſtols and carbines of Breſcia, or a ſword tempered in the Ebro, he bethought himſelf, prudently and ſenſibly, to eſtabliſh manufactures of arms, in every convenient place, throughout his whole dominions; in all which inſtances, not to add a great number of others, as the reformation of law, and abridgment of lawſuits, &c. &c.; he has been wiſely and faithfully copied by the king of Pruſſia.

Laſtly, as it was a maxim with Guſtavus to perform as much as he could in his own perſon, he requeſted an interview, at a frontier town called Ulfsbeck, others ſay Halmſtadt, with Chriſtian, king of Denmark, in order to leave his dominions unexpoſed to any invaſions from that quarter; and all theſe difficulties being previouſly adjuſted, he publiſhed the famous conſtitution, *De adminiſtratione & incrementis civitatum in regno Suecico.* There ſtill remained another reaſon for renewing a good underſtanding between Sweden and Denmark, for the kings of either country plainly apprehended, that the new commotions in Bohemia and the *Annexed Provinces*, as they are called, deſerved their attention. Having therefore exchanged all matters of compliment and civility on an open plain, with enſigns flying, drums beating, and a reciprocal diſcharge of muſquetry from the little armies that eſcorted them, they retired to a neighbouring city, and paſſed the time from February 25th to March 11th in hoſpitality and friendſhip *.

Nor was Guſtavus's attention to the troubles of Bohemia and the annexed territories ill directed; for Sigiſmond at that moment had ordered a body of Coſſacks to march to the emperor's aſſiſtance, and had exhorted, by letters, the duke of Lignitz, proteſtant general in Sileſia, and the Bohemian nobles, to make their timely ſubmiſſions to the court of Vienna †.

In the year 1620, when Guſtavus was meditating how to make an effectual invaſion into Poland, which pro-
1620. ject was carried into execution the enſuing year, Sigiſmond formed a deſign, as ſome ſay, to entrap this enterpriſing and magnanimous neighbour. With *his* connivance and privity therefore, colonel Farenbach had orders to make an offer of ſurrendering into Guſtavus's hands ſeve-

* *Laurea Auſtriaca*, pagg. 145, 146.

† Ibid. *Lotichius* de Rebus Germ. fol. tom. i. 224. Francofurt. 1646.

ral

ral fortified towns in Livonia, with a view thereby to ſeize his Swediſh majeſty at ſome conference upon the occaſion, and make him priſoner; but the ſtratagem by ſome chance or other took air, and the whole negotiation vaniſhed in an inſtant. Thus Sigiſmond was obliged to repoſſeſs his towns; nor did the loſs of them diſcontent Guſtavus, as he ſtill continued maſter of his own perſon and liberty.

By Farenbach's appearing at this time in the Poliſh ſervice, for, though a Lifelander by birth, he had borne command under the houſe of Auſtria, it is pretty certain that a ſort of clandeſtine aſſiſtance, though the point has hitherto been overlooked in hiſtory, had been conveyed into Poland by the Auſtrian miniſters nine years, at leaſt, before the noted period of Walſtein's diſpatching colonel Arnheim upon that errand at the head of 10,000 men; which ſhews, that the pique and reſentment, which the king of Sweden had conceived againſt his Imperial majeſty, was a wound of long duration, and the memory thereof prediſpoſed him for a number of years, though reaſons of prudence checked his inclination, to make ſome honourable repriſals, by a German invaſion, in his own behalf, whenever a proper opportunity ſhould preſent itſelf.

To return from this ſlight digreſſion: notwithſtanding I have thus related the enterpriſe of Farenbach *ex ſide codicum*, yet ſtill it is my own private opinion, that his want of ſincerity in this affair pointed towards Sigiſmond, and not Guſtavus; for why otherwiſe ſhould the prince laſt mentioned admit him afterwards into his ſervice, and entruſt him with large ſums of money, in order to levy 3000 men in Holland and Denmark? Yet though Farenbach at this period of time appeared not to be a villain in the eyes of Guſtavus, nor perhaps was he; nevertheleſs, he ſoon convinced the public, how dangerous it was to repoſe any truſt or confidence in him, for he ran away with the king's money, and enrolled himſelf a ſecond time under the Imperial enſigns; and he it was who at the head of his German regiment firſt entered the town of Bamberg in 1632, when Tilly's army fell upon the troops commanded by Horn, and obliged that general to retreat; which vigorous attack ruffled the temper of Guſtavus for a few moments, as it was the firſt and only ſmall diſgrace worth notice which the Swediſh armies met with during two of the moſt extraordinary campaigns that perhaps ever were made.

This Farenbach was one of the ſtrangeſt mixtures of inconſtancy, perfidiouſneſs, ability, and bravery, that is to be found in modern hiſtory. At the time he beat the Swedes

at Bamberg, he correſponded with Guſtavus at Mentz and Francfort: and at length, though this indeed happened near twelve months after the king's death, was condemned publicly at Ratiſbon, upon preſumption of having kept up an epiſtolary intercourſe with the late Guſtavus, in reference to betraying the town of Ingoldſtadt*, which general Cratz intended to deliver up in the ſame manner the enſuing year. As officers of faſhion in thoſe times were beheaded, without being diſgraced with bonds or fetters, he ſprung from the ſcaffold, and wreſting a partiſan from the hands of one of the guards, killed four ſoldiers directly, and wounded ſeveral; but at length was oppreſſed by numbers, and cut to pieces. In that inſtant a courier arrived from Vienna, with a reprieve, or pardon, obtained by the interceſſion of his lady and friends, for in him fell the beſt engineer in the Auſtrian ſervice, having learnt his profeſſion under no leſs perſon than Guſtavus, upon which incident an Italian author†, with all the gravity of a Spaniſh caſuiſt, gives this ſober moralizing advice; "Courteous reader, if ever it is thy "misfortune to be condemned to execution, walk ſlow, "create excuſes, and deviſe delays; who knows but a pardon "may arrive the very laſt moment?"

Guſtavus now thought fit to embark in an enterpriſe different from all thoſe before mentioned; for concluding that one day or other he might find himſelf embroiled with the houſe of Auſtria, which ſeemed, in caſe ſhe could once thoroughly humble the princes of the evangelical union, to aſpire at nothing leſs than univerſal monarchy, he judged it highly expedient to make a tour through the empire ‡, attended only by a friend and ſome domeſtics, under the diſguiſed name of monſieur GARS ‖; which four letters make the four initials of *Guſtavus Adolphus Rex Sueciæ*. When this preciſely happened, I was long at a loſs to form any ſolid and well-grounded conjecture. Some ſuppoſe it to be juſt before he invaded Germany, which appears improbable §; but an excellent book lately publiſhed **, the preface to which may be conſidered a maſterpiece of hiſtorical correctneſs, gives us aſſurance in ſo many words, "That "Guſtavus in the ſummer of the year 1620 paſſed in a diſ-"guiſed habit through the chief towns in Germany, and

* *Proceedings in Bavaria*, &c. 4°. Lond. 1633. p. 48.
† *Riccio* de Bellis Germanicis. L. x. 4°. Ven. 1648.
‡ Supplement of *Foreſti*.
‖ *Swediſh Intelligencer*, Part iv. 183.
§ *Riccio* de Bellis German. p. 191, &c.
** *Letters* to and from Sir Dudley Carlton.

"ended

" ended his journey at the court of Berlin, in order to ſee " the young princeſs of Brandenburg, whom he intended to " marry*." Thus in *love*, as well as in *war*, our Hero always choſe to reconnoitre the ground in perſon.

Here a ſecond particular circumſtance deſerves ſome notice. I have been aſſured by a perſon of excellent parts, lately deceaſed, who had travelled many years in ſearch of hiſtorical knowledge, that the name of Guſtavus Adolphus is enrolled among the ſtudents of Padua; but if ever that prince was there, it muſt have been in his younger days, as I hinted before, or by enlarging his tour a little in the preſent journey. Upon the like authority it was moreover aſſured me, that Oliver Cromwell appears to be regiſtered in the ſame book, and yet hiſtory is ſilent in both theſe reſpects; though each paſſage, except my memory deceives me, is confirmed by a modern Italian author, in his account of that feat of learning; but as I neither remember the writer's name, nor have the performance by me, it becomes me to expreſs my ſentiments on the ſubject with reſerve and caution.

It is highly probable that both the tender and warlike paſſions engaged his Swediſh majeſty to make a journey into the empire. He had a view perhaps, even ſo far back as the preſent period, of having ſomething to ſay to the Germanic ſyſtem: and as to Maria Eleonora, ſiſter to George William then elector of Brandenburg †, in the twentieth year of her age; ſhe appeared to be a conſort worthy of him, both as a heroine and a Chriſtian. By a painting I have ſeen of her, ſhe was a beauty of the graceful and majeſtic kind: and moreover, a connexion with her brother was not to be overlooked by one, who had conceived an idea of erecting ſome future edifice upon German ground. Nor may the perſon of Guſtavus be paſſed by here without remarking, that he was one of the talleſt and moſt graceful figures in all his army, large limbed, but not corpulent: yet ſomething inclined to plumpneſs towards his latter days, though his bulk never encumbered or incommoded him. His eyes, of a light grey colour, had a piercing clearneſs mixed with ſoftneſs, except when anger diſcompoſed them; his

* Letter from Sir Dudley to Secr. Naunton, July 20, 1620.

† George William was a weak and not very proſperous prince, for Schwartzenberg his prime miniſter betrayed him perpetually to the houſe of Auſtria. His two uncles, the duke of Jagernſdorf and the adminiſtrator of Magdeburg, were both put under the ban of the empire. He married the princeſs Charlotte, ſiſter to the king of Bohemia. *Memoirs of the Houſe of Brand.* 40, 41.

hair light, his nose somewhat aquiline, his forehead large, and his complexion florid.

In more barbarous ages his look and stature might have advanced him to the regal dignity; for hardly any Swedish horse could carry him when completely cloathed in armour; but by all the paintings and prints I have ever seen of him, of which the number cannot be recollected, he appears, even making allowances for the mode of dress, much *older* than he really was, which I attribute to the violent and constant fatigues of his mind and body. There is a thoughtfulness mixed with spirit in all his looks when well drawn, and a sort of recollection joined with fortitude. Indeed, as he united the statesman with the warrior, neither his limbs nor his mind were ever at ease; for he negotiated and made campaigns, without ever being dismayed or embarrassed, from the seventeenth year of his age to the hour of his death; so that no warrior or minister ever better deserved the device and inscription on a medal which an ingenious foreigner, the chevalier Edlinger, once shewed me; the emblem was a cube, with this motto, ÆQUALIS SEMPER ET ERECTUS.

Gustavus introduced his queen into Stockholm with extraordinary pomp, and the nuptials being there solemnized, he appointed the ceremony of her coronation for the month of November. This illustrious and amiable princess, after one or two disagreeable miscarriages, at length, in 1623, brought him a daughter, named Christina, who died the ensuing year; and then a second Christina, who at a year old was declared by the states heiress to the throne, in 1627. This decree of the senate is still to be seen *.

Meanwhile Gustavus made great preparations for war by sea and land, and introduced a *secular* solemnity in memory of the reformation established in Sweden. The edict against travelling was likewise enforced by additional clauses, inasmuch as such practice thinned the kingdom of subjects, and promoted evil designs from enemies; yet leave was allowed the nobility, out of regard to their antient privileges, to pursue their studies, or cultivate the art of war in foreign countries, upon condition they first obtained a royal passport, and did not reside in suspected places. Lastly, new care was taken of the army and navy, and a slight tax levied upon corn and cattle.

His Polish majesty at the same time, whilst Gustavus was employed in the pursuits of love and glory, fortunately escaped a sudden danger in his own capital at Warsaw; where

* *Sueciæ Respublica*, 12°. 1631. p. 249.

one

one Piecharſchi *, a nobleman of diſtinction, had conceived a violent averſion againſt his ſovereign, partly on account of his political and military conduct, for the prince gave the better half of his time to muſic and chymiſtry, and twice loſt the throne of Moſcovy by his neglect †, and partly becauſe his majeſty had aſſigned curators to take upon themſelves the management of his eſtates, which were very conſiderable: repreſentation being made that he was diſordered in his intellects. Like Felton, his ſucceſſor in that deſperate trade, who aſſaſſinated Buckingham, he was ſuppoſed to have no partner in the undertaking; but one morning as the king, attended by his courtiers and guards, entered the veſtibule of the great church, Piecharſchi ſtarted from behind a private door with a ſmall battle-axe in his hand, and ſuddenly attacking his maſter, gave him two ſtrokes, one on the cheek, and one on the ſhoulder. Sigiſmond immediately dropped, but neither wound proved mortal. Few people were in the church, and ſtill fewer obſerved the blows. Meanwhile a poor Italian muſician who belonged to the choir, but could not ſpeak half a ſentence of Poliſh, augmented the confuſion, for he beheld the whole affair, by crying aloud, *Traditore, traditore!* which the byſtanders concluding to ſignify *Tartari*, ruſhed out of the cathedral to ſave themſelves, ſuppoſing that a party of thoſe barbarians had broken into the city ‡. Uladiſlaüs, the king's ſon, aſſiſted by a crowd of courtiers, ſoon ſeized the aſſaſſin, and diſarmed him. He made neither confeſſion nor ſubmiſſion; lamenting only that his right arm had deceived him. His breaſts were torn off at two different gates of the city with red-hot pincers, which operation he ſubmitted to without a word or a groan ‖. His limbs were torn to pieces by wild horſes, they were then burnt, and their aſhes thrown into the Viſtula.

By this time Guſtavus was determined to reduce Poland to reaſon by ſome method or other. Of courſe he made the Poles repeated offers of prolonging the truce, or concluding a peace; but Sigiſmond, notwithſtanding the Turks, Tar-

* *Piaſeccii Chronica Geſtorum in Europa ſingularium.* Cracov. 1646, p. 404. *This otherwiſe excellent book* muſt be conſidered as very partial to the Poliſh cauſe, as will appear by confronting it with Loccenius, M. Bayle, and others. I thought it proper to give the reader this precaution once for all. See alſo, *Brachelii* Hiſt. noſtr. Temp. p. 37; one of the moſt complete abridgments ever publiſhed in any language, being equally excellent as to method, truth, and a right choice of incidents.

† Tacite *d' Amelot de la Houſſaye*, L. 6. p. 516, 518.

‡ *Kobierziſki* Hiſtor. Vladiſlai in loco.

‖ *Laurea Auſtriaca*, p. 341, &c.

tars,

tars, and Moſcovites preſſed him on every ſide, continued immoveable, in oppoſition to every attack that could be made upon him on the part of Sweden. Upon this Guſtavus declined the ceremony of previouſly diſpatching an herald to declare his intentions; as he underſtood the war, in the language of the juſpubliciſts of that age, to be *protractum duntaxat, non ſublatum.* Therefore for prudent reaſons, conformably to his natural ſpirit and turn of mind, he opened the campaign, at the head of four and twenty thouſand men, with a very critical and difficult undertaking, the ſiege of Riga, the capital city of Livonia; wiſely foreſeeing, that the reduction of the province would depend entirely upon the fate of the metropolis. Riga was a large city, the emporium of all the countries that laid round it, well fortified, according to the manner of thoſe days, and carrying on a conſiderable commerce. It ſtands on the river Dwina, which divides it into two unequal parts, not to mention its being protected by a ſafe and commodious harbour, removed about two leagues from the ocean. This town belonged originally to the knights of the Teutonic order; it then formed itſelf into a republic, and ſubmitted to Poland on the ſame footing with Dantzic.

Had Guſtavus been of a timorous or ſuperſtitious temper, he ſuffered enough at the beginning of this enterpriſe to have deterred him from the attempt. A violent ſtorm in the mouth of the Dwina diſperſed and ſhattered great part of his fleet, in ſpite of all the care of Gildenheim and Fleming, the two admirals; but his maxim was always to gain ground upon diſappointments, and redouble his activity, inſtead of waſting time in uſeleſs reproaches upon himſelf or
1621. others. Keeping his eye therefore firm on his object, he landed his men, and inveſted the city. The principal officers that ſerved under him were De la Gardie, Wrangel, Horn, Banier, Oxenſtiern, and Ruthven a Scottiſh colonel: names well known in the ſucceeding parts of our hiſtory. Meanwhile his fleet, being once more aſſembled together, protected the mouth of the harbour, and conveyed to him all proper ſupplies preventing not only the enemy, but all neutral powers, from throwing any relief into the town, whether of men, ammunition, or proviſions. What was ſtill more fortunate for him, the Grand Signior had raiſed the ſiege of Babylon, in order to pour the whole torrent of his forces into Poland *; ſo that 60,000 troops, under the conduct of an old experienced officer, Chodkievi, prefect

* *Brachel.* Hiſt. noſtr. temp. 52.

of

of Lithuania, who died ſoon afterwards of a broken heart, were looked upon as nothing more than barely ſufficient to check the incurſions and depredations of 300,000 infidels.

Now though Guſtavus landed his troops at Mulgrab with great dexterity, an art of war then little known, and to which he paid uncommon attention, yet it was not in his power to perform any very remarkable ſervice, till velt-maréchal De la Gardie arrived with the Finland regiments. His majeſty then opened his intentions to the ſoldiers in a ſet ſpeech, and having run a line round Riga, inveſted it according to form; encamping chiefly on the ſand-banks to the eaſt of the Dwina. In his own quarter, which conſiſted of 6000 foot and 800 horſe, ſerved prince Charles his brother, Oxenſtiern, Horn, Banier, and count Mansfelt. De la Gardie extended his troops on the king's right, having under his command the *pretorian* foot-guards and three regiments of infantry, making 4500 men and 300 horſe. Wrangel directed the third ſtation at the head of his own and Ruthven's foot regiments, with 700 cavalry; being ordered to encamp on the king's left, at or near a place called Heintz's farm; and Seaton, a Scots gentleman, commanded the fourth diviſion, which lay encamped round a windmill, and was neareſt the town. Meanwhile colonel Henry Fleming, for the admiral's name was Claudius, having converted his ſoldiers to pioneers, guarded the iſlands in the Dwina, and alſo the weſtern ſhore of that river next to Dunamond fortreſs, whilſt the ſhips lay ſtationed in the mouth of the harbour. I am the more minute in deſcribing the diſpoſitions of this ſiege, as it was the firſt Guſtavus made in full form, and a maſterpiece in the inventive parts of war, wherein his great talent conſiſted, notwithſtanding all the tedious and expenſive performances of Spinola, in the Low Countries, ſome few years before.

The town of Riga was well prepared for defence, in every reſpect. It was guarded with good baſtions and well fraiſed half-moons; the citadel was garriſoned with a conſiderable body of regular infantry, and two troops of horſe; and the citizens undertook to join to them 400 experienced ſoldiers, and their own militia. How well they performed their duty, the duration of the ſiege will ſoon ſhew; for their attachment to Sigiſmond's intereſt appeared quite enthuſiaſtic.

Guſtavus ſpared his attention upon no occaſions; and on every caſual occurrence hazarded his perſon without heſitation. As it was the firſt ſiege of conſequence he ever engaged

in, he appeared, if I may be allowed the expreſſion, a very Proteus in command; ſuſtaining in the ſame day the characters of general, engineer, common aſſailant, and pioneer; for at Riga, in particular, he often ſtripped to his ſhirt, and wrought in the trenches with pick-axe and ſhovel, exhorting his brother Charles Philip, and the ſeveral officers who ſtood round, to follow the example.

This unparalleled vigilance and application to every object, great or ſmall, ſoon threw him into the way of danger; for in ſome preparatory meaſures he took on the ſand-hills in his own quarter, he miſſed little of diſproving an obſervation made by Charles V. *That no king had ever been killed by a cannon-ball* *, ſince a ſhot of conſiderable ſize paſſed directly on the very line where he ſtood a few moments before. Some time afterwards he conceived his preſence to be neceſſary where Seaton commanded, and there a ſecond ſhot killed ſome ſoldiers that ſtood near him, and daſhed the blood of lieutenant-colonel Stakelberg upon his clothes; and on another occaſion, during the continuance of this ſiege, a third cannon ball pierced his tent, and made towards him in a direction, as if predeſtined to deſtroy him †. Upon theſe accidents he changed the poſition of his batteries, and made himſelf maſter of higher ground, commanding the town, and *raking* the ſtreets through and through, wherever the leaſt opening preſented itſelf. As he choſe not to begin an invaſion with too much bloodſhed, foreſeeing well that it was almoſt impoſſible to enter the town by ſtorm, he ſent a trumpet to the commander and magiſtrates three ſeveral times, with propoſals of an honourable nature, couched in courteous terms; but they on the laſt meſſage, in order to preclude all hopes of accommodation, received and diſmiſſed the king's meſſenger blindfolded, returning him to his maſter quite overcome with ſpirituous liquors, and without an anſwer. Upon this the Swedes redoubled their efforts, and threw more bombs into the town than ever had been known in ſo ſhort a ſpace with the ſame quantity of artillery. What kept alive the ſpirits of the defendants, was a reliance on Sigiſmond's promiſe of raiſing the ſiege; but that prince was ſo embarraſſed by the Turkiſh invaſion, that it was not in his power to make good his intentions to any effectual purpoſe. To remedy this defect, Radzivil, prefect of Leſſer Lithuania, and one of the firſt men of quality in Poland, marched ſuch troops as could be ſpared, namely, 10,000

* *Bayle*'s diſcourſe on Guſtavus Adolphus.
† *Loccenii* Hiſt. Suec. p. 537.

foot

foot and 4000 cavalry, to the aſſiſtance of Riga; nevertheleſs, aſtoniſhed at the precautions Guſtavus had taken, he contented himſelf with being a diſtant ſpectator from the banks of the Dwina. He had only ſuch troops with him as could be haſtily collected, propoſing to throw ſome ſupplies into the town, in caſe he had not the power to raiſe the ſiege. The beſieged, conducted by one Burk, an Iriſh officer, made two attempts to croſs the Dwina in ſhips, and ſecure an entrance to ſome of Radzivil's troops; but Guſtavus thundered upon them in ſuch a manner from his batteries, erected on the ſhore for *that* purpoſe, that it was thought proper to diſcontinue all future attempts of the like nature. Meanwhile the king, by way of gallantry, entertained Radzivil with a general cannonade; and as one ball happened to pierce the tent of that commander, he for honour's ſake, began a ſkirmiſh the next day, and then departed. Upon this the king redoubled his efforts, and filled the town-ditch with faſcines and rubbiſh, having firſt cut off the communication with the rivers, and rendered himſelf maſter of Dunamond fortreſs, a ſtrong place to the north of Riga. He then ſent the magiſtrates a freſh ſummons, admoniſhing them of their danger, and the impoſſibility of their relief; to which they returned an abrupt and rude anſwer. Enraged at this, he took a half-moon by ſtorm, and the garriſon in return ſprung a mine formed underneath it, and blew up an hundred Swediſh ſoldiers into the air; nevertheleſs, their companions repoſſeſſed the ruins, and made a freſh lodgment among them. The art of mining was carried to great perfection in this ſiege, for both parties made various extraordinary efforts, which almoſt deſerve to be particularized; and his majeſty himſelf ſtill continued to work with his Dalecarnian miners below, with the ſame ſpirit as he had laboured with the hardy Finlanders above ground in firſt opening the trenches. At length a breach was made, and Guſtavus, in order to paſs the town-ditch, formed the firſt idea of a project which he executed afterwards more gloriouſly on the banks of the Elbe and Lech. In a word, he contrived a flying bridge of wood, and to prevent its being ſlippery, made the ſurface rough with ſtrong nails and pitched ſackcloth, ſeizing the opportunity under favour of the night to throw it croſs the foſſé, which, though filled with faſcines and rubbiſh, retained ſtill too much water to admit the paſſage of a large body of men. Colonels Seaton and Horneck* conducted the attack, but

* This colonel was condemned afterwards in Germany for cowardice, but the queen begged his life.

the

the ardour of the troops, which crowded forwards in greater numbers than was ordered for the firſt detachment, unfortunately broke down the machinery; for they were ſo eager that nothing could reſtrain them. In this accident the gallant Seaton* broke his thigh, which was afterwards cut off, and the garriſon at night reduced the king's building to a heap of aſhes.

Guſtavus, not in the leaſt diſmayed by this diſappointment, applied himſelf once more to mining, being reſolved, if he could not paſs over the ditch, to enter the town beneath it. He laboured therefore in a freſh mine that very night; whilſt the beſieged ſtill expected, contrary to all probability, a ſecond relief from Sigiſmond. During this interval, the king ordered his young military favourites Horn and Banier, attended by Chapelle, a French officer, and Muſter, a Scotſman, to ſtorm the ſand half-moon at the head of 3000 choſen ſoldiers. Theſe brave ſoldiers ſoon croſſed the ditch, and diſlodged a part of the enemy; but when they approached the top of the fortification, the beſieged made ſuch

* Since publiſhing the firſt edition of this work, the following curious anecdote relating to Seaton has been communicated to me, by a learned friend, a gentleman of Scotland, who does honour to his function.

" Many years before Guſtavus entered into Germany, and even before the Poliſh war began, he happened at a public review to have ſome diſpute with Seaton, and gave him a blow. When the field buſineſs was over, Seaton went immediately to the king's apartment, and demanded his diſmiſſal, which his majeſty ſigned; they both being ſo angry, that not a word more was ſaid on that ſubject. Seaton could not manage his other buſineſs ſo as to get away till next morning, which gave Guſtavus time to conſider matters more coolly; and having learned from undoubted intelligence, that Seaton propoſed taking the great road to Denmark, he took a truſty officer and ſome grooms with him, and contrived to ſleep every night where Seaton had dined the ſame day. When his majeſty came to the Daniſh territories, he ordered the officer to ſtay behind, and taking only one groom with him, overtook Seaton on a large plain. Riding up to him, he cried, *Diſmount, Sir; that you have been injured, is acknowledged; I am now come to give you the ſatisfaction of a gentleman: and take this farther with you, namely, that I am at preſent out of my own dominions. Guſtavus and you are both equals. We have both, I ſee, piſtols and ſwords. Alight immediately, and the affair ſhall be diſpatched.*

" Seaton, recovering a little from his ſurprize, diſmounted, as the king had done before, and falling down on his knees, ſaid, " Sire, you have " more than given me ſatisfaction, in condeſcending to make me your equal: " God forbid, that my ſword ſhould do any miſchief to ſo brave, ſo great, " and ſo gracious a prince. Forgive the tranſports of my falſe pride. Per- " mit me to return to Stockholm, and allow me the honour to live and die " in your ſervice." Words which he afterwards made good.

" His majeſty raiſed him from the ground, and embraced him: and thus they returned in the moſt amicable manner to Stockholm, to the great aſtoniſhment of all the army, till every circumſtance of the ſtory was known."

incredible

incredible reſiſtance, that they were repulſed by main force. Beams of wood were thrown to cruſh them, and huge ſtones and grenados ſhowered among them in every part. Chapelle's ſon died bravely, for he continued fighting to the very laſt; Horn and Banier were both grievouſly wounded, but his majeſty to comfort them, and the rather as they were unſucceſsful, ſent them both the order of knighthood that very evening. Upon this ſlight ſuperiority the garriſon propoſed a ſally, but the prudent magiſtrates put their negative on ſo raſh an undertaking.

Towards the middle of September, matters approached the very laſt extremity, for the Swedes had formed their mines under the town-ditch, and beneath the fortifications that were round it, whilſt the king, in order to prevent ſupplies from entering the city, having thrown a ſtrong boom croſs the Dwina, which ſome have thought to be his *own invention*, and prepared two new bridges capable of admitting five ſoldiers in front, his determination was to fire the mines at once, paſs his troops over the bridges in two places, and give a general aſſault with his whole army. It was then the inhabitants, after an obſtinate defence for the ſpace of ſix weeks, began firſt to be terrified. On the one hand the king had undermined the walls in every part, and on the other their garriſon was enfeebled, their ammunition conſumed, and all hopes of relief appeared chimerical. Now though Guſtavus knew their diſtreſſes, he affected not to diſcern them, in order to give the Livonians a right notion of his generoſity. Morally certain of poſſeſſing Riga in a day and a night, he allowed the beſieged a deliberation of ſix hours, at the concluſion of which hoſtages were exchanged, and a capitulation ratified. Meanwhile, from a true ſenſe of military merit, he granted the inhabitants very honourable conditions, though they had ſpoken of him during the ſiege in diſreſpectful and injurious terms*; and permitted them to incorporate themſelves into one ſyſtem with his own ſubjects. Theſe acts of mildneſs and generoſity aroſe partly from the dictates of his own heart, and partly from a good maxim of policy, always to behave humanely and generouſly in a conquered country. He, accordingly, never once upbraided the natives for the fatigues and miſchief their obſtinate reſiſtance had created to himſelf and his troops. As all great and good men, however modeſt they may be, feel ſome complacency upon having well performed any noble and illuſtrious action, his majeſty in the famous ſpeech he made nine years afterwards to the generals of his

* *Memorabilia Suecica Gentis*, p. 81.

army,

army, near Nurenberg, on the ſubject of their avarice, cruelty, and expilations, in a decent tranſitory manner juſt ſuggeſts to their recollection his own very different conduct at the ſurrender of Riga.

To reſume my ſubject. The inſtant Guſtavus entered the town-gate, he directed his ſteps to the great church of St. Peter, where he kneeled down, and returned his thanks to God in a ſhort prayer. As to allegiance, he told the inhabitants, *he never deſired or expected better from them, than they had ſhewn their former maſter; upon which account he ſhould not only preſerve their privileges, but enlarge them.* The magiſtrates then apologized for their conduct with reſpect to Poland, obliquely upbraiding Sigiſmond, after the repreſentations they had made him of their imminent danger, for returning the cold and evaſive anſwer, that the palatine of Wilno, who was at that time employed in Podolia, ought to have taken due care of the Livonian territory.

They likewiſe told his majeſty *, that Guſtavus made a ſwifter paſſage from Stockholm to Riga, than Radzivil had done from Poland to Riga, and that though the latter commanded troops enough to have anſwered the purpoſe, yet that he, Guſtavus, prevented him in every thing, by poſſeſſing the country beforehand; as alſo, by making himſelf maſter of every ſtrong paſs, and ſtopping the navigation of the Dwina: in which circumſtance *at that time* conſiſted one great part of the military ſcience. They next expatiated much on the clemency and affability of their new conqueror, who far from reproaching them for having made a reſiſtance ſo detrimental, told them, from his own pure generoſity, in ſo many words, that if a ſolid peace could be concluded between him and Sigiſmond in three years, he would allow them to return to their Poliſh allegiance, with reſervation of all their ancient rights and liberties: concluding with this remark, *That whoever had occaſioned the loſs of their city*, and whom he meant is eaſy to be diſcovered, *muſt render account for it at the laſt day to the Supreme Being* †; and thus the affair ended.

To this remonſtrance Sigiſmond had not the condeſcenſion to return an anſwer; but prince Radzivil held the pen in his place, and wrote a letter full of acrimony and recrimination; a ſort of return which the brave inhabitants had in no way merited.

* In a memorial, dated at Riga, Sept. 20, 1621.

† *Loccenii* Hiſt. Suec. p. 537.

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There is one circumſtance in his letter extraordinary enough. The people of Riga had repreſented Guſtavus as a prince of unparalleled clemency and generoſity, to which Radzivil coolly replied, "He was not diſpleaſed to hear that the king "of Sweden was a Chriſtian."

Guſtavus then, at the head of a detachment of 14,000 men, having firſt baniſhed the jeſuits from Riga, inveſted and took Dunamond; in conſequence whereof he next made himſelf maſter of Mittau *, the capital of Semigallia, and place of reſidence of the dukes of Courland. This city then ſubſiſted under the title of a *beneficiary poſſeſſion* from the republic of Poland, with whoſe intereſts the reigning duke naturally ſided on account of his ſituation; and from compaſſion to theſe circumſtances, Guſtavus generouſly promiſed to reſtore the town to him upon the obſervance of certain conditions ſet forth in the body of the truce then to be concluded between himſelf and Sigiſmond; which engagement was made good by the king of Sweden.

Further than Mittau he advanced not; for by this time ſome Poliſh parties had committed great depredations near Riga. He therefore flew to the aſſiſtance of his new ſubjects, and left general Wrangel in Mittau with a garriſon of 2000 men. Upon this a truce enſued between Sweden and Poland, which was to remain in force till the expiration of the enſuing year.

The entrance of 1622 was rendered extremely uncomfortable to Guſtavus by the death of his brother †, whom he loved extremely; a young prince of acknowledged courage, and remarkable for uncommon ſweetneſs of temper. But the ſame year was rendered illuſtrious in another reſpect, inaſmuch as it gave birth to Charles Guſtavus, afterwards Charles X. king of Sweden. 1622.

Guſtavus now began to be perfectly well apprized, that to *ſubſiſt* an army was far more difficult than to conduct the *fighting part*. For theſe reaſons, returning to Stockholm in the winter, a ſlight truce being concluded with Poland, as we obſerved before, and oaths of allegiance adminiſtered to the deputies of Riga, he took care to procure a clear account of his revenues; adjuſted ſome difficulties then ſubſiſting betwixt Sweden and Denmark; and formed ſo good an underſtanding with Chriſtian, that he promiſed neither to allow the Poles to make levies in his dominions, nor permit

* Puffendorf ſays Brittau; but a nobleman of Courland, the baron de Klopman, aſſures me there is no ſuch place.

† He died at Narva, Jan. 25, 1622, aged twenty years and nine months.

their ships to carry provisions or military stores through the Sound; and as the duties of the year 1620, upon corn and cattle, did not appear sufficient to carry on the war, Gustavus introduced what was then called an EXCISE, an expression, hitherto unknown in Sweden, and defined to be a royal tax levied chiefly upon such things as were eatable and drinkable. The states, at first, made some objection to this impost, but at length it passed with universal consent. His majesty, it is true, proposed it only as a temporary expedient, but, however sincere his intention might be, it was never afterwards in his power to take it off, being daily involved more and more in interesting exploits. In a poor country like Sweden, as this was the most advantageous, so it was the most trying contribution that could be devised. The nation had such a confidence in the integrity and bravery of their sovereign, that after a few slight murmurs, they submitted cheerfully; and, upon this agreeable compliance, Gustavus determined to move the seat of war into Prussia, partly as lying nearer home, and partly to secure the Baltic, and preserve it from depredation and insult.

Nothing could compose the uneasiness which Gustavus received from the death of his brother, and his mortification upon that occasion was rendered still more sensible, as he had no children by queen Eleonora. These two events contributed to raise Sigismond's hopes to the highest degree; for that prince was the greatest pretender then in Europe. He had a right to all he could take, and in proportion to his prospects his pretensions always improved, not only in tone of style, but in force of title. His men of law kept pace with the sword, and upon every event brought new demands and new proofs.

Hence it was that Sigismond the ensuing year, having formed a design of invading Sweden, made a politi-
1623. cal progress through Poland, and being entertained with great magnificence at Dantzic, took care to consider occasionally the state of his marine, and the means and possibility of transporting an army to the gates of Stockholm. Gustavus being, as my historian observes *, *princeps cautus, ad omnes occasiones invigilans ad avertendum si quod ingruerat periculum*, thinking it always the best policy to commence an invasion, instead of repelling one, arrived, by a sort of magical transportation, with a fleet of sixty-six ships, of which twenty were large ones, at the mouth of the port

* *Kobierzitski*, Historia Vladislai, 4°. 857—859.

of

of Dantzic. Sigiſmond mounted a watch-tower, in order to behold his kinſman in the character of a ſea-commander: upon which the land fortreſſes paid him the compliment of a general diſcharge of artillery; and to theſe Guſtavus replied with all his naval cannon, which by ſome was interpreted as a kind of warlike declaration. His Poliſh majeſty, not chuſing to explain the incident in this manner, contented himſelf to diſpatch a perſon in the name of the magiſtracy of Dantzic, with orders to repreſent and complain that ſuch practices infringed the liberties of the port in time of truce. Guſtavus received his deputy with great courteſy, proteſting that he was inclined to cultivate a peace more and more, and that he meditated no freſh warlike tranſactions, except under the juſtification of a *prior læſit*. He then aſked many familiar queſtions concerning the king and queen, and charging the repreſentative employed to deliver his compliments to prince Uladiſlaüs, whom he had a great deſire to ſee, returned contentedly home without cauſing the leaſt moleſtation.

Time ſoon convinced the public that Guſtavus's preſages and precautions were extremely well grounded; for the truth was, Sigiſmond received his opinions at that juncture, concerning Sweden, from diſcontented exiled Swedes, ſuborned Germans, and Spaniſh jeſuits*, ſtationed near him by the court of Vienna, rarely admitting a ſingle Polander into deliberations of this nature, and of courſe meditated an expedition at the very moment we are now mentioning. This broke out more diſtinctly, the year enſuing, when he demanded large aſſiſtance, in money, at the aſſembly of the ſenators, and requeſted that the marine might be placed on a new footing, and the land army reinforced; but the ſtates of the kingdom declined to advance money for theſe purpoſes, and on the contrary prolonged the truce in a manner no ways conformable to their maſter's inclinations; which gave Guſtavus opportunity and leiſure to plan his future enterpriſes upon Livonia and Pruſſia †.

State intrigues produced another miſmanagement on the part of Sigiſmond. Moſt men caſt their eyes on Conoſpoliſki as the ableſt commander in the crown ſervice; but as that officer was then employed on the ſide of Ruſſia, it was thought neceſſary to give the preſent command againſt Guſta-

* Poloniæ rex nunquam excidiſſet regno Sueciæ niſi credulam aurem jeſuitis Hiſpanis, quibus acceſſus per conjugium Auſtriacum liberior patebat in regnum & ad reginam præbuiſſet. *Arcana Dominat. Hiſpan.* 124.

*Kobierziſki*, Hiſt. Vladiſlaüi. 4°. 857—859.

vus to one Zamoski, palatine of Kiow; but Denhoff prefect of Lasci, who had then great interest in the cabinet, did not care to admit a representative in Conospolski's department, lest the kingdom, in case of any notable success, should wish to see him continued. Thus the campaign of a second summer was ruined, for Conospolski did not arrive till the month of October *.

Meanwhile the Spaniards much wanted to keep Sigismond in a state of war against Gustavus, and to that end his Catholic Majesty dispatched count de Solre to him with a magnificent retinue. This nobleman, originally a Fleming, wore the order of the golden fleece, and afterwards attained to high authority in the court of Madrid. In his instructions Gustavus was styled, more than once, the supporter of an erroneous religion, and usurper of Sweden. The main purpose of his embassy was to obstruct the truce, and prolong the war. Sigismond replied, very sensibly, that the constitution of Poland was not calculated for a state of warfare, and that Spain could assist him only by commanding a powerful fleet to range the Baltic †. He in course asked a fresh cessation of arms, to hold till June 1625, which favour Gustavus readily granted him; for he formed this opposition merely upon a principle of self-defence, since Sigismond had placed himself at the head of a fleet of transports with a view to make a descent on the Swedish territories. Thus the designs of Spain and Poland were rendered abortive, and the town of Dantzic was compelled to make a profession of neutrality. The Spaniards thought better of the matter five years afterwards, and sent a fleet to the Baltic.

* *Kobierzisski*, Hist. Vladislaüi. 4°. 921—923.

† This answer may be worth preserving; it is the extract of a letter from Sigismond III. to Philip IV.

" *Conditio imperii regiæ majestatis qualis sit, & quibus adstricta legibus, non* " *ignorat catholica majestas: omnia pene in hoc regno statuum arbitrio geri, ita ut* " *de bello bellique nervo, nihil inconsultis ordinibus statui decernique possit: quæ* " *res sæpe necessarios & opportunos regis pro publica salute conatus retardat, non-* " *nunquam etiam irritos reddit.*" Hic ipse regni Sueciæ invasor, jampridem in ordinem redactus fuisset, nisi toties ab ordinibus regni impetratis induciis, falsa honestæ pacis & tractationis ostentatione, nobis illusisset. *Ultimò addit* de paciscendis cum hostem induciis etiamsi ille ab iis abhorrere non videatur in præsenti rerum statu non cogitat regia majestas, magis eas circumspicit rationes, ut, hoste hic impedito, *arma in Sueciam transferat*, quod si *à classe paratior esset*, jampridem *nefarii hostis* ausus coerciti fuissent. Qua in re si catholica majestas *classe sua litoribus Suecicis admota regiæ majestati suppetias ferret*, rem dignam et catholico nomine & fraterno amore præstaret: & haud dubiè una eademque ratione Daniæ regem, nunc visceribus Germaniæ inhærentem, ad tuendum regnum suum & præsentis & domestici belli ostentatione retraheret. *Kobierzisski, ut supra.*

During this ſhort ceſſation of hoſtilities, his majeſty found opportunities to take a ſecond view of the ſtate of learning in his kingdom; beſtowing on the univerſity of Upſal * all the patrimonial eſtate belonging to his own houſe of Vaſa † excepting Lindholm, his family manſion, and the manor round it, which he thought fit to reſerve; the one and the other remaining now in the poſſeſſion of the Cederhielms ‡. He founded a ſecond univerſity at Abo, and erected ſchools in Lapland; and performed a ſimilar act ſome few months before his death, eſtabliſhing and endowing the univerſity of Dorpat in Livonia, with a view to cut off all the inconveniences and expences of travelling into Sweden for the ſake of education. Chriſtina, his mother, afterwards conveyed by her laſt teſtament £.5000. towards the perpetual ſupport of thirty ſtudents at Upſal. Nor was high-admiral Gildenheim, Guſtavus's natural brother, behind the family in point of generoſity to learning, for he bequeathed ſix little farms for the maintenance of two ſcholars of more diſtinguiſhed genius than the reſt of their companions; and what was ſtill a further ſubject for admiration, his executors for forty years, without exception, beſtowed the benefaction on the moſt deſerving §. Influenced by theſe examples, the preceptor of Guſtavus, who was an excellent claſſical ſcholar, and well knew the advantages of ſtyle and eloquence, endowed a profeſſorſhip of oratory, and the pupil confirmed it by royal charter. Indeed Guſtavus always ſhewed the higheſt gratitude to this excellent man; for he made him a ſenator and chancellor of Upſal, ſupreme judge in the kingdom of Gothland, and, though not of extraordinary birth, created him baron Duderhoff, and employed him afterwards in ſeveral important embaſſies. 1624.

In a word, the univerſity of Upſal had been quite neglected, and became a ſort of deſert during the reign of John, Guſtavus's uncle, but the donations allowed by the king ſufficed to maintain 150 ſtudents.

How inexpreſſible is the pleaſure to behold the ſtudies of theology, philoſophy, and humanity, protected and encou-

* In the whole grant he ceded to the univerſity, for ever, thirty-ſix manors, and thirty farms, eight eſtabliſhed granaries of tythes and four mills, in order to ſupport poor ſtudents, as well as to augment the ſalaries of profeſſors; ſo that it is probable, notwithſtanding I want authorities whereby to ſupport the conjecture, that ſome crown poſſeſſions were added to the paternal eſtates of Vaſa.

† *Memoirs communicated.* The preſent owner's grandfather was a ſenator.

‡ Ibid.

§ *Memorab. Suec. Gent.* 157.

raged by men of the ſword! It is probable that one of the moſt remarkable inſtances of the affection which military men have ſhewn to learning is to be found in the hiſtory of Ireland, where the troops in 1622, if I can read the date right in my papers, at the concluſion of a very fortunate campaign, made a preſent of £.1800. out of their pay, to the college of Dublin, to purchaſe books; and Uſher and Chaloner ſaw the ſum faithfully applied. Guſtavus, as far as the hurry and confuſion of a martial life would allow him, teſtified upon all occaſions a high regard for learning and men of letters; giving the public a proof of his excellent taſte, by making Grotius's incomparable book, *de Jure Belli et Pacis*, which though mentioned here was not publiſhed till the year afterwards, his delight and his ſtudy; nay, he carried his idea of the author ſo far, that he determined to employ him, whenever buſineſs flowed in faſter, as a public miniſter: in which meaſure Oxenſtiern heartily concurred. This project was reſumed, when negotiations began to thicken extremely in Germany; but the king's premature death rendered the ſcheme abortive for that period.

Returning therefore from this digreſſion, I ſhall continue to inform the reader, that the conditions of the aforeſaid treaty turned purely upon one circumſtance, which was, that neither party at its expiration ſhould be allowed to declare war without two months notice previous to the 1ſt of June 1625: a ſtipulation, which, by the mere perverſity of accidents, created ſome miſunderſtandings in the enſuing year. Many other punctilious difficulties were ſtarted and refuted*, inaſmuch as all that *juſ-publiciſts* could deviſe, and all that a ſcholaſtic nation could refine upon, was advanced by Poland; but it may ſuffice to remark, that the ſolid ſtrong ſenſe of Oxenſtiern ſoon pierced theſe delicate, but thin-ſpread cobwebs of ingenious ſubtilty.

Matters ſtood upon the ſame footing between the two kings; for the rival of Guſtavus was little more or leſs than a ſchoolman on the throne. Diſtinctions without difference made up the half of his policy; he thought all things lawful that he had the dexterity to obtain, and valued himſelf more upon artifice, if he could reach his object, than upon ſincerity and plainneſs; falſly ſuppoſing, that all circumvention and overreaching implied ſuperior abilities. On the other hand, Guſtavus was unreſerved and open, generouſly honeſt, and void of diſſimulation; and it was his choice, though

* *Locceni* Hiſtoria Suecana, 548, 549.

nature

nature had given him talents to act otherwiſe, had it ſo pleaſed him, to oppoſe a ſort of compendious pointed common ſenſe to theory, eloquence, and ſophiſticated diſtinctions; convinced, as has been obſerved on a like occaſion, that in this and all ſimilar caſes, *The very gleanings of the grapes of Ephraim are better than the vintage of Abiezer.* If we examine hiſtory ever ſo carefully, we ſhall find but few families that have produced at the ſame time two contenders of ſuch oppoſite characters as Guſtavus and Sigiſmond, both deſcended from the houſe of Vaſa, and both firſt couſins to each other. Of the two, Sigiſmond alone muſt be conſidered as the perſon irreconcileable; yet, unfortunately for him, he found perpetual obſtacles, partly occaſioned by his own miſconduct and diſingenuouſneſs, from that *honeſt* but *capricious* form of government, *a Poliſh Diet.*

In truth, the good people of Poland had ſenſe enough*, being not a whit inferior to the Italian nation in quickneſs of parts, to diſlike the great abilities of Guſtavus in the character of a ſoldier, ſince it appeared plainly, during the uniform courſe of all preceding campaigns, that he overcame them merely by the arts of fortification and the regular conduct of ſieges, by a new manner of uſing artillery, and uncommon precautions in the article of encampments †, poſſeſſing in an high degree that great military virtue which Tacitus recommends; *non alium ducem* OPPORTUNITATES *locorum ſapientius legiſſe.* On theſe accounts they privately wiſhed for peace; nor were reaſons wanting to clog the wheels of war, in order to facilitate that event; for the king had conferred the biſhopric of Warmia on prince John Albert, his third ſon, then living, who was under the age preſcribed by the eccleſiaſtical laws, being in truth only twelve years old. It was, likewiſe, contrary to the conſtitution of the realm, to raiſe a prince of the blood royal to ſuch a ſtation as muſt place him *ex natura officii* in public prefectures, and give him ſeſſion, deliberation, and ſuffrage in a national capacity. Such proviſion had been made to check the influence of the royal family! The queen likewiſe, who was an Auſtrian by birth ‡, had given great umbrage to a nation jealous of its liberties, inaſmuch as ſhe had purchaſed, from a certain nobleman, the county of Zyweck for the ſum of

* *Brachel.* Hiſt. noſtr. temp. lib. ii. 85.

† *Kobierziſki,* Hiſt. Vladiſlaüi, p. 924.

‡ Sigiſmond married two daughters of Charles duke of Stiria, father of Ferdinand II. namely, Anne in 1592, and Conſtantia in 1605: the firſt in her nineteenth and the ſecond in her ſeventeenth year. *Genealogiæ Ritterſhuſii,* fol.

£.300,000. in direct infraction of the *pacta conventa*, where it is ſolemnly ſtipulated, that the king and the king's family ſhould always continue under an inability of purchaſing, or, in other words, of impoveriſhing the nobles and enriching themſelves; and ſo anxiouſly was this reſtriction kept alive, that confiſcations for treaſon, devolved not into the regal treaſury, but on the contrary were beſtowed on ſome other perſon who was of the ſame rank and order with him proſcribed; with this ſingle advantage of prerogative reſerved to the crown, that his majeſty had power to nominate the party who was to enjoy the forfeiture, under the conditions above mentioned.

The purchaſe here ſpoken of was attended with other circumſtances, capable of alarming a nation ſo thoroughly tinged with political jealouſy. The diſtrict of Zyweck lay near enough to preſcribe laws to Cracau, and at the ſame time bordered on Sileſia, Moravia, and Hungary, whoſe inhabitants were of a turbulent and warlike nature, and in proportion more intermeddling with reſpect to Poland, as the major part of them conſiſted of proteſtants very ſincere and extremely jealous. What adminiſtered further cauſe for ſuſpicion was, it's convenient ſituation for enliſting ſoldiers to the detriment of the republic: and it contained ſeveral fortreſſes, caſtles, and ſtrong paſſes, where the crown had no concern*. It was objected, in the next place, that the current coin of the kingdom was debaſed by counterfeiting, and diminiſhed by clipping; upon which point one of the ſenators obſerved, that this was a grievance which proved burdenſome to every individual, and aſſigned the following ſtate reaſon for a ſpeedy redreſs, *Privata acrius urunt, publicorum ſenſus facilius tranſmittitur*†.

The Lithuanian repreſentatives, as if it were by a concerted deſign, refined upon the abuſes of the national coin, by obſerving, that it was not only clipped and adulterated, but reduced to ſuch a ſcarcity, in point of quantity, that hardly enough remained to anſwer the common circulating demands; which ſcarcity was alledged to reſult from an ill-conceived and unſucceſsful war againſt Guſtavus, who to their own knowledge had generoſity enough to allow Poland no diſhonourable peace, whenever the kingdom thought fit to aſk it properly; and indeed it was Guſtavus's character never to urge an enemy to the laſt extremity of diſtreſs; ſince if ſuch a perſon chanced afterwards to prove ungrateful,

* *Piaſeccius* in annum 1624.

† *Brachelii* Hiſt. noſtr. temp. lib ii. p. 86. 8vo.

or

or unfaithful, he was always conſcious, from a ſuperiority of parts and valour, that he had the power in his hands to reduce him to right reaſon, or brand him with ſome mark of condign puniſhment.

The obſtructions and difficulties already aſſigned, ſerved to cool that rancour of heart which Sigiſmond always cheriſhed againſt his kinſman, and paved the way to a ſeries of truces, which he ſigned grudgingly, and obſerved unfaithfully.

Some other national allegations were likewiſe produced. It was remarked, that Sigiſmond had diſpatched a large body of Coſſacks into Bohemia, and plunged himſelf abruptly into the confuſions of the empire, without requeſting the concurrence of the ſtates; which precipitate ſtep had given birth to an irruption of the Turks, inſtigated by the perſuaſions of Gabriel Bethlem, and made Poland liable to incurſions and depredations.

At length the Lithuanian ſenators had the boldneſs to aſſert, that without aſſuming to themſelves the right of prophecy, they would venture to foretel what ſort of terms Guſtavus would condeſcend to grant them; which ſerves to ſhew that a great prince performs as much by dint of correſpondence as by the point of the ſword. It was obſerved therefore, that upon ſuppoſition all Livonia was reſtored to him, aſſignment ſhould be made of the territories of Finland and Eſthonia to ſome one of Sigiſmond's children, in caſe Guſtavus died without male iſſue; meanwhile Sigiſmond was to preſerve the title of king of Sweden, under ſtrict proviſo that he gave no diſturbance to the actual poſſeſſion of his rival and neighbour.

A diſcuſſion of all theſe matters being thus premiſed, there ſtill remained freſh latent cauſes of miſtruſt and diſapprobation. A clandeſtine and criminal correſpondence had been diſcovered, from the import of certain letters, intercepted in the Low Countries, whereby hopes had been given, it was ſuppoſed from prince Radzivil, prefect of Leſſer Lithuania, to Gaſton, duke of Orleans, brother to Louis XIII. of ſucceeding Sigiſmond in the throne of Poland; upon which the king took the alarm, and denied Radzivil the prefecture of Greater Lithuania, then vacant, to which he had a right both from merit and ſtation; ſubſtituting in his room the prince Sapieha, an old man of great authority, approaching the eightieth year of his age: rich enough, from his own funds to contribute immenſely towards the ſupport of a war, but enfeebled as to his capacity, and converſant in civil life more than the military. The conſequence of this was, that

Radzivil

Radzivil ever afterwards maintained a good underſtanding with Guſtavus, and, in 1632, made him an offer of the crown of Poland.

Upon the whole, the event of this diet proved not diſadvantageous to the affairs of Sweden; for the friends of Guſtavus had intereſt enough to check the advance of money, neceſſary for the maintenance of a northern war; which compelled Sigiſmond, with infinite reluctance, to conclude the truce above mentioned; during which interval the Swediſh monarch extracted ſufficient money from the province of Livonia to put himſelf into a ſtate to reſume the war with ſucceſs and vigour. The affair of Zyweck was referred to a future diet; and as to the biſhopric of Warmia *, the king was obliged to make proviſion by diploma, that his ſon Albert ſhould neither exerciſe the epiſcopal function, nor take poſſeſſion, till he had arrived at due eccleſiaſtical age; ſubmitting likewiſe to take the oaths of fidelity to the republic, previouſly to all rights of ſeſſion and ſuffrage in the diet. Laſtly, all officers and ſoldiers employed in foreign ſervices, the Imperial ſervice eſpecially, were ſolemnly recalled, under penalty of being conſidered and puniſhed as fugitives and rebels. This point was carried againſt the crown at the very cloſe of the diet, though Sigiſmond himſelf ſate in the ſenate houſe, and liſtened to the debate till break of day. At that period Guſtavus finiſhed the diſpute which had ſtill ſubſiſted, in a latent manner, betwixt him and Denmark from the year 1622, with reference to the duties of the *Sound*; and effected it merely by his high and inſurmountable ſpirit.

Meanwhile the death of James I. king of England, made no conſiderable change in the affairs of Guſtavus; and here I will ſpare myſelf the vanity of drawing a laboured character of his Britannic Majeſty, ſuch a taſk being the exerciſe of a rhetorician and not the work of an hiſtorian: ſince it is in an author's power, if he hath any ſkill in hiſtorical painting, to place the picture in this or that particular light, and overcharge or diminiſh the features, in proportion as fancy ſhall direct, or prejudice and partiality miſguide him. True characters are beſt collected from a fair narrative of facts. The more unprejudiced foreigners, if people are inclined to know *their* opinions, ſeem to have had a thorough inſight into James's caſt of mind and politics; Nani informs us, "That he governed the Engliſh "and Scots by the machinery of their natural averſions to

* *Piaſecchii* Chronica Geſtorum in Europa ſingularium, in annum 1624. fol. *Cracov.* 1645.

"each

" each other, upon the principles of a private political " maxim, that eaſe and idleneſs, in the very nature of things, " ſoften and prediſpoſe mens hearts to admit ſlavery: his firſt " propoſals at Vienna might have been liſtened to, but they " were ſo impracticable and abſurd, that the ſubtil Spaniards " ſoon ſaw what ſort of perſon they had to deal with, and " availed themſelves accordingly of his improbable ſchemes " and delays. They knew likewiſe that he trembled at war, " and abominated a rebellion *." And Le Barre tells us, in words ſo elegant, that I ſhall leave them to work their way in his own language, " *Il étoit d' un naturel doux, mâis d' un* " *eſprit qui ne portoit guères ni ſes ſoins, ni ſes vues au delà de* " *lui-même. Borné au preſent, abandonnant au tems, le ſort* " *de ſa poſterité, droit par charactere, & facile à être trompé;* " *comme il le fut par les fauſſes négotiations de la maiſon* " *d'Autriche. Il s'en aperçut vers la fin de ſa vie, lorſqu'il* " *n'etoit plus tems de ſecourir le Palatin ſon gendre* †."

Charles ſucceeded his father in the crown. He was a good man, but wanted reſolution. It is true he formed a league, offenſive and defenſive, with the ſtates of the United Provinces, and equipped a large fleet, to which the *latter* joined a ſquadron of two and twenty ſhips. Nevertheleſs, without expatiating upon theſe circumſtances, it muſt, ever, be candidly acknowledged, that James felt ſome remorſe and compunction with reſpect to the Palatinate in his laſt days and hours; and according to the accounts of an accurate and ſenſible author ‡, who wrote upon authentic memoirs delivered to him by the *injured* family in queſtion, which had no great reaſon to be partial, charged his ſon, only eight and forty hours before his deceaſe, *as he hoped for a parent's benediction, and that of heaven, to exert all his powers in order to reinſtate his ſiſter and her children into their hereditary dominions: for*, continued he, *it was my miſtake to ſeek the Palatinate in Spain* §. It is a ſatisfaction to me to inſert this little anecdote, whereby James's character is ſo far cleared, as he appears to have died a *political* penitent.

The year 1625 opened with new tranſactions in the Swediſh ſenate. A vote paſſed for raiſing a ſort of 1625. ſtanding army, *De perpetuo milite ſubſidario*, with this reaſon aſſigned, that a warlike ſtrength of ſuch a nature might be always ready to prevent the difficulties which ariſe from unforeſeen or ſudden events, both in times of war and in times of peace; and in order to levy a new fund for this purpoſe, by way of ſuccedaneum to the other taxes then ſubſiſting, a

* *Hiſtoria di Nani*, pag. 138. fol.
† *Le Barre*, Hiſt. Générale d'Allemagne, Tom. ix. 4°. pag. 557.
‡ *Frederic Spanheim.*
§ *Memoires d' Electrice Palatine, Louiſe Juliane*, 4°. Leyde, 1645.

duty

duty was laid upon all corn that paſſed the mill, and the impoſt was intended to favour the poor, who bruiſed, at home, by hand, the little pittance of grain which was barely neceſſary for the ſupport of life. Before this edict received its full ſanction, the ſenate and nation agreed to ſupply the land and naval expences by a voluntary contribution, and voted a large body of recruits, in order to fill up the neceſſary deficiencies occaſioned by the accidents of war.

The truce, between Sweden and Poland, being now expired, Guſtavus, who ſincerely adhered to the good faith of an honeſt warrior, ſent a trumpeter, at the time appointed, to declare his intentions, but the ſeverity of the weather rendered it impoſſible for the meſſenger to acquit himſelf of his commiſſion in due ſeaſon. The Poliſh ambaſſadors complained loudly of this neglect, to whom the Swediſh miniſters replied, That the king their maſter had been amuſed beyond all human ſufferance, and that he alone could grant with propriety, what they on their own parts could not preſume to aſk. It was obſerved further, that the deputies of Poland were not furniſhed with ſufficient powers, and that Sigiſmond in his inſtructions of 1624 had implied Guſtavus to be an uſurper; whereas the latter, on the contrary, had not dropped a ſingle expreſſion that could be looked upon ill-natured or equivocal; nor were they, the Swediſh ambaſſadors, charged with any one ſecret article, it being their ſovereign's cuſtom to explain fully and publicly every circumſtance he propoſed to follow. The Poliſh repreſentatives ſtill inſiſted, that a war and a treaty were things incompatible at the ſame time, and that Guſtavus muſt firſt diſarm, and then negotiate. Upon this, Oxenſtiern*, who was at the head of the legation, aſſumed the argument, being exaſperated not a little; and told them firmly, there ſhould be no ceſſation of arms till the preliminaries of the treaty were adjuſted; and upon *that* ground he had his maſter's orders to prolong the truce till Auguſt next enſuing, and not a moment further; ſince otherwiſe the ſeaſon of the campaign would be elapſed, and who would indemnify the Swedes for their expences and fatigues? Obſerving at the ſame time, that Livonia was intended to be included in the armiſtice aforeſaid; inſiſting likewiſe, that during this ceſſation it ſhould be allowed the Swedes to draw proviſions from Lithuania and Courland, and that Radzivil ſhould approach their camp no nearer than within a diſtance of ten miles. He concluded with remarking, that he had the honour to ſerve a prince

* *Loccenii* Hiſt. Suec. p. 548, *&c.*

who

who knew how to ſhoot opportunity on the wing;——That their propoſals were only a ſtale pretext, calculated to protract the time;—That the king his maſter had the ſword drawn;—That he ſaw his conveniences, and underſtood how to uſe them.—Thus the affair terminated without deciſion.

Meanwhile, aſſiſted with ſuch helps as the goodnatured Swedes had generouſly contributed, his majeſty ſailed for Livonia, having a fleet of ſeventy-ſix ſhips under his command; and by the beginning of April made himſelf maſter of the caſtle of Kokenhauſen, an important fortreſs ſituated near the banks of the Dwina, rendered ſtrong by art, at the expence of the knights of the Teutonic order, and advantageouſly protected by nature. He then conquered Selburg, Duneberg, and Nidorp, not to mention Potnavia, which he had taken before, places all well ſupplied with Poliſh garriſons. Afterwards he maſtered Dorpat, which made an imperfect reſiſtance, and ſurrendered in deſpair of not receiving relief. Thus he reduced all Livonia in a ſhort ſpace, excepting Dunamond, having marched his army backwards and forwards near 700 miles. As one of the enemy's colonels had formed a deſign of poſſeſſing Riga, either by treachery or ſurprize, our vigilant monarch intercepted him in the very march, and cut his detachment to pieces. After that, by means of good intelligence, he overreached young Sapieha, who then had ſiniſter deſigns upon Riga, at the head of the Poliſh army, which loſt moſt of its baggage, and a conſiderable quantity of artillery; for the youth, from his natural impetuoſity, fought to give battle at the very moment he ought to have avoided it; and ruſhing into a general action over raſhly, ſoon fell a ſacrifice to a vigilant, compoſed, and determined opponent. This the Poliſh hiſtorians themſelves acknowledge. The king then throwing a bridge over the Dwina, which divides Semigallia and Lithuania, and opening a way to himſelf into the latter province, took Poſvolia, which harboured a garriſon of Coſſacks, who greatly harraſſed his march, and then Birzen, a fortification of note in thoſe days, where he found ſixty or ſeventy pieces of artillery, one of which was remarkably fine, being emboſſed and indented on the outſide in a manner to reſemble cracks and flaws, and encircled with an ornamental foliage of iron-work, as if it was intended to render the piece fit for ſervice. In the next place he turned his eyes upon Courland and Semigallia, and made himſelf maſter of Mittau, Bouſhe, and ſeveral other important places, partly by force, and partly by ſtratagem; yet all theſe ſucceſſes in

war

war were not ſufficient to render him averſe to an accommodation; ſo that it appears at firſt ſight as if it was matter of choice with him, rather to receive laws than impoſe them: though perhaps there may be another reaſon aſſigned, which ſhall be glanced at hereafter. To this effect he diſpatched Oxenſtiern to propoſe, once more, a treaty of peace; and Salvius, *ſub-delegate* to the chancellor in ſuch conferences, and Horn, not Guſtavus Horn the general, were ſent before or after him as coadjutors. The two latter* fell into the hands of the Coſſacks, and were interrupted in their political voyage. Oxenſtiern, violently exaſperated at this infraction of the law of nature and nations, demanded his aſſiſtants, with a tone of authority, by way of preliminary; to which Radzivil, the Poliſh general, at length conſented. Thus they rejoined the chief of their embaſſy, but effected nothing. Upon this a battle enſued on the vaſt plains of Semigallia‡, near a village called Walhoff, about twelve miles from the banks of the Dwina, where it was pretended the Poliſh cavalry would perform wonders, having full ſcope and room to act; but Guſtavus ſoon convinced Sapieha, the father§, a prince not deficient in fine parts, but too old to become a great commander, that he could conduct a pitched battle with the ſame facility, as he entrenched his camp, or beſieged a town. It may be worth remarking, as we obſerved before under the ſiege of Riga, that nothing could be more curious in the military ſcience, than an exact deſcription of this firſt capital battle which Guſtavus engaged in, ſince it was upon the preſent occaſion

* Bayle in his hiſtory of Guſtavus mentions Arvitz, Horn, and Salvius, as three ſub-delegates; but here he miſtakes, for the hiſtorian ſays ARVIDUM HORNIUM, & IOHANNEM SALVIUM; which laſt perſon, whoſe ſurname was Adler, born of mean parentage, was firſt a phyſician, and next a juſ-publiciſt. He then rambled over all the more enlightened nations of Europe, much in the manner of the ingenious baron Holberg in our days, who after having ſtaid long in England, undertook a journey, on foot, from Calais to Italy, on the ſlight foundation of fifty ſhillings, and there ſtudied many years. Salvius on his return could not eſcape the penetration of Oxenſtiern, who having ſtrongly recommended him to the king, employed him in all caſes of importance, and moſt particularly at the peace of Munſter, being created a ſenator and baron Orneholm.

‡ The duchy of Courland, as we ought to have obſerved in the preceding page, is divided into two provinces, Courland properly ſo called, and Semigallia. Courland in the old *Curiſh* language, which is a dialect of the Sclavonian, ſignifies a *flat land*, and Sem-galle, Semigallia, imports a *land on the other ſide*: for the word *ſem* is alſo ſynonimous to land.—*Memoirs communicated.*

§ This prince Sapieha was called Leo; and the ſon, who had been lately defeated, was named Staniſlaus.

that

that he diſcovered all at once his inventive talents in the diſpoſitions of the field; but hiſtorians, like commentators, uſually leave us in thoſe *parts* that are moſt *curious*, which will appear more plainly when we come to examine how the king loſt his life in the battle of Lutzen. All we learn with reference to the preſent engagement is, that Sapieha conducted no inconſiderable army, for he carried with him the flower of the Lithuanian troops, then thought the beſt in Poland; 400 Coſſacks, and 200 cuiraſſiers; about 900 German infantry, 2000 huſſars, and 400 Heyduos. Neither do we know more on the other hand, except that Guſtavus placed himſelf in the centre, and gave great proofs of military genius. Count Thurn, the father, and not the ſon, according to the account of ſome hiſtorians, commanded the right wing, and Guſtavus Horn the left, ſupported by the colonels Plato and Teüffel. The action was ſharp, but ſoon brought to a concluſion in favour of the Swedes. Guſtavus, in the very height of this new proſperity, did not forget to make Sigiſmond a tender of a ſecond peace; for he well knew the tedioufneſs and uncertainty of waging war againſt a ſort of vagabond army, which it was hard to find, and harder ſtill to bring to a deciſive battle.

Be that as it will, the Poles loſt their artillery, their baggage, and a great number of ſtandards, relinquiſhing to the enemy many priſoners, and leaving 1600 men on the field of battle. It is by ſome aſſerted, that the king of Sweden, previouſly to this engagement, ſent a trumpeter to Sapieha with this ſhort meſſage; *That as there were two ſuch things in the world as peace and war, he made him the compliment of chuſing that which he preferred moſt.* To which Sapieha replied, "That having only one ambition, his deſire was, to "make a fair trial with his majeſty upon equal ground." Not that Guſtavus complied with his requeſt, then the high military mode, upon a principle of gallantry; but foreſeeing that as his troops were better than the Poliſh ones, and his diſcipline ſuperior, *plain ground* to him was a ſort of *advantage*. Moreover, it was highly expedient in his circumſtances to bring on a deciſive battle; and it may eaſily be gueſſed what induced Sapieha to come to action. The Poliſh armies, it is well known, abound in cavalry, and it was firmly believed in thoſe days, that infantry, on even ground, could make no reſiſtance againſt horſe; but the king of Sweden, who *firſt* ſupported the *contrary opinion*, conjectured otherwiſe, and realized his ideas upon that ſubject more than half a century before the invention of the bayonet, which, when compared with the *reformed* pike

of Guſtavus, appears to be leſs ſerviceable. Mansfelt's troops, it is true, had performed ſomething of this kind a few years before, but that was effected purely by chance, and neceſſity; nor, though the fact was indiſputable, did *he*, or any military man, draw concluſions from it.

Sigiſmond ſtill continued inflexible, notwithſtanding he perceived his competitor to be great in all things, and felt in the ſpace of a few months the ſeveral effects of his extraordinary abilities, not only in a deciſive pitched battle, the event of which had thrown, into the hands of the Swedes, all the vaſt duchy of Lithuania, excepting only the town of Dunamond, but in the art of inveſting fortified towns, and in the very direction and management of a Poliſh diet. Added to this, the diſpoſitions of Providence, and the wiſe arrangement of human events, by the artful adjuſtment of Guſtavus, had rendered the military tranſactions of this year highly unproſperous to Poland. Two national misfortunes helped to cooperate to the ſame end. The one was a fire, which broke out at Jaroſlau, one of the moſt renowned fairs in Europe, next to thoſe which are held at Franckfort and Leipſic; and as the houſes in Poland are all built of wooden materials, the flames ſoon conſumed the city, and all the rich merchandizes therein contained *. The other unfortunate circumſtance was, that the Coſſacks thought fit to invade the Cherſoneſe of Tartary, in order to revenge a brother of the Cham, who had been lately diſmiſſed from the Ottoman ſervice. This irruption forced the Grand Seignior to requeſt that Sigiſmond would recall his barbarians; which obliged his Poliſh majeſty to ſend Conoſpoliſki, his beſt general, to reduce theſe invaders to reaſon. Thus Guſtavus, during the ſpring and ſummer, obtained a breathing-time of very conſiderable advantage.

Having mentioned the Coſſacks, it may be matter of curioſity to make a few remarks incidentally upon a race of beings as extraordinary in the military hiſtory of thoſe days, as are the Pandours and Talpaches in the preſent century.

The Coſſacks are not, properly ſpeaking, an original nation †, but a ſet of irregular ſoldiers, formed upon their own principles, into a community. His Poliſh majeſty appointed them a general, which was not the caſe at that time betwixt the emperor and the Croatians, but the inferior officers were elected according to their own regulations. They derive

* *Piaſecchii* Chron. in annum 1625, fol. p. 455.

† *Brachelii Hiſt.* noſtr. temp. 8°. p. 110, &c. *Piaſecchii* Chron. p. 52, &c.

their

their name from the word *coza*, which in the language of Poland ſignifies a *goat*, alluding to the celerity of their moving from place to place, and the depredations they make in the countries round them. It was their cuſtom to winter in the iſlands of the Nieper, or Boryſthenes, called *Saporoiæ*, in order to be prepared againſt the irruptions of the Tartars and Turks. In ſummer they roamed from place to place, ſupporting themſelves partly by hunting, and partly by dried fiſh, with which the aforeſaid river abundantly ſupplied them; and towards the approach of the new year, except the roads had been rendered impaſſable, they returned regularly to their cottages, and reviſited their wives and children: in all places of their peregrinations and wanderings ever acknowledging themſelves ſubjects to the crown of Poland. In former times they carried a bow, a quiver, and a ſhort ſword; but in the wars we ſpeak of, they ſupplied themſelves with carbines, head-pieces, and breaſt-plates. Such were the Coſſacks properly ſo called; nevertheleſs, it muſt be obſerved in the courſe of hiſtory, that the Poliſh light horſemen in general uſually paſs under that denomination.

Meanwhile Sigiſmond, their ſovereign, aſtoniſhed at ſuch rapidity of conqueſt on the part of Guſtavus, in order to recover the immenſe tract of ground that had been lately loſt, iſſued out his *monitorials* to convene a freſh diet at Warſaw, immediately upon the opening of the enſuing year; but Guſtavus was expeditious enough to prevent his rival, and while Sigiſmond was racking his imagination with deviſing ways and means how to drive him from the duchy of Lithuania; behold! the Swediſh monarch, though the enterpriſe, at that period, remained a ſecret, was forming a ſcheme of kindling a freſh war in the heart of *that* Pruſſia which belonged to Poland. About the ſame time his Britannic majeſty made ſome faint attempts of entering into meaſures with Guſtavus and the king of Denmark, with regard to the reſtitution of the Palatinate; but received very cold and unſatisfactory anſwers. They at length plainly told him, they had nothing to ſend but matter of unintelligible amuſement, except he gave them an example by diſpatching an Engliſh army into Germany.

Buckingham, afterwards, in the congreſs of ambaſſadors held at the Hague, reſumed the point, with relation to Sweden, in which ſome advances were made on either ſide: but his Swediſh Majeſty, who wanted impatiently to interpoſe in the empire, and clip the wings of the Auſtrian eagle, demanded ſome conditions incompatible with the intereſts of the king of Denmark, Charles's uncle, and thus the negoti-

ation came to nothing. Nevertheleſs, freſh inſtructions came, tending to compoſe all differences between the two northern kings, with a view, it is thought, of authorizing Guſtavus to interfere in Germany, which was then ſuppoſed to be his predominant paſſion.

Having mentioned Buckingham, it has been ſuggeſted to me, that he and Guſtavus had a better underſtanding with each other a few years afterwards; and that when the Duke made his famous expedition againſt the iſland of Rhé, doubting much of ſucceſs in ſuch an undertaking, he conceived a ſcheme, in caſe of diſappointment, being then abſolute maſter of all men's ſervices that acted under him, of ſailing directly and making a ſettlement, by virtue of a commiſſion from Guſtavus, in ſome part of the Spaniſh Weſt-Indies. The idea is romantic, but not abſolutely improbable. Nevertheleſs, I have been ſhewn the ſketch of a treaty to this effect between Guſtavus and Buckingham, which laſt was a viſionary man and of an unbounded imagination. Foreigners give us a better idea of him than our own hiſtorians. He had the preſumption, in France, to talk to queen Anne in the ſtyle of a lover; and the marchioneſs of Sennecy, dame of honour, who placed herſelf between him and her miſtreſs in order to keep him at a greater diſtance, ſaid to him in an angry tone, "*Sir, people do not talk thus here to a queen of "the realm**."

Baſſompiere, in the journal of his own life, gives us another inſtance of the duke's petulant vivacity: "I had," ſaid he, "a long diſputative audience with his Britannic "majeſty, who permitted himſelf in the courſe of the debate "to be hurried away by the violence of paſſion, to whom I "anſwered reſpectfully but firmly; when on a ſudden Buck-"ingham moved from that part of the room where he was "ſtanding, and planting himſelf between the king and me, "ſaid pertly enough, *Je viens faire le holà entre vous deux.*" I muſt obſerve likewiſe, that Richelieu and he hated each other mortally; the cardinal wrote him a letter, where he joined the body of his epiſtle to the word Monſieur at the beginning, making no ſpace nor diſtance. The duke returned him an anſwer upon the ſame principle; for which indeed one cannot blame him. He ſeems to have remembered ſomething of the ſame nature which paſſed between two grandees in Spain; the one wrote a letter to the other, and ſubſcribed himſelf at the bottom ſimply, *The Marquis*, im-

* Memoires Hiſtor & Polit. *d'Amelot la Houſſaye*, tom. i. 545, which anecdote is confirmed by *Nani*.

plying

plying that this title belonged to him by way of pre-eminence, but the other returned him a ſignature at the bottom of his letter equally extraordinary, for he ſigned himſelf, *The other Marquis.*

Nevertheleſs, in ſpite of all ſucceſſes with reference to Poland, Guſtavus ſtill ſhewed himſelf inclined to peace. He did not reliſh a long unprofitable war, which in no reſpect ſatisfied his great deſigns; and as he pitied his ſubjects with the tenderneſs of an affectionate parent, he did not chooſe to burthen them with extraordinary expences, except profit and glory could make them ample amends for the generoſity of their contributions. Perceiving Sigiſmond, on the footing things then ſtood, determined to omit no occaſions of diſtreſſing him, in caſe he embarked in another war, and ſhould meet the ſlighteſt check; he ardently deſired to introduce a ſolid peace, or an inviolable truce; both which he had a right and power to preſcribe to his adverſary; but perceiving Sigiſmond to be a man whom he could neither reſtrain, amuſe, nor ſatisfy, he at length reſolved to put one favourite ſcheme into execution with a very high hand, the FELICITER AUDET being his military and political motto, and this was nothing more or leſs than to produce a war nearer home, or a new theatre of action. When, therefore, it was concluded naturally by the Polanders, that he, being now at Stockholm, would make a ſecond irruption into Lithuania, all of a ſudden, to the ſurprize of Europe in general, before the common ſeaſon of opening a campaign, it being only the month of February, having already contented himſelf with the conqueſt of Livonia* or Lifeland, he embarked an army of 26,000 men in 150 ſhips†, and ſteered his courſe into the harbour of Pillau, which town was then garriſoned by the troops of the elector of Brandenburg, as duke of Pruſſia. The governor, whom ſome ſuppoſe to have been *retained* by a proper application of money‡, had more probably private inſtructions to relinquiſh the place without reſiſtance to the poſſeſſion of the Swedes, firing only a few pieces of artillery not loaded with ball; for Sigiſmond, ſome days before, had predicted the invaſion of Guſtavus to the ſtates of Ducal Pruſſia and the elector of Brandenburg. He requeſted the latter to conſider himſelf as a poſſeſſor only by *beneficiary* right from the crown of Poland, and had ſent inſpectors to examine thoroughly the harbour in queſtion, who all returned him ſolemn aſſeverations, that every thing

1626.

* *Lotichius* de Rebus Germanicis, fol. tom. i. 179. † Idem, Ibid.
‡ *Kobierziſki*, Hiſtor. Vladiſlaüi, 4°. p. 920.

appeared to be in a ſtate of abſolute ſafety, which afterwards excited no ſmall ſuſpicions in the king's mind *. Nor muſt we, on the other hand, forget that Guſtavus had previouſly offered a neutrality to the elector, his brother-in-law, which he accepted with thankfulneſs, and by way of return made him an offer of the town and harbour, both as a ſecurity in caſe of retreat, and as the means whereby to collect either contributions or purchaſeable ſupplies from the city of Dantzic, the firſt of all the Hanſe-towns, and uſually ſtyled the granary of the North: where great things were dreaded from this aſtoniſhing invaſion of Pruſſia; ſince a grave and pious hiſtorian † aſſures us, that the inhabitants had beheld two armies fighting in the air with thunder and lightning inſtead of artillery.

Pillau, eſpecially if the caſtle be included, which ſurrendered likewiſe, was a ſtrong place of great importance, ſituated near the iſland of Nerunga, on the coaſt of the Baltic, and diſtant from Koningſberg, a town then celebrated for its wealth and traffic, about twenty miles. A little frith conducts from Pillau into the lake of Friſeha, which extends itſelf from Koningſberg, weſtward, to the mouth of the Viſtula; a breadth little leſs than threeſcore miles. In this quiet water Guſtavus refreſhed his troops ſome days, and then diſembarked them at the very point where the river Paſſenge, or as ſome call it Paſſeria, diſembogues itſelf into the above lake. It may be worth while juſt to inform the reader, that Pruſſia, which belonged originally to the knights of the Teutonic order, who in proceſs of time fell a ſacrifice to their inſolence, luxury, and corruption of manners, was divided into two parts, one belonging to the king of Poland, and one to the elector of Brandenburg. The former of theſe princes poſſeſſed Dantzic and all that lies eaſtward on the banks of the Viſtula, to a certain breadth, in which tract may be reckoned many towns of great conſequence, as Thurn, Marienberg, and Culm, formerly the metropolis of the diſtrict; alſo Elbingen, the moſt flouriſhing and beautiful of them all. The latter of theſe princes enjoyed a territory which borders to the north on the Baltic ocean, the Churiſh lake, and the edge of Courland; confined eaſtwards by Samogitia and part of Lithuania; having the palatinate of Maſſovia to the ſouthwards, and Royal Pruſſia on the weſtern ſide ‡.

* *Kobierziſki*, Hiſtor. Vladiſlaüi, 4°. p. 921.
† *Scheffert* Memorab. Suec. Gentis, p. 11, &c.
‡ *Piaſecchii* Chronica, in annum 1626.

Guſtavus,

Guſtavus, who had but one principle of action whenever he entered a conquered or neutral country, acquitted himſelf, in the elector's dominions, with all imaginable moderation, equity, and humanity, and ſo much the rather, as the terms agreed upon between them were perfectly well comprehended on either ſide. Paſſing therefore all electoral towns, without notice, and pointing the courſe of his army to the ſouth-weſt, his firſt ſtep, in order to diſmay the enemy, was laying a tax of 30 *per cent.* on the navigation of Dantzic. After that he took Braunſberg and Frawnberg, which Piſſau in effect commanded, transferring the collegiate and town-libraries of the former place to the univerſity of Upſal, which in truth was more matter of ſhow than real advantage, being intended as a *ſilent reproof* to the friends of the houſe of Auſtria, inaſmuch as Tilly had ſome years before, by the connivance of that court, tranſported very nearly the whole Palatine collection from Heidelberg into the Vatican. Concerning that unfortunate ſiege, the Heidelbergers, to this moment, talk of the incredible reſiſtance made by the Engliſh, for it was more a carnage than a military engagement on both ſides. Every thing was plundered indiſcriminately from the palace to the artificer's ſhed; nor did thoſe learned treaſures eſcape, which till that time were eſteemed the glory of the proteſtant parts of Europe. This library ſtood in the church of the Holy Ghoſt. Moſt of the books, eſpecially the MSS. Tilly, by the emperor's orders, conveyed to Italy, and a ſmall proportion was ſent to Munich. The Croatians, whether they could read or not, ſecured ſome few books, which were ſold to the learned and curious piece-meal, ſo that morſels of this illuſtrious collection, may be ſeen not only in various libraries, beſides the Vatican and at Munich, but diſperſed into private hands all over Europe. Amongſt other valuable MSS. there were ſome pieces that the Romaniſts were extremely glad to ſecure from public view. Such, for example, was St. Chryſoſtom's epiſtle to Cæſarius, oppoſing the doctrine of *tranſubſtantiation*; and many more of a like ſtamp. Nor can a proteſtant to this hour, though ever ſo well received by the Cardinals at Rome, and to do them juſtice they are remarkably courteous to men of letters, procure any free and undiſturbed acceſs to ſeveral MSS. that once belonged to the Heidelberg collection.

The elector of Bavaria, who was a prince of great acquired as well as natural parts, had a violent deſire to tranſport this ineſtimable treaſure to his own palace; and if he had, Guſtavus might have reſtored this learned treaſure to the Elector

Palatine in 1632, but the pope had a fancy to make himſelf maſter of ſo extraordinary an acquiſition; and his requeſt did not well admit of refuſal; for he was the firſt mover of transferring the Palatinate to the houſe of Bavaria, and the court of Munich beſides had a new game to play at Rome, as Gregory XV. formerly cardinal Ludoviſio, died ſoon after this period, and Urban VIII. who well deſerved to be courted on account of his great ſpirit, as well as excellent underſtanding, ſucceeded him. He had been deputed nuncio by Clement VIII. into France, and held Louis XIII. in his arms, when he was chriſtened. Nor was he over-much prepoſſeſſed in behalf of the intereſts of the Spaniſh faction, with which Bavaria then co-operated. A theſis was publiſhed immediately on his election, with this title, *Num Papa eſſet Catholicus?* To which Paſquin by the direction of the party replied, *Tace, tace——Eſt Chriſtianiſſimus**. Matters therefore being thus ſituated, the books were divided; and a Greek named Leon, librarian of the Vatican, croſſing the Alps on the occaſion, he made no unfavourable diviſion, as to quantity and quality, in behalf of his maſter, when a partition treaty of manuſcript learning came to be ſettled between him and one of Tilly's commiſſary generals.

The king baniſhed the whole race of jeſuits from Frawenberg, as he had done formerly at Riga, not merely as Roman catholics, but as public incendiaries both in war and politics; and it will hereafter appear how ſincerely earneſt they were to be revenged of him, and how capable they demonſtrated themſelves of returning him an equivalent at no inconſiderable diſtance of time. He then took Ravenſberg by compromiſe, with the ſmalleſt loſs that can be well conceived; for a ſudden panic had poſſeſſed the garriſon.

Some days afterwards he inveſted Elbingen †, where the defendants were almoſt equal in number to thoſe that beſieged them. Here the king gave a freſh proof, both of his good nature and contempt of danger; for whilſt the commander and burgomaſter were ſigning a capitulation in his tent, he walked up to the town-gates, and deſired to be admitted within the walls upon courteous terms. He then aſked pardon of the inhabitants for not making his appearance in a better ſuit of cloaths, and conveying himſelf from the crowd, in the midſt of their admiration, ſtepped into a bookſeller's ſhop, and deſired the honeſt man to ſupply him

* *Arcana Dominat. Hiſpan.* p. 15, 12°.
† *Piaſecchii* Chronica in hunc annum.

with

with an edition of Buchanan's poems *. Perhaps, for the remark is proper to be made under any article of this or a ſimilar nature, the public in general may be apt to blame me, for mentioning ſuch little incidents in reſpect to the life of a perſon truly great: but I appeal to every man's heart, whenever he reſpects the character of any one, whether he is not more pleaſed with the recital of little circumſtances unknown, than with a pompous repetition of ſhining actions which have already been told over and over again. Illuſtrious perſons are partly known from minute, common, and unguarded tranſactions; and if the public can ever bear the recital of particularities, it will receive them kindly in the account of a *man*, the very copying of whoſe picture afforded daily bread to half the portrait painters who then flouriſhed in Europe.

By making himſelf maſter of Elbingen, to whoſe governor Guſtavus gave as good terms as the Romans granted Antiochus king of Syria on a like occaſion, he fulfilled what the continuation of Foreſti obſerves ſenſibly concerning him, namely, that though he had rarely more than an army of 12,000 men in Poland, yet he ſucceſsfully engaged ſeveral Poliſh generals at the head of great bodies of forces in the ſame campaign; took the ſtrong and important city of Elbingen, and afterwards ruined two imperial detachments, which amounted at leaſt to 16,000 ſoldiers: obtaining, by the poſſeſſion of the laſt named town, all that a warrior, in ſuch circumſtances, could deſire; for he procured money, refreſhments, and a vaſt quantity of military ſtores. At the ſame time an infinite number of recruits, many of them ſoldiers of fortune, and Scotſmen, flocked to him from Ducal Pruſſia; ſo that he completed all his regiments †, and was enabled in three days to march to the ſeat of the knights of the Teutonic order, Marienberg, into which city one Penclau, a commander in the Poliſh ſervice, had conveyed, with great dexterity, a reinforcement of 200 men, whom he was marching caſually into Lithuania. The garriſon being ſtill deficient and incomplete, he undertook only the defence of the caſtle, and changed even that reſolution upon a night's reflection. Not that it is certain whether he feared an aſſault from the Swediſh army, or whether he dreaded a court martial, at home; inaſmuch as he had undertaken to defend a fortreſs without orders; for the Poliſh ſervice in thoſe days was full as punctilious as

* *Character of Guſtavus Adolphus.* Lond. 4°. 1633.
† *Brachel.* Hiſt. noſtr. temp. lib. iii. 128.

that of the Spaniards. Whatever may have been the cauſe, we may ſuppoſe, having the honour to be invited by Guſtavus to ſupper, he frankly ſurrendered both town and caſtle during the courſe of the repaſt, leaving in the hands of the Swedes a Poliſh receiver-general, with his provincial cheſt, by way of ſecurity. Fortunately at the ſame time count Thurn joined his maſter with a conſiderable body of cavalry, having left Livonia, and made a very prudent march through Ducal Pruſſia.

Thus reinforced, the king took Stum, Chriſtburg, Vormitz, and Brodnick, and formed a lodgment in the two iſlands of Verder, which are ſurrounded by the Viſtula and the river Nagoth. To this the natural remiſſneſs of the Poles, and the diſſenſions that ſubſiſted between their generals, not a little contributed. In truth, the great matter was, that Guſtavus was infinitely their ſuperior, not only in pitched battles, and the art of inveſting towns, but in the method of intrenching his army, and erecting fortifications almoſt inſtantaneouſly; ſo that it was next to impoſſible to force him to an engagement, except he choſe to embrace the opportunity. He then, to open a free paſſage between Sweden and his army, blocked up the mouth of the Viſtula in the narroweſt part, and with great preſence of mind prevented an attempt of the Polanders to burn his ſhips, by reaſoning rightly from the accidental diſcharge of a ſingle muſquet. This ſtrategem, if we ſubſtitute faſcines in the room of turves, was preciſely the ſame with that which had been practiſed againſt Breda. He then rendered himſelf maſter both of Mew and Dirſchau, two ſtrong towns ſituated on the banks of the Viſtula, having thrown a bridge over that rapid and wide-extended river. The greatneſs of his parts here appeared very conſpicuous, for by preoccupying theſe places, it was his purpoſe to preclude Sigiſmond from interrupting the important ſiege which he propoſed afterwards to lay to Dantzic: but matters were not then ripe for ſo important an event. Marching therefore with one Brahé*, an officer of twenty-four years of age, at the head of ſome cornetcies of Smalandian horſe, he drove the Poles from Gluckſtadt, and ſeized all their baggage; contenting himſelf, at the preſent juncture, to ſend to the Dantzickers, as he approached their city, certain terms of hard digeſtion, of which the principal were to this purpoſe:

* The king choſe him afterwards for his companion, when he croſſed the Rhine in a wherry to attack the Spaniards. He commanded the firſt centre of infantry at the battle of Lützen, being then count Weiſſenburg.

That

That all ſhips ſhould pay him a certain impoſt: that the town ſhould enter into a ſtrict and unreſerved neutrality: that his commiſſaries ſhould be allowed to purchaſe corn for ready money; and that the Poliſh veſſels then lying in the harbour ſhould be diſmiſſed: to all which propoſitions, the laſt only excepted, the inhabitants conſented with outward complacency, it is true, but with an inward duplicity. Nevertheleſs, in a ſhort time he made himſelf maſter of the whole of Poliſh Pruſſia; for upon this occaſion ſome favourable circumſtances happened to aſſiſt him. On the one hand, Sigiſmond was abſent, and violent perſonal animoſities ſubſiſted betwixt his generals. On the other hand, Guſtavus was not only a firſt-rate general, but proveditor of the army, *meſtre de camp*, engineer, explorer of paſſages, and common ſoldier. He had vigilance to foreſee, activity to examine, and courage to execute whatever appeared to come within the reach of man. This ſeems to correſpond with what Sir Thomas Roe, the Engliſh ambaſſador, pronounced concerning him about three years afterwards*, "That he was "a prince who had well conſidered *ſi violandum eſt jus*: a "moſt temperate and courageous commander, that doeth all "offices both of a ſoldier and counſellor: *Vir ad magnus res, "& revolutiones natus*†." It may be obſerved further, that his troops were well cloathed, well paid, and well fed. He allowed of no licentiouſneſs, plunder, cruelty, debauchery, or immorality; and by his example, joined to an exact diſtribution of favour and cenſure, rewards and puniſhments, he made his officers and ſoldiers as like himſelf as circumſtances could admit.

It may not be amiſs to obſerve afreſh in this place, that what paſſed between Guſtavus and the Dantzickers, appears to be only on their ſide matter of cajolement and trial of ſkill: for they ſent deputies to him juſt to rebate the edge of his keenneſs, and protract the time till the approach of Sigiſmond, whom they privately favoured. In fact, that monarch ſoon arrived at the head of 30,000 men in the neighbourhood of Graudentz; and then the Dantzickers took off the maſk, and committed ſome hoſtilities on the Swedes, who afterwards treated them as they juſtly merited.

Sigiſmond after ſome fruitleſs attempts, in one of which he loſt 4000 men near Marienberg, laid ſiege to Mew, a ſmall town in Pomorelia, near the entrance of the river Verſa into the Viſtula, and entrenched the main part of his army on a ſteep eminence, by which the Swedes muſt neceſ-

* MS. letter to the earl of *Carliſle*; October 27, 1629.

farily

ſarily paſs; for as he foreſaw they would attempt to raiſe the ſiege, he wanted to bring them to a ſort of general engagement, which in his judgment, conformably to the nature of the ground, had all human appearances of proving favourable to himſelf. Guſtavus drew near, and examined the approaches with uncommon attention, but foreſaw great inconveniences from the furious ſweep of two batteries, which the enemy took care to erect in good time.

It was indiſpenſably neceſſary for the ſervice of the campaign, either to raiſe the ſiege, or throw relief into the town; for on Mew and Dirſchau depended the hopes of poſſeſſing Dantzic; but nothing leſs than a complete victory could effect the firſt, and a certain ſuperiority, like that of a battle ſomething more than half deciſive, was alone capable of producing the ſecond. That ſharp ſervice was to be performed, every ſoldier well comprehended; how to effect it like men of honour was the remaining difficulty. It was the rare felicity of Guſtavus on this occaſion, to be puzzled, but not diſmayed; to loſe his conjectures, but not his reaſon; for his mind, in ſuch circumſtances, exerted itſelf in proportion to the danger. Having marched therefore from his camp at Dirſchau, at the head of 3000 choſen infantry, and 500 horſe, without drums or trumpets, in hopes of beating up one of the enemy's quarters, ſo far at leaſt as to throw relief into the town, he determined inſtantaneouſly, in one of theſe military irradiations, to aſcend the hill, purſuing the track of a ſmall winding bye path; nevertheleſs, at the ſame time, he found the enterpriſe ſo dangerous, that he thought himſelf obliged, conformably to the cuſtom of the age upon peculiar occaſions, to animate his ſoldiers by a ſhort ſpeech. The brave young Thurn, ſeconded by colonel Hepburn, a Scots officer, of great abilities and of approved courage, conducted the attack.

If the reader can repreſent to himſelf the behaviour of a body of Engliſh ſailors, commanded to climb a very deſperate hill, he may then form ſome idea of that alacrity which animated the Swediſh ſoldiers; and as the ſlopes of the aſcent were well furniſhed with trees, theſe trees ſerved the aſſailants for maſts and cordage whereby to mount.

When Thurn and Hepburn had reached the ſummit, which lay near the banks of the Viſtula, they found the Poliſh ſoldiers entrenching themſelves, like good pioneers, and fell on them with incredible fury; but as the Poles poured in freſh troops every moment, the fight was maintained for two hours with incredible obſtinacy. Thurn, now finding the ſervice extremely dangerous, retired a few

paces to a poſt which had appeared to him more defenſible. The Polanders attacked him in this retreat with redoubled fury, being reinforced by a large body of Heyducks and Coſſacks, crying aloud, "That the Swediſh curs could not bear the bite of the Poliſh wolves." The gallant Bohemian ſoon convinced them, that a ſhort retreat was ſomething very different from an actual flight. During this interval, Guſtavus threw a ſupply of men and ammunition into the town. It once more appeared, that infantry were able to reſiſt an equal or ſuperior body of cavalry; for the fire of Thurn's ſoldiers was irreſiſtible, and the pikemen ſtood immoveable, like a wall of braſs. Upon this footing ended the action; of which the ſucceſs was whimſical and capricious; for though the Polanders kept the field of battle, they abandoned the ſiege. Thus the turn of the ſcale inclined rather to Guſtavus's ſide; he having carried his point, and his opponents loſt theirs. Sigiſmond was not preſent in this engagement, but prince Uladiſlaüs, his ſon, behaved extremely well. The action laſted two days*. There were ſome other circumſtances uncommonly remarkable in the preſent engagement. On a juſt average every Swede killed a man, loſing only one-ſeventh of their own number. The Engliſh colonel Moſtyn, and a count Brahé, not the young man mentioned before, performed particular ſervices that day. The former ſtood firm at the head of 200 German arquebuſiers, and reſiſted every impreſſion the enemy could make; and the latter, by the king's command, had ventured up the hill by another track, attended only with a ſmall party of infantry, and there ſupported the fire of the Polanders till he made himſelf maſter of the ground, and conveyed the intelligence to his royal maſter.

The Poles were ſo terrified at this deſperate reſolution of the Swedes, that without further delay they raiſed the ſiege, though attacked only by an handful of men. Their conduct, as it is commonly delivered down to us in hiſtory, ſeems to me remarkably myſterious; but in truth the matter was, the Poliſh generals diſagreed among themſelves; they likewiſe knew that Guſtavus would immediately cauſe the larger part of his army, being then at a ſhort diſtance, to join him, and in the third place, the Poliſh camp was ill ſupplied with powder.

Guſtavus entered the town that evening, extolling the fidelity of the inhabitants, and bravery of the garriſon, to the higheſt degree, and allowing no man's good ſervices to

* *Latich.* de Rebus German. fol. tom. i. 481.

paſs

paſs unrewarded. At night, when all the officers aſſembled to prayers in his lodgings, as was not uncommon, with a view particularly to return thanks for their maſter's delivery that day, for his great eſcapes were manifeſt, Botvid, his majeſty's firſt chaplain, who had retired to his devotions apart from the army during the whole of the action, made him his congratulations after the ſervice was concluded; and received from Guſtavus this pious and elegant anſwer; *That he little doubted the proſperity of the battle, when Moſes aſſiſted him with his prayers on the mount* *.

In the hurry and confuſion of this action, Guſtavus fell twice into the enemy's hands. How he eſcaped the firſt time cannot well be aſcertained; nevertheleſs, he was preſerved the ſecond time, by the admirable preſence of mind of a Swediſh horſeman, who, to conceal his majeſty's quality, cried aloud to the Polanders, "Have a care of yourſelves, for we will "reſcue my brother;" ſince, it muſt be noted, he had three or four companions at his elbow. This taſk he performed in an inſtant. Not long afterwards, Guſtavus perceived his deliverer to be made priſoner in turn, and putting himſelf at the head of five or ſix cavaliers, brought him off triumphantly. *Now*, ſaid he, *brother ſoldier, we are upon equal terms, for the obligation is become reciprocal* †.

Meanwhile Sigiſmond made ſome ſlight indications of liſtening to a treaty. Place and time being named, the ambaſſadors met, and it was the moſt unmeaning and ſolemn interview that ever was known. Every man affected the gravity, wiſdom, ceremony, and taciturnity of a Spaniard. At length a Poliſh nobleman of ſpirit, provoked beyond patience with theſe ſerious grimaces, broke ſilence, and propoſed terms, which Oxenſtiern and the others poſitively rejected. Indeed this expedient of Zamoſki ‡, for ſuch was the propoſer's name, if one may judge of the piece from the ſample, carries with it a very extraordinary appearance, and may ſerve to demonſtrate, at leaſt collaterally, what an high idea he and his brother deputies had conceived of our king's generoſity and greatneſs of ſpirit. The tenor of it ran to the following effect. "That the Swedes ſhould "cede Livonia to Poland, and Sigiſmond on his ſide "ſhould reſign to Guſtavus Eſthonia and Finland:" to which latter principality he had a more immediate claim, inaſmuch as it was a part of his father's appennage; "and in

* *Loccenii* Hiſt. Sueean. p. 554.

† *New Star of the North*, Lond. 4°. 1633.

‡ *Lotich.* de Rebus Germ. tom. i. 482, &c.

"caſe

" caſe Guſtavus died without iſſue male," his only brother being dead about four years before, " that then one of Sigiſ-
" mond's ſons ſhould be declared ſucceſſor to the crown of
" Sweden, and Sigiſmond himſelf aſſume the title as an
" external form; the next relation of Guſtavus being to be
" inveſted with the duchy of Sudermania *in perpetuum*."

Now it is Puffendorf's opinion, that this propoſal came from the Swedes*, which appears to me highly unlikely, and the more ſo, as a better inſtructed author informs us, that the conditions, alike unjuſt and unworthy†, were firſt deviſed by the Polanders; nor can the *baron*'s exactneſs, any more than his impartiality, be always relied on; for he tells us in the ſame paragraph, that prince Charles, the king's brother, died the preceding year, 1625, whereas his deceaſe happened four years before, in 1622.

As this propoſed accommodation had the air of extravagance, of courſe the war commenced afreſh. Conoſpoliſki, the ableſt general amongſt the Poles, formed an enterpriſe againſt Dirſchau, but retired with loſs and diſappointment; for Guſtavus had prudently thrown troops into the town before he could poſſibly approach it. Sigiſmond made like attempts upon Mew and Marienberg, with the ſame ill ſucceſs. Thus the campaign concluded neither unſatisfactorily nor ingloriouſly for the Swediſh cauſe. The king, whoſe troops began to be extremely harraſſed through the extent of his conqueſts from April to October, encamped himſelf with great judgment on the approach of winter; having all Pruſſia at his devotion behind him, and the navigation of the Viſtula open betwixt himſelf and Sweden; and thus he bade defiance to the united efforts of Sigiſmond, Conoſpoliſki, and Sapieha.

Towards the end‡ of this year, Guſtavus was rendered happy by the birth of a ſecond daughter, called Chriſtina; the former, likewiſe named Chriſtina, or as ſome ſay Chriſtiana, having been dead ſome time. Upon this new event, Sigiſmond, which is not uncommon to perſevering, and obſtinate minds, grew more and more encroaching, proud, and intermeddling every day: upon which the Swediſh ſenate, fully determined to mortify his vanity and check his ambition and turbulence at once, thought proper to ſettle the ſucceſſion on Chriſtina, and declared her heireſs to the throne.

* *Introduct.* du Baron Puffendorf, tom. iv. p. 202.

† Iniquis prorſus, & indignis conditionibus à Polonis oblatis. *Loccen.* lib. viii. 554.

‡ December the 8th.

It

It has been the misfortune of this unaccountable woman to have been more ſpoken of in hiſtory and memoirs, than one half of her female cotemporaries. Reading much, for the great Oxenſtiern was her tutor, yet not extremely learned; a collector and critic in the fine arts, but collecting without judgment, and forming concluſions without taſte*; affecting pomp, and rendering herſelf a beggar; fond to receive ſervile dependance, yet capable of abdicating a crown; delighting in cruelty, yet diveſting herſelf of the means; paying court to the moſt ſerious Chriſtians, and making profeſſion of little leſs than deiſm. It is afflicting above meaſure to conſider ſuch a daughter in the light of being deſcended from ſuch a man. She has claim at leaſt to a certain degree of oblivion; and one muſt ſay of her with the great Oxenſtiern, on a like occaſion, who when he pronounced the words, could hardly refrain from tears, *Alas, alas, be things as they will, nevertheleſs ſhe is the daughter of the* GREAT GUSTAVUS!

Matters continuing ſtill upon a diſagreeable footing in reſpect to Poland, Guſtavus took care, like a pru-
1627. dent and condeſcending prince, to lay before the ſenate all the efforts, advances, and conceſſions he had made, in order to procure a laſting peace. Theſe papers being thoroughly peruſed, the ſtates took flame in an inſtant, and being charmed on the one hand with their maſter's ſincerity and communicative temper, and exaſperated beyond all imagination on the other at the rejection of ſuch reaſonable conditions as he had vouchſafed to propoſe, determined once for all to mortify the pride of Sigiſmond, and cut off his pretenſions even from the very root. In a word, they repoſed a confidence ſo unlimited in their ſovereign, that they made him a tender of new ſupplies of money, and determined to ſerve under him in their proper perſons if there ſhould be occaſion. Great national actions can

* Amongſt various anecdotes that might be produced on this head, I ſhall ſpecify only one with regard to pictures. She collected at Rome many fine pieces, painted by the greateſt maſters, and ordered their extremities to be clipped with ſhears, till ſhe reduced them to the ſize of the ſides of rooms, or the compartments of ſtucco-work and wainſcoting, where ſhe intended to place them, little conſidering, that when the ſuperficial extent of a picture is diminiſhed by cutting, that the proportions which remain are greatly injured, if not totally ruined. I have ſeen at a broker's ſhop a roll of Titian's painting, half a yard wide, having been ſeparated from its original by this unmerciful Procruſtes. From an anecdote delivered down to us by Dryden, ſhe is delineated in the Grand Cyrus, under the character of queen of Corinth; whence that poet drew her in his dramatic performance, called *The Maiden Queen.*

never

never be effected, except the king and his people preſerve a mutual confidence and eſteem for each other: it was in the power of the latter to have checked the operations of the war at any time, either through peeviſhneſs or capriciouſneſs. After ſuch evidences of unreſerved frankneſs and ſincerity, his majeſty began to feel he had fixed his footing on firm ground; and therefore with an eye to popularity, and in hopes of conciliating the affections of his ſubjects to him more and more, he beſought the ſtates to examine carefully a plan that had been laid before him for eſtabliſhing a commerce to the Weſt-Indies *. From this undertaking he propoſed to give his nation a new turn for maritime affairs, and draw no ſmall advantage from an intercourſe which had proved not unprofitable to his European neighbours, alledging likewiſe, which in him was certainly matter of ſincerity, the ſingular advantages of ſpreading the ſacred truths of the Goſpel over thoſe uncultivated and unlightened regions. On the ſame religious principles he ventured on a bolder and more noble ſtep nearer home, and at this important juncture republiſhed and enforced an edict in *favour of diſtreſſed and oppreſſed proteſtants in all countries*, offering theſe emigrants a ſafe retreat in Sweden, together with an immunity from all taxes † for ſome years; and what is ſtill more noble and diſintereſted, full permiſſion to return whenever the troubles of Europe ſhould be compoſed. Beſides preſerving a ſincere and generous ſenſe of piety at bottom, his majeſty had certainly an eye to the extravagant power and cruelty of the houſe of Auſtria, and opened a ſanctuary to a million of people, who, after the loſs of all their worldly goods and poſſeſſions, were deprived of their civil and religious liberties; ſo that we may denominate this meaſure one of thoſe fortunate actions in a prince, which at the ſame time is wiſe and good: and as Guſtavus had ſomething of the ſingular and inventive caſt in all he did, he may be conſidered, except we ſuppoſe him to copy the conduct of queen Elizabeth on the like occaſion, to be the father of the *refugees*, and the protector of exiles. In this circumſtance likewiſe he has been imitated by One, who, by copying the actions of Guſtavus, pays a ſilent tribute of honour to the memory of the deceaſed.

It is not to be deſcribed how much all theſe new ſchemes at Stockholm delighted the ſenators; and particularly that

* APPENDIX, ART. III. It was preſerved by Biſaccioni in his Commentaries, 4°. in Venet. 1634.

† This heroical and chriſtian declaration is preſerved by *Loſichius*, tom. i. p. 546.

relative

relative to eſtabliſhing a ſettlement in the Weſt-Indies; to which all people ſubſcribed generouſly and readily, in conformity to the example the king had ſet them. One Uſſling, a Fleming, two years before, firſt made this propoſal to Guſtavus, who readily complied with it both from religious and political reaſons; inaſmuch as in the latter caſe he propoſed, by introducing commerce, to leſſen the taxes that affected agriculture, caſting likewiſe a ſmall ſide-glance at the king of Spain, who extracted, as he thought, rather too much money from the American regions, which tended chiefly to aggrandize himſelf and the Imperialiſts likewiſe. But his majeſty, greatly interrupted by affairs nearer home, had not power to give laws to two worlds at once; and the Spaniards, with a view to ſupport the Poliſh or Imperial intereſts, for no reaſon was aſſigned, contrived, dexterouſly enough, to make themſelves maſters of the little Swediſh ſquadron that ſailed for America. Nevertheleſs, the diſappointment was far greater than the real loſs; for this firſt equipment was only a ſort of feeling the pulſe, in order to judge how far ſuch a kind of expedition might anſwer hereafter; ſo that the ſubſcribing ſubjects, and the nation in general, bore their loſſes patiently, and the ſums of money that remained were appropriated to the uſes of the war, and to other ſervices of ſtate.

Whilſt Guſtavus employed himſelf with great attention at Stockholm, where by conſent of ſenate, making a draught of one man out of ten throughout his dominions, he formed a body of 40,000 fine recruits in caſe of emergency*, Conoſpoliſki, notwithſtanding the extreme ſeverity of the ſeaſon, changed the ſiege of Dantzic into a blockade, taking care at the ſame time that the little Swediſh army, which Guſtavus left behind him, ſhould make no incurſions, into the parts of Poland hitherto unconquered, having rendered himſelf maſter of the port of Buca, from whence, and from the harbour of Pillau, the Swedes, in effect, inveſted Dantzic. Meanwhile Guſtavus ſuffered no ſmall uneaſineſs, as the tempeſts of the ocean and the inclemency of the ſeaſon would not allow him to tranſport a large reinforcement to his army. What contributed moſt to agitate and chagrin him was, that the Poles had repoſſeſſed the city of Putzka, which gives laws to a ſmall territory of the ſame name; and that the colonels Strief and Teüffel †, both men of ſervice, the former having commanded the right wing of cavalry at

* *Lotich.* de Rebus Germ. tom. i. p. 845. † Ibid. p. 545.

the

the battle of Prague*, and the latter being an officer whom Guſtavus particularly eſteemed, had the misfortune to be ſurprized by the vigilance of Conoſpoliſki, at a time they ſuppoſed him at leaſt ſixty miles away from them. They had 8000 new-raiſed troops under their command, all levied during the preceding winter, in and near the territories of Brandenburg. As the men were unpractiſed, and unexperienced, it was not eaſy for their commanders to infuſe ſpirit into them; for when Sigiſmond's general had ſurrounded them on every ſide, and the Poliſh horſe began the attack, theſe military novices advanced their hats upon their pikes, without deliberation, and aſked for quarter. Of courſe Strief and Teüffel were taken priſoners, and the common men were diſmiſſed to Germany, under promiſe not to ſerve againſt the kingdom of Poland for one year then next enſuing. Behold here the only real diſgrace that ever befel a large body of troops under the pay of Guſtavus; and ſtill it muſt be conſidered in the ſecond place, that the men were all infants in the practice of war, and that their maſter was abſent too. His majeſty, when the event had happened, made no remonſtrances nor complaints, it being his cuſtom to be angry only whilſt matters continued undecided; yet never meeting with the name of Strief in the future courſe of our hiſtory, it ſeems probable to me that the king diſmiſſed him. Teüffel he knew to be brave and able, and allowances being made that the beſt officers may be defeated once or twice, he continued and rather increaſed his favours to him.

Conoſpoliſki thought it now high time to refreſh his men; but Guſtavus arrived with the firſt fair wind in the month of May, and forced him to return very reluctantly to the duties of the field. Indeed it was our hero's cuſtom to anticipate the approach of ſpring in opening a campaign, but the tempeſtuouſneſs of the ſeaſon prevented his embarkation till the time mentioned, and then he made his appearance in Pruſſia at the head of a brave and well-diſciplined army, opening the campaign with uncommon luſtre, and gaining two very notable advantages in one day; for he took the fort of Keſmark by aſſault, and defeated a large detachment of Poliſh troops which marched to its relief. He then applied himſelf to the ſiege of Marienberg, a ſtrong fortreſs built by the Dantzickers in order to free them from the inſults of the Swediſh fleet, and ſoon reduced it, though

* This officer was a Hollander, and ſent by the ſtates-general with a regiment of horſe to aſſiſt the king of Bohemia.

it was well ſupplied with proviſions and military ſtores, and doubly garriſoned. The Poles however purſued the war with ſurprizing perſeverance, and had briſkneſs enough to attack Guſtavus's camp, which occaſioned a ſecond action at Dirſchau; where the enemy's infantry had been entirely broken and ruined by the Swediſh cavalry, if a large body of Poliſh horſe had not inſtantly moved to their ſupport. The aſſailants however, notwithſtanding their ſuperiority of numbers, were at length repulſed, and happy for them they eſcaped on ſo good terms; for whilſt Guſtavus was ſurveying, from an eminence, the nature of the ground, both with reſpect to himſelf and the enemy, upon ſome notable alteration in the turn of the battle, he had the misfortune to be ſtruck by a falcon-ſhot near his elbow, which diſconcerted his generals and his ſoldiers not a little. On this occaſion all the chief officers of the army, with Oxenſtiern at their head, beſought him, in the moſt tender manner, to manage his life with more care, as he paſſionately loved his ſubjects, and was beloved by them with reciprocal affection. Convinced of their attachment to him, he told them with emotion, modeſty, and at the ſame time a certain degree of firmneſs: "*That the divine power would continue juſt the ſame, when he was gone; nor did he ſuppoſe himſelf ſo indiſpenſably neceſſary to the conſervation of his kingdom, as they, from a kind preposſeſſion in his favour, were inclined to imagine: Since,* ſaid he, *if the Supreme Being ſhould be pleaſed to diſpoſe of me in the day of battle, he will queſtionleſs raiſe up ſome, abler ſupport to the crown of Sweden. But,* continued he *if that ſelf-ſame Being hath committed this important charge to me, it is my buſineſs to perform it without any views of favouring myſelf; and if death be my portion in war, how can a king die more glorioufly than in the defence of his people?*—It appeared afterwards, from Guſtavus's future practice and turn of mind, that the *remonſtrance* had leſs effect than the *reply**.

When his majeſty's phyſician, who thought a man of his importance muſt ſay ſomething to ſtrengthen the requeſt of the prime miniſter Oxenſtiern and the generals, approached, the king with a ſmile replied to him: *Doctor, pray make your converſation ſhort, and call to mind the good old Latin proverb, Ne ſutor ultra crepidam*†: whence it is manifeſt that he bore all his pains with compoſure of mind and gaiety; ſince, on another occaſion, when the ſurgeon was puzzling himſelf to extract a muſket ball, Guſtavus, doubtleſs remembering a ſaying of Alexander the Great on a

* *Loccenii* Hiſt. Suec. p. 556. † Ibid.

like

like occaſion, *beſought the artiſt to allow the ball to continue in his body, as an illuſtrious monument that he had not paſſed his youth in idleneſs and inactivity**.

What afflicted Guſtavus more than the wound, was the news he received, that Adolphus, duke of Holſtein, had marched a body of Imperial troops in order to join himſelf with Sigiſmond. This general, ever diſtinguiſhed for giving marks of the cleareſt courage, laboured under two misfortunes; his powers to act were circumſcribed; nor had his troops overmuch opinion of his parts, or military conduct, if we except the fighting only. In ſpite of the arrival of theſe veteran bands, the king was obliged to go to Stockholm, in hopes to recover his health, much impaired by the wound he had lately received; and in the interval he left the command of his army to count Thurn, who choſe to give the men reſt rather than action; nevertheleſs, upon relinquiſhing a caſtle which the Polanders immediately ſeized, he contrived, having left a concealed mine beneath it, to blow up a conſiderable number of enemies, together with the whole fortification.

Thus concluded the campaign of 1627, and Guſtavus by this time had obtained ſo great a character as a prince of conſequence, that even his Britannic majeſty humbly entreated his friendſhip, and ſent him the order of the garter by way of compliment for the heroic actions he had performed.

Here we naturally conclude the tranſactions of the year 1627; and we may juſt tranſiently obſerve, having made mention of Charles I. that England, France, and Spain, were governed at this period by three youths, who had Buckingham, Richelieu, and Olivarez, for their prime miniſters.

Nor was Guſtavus inactive during his reſidence at Stockholm, admoniſhing, by edict†, under pain of confiſcation of ſhips and cargo, all commercial perſons 1628. in the Hanſe-towns to abſtain from conveying proviſions and military ſupplies, of any ſort, to the inhabitants of Dantzic, whom he conſidered in the light of declared enemies, inaſmuch as they publicly infeſted the ocean, and did great harm both to his ſubjects and allies. Nevertheleſs, that he might not preclude all hopes of an accommodation, he artfully allowed them at the ſame time a free intercourſe of commerce with foreign countries, except in ſuch in-

* *Loccenii* Hiſt. Suec. p. 556.

† It was rather a ſort of manifeſto very politely and yet acrimoniouſly worded: *Lotichius* hath preſerved it, tom. i. 608, 609, 610.

ſtances as fell within the article of warlike ſtores and aſſiſtances; upon condition that they paid a certain impoſt to the royal fleet of Sweden, then blockading the harbour. Theſe meaſures were not conceived hard with reſpect to Dantzic, as that town was a thorn of uneaſineſs which his majeſty could not eradicate, unleſs with dexterity.

Matters being placed upon this footing, the ſpring of the year as yet but juſt commencing, Guſtavus reimbarked from Stockholm in a fleet of three and thirty ſail, and lighting upon ſeven Dantzic ſhips between that town and the fort of Weiſſelmond, took three, ſunk a fourth, and gave chaſe to the remainder. One ſheltered itſelf in the port of Colbergen, but the Swedes demanded it from the inhabitants, who, being ſubjects to the elector of Brandenburg, reſigned it, as is ſuppoſed not unwillingly, though a certain face of appearances was kept up. His majeſty's ſquadron was not ſo fortunate a few days after, for coming by chance on five Poliſh ſhips, one of which was laden with ſtores, the commanders of them behaved ſo well, that they forced their way through the Swediſh fleet. About the ſame time a detachment from the main army attempted to ſtorm ſome of the outworks of Dantzic, but were repulſed with loſs, ſeveral captains being taken priſoners, and count Thurn wounded. During theſe operations, the Polanders, with very inconſiderable loſs, made themſelves maſters of Pautzken and Mew. Stung to the quick with theſe ſlight diſgraces, his majeſty broke up from his camp of Dirſchau, at the head of a detachment of 7000 men, and having made a concealed march over moraſſes, thought impaſſable, poſſeſſed himſelf, by means of induſtry, dexterity, and ſtratagem, of the leſſer iſland near Dantzic. He paſſed the river over three flying bridges, conveying in light carts and on horſes his boats and leather artillery; for which latter invention he had an uncommon fondneſs*; ſo that, almoſt in an inſtant, he croſſed the ſtream and erected his batteries; a taſk the Polanders in their own minds allowed him a week to effect, and that with difficulty; having killed 200 of his opponents, and ſeized twelve, ſome ſay twenty-two, pieces of artillery; upon which it was commonly ſaid by the Swediſh ſoldiers, that the Poliſh general had found the ſpoil of a village in Mew, but that their king had found the plunder of a city in a half-inhabited iſland. Achatius Todt, who proved afterwards a renowned general

* *Latich.* de Reb. Germ. tom. i. 611.

in

in the German wars, (accompanied, as ſome ſay, with Leſley and Sperreüter, whoſe names will be better known in the courſe of our hiſtory) was in the mean time diſpatched with two troops of cavalry and a ſmall body of dragoons to obſerve the motions of Conoſpoliſki's army; but as the Poles, like the Croatians, &c. have little reſource but in the arts of ſurprize and ſtratagem, he found himſelf ſuddenly involved in an ambuſcade in the foreſt of Grebin, and as there remained no poſſibility of a retreat, placed himſelf at the head of his men, and twice cut his way through the enemy, four times his ſuperior in numbers, more with the air of a conqueror than like an officer who was compelled to act the beſt part he could; for he conducted his troops ſafe to the camp, and brought four ſtandards with him. For this action the king rewarded the more diſtinguiſhed officers and common ſoldiers, and conferred the honour of knighthood on their commander in as public and ſolemn a manner as he could deviſe*.

Upon this Conoſpoliſki began to take flame in earneſt, and marched up to the lines of the king, who feared him not, as his army had been augmented by 9,000 Scots and Engliſh ſoldiers, which, joined with his other troops, made a body of 24,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and 3,000 archers. How indeed a firſt-rate genius, enlightened in the arts of war like Guſtavus, could condeſcend to employ this latter ſpecies of ſoldiers, will appear to moſt perſons as ſomething that exceeds all common belief; but my own private conjecture is, that they were a combined maſs of irregular barbarians who had deſerted to the Swedes, and had been accuſtomed to uſe no other ſort of military weapons. Hence it is natural to imagine that the king received them, merely becauſe he could not decently reject them; for to his dying moments he hated that claſs of ſoldiers, if the name may be given them, called *irregulars*; partly on account of their depredations and cruelty, and partly becauſe they had a talent for military miſchief, without ever producing any one poſitive military good. In proof of this it has been aſſured me, that prince Eugene always honoured Guſtavus for his great and juſt idea, and in conſequence of it diſpoſed the rabble of his Hungarians and Croatians, though ſome of them ſince the days of Guſtavus have been rendered regular, in ſuch poſts and ſituations only, where no particular onſet could be expected, allowing them barely the power of working harm, without being connected with more honourable forces. Setting theſe barbarian combatants out of the queſtion, the king had ſtrength enough

* *Memorab. Suec. Gentis*, 166.

not to ſuppoſe Conoſpoliſki ſo formidable an enemy, as that he ought to ſhun him; therefore to give his adverſary a fair pretext of entering into an engagement, he gallantly confronted him upon equal ground, as a ſpeedy deciſion was highly to be wiſhed for by one who commanded an army in an hoſtile country, where proviſions were procured with difficulty. The conflict was very obſtinate on either ſide, but Guſtavus finding himſelf able to bear the efforts of the Polanders without breaking his ranks, or cauſing the men to retreat, detached the beſt of his cavalry and infantry to make an onſet upon the rear of the Poliſh army. Meaſures were ſo well taken, that this march was made unperceived, and in the firſt and laſt attack the Poles loſt 3,000 men, four field-pieces, and fourteen colours; not to mention that Conoſpoliſki himſelf was grievouſly wounded.

This event gave the citizens of Dantzic more ſerious thoughts; they ſaw themſelves marked out as an object of chaſtiſement, and began to perceive, that they were more and more confined and limited every day. The king by this time had blockaded their city with his land forces, and ſtationed eight veſſels at the mouth of their harbour to hinder all ingreſs and egreſs. This was giving the inhabitants a wound in the vital part; for a town of commerce ſoon lends an ear to accommodations when you can once divert the ſtream that feeds and ſupplies it; yet the remark failed in the preſent inſtance, partly as Walſtein had conveyed an Imperial fleet to their aſſiſtance, and the Dantzickers had the good fortune, with eleven veſſels, in a ſharp engagement which laſted at leaſt three hours, to defeat the Swediſh ſhips; four of which, one being admiral Sterniſkield's, they took; and had probably treated the vice-admiral in the ſame manner, if he had not, more vain-glorioufly than prudently, blown up his veſſel and all the crew into the air *. The Swedes loſt a conſiderable number of people, beſides their commander in chief, who died ſword in hand. In truth the Dantzickers, though leſs brave, were the better ſeamen: yet Appelman, their admiral, was killed, as were likewiſe ſeveral officers and 400 mariners: and as to the Swediſh fleet, the remainder thereof was driven in a forlorn and ſhattered condition into the port of Pillau. Guſtavus did not greatly reliſh this diſgrace, though the affair was performed on an element where he had acquired no vaſt experience. In the firſt tranſports of his ill-humour he could not help repining,—*That a pacific commercial rabble*, to uſe his

* *Memorab. Suec. Gentis*, 91, 92.

own

own words, *ſhould beat a ſet of brave fellows, who made fighting their profeſſion.* Notwithſtanding this momentary diſappointment and chagrin, he ſoon looked upon the event with leſs prejudiced eyes, and, as was always his cuſtom, after the ebullition of the firſt momentary heat, ſet himſelf to repair the loſs with double diligence, attention, and patience; nor was it his temper ever to be angry or complain after he had paſſed his firſt ſentiments upon any unfortunate affair. He immediately therefore replaced his former fleet with a ſecond fleet of twelve ſhips, and having obſtructed all commerce between Dantzic and other places, transferred that very maritime intercourſe to the city of Koningſberg; a place for commerce not injudiciouſly choſen, as an acute and ſenſible prince has ſince demonſtrated.

It was, if I miſtake not, in this campaign, but upon what occaſion one cannot ſay, that Oxenſtiern attempted to diſſuade his maſter from ſome undertaking of a very ſpirited and hazardous nature: *My good chancellor*, ſaid the king, *you are too cold for my temper. Yes, Sire*, replied the miniſter, *yet if my ice did not infuſe a damp into your fire, it is poſſible your majeſty might have been ſcorched ſome years ago* *. How far Oxenſtiern had reaſon for inſinuating this incidental reproof as to military enterpriſes, is by no means here a matter of queſtion. The king heard him with good humour, and dropped the converſation. Nevertheleſs, it may ſuffice to obſerve, that no man truſted more than Guſtavus in foreſight, precaution, and the probable judgment of ſecond cauſes; ſo that many days before the breaking out of any important deſign, it was his cuſtom to decline company, affect retirement, and ſtray abroad in the fields like a perſon immerſed in thought. It was in one of theſe reveries that Gaſſion afterwards found his majeſty alone, and wandering far diſtant from his camp and ſoldiers, at the very time he was meditating to make his firſt trial of ſkill on the renowned Tilly.

A peace had now been talked of ſome months. It was to have been effected by the interpoſition of the Dutch ambaſſadors; but as in their journey they had made a private viſit to the army of Guſtavus, and conferred with him on the footing of openneſs and freedom, his Poliſh majeſty paid little regard to their mediation, though in truth the terms propoſed, carried with them a better proſpect than had appeared formerly. Upon this a new ſcene was laid open; for Gabriel Le Roy †, the Spaniſh miniſter, perplexed the cauſe

* *Schefferi* Memorab. Suec. Gentis, p. 32.
† *Piaſecchii* Chronica, in annum 1628.

on the Swediſh ſide of the queſtion, and baron D'Auchi, who afterwards aſſiſted him, overturned all. The truth was, the houſes of Auſtria and Spain began to perceive, too manifeſtly, from the generous, the prudent, the magnanimous turn of our northern hero, that he had it always in his power to diſturb, if not to deſtroy the immenſe conqueſts they had made in Germany; the rich acquiſition of ten the moſt proſperous campaigns that Europe had then beheld. It was therefore reſolved to traverſe the ſchemes of Guſtavus. Prodigal of promiſes, they conſequently aſſured Sigiſmond of ſecuring to him the poſſeſſion of all Sweden, and agreed to ſend twenty-four men of war, 14,000 veteran ſoldiers, and about £. 33,000 ſterling *. The firſt and laſt articles were never thought of afterwards, excepting that D'Auchi depoſited about £. 16,000 by way of beginning, which breach of promiſe was an irreparable failure in point of policy, ſince a body of 20,000 men, a moderate naval force, and one tenth part of a million of money, had queſtionleſs ſecured them in the poſſeſſion of Germany for the century then to come, if not much longer. It is thought this parſimony or remiſſneſs proceeded alone from the Imperial court. For though the wary Spaniards, better politicians than the Auſtrians, feared Guſtavus even at the greateſt diſtance, and the rather, as the ſagacious Spinola had always declared, that Guſtavus was the only prince in Europe whom the two crowns ought either to find employment for, or cajole and amuſe; yet the latter ſuppoſed him an impetuous enterpriſer in war, and looked upon his men as novices and probationers in the ſchool of fighting. Walſtein's extraordinary ſpeech to Arnheim, when he ſent him afterwards into Poland, ſeems partly to confirm this opinion, as will appear hereafter; and when Guſtavus landed in Germany, the rhodomontade at Vienna was, "That he was a "king of ſnow, and would ſoon melt as he advanced ſouthward." The emperor, in conjunction with his allies, and incluſive of garriſons, had likewiſe 170,000 ſeaſoned men, moſt of whom had been engaged in ten years ſharp ſervice; and as for one part of them, the old corps of Burgundians and Walloons, who had been formed in the Low Country wars, they were looked upon as invincible. Genius and courage, however, placed at the head of an handful of men, ſoon counterbalanced all theſe ſeeming advantages; for Guſtavus, by an extraordinary reach of parts, created a new ſyſtem of fighting; and ſaw, moreover, that cruelty,

* The papers relating to this tranſaction fell afterwards into the king's hands when he entered Germany.

rapine,

rapine, lewdneſs, drunkenneſs, and immorality, were capable of bringing down the beſt ſoldiers to the common level. As Sigiſmond had not the gift of foreſeeing theſe diſadvantages or advantages, it was his misfortune to liſten to the propoſals made by Spain and Auſtria; and great, on the other hand, was D'Auchi's ſurprize, when, upon his arrival at Lubec and Roſtock, he ſaw, plainly, that no uſe had been made of the money he had engaged to give with intention to put the marine in order. But this proceeded from no remiſſneſs in Sigiſmond. The truth was, the Hanſeatic League withheld their aſſiſtance, having no deſire to ſee an Auſtrian admiral in the Baltic; nor did they chuſe to give umbrage to the kings of Sweden and Denmark, who had juſt added a temporary article to their late alliance, with reference to all intruſions upon the free ſovereignty of the Northern ocean*, under condition that neither party ſhould accede to new terms with any other prince or ſtate without including his firſt ally. The naval enterpriſe being thus rendered abortive, Sigiſmond humbly requeſted, that the ſum depoſited might be made over to the uſes of a land war. To that petition the Spaniſh miniſter pleaded want of inſtructions. This chicanery rather ſharpened the king of Poland than dejected him; for though the ſenate, convened this autumn at Warſau, had complained of the prolongation of an ineffectual war againſt the Swedes, and had withheld as much as lay in their power the annual ſupplies, yet, in ſpite of all obſtructions and delays, he purchaſed and equipped ſhips with his own money, and placed them under the conduct of an excellent ſeaman, who on the approach of winter had attacked a Swediſh ſquadron, which blockaded the harbour of Dantzic, agreeably to what we have before mentioned.

By this time the cold ſeaſon began to draw nigh; but Sigiſmond and Conoſpoliſki being now joined, for the latter had been diſpatched for a ſhort ſeaſon to oppoſe an irruption made by the Tartars, formed a ſcheme of entertaining Guſtavus with a winter campaign. The king of Sweden had a great deſire to refreſh his men, and therefore applied himſelf to the grand ſecret of entrenchment, which was, properly ſpeaking, a military invention, almoſt all his own. In this ſituation he allowed the enemy to gaze during pleaſure. Struck with aſtoniſhment at his judicious encampment, Conoſpoliſki undertook the ſiege of Dirſchau, and Sigiſmond paid a viſit to the inhabitants of Dantzic, whoſe

* *Loccen.* Hiſt. Succ 559.

fidelity

fidelity to him juſtly merited that attention. In the month of November he held a national diet at Thurn, and ſupplies were voted for the war with greater unanimity than is uſually to be found in Poland. Encouraged by a diſpoſition of the nation, ſo benevolent, it was propoſed by the king's party to appoint a ſucceſſor to the throne; at which the nobility took fire, and demanded that the traiterous adviſer of ſuch a project ſhould be given up to the mercy of the laws: ſo jealous were they of appointing one king during the life of another.

I muſt now aſk the reader's permiſſion to make a momentary digreſſion, in order to introduce a ſtory which I know not where to place according to the ſtrict rules of chronology.

It was in one of theſe Pruſſian campaigns that the irrational practice of duelling aroſe to a conſiderable height in the Swediſh army, not only amongſt perſons of rank and faſhion, but between common ſoldier and common ſoldier. Guſtavus therefore publiſhed a ſevere *edict*, and denounced death againſt every delinquent. Soon after, a quarrel aroſe between two officers of high command, and as they knew the king's ſteadfaſtneſs in keeping his word inviolable, they agreed to requeſt an audience, and beſought his permiſſion to decide the affair *like men of honour*. His majeſty took fire in a moment, but repreſſed his paſſion with ſuch art that they eaſily miſtook him. With ſome reluctance, but under the appearance of pitying brave men who thought their reputation injured, he told them, that he blamed them much for their miſtaken notions concerning fame and glory; yet as this determination appeared to be the reſult of deliberate reflection to the beſt of their deluded capacity, he would allow them to decide the affair at time and place ſpecified: *And, gentlemen*, ſaid he, *I will be an eye-witneſs myſelf of your great valour and high ſpirit.*

At the hour appointed Guſtavus arrived, accompanied by a ſmall body of infantry, whom he formed into a circle round the combatants; *Now*, ſays he, *fight till one man dies:* and calling the executioner of the army to him, or the *provoſt martial*, as the language then ran, *Friend*, added he, *the inſtant one is killed, behead the other before my eyes.*

Aſtoniſhed with ſuch firmneſs, the two generals, after pauſing a moment, fell down on their knees and aſked forgiveneſs of the king, who made them embrace each other, and give their promiſe to continue faithful friends to their laſt moments; as they both did with ſincerity and thankfulneſs*.

* *Memorab. Succ. Gentis*, p. 61—63.

From

From this period we find no duel between men of note in Guſtavus's ſervice; and though the edict, above referred to, is not to be found in the Swediſh or German hiſtorians, yet in the king's military code, which admirable ſyſtem of laws now lies before me, there are the ſame ſevere decrees againſt *duelling*, all injuries of honour being to be redreſſed by the *army-conſiſtory*, upon due complaint and repreſentation; nor is it unknown by the curious that this work was originally compoſed in Livonia, 1621, at or during the ſiege of Riga *. It was reviſed and corrected during the Pruſſian campaigns, particularly in the years 1626 and 1627, and laſtly, nineteen freſh articles †, and many more perhaps occaſionally, and ſome new prayers were added ‡, after his majeſty arrived in Germany, being made public in 1631.

Nothing diſturbed Guſtavus ſo much as the reſiſtance made by the city of Dantzic; commercial towns having infinite reſources, and being always hard to conquer. Nevertheleſs, as he had the affair ſo much at heart, it is probable he would have taken it the preceding year; but a muſquet ball happened to wound him in the belly, inſomuch that his life was deſpaired of; and then the generals, loſing all their hopes, proceeded coolly in the enterpriſe. As it was a maxim with Guſtavus always to carry war into an enemy's country, he made this town the principal object of his attention, and the rather, as the enemy drew from it his greateſt ſupplies. Having, therefore, new-modelled his fleet, which conſiſted of twelve large ſhips; the Swedes, by way of retaliation, ſoon overcame the combined Dantzic and Poliſh fleets, after an obſtinate engagement, which laſted a whole day; forced the admiral's ſhip on a bank of ſand, and there battered it to pieces §. A ſecond ſhip, of almoſt equal ſize and value, called Holland Houſe, had certainly been taken, but after an incredible reſiſtance of twelve hours, it happened to blow up into the air by chance.

Guſtavus now began to make his approaches in form round Dantzic on the land ſide, having blocked up the mouth of the harbour with his fleet, which removed the trade to other places, and particularly to Koningſberg. He then paſſed a moraſs fifteen Engliſh miles long, at the head of 10,000 ſoldiers, in high confidence, being aſſiſted in ſwampy and difficult gullies by particular bridges of his own invention;

*. A copy whereof was tranſmitted to England by lord *Reay*.
† *Arlanibæ, Arma Suec.* 4°. p. 96, &c.
‡ *Arlanibæ, Arma Suec.* 4°. p. 77—87.
§ It only carried 40 guns, and was valued at £.50,000. ſterling.

carrying

carrying likewiſe with him a large quantity of that artillery* which he himſelf had invented, than which nothing could be more uſeful in heavy countries, in caſe of a ſudden attack, he conducted his army, contrary to all men's expectations, into a foreſt which encircled the town on one ſide; taking Schonec and Marnevec as he paſſed along.

Alarmed at ſo unexpected a march, the magiſtrates of Dantzic began to fear an inſurrection, as proviſions, by the meaſures taken at land and ſea, were rendered extremely ſcarce. To augment theſe misfortunes, the Spaniards had ſo far deceived them with reſpect to twenty-four men of war, which they had promiſed to ſend to their ſupport, that Walſtein, on the contrary, ſupreme commander in the northern parts of Germany, who ridiculouſly enough ſtyled himſelf admiral of the Baltic, doing that by way of boaſt which the court of Vienna affected in earneſt, inſiſted on their ſending nine ſhips to him, to facilitate the ſiege of Stralſund, and to give laws to the coaſts. This doubly incommoded

* Whoever conſiders, extraordinary as ſuch a conſideration may be, that moſt of Guſtavus's inventions expired with him, notwithſtanding ſo many excellent officers had been formed under his eye, the arts of war verging to a ſort of decline from the death of our king till the times of Montecuculi and Turenne, will not be ſurprized if we hear no more of this invention of a new and more portable ſort of artillery. Perhaps it was not ſo uſeful as was at firſt expected, yet this may partly be conjectural, ſince it is manifeſt, on the other hand, that the king uſed it from the year 1628 to the hour of his death.

Theſe pieces were certainly of extraordinary ſervice upon all ſudden attacks in deep or mountainous countries, for one ſtrong horſe could convey a couple of them as faſt as any troops could march; and what was more, they could be ſhifted in an inſtant, according as neceſſity required.

Authors well inſtructed on this ſubject inform us, (*Schefferi Memorab. Suec. Gentis*; *Pietro Pomo, Guerre di Germania*, lib. i. p. 33.) that they were compoſed of the moſt hardened leather, girt round with iron or braſs hoops, and could be brought to diſcharge ten times ſucceſſively. Now if this account be true, they ſerved to anſwer the purpoſes not only of ſudden attacks, but of more deciſive as well as more general engagements. About ten years ago I happened to mention this ſort of artillery to a perſon who had a paſſion for new projects. He ſeemed convinced that ſomething might be ſtruck out in this way: and my learned and ingenious friend Mr. Johnſon informs me, that he was juſt ready to aſk the honour of his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland to be preſent at an experiment, but in the interim the poor man died. See more in a note relating to leather artillery at the battle of Leippe.

Some give our hero the honour of firſt introducing *dragoons* into the military ſervice, though Mansfelt, as we have obſerved elſewhere, puts in a ſort of claim to this invention. Yet Scheffer's words (*Memorab. Suec. Gent.* p. 42, 43.) are very peremptory in Guſtavus's favour. Primus ſane fuit ipſe qui pedites cum bombardis majoribus impoſuit equis, illudque genus eduxit in aciem quod deinde *dragonarios* vocant, ut ſic celeritatem equitum & vim peditum ingenioſa hæc mixtura in iiſdem conſequeretur.

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the Dantzickers, by depriving them of their own natural force, and by diſobliging the king of Denmark, who ordered his navy to make repriſals on the people of Dantzic, whoſe ſhips they ſeized, and publicly confiſcated. The city itſelf eſcaped from Guſtavus by a ſort of miracle, for the rains fell to ſuch a prodigious degree, the Viſtula overflowing its banks in all places, and waſhing away the temporary bridges, that the Swedes were obliged to break up their camp, having no alternative, but ſtarving with hunger, or periſhing by water. Five thouſand men were ſurrounded ſo ſuddenly by the inundation, that the king was obliged to feed them with uncommon difficulty, and more eſpecially as he found himſelf in a country where proviſions are rendered extremely ſcarce; but the food, ſuch as it was, was religiouſly divided between this corps and the main army. When the floods began to ſink, his majeſty drew off all his forces, having received a body of recruits from Sweden in 54 tranſports, and 2000 cuiraſſiers, enliſted by the Rhingrave*. He took Neuburg, on the Viſtula, by ſurrender, as he marched along, as alſo Straſberg and Dribentz; in all which places, particularly the former, the ſoldiers gained an immenſe booty, belonging to the Poliſh queen and nobles, and amounting, as the language of the age then ran, to ſix tons of gold, which make about 54,000 pounds ſterling. It was the king's idea to advance to Thorn, but this acquiſition of wealth ſoon occaſioned a ſeries of inconveniences. The ſoldiers grew diſſolute, and diſperſed themſelves over the country to find opportunities of ſpending their money; of courſe, ſome were put to the ſword by the enemy here and there, and others ſurrendered on conditions which the Poles ill obſerved; for they were all murthered in cold blood. Nothing hurt Guſtavus like ſuch violations of the law of nature, humanity, and common good faith; inſomuch that in the tranſports of his reſentment he made incurſions, like the hero of a romance, even to the gates of Maſſovia and Warſaw; and in one of theſe expeditions took five pieces of artillery, which Walſtein had ſent to Sigiſmond's army.

He then took the town of Switz by ſtorm, and cut to pieces a body of Polanders who attempted to deſtroy a convoy that was marching to Straſberg. Amongſt the priſoners at Maſſovia, which town was taken ſword in hand, many Poliſh matrons and young women of faſhion fell into the hands of his ſoldiers, who being heated and enraged with the

* *Lotich.* tom. i. p. 611.

reſiſtance

reſiſtance made by the garriſon, and rendered vicious by their late ill acquired riches, might have proceeded to ſome outrages againſt the fair ſex; but the king cruſhed all ſuch attempts in a ſingle moment; telling the troops, *That people who ſerved under his command were to wage war and commit hoſtilities upon their own ſex only; and that the ideas of a ſoldier and a raviſher ought to carry no connexion between each other.* He then diſmiſſed the ladies courteouſly, upon the promiſe of their reſpective ranſoms, inſomuch that no one woman received even the ſlighteſt inſult.

Yet theſe digreſſions allowed no one thing to eſcape the attention of Guſtavus. He therefore kept his eye conſtantly fixed on the depredations committed in the Baltic by the combined fleet of Spain and Auſtria, which he ſoon diſperſed and ruined, by ſtationing a good quantity of ſhips near Wiſmar: and then, in order to preclude the interpoſition of Sigiſmond, of which previous notice had been given him, allowed the elector of Brandenburg ſix months ſpace to deliberate whether he would eſpouſe the Swediſh or the Poliſh cauſe. It is well known the ſaid prince ſecretly favoured the Swedes; yet he had ſtrong reaſons, obvious to all readers, to wiſh for a laſting accommodation between the two contending crowns, which he helped to effect the enſuing year; nevertheleſs, in order to preſerve appearances, he ſent Sigiſmond 600 infantry, whom Guſtavus contrived to intercept in their march. Nor was it difficult perhaps to be apprized of the route they intended to take; upon which Sigiſmond broke off all intercourſes of friendſhip with the elector.

During theſe tranſactions, Conoſpoliſki contrived to retake Brodnitz, which La Mortagne, a French officer of repute, had ſurrendered, ſome time before, to the Swedes; for which precipitate ſtep the Poliſh general cauſed his head to be ſtruck off, publicly, and then, by way of retaliation, being very dexterous in matters of ſurprize, defeated the rear guard of the Swediſh army, and took Banditzen, who was an officer of reputation, priſoner.

In revenge for this check, Wrangel, governor of Elbingen, which town the Poles had in a certain manner blockaded, croſſed the Dwina at a ford that was ill defended, defeated a large body of troops, and ſeized their cannon and baggage: and again, as he was traverſing the country with 8000 men, in order to collect proviſions for the army, which was then in no ſmall diſtreſs, he ſurprized, near Straſberg, at a ſmall village called Rudovic, a large body of Croatians and Coſſacks; and as he diſcovered them to be irreſolute, or at

variance in their opinions, he charged them ſo ſuddenly that he ſoon diſperſed them, and carried off a convoy of 2000 carts and waggons, to the great aſſiſtance of the Swediſh army during the remainder of the campaign, which was cloſed with a gallant performance of old count Thurn*; though the profeſſed hiſtorians of that period have been ſilent upon the ſubject. It has been obſerved before, that Guſtavus had taken Neuburg. This town Conoſpoliſki beſieged, and whilſt he inveſted it, Thurn and Teüffel both commanding in it, young Thurn died of a fever. The old man wrote to the Poliſh general to deſire leave, as he only ſerved Guſtavus in the capacity of a volunteer, to remove the young man's body, that it might enjoy the rights of ſepulture in a friendly country; but the requeſt was

* Mathias Henry, count de Thurn, was one of the principal perſonages in Bohemia. He began the religious and civil commotions in that kingdom; nor did he ever ſubmit to the houſe of Auſtria; but after the battle of Prague diſcharged ſeveral embaſſies in the name of Frederic, a ſovereign of his own chuſing, and Mansfelt, to Gabriel Bethlem, the Grand Signior, and the Venetians; took a commiſſion under the latter in 1624, and being honourably diſmiſſed when the elector Palatine diſbanded his army, paſſed into the ſervice of Denmark in 1627. He accepted of a general's commiſſion under Guſtavus, and being taken priſoner was freed by Gallas, with orders, as was ſuppoſed, from Walſtein; who, out of a capricious gallantry peculiar to himſelf, had a mind to rob the court of Vienna of ſo delicious a ſacrifice. Some time afterwards, namely in 1634, he made a brave defence at Ratiſbon, and had the courage and addreſs to procure his own exception in the capitulation.

This great patriot was ſuppoſed by ſome to be juſtly piqued, becauſe Martinitz, one of the three judges that was thrown from the window, in the firſt inſurrection, had ſupplanted him in obtaining the government of Carlſtein-caſtle, where the crown of Bohemia and all records of conſequence were preſerved. His ſpeech to the chiefs of his country on the breaking out of the rebellion, as it is delivered down to us by Nani, may keep pace with moſt of the pompous harangues of the antient hiſtorians, and appears to me to have a better chance to be authentic. He concludes it in theſe words: "Liberty, from this example of ours, will inſinuate itſelf throughout the "empire; and though there be *ſome appearance of violence* in our conduct, "yet *neceſſity* and *piety* will excuſe the fact. There remains now no room "for repentance, and no plea for forgiveneſs. The die is thrown—Freedom "or the ſcaffold—Men of principle, if conquerors, men of conſcience and "independent.—But if overcome, poor perfidious beings, perjured, and "rebellious."

Thurn, in the German language, ſignifies a *tower*; and therefore the French writers, conformably to their uſual freedom and careleſſneſs, ſoften the name into count *La Tour*; and Carte and the other Engliſh hiſtorians, when treating of the affairs of the Palatinate and Bohemia, talk of him very familiarly under that appellation. Thus too, by the ſame rule, I might undertake, as an Engliſhman, to diſcourſe of Mrs. *Steel* and her Homer intending at the ſame time to be underſtood as ſpeaking of madam *Dacier*.

There is a large exquiſite print of count Thurn from a painting of Miervelt: the fire of his eyes is inexpreſſible.

denied.

denied. Enraged beyond meaſure at this refuſal, he cut his way through the enemy's lines, by an admirable ſtratagem, with only fifty followers, and carried his ſon's corpſe to the place where the Swediſh *cancellaria* was then held, never diſmounting, but for refreſhment, a few moments, in a journey of eighty miles.

At the diet of Warſaw, held in the month of July this year, a conſiderable number of the ſenators declared, that it was in vain to wage war againſt Guſtavus, except hoſtilities were commenced againſt the elector of Brandenburg. King Sigiſmond, therefore, ſent a ſlight meſſage, admoniſhing him, in gentle terms, of the allegiance he owed the kingdom of Poland, by Denhoff his ſecretary, being privately determined, in caſe of an evaſion or downright refuſal, to levy money at all events, and purſue his object of deſtroying Guſtavus. It was likewiſe ſuggeſted to the elector of Brandenburg, that his right to Pruſſia was a ſort of feudatory tenure, dependent on the republic of Poland, which ſaid *fiduciary* poſſeſſion he might forfeit, or not, according to his future conduct. Nevertheleſs, the nuncios of the provinces, and the major part of the ſenators, afforded Sigiſmond as little aſſiſtance as poſſible, upon preſumption or private intelligence, that it was not difficult to obtain a tolerable peace. Thus the war proceeded languiſhingly on the Poliſh ſide.

Two diſagreeable occurrences happened this year in Germany, each ſufficient to embarraſs any mind but that of Guſtavus. The one was the ſiege of Stralſund, and the other the congreſs at Lubec. But the king carried his point in the firſt inſtance; and played his cards ſo dextrouſly in the ſecond, as to give himſelf an advantageous opening ſoon after; for theſe two events were a part of the preparatory incidents which helped to bring Guſtavus into Germany.

Walſtein's great intention in poſſeſſing Stralſund, was to give laws, at one ſtroke, to the kings of Sweden and Denmark, and to invade the dominions of the latter without delay. In order to effect the tranſporting of his troops, Schwartzenberg was diſpatched to the Hanſe-towns, to Lubec in particular, to demand ſuch ſhipping as might be needful on the occaſion, and grant them, in the Emperor's name, ſome privileges, upon condition they would confine their commerce, for the future, to the coaſts of Spain, and the countries that depended on the houſe of Auſtria. The anſwer returned to him was, that the ſaid towns had confederacies and alliances with neighbouring princes, indeed Guſtavus was the principal object alluded to, and that it would be highly imprudent

dent in them, to add fuel to particular wars, who ſubſiſted by a general commerce with all mankind. Upon this, Walſtein, affecting to be extravagant in all things, procured a patent to be *admiral of the Baltic*, and having conquered Roſtoch, Wiſmar, and ſeveral other maritime towns, turned his thoughts to ſea affairs and ſhip-building. Stralſund alone obſtructed his imaginary poſſeſſion of the Northern ocean; for that city, once conquered, gave him juſt the inlet he deſired: and as it was well furniſhed with wealth, ſhipping, ammunition, and proviſions, it was in a ſtate to enable him, at leaſt as he conjectured, to land in Denmark, and make a conqueſt of the whole kingdom. The immenſe ambition of this project, aſtoniſhed Chriſtian, and determined him to ſupport the Stralſunders at any rate: and as he liked no corps in his ſervice better than lord Reay's Scottiſh regiment, he tranſported it thither without delay. This was the firſt ſiege of conſequence that Germany had hitherto ſeen. Walſtein, for his own ſake, on account of Stralſund's lying ſo near his new dominions*, was reſolved to obtain it, whatever ſacrifice he made. It is thought, by many, he had formed a deſign to involve the duke of Pomerania in ſome broil with the emperor, whoſe territories, ſuppoſing them to be ſeized under any pretext, laid very commodious for facilitating and extending his vaſt project on the Baltic. For theſe reaſons he poured regiments into Pomerania, like ſwarms of locuſts, with this difference, that they not only devoured the produce of the earth, but ſqueezed the very laſt dollar from the inhabitants, and made the duke himſelf little leſs than a ſtate priſoner in his own caſtle. To return to the ſiege: he firſt proceeded by artful means, and ſent Arnheim, camp-maſter general of his army, to the magiſtrates, to demand winter quarters for a certain number of men, a requeſt which was not granted. He then diſpatched colonel Goëtz, to aſk paſſage only for a body of troops through the town; that petition alſo was rejected. Walſtein then, in order to make the emperor a party concerned in his ſyſtem, demanded of the inhabitants a contribution of about £.25,000. concluding naturally enough, that the magiſtrates would ſtill continue in an humour of denial. They, contrary to his expectations, advanced part of the ſum immediately, and pledged their honour for the reſt, upon condition that he erected no fortification

* He had lately received the inveſtiture of the duchy of Mechlenberg; but was never *duke of Walſtein*, as the *author of the Annals of the Empire* inaccurately ſtyles him.

near their town, as he had lately done. This prompt advancement of good rix-dollars pleaſed Walſtein's avarice, for that general was equally rapacious to collect, and profuſe to beſtow, but did not ſatisfy his ambition; he therefore without further ceremony ordered Arnheim to inveſt the town. Upon this the inhabitants implored the aſſiſtance of their neighbours the Dantzickers; and Guſtavus, to all appearances unaſked, though this circumſtance ſhall not be confidently aſſerted, ſupplied them generouſly, as the ſeas were open, with a good quantity of military ſtores, of which the inhabitants at that time ſtood in great need. Oxenſtiern indeed had partly opened the king's intentions in a conference with the duke of Pomerania, wherein it was ſuggeſted caſually, at leaſt to all outward appearances, that Guſtavus was determined not to ſee the poor Stralſunders deprived of commerce and liberty at one ſtroke, and that by ſuch an interpoſition he manifeſted himſelf to conſult the emperor's true glory and intereſts better than Walſtein and the whole Imperial miniſtry could pretend to do. Meanwhile the duke of Pomerania, having in vain requeſted Oxenſtiern to abſtain from all interpoſition with reſpect to Germany *, attempted to mediate a ſort of convention between his Imperial majeſty and the town. The conditions were, that all foreign troops ſhould be diſmiſſed from the garriſon, and the city place itſelf under the protection of the ſaid duke, paſſing its word of honour to be faithful to the emperor, and to give no obſtruction to the imperial troops then cantoned in the iſle of Rugen, which was ſeparated from the continent of Stralſund by a ſmall frith of ſea, and erect no new fortifications; with a proviſo of admitting Pomeranian ſoldiers to guard the town. Upon this a treaty † was renewed, for former ones had ſubſiſted between Sweden and Stralſund. Sadler undertook the taſk, and expreſſed his maſter's ſentiments very dexterouſly; for allegiance to the emperor was inculcated ſtrongly upon the inhabitants, and it was recommended to them to pay all due obedience to the duke of Pomerania; inaſmuch as his Swediſh majeſty had no object in view but to preſerve the freedom of the Baltic, and maintain the immemorial rights and liberties of a town, in thoſe ſenſes, independent. During the attempt finally to adjuſt theſe articles, Walſtein marched with the eagerneſs of a new monarch to Guſtrow, in order to receive the homage and

* *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relat.* tom. i. p. 58.

† It is preſerved by *Lotichius*, tom. i. 608, and was to hold in force twenty years. *Loccenii* Hiſtoria Sueana, p. 560.

oaths

oaths of allegiance from his ſubjects, as the two dukes of Mechlenberg, Albert and Adolphus, had fought under the Daniſh enſigns, and laboured, even then, beneath that bitter ſort of proſcription, commonly called the *ban of the empire*, having paid no regard to a previous admonition from the court of Vienna. Colonel Holk had hitherto, at the head of the Daniſh forces, taken upon him the command of the town. The men were obliged to perform forty-eight hours ſervice turn by turn for ſix weeks, and yet Holk, in the midſt of this ſevere ſervice, took it into his head to eſpouſe a young wife, and celebrate his nuptials in a public manner; which all the German hiſtorians conſider as a very unbecoming act of levity.

Guſtavus took the advantage of Walſtein's abſence, to convey ſome forces into Stralſund, which gave the inhabitants ſpirit to change their language; ſo that the fine airy project of the duke of Pomerania vaniſhed into nothing. That prince then perſuaded the emperor to diſcontinue the ſiege, which provoked Walſtein to ſuch a degree, that he ſent a threatening letter to the elector of Saxony, whom he ſuſpected to be at the bottom of this project; and what was ſtill more, not only declined obeying his maſter's orders, but, on the contrary, enraged with Arnheim's ill ſucceſs or remiſſneſs, made a journey to the camp in perſon, and renewed the attacks with incredible fury, ſwearing, according to his common cuſtom of bravado, "that he would take Stralſund, though "it hung in the air from heaven by a chain of adamant." However, this was not an eaſy taſk; for no place is better ſituated by nature. It fronts the ſea in a ſort of elliptical figure, and at the two extremities joins the main land by a narrow iſthmus. Behind it lies the lake of Franken, which can be paſſed only in one place, by means of a high cauſeway; and to increaſe the difficulty more on the part of the beſiegers, it was not in their power to obſtruct the entrance of ſupplies into the harbour. I ſhall not give a full detail of the ſiege; it may ſuffice to ſay, that as Walſtein puſhed on his aſſaults with all the fury and induſtry that reſentment could ſuggeſt, the Danes found the defence of the place beyond their ſtrength. A ceſſation of arms being agreed upon for a fortnight, a ſecond regiment of Scots in the Daniſh ſervice was thrown into the town during the interval, and then, Chriſtian, making a private treaty with Guſtavus, caſt the burden off his own ſhoulders, and transferred the danger and glory to his Swediſh neighbour: who immediately ſent Sir Alexander Leſlie with a body of choſen troops to defend the town, and Holk for ſome time acted

under him. This ſupport of the poor Stralſunders confirmed Guſtavus in the idea of interpoſing with the affairs of, and giving laws to the continent. At length, Walſtein, after a ſiege of three months, having half ruined a numerous army, thought fit to diſlodge; finding, by dear-bought experience, that it is next to impoſſible to take a city that can at all times receive freſh ſupplies from ſea, eſpecially if the garriſon behave with fidelity and courage.

The congreſs, which was held at Lubec this year, created freſh troubles to Guſtavus. The meeting of the plenipotentiaries was more ceremonious than uſeful. On the part of the emperor came the baron Aldringer and count Gronsfelt, both colonels; Rupa commiſſary-general, and Walmerode. In behalf of his Daniſh majeſty appeared Frieſe and Uhlfelt, the one counſellor of the kingdom, and the other counſellor to the king; admiral Skeel, the two Rantzaus, who were both privy counſellors, Levin, maréchal of the court, and ſecretary Gunter. Theſe politicians, who were all extremely able in their way, eat, drank, affirmed, denied, intrigued, and wrangled for ſix months: ſo 1629. that the year 1629 overtook them in their debates; yet nothing of moment appears to have been decided. Much depended afterwards upon an event I am going to relate. Guſtavus had policy enough not to allow a peace to be ſigned under his eye, without concerning himſelf more or leſs in ſo critical an affair: he therefore diſpatched Spar, and Oxenſtiern, a relation of the prime miniſter, to the aſſembly, with orders to ſee all things reſtored to their antient tranquillity, and to ſolicit, in particular, for the town of Stralſund, and the reinſtatement of the dukes of Mechlenberg, whom as relations and neighbours, he had admitted under his more immediate protection. Some weeks before, ſecretary Salvius, who afterwards gave ſuch proofs of his abilities at the peace of Munſter, was ſent into Denmark, to beſeech his majeſty to give introduction to the Swediſh plenipotentiaries at Lubec. That prince replied coldly by letter, after having taken an undue time to return an anſwer, "That as he had received no commands from the court of Vienna with reference to his Swediſh majeſty, he could not preſume to venture on a ſtep of ſo delicate and dangerous a nature, without being previouſly furniſhed with proper authorities; wherefore if theſe *northern plenipotentiaries* had any thing to offer which tended to the public utility, his advice was, that they ſhould ſubmit their propoſals to the Auſtrian miniſtry at Vienna." The truth was, he loved not Guſtavus, and dreaded the emperor; and moſt people at that time attributed this evaſion

to the influence of Walſtein. Without entering minutely into theſe ſecrets, the king of Sweden reſented the indignity in a manner natural to his high ſpirit, for if that prince had any one fault, it was being liable to ſudden tranſports of paſſion, and this affront ſtuck ſo nearly to his heart, that he alledged it afterwards as one of the principal reaſons that induced him to land his army in Germany, and interfere with the ſtate of affairs upon the continent; ſince, it is reported by a writer * well verſed in the hiſtory of treaties, that the Swediſh deputies were forbidden to enter Germany and approach the congreſs, under pain of death. The reſult of the treaty at Lubec was, that his Daniſh majeſty ſhould content himſelf with the title of Duke of Holſtein, without preſuming to name either his wiſhes or diſinclinations to the emperor, in regard to the ſyſtem of the Germanic body; that he ſhould relinquiſh his pretenſions to certain biſhoprics on the continent, and reſtore to the Imperialiſts the iſlands of Femor and Neuſtrand, and ſuch other places as he then poſſeſſed by right of arms. This premiſed, by virtue of the ſame treaty he was to re-enjoy his antient poſſeſſions, upon condition the emperor ſhould ſtill retain his old title to Holſtein, Stormar, and Ditmar; that the expences of the war ſhould be reimburſed, and the priſoners exchanged on either ſide. Nevertheleſs, the king of Denmark, at leaſt in order to preſerve appearances, had courage enough to refuſe a requeſt that Walſtein made him, of adding a ſmall ſquadron to the Imperial fleet, under pretext of ſecuring the free navigation and tranquillity of the Baltic †.

By this time Ferdinand had overcome all his enemies in and round the empire, and erected the houſe of Auſtria into an univerſal monarchy. One of Walſtein's deputies in fact acknowledged this to the king of Denmark; for, being aſked if the Imperial party did not fear ſome check from the united efforts of France, England, Sweden, and Holland, he replied unconcernedly, that the perſon who was once maſter of Germany, might deſpiſe the combinations of ſuch remote and inconſiderable enemies. God, to make ambition its own curſe, has given it certain ideas of acquirable greatneſs that are unlimited, unreaſonable, and, what is ſtill worſe, never to be ſatisfied. Ferdinand, therefore, arrived now at the utmoſt height of human vanity, for all things relating to finite beings have certain reſtrictions and limitations, ſtill found a void in his own breaſt. He wanted ſomething, and this

* *Ambaſſadeur de Wicquefort*, Part i. 219.
† *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relat.* tom. i. p. 58.

was neither more nor leſs, than the total extirpation of the proteſtant religion in Germany. The undertaking was great and hazardous, and therefore he began it gently; and as he was to walk in unfathomable waters, felt his ground ſtep by ſtep before he obliged himſelf to take the deſperate plunge.

He made his firſt eſſay warily and cautiouſly enough, upon his own hereditary dominions; and publiſhed an edict to this import, that all perſons of the evangelical perſuaſion muſt leave their poſſeſſions and depart, or conform to the popiſh religion within a time preſcribed. Even one ſixth of Auſtria itſelf was then peopled with proteſtants, and Bohemia, Hungary, Moravia, Stiria, Carinthia, and Carniola, boaſted ſtill greater numbers; many likewiſe wavered in their faith, and a conſiderable number concealed their ſentiments till ſome general deciſion ſhould put their declarations out of danger. Yet the publication of this edict produced more trouble than was firſt apprehended. The peaſants of Bohemia, where the ſpirit of religious liberty could never be extinguiſhed, formed themſelves into a body, in ſpite of all former decimations and proſcriptions, and concerted a deſign of ſeizing the emperor and his attendants on a hunting day, when probably they would have given his ambition its deciſive ſtroke. The conſpirators drew lots who ſhould perform this deſperate deed; but chance or infidelity made a diſcovery of the whole plot, the author eſcaped into Hungary, and then ſheltered himſelf in the Ottoman dominions.

The prelude of religious tyranny being thus began, the emperor boldly diſplayed his whole game at once, performing what his predeceſſors had long fruitleſsly deſired to effect: and publiſhed the famous *edict of reſtitution**, which at length brought Guſtavus into the empire, and overturned the labours of twelve of the moſt proſperous campaigns that the houſe of Auſtria, or any European power, had ever ſeen. For that little cloud which aroſe in the North, *no larger than the palm of a man's hand*, to make uſe of the words of Holy Scripture, collected its force ſo ſuddenly, and ſpread that force ſo violently, that it blotted out the radiant glories of the houſe of Auſtria from the hemiſphere, almoſt before a man could ſay *there, there!*

Ferdinand therefore, ſolicited hourly by the Princes of his own perſuaſion, and extremely well inclined to bigotry on his own part, under pretence of making the *formulary* of the religious peace concluded at Augſburg by the common

* There is an excellent abridgment of this edict in *Brachelius*, 185—188.

conſent

conſent of all the Germanic princes his rule and guide; gave orders to his ſtateſmen and lawyers to compoſe and digeſt this mighty work, of which the publication, that it might be rendered more complete, was deferred till the enſuing year; and during the interval application was made to the principal catholic princes to deliver in their opinions on ſo delicate and dangerous a ſubject.

Amongſt a conſiderable number of eccleſiaſtical benefices marked out, in a catalogue delivered to the emperor, theſe few following ones were to be made the firſt ſacrifice, namely, the archbiſhoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen, the biſhoprics of Minden, Oſnabrug, Halberſtadt, Verden, Lubec, Ratzburg, Schwein, Camin, and the abbacy of Hirſchfeld; and what was ſomewhat extraordinary, they all afterwards ſhared the fate of ſecularization by the conſent of both religions at the peace of Munſter, excepting Oſnabrug, in which the catholic party reſerved an alternative, and Lubec. The latter would have taken its ſhare in the common wreck, if the chapter had not engaged itſelf, one year before the peace was concluded, to chuſe ſix biſhops, ſucceſſively, from the houſe of Holſtein-Gottorp, to which family the plenipotentiaries allotted the adminiſtration of the biſhopric.

Thus the papiſts, artfully enough, paid the proteſtants out of *their own church*, and the latter ſwallowed the bait without heſitation, though they had been fighting, as they pretended, thirty years, for the ſupport and dignity of *that very church*. Magdeburg, Minden, and Halberſtadt, were all erected into principalities, and given to the houſe of Brandenburg. Bremen and Verden were made duchies, and aſſigned to Sweden; Ratzburg and Camin were dignified with the title of principalities, and beſtowed on the duke of Mechlenberg; and Hirſchfeld was ſtyled a principality too, and conferred on the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel.

At length, to the infinite diſquiet of the proteſtant party, the *edict of reſtitution* was publiſhed, and commiſſaries diſpatched into all the provinces, to effect the reſtoration of the ſeveral acquiſitions which the evangelical party had been ſuppoſed to procure for themſelves ſince the treaty of Paſſau. There was one very embarraſſing clauſe in it. In caſe a papiſt had turned proteſtant ſince that period, yet the poſſeſſion was not to follow its natural and original maſter. Thus *confuſion was rendered more confuſed*; and what was equally diſagreeable, no prince was out of the reach of the decree; for it touched the friends of Cæſar, as the Germans affect to ſpeak, as well as the enemies. The firſt and principal perſonages in the empire felt an unwillingneſs to relinquiſh

rich eccleſiaſtical benefices, which ſerved to make ample proviſion for their children and relations; and ſome princes there were, whoſe poſſeſſions of the kind exceeded their patrimonial ones. It was objected therefore, that long and undiſturbed poſſeſſion ought to be conſidered in good politics as a thing ſacred, and a fort of title; and it was decreed likewiſe, that the proteſtants aſſented in the *peace of religion* to the inſertion of the article in reference to the reſtoration of the *bona eccleſiaſtica*, and as a proof of this, appeal was made to the journals of the whole tranſaction; it being plain beyond contradiction, that the ſaid clauſe had been forced into the *inſtrument of peace* by the obſtinate perſeverance of the papiſts and the mere arbitrary violence of the emperor. Here the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg joined iſſue, and requeſted that the difficulty might be referred to a new general diet, inaſmuch as what related to all, ought to be examined and decided by all. To this the Imperial party replied, that the determination of the affair belonged ſolely to the emperor, as appeared from ſeveral *receſſes* * of the empire, and the laſt reſolutions agreed upon by the electoral convention held at Mulhauſen.

Upon this, the commiſſaries proceeded to viſit their reſpective diſtricts, with orders particularly to ſummon before them, at different times and places of hearing, all thoſe who kept certain church poſſeſſions, and all thoſe who ſued for their reſtitution; and in caſe unjuſt occupation and detention were once proved, the delinquent party was to be commanded in the emperor's name to make reſtoration; nor was the matter to admit of any delay, though it was alledged that the cauſe was then depending in the chamber of Spires, or that it was determined to lodge an appeal in the next general diet, ſince the laſt edict had proviſionally precluded all ſuch obſtructions and interference. Cathedral and collegiate bodies were referred to the pope's declaration, which was expected to appear daily; and by way of encouragement to thoſe who ſubmitted frankly, and without any reſiſtance, all paſt profits were to be allowed them; whereas at the ſame time a retroſpection in this point was threatened to the refractory, and a ſpeedy interpoſition of the military power. In this rapid career of arbitrary perſecution, the popiſh party made a falſe ſtep in the

* To underſtand this expreſſion the reader muſt obſerve, that what the ſtates eſtabliſh in a diet by plurality of voices, is called *placitum Imperii, a decree of the Empire*. When the Emperor approves this *decree*, it becomes an Imperial decree in form, and is named *concluſum Imperii, a concluſion of the Empire*. When the aforeſaid acts are *ſigned* and *publiſhed* in the forenſic ſenſe of the word, they are then ſtyled *receſſus Imperii*, or *receſſes of the Empire*.

very

very firſt act of partition, for many old occupants expected, which was natural enough, to re-enter into their poſſeſſions, whereas new claimants ſtarted up, who had no title to ſhew but a free grant from the emperor and the pope.

The firſt difficulty began at Augſburg, which appeared really to be ſomething ominous, as the famous confeſſion had been preſented there. The then biſhop demanded his entire juriſdiction; but a military force ſupported the authority of the Imperial commiſſary. In vain the elector of Saxony preſented remonſtrance after remonſtrance; the proteſtant miniſters were rejected from their parochial cures, and the inhabitants of the ſame perſuaſion prohibited from attending divine ſervice, not only in the city, but in the neighbouring villages and fields. The circumſtance of this tranſaction piqued the elector of Saxony almoſt as much as the tranſaction itſelf; for he conſidered Augſburg, with reſpect to the evangelical religion, as the place of its ſecond birth, and was mortified to obſerve, that matters ſtood, now, on as bad a footing as they did ſome time before the *peace of religion* was agreed upon; and what alarmed him more was, that the writers of the oppoſite party aſſerted, in numberleſs pamphlets, that the evangelical religion was not the ſame ſyſtem of belief and practice which had been ſet forth, formerly, in the Augſburg confeſſion. This, as he well foreſaw, was laying the axe to the roots of the reformation, ſince if that allegation was once allowed to be true, no perſon of the *evangelical perſuaſion*, as then profeſſed, had any certain rights or intereſts in the *peace of religion*. He therefore ſummoned all the eminent civilians and divines of his party to a meeting at Leipſic, and united their arguments together in one apology againſt the Romaniſts, ſetting forth, that the elector of Saxony, and other proteſtant princes and ſtates, had preſented a clear and well reaſoned confeſſion of faith to Charles V. which act, reciprocally authenticated by both parties, had been enrolled in the regiſters of the empire, and as they had perſevered inviolably in the ſame ſyſtem, without any addition to, or diminution from it, it was therefore abſolutely equitable and reaſonable to expect, that they ſhould not be precluded from the protection and advantages which the *peace of religion* granted them, as it was compoſed and regulated by the principles of the aforeſaid confeſſion.

During theſe tranſactions a new perſecution had ariſen in Bohemia, of a very extraordinary nature, upon which many of the unhappy natives fled to Sweden. An edict was publiſhed,

liſhed, that all women of the evangelical perſuaſion, married to catholics, whereof there were numberleſs examples, ſhould be expoſed, *ipſo facto*, to baniſhment, unleſs they retracted their religious opinions. The ſeverity of this decree gave uneaſineſs to the papiſts themſelves, whom it affected. The firſt officers of ſtate, and nobles of the kingdoms, had intermarried freely amongſt the proteſtants before the breaking out of the civil wars; for the ladies in Bohemia became heireſſes almoſt in the ſame manner as they do in England. Upon this account, the huſbands, fearing a confiſcation of their wives poſſeſſions, expreſſed an aukward ſort of diſlike, and the rather, as no divorce was propoſed by way of giving them opportunity to try their fortunes in a ſecond marriage. The ladies took a nobler part; they exclaimed loudly againſt this matrimonial perſecution, and not a ſingle woman left her houſe and family. Thunderſtruck with ſuch perſeverance, the Imperial chamber iſſued, May 1, 1629, a ſecond edict of the explanatory kind, allowing the fair ſex a ſort of toleration till the huſband's death; after which they were deprived from the right of poſſeſſion, and ordered to remove into ſome other country, under prohibition, during the interval, to be preſent at any nuptials or other public entertainments, except upon condition of giving precedency to every woman of the catholic perſuaſion. How arbitrary muſt a ſovereign be, who can enact laws of ſuch a nature againſt women!

Whilſt the commiſſaries executed their office with great ſeverity in the judicial way, and both parties, to change the nature of their former diſpute, engaged, with great acrimony upon paper, a new complaint took its riſe, affecting both ſides deeply, though perhaps not equally; and that was the licentiouſneſs, rapine, and cruelty, of the Imperial army, which Walſtein had encreaſed beyond meaſure: even though 10,000 men had been ſent into Poland againſt Guſtavus, and a conſiderable ſupply detached for the ſervice of the archduke in the Low Countries; not to mention an army of near 30,000 ſoldiers employed in Italy on the reduction of Mantua.

Walſtein gave room for further complaints, for all Germany trembled at the thoughts of war, and that general was indefatigable in ſeeking opportunities to create a new one. As he was a punctual man in matters of ſeverity, he ſent colonel Pecker to Magdeburg with a regiment of Croatians, in order to receive the contribution he had impoſed on the town; an errand diſagreeable enough to a city not over wealthy, and which valued herſelf upon being by no

no means the moſt ignoble of the Hanſe-towns. Upon this the populace, whether with or without the connivance of the magiſtracy, cannot be aſſerted, ſeized ſome ſhips of corn that were making their way down the Elbe to Walſtein's army, and committed ſome ſlight acts of hoſtility on the regiment then quartered near the town. The magiſtrates made ſhew of great external diſapprobation upon this occaſion, but Walſtein, naturally of a vindictive and uncontroulable temper, bearing them likewiſe an antient hatred, as they expreſſed no joy when he became their neighbour, and was created duke of Mechlenberg, ſent word immediately, that by way of making their peace with the emperor, they muſt levy a regiment of ſoldiers for his ſervice, and maintain them at their own expence. A memorial was preſented to him with a view to mollify this ſeverity, but Walſtein rejected their applications with ſcorn, and ordered a part of his army not only to blockade, but beſiege the town. The Hanſeatic cities hereupon took the alarm, particularly Brunſwic, Lubec, and Hamburg, and ſent deputies to him, in hopes to break the force of his anger, and induce him to withdraw his troops. His anſwer was, and if they knew the man they had reaſon to expect ſomething of ſuch a nature, that the corn muſt be reſtored him in the firſt place, and the ſeveral delinquents delivered into his cuſtody; ſufficient caution being alſo given him for future good behaviour on the part of the citizens, and that then the contribution levied upon them muſt be diſcharged, and an Imperial garriſon admitted into the town, in order to give laws to the populace. From that moment the magiſtrates of Magdeburg perceived that their deſtruction was determined, ſince a garriſon would always have the power to exact contributions at will, and to introduce the *edict of reſtitution* whenever they pleaſed. Be that as it will, they choſe to wait the event, and refuſed to admit the garriſon; promiſing at the ſame time to give implicit obedience to the emperor in every other reſpect. They then beſought leave to ſend their deputies to Vienna, but Walſtein denied them that favour, being advanced by this time as far as Guſtrow, and gave the inhabitants to underſtand that if they did not receive his garriſon in five days, all future accommodation ſhould be ſet aſide. Nevertheleſs, that general, from ſome motive undiſcoverable to us at preſent, for the inhabitants had made all poſſible preparations for a deſperate defence, contented himſelf with bare threats, and lowering his tone all in a moment, excuſed them even from the payment of the contribution he had before demanded, and requeſted nothing further, but to perſevere

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in affection and loyalty to the emperor. Some ſuppoſe that he dreaded to aſſault a ſet of men made deſperate by oppreſſion; but Walſtein was not ſubject to terrors of that kind. Others conjecture that he had received a poſitive countermand from his maſter; but ſuch he had often diſobeyed upon other occaſions; therefore my private opinion is, and that ſeems to me moſt agreeable to his character, that he feared to irritate Guſtavus, who then wanted an occaſion to invade Germany, for Guſtavus was an object of fear, even to Walſtein; or that he thought it imprudent to kindle up a war juſt in the neighbourhood of his new-acquired dominions.

Guſtavus was much enraged with Walſtein's inſolence at the late convention, for great part of the outrage committed againſt his majeſty's dignity was aſcribed to him. It was therefore determined to puſh the war with ſuch vigour, as to force the Poles into a compliance. In theſe campaigns he relied chiefly on the connivance and private favour of the elector of Brandenburg, whoſe ſiſter he had married. That prince ſecretly wiſhed him well as far as he durſt, and permitted him tacitly, in caſe of ill ſucceſs, to retreat and ſhelter his troops in his dominions. It was in this aftergame that Guſtavus placed his confidence, upon ſuppoſition that any conſiderable misfortune ſhould befal his army. Nevertheleſs, part of the elector's affection could not be concealed from the ſuſpicious and watchful Auſtrians, and that was the eaſy poſſeſſion he granted Guſtavus of the port of Pillau, by which means the Swediſh army was chiefly ſupported, not only as to proviſions and implements of war, but alſo with reſpect to reinforcements.

As Walſtein had preſſed the town of Stralſund extremely hard, and Guſtavus had ſent the inhabitants a ſuccour of 500 men, and a good ſupply of ammunition, the court of Vienna grew enraged to ſuch a degree, that in conſequence it was determined to diſpatch Arnheim to the aſſiſtance of Sigiſmond*. Him Walſtein diſmiſſed with this extraordinary injunction: "Arnheim, take 10,000 men, and drive "Guſtavus out of Poland; and in caſe you cannot perform "the taſk, tell him Walſtein will come and effect it himſelf †." This vain-glorious threat puts me in mind of a ſpeech that an Iriſhman made to one of our Henrys. He was ſent by a certain Mac-Gilpatrick, chief of Upper-Oſſory,

* *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, fol. three tomes, adorned with maps, plans, portraits, &c. engraven by the celebrated Matthew *Merian*, and publiſhed by Cornelius *Danckaërtz*. Tom. i. p. 51, 52.

† *Swediſh Intelligencer*.

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to the king, to complain againſt the deputy of that province; and meeting his majeſty going to chapel, delivered his embaſſy in theſe words: "*Sta pedibus tuis, domine rex*; "*dominus meus Gilla-Patricius me miſit ad te, & juſſit dicere,* "*quod ſi non vis caſtigare Petrum Rufum,* IPSE FACIET "BELLUM CONTRA TE."

The Poles admitted theſe troops into Pruſſia with a ſort of diſtruſt*; notwithſtanding Sigiſmond declared that he had, perſonally, requeſted ſuch aſſiſtance from the emperor, in order to extirpate the Swedes from Pruſſia, and recover his own hereditary dominion of Sweden. Yet the ſenators entered coldly into his allegations; for Arnheim being the ſlave of Walſtein's inclinations, was looked upon as a perſon of ſuſpected faith, and the orders of the kingdom replied, that Guſtavus, on ſuppoſition he was not provoked, was too far removed from their concern: and if his majeſty had carried his zeal for popery, by the advice of the pontifical party, to the very brink of extremity, it was now his own buſineſs to recover the crown of Sweden in the beſt manner he could.

As the Poliſh ſenators were much diſtinguiſhed for plain dealing and free ſpeaking, ſo the ſtates of Sweden diſtinguiſhed themſelves in another reſpect, and that was in affection and loyalty: repreſenting to their maſter in the ſtrongeſt and moſt tender manner, "That as Sigiſmond had refuſed "the reaſonable offers which had been made to him by the "deputies of Brandenburg and Holland, and inſiſted that "Sweden ſhould reſtore to him all the conqueſts that had been "made in Livonia and Pruſſia; as he had requeſted an aux-"iliary army from his imperial majeſty, and as the emperor "had denied admittance to the Swediſh plenipotentiaries at "Lubec, they implored Guſtavus, in caſe a deaf ear was "turned to his future generous propoſals, to commence the "war with redoubled vigour, and fix the ſeat of it in ſome "foreign country, that being in their opinion the moſt advan-"tageous method of carrying on hoſtilities; it appearing to "them infinitely more dangerous and fatiguing to protect "their own coaſts, and leſs reputable and diſtinguiſhing "likewiſe in the eye of the public." It was then voted, that money ſhould be raiſed according to the taxes at that time ſubſiſting; that the recruits to be levied ſhould be continued for two years certain, and that the marine ſhould be placed on the beſt footing that human prudence could deviſe; and to ſtrengthen the fleet, particularly, each nobleman, who

* *Hiſt. Authent. Relat.* tom. i. p. 53.

furniſhed

furniſhed an horſe to the military ſervice, engaged to ſubſcribe about eight pounds. Large ſums were likewiſe promiſed from the India company, and the clergy and people in trade agreed to fit out fifteen armed ſhips. At the concluſion of the meeting the king paid a very gallant compliment to three of his officers; for he made Horn, Banier, and Todt, all ſenators.

Some time afterwards arrived an embaſſy from Moſcovy, with full powers to make his majeſty an offer of diſpatching an army into Poland againſt Sigiſmond *. The propoſal was declined with thankfulneſs and courteſy, either, becauſe the king had ſome expectancies of an accommodation, or becauſe he never reliſhed the aſſiſtance of irregular forces; for he always conſidered war as over cruel and bloody in itſelf, without the aid of barbarians.

Arnheim, by this time, had made Higher Pomerania the rendezvous of his troops †. He then marched to Graudentz, a city of Poland, lying on the eaſt ſide of the Viſtula, in order to join Conoſpoliſki, whom the Imperialiſts conſidered as a general of reputation. In twelve days, the Poliſh chief encamped his troops on the eaſtern ſide of the Viſtula, oppoſite to Arnheim, who, as yet, could not reach Graudentz. A bridge of boats was then thrown over the river near Marienverder, in order to facilitate the junction of the two armies, whoſe reſpective generals, after that was effected, took care to regulate their marches in ſuch a manner, and with ſuch diſpoſitions, as to be prepared for battle in caſe they were forced to engage. The emperor's army always made the right wing, as the poſt of honour. Amidſt their various decampments from place to place, advice was at length brought them that Guſtavus drew near. Arnheim and Conoſpoliſki held themſelves in readineſs to receive him, and, to prevent ſurprize, marched in battle-array to a little town called Marienverder, about ſix miles from Thorn, where Guſtavus then was at the head of part of his army, which had made an advanced journey, in order to reconnoitre the appearance of the enemy. The Imperialiſts being apprized of Guſtavus's intentions, decamped before break of day, with a view to render themſelves maſters of a difficult paſſage, ſituated in the midſt of a wood, and

* *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, tom. i. p. 56.

† As the operations of this laſt and moſt important campaign in Poland may be treated partially, both by Loccenius and Piaſecchi, the one a Swede, and the other a Poliſh biſhop, I ſhall conduct myſelf chiefly by the plain and ſoldier-like narrative of Sirot, notwithſtanding he then bore arms on the Imperial ſide. *Memoires de Sirot*, 2 tom. 12°.

capable

capable to afford them opportunities of making great reſiſtance. Here, in a ſort of amphitheatre, ſtood a mill, on the banks of a conſiderable river, near which was a large moraſs, that rendered the approach very difficult on one ſide: the other ſide was likewiſe protected to a certain degree, inaſmuch as the Swedes had a wood to paſs through, and the roads were narrow. It is certain, if Guſtavus had ſeized this poſt firſt, according to his own intentions, the Poles and Imperialiſts had been greatly perplexed: but fortune favoured the united armies, ſome of whoſe troops arrived there long before the Swedes, and made a lodgment by dint of induſtry; for Conoſpoliſki, who well knew the importance of the poſt, marched all night at the head of nine regiments, beſides two regiments of dragoons and Coſſacks, and began to entrench himſelf by break of day. He then placed a grand guard at the front of the wood, on that approach next the Swedes, for fear of being ſurprized in his concealment. A part of his advanced troops, favoured by the darkneſs of the night, diſperſed themſelves here and there through the fields that extended beyond the wood, and brought intelligence at break of day, that a regiment of dragoons, and another of horſe, were in full march to ſecure the poſt in queſtion.

Theſe troops were conducted by the Rhingrave *, a hot young man, who had like to have ruined his maſter's ſchemes by his impetuoſity. Guſtavus had ordered him to puſh on and ſecure the paſſage, upon ſuppoſition only that he met with no remarkable oppoſition †; but the Rhingrave, who afterwards, to do him juſtice, became a more compoſed and regular general, puſhed his men on with that extremity of reſolution, that the enemy ſoon found it expedient to relinquiſh the firſt poſt, though their number more than counterbalanced that of the Swedes; for he attacked them with ſuch fury and intrepidity, that he allowed not his dragoons an opportunity to diſmount, which was an order the king had given him, for particular reaſons.

Had this brave young man ſtopped here till Guſtavus came up, all had been ſafe; and it is probable a ſignal victory might have enſued; yet it no where appears that his maſter was angry with him; for it was his notion there ſhould be

* His name was Otho Lewis. He before performed a very gallant action in the Daniſh ſervice, at the retreat of Oldenberg in 1626, after the fatal loſs of the battle of Lütter; but made a ſecond miſtake in Germany, which might have proved fatal to him.

† *Loccenius*, p. 561.

rather

rather too much fire in youth, in order to ſupply proper remains for more maturer years.

The Rhingrave advancing briſkly to purſue his point, prepared himſelf to force a ſecond entrance. Arnheim and Conoſpoliſki being informed of this rencounter, and of the deſign of the enemy, imagined themſelves outdone both in dexterity and bravery. Upon this, inſtructions were given, that a large diviſion of the army ſhould march on, in order to ſuſtain thoſe who defended the paſſage and the mill. The troops obeyed with ſuch diligence that they ſupported their comrades, who otherwiſe muſt have ſunk under the ſuperiority of the Swedes, who attacked like men poſſeſſed, and whom neither the difficulty of the ground, nor the perpetual diſcharge of muſquetry, could compel to retreat. Nevertheleſs, the Imperial cavalry, after galloping a good hour, was ſo fortunate as to prevent the Swedes from making any farther progreſs, and arrived juſt at the point of time when the engagement began to grow deſperate. Guſtavus in that inſtant had juſt joined his men with a reinforcement of ſome regiments, and choſen troops; but ſoon found that matters were not ſo circumſtanced as to favour his undertaking. Being a man of honour, he was, notwithſtanding, reſolved to bring his ſuffering ſoldiers off with credit; for the Rhingrave had loſt five colours, and 200 men were killed; not to mention many priſoners whom the enemy had taken. At this very inſtant Guſtavus learnt, that beſides part of the Poliſh army, the whole Imperial force was advancing to attack him, a ſet of hardened and experienced troops, far more reſpectable than the Polanders, which made him think of ſounding a retreat; and not engaging himſelf, imprudently, in a place, and in an attack where he could not ſucceed but by a combination of fortunate circumſtances hardly to be expected. His majeſty had no intention to draw on a battle that day, but only to ſecure a paſs; having left the better part of his army at a good diſtance behind, under Wrangel's care, and having no more with him than 8 or 10,000 picked men, with whom he was to oppoſe an enemy outnumbering him by two thirds. At the moment he was meditatingto file off and retire, two freſh regiments of Imperialiſts arrived, and, diſmounting immediately, fell on with ſuch fury, that they oppreſſed theSwediſh troops by weight and number, and drove them back to the edge of the wood where the Poliſh grand guard had firſt lodged themſelves. At the ſame time Sirot joined the Imperialiſts with the regiment of Arnheim, ſeven ſelect companies of foot, and two regiments of Coſſacks; ſo that Guſtavus was obliged to retire

tire behind a hill of ſand, about 3,000 paces from the entrance of the wood, and range his troops afreſh in a ſituation where they could not readily be ſeen, or a notion be formed of the diſpoſitions then made. After various ſkirmiſhes and attacks on looſe uneven ground, Guſtavus contrived to mount the eminence of an hill, on which was a large area, protected on one ſide by a marſh and wide lake, and on the other ſide by a deep ditch, that came out of the wood and environed the ſpace, round which was a very large meadow: and there Guſtavus lodged his troops. Several rencounters took place with different ſucceſs, when the Imperial army at length came up, but was greatly embarraſſed for want of ſufficient room to act. Amidſt this confuſion, the Poliſh troops that were firſt on the poſt determined to make themſelves maſters of the ſummit of the hill. They accordingly all advanced in one line, excepting the Coſſacks, who marched a few paces after them at right and left. On this new movement the Swedes redoubled their efforts; but the numbers that acted againſt them were ſo diſadvantageous, and the fire of the muſquetry ſo greatly ſuperior in frequency and quantity, that they quitted the top of the hill to their adverſaries, who entrenched themſelves there. Guſtavus had ſtrong reaſons for making this ſacrifice, though highly contrary to his natural temper; for he choſe not to lie ſo near the veteran troops of Germany, a ſet of men much cried up in thoſe days, when there was nothing to divide the two armies, but the rubbiſh of ſome old ruins.

In this third retreat the Coſſacks extremely incommoded the regiment of the Rhingrave in flank, and obliged him to attack them in ſelf-defence. Unfortunately, in making this movement, he laid himſelf open to Sirot, who, though inferior in point of numbers, ſeized one of thoſe critical moments in war, which never preſent themſelves a ſecond time, and made ſo judicious and ſeaſonable an attack, that the Swediſh army was obliged to face about. Regiment now oppoſed regiment, in like manner as one man engages another. The irregulars upon the whole did much miſchief, eſpecially upon the right wing of the Swedes. A ſeries of miſtakes and miſconduct in inferior officers had drawn Guſtavus into ſuch a dilemma, that he reſolved for a ſhort ſpace to try what an incredible effort might effect. He therefore fought at the head of the firſt regiment, like a common ſoldier, with an intrepidity not to be deſcribed. Sirot miſſed killing him very nearly; nor was the king backward in making his return. To comprehend this matter more exactly, it muſt be known, that this gallant Frenchman had ſhot the cornet

of the *prætorian* regiment of guards, and wanted to carry off the colours. Guſtavus, who was engaged juſt by, ſeeing the officer on the ground, and judging rightly of the French baron's deſigns, inſtead of taking a little path, which would have conducted him more ſafely round the edge of the lake, advanced towards Sirot by a ſhorter paſſage, and lodged a carbine-ball in his right arm, intending to have ſhot him through a vital part. Sirot, advancing, made a return with his piſtol, and fired ſo near the king's head, that he burnt his hair, and either the ball, or the motion the king made on the occaſion, cauſed his hat to fall to the ground. Sirot had with him by chance a domeſtic, who being inſenſibly drawn into the engagement, and having a deſire, as his horſe was killed under him, to ſeize the horſe of the cornet whom Sirot had ſhot, took up, as he was then on foot, the king's hat, and gave it his maſter. Sirot had not eſcaped ſo cheaply, had it not been for a coat of mail which he wore under his *hongreline*. He neither knew the king, nor the king him.

It is ſaid by an author *, not that I relate the writer's account for matter of fact, having no collateral authorities, that this very impious and heretical *hat* was ſent by the houſe of Auſtria to adorn the ſhrine of the lady at Loretto; which, ſaith the ſame perſon, is leſs to be wondered at, inaſmuch as the father of critics had the preſumption to bequeath his night-gown to the ſaid holy virgin. Whereupon a wit of that age wrote the following diſtich:

*Criticus virilem virgini togam legans*
*In morte fecit Lipſius ſolæciſmum.*

But to return to the action laſt mentioned. Upon the whole, it is certain, that the king always diſliked this loſs of his beaver, and comforted himſelf as well as he could with the following application to the enemy:

——— *Victor ovat ſpolio, gaudetque potitus.*
*Turno tempus erit magno cum optaverit emptum*
*Intactum Pallanta & cum ſpolia iſta, diemque*
*Oderit* ———

We have no account of the numbers ſlain on either ſide; yet the regiment of Bindhauſ, eſteemed the very fineſt in the Imperial ſervice, was intirely ruined; and fourteen enſigns of foot and five of horſe were taken by the Swedes. Who were made priſoners, and who were killed, appears not, ex-

* *New Star of the North*, p. 44. 4°. *Lond.* 1632.

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cepting a Swediſh velt-maréchal, whom I ſuppoſe to be Wrangel *, and count John, the Rhingrave's brother. Sirot's men took him, but the Polanders attempted to rob them of their capture, in expectation of a large ranſom. In this tumultuous conteſt the poor young nobleman was unfortunately killed. The king, that day, received five muſquet-balls on his armour. Conoſpoliſki engaged hand to hand with a Swediſh cornet, ſo violent was his inclination to ſeize a pair of colours; but his horſe ſunk under him, pierced through with ſeveral balls; and, like Guſtavus, he was taken priſoner, and then reſcued. In one part of this battle, he exhibited a practice in war, which will hardly be credited in a Poliſh officer; and very probably it was his own invention. This was a MASQUED BATTERY, ſecured by a redoubt †, which occaſioned an unexpected and very great ſlaughter.

One Soop, a captain of horſe, reſcued the king when he was taken priſoner. The king was fighting amidſt a body of Polanders, who were ignorant of his perſon. A Poliſh horſe-ſoldier had clapped a piſtol to his ear, when Soop ſhot him in the very act of attempting to give fire; for Guſtavus was ſullen, and refuſed to aſk quarter, or follow the enemy. Soop then, at the head of his own troop of cavalry, ſoon diſperſed the crowd round his maſter, and, ſeizing his bridle by force, compelled him to retire; for which the king created him a chevalier in the public aſſembly at Stockholm ‡.

The two generals determined to give Guſtavus a ſecond attack the next day; but the king's capacity foreſaw its inconveniencies, and a maréchal of his camp reinforcing him, by order, with 3,000 freſh men, gave him an opportunity to retreat triumphantly, without the leaſt moleſtation from the enemy.

His majeſty's conduct on this occaſion, allowances being made for the Rhingrave's impetuoſity, and for his not poſſeſſing the poſt in diſpute ſome hours ſooner than perhaps it was poſſible for him to have done, had all things to boaſt which a great general can lay claim to. His perſonal bravery was perhaps juſtly blameable; except we conſider, that he was training and forming himſelf in the apprenticeſhip of

* This officer, whoſe chriſtian name was Herman, muſt not be confounded with Charles Guſtavus Wrangel, who made ſo great a figure after the death of Guſtavus Adolphus.

† *Hiſt. des Guerres & des Mouvements*, &c. ſous le regne de Louis XIII. tom. iii. 185.

‡ Soop, Henry, commanded eight troops of horſe at the battle of Leipſic.

war; and all commanders at firſt muſt give the troops a high idea of their perſonal valour. His preſence of mind was extraordinary; he never loſt his recollection for a moment; but made the immediate and only proper uſe of every man that came to his aſſiſtance. His diſpoſitions, his changes, his efforts, his attacks were ſuch, that the cuiraſſiers of the Imperial army, who were armed cap-a-pie, and looked upon as invincible, could never break his lines, or force him to fight beyond his choice; and the retreat he made was carried to the utmoſt pitch of ability that the circumſtances could admit of. Sirot took nine pieces of leather cannon, and two of caſt metal, from four to ſix pounders.

The king afterwards earneſtly deſired to have an interview with that officer, and paſſed many encomiums upon him with great politeneſs. He preſſed him much to ſerve under him, and, as Sirot only commanded ſome ſelect companies in the Imperial army, offered to place him at the head of as many regiments in the Swediſh ſervice. Sirot at that time made his excuſes, upon the footing of a man of honour, who had pledged his word elſewhere. *Truſt me*, replied Guſtavus, *and quit the party you have eſpouſed; aſſuredly, elſe, you will be obliged to do ſo in a few years; for if ever a peace be concluded between Sweden and Poland, I will that moment declare war againſt the emperor, in conjunction with the king your maſter: and if you chuſe not to comply with my requeſt at preſent, promiſe me at leaſt, when you have delivered back your companies, to give me a meeting**. When the king afterwards had made ſome progreſs in Germany, he wrote to Sirot with his own hand. Sirot haſtened to him: but in the interval Guſtavus was killed, and the Frenchman ſerved under the duke de Weimar.

At night Guſtavus retired to his old camp at Marienberg, and the enemy's two generals retreated to the poſt they had defended; ſince in truth they could not poſſibly find a more ſecure and advantageous ſituation. Their army paſſed the whole night under arms; but no enemy moleſted them.

The next day two priſoners, taken from the Swediſh army, one of whom was named Hume, were greatly ſurprized to ſee Sirot wearing the king's, their maſter's hat; Sirot himſelf being entirely ignorant to whom it belonged. They wept: exclaimed and acknowledged it to be Guſtavus's, beſeeching in the moſt earneſt manner to be informed if the king was dead. Sirot recounted the tranſaction to them: upon which they recovered a little from their anxiety and ſurprize.

* *Memoires de Sirot*, tom. ii.

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Soon after the united armies retired to Marienverder, in order to obſerve Guſtavus's motions. At this time his Poliſh majeſty arrived in the camp; and changed the diſpoſitions the generals had made, and the deſigns they had formed. Having ſummoned a grand council of war, he propoſed to ſeek Guſtavus in his intrenchments at Marienberg, and make an attempt to force them; concluding, they were not yet put in a poſture of defence: but in that circumſtance he little knew the military ſkill, caution, and diligence of his antagoniſt: who in eight days, nature having done much, had made his camp difficult to be approached; being protected on one ſide by a moraſs, and on the other ſide by a little river; with only a ſmall opening, which Guſtavus had made defenſible by excellent intrenchments and fortifications. Nevertheleſs, the king of Poland ſtill had an inclination to force his enemy's lines; and having made ſeveral unſucceſsful attempts, was at length repulſed with very conſiderable loſs. In conſequence of theſe mortifications, Sigiſmond determined to encamp himſelf not far from his own intrenchments. Arnheim quitted the Poles, and taking with him his four regiments of horſe, and four of foot, poſted himſelf at Neuberg, near the Viſtula, where the enemy had erected a fort in a ſmall iſland. Forming a deſign therefore to make himſelf maſter of this fort, he attacked it with a body of ſoldiers whom he conveyed over in boats; but the enterpriſe miſcarried. After various unſucceſsful attempts, he united himſelf a ſecond time with the Poliſh army, and encamping near Guſtavus, gazed upon him during the remaining part of the campaign without doing any thing. It is true, the united generals ſpared no pains to tempt Guſtavus to a deciſive battle: but that prince underſtood his profeſſion too well, and had too diſtinct a notion of the ſuperiority of his adverſary's numbers, to enter into any hazard out of pure gallantry; he therefore kept firm to his poſt; nor were they able either to force his lines, or to compel him to retire. By this time Arnheim grew indiſpoſed, or made pretences rather of indiſpoſition, for he was the beſt diſſembler in the world; and thus the command of the Imperial troops devolved on duke Julius of Saxe Lauenberg; and then on a count Mansfelt.

Arnheim had diſpleaſed Sigiſmond, by refuſing to attack the town of Marienberg, having no authority, as he alledged, from his court, to invade the territories of the elector of Brandenburg, who owned that part of Pruſſia. What his inſtructions were, cannot well be aſcertained, but this is manifeſt, that his eſtate lay in the dominions of that elector;

and there are reaſons to ſuſpect, that he betrayed the Poles, and advertiſed the elector, privately, of all their deſigns, ſo far as they bore any reference to his eſtate.

In this interval, Sirot made an attempt to force Guſtavus's lines, which the king allowed to be a ſpirited attack, and undertaken like a man of ſervice. The young Frenchman in the firſt place made himſelf maſter of an approach called Pozolar, where he defeated four troops of horſe and two of dragoons, commanded by a brother of maréchal Wrangel, whom he killed. He next ſeized the dyke of Elbin, and had ſtormed fort Oſbron, where was only a garriſon of fourſcore men; but the water being high, and the foſſé wide and deep, and having no portable bridge, nor ſcaling ladders, he ſent for advice and aſſiſtance to the new Imperial general, who abruptly refuſed them both, and gave him poſitive orders to withdraw. In that interim two Swediſh regiments, with ſome field artillery, arrived to ſuſtain the fort. They handled the french baron rudely enough, to make uſe of his own words; nevertheleſs, he retired in good order, and with no conſiderable loſs. The king then diſpoſed his troops ſo judiciouſly, ſecuring all paſſes, and bringing ſuch plentiful ſupplies of proviſions to his army, that Sigiſmond and the Poliſh generals had not power, after various efforts, to make themſelves maſters of an inconſiderable city called Stum *.

But the arrival of M. de Charnacé, the French ambaſſador, a miniſter more eſteemed at home than abroad, ſoon put an end to the Poliſh war. He was a military man as well as a politician †. Nevertheleſs, Richelieu, who did not abſolutely confide in his abilities, artfully diſpatched to Guſtavus, but without any public character, the capuchin father Joſeph, whom he called, not improperly, *His political right arm.* De Charnacé made his proper applications to the two contending kings, and prevailed on them to ſend their reſpective deputies to a conference. To this purpoſe tents were

* *Hiſtorical or Authent. Relat* tom. i. 53.

† Hercules, baron de Charnacé, was a colonel of infantry, and a captain of horſe. He was the firſt public miniſter who gave the prince of Orange the title of *Highneſs* inſtead of *Excellency*, in the year 1637. He had always a certain abruptneſs in his *manner*; for when prince Henry Frederick of Naſſau modeſtly made his excuſes for omitting a certain enterpriſe, on account of the oppoſition that aroſe from wind and tide, he cut him ſhort by replying; *Sir, be pleaſed to remember, that there is no wind nor tide in France.* At the ſiege of Breda, the ſame prince, by way of return, ſaid to him, as he ſtood near him in the trenches: *If you feel any uneaſineſs, let me beſeech you to withdraw.* Upon which De Charnacé kept his ground out of obſtinacy, and was killed by a muſquet ball.

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erected about 500 paces distant from each camp: but his Swedish majesty protested the conference should not go on, except he saw Sirot: so great a regard did he always pay to persons of distinguished valour.

De Charnacé having brought the treaty to some forwardness, played his cards with a sort of shyness mixed with indifference, which put Gustavus partly out of temper, and partly upon his guard. Notwithstanding he made Gustavus an offer of a supply of money, assuring him, at the same time, that the duke of Bavaria, and his confederates, earnestly besought the king his master to undertake the protection of Germany, and give a check to the progress of the house of Austria, whose power began to be equally terrifying both to papists and protestants. How far this assertion was literally true, in each of its branches, cannot be distinctly ascertained; yet thus much is certain, that De Charnacé had been dispatched to the elector of Bavaria some months before, with a view to reconcile him to the protestant princes, and detach him from the emperor; dexterously insinuating at the same time, that they, in conjunction with his master, would raise him to the dignity of the Imperial throne after the death of Ferdinand. Maximilian did not chuse to make so desperate a plunge in politics all at once, although he dropped some expressions, which tended to shew indistinct disapprobation of the emperor's conduct, and a strong disgust at the king of Spain, who *traversed* him, to use his own expression, in all things*. He then harangued more at large on the ambition and insolence of Walstein, and passed his word not to assist the emperor to the disadvantage of the duke of Mantua. It thence appears, that though the elector had not courage enough to separate himself at once from the house of Austria, it is plain he had certain inclinations to procure and cultivate a good understanding with France, as will appear more distinctly in the sequel of our history. Gustavus had no dislike to this negotiation, but still suspected that the French minister did not act sincerely and seriously with him. He had likewise a doubt if De Charnacé had any other views than to divine, if possible, what might be his future intentions. For these reasons he gave him some slight glimmerings of hope, and then returned him an answer conceived in vague and general terms.

The elector of Brandenburg had his reasons likewise for dispatching a public minister, in order to bring the afore-

* Differt. de *M. Puffendorf* sur les alliances entre la France & la Suede, 8°. A la Haye, 1709.

mentioned treaty to a happy concluſion; and his Britannic majeſty, ſucceſsful by happening once in his politics to agree with the inclinations of the contending parties, made uſe of Sir Thomas Roe in the like undertaking, who acquitted himſelf with good temper and diſtinguiſhing capacity. Guſtavus had a great deſire to be upon good terms with England, having conceived favourable opinions to the advantage of Charles I. who had honoured him with the inveſtiture of the garter, and rendered him ſignal ſervices before this period, in compoſing the diſagreeable commotions that had ſubſiſted between him and Sigiſmond, which in a word oppoſed the darling project of his life, namely, an invaſion into Germany. Nevertheleſs, it was Charles's misfortune not to keep pace with Guſtavus's expectations; for inheriting a part of his father's pacific diſpoſition, he at the ſame time inſpirited Guſtavus, and lent a kind ear to propoſals of accommodation from the court of Vienna: and with a view to facilitate this project, afterwards diſpatched Anſtruther, who had been long the Britannic reſident at Copenhagen, with inſtructions of a conciliating nature to the diet of Ratiſbon.

In a few days the treaty took effect, it being now the month of Auguſt*. It was to hold its force for ſix complete years; at the expiration of which, in 1636, D'Avaux protracted it for one and twenty years more, and indeed it was high time, on the part of Sigiſmond, to conclude ſomething, notwithſtanding he ſhewed great unwillingneſs on the occaſion †; for the kingdom of Poland was weakened and perplexed to ſuch a degree, that the king found it impoſſible to carry on the war with any tolerable ſucceſs and reputation. Theſe reaſons induced him to connive at the mediating aſſiſtance of France and England: and it was agreed that the Swedes, during this period of reconciliation, ſhould poſſeſs Elbingen, Memel, and Braunſberg, the fort of Pillau, and all the acquiſitions Guſtavus had made in Livonia. Two years and more ere the expiration of the truce, his Poliſh majeſty died, ſix months and a few days before Guſtavus, in the ſixty-ſixth year of his age, worn out with inquietudes and fatigues, after a reign of forty-five years, chequered with good and adverſe fortune. His parts were rather acute than ſtrong; he was enterpriſing, artful, having reſources at will; and had the talent of ſtruggling through misfortunes without being diſmayed by them. Self conceit and obſtinacy were his greateſt faults, and ſerved to

* *Hiſt. or Authent. Relat.* m. i. 56. † *Loccen.* Hiſt. Suec. p. 562.

account

account for the moſt conſiderable part of his miſapprehenſions and miſcarriages. His family has been long ſince extinct.

After the adjuſtment of the laſt mentioned truce, nothing enſued of importance, except a treaty, concluded betwixt Guſtavus and the town of Dantzic*. The firſt conſequence of the truce between Sweden and Poland, was the return of Arnheim and the Imperial army into Germany. It may be aſked, why this general, with a body of 10,000† veteran troops, did not perform his duty better, and with greater ſucceſs? He was a man of artifice and ſtratagem, beloved by the ſoldiery at that period, and endued with great political abilities. But Arnheim, very juſtly ſuſpected through the whole campaign, poſſeſſed no inconſiderable eſtate in the territories of Brandenburg, which made him unwilling to promote the war with vigour, for then the aforeſaid electorate might naturally have become the ſeat of action; and upon theſe occaſions prince Uladiſlaüs ſuggeſted his ſuſpicions concerning him to his father Sigiſmond‡. He was alſo a creature ſubject to the *ferula* of Walſtein, who, like many other generals, had the ſelf-denial to ſacrifice his glory, great as that glory was, to his private paſſions and intereſts, his caprice and ambition. Walſtein, for reaſons which muſt occur to every ſenſible reader, had no deſire to bring this war to a concluſion by any deciſive ſtrokes; yet I muſt aquit him of having any perſonal views to a conſiderable degree, with reſpect to the private orders he gave Arnheim as to the campaigns of Poland; ſince the true intereſt of the houſe of Auſtria then was, coincidently with Walſtein's intereſt too, to carve out juſt employment enough for Guſtavus, without reducing either him or Sigiſmond to any certain and definite concluſions: for then they knew but too well, even though Guſtavus had been forced to make a peace, that he would turn his arms againſt Germany, and in that reſpect France counterworked, and overreached them.

Meanwhile new circumſtances in the Germanic ſyſtem paved the way for an invaſion more and more on the part of Guſtavus. It was now thought high time, at Vienna, to take off the maſk a little in regard to the elector of Saxony, who had implicitly, without ſerious reflection, been its obſequious ſervant for many years, with a view to make ſome inconſiderable acquiſitions in Luſatia and Bohemia, which

* *Hiſt. or Authent. Relat.* tom. i. p. 57. † *Loccenius* ſays 7000, p. 561.

‡ *Kobierziski*, Hiſtor. Vladiſlaüi, p. 925.

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the houſe of Auſtria, merely by its ſuperior greatneſs, had the power of reſuming whenever ſhe pleaſed. The event I am going to relate ſoon convinced him, though a weak man, who had been ſold by his general and miniſters many times before and after this period, that the emperor had a mind to check him in his career, and give him a thorough mortification, once for all, in ſpite of meritorious paſt ſervices, and the alliance then ſubſiſting between them. To explain this point, it muſt be known, that the chapter of Magdeburg, out of obedience to an Imperial proſcription, in the beginning of this year, had diſpoſſeſſed Chriſtian William, marquis of Brandenburg, adminiſtrator of the archbiſhopric, and placed, in his room, Auguſtus, third ſon, living, of the elector of Saxony; which young man was then aged about fifteen. The court of Vienna, inſtead of ratifying this election in behalf of a family that had ſerved its intereſts aſſiduouſly, aſſigning no incapacity on account of youth, choſe to make it devolve on the archduke Leopold, the emperor's ſecond ſon*, who was born the ſame year with his brother candidate. Meanwhile the ſee of Rome was applied to, and ſecured upon this occaſion; and when a denial was returned to the elector of Saxony, he perceived forthwith that the court of Vienna could write two ſtyles with equal energy; and that the title of prince *ab utili*, as the politicians then expreſſed themſelves, had an intereſt in it infinitely ſtronger than all paſt aſſiſtance and good ſervices. This repulſe comforted the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel not a little; for he, who was half an enemy at leaſt to the imperial family, had loſt the abbacy of Hirſchfeld, which was made an appennage to the aforeſaid archduke; and the elector of Saxony, an inviolable ally and friend of the emperor, met with treatment juſt as harſh, conducted, from the beginning to the end, with as little ceremony and as much indelicacy.

* This prince was not ill-provided with church-preferments, both in proteſtant and popiſh countries; for the archbiſhopric of Magdeburg and the biſhopric of Halberſtadt were ſuppoſed to amount each to 50,000 l. per ann. and the income of the abbacy and territory of Hirſchfeld was imagined to be half that value. Theſe were only a ſort of commendams, to be preſerved with his other eccleſiaſtical poſſeſſions. Previouſly to the preſent period he had been created biſhop of Straſburg and Paſſau, by the reſignation of his uncle, the archduke of Inſpruch, who had married the widow of duke d'Urbino. It was moreover intended to have procured for him, in courſe of time, the archbiſhopric of Bremen. He was alſo adminiſtrator of Murbach and Luders.

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His Daniſh majeſty too began to ſuſpect, as he poſſeſſed only one town, namely, Glucksſtadt, in the Duchy of Holſtein, that to ſupport an equal balance of power in Germany, was a taſk beyond his ſtrength and abilities. Therefore it was he inclined a favourable ear to the treaty of accommodation which the emperor had declared ſhould be held at Lubec, for a tedious and unſucceſsful war had chaſtiſed his ambition thoroughly; and as omens and prodigies in thoſe days determined moſt men's reſolutions and practices, it happened, whether fortunately or otherwiſe I cannot ſay, that a flaſh of lightning pierced the royal chapel of Copenhagen, and deſtroyed the funeral trophies of all the kings. Chriſtian was ſtruck motionleſs in his military capacity from that moment, and never afterwards recovered the uſe of his warlike faculties.

Meanwhile Guſtavus, who, above all things, paſſionately deſired the concurrence of his ſubjects, could not allow himſelf to venture on invading Germany till he had firſt collected the ſentiments of the good people of Sweden. Not caring to receive any public check in the ſenate-houſe, he conceived it moſt proper to aſſemble, in his own tent, the ableſt men, civil and military, he then had round his perſon. It was there modeſtly ſuggeſted by one or two, who alledged they were not able to comprehend the effects of a war on the continent, whether through deſign, or from narrow and contracted notions I cannot ſay, "That the revenues of the kingdom "had been exhauſted in foreign expeditions: that it favoured "too much of romance to ſupport the intereſts of any "power, or eſpouſe the cauſe of any religion on the other "ſide of the water: that a good king ought to ſtay at home, "and not croſs the ocean in purſuit of feats of arms: that "the dukes of Mechlenburg might be reinſtated better by "good counſel than by the ſword: that the German electors "were the beſt judges of the affairs of the empire, and "beſt able to vindicate them: that the maintenance of the "proteſtant religion depended on God, and not on man: "and laſtly, that as the ſea was a natural barrier, ſufficient "to protect Sweden from all invaſions; ſo it likewiſe ren-"dered every interpoſition upon the continent unſeaſonable, "expenſive, and unavailing."

It was obſerved further, "That the emperor had given the "Swedes no lawful occaſion for declaring war, though "many inſults had been offered, and various injuries com-"mitted againſt them: that the troops ſent to Sigiſmond "were ſuppoſed to be hired by the republic of Poland; and "that this ſuppoſition might be admiſſible, if a nation choſe

"to

" to close its eyes a little in order to obtain tranquillity and " peace: that a sea invasion against Sweden was a thing " remote and of a romantic nature; and an irruption by land " was equally improbable, since the kingdom of Denmark " must be first subdued and reduced*; and as to Livonia " and Prussia, no attempts could be made there, but such as " were incompatible with the Polish truce." The expences of a war upon the continent were next expatiated upon; nor was the immense power of the emperor passed by without notice taken of it; nor the dispeopling of Sweden, nor the making conquests for other persons advantages; the whole being concluded with a pathetic peroration, relative to the state of the kingdom, during the minority of an infant princess, in case it should please God to dispose of his majesty's life.

To these allegations and suggestions the king, and the major part of the assembly, replied to the following effect†:

" That universal monarchy, even upon the continent, " must be repressed by neighbouring nations at great hazard " and inconceivable expence, provided such nations are only " protected by a small interposition of ocean; since a power " of that encroaching and arbitrary kind must, in its own " nature, make new and wider undulations every moment, " except it be properly checked, and prudently restrained: " so that the fate of a country, removed at a moderate degree " of distance from it, is only *res protracta, sed non sublata.*" This preliminary being got over, it was observed next: " That the Imperial troops were dispatched avowedly into " Poland, and that if such insults and aggressions were " timorously connived at, the character of Gustavus would " be given down to posterity in an ambiguous light; for " hostile actions carried more signification with them, than " the disavowal of courts and ministers: *That invasions were* " *more to be feared than people imagine; having, according to* " *all histories, been generally crowned with success: great things* " *being always to be done in war, merely because they were sup-* " *posed to be impossible.* That Walstein, by the assistance of a " Spanish fleet, then stationed at Dunkirk, had formed im- " mense designs, to say the least of them, against the marine " of Sweden; and that the king himself, considered in the " light of a man of courage and an intelligent being, had no " choice of an alternative with respect to peace or war." Still it was graciously observed by his majesty, " That he " should commit his own glory and private sentiments to " the breasts of his senators, who, in a short space, should

* *Loccenii* Hist. Suec. p. 563. † Ibid. p. 563, 564.

" have

" have full permiſſion to debate, publicly, the expediency or " inconveniency of *invading the empire.*" *I know,* cried the king with ſome emotion, *as well as any one perſon amongſt my ſubjects, the difficulty, the perils, the fatigues and duration of ſuch an undertaking; yet neither the wealth of the houſe of Auſtria nor her veteran forces, diſmay me. There are powers, even in the empire itſelf, who may not diſlike the favour of a viſit; and I may venture to aſſert, that a certain edict has caſt a damp upon the burning zeal of Saxony. It is moreover underſtood, that the Imperial army ſubſiſts by rapine and military exactions; whereas on the other hand, though the Swediſh revenues are not conſiderable, yet the money is paid with punctuality; and my ſoldiers are accuſtomed to temperance, frugality, and virtue. In the worſt of caſes my retreat is ſecure; and my brave troops ſhall never want their daily ſubſiſtence, though it is tranſported to them from Sweden; and if it is the will of the Supreme Being, that Guſtavus muſt die in the defence of his country, he pays the tribute with thankful acquieſcence: it is a king's duty and religion both, to obey the great Sovereign of kings without a murmur. I ſhall leave the world with a firm perſuaſion that Providence will ſupport my ſubjects, becauſe they are faithful and virtuous; and that my miniſters, generals, and ſenators, will punctually diſcharge their duties to my child and people, inaſmuch as they reſpected me, and loved their country**.

I own myſelf at a loſs which to admire moſt in this debate, his majeſty's abilities or his honeſty; for as he had not actually ſettled any diſtinct agreement between himſelf, France, and England, though morally ſure of effecting ſomething on that head, he generouſly diſdained to have recourſe to perſuaſive and plauſible arguments; and indeed it was always his way to preſerve ſome reſources by way of ſurprize, and perform more than he gave people reaſons to expect. It was only for a man like Guſtavus to quit the common high road of a politician; and if Charles I. had thoroughly underſtood this exception in human nature, he would not have ruined, as far as was in his power, the elector Palatine's cauſe, by inſiſting upon promiſes, from Guſtavus, relative to the reſtitution of that prince, before he had power to make them good. The true policy had been to have truſted the king of Sweden, and ſuſpected the reſt of mankind; which incidental remark the reader will ſee verified hereafter, by the king's affection and regard for that unfortunate prince, at a time when his Britannic majeſty gave over all concerns for his intereſt.

* *Loccenii* Hiſt. Sueçan. p. 563—565.

It

It muſt be remembered, that this aſſembly was held in Pruſſia; and from thence Guſtavus ſet ſail for Stock-
1630. holm. De Charnacé attended him in the voyage; and there he renewed his application to form an alliance between Sweden and France; but in ſuch high terms, and with ſo great an air of indifference, that men of ſenſe ſuſpected Richelieu, who had been made ſecretary of ſtate and prime miniſter long before, rather to want to penetrate Guſtavus's deſigns, than to form any real agreement between the two crowns: for De Charnacé threw out his propoſals in a manner ſo extremely general and unlimited, that in every inſtance he ſeemed to reſerve for his maſter a ſafe retreat. Neither was he over modeſt in the requiſitions he made. It was expreſsly required by him, that Guſtavus, upon entering Germany, ſhould maintain an army of 36,000 men, and oblige himſelf to continue the war ſix entire years, without intermiſſion; for which ſervices France ſhould pay him annually £.75,000. ſterling. Guſtavus, conformably, not only to right reaſon, but to the natural caſt of his temper, treated every article of theſe conditions with an air of penetration and diſdain. He did not chooſe to enliſt himſelf as a mercenary general upon ſo contemptible a ſtipend; nor was it pleaſing to him to be excluded from the means of treating with the emperor, upon condition propoſals were offered ſatisfactory to his own honour and the proteſtant cauſe. He feared alſo leſt the other princes and ſtates, who courted his alliance, or might reciprocally be requeſted by him to enter into engagements, ſhould neglect, contemn, or think ill of his friendſhip, when they knew him to be engaged by France to carry on the war, in the empire, at all events, for a limited number of years. A further difficulty yet remained; De Charnacé had forgotten to ſpeak ambiguouſly; and Guſtavus plainly ſaw that France, whilſt ſhe fettered him for a certain number of years in the empire, had a private view to make an advantageous peace, with the emperor, in Italy. For theſe reaſons the preſent negotiation was ſuſpended; nevertheleſs, not to cruſh it abſolutely, the ſecretary Nicholai was ſent to Paris, to inſinuate that Guſtavus had no diſinclination to an engagement, where the concluſions were reaſonable, and not inconſiſtent with his welfare and dignity.

During this interval, De Charnacé ſet out with a view to return home, but received orders at Copenhagen to embark again for Stockholm, with freſh inſtructions, as it was generally thought, relative to a new *confederacy* in reſpect to the

the invaſion of Germany *; and thus matters were conducted to a more ſucceſsful concluſion.

It has been aſſerted by Waſſenberg †, an author of ſuch great repute, that the famous count de Furſtenberg publiſhed a commentary upon his hiſtory, that Guſtavus, upon the propoſal made him to enter Germany, placed ſo little confidence in French promiſes and ſubſidy payments, that he inſiſted on his Chriſtian majeſty's ſending ſeven hoſtages to reſide at Amſterdam by way of ſecurity: and it was made a point likewiſe, that the republic of Venice ſhould ſend two hoſtages on the ſame purpoſes to Stockholm; and the Engliſh and Moſcovites ſhould diſpatch a certain number to make their abode in ſuch places as the king ſhould ſpecify ‡. The ſtates general were truſted upon their bare parole of honour: a mark of confidence which at that time they juſtly merited, on account of their ſincere good will to the unfortunate elector Palatine, and the proteſtant religion, upon all occaſions.

This matter being thus diſmiſſed for a ſeaſon, Guſtavus at length propoſed the final diſcuſſion of peace and war to the ſtates of the kingdom aſſembled in ſenate. Various arguments were then alledged on either ſide, in ſubſtance, much the ſame with thoſe already related; but at length it was unanimouſly determined in favour of a ſafe and glorious peace, or a briſk and perſevering war, without admitting any intermediate ſtate of things by way of ſuccedaneum. The ſenate concluded with an earneſt requeſt to his majeſty not to conſent to a peace, *except he had his helmet on* §; requeſting him at the ſame time to relinquiſh no preſent or future acquiſitions, without maintaining in the higheſt degree the honour and glory of Sweden, the ſovereignty of the Baltic, and the free exemption of the town of Stralſund; not forgetting the reſtoration of the dukes of Mechlenburg, and the re-eſtabliſhment of ancient tranquillity in the two circles of Lower and Upper Saxony; keeping a ſtrict and watchful eye to all alliances then contracted, or thereafter to be contracted, with foreign princes, and the true preſervation of the rights and dignity of the proteſtant religion ‖.

* *MS. letter* from Sir Thomas Roe to lord viſcount Dorcheſter, ſecretary of ſtate, Feb. 14. 1629-30.

† *Florus German.* p. 260.

‡ *Continuat. Laur. Auſtr.* fol. p. 24.

§ *Sed tantum ſub clypeo*: but the original words could not be tranſlated literally, according to the then uſage of war.

‖ *Hiſt. Authent. Relat.* in Low Dutch, fol. tom. i. p. 51.

Upon

Upon this the ſtates of the kingdom diſpatched a deputy to Walſtein and Tilly, to whom his majeſty ſent alſo two letters*. When the perſon employed, whoſe name was Nicholas Bielké, lord juſticiary of the country of Smaland, arrived at Stralſund, he thought proper, for certain reaſons, to ſend his letters and a copy of his inſtructions to the reſpective generals, and complained with great acrimony againſt the haughtineſs of Walſtein. It does not appear, that this arrogant commander had the politeneſs to return the king an anſwer: but Tilly made a reply with great reſpect, and modeſtly vindicated both himſelf and his party. The reſult therefore was, that the affair of Stralſund gave Guſtavus pretenſions upon the empire; and paved a foundation for him to proceed upon; for it rendered him maſter of a ſea-port equally convenient for advancing or retreating.

Now opens a great proſpect, that is, the invaſion of Germany; and ſince this point may be juſtly conſidered as the moſt important event in European hiſtory, it appears highly neceſſary, once for all, to form a ſhort but diſtinct notion of the ſtate of the empire, for a century and ſomething more preceding, with reſpect to its religious, civil, or military commotions.

" Previouſly † to the Bohemian troubles in 1618, about " an hundred years, almoſt to a month, Martin Luther, " profeſſor of theology in the univerſity of Wittemberg, " began to diſpute publicly againſt the abuſes of indulgen- " cies; and Ulric Zuinglius at the ſame time declaimed from " the pulpit againſt the aforeſaid abuſes. The doctrines of " Luther in general were extremely reliſhed by the majority " of mankind; and he found moreover an excellent patron " and protector in Frederic the Sage, elector of Saxony, and " John the Conſtant, his brother. This was that very " Saxon elector who, in conjunction with ſome other ſtates, " *proteſted* againſt the Imperial decree in the diet held at " Spires, in the year 1529, from which action the name of " *Proteſtant* firſt took its riſe. After that a confeſſion of " their faith was preſented to the emperor Charles V.‡ at the " diet

* *Hiſtorical or Authent. Relat.* in Low Dutch. fol. tom. i. p. 51, 52.

† *Memoirs communicated*, by the famous jus-publiciſt M. de Maſcou, Dean of Zeitz, a counſellor to the late king of Poland; who furniſhed me with abundance of hints and materials for writing this hiſtory. He was upon the whole the greateſt maſter of hiſtorical and treaty-learning I ever knew. He had alſo taſte and penetration.

‡ It has been thought by ſome, that the houſe of Auſtria, in ſucceeding ages, formed its plan of univerſal monarchy upon the practices of this prince, and upon ſome traditional ſchemes and ſayings of his, that had been delivered down

" diet of Augſburg the enſuing year, and thence the " Lutherans ſurname themſelves to this very hour *Fidei* " *Auguſtanæ addictos*; and as there was great reaſon to fear " that the emperor would attempt to reduce them to con- " formity by force of arms, they thought it both ſafe and " convenient to place themſelves in a ſtate of defence, and of " courſe formed immediately the famous league of Smal- " calden; a ſmall city in the territories of Heſſe.

" The elector of Saxony, and Philip landgrave of Heſſe, " were the chief perſonages in this confederation. But " Francis I. king of France, Henry VIII. king of England, " who had publiſhed a treatiſe againſt Luther, upon the " ſubject of the ſeven ſacraments, which procured him the " title of Defender of the Faith, and the king of Denmark, " all aſpired to obtain the good graces and amity of the " confederators at Smalcalden. M. de Bellay concluded a " treaty with them at Eſſinguen in 1532; and it was then " ſuppoſed in France, that a political ſtep of this nature " would create the means of giving an oblique check to the " immenſe power of the emperor. Yet the new religion " unhappily performed that, which the enemies thereof " could not effect; for the two communions of Lutherans " and Zuinglians, or, as ſome affected to call themſelves, " *Helvetians*, had the misfortune to diſagree in the very " infancy of reformation. At firſt the difference was " ſlight,

down to poſterity by uninterrupted ſucceſſion. The potentate in queſtion, the moſt powerful and illuſtrious of all the ſucceſſors of Charlemagne, trained up to great enterpriſes, firſt by Perroner, and then by cardinal Granville, conceived the high idea of becoming ſole monarch of Europe; a title the Auſtrians and Spaniards at that juncture greatly wiſhed to ſee realized. They well foreſaw the difficulties which the princes and ſtates of the empire might throw in their way, and of courſe made the grand attempt to divide them, under pretext of extirpating the doctrines of a Saxon profeſſor. This expreſſion of *pretext* I purpoſely make uſe of, inaſmuch as it was in their power, many years before, to have given the death-ſtroke to the Lutheran cauſe. Some writers have thought that Charles V. granted more favours to the proteſtants by the *pax religioſa*, than an abſolute religioniſt could be thought to have done; and have ſuſpected, though perhaps without foundation, that the conference at Worms had made ſome impreſſion on his mind, and wrought therein no inconſiderable change; for when the Spaniards in the Smalcaldic war, on the ſurrender of Wittemberg, after the defeat of John Frederic, elector of Saxony, deſired permiſſion from him to dig up the bones of Luther, and burn them, he replied with great emotion: " Leave the " man in peace, I have no inclination to behold him again, having ſeen " enough of him in the diſputation at Worms." What confirms the matter ſtill farther is, that his laſt words were reputed to be theſe: *In ſolis meritis Chriſti confido.* [*Hiſpanicæ Dominationis Arcana*, p. 20 & 26. *Motifs pour la Guerre d'Allemagne*, p. 95.]

" ſlight, relating to little more than ſome ſlight diſagreements " in the article of the Holy Supper; but after the *Helvetians* " had adopted the doctrines of Calvin, the ſeparation pro- " ceeded to greater lengths. It was the cuſtom of the age " to ſurname this latter party *Calviniſts*, but for their own " parts they choſe rather to be dignified with the title of the " *Reformed*.

" At length the reformation made ſurprizing advances in " neighbouring countries. Guſtavus Vaſa eſtabliſhed it in " Sweden, and Albert of Brandenburg, firſt duke of Pruſſia, " embraced it likewiſe. Chriſtian III. king of Denmark, " cauſed Doctor Pomeranus to come from Wittemberg, in " order to eſtabliſh the new religion in the North. This " eccleſiaſtic performed the ceremony of his coronation, and " compoſed a liturgy at that time, which is made uſe of to " this hour in the coronation of the kings of Denmark.

" About the ſame time, and with a motion almoſt as rapid " as lightning, the reformation ſpread itſelf over all Pruſſia " and Livonia, as alſo over Poland, Lithuania, and even " Bohemia, Hungary, Tranſylvania, Auſtria, and Carniola.

" On the other hand, it made its progreſs with the ſame " rapidity through the Low Countries, but was attended " there with great commotions and diſturbances, which " took their riſe from the anabaptiſts, and then forced its " way into the dominions of France, where Calvin threw it " into a new mold.

" The court of Rome diſcountenanced all diſcuſſions upon " this ſubject; and the popes perſiſted in one uniform tone " with Charles V. which was, to cruſh the proteſtants in " Germany by mere force of power. The emperor was " not of ſo turbulent and ſanguinary a temper, and had " reaſons beſides for dealing more mildly with the proteſtants, " and more circumſpectly. He had a long and diſagreeable " war to carry on againſt Francis I. and the Grand Signior " had no leſs ſcheme in view than to take Hungary from the " emperor's brother, Ferdinand I; in proſecution of which " he threw all Germany into an alarm, by inveſting the city " of Vienna in 1529.

" Meanwhile the emperor, and many other catholic ſove- " reigns, unſucceſsfully requeſted a free council of the pope. " Perhaps his Imperial majeſty might have done better to " have convened a national council by way of *ſuccedaneum*: " but that not being the caſe, at length pope Paul III. *ex-* " *hibited*, what may juſtly be termed, a *farce* or *interlude* to " all Europe, namely, the convening the aſſembly of Trent,

" which

" which was ſuppoſed to repreſent an œcumenical council:
" but the proteſtants kept themſelves upon their guard, and
" were not overreached.

" Such being the caſe, the emperor, after the concluſion
" of the peace at Creſpy in 1544, found himſelf in a capacity
" to turn his arms againſt the confederates of the Smalcaldic
" league, and two years afterwards publiſhed an Imperial
" proſcription againſt the two principal perſonages concerned
" therein, namely, the elector of Saxony and the landgrave
" of Heſſe. He then defeated the elector at the famous battle
" of Muhlberg, April 24, 1547, and took him priſoner:
" commanding that day in perſon, though extremely afflicted
" with the gout. Yet ſo great was this prince's paſſion for
" glory, when placed in the balance againſt other ſentiments,
" that he transferred the electorate of Saxony to prince
" Maurice. Hence it is that the electoral dignity paſſed
" into that branch of the family which is called *Albertin*.
" The landgrave, in order to obtain his pardon, was obliged
" to come to Halle, and perform the ceremony of genu-
" flexion at the feet of the emperor, who ſtill detained him
" priſoner, though Granville, his great chancellor, had given
" ſtrong hopes to the contrary. Hence aroſe a new war;
" and this may be called the moſt ſhining epocha in the
" reign of Charles V. inſomuch that a ſuſpicion has ariſen
" in many minds, as if he intended, after the reduction of the
" proteſtants, to have given a new caſt to the form of the
" empire.

" Be that as it will, it grieved him particularly to have
" made his brother Ferdinand king of the Romans; ſince
" thereby he precluded himſelf from having the power of
" aſſociating to the empire his ſon Philip; a young man
" whom hiſtory might have pronounced fortunate, had he
" chanced to inherit his father's genius! He ſoon afterwards
" acted an unbecoming part in England, upon eſpouſing
" Mary, who had juſt then ſucceeded her brother Edward,
" and in the tranſports of enthuſiaſm overturned that re-
" formation, which his brother-in-law had taken care to
" introduce.

" At that very time, when the emperor Charles V. con-
" cluded himſelf ſovereign diſpoſer of the fortunes of all
" the proteſtants in Germany, Maurice, the new elector of
" Saxony, formed a freſh league, in order to ſecure the
" liberty of religion; and Henry II. king of France, who
" had lately ſucceeded his father, Francis I. availed himſelf of
" this critical conjuncture with a view to make a powerful
" revulſion; and of courſe concluded with the confederate

" princes the famous treaty of Chambor. The elector of " Saxony in 1552 ſuddenly marched an army againſt the " emperor, who at that time was without troops in the " country of Tyrol, and ſuſpected nothing. His eſcape was " fortunate; for the confederates miſſed little of ſurprizing " him in the city of Inſpruck. Henry II. too declared " war againſt him, and ſurnamed himſelf the protector " of the Germanic liberty; a title the French kings have " ever affected to aſſume ſince that period! As if there " was an opiate in the ſound, which might ſerve to lull the " empire to ſuch a degree, till it dreamt itſelf into a ſtate of " ſlavery.

" At the ſame time the princes of Farneſe took the alarm " in Italy, and cloathed themſelves in armour: ſo that the " emperor, perceiving himſelf embarraſſed on all hands by a " ſeries of revolutions quite unexpected, immediately con- " cluded a truce with the proteſtants at Paſſau, in order to " employ all his forces againſt the king of France.

" This truce was at length ſucceeded by the *peace of reli-* " *gion**, agreed upon at Augſburg, anno 1555, in a general " diet of the empire, wherein Ferdinand king of the Romans " preſided in the abſence of the emperor his brother, who " employed himſelf at that time in the Low Countries, having " already planned out, to himſelf, the ſcheme of relinquiſhing " the throne, and paſſing the remainder of his days in retire- " ment and tranquillity.

" The *peace of religion*, it muſt be obſerved, did not then " extend itſelf to doctrinal points; it eſtabliſhed only a full " and fair equality between papiſts and proteſtants *in rebus* " *civilibus*: and of courſe the *latter* were left in quiet poſſeſ- " ſion of all the biſhoprics and other eccleſiaſtical benefices, " with which they had inveſted themſelves till this period. " Nevertheleſs, king Ferdinand inſerted one clauſe, at the " ſolicitations of the catholics, which was, " *That whenever* " *a prelate of the Romiſh perſuaſion ſhould think fit to embrace* " *the proteſtant communion, he ſhould then be obliged to relin-* " *quiſh his benefices.*"

* The moſt eſſential article of this pacification was, " That no perſon " thenceforwards ſhould be proſecuted in the Roman empire for the ſake of " religion." The treaty itſelf, commonly called the *pax religioſa*, was concluded in the year 1552, between the emperor Charles V. and the elector of Saxony; to which the elector of Brandenburg and the landgrave of Heſſe, &c. were admitted parties. It received a reviſion *three* years afterwards at the diet of Augſburg, and conſiſts of thirteen general articles; of which the reader may peruſe a clear diſtinct abridgment in *Brachelius*, Hiſt. noſtr. temp. 12°. 186, &c.

" This

" This ſhort clauſe is called the *Reſervatum Eccleſiaſticum*, " and has been conſidered by the Romaniſts as the bulwark " of their church. The proteſtants exclaimed loudly againſt " this perplexing limitation, and with greater reaſon, as it " happened to be inſerted contrary to their knowledge, and " without their permiſſion*. Thus a few ſtrokes of the pen " gave birth to innumerable diſcords, altercations, and in- " teſtine commotions, which were never truly compoſed till " the peace of Weſtphalia.

" When the prelates arrived at the council of Trent, they " had no inclination to enter into debates in the neighbour- " hood of a reſpectable army; and making theſe appearances " a pretext for withdrawing, retired to their reſpective homes " April 22, 1552.

" France extracted no ſmall advantage from the wars and " confuſions then ſubſiſting; for ſhe procured the poſſeſſion " of Metz, Toule, and Verdun; and the delicious taſte of " theſe three little morſels quickened her appetite to ſuch a " degree, that ſhe at length ſwallowed down the three " reſpective biſhoprics that belonged to them.

" The council of Trent aſſembled a third time in the year " 1562, and publiſhed its decree the year enſuing. But, in " ſpite of all the anathemas then thundered out, the emperor " Ferdinand † confirmed the *peace of religion* throughout the " empire, and the number of proteſtants augmented under " his reign, and thoſe of his ſucceſſors Maximilian ‡ and " Rodolphus II. § in the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, " and

* As the proteſtants had never intereſt to procure this clauſe to be expunged, a freſh one was inſerted by way of counterbalance at the treaty of Munſter, whereby it was ſtipulated, " That a proteſtant prelate, upon " profeſſing himſelf a Roman catholic, ſhould be deprived of his dignity and " his revenues."

† This prince, brother to Charles V. in all but what related to the *Reſervatum Eccleſiaſticum*, diſcovered no outrageous ſpirit againſt the proteſtant religion, and was pleaſed to ſay, a ſhort time before he died, that he had laboured to compoſe the animoſities between Chriſtians, and had attempted to compel no man to believe contrary to his private ſentiments. What confirms this is, that he and the elector of Saxony agreed very well in their general opinions, and his ambaſſador at the council of Trent gave attention to the marriage of prieſts, and the communion under both kinds: ſo that the council in general appeared to be much better ſatisfied than his holineſs the pope. *Motifs pour la Guerre d' Allemagne*, 96.

‡ Maximilian, ſucceſſor to Ferdinand, decently obſerved all the forms of popery; but there are reaſons to think his heart had no inſuperable averſion to the oppoſite religion: for the proteſtants owe to this prince the favourable conſtitution granted them 1577, in which he diſpoſed of all their *Bona Eccleſiaſtica*, in a manner contrary to the ſentiments of his own party.

§ Rodolphus, brother to Maximilian, behaved well to the proteſtants, even in the hereditary dominions. He allowed a Lutheran doctor to come from

" and in all the hereditary dominions of the houſe of Auſtria " in Germany: and the latter prince in particular granted " ſome notable privileges to the proteſtants of Bohemia, and " the annexed provinces, under the title of *Literæ majeſtatis.*

" Queen Elizabeth not only re-eſtabliſhed the reformation " in England, but ſupported it likewiſe in France and the " Low Countries, where the indiſcreet zeal of Philip II. " paved the way for thoſe future revolutions, which ad- " miniſtered a ſeries of opportunities, all tending to the " diſmemberment and enfeebling of the houſe of Auſtria; " whilſt, on the other hand, the love of liberty took root " imperceptibly in the United Provinces, and derived its " chief ſupport and nouriſhment from the treaty of Utrecht, " concluded in 1579.

" In France, the reformed religion made more rapid " advances, and miſſed litt.e of aſcending to the throne in " the perſon of the king of Navarre. But the particular " league ſo much talked of, compelled this prince at length " to pay his attendance at maſs.

" Soon after, the tempeſt began to thicken all over " Germany, in a very formidable manner. The proteſtants " being alarmed at the perſecuting ſpirit of Ferdinand II. to

Brunſwic, and inſtruct ſuch of his ſubjects as were of his perſuaſion. This anecdote was acknowledged by the Imperial miniſter, count Lamberg, and others, in his own houſe, at the congreſs of Oſnabrug, 1648. From which ſeries of remarks, by way of notes, it appears plainly, that the houſe of Auſtria was never ſo ſincerely bent upon becoming abſolute, as *at the time* Guſtavus thought fit to enter the empire.

Under theſe above-named emperors, the court of Spain had no great aſcendancy in Germany. The two firſt were its concealed enemies more or leſs; and Rodolphus, piqued at the infanta's being given in marriage to archduke Albert his brother, always maintained a ſecret hatred to Spain, notwithſtanding he had been educated in the court of Philip II. Theſe reſentments continued ſo ſtrongly upon him, that ſome years afterwards he gave the Spaniſh ambaſſador a box on the ear, and baniſhed him from his court, for making a very petulant and lively remonſtrance to him: and this, Volmar, the Imperial plenipotentiary, confeſſed at Nuremberg to the French miniſter.

During all this period the crown of Spain received no conſiderable aſſiſtance from the emperor or the empire. But matters took another turn in 1612, when Mathias aſcended the Imperial throne. Good correſpondence and intelligence was immediately formed between the two courts; and the ambaſſador of the latter ſoon found means to create and foment diviſions in the empire, upon the plan of Charles Vth's memoirs, and wakened the ſleeping fires in Bohemia to their full activity, by diſcovering the uneaſineſs of the proteſtants, and then exhorting the court of Vienna to purſue the moſt arbitrary and perſecuting methods of reducing them to obedience. Thus by adminiſtering breath to a few latent ſparks, a furious flame was raiſed, and the conflagration did not ceaſe in leſs than thirty years. [*Motifs pour la Guerre d'Allemagne*, 96, &c.]

" which

" which the Spaniards took care to adminiſter fuel, and " dreading extremely what a perſon of ſo furious a temper " might undertake, whenever he mounted the Imperial " throne, had the precaution to unite themſelves under the " denomination of *Unioniſts*; and, on their parts, in order " to counterbalance the ſchemes of the papiſts, formed an " immenſe project, which had the appearance of exterminat- " ing the Auſtrian princes from the empire, or depriving " them at leaſt of the better part of their dominions. This " aſtoniſhing revolution broke forth at Prague in 1618.

" Their expectancies from England, France, Holland, " and Denmark, all deceived them. James I. hated king- " making, and had an averſion, as foreigners tell us, to a " drawn ſword. The proteſtants in France were ſoon " humbled, and had the power of contributing nothing, " except their good wiſhes and their prayers; and the " catholic party there overturned the union by their intrigues; " for that kingdom, at the period I am now ſpeaking of, " under the miniſtry of the conſtable Des Luynes, by a " contraſt of politics remarkably ſingular, cultivated the " friendſhip of the Spaniards, and advanced their intereſts. " Thus, the Auſtrian affairs being raiſed to the higheſt " pitch, out came, almoſt at one ſtroke, the fulminatory " *edict of reſtitution*, which founded the alarm afreſh, and " continued the war for a period of THIRTY YEARS. In " the various edicts publiſhed by the court of Vienna on this " occaſion, it was expected by the emperor, that the Re- " formed had no title to be comprehended in the *Pax* " *religioſa*, and that the proteſtants in general ought to reſtore " all the eccleſiaſtical poſſeſſions which they had appropriated " to themſelves ever ſince the concluſion of that treaty. " This ſingle ſtep brought the great Guſtavus into the " empire." Thus far M. de MASCOU.

I ſhall now attempt to deſcribe in a few words the further ſituation of things at this important period. It appears from what has been obſerved, that the houſe of Auſtria had continued in the higheſt ſplendor ever ſince the time of Charles V. At this important juncture, ſhe was miſtreſs of Spain, Portugal, the treaſures of America, the Low Countries, the Milaneſe, the kingdom of Naples, Bohemia, the incorporated provinces, Hungary, its own hereditary dominions, and, to a certain degree, of all Germany; ſo that if ſo many ſtates had united under one chief of that family, there is reaſon to think that the proteſtant religion muſt have been extinguiſhed, and all Europe enſlaved. The houſe of Spain, at that time, conſidered itſelf to be all-powerful; ſince in a Latin

MANUSCRIPT memorial *, or letter, which I have in my poſſeſſion, addreſſed to Louis XIII. it is there ſaid, that his Catholic majeſty, Philip IV. had the preſumption, and one may add the impiety likewiſe, to place this MOTTO under his ARMS—SINE IPSO FACTUM EST NIHIL;—which expreſſion, if it does not border on blaſphemy, the reader muſt judge; for it is applied to our BLESSED SAVIOUR by St. John. The emperor too, by means of his own proper forces, and thoſe of the catholic league, had by this time cruſhed every prince and ſtate that preſumed to oppoſe his ambitious deſigns. He had reduced Bohemia and the *annexed provinces* after their revolt, and had compelled their unfortunate prince not only to relinquiſh his new kingdom, but his patrimonial territories; for after a mock reign of eighteen months, the deciſive battle of Prague unkinged him, and ſent him to ſeek his bread and his fortunes in other countries, ſince his Engliſh father, as is obſerved in the Memoirs of Louiſa electreſs Palatine, only ſupplied him with peaceable advice and ſcholaſtic quotations, inſtead of money and legions.

Upon this the emperor doled out, in parcels, the dominions of Frederic to ſeveral potentates that were in his intereſts. The greater ſhare was transferred to Maximilian, elector of Bavaria, as the perſon among them the moſt reſpectable in rank, and the moſt conſiderable in point of ſervices. To him therefore was conſigned the whole Upper Palatinate, except only a trifling part, and the electoral dignity. Alarmed and aſtoniſhed at theſe tranſactions, his majeſty of Denmark formed an alliance with ſome German princes, his neighbours, and commenced a freſh war againſt the houſe of Auſtria, which proved upon the whole ſo unſucceſsful, that he was obliged to accept ſuch conditions of peace as the Imperial party thought fit to preſcribe. Ferdinand on the other hand, elevated with ſuch a ſeries of ſucceſſes, which gave him pretexts for raiſing a very conſiderable army, and pretences to continue the ſame army on foot, with appearance of extirpating his enemies, and maintaining a general peace throughout the empire, determined to unfold to the public, the myſterious object of all his wiſhes, which, though many ſuſpected, yet few poſitively believed. In order therefore to place ſuch princes as were ſuppoſed to entertain unfavour-

* This treatiſe is written in very elegant Latin, with uncommon ſpirit and freedom of ſentiment, and contains eleven pages in folio. It concludes with theſe remarkable words to Lous XIII. *Agnoſce teipſum & victor eris.* The author has another curious MS. on the ſame ſubject, entitled *Diſcours ſur les moyens que tiennent les Eſpagnols pour parvenir a la monarchie de l'Europe; & que l'on peut faire pour les empeſcher.* Fol. pag. 20.

able

able ideas of him, beyond the bare poſſibility of obſtructing his future deſigns, he publiſhed the *ever memorable edict*; which, joined to the inſolence, outrages, and depredations, of Walſtein's army, that lived every where at diſcretion, and made but ſmall difference between friends and foes, alarmed even the catholic as well as the evangelical powers. The former began to perceive that the plan formed by the houſe of Auſtria was too exorbitant, and likewiſe too tyrannical: for Walſtein is ſaid to have drawn £. 300,000. ſterling from the electorate of Brandenburg only*. Nor did George William himſelf, the then reigning prince, greatly reliſh the *edict of reſtitution*, inaſmuch as it portended no leſs than an annihilation of the biſhoprics of Brandenburg, Havelburg, and Lebus†.

In ſupport of this remark, it may be worth obſerving, that the elector of Bavaria himſelf was not void of ſuſpicions and jealouſies; who indeed, principally on his own account, had thought fit, by one and the ſame ſtroke, to preſerve the emperor, and ſecure to himſelf that delicious morſel, the Higher Palatinate. Here he ſecretly wiſhed to ſtop; but as ſuch a check appeared to be rather too bold and abrupt, he contented himſelf with clogging the wheels of the Auſtrian machine, by projecting, at a diſtance, the diſgrace and ruin of Walſtein, and paving the way remotely to an underhand intercourſe between the courts of Munich and Verſailles. As he was the moſt refined and myſterious politician of any prince in thoſe days, he made one attempt which appeared not to be much, and yet proved a great deal; for, under the ſhew of prudence, œconomy, and not giving any undue umbrage to the proteſtants, he induced the court of Vienna to engage itſelf in an enterpriſe, much more prejudicial to her project of abſolute power, than the removal of Walſtein could be; and that was, to march 30,000 men into Italy, in order to take poſſeſſion of Mantua and Cazal in the Imperial name, as alſo to *diſband a veteran corps of proteſtants*, who fought under the Auſtrian banners, for this prince, with all his policy, was a determined bigot; and laſtly, to pare away ſomething from the immenſe number of the catholic forces; ſince a ſmaller quantity of ſoldiers was ſufficient in all probability to give laws to the empire at that conjuncture. This we would acknowledge to be true, if ſuch a prince as Guſtavus had not happened to live at the ſame time; but whether Maximilian privately wiſhed for *his* interference, or whether he overlooked or deſpiſed him, as a

* *Memoirs* of the Houſe of Brandenburg. † Ibid.

perſon

perſon ſo very remote from the Germanic ſyſtem, is more than I can take upon me, at this diſtance, to determine. Either way it is certain that the Imperial forces and thoſe of the league, which made up 125,000 men in all, were reduced, garriſons excepted, to about 70,000 ſoldiers;—a quantity of troops ſufficient to have enſlaved the empire at that time, if unforſeen accidents had not interpoſed.

On the other hand, the neighbouring princes and ſtates took umbrage at the immenſe and ambitious projects of the houſe of Auſtria; and after various reflections, in conſequence of the ill ſucceſs that had attended his Daniſh majeſty's irruption into Germany, found no perſon upon whom they could fix their hopes but Guſtavus. Him they were obliged to extricate from that diſagreeable war which engaged him in Poland; for the fate of Europe ſeemed to depend upon this one political negotiation; and as all parties, without conſulting each other, were convinced his Swediſh majeſty alone could perform the taſk, England, Holland, and France, alike intereſted themſelves in propoſing an accommodation. The laſt more particularly, as ſhe was neareſt in ſituation to the emperor, and moſt a rival to him in power: and the rather as Richelieu, who then ſat at the helm, and directed the whole political machine, had adopted the ſyſtem which *Henry* IV. formerly favoured, namely, to depreſs and humble the houſe of Auſtria. A ſyſtem, France, ſince that period, has contrived to execute ſucceſsfully more times than one!

The Swediſh and Auſtrian parties, at this criſis, both ſought the aſſiſtance of the king of Denmark: but that politic and wary prince, long exerciſed in misfortunes and diſappointments, expreſſed a deſire to continue neutral; for in truth the emperor had terrified him on the one hand, and he had conceived a jealouſy of ſo powerful and enterpriſing a neighbour as Guſtavus on the other.

Some perſons may aſk, how far, and in what reſpects, the *thirty years war* can be conſidered a war of religion? As Guſtavus was a prince who had a vital and ſincere affection for the preſervation of the evangelical doctrine, it is not to be doubted that theſe ideas made ſome impreſſion on his mind; but upon the whole I think it is certain, that he would have oppoſed the inſolence and arbitrary views of the houſe of Auſtria, even if ſhe had made profeſſion of the proteſtant belief: ſo that I have been prompted, ſometimes, to think, that religion had leſs to do upon the preſent occaſion than is commonly imagined, and

that

that it was only a ſort of half pretext: as the electreſs Palatine, Louiſa Juliana, no inconſiderable ſtateswoman, uſed always to aſſert.

I muſt not omit, that the people of the cabinet conſtantly kept pace with the men of the ſword: for previouſly to the breaking out of the Bohemian troubles, the proteſtants had violent ſuſpicions that the Imperial court, then ſuppoſed to be under the influence of the jeſuits, had a mind to violate the grand *pacificatorium* of Paſſau, and erect itſelf by degrees into an univerſal monarchy. With a view to recriminate upon this head, the elector of Bavaria, after the battle of Prague, ordered his *jus-publiciſts* to ſet forth an impreſſion of the *Anhaltine Cancellaria:* a collection of ſtate papers found amongſt the plunder of the prince of Anhalt's baggage, which were alledged to contain no leſs deſigns, than to extend proteſtantiſm from the Baltic to the Mediterranean*: to which a counſellor of the elector Palatine made a reply; and one Keller, a jeſuit, under the name of Fabius Hercymannus, printed a ſort of rejoinder in behalf of the catholic ſide. Various controverſies enſued afterwards. At length Camerarius, prime miniſter to the ſaid elector, or next at leaſt in conſequence to the chancellor Grun, thought it high time to enter the liſts, and give the public, by way of counterpoiſe, a *Cancellaria Hiſpanica.* Ruſdorf afterwards beſtowed the high finiſhing touches to what his maſter and preceptor in politics had left unfiniſhed; and that not only in his *Vindiciæ Cauſæ Palatinæ*, but in his *Cancellaria Bavarica*; a work I have ſpoken of elſewhere with much approbation. Whilſt I have the former part of that performance in my eye, I cannot help obſerving, that the tranſlation of electorates hath been three times unproſperous to the Imperial houſe of Auſtria—Once in the perſon of Charles V. who found no enemy more inveterate againſt him than the duke of Saxe Maurice, whom he had inveſted with the honour of the electoral bonnet—Once again in Ferdinand II. who having diſobliged Walſtein by transferring the Palatine dignity, and diſplaced him from his ſupreme command as general, in order to pay court to Maximilian of Bavaria, opened thereby an entrance to the ſword of Guſtavus—And a third time in a later inſtance, which bears no connexion to my preſent hiſtory.

* Amongſt theſe papers was found the prince's military journal in his own hand-writing, concerning which we ſhall ſpeak more fully in another place.

Theſe

Theſe preliminary foundations of the ſtate being thus adjuſted, it may be ſufficient to obſerve, that the proteſtant princes of Germany, in an indirect and concealed manner, with a ſort of air, ſomething betwixt diſtreſs and reſerve, for their terrors of the houſe of Auſtria were inexpreſſible, had beſought Guſtavus to make ſome advances in their behalf; inſinuating that Ferdidand in general aimed at abſolute ſovereignty over the empire, and intended to render the whole Germanic body hereditary in his own family. It was ſuggeſted likewiſe, that his troops occupied every territory, and committed depredations and outrages unheard of; an Imperial garriſon being lodged in almoſt every town of common importance: That religious and military perſecution advanced by equal ſteps; and that princes, free cities, biſhoprics, and eccleſiaſtical communities of every ſort, among the proteſtants, were obliged, by the edict of reſtitution, to ſurrender all church poſſeſſions; which edict then ſubſiſted, and was executed with the utmoſt ſeverity. It was further added, that his Imperial majeſty had diveſted the dukes of Mechlenburg, who were nearly related to Guſtavus, of their dominions, for preſuming to take part with Chriſtian king of Denmark; and conferred their territories on Walſtein by his own authority: and laſtly, that the emperor, to increaſe the number of catholic votes, had annihilated *that* of Frederic elector Palatine, and created it anew in the perſon of Maximilian, elector of Bavaria, which made an alteration of two electoral voices in favour of the Romiſh religion.——It was then indirectly inſinuated, that both Saxony and Brandenburg had interceded with the emperor in behalf of Frederic their colleague, and had long declined to acknowledge Maximilian in his new electoral capacity, inaſmuch as he was choſen contrary to the orders of the golden bull, for no elector can be proſcribed or depoſed without the unanimous conſent of the diet in body aſſembled; but that the court of Vienna had paid no regard to theſe legal objections.

Any perſon would naturally imagine, that a ſeries of repreſentations like theſe, voluntarily produced almoſt a twelvemonth before Guſtavus entered Germany, would have prevailed on a prince, more diffident than Guſtavus, to have undertaken the enterpriſe, in hopes of a free and generous aſſiſtance from the proteſtant part of the empire. How great then was his majeſty's uneaſineſs, and ſtill greater his diſappointment, when he received no encouraging anſwers from the electors and other German princes for many months after he had

had written to them*. The ſubſtance of what he wrote contained, as follows. A clear induction of the injuries and motives which had inclined him to make an invaſion into the empire: after which he beſought each elector to uſe all his intereſt, and exert the whole of his addreſs, to prevail on the emperor to reſtore things to their ancient ſituation; adding, that any peace, except a *weak* and *inglorious* one, was preferable to a war ſuppoſed to be juſt in many reſpects. That if his Imperial majeſty perſiſted to refuſe him and his friends reaſonable conceſſions and honourable conditions, he conſidered himſelf as abſolved from all tranſgreſſion before God and man, and was determined, for the ſake of Europe in general, to ſupport his own reputation and the cauſe of liberty and religion to the laſt moments of his life.

It likewiſe raiſed his indignation, to diſcover that the terrors of the houſe of Auſtria had ſo far poſſeſſed his proteſtant well-wiſhers, that they durſt not make uſe even of explicit terms, and had been ſo meanly timorous as to omit the regal titles in their addreſſes to him, the emperor having taught them to underſtand, that Sigiſmond alone was king of Sweden. Nor was he much leſs chagrined at the conduct of his Daniſh majeſty, who had not interfered one half ſo much as was expected, contenting himſelf, after many remonſtrances, to have procured a mock congreſs at Dantzic, where the Imperial miniſters rejected all accommodations in very peremptory language†.

Guſtavus was not to be diſmayed; and, never once loſing ſight of his object, puſhed on according to his firſt plan, well convinced in his own private judgment, that theſe princes muſt join him, when he once came to make a diſtinguiſhed figure in Germany; and that the king of Denmark would be obliged, at leaſt, to keep a neutrality. He was more exaſperated when he reflected, that the houſe of Auſtria was determined to fix her footing on the other ſide of the Alps; and was vexed to obſerve how ill the generals of the kings of Denmark and Bohemia had acted, and how languidly their Britannic majeſties had exerted themſelves in ſupport of the unfortunate prince laſt mentioned.

The king took ſome time, notwithſtanding he was thoroughly provoked, to return his anſwer to the German

* See alſo the electors' and Guſtavus's letters, in the APPENDIX, Art. X. XI.

† *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, tom. i. p. 100.

princes;

princes; and reproved them, with an air of dignity, for the omiſſion of his royal titles: *titles*, ſaid he, *which I have received from God and my anceſtors, and having maintained them with reputation for twenty years, will never relinquiſh, even in the laſt moments of my life.* He continued then to inform them, that he once had an intention to have ſealed their letters, and return them, but that he at length peruſed and preſerved them in his poſſeſſion, in hopes of confronting them with others written in quite a different ſtyle. He commended them for approving his earneſt deſires to bring about a peace, and gently reprimanded them for not diſcovering their good wiſhes on that head; inſinuating, at the ſame time, that they muſt not be uneaſy, if he ſought, elſewhere, for ſuch remedies as tended to preſerve his own reputation, and maintain his allies and friends in a ſtate of ſecurity. That he had no diſinclination to form friendſhips with his Germanic neighbours, provided ſatisfaction was made him for the extraordinary freedom lately taken. And laſtly, that the affairs of Germany and the evangelical religion concerned them much more than himſelf.

Nevertheleſs, it will appear a matter of aſtoniſhment to poſterity, that Guſtavus ſhould invade the empire; no ways certain of the aſſiſtance of the proteſtant princes, and not ſecure in the co-operation of France. To the firſt point I have ſpoken already, that he expected *their* aid, from a principle of convenience; and from the latter difficulty I hope likewiſe to extricate myſelf. People who have a moderate knowledge of the ſubject of the hiſtory they undertake, and the characters of the perſons concerned in it, may ſometimes get at the truth by probability of circumſtances and characters. It may be remembered, therefore, that the negotiation between Guſtavus and the French ambaſſador broke off abruptly; and if we follow the general track of hiſtorians, we ſhall find no reconciliation of opinions till the concluſion of the treaty at Berewalt, in the month of January the year enſuing. Still one cannot help thinking, that a prudent and politic prince, like Guſtavus, would never have entered the empire till he had brought France to ſome terms, and for this reaſon, it was caſually obſerved in the proper place, that the Sieur Nicholaï was diſpatched to Paris to negotiate ſomething more reaſonable and more practicable than what De Charnacé had propoſed; and though nothing might be ſigned in the due form of treaty, yet it is manifeſt the ſubſtance and ſpecification of articles were agreed upon under parole of honour.

Though

Though Puffendorf*, who writes profeſſedly on the alliances between France and Sweden at this period, maintains a profound ſilence on the occaſion, yet a Swediſh hiſtorian† luckily ſteps in to our aſſiſtance, and ſays, that an agreement was made between the kings of the two reſpective nations; it might probably be verbal only, upon the common principles of political good faith, whereby it was ſtipulated, that the former power, for ſix years, ſhould allow the latter annually, either £.66,000. or £.82,500.; for the author pretends not to ſpecify diſtinctly the preciſe ſum. The intention of France however was to maintain and carrry on a ſufficient war in the German empire. About this period Sir Thomas Roe, in a letter to lord viſcount Dorcheſter, regrets that a contribution of money was not given to the king of Sweden, with a view to facilitate an invaſion of Germany, "inaſmuch as De Charnacé, the French ambaſſador, had made ſome offers to that purpoſe‡." And in another§ to ſir Dudley Carlton, nephew to lord Dorcheſter, and reſident in Holland, he obſerves more minutely, "that De Charnacé had offered Guſtavus £.50,000. annual contribution, attended with a commiſſion to add £.17,400. more; and that Mr. Meldrum, a Scots gentleman, was gone expreſs to the king of England, to carry the propoſitions of a treaty."

What confirms me in my opinion, that the king of Sweden would never have ventured on a German invaſion without eſtabliſhing a good correſpondence with France, is, that before he entered on this great work, he omitted not to communicate his motives and reaſons to moſt of the proteſtant princes and ſtates in Europe, hoping thereby to obtain their aſſiſtance, or at leaſt ſound their inclinations. For theſe reaſons he diſpatched Sadler, ſome time after writing certain letters above mentioned, to ſeveral German princes, and then to the Swiſs cantons; commiſſioning him in this latter reſpect to open the whole ſcheme, frankly and without reſerve; and paint in proper colours, "The juſtice of the undertaking on the one hand, and the neceſſity of counterbalancing the immeaſurable greatneſs of a certain power on the other. That the Helvetic leaguers in particular ought to have, for their object, the reſtoration of German liberty, ſince the houſe of Auſtria had dormant claims to produce againſt them, which ſhe would be ready

* *Traité des Alliances*, &c. 12° & 8°, 1709. † *Loccenius*, p. 565, 4°.
‡ *MS. letter of Sir Thomas Roe*, dated Feb. 26, 1629-30.
§ *Second letter*, May 17, 1630.

to

to juſtify at the point of her ſword, when other countries had been ſufficiently chaſtiſed—That attempts againſt mankind in general were to be repulſed by the united efforts of all—And that his majeſty hoped to behold with extreme ſatisfaction the revival of the ancient Helvetic ſpirit*.

Sadler being unable to diſcover any thing to his advantage, for a dread of the houſe of Auſtria had poſſeſſed all men, judged it proper, like a prudent miniſter, to make his private attempt here and there, and ſuppreſſed his very ample commiſſion directed to the general aſſembly of the ſtates. Nevertheleſs, Guſtavus, indefatigable and undiſmayed in all his ſolicitations, reſolved to make a ſecond attack upon the Swiſs before he entered Germany; and diſpatched the chevalier Rache, privy-counſellor and counſellor of ſtate, with orders to apply, once more, to the body of the league in general, and to ſome proteſtant cantons in particular. But this miniſter had ſo many political digreſſions to make in the courſe of his journey, that he arrived not at Baden, where the thirteen cantons and their ſeveral allies were aſſembled, till towards the end of the year 1631, of which we ſhall ſpeak more at large in its proper place.

Notwithſtanding theſe diſcouragements, Guſtavus determined to maintain his point, having obtained the full conſent of all the ſtates of the kingdom, convened at a final aſſembly at Stockholm. He there declared his wife regent of the kingdom, and his daughter Chriſtina lawful heireſs of the crown; conformably to a preceding act of ſtate made ſoon after her birth, with a view to mortify the king of Poland, and cut off his pretenſions. It is true ſome few ſenators indirectly ſuggeſted, that a prince ſo paſſionately beloved and honoured by his ſubjects, would do beſt to continue in his own kingdom, and commit the war to able and experienced generals; in which they ſhewed themſelves no very profound politicians, by judging ſo ill of the diſpoſition and temper of their maſter, who confuted them without heſitation, in a ſpeech equally animated and argumentative, exhorting them to bear in mind the bravery and conſtancy of their anceſtors; and, returning them his beſt thanks for their ſervices, he concluded with a tender and affectionate farewel. He then ſtepped aſide a moment, and bringing in his daughter by the

* *Mercure Suiſſe*, p. 9. This excellent book was publiſhed anonymouſly in 1634. Its author was *Frederic Spanheim*, who wrote *Le Soldat Suedois*, and the *Memoires d'Electrice Palatine*.

hand,

hand, preſented her to the houſe in dumb ſhew, which drew many tears even from northern eyes.

After that he delivered a manuſcript treatiſe, of his own and the chancellor's compoſing, to the ſtates of the kingdom, containing directions in all ſuppoſable matters of difficulty, in caſe the throne ſhould become vacant; and joined to them, by way of preſident, particularly in regard to the finances and the adminiſtration of juſtice, his kinſman prince John Caſimir, count palatine of the Rhine, father to Charles Guſtavus, who afterwards aſcended the Swediſh throne.

This body of laws, ſixty-five in number*, was ſealed up and depoſited afterwards in the public chancery. I have in my poſſeſſion, a beautiful MS. of it, which appears to have been taken immediately after the ratification of the ſenate, June 29, 1634. This great work of Guſtavus and Oxenſtiern may be conſidered as the reduction of contingencies to one uniform ſyſtem. Nor is it poſſible to place their political characters in a more advantageous light. The packet, as I apprehend, received the following inſcription on the outſide, from the hand of the chancellor: REGIMINIS SUECICI CONSTITUTIO—QUAM REX INVICTISSIMUS GUSTAVUS SECUNDUS ET MAGNUS ULTIMÆ VOLUNTATIS INSTAR REGNO POPULISQUE SUIS STATIONE HAC MORTALI FUNCTUS EXHIBENDAM VOLUIT.

As Guſtavus had received ſo many inſults and injuries from the emperor, he diſpenſed with declaring war in form; conſidering Arnheim's march into Poland as an expreſs declaration on the Imperial ſide †. Nevertheleſs, the invaſion of Germany muſt not be conſidered as an action ſo very haſty and abrupt; for Guſtavus had given more than glimmerings of an hoſtile diſpoſition againſt the houſe of Auſtria, by ſending ſir Alexander Leſlie to Stralſund the preceding year, and in the month of April of this preſent year, had ordered him, being then governor of Stralſund, accompanied by colonel Dewbatel ‡ and ſome other officers

* See PREF. to the 2d edition.

† This precedent may ſerve to ſhelter the Engliſh nation from the reſentments of my good friend M. de Voltaire, who expreſſes great diſpleaſure againſt our kingdom for commencing the late war, without publiſhing a formal declaration of hoſtilities. Whereas the operations of the French in America, and the tranſactions of the Imperialiſts in Poland, are circumſtances nearly, if not ſtrictly, parallel: and the words of *Loccenius*, with reſpect to Guſtavus, on this occaſion, deſerve well to be tranſcribed: Cæſari vero indicere bellum, rex non neceſſarium eſſe putavit: quum vim ſibi ab eo prius haud denuntiatis armis, illatum arcere, natura ipſa permitteret; & hoc ipſo *ſatis denunciatum* bellum a ſe eſſe crederet. . . . . Lib. viii. p. 567.

‡ No one trifling circumſtance in the preſent hiſtory has puzzled me ſo much as finding out the real name of this warrior; for we read promiſcu-

officers of leſs note, to embark from Stralſund, and make a lodgment in the iſle of Rugen*, where they ſoon drove to the laſt extremity Goëtz, the Imperial commander; who, after various unſucceſsful ſkirmiſhes, was obliged to ſave himſelf by water to Stetin, and leave the whole iſland to the diſcretion of the Swedes.

Guſtavus had a much finer army at this time than the world could well imagine. He had trained up a ſet of young generals, for few, except Oxenſtiern, were older than himſelf, who were all ſelected and choſen geniuſes: each eminent for one or more diſtinguiſhing qualities. Nor were his common ſoldiers novices, as ſome people ſurmiſed, ſince the very Swediſh forces had been ſeaſoned by a ſucceſſion of ſevere campaigns. The major part of his troops were men of great experience, for he had gleaned up, at various times, all that was good in the diſperſed armies of Mansfelt, duke Chriſtian, the kings of Denmark and Poland, and the troops that belonged to the town of Dantzic. He had likewiſe 10,000 Engliſh and Scottiſh ſoldiers, who had moſt of them ſerved in the German wars; a ſet of men he principally confided in, conferring on them the reputation of being always uſeful to him in time of need †. He had likewiſe,

ouſly in all hiſtorians of *Dewbattle, Tupadel, Tubal, Dubalt, Du-wall*, &c. As to Haubald, he was certainly another perſon. After all this, his true name was not *Dewbatel*, though I call him ſo, in order to correſpond with other authors, but *Mac-Dougball*; being deſcended from a Scottiſh father in the Swediſh ſervice and a woman of Lifeland. The king loved him, extremely, from the time he knew him in the capacity of a common ſoldier, making him Colonel of his own guards, on the death of Teüffel, and governor of Ruſſelheim. Being taken priſoner near Nuremberg, the Imperial general Walſtein diſmiſſed him without ranſom, and entruſted him to negotiate an accommodation with Guſtavus. Acquitting himſelf well in various commands of importance, he was at length betrayed by Arnheim in Bohemia, but Walſtein generouſly releaſed him, and defrayed his ranſom a ſecond time. He then roſe to be ſergeant-major-general under the duke de Weimar; but, forgetting the obligations he had to his deceaſed maſter, deſerted the cauſe of Sweden at a period when his aſſiſtances were chiefly wanted; becoming a fatal, but we hope an uncommon proof, that the brave man, and the man of honour, are not always united in the ſame perſon.

* This iſland belonged to the duke of Pomerania. It is twenty miles ſquare, and lies about two miles from Stralſund. It was *infeſted*, ſays an hiſtorian, rather than *guarded* by the Imperial troops; for Guſtavus afterwards, by letter, told the emperor, who had accuſed him ſharply of invading Germany, that he did not *conquer* the iſle of Rugen, but only *took poſſeſſion* of it. This iſland was confirmed to the Swedes at the peace of Weſtphalia as a diſtinct principality. The allies conquered it with great difficulty in the year 1715. But by the peace of the north, 1720, it was reſtored to Sweden, very much ſhattered, and in extreme ill-plight.

† In the grand campaign of 1632, Guſtavus had ſix Britiſh generals, thirty colonels, and fifty-one lieutenant colnels. *See Monro's Liſt.*

wiſe, to a certain degree, the power of picking and chooſing from the armies of Walſtein and Tilly; for many of the Auguſtan confeſſion choſe to ſerve under them rather than ſtarve, and a great number had left their party upon having received ſome injuries, either real or imaginary.

No troops were ever better calculated for ſervice than the Swediſh part of his army, being naturally brave and hardy, patient of fatigues, frugal, induſtrious, obedient, ſober, and verifying the remark made by Vegetius, *Septentrionales populi largo ſanguine redundantes, ſunt ad bella promptiſſimi*; and another by Lucan,

*Omnis in Arctoïs populus quicunque pruinis*
*Naſcitur, indomitus bellis & Martis amator.* Lib. vii.

Tacitus applies this high idea of the ſtrength and bravery of northern nations to the country of Sweden particularly, as a territory *quod valebat viris & armis.*

The whole dominions of this kingdom, at the time Guſtavus poſſeſſed the throne, meaſured, according to ſome writers, about 1,500 miles in length by 1,000 miles in width; an immenſe tract of country, but not ſo well inhabited as, there are reaſons to conjecture, it had been, in the times of the antient Goths, of whoſe populouſneſs many manifeſt traces yet remain, even in the woods and foreſts; and of which more convincing proofs may ſtill be produced by the four incredible emigrations made from thence into other countries. An author who publiſhed an account in the year 1633, relative to the king's invaſion of Germany *, tells us, that this kingdom, excepting only ſome more remote provinces, was comprized under the old denomination of *Scandinavia*, which vaſt peninſula, if one may be allowed to call it ſo, was ſuppoſed by Pliny to be a tract of land *incompertæ magnitudinis*; at preſent imagined to meaſure lengthways about 1,200 miles, and 540 miles in breadth. Here it muſt be noted, that under the name of *Scandinavia*, are comprehended the kingdoms of Sweden, properly ſo called, and thoſe of Gothland and Norway, excluding the part that belongs to Denmark. To theſe may be added Beärmia, Scrifinia, Lapland, Bothnia, Finland, Carelia, great part of Livonia, the town of Stralſund, and the iſland of Rugen. Thus ſtood the poſſeſſions of the crown, when the king of Sweden made his firſt appearance in Pomerania; and yet perhaps all theſe vaſt tracts of territory did not contain

* *Diſcours de l'Etat & Couronne de Suede*, 8°. 1633.

many more inhabitants than the kingdom of England alone *.

Nature ſeems to have formed the Swedes expreſsly for war; for they are brave, ſober, patient, pliable, well-principled, and induſtrious; every common ſoldier being at the ſame time, a peaſant, a pioneer, and a mechanic. Guſtavus had likewiſe more reſources than could well be imagined, having a fleet, which contained above ſeventy ſhips of notable force, and being capable at a fortnight's notice to produce 40,000 choſen infantry, and a good body of cavalry, wherever he pleaſed. What was more, he taught them all to follow their leader implicitly. It is true, the horſes of the country in general were ſmall, but active and vigorous. Nevertheleſs, his majeſty, who was one of the talleſt and moſt graceful perſonages in the whole army, could hardly be carried by one of them, when he was completely cloathed in armour.

Matters being now advanced to a criſis, Guſtavus determined to make good his intentions; and the rather, as the ſituation of his dominions removed him at ſuch a diſtance from the houſe of Auſtria, that he had no reaſons to fear many military repriſals from that quarter. The Baltic ocean was ſpread between him and the emperor's generals,

* The kingdom of Gothland, ſays the author laſt cited, which occupies the ſouthernmoſt part of the peninſula of Scandinavia, is about 450 miles long and 300 broad. It is divided into three parts, Eſtergothia, Weſtergothia, and Gothia *meridionalis* or Smaland. The firſt contains the provinces of Teuſchia, Bravichia, and Kindia; the ſecond, Dalecarnia, Vermland, Marchia, Falonia, Voſbogia, Ridvegia, Frochinia, Gudhumia, Cachinnia and Warthopia; and the third, Verendia, Motingia, and the dioceſe of Nexo. As for the iſland of Gothland, it belonged to Denmark.

The kingdom of Sweden, ſtretching itſelf from South to North, extends 900 miles from the river Motala to the confines of Beärmia, and contains eleven duchies, namely, Sudermania, Roden, Geſtritia, Halſingia, Midelpadia, Angermania, Coperdalia, Weſtermania, Upland, Fieringia, and Neritia.

Swediſh Norway is the weſternmoſt part of Scandinavia, divided from Sweden and Gothland by one continued chain of mountains, in moſt places inacceſſible.

The province of Beärmia is the very northernmoſt part of Sweden.

*Scrifinia* lies betwixt Beärmia and Finomarchia, but inclines rather more to the ſouthwards.

Of *Lapland* we ſhall ſay nothing, as Scheffer's hiſtory has rendered it known to moſt readers: and *Bothnia* is a large province, which occupies the nothern part of that huge body of water, which the Baltic ocean diſembogues into the center of Scandinavia, commonly called the Gulph of Bothnia.

Finland is a very conſiderable province, plentifully peopled; Carelia is large, but not ſo populous; Livonia, Stralſund, and the iſles of Rugen, are better known. *Diſcours de l'Etat et Couronne de Suede*, p. 5—59. anno 1633.

and

and as to naval ſtrength he was greatly ſuperior to his adverſary.

He therefore publiſhed his grand manifeſto once for all*; and cauſed it to be printed in Latin and German, in order to diſperſe it, more advantageouſly, throughout the empire. Though it was a very ſenſible and well reaſoned performance, I ſhall not trouble the reader with a long declaration of all the cauſes which induced our hero to carry this invaſion into Germany; as many of the material ones have been already treated of in the courſe of our hiſtory. Nevertheleſs, there is ſomething very ſolid, and at the ſame time not unartful in the beginning of it, where he inſinuates, That whoever lives near a powerful and ambitious monarch, can enjoy peace no longer, and in no greater quantity, than that monarch thinks proper to allow him.

The ſubſtance of it was to this effect: That his Swediſh majeſty had ſincere intentions for the preſervation of the evangelical doctrine:—that in the year 1625, his letters from Poland to Gabriel Bethlem† had been intercepted by the emperor's means; that the matter of them had been

* The original performance being long and circumſtantial, we have thought fit to abridge it carefully in the preſent and enſuing pages.

† Such was that prince's true name, and not *Bethlem Gabor*, as the Engliſh hiſtorians affect to call him; for the Tranſylvanians place the ſurname after the Chriſtian; and *Gabor* ſignifies Gabriel. If ever an unaccountable man deſerved a note, it may be beſtowed on this potentate, and the rather as he had many tranſactions with Great Britain. From a ſimple gentleman he attained to the government of Tranſylvania, and from an inſignificant portion of ground in the European ſyſtem, negotiated at once with all the proteſtant princes and ſtates, half the popiſh ones, and the Grand Signior into the bargain; ambitious, artful, reſerved, and treacherous, who ſerved all, ſold all, and betrayed all. Formed in the court of Gabriel Battori, he paſſed his life in arms from the ſeventeenth year of his age, and lived for ſome time at Conſtantinople. He had been preſent in forty-two battles; and often declared, that his circumſtances were ſo mean, even when he was thirty years old, that a merchant of Caſſovia refuſed to lend him eighteen pounds, for want of ſecurity. He was affable, polite, intriguing; but capricious and mutable beyond imagination; talked Latin with tolerable fluency, and loved the ſociety of men of letters. His memory was aſtoniſhing, and nothing delighted him more than to reaſon about the reformed religion, which he profeſſed. He took great delight in fine cloaths and jewels, copying the Hungarian faſhion in the flowing length of his robes, and the ſhort cut of his hair; but modelling his beard according to the French mode. His firſt wife, Carola, though well deſcended, proved the beſt œconomiſt then in Europe, for ſhe was his head cook, and kept the key of his Tokay, as he had negotiated himſelf with the houſe of Auſtria into the poſſeſſion of that vintage. On Carola's deceaſe, he married, in his advanced age, a beautiful young princeſs, ſiſter to the wife of Guſtavus,

been ſhamefully miſinterpreted, the contents falſely publiſhed, and the courier treated like a common criminal:—that the emperor had privately fomented the differences between him and Sigiſmond, and beſides ſupplied his adverſaries with great quantities of corn, and diſpatched two armies with orders to act publicly againſt him in Poland; one conducted by Adolphus duke of Holſtein, in the year 1627, and the other commanded by Arnheim in 1629, denying him at the ſame time the common favour of enliſting men in the empire—That he had diſpoſſeſſed his kinſmen, Adolphus Frederic, and John Albert, dukes of Mechlenburg, of their territories, without citation or trial, and beſtowed them on Walſtein through mere caprice, and without being ſupported by any concurrence of the Imperial diet—That he poſſeſſed ſeveral havens on the Baltic coaſts, and aſſumed over that ſea a ſovereignty, to which Sweden had a juſt claim from time immemorial, interrupting all commerce betwixt the ſubjects of that kingdom, and the inhabitants of Colberg, Gripſwald, Roſtock, Wiſmar, and ſeveral other Hanſeatic and Vandalic towns, now enſlaved by the Imperialiſts—That he had confiſcated the merchandiſes of Swediſh traders; attempted to throw all

to whom, on his deceaſe, he aſſigned three ſignories, in one of which grew the vineyard we have mentioned; as likewiſe 100,000 ducats, as many rix-dollars, and the ſame number of florins, which made in all about 77000 pounds ſterling. He died in the fifty-ninth year of his age, having paſſed the whole time of his exiſtence in one continued ſtorm of his own creating. Nature, to make his diſtempers correſpondent with his life, united a ſort of contradiction in them; for he died of a dropſy and St. Anthony's fire. [*Continuat. Laureæ Auſt.* p. 17.] To keep up his inconſtancy and capriciouſneſs to the laſt, he bequeathed a fine horſe, and 20,000 pounds in ſpecie, to his old enemy the emperor; and the ſame ſum to Ferdinand king of Hungary, and the Grand Signior; recommending however his young wife and country to his Imperial majeſty. *Ibid.*

He was ceremonious and jealous of his honour to the higheſt degree; for having diſpatched an ambaſſador to the court of London, he gave him orders to make his appearance before the king without uncovering his head during the courſe of the audience; a punctilio which created ſome confuſion in the Britiſh palace.

In a word, his reſtleſs and turbulent ſpirit never allowed him to be idle a ſingle year. He was one of thoſe princely tormentors of mankind, who love to fiſh in troubled waters. No power of treaty language could bind him; nor could even money ſecure him; ſince he either changed for the ſake of changing, or flattered himſelf that he could always make a better bargain. I have ſeen letters from him to the cham of Tartary, where the rhodomontade is a ſort of comedy. The reader may find one of an extraordinary caſt in the *Laurea Auſtriaca*, fol. p. 336. See alſo, *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illuſtri*, 4°. *cum. fig.* Roma, 1646. p. 360, &c.

all commerce into the hands of the Spaniards; and, when that attempt failed, had hired Poliſh and Dantzic ſhips, and made the Baltic a ſeat of piracy—That the iſland of Rugen, which the Auſtrian troops had lately invaded, had voluntarily taken refuge under his protection, as had alſo Stralſund; in ſuccouring which he had done no more than his Daniſh majeſty had ſhewn him an example of—That he (the emperor) had rejected Salvius the Swediſh ambaſſador at the treaty of Lubec, when a peace was negotiating between him and Chriſtian king of Denmark—And, to conclude, had caſt ſeveral neglects and affronts upon him at the general aſſemblies of the empire, and declared him, in ſo many words, a profeſſed enemy to the Germanic ſyſtem.

As kings, whenever they have the condeſcenſion to oblige the public by their writings, are the fitteſt critics to review the conduct of kings, it may not be unworthy of remark that a ſuppoſed royal hiſtorian treats this manifeſto as a complete piece of monarchical ſophiſtry. For my own part, I acknowledge myſelf at a loſs to penetrate into the reaſons, which induced ſo clear ſighted a writer, to make this remark; nevertheleſs, it may not miſbecome a perſon like me to imitate the humility of an antient rhetorician, who did not chuſe to engage in a diſpute againſt the *maſter of twenty legions.*

At the time Guſtavus prepared to embark, all men's eyes were turned upon prodigies. Chemnitius*, an hiſtorian of the very beſt credit, mentions ſome. Armies were beheld in the air in various parts, and the very claſhing of armour was ſuppoſed to be heard at Nurenberg. Three ſuns were ſeen at Ratiſbon, and one of Tilly's ſoldiers ſweated blood very profuſely, having no actual diſtemper, but complaining of a certain weight upon his ſpirits. At Magdeburg, as ſome tell us, the ſeat afterwards of the moſt tragical ſcene in

* *De Bello Sueco-Germ. Lib.* i. *in fine.* The firſt volume of this work, originally ſet forth in German, was tranſlated into Latin, as is ſuppoſed by the author, and publiſhed in folio the ſame year, 1648, containing 386 pages.

The ſecond volume, which takes place after our period, was compoſed not only upon Oxenſtiern's memoirs, but has been imagined, by ſome, to have been committed to writing, in its preſent form, by the miniſter himſelf, who gave Chemnitius, Bogiſlaüs von Chemnitz, the honour of being its father. As far as I know, it has not been tranſlated, and was publiſhed at Stockholm 1653, making 1046 folio pages. The reſt of the work is in the archives of Stockholm.

the whole thirty years war, a child was reputed to be born with boots and ſpurs of fleſh, in dragoon faſhion, and an helmet of the ſame materials, with two balls in a pouch of ſkin on the left thigh. All theſe circumſtances, with numerous others, are related by hiſtorians, who, I believe in other reſpects, would not have publiſhed a known untruth upon any conſiderations; but different ages have their periodical diſtempers of believing *too much or too little.*

One cannot but regret, that ſome few days after his majeſty ſet ſail for the empire, the intrepid and ſenſible politician, ſir Thomas Roe, found himſelf obliged to return for London *. His abſence was greatly to be lamented by all admirers of national glory; for England behaved afterwards with no great reputation in reſpect to Germany.

His majeſty left Stockholm at the head of 130 ſhips of different ſizes, and, if ſome accounts, which I have ſeen, be true, divided the care of conducting the five ſeveral ſquadrons, for of ſo many his fleet conſiſted, between the land and ſea officers, reſerving to himſelf the honour of being admiral ſupreme, and appointing lieutenant-general Banier, the perſon next to him in authority, to take the command of the third diviſion. This enterpriſe of croſſing the ocean carried with it, from beginning to the end, a very diſagreeable and unpromiſing aſpect; for it was five weeks before Guſtavus reached the ſhore of the iſle of Uſedom, being confined to one port for a whole month.

On the king's right hand, the fleet being drawn up in a ſort of battle array, ſailed high admiral Gildenheim, natural ſon to Guſtavus's father; and on Banier's left the watch-maſter-general of the navy. A ſmall body of ſhips by way of reſerve were conducted, at ſome diſtance, behind, by the vice-admiral.

His majeſty had the foreſight or good fortune to reach Pennemond harbour in the iſle of Uſedom, juſt at the approach of evening, and was a little ſurprized to ſee the whole country in a flame at one inſtant. Nevertheleſs, he ordered his infantry to diſembark in large flat-bottomed boats, prepared for the purpoſe, aſſigning 200 men to each veſſel, and two ſmall field-pieces. It is to be remarked, that he piqued himſelf upon being the firſt perſon to ſet his foot on German ground, and taking a pick-axe in his hands immediately began to open a trench, ordering half the men to labour, and half to ſtand to their arms by turns. In this

* By his own papers it was June 1, or 2, 1630.

debark-

debarkation he made choice of the moſt proper place in the whole iſland, it being a ſpot where the Daniſh troops in the late war had thrown up an imperfect redoubt in the year 1628; and as this firſt ſtep was of a very hazardous and critical nature, his majeſty exerted ſo much induſtry and dexterity on the occaſion, that he conveyed eleven regiments to ſhore, and took care to ſee them intrenched before break of day, near a ſmall village, whence the harbour took its name.

A ſecond, but ſmaller diviſion of troops he conveyed to Stralſund, and, diſmiſſing the fleet, commanded all the ſea officers to return to Stockholm for new ſupplies of proviſion and forage, being determined to oppreſs the inhabitants of the empire as little as poſſible.

There was *one* thing very particular in regard to the times, when Guſtavus firſt ſet his foot in Germany, for it happened preciſely that very day, upon which, juſt a century before, the confeſſion of Augſburg had been preſented to the emperor Charles V. Immediately on landing, after having given ſome ſhort neceſſary orders to the generals that ſerved under him, he retired a few paces from them and his men, and, falling down on his knees, offered up a prayer to the Supreme Being*; then turning round to his officers, ſome of whom ſeemed ſurprized at ſo uncommon an example of piety, told them with an alert and cheerful air, *That a good Chriſtian would not make a bad ſoldier. The man,* continued he, *that has finiſhed his prayers, has completed one-half of his daily work*†. It was not indeed the king's firſt intention to land his army in the iſland of Uſedom; he knew Rugen to be a larger and more fruitful diſtrict, and purpoſed to make it his magazine of proviſions, and his ſure aſylum in caſe of a defeat. But Leſlie made himſelf maſter of it unexpectedly, and joined his maſter with part of the Stralſund cavalry, with his own and half of Hall's regiment of infantry, and four troops of Dewbatel's horſe ‡.

* It is preſerved in the *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relat.* tom. i. p. 166.

† *Arlanibæi Arma Suecica*, p. 19. Swed. Military Diſcipline, 31.

At a country ſeat in the middle of Sweden, belonging formerly to the noble family of De la Gardie, but now conferred on count de Teſſin for life, is a hall adorned with hiſtorical paintings, portraits, and emblems, all relating to the actions of Guſtavus Adolphus. In one little compartment the preſent ſtory is ſet forth, and the heads of the generals, who ſtand round, are all ſuppoſed to be painted from life. In larger compartments are to be ſeen Guſtavus on horſeback, and the principal actions of his campaigns, comprehending likewiſe the ſcene of his death. The generals' heads are in leſſer ſquares, and at bottom are emblematical deſigns relative to the character of each officer. *Memoirs communicated.*

‡ *Chemnitii Bellum Sueco-German.* tom. i. p. 44.

As

As this voyage had been protracted at leaſt a month beyond the king's expectations, he frankly told his men, *That as they were veteran ſoldiers, and had experienced hunger with him as well as plenty, he beſought them to continue their patience for a ſhort ſpace, and he would ſoon feed them well at the expence of their enemies.* After ſo generous a proof of affection and ſympathy, not a ſingle murmur was heard throughout the army; nor did the meaneſt ſoldier conceive a notion of plundering the inhabitants even for ſubſiſtence; well knowing, that he ſerved a maſter, who, though he compaſſionated the hardſhips his troops might ſuffer, yet never could be induced to diſpenſe with any violations of natural juſtice and military diſcipline. It was upon this very occaſion that Guſtavus likewiſe told his men, *They muſt not be alarmed at the Imperialiſts, and conſider them in the light of new antagoniſts, ſince they had fought with ſoldiers of the ſame ſtamp in Poland and Pruſſia; and that the ſample and the piece were of one colour and one contexture**.

It may be advantageous for a moment to take a ſhort ſurvey of Guſtavus's marine; and the rather, as hiſtorians, like commentators, uſually paſs by theſe more curious reſearches and enquiries. This prince in general neglected nothing; and amongſt other things kept an attentive eye to the ſea as well as the land; for at the very period now under conſideration, he was maſter of fifty fighting ſhips, of from 20 to 40 guns, and 6000 regular ſailors, chiefly Finlanders, Angermanians, Dalecarlians and Hollanders; which made his power, with reference to the houſe of Auſtria, as indiſputable in the Baltic, as it proved afterwards in the empire. The quantity of royal artillery was at that time amazing, unleſs we conſider the vaſt reſources of metal in the Swediſh mines. Many ſuppoſe that Guſtavus was owner of 8000 pieces of ordnance†. Under this head it may not be improper to obſerve, that Sweden, at that time, ſupplied the king with a certain number of land forces; for each province maintained a conſiderable body of regular troops, to which the modern reader may give the name of militia, or what other denomination he thinks fit. For example, Sweden, properly ſo called, and Gothland, ſupported at leaſt 16000 infantry, and 5500 cavalry, which though fed by their reſpective provinces, were cloathed by the king; received a monthly ſtipend from him, and paid no duties. It is true, this military conſtitution or eſtabliſh-

* *Chemnitii Bellum Sueco-Germ.* tom. i. p. 44.
† *Bertii Commentaria*, 4°, p. 357.

ment,

ment, in time of peace, was extremely frugal; though each company of infantry contained at leaſt 500 men, yet only one captain was aſſigned it, and one lieutenant, who received their cloaths and food from the royal bounty. The captain had a ſalary of five pounds fifteen ſhillings a year; and the foot ſoldier three ſhillings and ſixpence per month. About one-third more was allowed the cavalry: and every ſoldier made priſoner in war, was to be exchanged, or redeemed at the king's expence. It ſhould likewiſe be obſerved, that Finland, Livonia, and all the other provinces, contributed towards the general ſyſtem of a perpetual army, according to their wealth and tract of country, in the ſame proportions. Thus Sweden under Guſtavus may be conſidered as a true military government, like that of the Romans in their better days *.

Such an original baſis of national forces having been eſtabliſhed by the laws of Sweden, his majeſty increaſed his number of troops, when he pleaſed, *but at his own charges*; and thus much is certain, that he hired and employed more foreign troops, than the contingents of his own dominions could poſſibly amount to; ſo that we may reckon his own army, at leaſt, during the three grand campaigns in Germany, to amount to 60, or 70,000 fighting men. Though the revenues of Sweden could not be great, this *wonderful man* neither borrowed money, diſtreſſed his ſubjects, nor left behind him any *conſiderable national debt, notwithſtanding all the treaſure was ſpent abroad.* Nor does it ever appear that his army wanted pay a ſingle month; on the contrary, it was his general cuſtom to advance one-third of pay on the firſt, eleventh, and twenty-firſt days of every month †.

There is a certain illuſtrious prince now in being, who copies Guſtavus in one part of the circumſtances abovementioned, and that is punctuality of payment. Indeed, Guſtavus was one of thoſe geniuſes which ſhine proportionably both in the *great* and *leſſer* degrees of excellency. Alike conſiderable, if circumſtances could be ſuppoſed equal, as common ſoldier, financier and proveditor; an engineer, politician, and generaliſſimo: nor do I throw out theſe encomiums rhetorically and indiſcriminately, as is the common method of embelliſhing characters, but interſperſe them occaſionally as they ariſe from facts.

* *Bertii Commentaria*, p. 355—358, &c.
† *Swediſh Military Diſcipline*, 4°. Lond. 1632.

Indeed

Indeed it is impoſſible to aſcertain what the revenues of Guſtavus might be at this period; nor have my Swediſh friends been able to tell me. All we can learn from cotemporary writers is, that he had ſome royal demeſnes, as well as a patrimonial poſſeſſion*; that he had a ſole right in particular mines, and a tenth from all. He had likewiſe ſome peculiar taxes appropriated to his own coffers, and the tythes of the kingdom, great and ſmall, as the eccleſiaſtics term them, including thoſe of fiſh, cattle, and furs; which latter, from Lapland eſpecially, made no inconſiderable object; and in times of war new demands were made from the provinces †.

As to his men, the Swedes, from the days of Tacitus, were remarkable for their *obſequium erga regem*. Neither Roman nor Grecian invaſions could ever reach them; whereas they, on the contrary, at various times, overran all Europe with the rapidity of an unexpected torrent. The ſoldiers of Guſtavus were patient of cold beyond expreſſion; nor was it uncommon for a ſentinel in extremity of winter to remain eight ſucceſſive hours on his poſt without being relieved. The king however took conſtant care to cloath them accordingly, and allowed each man, beſides his regimentals, a long warm cloak, of Swediſh manufacture, lined with Lapland fur. Another incalculable advantage in Guſtavus's army was, every perſon being his own tradeſman, his own artizan, and his own mechanic. Hence it happened, to name only one particular inſtance, that when the king wanted to erect his temporary bridge acroſs the Lech, he had 2000 very tolerable carpenters amongſt his ſoldiers. It was the ſame likewiſe when pioneers were wanted, or in matters of maſonry and fortification.

As to the cavalry, the Swediſh horſes were ſmall, but well figured, making up in velocity and vigour what they wanted in height and bulk; it being poſſible for them, relieved only by a ſlight refreſhment, to keep in action forty ſucceſſive hours. Nevertheleſs, as the ſize, weight and preſſure of horſes are of no ſmall conſequence in the day of battle, Guſtavus generally choſe to mount his troops upon ſuch as were the produce of Germany and Denmark ‡. What was equal to moſt other advantages, his officers both reſpected and feared him; for he ſaw their faults with a ſingle glance, and drew concluſions

* This he beſtowed on the univerſity of Upſal.

† *Bertii Commentaria*, p. 355, &c.

‡ Ibid. *Diſcours de l'Etat & Couronne de la Suede*, 4°. 1632.

from

from them with the greateſt exactneſs. On the contrary, whenever they acquitted themſelves well, he beſtowed his honours, pecuniary rewards, and encomiums, liberally. I have not hitherto diſcovered, though the caſe is common even in the moſt able commanders, that he ever conſidered any one general, that acted under him, in the light of a rival; nor deſtroyed a ſingle man of conſequence either through jealouſy, or reſentment, or the juſt ideas he had formed of military diſcipline, if we except only colonel Mitzval. Although his heart was equally humane to all perſons upon every occaſion, yet it was very certain his *private* maxim *was*, to be reverenced by his generals* and beloved by his common ſoldiers: and indeed they devoted their hearts paſſionately to him, for no man balanced between certain death and the inclination of his maſter, who never made the meaneſt ſervant a ſacrifice to his pride, his obſtinacy, or his vanity. Perhaps a judgment of the temper of the ſoldiery may be formed, from the ſlight circumſtance I am now going to relate. The Livonian regiment of Denhoff had a ſtandard of black ſilk damaſk, whereon Abraham's offering of Iſaac was embroidered with this inſcription:

*Ut Abrahamus vult immolare filium,*
*Pro Rege ſic nos parati ſumus mori.*†

To return to the preſent embarkation, his majeſty contrived to bring with him ninety-two companies of foot and ſixteen cornetcies of horſe, half of which conſiſted of Engliſh, Scottiſh, and German forces, which troops, in thoſe times, ſuppoſing them to be full, made about 13,800 men, whom the king in a month's time increaſed to 20,000, if not more: excluſive of 6 or 7,000 ſoldiers which had been conveyed to Germany ſome time before, in order to reinforce the garriſon of Stralſund, and take poſſeſſion of the iſle of Rugen. Indeed it may be conſidered an uncommon inſtance of prudence and precaution in his majeſty, to diſlodge the Impe-

* This is corroborated from the idea which De la Gardie, his general in chief and military preceptor, had formed of him. When that commander was invited to a conference with the Czar, the Moſcovite courtiers told him, he muſt leave his ſword in the anti-chamber. "Gentlemen," ſaid he, "you may give countenance to ſuch forms as you pleaſe; but the prince your maſter has had ſome obligations to this ſword of mine during the campaign wherein I aſſiſted him, by my ſovereign's orders, againſt the Polanders: and be the diſappointment of the interview ever ſo great, no monarch upon earth ſhall make De la Gardie reſign his ſword, except Guſtavus." *Memorab. Suec. Gent.*

† Vide *Arlanibæi Arma Suec.* p. 39.

rialiſts

rialiſts from this iſland; for as it lies contiguous to Uſedom, between that and Sweden, of courſe his retreat, if fortune had favoured the enemy, could never have been made ſecure, whilſt Rugen remained in any perſon's poſſeſſion except his own. Leſlie, the Swediſh commander there, took care to aſſure his maſter, about the time he drew near the German coaſt, that all things were effected to his majeſty's ſatisfaction, which determined Guſtavus to advance to Uſedom.

In order to animate his army a little at firſt, the king gave his ſoldiers all the lawful plunder belonging to the Imperialiſts, and allotted a body of troops and two men of war to protect the iſland, being determined not only to make it his ſea-port and magazine of war, but his ſure retreat in caſe of misfortune or diſappointment. Concluding it, likewiſe, highly convenient to refreſh his troops, who were not a little fatigued with a tedious and diſagreeable voyage, he allowed them two days reſt, and in that interim contrived to land his horſes and his artillery, as alſo ammunition, proviſions and military utenſils. It was his next buſineſs to take care of the poor inhabitants. Having publiſhed a proclamation to aſſure them of the moſt perfect peace and protection, he diſtributed food and raiment to the hungry and naked; thus, by turns, exerciſing the three glorious characters of an able general, a wiſe politician, and a good Chriſtian; ſo that in the whole courſe of the war he injured the Imperialiſts as much by his clemency and generoſity, as by his prudence and magnanimity.

Theſe military and civil precautious taken, his majeſty, on the third morning, made an excurſion over the better half of the iſland, at the head of 1,000 horſe and 3,000 *commanded** muſqueteers; an expedition in which he drove the Imperialiſts before him without difficulty; for in truth they had no inclination to engage with him.

It may be aſked not improperly, where Walſtein was at this conjuncture, the command in theſe parts being his proper and reſpective department? To which queſtion may readily be replied, he employed himſelf at the preſent conjuncture in other matters of more immediate importance to his own intereſt, firſt in Bohemia, and then at Memmingen, in order to avert the diſgrace that threatened

* *Commanded men*, in the language of thoſe times, were the better half of a regiment ſelected from their companions, and conducted by the reſpective colonels; ſo that in this particular the troops, upon enterpriſes of importance, were doubly *colonelled*. We ſhall ſpeak more of this invention of Guſtavus elſewhere.

him

him by the diet of Ratiſbon. Tilly too, carefully declined to enter that military walk which belonged properly to Walſtein, whom he feared on account of his ambition, and diſliked from his inſolent and reſerved temper. For theſe reaſons he choſe to occupy himſelf in Franconia, and about the borders of Lower-Saxony, in giving the finiſhing ſtroke of reduction to the princes and ſtates which had aſſiſted the king of Denmark in the late war.

I may perhaps explain this paſſage more diſtinctly, by tranſcribing another paragraph from my original materials, where it is obſerved, that nothing could be better judged than the time which Guſtavus ſeized for invading Germany. Though the houſe of Auſtria and the leaguers juſt before this period had a great number of veteran troops on foot, yet one part had been diſbanded out of pure reſpect to the complaints preferred at Ratiſbon; another army had been diſpatched to form the ſiege of Mantua; Walſtein lay inactive in the circle of Suabia, we mean in a ſoldier-like capacity, in order to watch the motions of the diet, where his ruin was intended; and Tilly bent his thoughts on reducing the only rebel to the majeſty of the empire, the Landgrave of Heſſe, and bringing into obedience, ſome parts of Weſtphalia and Lower-Saxony; where he had grants given him of great poſſeſſions as a reward for his ſervices; particularly the lands belonging to that gallant youth Chriſtian, duke of Brunſwic and biſhop of Halberſtadt.

After all this, it is ſtill ſurprizing, how many *armies* his Imperial majeſty and his aſſociates had then on foot, all well ſeaſoned troops, accuſtomed to victory. The forces of the league, conſiſting of *thirty thouſand men*, acted in Weſtphalia and Lower-Saxony, under the command of Tilly, Pappenheim, and other generals, in ſeparate diviſions.——A ſecond body of troops *nearly equal in number* attended Aldringer, Colalto, and Gallas, in the Italian expedition, and returned in a few months.——Montecuculi and Oſſa, in conjunction with the archduke Leopold's forces, making in the whole a body of *ten thouſand men*, gave laws to Suabia and Alſatia, extending their dominion more or leſs from the Valteline to the town of Straſburg.——Then their good allies, the Spaniards, took the lead, and diſperſed *ten thouſand* Walloons over the whole Lower-Palatinate and countries adjoining. ——The three eccleſiaſtical electors had an army of about *eight thouſand* men in their own territories; and thus a boom of conqueſt was ſtretched out from the ſource of the Rhine to the circles of Weſtphalia and Lower-Saxony, or, in other

words, from the feet of the Alps to the ſhores of the Baltic, where Tilly and Pappenheim were univerſally ſuppoſed to be next to invincible.

At the ſame time the interior parts of Germany ſecured themſelves: for as the houſe of the Palatine was by this driven from its hereditary poſſeſſions, the other few proteſtant princes had ſubmitted by agreement, or been diſpoſſeſſed by force.

Nor was the eaſtern ſide of the empire left without protection, though the elector of Saxony appeared not then diſaffected to the Auſtrian intereſts, for Baltazar di Marradas commanded *eight thouſand men* in Bohemia, where Walſtein likewiſe was all-powerful, like a ſovereign ruler; and Tieffenbach and Goëtz headed another army *of the ſame extent* in Sileſia and Luſatia.——If therefore any part was *weak*, and *that* we may attribute to the extraordinary ſagacity and courage of the invader, it was the long extended duchy of Pomerania, and the ſhore of the Baltic belonging thereto. The duke of Pomerania was a mere ſhadow of power, being in effect a ſtate priſoner, and at beſt maſter of a few broken regiments; and as to the elector of Brandenburg, it is well known he had no more than four or ſix thouſand ſoldiers, not overwell paid, and but poorly diſciplined; whilſt Torquato di Conti, at the head of *ſixteen thouſand* inſolent and unmerciful veterans, had reduced either country to ſuch a ſtate of ſervitude, that the inhabitants durſt not truſt the idea of Guſtavus even to enter into their private thoughts. That *great man*, expecting, but not ſure of one German alliance, and relying on the conſciouſneſs of his own lenity, prudence, dexterity, and fortitude, had the aſtoniſhing reſolution to croſs the ocean, and fix his footſteps in a hoſtile empire, repoſing his hopes on the narrow baſis of *thirteen thouſand eight hundred* ſoldiers, for the garriſon of Stralſund muſt not be computed as any real aſſiſtance, except under its own walls, wherewith to confront *nine ſeveral armies*, which, ſuppoſing thoſe troops to be divided into eight equal portions, were each equal, if we except only a few men, to the whole of his majeſty's force at his firſt landing. To the Imperial field-troops, &c. may be likewiſe added the Imperial garriſons; for in thoſe days every town in Germany, being more or leſs fortified, required a protection. So that, in fact, the king had more than one hundred ſtrong cities and fortreſſes to beſiege; and though the moderns may ſay that the ſtrength of a fortification was in thoſe days nothing, yet at the ſame time we ought to put them in mind that ſtrength is a term relative to the ſubſiſting arts of inveſting and attacking towns; nor

nor could Guſtavus have conquered the empire in twice the number of years, if he had not, by his genius, managed his artillery as ably as if he had lived in the next century. Tilly allowed him this juſtice at the taking of Magdeburg, for he had but one excellent engineer in all his army, and that was Farenbach, who learnt his profeſſion under Guſtavus, and then deſerted.

Meanwhile his majeſty, no ways diſmayed by numbers, and taking the advantage of Walſtein's avocations, and Tilly's jealouſies, croſſed the ſmall frith which divides Uſedom from the continent, being little more than the mouth of the river Pene; and leaving ſergeant-major-general Kniphauſen to guard Pennemond fort and the reſt of the iſland, marched directly to the town of Wolgaſt, and cutting to pieces two hundred Croatians, out of a larger number that oppoſed him, made himſelf maſter of a ſtrong fort at the water's edge, ſword in hand, and left Banier to maintain it. Nevertheleſs, during this ſlight attempt on the town of Wolgaſt, which was only to feel the enemy's pulſe, Torquato de Conti *, chief commander in thoſe parts, an older officer than Walſtein, but not ſo dexterous nor ſucceſsful, and his inferior too in rank and authority, at the head of three German regiments †, made a fruitleſs attempt to raiſe the ſiege.

Upon all occaſions this general ſhewed himſelf to be no great commander. By extortion, it is true, he wreſted from the duke of Pomerania the ſtrong towns of Gartz and Griffenhagen, but miſcarried in his attempt on Stetin, though he diſpatched thither colonel Walſtein, who carried a letter of ſummons from his kinſman and nameſake ‡.

* *Bougeant* calls him Torquato Conti. Honeſt Thom. Carve, who was not very exact in names, calls him *Tuccatocont. Vices generalis inter Imperatorios tunc forte gerebat Excell. Dnus.* Tuccatocont. *Itin.* tom. i. p. 11. But to ſpeak properly he ſhould be called Torquato de Conti: *Torquatus de Comitibus*, according to the tenour of the Imperial patent. He was originally deſtined for the church, but choſe rather to carry arms; and ſerved firſt in Lombardy among the Spaniſh troops as captain of horſe, and then under Bucquoy in the Hungarian wars. He was little beloved, and leſs confided in, by the ſoldiers; and on account of his exactions and ſeverities, the common people always ſurnamed him *The Devil*. Nevertheleſs, before he paſſed into the Imperial ſervice, he was the firſt man who diſcovered Mazarine's genius, and recommended him, when he was about twenty-three years old, to his holineſs the pope. Upon quitting the Imperial ſervice, he obtained a freſh employment at Rome, which ſuited better with his age and infirmities; for he was made *captain-general of the eccleſiaſtical forces*.

† It muſt be obſerved that the German regiments were much larger than the Swediſh.

‡ *Chemnitius de Bello Sueco-Germ.* tom. i. p. 37.

It has been matter of difficulty to ſome, why Torquato did not attempt to oppoſe Guſtavus at his firſt landing, or give him battle at leaſt a few days after his arrival! Nevertheleſs, of this difficulty one may ſafely venture to give a ſolution. The whole country had been depopulated by the Imperialiſts; their general could not, with certainty, tranſport proviſions to his army from the parts of the empire which lay to the ſouthward; whilſt Guſtavus, for the firſt two months, having the ocean open at his pleaſure, derived ſupplies, though not abundant ones, from his own country. On this account, Torquato fell back and made two camps at Gartz and Stolp, almoſt at the two extremities of Outer Pomerania; making Landſberg, which forms the ſouthern point of the triangle, a fort of middle place of reſidence, by the emperor's expreſs orders.

On this point I may digreſs for a moment, in order to obſerve, that it was one great error in this general, not the leſs abſurd for being common, to deſtroy, in the manner he did, all cattle, proviſions, barns, hay-ſtacks, and mills, merely with a view to deprive the Swedes of ſubſiſtence at their firſt arrival. If the houſe of Auſtria had previouſly *paid* for theſe things, and then *deſtroyed* them, the conduct had been admirable; but in the other view of the queſtion, ſhe loſt the hearts of the common people entirely; for we muſt take human nature from the higheſt to the loweſt as it really is; and though a peaſant may greatly eſteem his prince and country, he loves his family, and his little dearly-earned acquiſitions, ſtill more. The event ſoon juſtified the obſervation, for Guſtavus from that moment wanted nothing at the market price.

I may ſtill give the reader a better idea of Torquato de Conti's want of abilities; for about this time, at or near the landing of Guſtavus, Sigiſmond king of Poland informed him by letter what ſort of warrior he muſt expect to find in the perſon of his Swediſh majeſty; and how much it behoved him to keep a ſtrict eye to the preſervation of Pomerania. But Torquato, who, though a native of Italy, had more Spaniſh pride in his temper than Roman cautiouſneſs, returned him a ſhort ſlight anſwer, according to the language then uſed at Vienna, which he never afterwards took care to make good; namely, that Guſtavus ſhould find enough employment againſt men of ſervice, and learn, by dear-bought experience, that he had left his laurels in the groves of Pruſſia*.

* *Kobierziſki*, Hiſt. Uladiſlaüi, p. 931.

From

From Wolgaſt his majeſty returned to Uſedom, and paid ſome little attention to matters of politics, employing his troops at the ſame time in the total reduction of that iſland, and a ſmall one contiguous to it, called Wollin.

His firſt buſineſs was to give audience to the miniſters of his couſins the dukes of Mechlenburg*, and the deputies from Stralſund; and private meſſages paſſed between him and the duke of Pomerania†. The latter, terrified by the menaces, and diſmayed by the ſeverities of the houſe of Auſtria, had made ſome overtures to his Swediſh majeſty on the ſubject of returning home and leaving the empire to be the ſole arbiter of its own peace and quiet.

This prince, well foreſeeing which way the ſtorm of the north pointed, had ſent to Guſtavus juſt before he embarked, to beſeech him to make ſome other country than Pomerania the ſeat of invaſion. Many memorials and replies paſſed between the Swediſh and Pomeranian miniſters; at length the king told the latter, juſt as he was going on ſhip-board, *That he would carry his anſwer, in perſon, to the duke their maſter.*

Rightly concluding, that theſe difficulties proceeded more from fear than any real diſapprobation of his expedition, he advanced directly to the ſtrong fort of Schwein, ſituated on the eaſtern ſide of the iſland, and took it without reſiſtance, for the Imperial garriſon thought fit to diſlodge at firſt ſight, and croſſed the river into the iſland of Wollin; a little diſtrict, ſomewhat ſmaller than Uſedom, being about twenty miles long by ten or twelve broad. It is formed into an iſland by the ſea, the Friſhoff-lake, the mouth of the Oder, and a ſmall frith, that is half a rivulet and half a moraſs. Guſtavus having found ſome boats, ſoon purſued the Imperialiſts acroſs the water. They in their flight ſet fire to a fine caſtle belonging to the elector of Saxony's ſiſter, and ſoon evacuated the iſland, leaving behind them their cannon, baggage, and part of their horſes; fulfilling to a tittle the remark of Tacitus, *triumphati magis quam victi.* Here were found two beautiful leopards, confined in a cage, intended, by Walſtein, as a preſent to the emperor: for as he had the vanity to conſider himſelf admiral of the Baltic, he thought it neceſſary to give ſome proofs at Vienna of his commercial intercourſe.

In theſe two iſlands the king had reſted near a fortnight, not from any love he bore to inactivity, but to procure

* Adolphus Frederic of Schwerin and John Albert of Guſtrow: the former born in 1589, the latter in 1590.

† Bogiſlaüs duke of Pomerania died, aged ſeventy-ſeven, in 1637. The laſt of a family which had enjoyed that duchy 700 years.

means for tranſporting his artillery, troops, and baggage over the lake of Friſhoff, a paſſage of about twelve miles in length, which gave him entrance into the large mouth of the Oder, and thence to Stetin. Of this enterpriſe we ſhall ſpeak more diſtinctly hereafter.

Whilſt matters were thus preparing, we ſhall recur for a few minutes to the laſt-mentioned diet of Ratiſbon, which continued ſitting, and had been convened before Guſtavus arrived in Germany; or, to ſpeak more properly, juſt before his landing. When he quitted Sweden, the ſtates of the empire, at the earneſt ſolicitation of the proteſtants, had aſſembled themſelves at that place, in order to deliberate about the means of reſtoring their country to its ancient tranquillity. Upon the grand event of his Swediſh majeſty's arrival in the iſle of Uſedom, *Cæſar*, as the Germans affect to call him, gave indications of his ſupreme will to the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, commanding them to ſupply his numerous army with proviſions and military ſtores; and upon theſe conditions generouſly promiſing to make ſome mitigations in their favour, by way of acknowledgment, in the *edict of reſtitution*. Guſtavus likewiſe notified his appearance in Germany to the latter of theſe two electors, and explained the reaſons that induced him to make an attempt upon Pomerania, that country being contiguous to the electorate of Brandenburg, preferably to any other part of the empire, making him at the ſame time an offer of ſecurity and protection, provided he did not oppoſe him in an hoſtile manner.

It is much to be doubted whether it was in the emperor's power, conſiſtently with common prudence, to have put off this general convention of the Germanic body. The proteſtant princes had been almoſt ruined, and complained ſo loudly, that it was neceſſary to make them ſome plauſible conceſſions. Military executions on the one hand, and the forenſic executions on the other hand, had given the edict full activity, and many princes, the duke of Wirtemberg in particular, had allowed the monks, nuns, and clergy to repoſſeſs their ancient eſtabliſhments. The elector of Saxony likewiſe was particularly anxious to maintain his ſon Auguſtus in the archbiſhopric of Magdeburg, which the emperor had deſigned for his ſecond ſon, Leopold. For this reaſon the elector promoted privately the aſſembly at Heidelberg in 1629, whence a petition for the revocation of the edict was addreſſed to his Imperial majeſty, and a ſlight ſort of *confederation* projected between the proteſtant powers; nor were certain inuendos omitted with reference to Guſtavus.

What

What was ſtill worſe, many princes of the catholic perſuaſion wiſhed for peace, inaſmuch as their countries had been terribly haraſſed even by the armies of their victorious friends. Of this claſs was the duke of Neuburg, deſcended from a younger branch of the Palatine family. The archbiſhop of Saltzburg too had withdrawn his contributions for no better reaſon, than becauſe no deſirable ſpot of proteſtant ground bordered upon the edges of his territories, at a time when his neighbours were all making new acquiſitions. The elector of Tryers* likewiſe grew ſick of the depredations of the Spaniſh troops, and the elector of Cologn, brother to the duke of Bavaria, joined him in remonſtrances on the ſame ſubject; yet not one of theſe princes would conſent to ſuppreſs the edict of reſtitution.

Certain ſuſpicions, or glimmerings of ſuſpicion, were ſtill ſuppoſed to prevail amongſt theſe princes; for though the real object of the houſe of Auſtria was the ſubverſion and deſtruction of the proteſtant party, that being conſidered as a work of no extraordinary difficulty; yet a traverſe ſcene was to be drawn behind this outſide one, and the deep deſign at bottom was to humble the catholics in their turn, and eſtabliſh an *univerſal monarchy* in the empire. Count d'Ognata, the Spaniſh ambaſſador, unfortunately opened himſelf once upon this ſubject, and ſaid, "That the epiſcopal gowns in Germany were ſomething of the longeſt, and wanted paring."

Upon the occaſion of this diet the emperor made a magnificent entry, attended by his wife and ſon, and the king of Hungary and Bohemia. All the catholic electors appeared. The electors of Brandenburg and Saxony, though perſonally written to by the emperor, implored him to liſten to the repreſentations of Sweden and France, and conclude an univerſal peace. The real reaſon of this was, though the elector of Brandenburg complained that fourteen regiments complete had been quartered on him alone, and the Auſtrian regiments were then extremely large, that both theſe electors declined ſeeing the emperor in perſon, as they did not chuſe to elect his ſon king of the Romans. The duke of Saxony was not by any means ſo poor as he pretended; and what was ſtill more, they had maintained an indiſtinct but timorous correſpondence with Guſtavus, and were conſcious that ſomething of that nature might get wind during the tranſactions of the diet.

Each of theſe princes pleaded poverty in order to be excuſed attendance, and mentioned the ſeemingly incredible

* Philip Chriſtopher Van Soëtern.

ſums which the Imperial officers had extorted from their ſubjects*. Such public expilations had never been known or read of; and beſides all this, a lively picture was drawn, not only of the avarice, but of the cruelty and inſolence of the commanders†; and, by way of concluſion, it was ſtrongly recommended, upon ſuppoſition a laudable peace could not be procured, that new laws ſhould be made with regard to conqueſts, contributions, and plunder; and a freſh ſyſtem of diſcipline and regularity enforced by the ſtrongeſt penal ſanctions that could be deviſed. It was requeſted alſo that ſome more effectual method of paying the army might be propoſed, and that a better application might be made of the Germanic money collected and ſet apart for this purpoſe. In the latter clauſe the catholic electors all agreed; for the Imperial armies made little difference between friends and foes.

Great part of the military licentiouſneſs and ſeverity of courts of judicature, above complained of, was attributed to Walſtein, whom the world in general ſtyled the *German Dictator*. The confederate princes and electors hated him as a *new-raiſed man*, who from a Bohemian gentleman, by the emperor's indulgence, roſe to be firſt a count and then duke of Fridland, Sagan, and Mechlenburg. His manner of living diſguſted them too, for he maintained finer retinues, and kept a more magnificent table, than moſt of them could afford to imitate. For generoſity, and a more than princely affectation of rewarding valour and merit, he exceeded them all; it being a maxim with him, "*that a prince who deſired to be ſerved cheap, had always cheap ſervices done him.*" There were other circumſtances peculiar to this unaccountable perſon, which produced freſh uneaſineſs. Being uncommunicative by nature, and reſerved through choice, he made himſelf free with none of his aſſociates, neither imparting his own deſigns, nor collecting the ſentiments of others, except at ſuch diſtance as was unobſervable: ſo that upon the whole, at leaſt to external appearances, he overlooked all men's opinions, and neglected all men's advice, if we except only that of his Imperial majeſty. From theſe cauſes he levied contributions, granted protections, diſpoſed of troops in garriſons and winter quarters, without ever conſulting the princes in whoſe territories theſe irregularities occurred; and upon any complaint or remonſtrance from them, his anſwer was, *That*

* *Memoirs* of the Houſe of Brandenburg.

† Publiſhed by the duke of Pomerania in High Dutch and in Latin.

*he*

*he had offended formerly by an improper condeſcenſion; but perceiving mankind to be void of gratitude on that head, he for the future ſhould change his mildneſs into aſperity.*

It may next be obſerved, that beſides the electors and their deputies, many perſons of great conſequence paid their attendance at this diet, as ſir Robert Anſtruther from England, M. Brulart and Father Joſeph on the part of France, and Ruſdorf in the behalf of the elector Palatine. Indeed the diet in general was the moſt pompous and magnificent that had ever been known, a circumſtance that ill became the deplorable miſery and poverty of thoſe times; and it is thought the expences of the duke of Bavaria alone, though that may not ſound high to the ears of an Engliſhman, amounted to near 25,000 pounds a month*.

Tilly likewiſe, and Anholt †, the two generals of the catholic league, made each of them an extremely handſome appearance. The former ſpoke of Guſtavus in the higheſt terms of reſpect, and unfortunately for himſelf, compared the grand event of a war to a caſt of the dice; but Walſtein, who did not then think his revocation ſo certain, rivalled even his maſter in point of ſhow, being attended by 600 horſemen finely mounted and richly habited, which created envy in the electors, and paved the way to his future diſgrace.

It may juſtly be imagined, that all parties here aſſembled had their reſpective games to play. The houſe of Auſtria aimed at univerſal monarchy over papiſts as well as proteſtants; and wanted likewiſe to give a check to the interpoſition of all foreign powers in the affairs of the empire; and a third grand object ſtill remained behind, which was to cauſe Ferdinand, the emperor's ſon, to be then appointed king of

* *Mercure François in annum* 1630. This diet began to diſpatch buſineſs about June 19, and ended November 13.

† *Le Barre*, (Hiſtoire d'Allemagne, tom. ix. p. 589.) in other reſpects a moſt exact hiſtorian, ſays, Tilly, and the Prince of *Anhalt*; but the prince of Anhalt entered into no ſervice, after he received his pardon and reprimand on account of the Bohemian wars. The perſon here meant is John James count of *Anholt*, next in command to Tilly, and watchmaſter-general of the Bavarian army, who died the November enſuing. Having here mentioned a ſmall inaccuracy in Le Barre's Hiſtory of Germany, I think it incumbent on me to declare, that this gentleman may be conſidered as a true hiſtorian. Inſtead of giving us a pleaſing narration of his own, unſupported by authorities, he carefully peruſed moſt that had been written on the ſubject, and then ſent eight or nine copies of his work, *interleaved*, to all the eminent hiſtorians in the empire, requeſting them to write their remarks and additions on the blank leaves; which was accordingly done. The work, excellent as it is, was of little uſe to me, for it is only a compendium of the whole German hiſtory.

the Romans. The elector of Bavaria had his reaſons for obſtructing indirectly this laſt attempt, and deſired likewiſe that Tilly ſhould be ſubſtituted in the room of Walſtein. In this the proteſtant electors joined him. Their deputies harangued largely on the inſolence and avarice of Walſtein duke of Fridland, for few people cared to give him the title he derived from Mechlenburg, and remarked in the courſe of their invectives, that he had waged war upon countries againſt which no war had been ever declared. In this combination againſt the general, the Spaniſh miniſters and the *Hiſpaniolized* Auſtrians, as the phraſe then was, moſt heartily concurred. France interfered too upon its old principle of firſt diſturbing the waters, and then purloining a large portion of the fiſh. The elector Palatine acted purely as a matter of form, without any hopes of ſucceſs; and the Britiſh ambaſſador appeared in the character of a preacher more than a negotiator. As to the eccleſiaſtical electors, they aimed at nothing but Walſtein's diſmiſſal, and the full continuance of the edict of reſtitution.

The emperor promoted and carried on the intrigues of this aſſembly very artfully; for though he determined to grant the proteſtants no one advantage, yet at the ſame time he well foreſaw, that the appearance of making ſome conceſſions carried with it an air of good temper and mildneſs. Moreover, he had reſolved within himſelf to inſinuate, that, as France, Holland, and Sweden, all caballed againſt the empire, and ſent both men and money into it, it behoved the proteſtants, as well as catholics, to unite in one common ſyſtem, and fruſtrate ſuch public attacks on the Germanic body in general. It was argued ſpecifically, that the elector Palatine had given no ſigns of repentance, and therefore it was neceſſary to paſs an irrevocable ſentence on him; that the Dutch had long ſhaken off all filial duty to the Imperial throne, and rendered themſelves maſters of ſeveral towns which belonged to the empire, not without intentions of reſtoring the elector Palatine to the Lower Palatinate: that the French king had interfered both in Italy and Germany, without ſolicitation on one part, and without giving notice on the other; and, laſtly, that Guſtavus was worthy of blame above meaſure, ſince he had never received the leaſt provocation from the houſe of Auſtria; there ſubſiſting in truth no one diſpute between him and the emperor but the affair of Stralſund, in the accommodation of which matter he had neglected to liſten to Dhona, the Imperial ambaſſador, as alſo to a public miniſter on the part of Denmark, who had undertaken the office of a mediator. One cannot preſume abſolutely to contradict

contradict this laſt aſſertion; yet it is plain enough to the clear ſighted and intelligent, that the king of Denmark's friendſhip to Guſtavus carried with it an inſincere aſpect, which naturally created miſtruſt and ſuſpicions. That prince juſtly triumphed, as he thought, in foretelling to himſelf, that the houſe of Auſtria might happen to be humbled in a certain degree; yet it did not pleaſe him to behold the Swedes in poſſeſſion of Stralſund; nor did he like the lodgment Guſtavus had made in the iſland of Rugen, which gave him power on either ſide of the Baltic ocean. He had a ſecret joy, however, in predicting to his nation, that Sweden and Auſtria would at length weary and torment themſelves to nothing. Theſe ideas, joined with caution and timidity, kept him in a ſort of ſuſpenſe, which he thought fit to term neutrality; yet at bottom he dreaded Guſtavus, and hated him too, and in ſpite of all obligations which the proteſtant religion might be ſuppoſed to have on his mind, ſecretly preferred the intereſts of the houſe of Auſtria.

On the other ſide, it appeared plainly, that the Imperial miniſters made peace only a plauſible pretext in the firſt article of the ſeveral propoſals produced by them; for the five ſubſequent ones breathed nothing but menaces, chaſtiſements, and hoſtilities; of which we have a clear proof: for when all the proteſtant deputies beſought the emperor to put a ſtop to ſuch unmerciful proceedings, cardinal Kleſel *, who had relinquiſhed politics except with a view to humble Walſtein, replied coldly and unconcernedly: *It was the decree of heaven, that people ſhould bear patiently what they had deſerved*†. To

* Melchior, archbiſhop of Vienna, prime miniſter and favourite of the emperors Rodolphus and Mathias.

† We cannot but ſuſpect that hiſtorians have made this ſpeech proceed from a wrong mouth: ſince this prelate, who was firſt perſonage in the Auſtrian cabinet, was generouſly inclined to the Bohemian proteſtants, and no great friend to the Spaniſh faction. When, in the year 1618, he perſuaded Mathias to uſe mild and gentle methods towards the revolters in Bohemia and the *annexed provinces*, and depicted in the ſtrongeſt lights the miſerable effects of perſecution and inteſtine wars, Ognata the Spaniſh ambaſſador made no ceremony to conſider him as a *traitor*; and the archduke Ferdinand, next year elected emperor, roundly told him, *He would rather ſee the kingdom* ſtarved *than* damned. *Hiſt. Eccl. Bohem.* 12° p. 152.

From theſe hints, Kleſel the cardinal archbiſhop ſoon concluded his downfal to be inevitable, and as he went to court conjured his domeſtics to ſtand upon their guard. The apoſtolic nuncio attended him. When he entered the antichamber, a chamberlain of the archduke made his maſter's excuſes for not receiving him. The emperor likewiſe compelled him to wait ſome time, the council door being bolted, and he and Ognata in cloſe conference, and then baron de Preüner came out and told him, whilſt Dampier and Colalto waited below with an armed force, that he had committed great miſmanagements

To recapitulate all the ſeveral offences of the proteſtant princes will be difficult; but the duke of Pomerania's great crime was, *that he had wiſhed the emperor ill ſucceſs in a bumper of white ale.*

As to the Ambaſſadors from foreign countries, it may ſafely be ſaid, that Anſtruther at leaſt did nothing, having in truth nothing to do. Though he had certain authorities to treat with the Imperial commiſſaries and the electoral princes, yet it is evident, that no good could be produced from ſuch attempts, as the houſe of Auſtria aimed only at cajoling his maſter, and lulling to ſleep thoſe faint good wiſhes which he bore to the Palatinate and the proteſtant cauſe. Nevertheleſs, by the artful interpoſition of Spain, which pretended to ſtand, in the character of a third perſon, between their Britannic and Imperial majeſties, he was received politely and courteouſly by the emperor, who perhaps, at that time, had ſome fears of an alliance then tranſacting between Charles and Guſtavus.

Anſtruther's ſecond inſtructions, bearing date July 22, 1630, carried the ſame conciliatory pacific air, which thoſe of James I. formerly bore, and are filled with remonſtrances and petitions inſtead of menaces and reſentment. They have all one tone; *Armis ſemotis, noſtro exemplo.* His Britannic majeſty declares in them, that the elector Palatine had reſigned to him the management of all his affairs, an aſſertion which may perhaps be liable to ſome queries, and that notwithſtanding his father and himſelf had ever proved unſucceſsful in their interpoſitions on Frederic's behalf, yet

miſmanagements in the government, and muſt retire with him: to which ſtep the then pope Paul V. had given his conſent. The cardinal put himſelf into great emotion at ſo abrupt an attack, and talked very loudly in his own juſtification; upon which Preüner preſented him with a riding coat and black hat, compelling him much againſt his will, to quit his red hat and pallium: and having conducted him privately down a back ſtaircaſe, Dampier received him in a cloſe poſt-chariot, and conveyed him to Inſpruck; the court obliging him to ſign a reſignation of all his preferments. And thus room was made for cardinal Ditrichſtein.

In vain Mathias lamented his diſgrace, for he loved him intirely, and confided in him above all men; nor was he made privy to the ſtratagem. All the anſwer he could receive from Ferdinand and his adherents, was, that the meaſures taken *had a view purely to his glory.* He then requeſted a promiſe from them in writing, that they would not injure the cardinal's life or fortune; but they only gave him their engagements of honour. When Urban VIII. examined this great miniſter's cauſe, he was found to have neither money nor poſſeſſions. A diſculpation was then paſſed in his favour: nevertheleſs, he declined all concern with ſtate affairs, except with regard to the diſmiſſion of Walſtein; and died in 1630, aged ſeventy-ſeven. *Laurea Auſtriaca*, p. 98, 99, 635.

that

that he ſhould ſtill continue to purſue the ſame pious work and ſalutary meaſures; eſpecially as his catholic majeſty exhorted him to perſevere in this plan, giving him reaſons to expect the moſt equitable allowances from the emperor. Leſt theſe advances might not prove ſufficient, Anſtruther had powers likewiſe to become reſponſible for the Palatine's ſubmiſſion *. Notwithſtanding, it no where appears that theſe powers were derived from the proper ſource of authority, that is to ſay, from the elector Palatine himſelf.

A few weeks after the date of this ſecond commiſſion, I believe towards the end of the month of Auguſt, if the preſent conjecture be exact in point of chronology, the emperor muſt have retired from Ratiſbon to his metropolis, for a few days, upon ſome buſineſs of conſequence. The ſaid ambaſſador from England was admitted to an Imperial audience at Vienna, not being able to procure ſuch admiſſion at the diet, where he made a long, ſubmiſſive, and plaintive ſpeech, which carried with it more the air of an elegy, than the ſpirited repreſentation of a powerful kingdom. Its purport was, for I care not how little time we employ on it, That the king his maſter acknowledged with grief and ſhame, that his brother-in-law the elector Palatine, diſregarding *his* opinion and concurrence, had acted formerly, in reference to the crown of Bohemia, not only raſhly, but unadviſedly; which imprudent meaſures ought chiefly to be attributed to the ambition and inattention of youth; and that it would highly become the emperor, conſiſtently with his accuſtomed clemency, to receive his ſubmiſſion, and reinſtate him in his dominions, inaſmuch as ſuch an act of free and gratuitous favour would oblige the kings of England to all poſterity.

It then proceeded to remark, That his majeſty of England, notwithſtanding the ſelf-evident reaſons for war, always choſe to prefer the amicable adjuſtments of treaty, ſo often eſſayed, and negligently regarded by his friends! repoſing himſelf in every emergency upon the known candour and *manſuetude*, that being the very word, of the houſe of Auſtria.—In the next place the folly of this ſpeech is equal to its meanneſs: ſince war is therein conſidered the moſt unchriſtian act in human nature, and the moſt uncertain. Mention is then made of the kind interpoſition of the courts of Madrid and Bruſſels, than which nothing could be more inſincere; and the *merites non petits* of James I. towards the houſe of

* *Fœdera*. tom. xix. p. 172.

Auſtria

Auſtria are ſtrongly inculcated.——No pretenſions of right are ſo much as glanced at; on the contrary, all is referred, as though the addreſs were to the Supreme Being, to the free, gratuitous, unconditional mercy and clemency of the Imperial throne. Laſtly, the diſtreſſes, the poverty, the exile of the numerous Palatine family, are repreſented as in a tragedy *; and a petition is preferred for an allowance, juſt ſufficient to keep them from ſtarving, which, ſays Anſtruther, by preſcription of right as well as by the laws of piety, cannot be denied to any perſon, conſiſtently with common juſtice.

Thus, as an Auſtrian hiſtorian obſerves †, in regard to another Engliſh ambaſſador diſpatched on the ſame errand, he flattered and trembled like a criminal pleading his cauſe before Pluto. Walſtein's aſſociates joined with Anſtruther in theſe repreſentations, partly to prevent England from combining with Sweden, and partly to play the elector Palatine's re-eſtabliſhment againſt the immeaſurable ambition of the duke of Bavaria. All theſe attempts were eluded by politely giving them a patient hearing; and the unhappy Anſtruther ſate himſelf down contented. The Auſtrians knew the extent of Charles's hereditary patience to an hair's breadth, and had likewiſe received indirect but tolerably certain aſſurances, that he had been tampering for ſome time with Guſtavus, whom he had inveſted with the order of the garter ſeveral years before at the ſiege of Dirſchau.

Frederic was more politic and heroic than his brother Charles; and Ruſdorf ‡, his firſt agent at the diet, gave proofs

* Que voſtre majeſté, &c. daigne auſſi jetter les yeux benins de ſa grace ſur une tendre, numereuſe, & innocente famille Palatine, & ſur une troupe d'autres leur parents & alliez, qui embraſſent en ſuppliant les autels de voſtre clemence & bonté Imperiale!

† *Laurea Auſtriaca*, ad annum 1621.

‡ One of the moſt able prime miniſters of the elector Palatine, who reſided many years in a public capacity at London, where he collected all the negotiations and ſtate tranſactions relating to Great Britain and the continent. His MS. conſiſting of ſeveral volumes in folio, is ſtill preſerved in the archives at Heſſe Caſſel; and, from a liſt of the contents tranſmitted to me, deſerves highly to be made public; ſince it is certain the affairs of the Palatinate influenced all *our* meaſures, more or leſs, during the reigns of James I. and Charles his ſon. As to the ſtyle of Ruſdorf, for the collection I am ſpeaking of is compoſed in Latin, the reader may eaſily form an idea from the other performances he has thought fit to publiſh, the *Vindiciæ Palatinæ* being one of the moſt complete works the world ever ſaw, and in the ſingle articles of method, brevity, and perſpicuity, may diſpute the palm even with Thomas Aquinas's *Summæ*, ſo juſtly celebrated for theſe perfections. It is here we may admire him in the character of a politician, jus-publiciſt, and

proofs of ability and firmneſs far ſuperior to what Anſtruther could pretend to. His maſter, the elector Palatine, had taken the precaution to convey letters to each elector, all written with his own hand, in which he beſought them to interpoſe their good offices with the emperor in his behalf. To theſe repreſentations his Imperial majeſty replied artfully enough, that he had private diſpoſitions in that unhappy prince's favour, whereof he ſhould ſoon feel the benign effects, if he would perſonally aſk his pardon, renounce the crown of Bohemia, and his own electorate for himſelf and his heirs, and enter into no future alliances nor intrigues either with German princes or foreigners; and *then* only, and *upon theſe conditions*, promiſed, from the mere motives of bounty and clemency inherent in his breaſt, to reſtore to him part of a province, and a penſion ſuitable to the dignity of a prince.

Theſe propoſals ſerved very well to amuſe the king of England, but Frederic rejected them like a man of honour and ſpirit, laughed at, deſpiſed, and deteſted them. This prince, though no great hero in the field, had a juſt ſenſe of his parentage and ſtation, and declared peremptorily, that he would have *all* the Palatinate or *none, nor ſhould any worldly motive induce him to cut off his children's birthright, and leave them penſioners to the houſe of Auſtria, if they were of a tame diſpoſition; or vagabonds and mercenary ſoldiers, if they were of an heroical one.*

In return to this, it is remarked by ſome, that the emperor alledged, by way of clearing himſelf, that the better part of Frederic's dominions were depoſited in the hands of the infanta Clara Iſabella *. But the elector Palatine gave no ear to ſuch ridiculous ſubterfuges and excuſes.

It

and civilian; and as to his claſſical abilities, witneſs his beautiful elegy, entitled, QUERELA FREDERICI MISSA UNIONI, written with all the elegance and ſpirit of the antients. It conſiſts of 304 lines: and is preſerved by Lotichius. If any conjectures may be formed from ſimilitude of thought and language, it was he who compoſed the *epiſtle* from the city of Heidelberg, in the character of a virgin, to general Tilly in 1621, when the Engliſh garriſon behaved ſo gloriouſly. It begins, *Siccine virgineum*, &c. and contains forty-four verſes. The curious may peruſe it in the *Laurea Auſtriaca*, p. 493, &c.—The proſe work bears this title; Jo. Joachim à *Ruſdorf Vindiciæ cauſæ Palatinæ & cancellaria Bavarica.* fol. 1640—Another folio, which I ſuppoſe to be his, was publiſhed in 1725, entitled, *Ruſdorf Conſilia & Negot. politica:* and many of his letters are to be found in *Chriſtian's Spicilegium*, 8o, 2 tom. 1724. *Memoirs communicated.*

* Iſabella Clara Eugenia, wife of archduke Albert. This great and politic princeſs was born at Segovia in 1566. She fixed herſelf in the Low Countries

It is furprizing that our hiſtorians ſhould know nothing of this *ſpeech* of Auſtruther, nor of *the four extraordinary conditions* required by the emperor, though the reigns of James and Charles I. can never be underſtood with any common exactneſs until we comprehend far better than we do at preſent the whole tranſaction relating to the Palatinate, with reſpect to ourſelves as well as the courts of Vienna, Madrid, and Bruſſels. The reader may have ſome ſlight obligation to me for producing this *political threnody* after the expiration of one century, and the fifth of another; yet it will be hard to aſcertain *what theſe four indigeſtible propoſitions really conſiſted of.* I once mentioned the affair tranſiently to a German nobleman, who at preſent is the brighteſt luminary of the court he ſerves, and than whom no one is more intimately converſant in the depths of hiſtory; and upon the whole it appeared highly probable to me, that the propoſals from the Auſtrian miniſtry were to this effect: *That Frederic ſhould reſign the Upper Palatinate for ever to the family of Bavaria; and—accept a penſion for his own life—That his elder ſon ſhould be bred a catholic at Vienna, and, having eſpouſed an archduchеſs of Auſtria, be reinſtated, at the father's death, into the Lower Palatinate.—Laſtly, that the elector Palatine, in aſking pardon, ſhould ſubmit to the degrading neceſſity of* DOING IT ON HIS KNEES.

As this prince, whoſe affairs explain the ſecret hiſtory of Great Britain for fourteen years, appears to be known chiefly by hearſay to the Engliſh hiſtorians, I ſhall venture to note concerning him, that the unhappy Frederic ſeems to have been born to nothing but vexations, diſtreſſes, and diſappointments*. The dukes of Neuburg and Deux Ponts diſputed ſtrongly, during his minority, the adminiſtration of the Palatinate; th one by virtue of the late elector's will, and the other as being the neareſt relation to him. At length the emperor Rodolphus decided in favour of the duke de Deux Ponts, who exerciſed the office of guardian, as guardians uſually do; that is, ſeverely and inſolently. Our

Countries at the beginning of the laſt century, and governed ſingly for twelve years. She lived to the age of ſixty-ſeven. There are many fine pictures of her. His grace of Devonſhire has a good one. It is ſuſpected by many that ſhe was rendered *barren* before ſhe was created archduchеſs; for when Philip II. conveyed the ſeventeen provinces to her by way of dowry, which give his ſon no ſmall diſquiet, he anſwered like a politician formed in his own Coimbrian college, "Promiſiſſe ſe quidem eas provincias, ſed multas rationes & cauſas poſſe inveniri, quæ eum hoc promiſſo abſolvant." *Arcana. Dominat. Hiſpan.* 124.

* *Schannat, Hiſt. Abregée de la Maiſon Palat.* 8°. à Francf. 1740. p. 55. &c.

young

young prince was ſon of Frederic IV. and the celebrated Louiſa Juliana, whom Spanheim's pen has rendered immortal in one of the moſt curious pieces of hiſtory extant*. Formed at Sedan under the duke de Bouillon, and moſt virtuouſly educated, he underſtood Latin extremely well, and talked all the modern languages; he was likewiſe uncommonly verſed in hiſtory, and earneſtly conſulted the peace of the empire. He had three excellent miniſters, Camerarius, Grun, and Ruſdorf.

The moment he was freed, by age, from the incumbrance of a guardian, he haſtened into England, and eſpouſed Elizabeth daughter of James I. The Engliſh, who are ſeldom indifferent upon any occaſion, took it into their heads to be extremely tranſported with this proteſtant match; and to do them juſtice they had reaſon to be ſo. Univerſal joy poſſeſſed the whole nation. Balls, carouſals, and feaſtings were innumerable. The very poets were called in from every quarter. Such magificence of ſcene has rarely been beheld in the moſt expenſive and extravagant times. Jonſon and Davenant held the pen; Lawes compoſed the muſic; Inigo Jones contrived the theatrical architecture, and the beſt painters, on this ſide the Alps, adorned the ſcenes with their pencils †.

Theſe honours, to which the order of the garter was added, lulled Frederic into a ſort of dream, and rendered him a viſionary in ambition, to which the ſpirited and magnanimous temper of his wife did not a little contribute ‡. He forgot his own dominions, in themſelves the moſt beautiful, and at that time the moſt flouriſhing in the empire, and caught incautiouſly though honeſtly, and with ſome diffidence, at what he imagined to be a great acquiſition, the crown of Bohemia. ‖.

* *Memoires de Louiſe Juliane Electrice Palatine*, 4°. a Leyde, 1645. [By *Fred. Spanheim.*]

† So that by a calculation which has fallen in my way, it appears that his Britannic majeſty, including Elizabeth's dowry of £. 40,000. expended on theſe nuptials from firſt to laſt £. 146,572.

‡ Joh. Nadanyi Florus Hungaricus, 12°. Amſt. 1663. p. 361.

‖ Amongſt various juſtifications of reſiſtance, &c. alledged by the Bohemians, concerning which an expreſs treatiſe has been publiſhed, entitled *Conſideratio cauſarum Belli Boëmici* 4°. *in libertate* 1647, it is remarked principally, that the LITERAS MAJESTATIS of the emperor Rodolphus, anno 1609, which granted free exerciſe of the proteſtant religion and communion *ſub utraque*, had been notoriouſly as well as frequently violated, contrary to all good faith, ſtipulation, and promiſe. With which aſſertion each impartial reader will concur readily, when he peruſes the *original Imperial letter*, preſerved in the laſt mentioned performance, par. ii. pag. 68, 84.

Had

Had this prince been bleſſed with a warineſs and penetration that rarely fall to a young man's ſhare; had he well known his own comparative weakneſs, or the ſtrength and fury of his enemies; had he ſeen ever ſo little into the mutability, inſincerity, and timidity of his father-in law, who never held but one tone, namely *abſtineto ab armis fatuis*, he might then, without heſitation, have rejected the offers made him by the proteſtants in Bohemia, who ſought him, not as a ſure protector and ſafeguard, but as the *only one* that could then be found.

Amongſt other things, this unhappy young man, according to the cuſtom of that age, allowed himſelf to be influenced by judicial aſtrology; and as the book of fate was a volume which every ſtar-gazer could read his own way, backward, forward, ſideways, or downward, it happened that one of theſe geniuſes had too much influence over the irreſolute mind of Frederic, who was hardly warm in the regal throne, when the battle of Prague put an end not only to his *power*, but even to his *expectations*. Thus, vacating a throne which he never enjoyed, he retired into Holland for an aſylum, and lived twelve years, an exile, upon public charity. His friend and relation the king of Denmark was too unfortunate in war, to be able to render him any aſſiſtance; and his father-in-law paid him only with ſchool diſtinctions and old ſayings, inſtead of well conducted troops, and bills of exchange.

As a ſoldier, it muſt be acknowledged he made no great figure, for he committed a great error in creating Anſpach generaliſſimo, and ſecretly favoured Hohenlo, whom all men ſuſpected, and who afterwards deſerted him. He wanted neither courage nor firmneſs; but they were more of the reflective than military caſt: for juſt before the battle of Prague he conveyed his eldeſt ſon and declared ſucceſſor out of the kingdom of Bohemia, which caſt a damp upon all men's ſpirits; he left the field of action like a defeated colonel of Croatians, and not with the dignity of a retreating prince, loſing his order of the garter in his retreat. Upon this account the Imperial beaux-eſprits affixed on the gates of Prague a programma to the following effect—That great rewards ſhould be beſtowed on the perſon who could give any tidings or intelligence of a certain runaway monarch, in the flower of his youth, of a complexion inclining to the florid, diminutive in ſtature, with a beard entirely juvenile, and eyes ſquinting a little. Of himſelf a well conditioned and worthy young man, but ſeduced by

evil-minded and ſeditious adviſers*. This is the firſt hue and cry after a fugitive king that I remember to have met with either in ancient or modern hiſtory.

This prince, in all other reſpects relating to civil and political life, appears to be ſtedfaſt and unſhaken. He remonſtrated, in the election of the king of the Romans, that if the Auſtrian ſucceſſion was not interrupted *then*, when the right line failed, no hope remained hereafter, when that honour was conferred on Ferdinand, who, having iſſue, would make it an appendage for ever to the Imperial throne; and inſtead of ſinking under the oppreſſions of the houſe of Auſtria, he rather ſeems to riſe upon them, preſerving a clearneſs of judgment as well an an uniformity of temper under the moſt ſevere trials †. Part of this may be attributed to the conduct of Elizabeth of England, his conſort, who was intrepid and heroic beyond all the reſt of her family. When young Thurn undertook to defend Prague a ſingle day, in order to facilitate her eſcape, ſhe generouſly refuſed to force the brave ſon of her beſt friend to fall into the hands of an unforgiving enemy. Though it is certain that her Bohemian majeſty never countenanced any intrigue, yet ſhe had a violent inclination to be adored at a diſtance. She was not to be called a conſummate beauty, though then in the height of her bloom, being about twenty-three years of age. Her figure was both of the majeſtic and attractive kind ‡, and ſhe certainly poſſeſſed what the French call the *manners and the graces*. Her courage and preſence of mind provided her with admirers; half the army being in love with her. The fierce Chriſtian duke of Brunſwic was her tractable ſlave §; and ſo was young Thurn and lord Craven. They all fought for her, as much as for the cauſe, and lord Craven when he left the wars, all hopes of recovering the Palatinate being cut off by the death of Guſtavus, carried his enthuſiaſm ſo far, that he built the fine houſe of Hampſted Marſhall, on the banks of the river Kennet, in Berkſhire, a tract of country not unlike the Palatinate, nor inferior to many

* *Riccio de Bellis German.* L. i. p. 46. Venet. 4°. 1648.

† See his *letter* to James I. preſerved in the Cabala, which may be conſidered as a maſterpiece in politics.

‡ There are two pictures of Elizabeth at Hampton Court, one when princeſs of England, and one when electreſs and queen of Bohemia; the latter by Vanſomer.

§ Elizabethæ conjugi Frederici ereptam de manibus Chirothecam pileo ſuo accommodans, juraverit; non demiſſurum ſe ſymbolum illud è capite, priuſquam regem Fredericum ſolio Pragenſi redditum vidiſſet. *Brachel. Hiſt. noſtr. temp.* p. 58.

parts of it in beauty, as a fort of aſylum for his injured princeſs *.

It is certain that poſterity, which uſually draws concluſions from the ſucceſsful or unfortunate nature of events, may blame Frederic for accepting the throne of Bohemia too raſhly. Yet he had excellent miniſters, who judged rightly, according to the probability of ſecond cauſes; but his pacific father-in-law deceived every expectation of the young prince; and the Bohemians, as much as they ſighed for liberty, declined all advance of *pecuniary aſſiſtance*. Nevertheleſs, it muſt not be diſſembled, that a pamphlet was publiſhed at that period, 1620, ſome few months before the battle of Prague, which, for ſpirit, elegance, and political argument, ſurpaſſes any thing relative to the times in queſtion, which I have peruſed †; and contained true ſuggeſtions no way diſadvantageous to the proſperity of Frederic.

The drift of this work was to prove, *that his Bohemian majeſty had paſſed the Rubicon; that the die of his fortune was caſt, it being in his power to* fall, *but not* deſcend; *that he might periſh by his* friends *more probably than by his* enemies, *as the whole race of Alexander was extinguiſhed by the generals of Alexander; that not four monarchs had proſpered in newly acquired dominions from the times of Julius Cæſar to Ferdinand II. but had been deſtroyed through envy or hatred; nor had any king ſate on the throne of Bohemia, who had not experienced ingratitude and rebellion.* "*Believe me,* Sire," continued the author to Frederic "*every man that* deſpiſeth *life is maſter of yours; conſider well your* declared *enemies, your* true *friends, and your* concealed *ones. Amongſt the firſt are the houſe of Auſtria, the pope, and their allies; to overcome ſuch powers, you muſt have brave officers, large reſources, and perſeverance in abundance. Hannibal gained three illuſtrious victories, and ten ſmaller ones, and yet at length becoming both tributary and exile, tarniſhed his whole character of bravery, by deſtroying himſelf with a draught of poiſon. You want his army and his ſupplies; and have therefore thrown yourſelf under the protection of men who* believe *themſelves at preſent your true friends. But reflect*

* It was a piece of architecture in the true taſte of the reign of Charles I. and coſt Lord Craven, though he never lived to finiſh the inſide, about ſixty thouſand pounds. The author, when a child, was a melancholy ſpectator of its deſtruction by fire, in the year 1718, or thereabouts. It was not built by Inigo Jones, but by Gerbier, a German architect then in vogue.

† It was entitled a *Free Diſcourſe*, or ſecret inſtructions with reference to the affairs of Germany, Bohemia, and Hungary, addreſſed in a letter to the elector Palatine.

*a moment*;

*a moment; may they not be obliged to contribute more than they like? may they not deſpair of a proper remuneration? may not competitions ariſe among them? may not ſomething hinder them from ſupplying their contingent? may not unforeſeen wars ariſe and demand their aſſiſtance at home? and, laſtly, may not your power, merely conſidered in itſelf, become odious unto them and matter of jealouſy? Nay, in length of time, they may propoſe counſels contradictory to yours, and deſert you at laſt. This happened in the reign of Charles V. when the princes gave up the cauſe of the* cities. *The houſe of Auſtria hath cards of exchange to play in her very laſt diſtreſs. She can cede the annext provinces* to the king of Poland, upon his promiſe to repulſe you, and guarantee her rights in other dominions: ſhe can make a peace with the Venetians, and grant them Friuli, Carniola, and Carinthia, upon ſuppoſition the republic will reinſtate her in Bohemia and the abovenamed incorporated provinces: ſhe can reſign ſomething remote to France and Spain, and make a juſt demand upon their aſſiſtances. Thus,* Sire, *you may be ruined in the high career of your proſperity: parts and induſtry contribute to deſtroy thoſe, who are predeſtined to be unfortunate."*

" *If you have* any *friends, they are your father-in-law, your wife, and the marechal de Bouillon. As to your* concealed *or* nominal *friends, the Bohemians are the firſt; they declared you king by mere neceſſity, having made a previous tender of the crown to the electors of Saxony and Bavaria, and even to the prince of Tranſylvania. It was their original intention to have created you a* ſtadtholder of Holland *or an* advoyer of Berne; *but the unforeſeen election of an emperor forced them to change the* conſul *into the* king. *You have taken* oaths *like an inconſiderable dependant; the ſtates are* your accuſers, your witneſſes, *and* your judges. *They can wage war when they* pleaſe, *but you* cannot: *they can levy an army* againſt *you, whilſt at the ſame time you are not maſter of an* arſenal, *a* magazine, *or a* ſingle regiment. *In a word,* Sire, *you are a tree that is* propped, *but not* rooted. *One may add alſo, that the Lutheran party diſlike you in private, and the Huſſites likewiſe."*

" *Venture not to imitate the example of your uncle Maurice. No prince ever waged war with more difficulties and greater ſucceſs; no ſon ever afforded more ſincere pleaſure or reputation to the ghoſt of a father; thoſe whom he conquered adored him, and made him a promiſe of eternal affection. Yet at this moment, if he had not prevented the malice of certain ill-wiſhers,*

* Sileſia, Luſatia, Moravia.

*nothing had remained of him but a* name *in hiſtory, and Barnevelt had reigned: for the war between* liberty *and* monarchy *is inextinguiſhable. It is juſt thus in Bohemia. You deſire to be a king* in ſubſtance *and not* in ſhadow. *You want* ſubjects, *and they want a* ſervant."

" *Nor have you better reaſons to rely upon the friendſhip or fidelity of Gabriel Bethlem. He is piqued at miſcarrying in the Bohemian election: contented now to fix his foot in Hungary, by your means to put in for a half ſhare of the general wreck of the incorporated provinces, or, upon any good occaſion, join with the emperor, and make the ſame diviſion with him, as he now wiſhes to effect with you. The inconſtancy and duplicities of this prince are well known: I here incloſe two original letters that paſſed from him to the grand vizir, the latter of which is dated ſince his alliance with the Bohemians*, and there you may ſee he makes no ceremony of betraying you to the Turks upon a proper occaſion. As to the Venetians, your Bohemian ſubjects will acquire no good ſentiments in your behalf, by entering into an alliance with determined republicans. The free towns of Germany will diſlike you, when their preſent apprehenſions are compoſed. Worms, Spires, Francfort, Ulm, and Nuremberg, thought you too powerful before. Remember to practiſe what* Cicero *adviſed the* novos homines: *farewell.*"

The age we are ſpeaking of, hardly ever gave us a more ſpirited, or more ſenſible, remonſtrance than the preſent; and it is a pleaſure to me to ſnatch from oblivion an hiſtorical fragment of ſo uncommon a caſt. It is, more or leſs, all truth; and a very compendious ſort of truth, powerfully and forcibly worded. Happy had it been for the unfortunate elector Palatine, if he had paid regard to a ſyſtem of politics, which perhaps came from an enemy; but the influence of his evil ſtars gained the aſcendancy, to which ambition contributed not a little.

Had Guſtavus lived, the elector might in all probability have been reinſtated at laſt; but on the death of that prince he ſoon followed his generous deliverer, labouring under no other diſtemper than a broken heart. He died at Mentz in the thirty-ſeventh year of his age, leaving behind him an afflicted wife and ten children under age.

It is true, the Bohemians alledged in their defence, that this prince was too economical to preſerve a kingdom that had been generouſly offered him. This is taking the advantage of being the firſt accuſers, and transferring

* Preſburg, November 24, 1619.

to him the fault, which was more peculiarly their own*. As to generoſity, he performed vaſt works with reſpect to the palace of Heidelderg, which any one will ſoon acknowledge when he knows the rock whereon it ſtands; and completed at immenſe coſt the fortifications of Manheim, began by his father, Frederic IV. In regard to his mildneſs of government, it is certain, that the common people loved him extremely: and amongſt other reaſons, that which a poor peaſant gave, was not a contemptible one; "*Friend,*" ſaid a Spaniſh general to an inhabitant of the Palatinate, "*what makes you adhere ſo ſtedfaſtly to an exiled and nominal ſovereign?*" "*Why, Sir,*" replied the fellow, "*that prince, when he governed us,* raiſed fewer taxes in a year, than you extort from us in the ſpace of a month †."

Notwithſtanding all that may be ſaid, it was the fate of this unfortunate prince to be unhappy, and yet deluded at intervals with glimmerings of hope to the very laſt. Before the battle of Prague, he appeared to have every thing at his devotion. Two years afterwards, the great Mansfelt, who was a warrior of a peculiar caſt, retrieved his affairs a ſecond time; whilſt the journey he made through France incognito, and to the quarters of archduke Leopold's ſoldiers, are highly deſerving of commendation; but the loſs of three deciſive battles, and three ſeveral armies, in the ſpace of two months and eight days, reduced him at length to ſign the *following extraordinary diſmiſſal of his troops,* which diſcovers more greatneſs of mind than deſpondency. Nor can I

* In proof of this ſuggeſtion, it is clear, from hiſtory, that they ſubmitted with too much viſible readineſs and complacency after the battle of Prague: [*Ephemeris expedit. in Bohem.* 103, 104.] ſigned *a retraction,* and ſwore *new allegiance* to Ferdinand II. of which the form may be peruſed in the laſt mentioned valuable performance, p. 107, 108; where it is ſubjoined, that eight days after the aforeſaid battle, "Duo ex Britannia legati apud ſuam ſerenitatem (Maximilian. elect. Bav.) de pace componenda egerunt, quærendam aliquam viam, qua inter Ceſarem, reges, & principes pax conveniret. Sed eum *ſigillatim nihil* adferrent, quo modo res tractanda fuerit, ſua ſerenitas *generatim,* quæ res poſtulabat, reſpondit." Ibid, 109.—And to this may be added a ſubſequent remark: "Angli fratrum expectationi non reſponderunt; ſpem miſerorum fefellerunt, cauſam evangelicorum nunquam ſatis cognoſcere voluerunt, papiſtis in Antonia de dominis impoſtori, fidem habuerunt; aliquid aliquando, legatis & verbis pro Palatinis egerunt, ſed ita frigide, ut nihil effecerint. Nec huic cauſæ & bello communi ſeſe immiſcere ipſis placuit, donec animadverſione dei tacti, ipſimet inteſtino bello puniantur, atque in viſcera ſua ſævientes immutuas cædes ruant." *Conſideratio cauſarum belli Boemici.* 4°. *in libertate,* 1647, pag. 137—part 11. See more in a tract, very ſcarce, called a III. *Part of the Swediſh Diſcipline,* p. 4.

† *Arcana Dominat. Hiſpan.* p. 186.

abſtain from attempting to recover a relict of hiſtory ſo extremely curious.

" BE IT KNOWN TO ALL:

That the illuſtrious princes, the captain-general of my forces, and the general-lieutenant under him, namely the count of Mansfelt, prince Chriſtian duke of Brunſwic; AND all the colonels, lieutenant-colonels, captains, and other officers of every denomination, at preſent ſerving under them, HAVE each ſingly and conjointly to the utmoſt of their power rendered the elector Palatine faithful ſervice in war: BUT now being deſtitute of all human aſſiſtances, HE perceives it impracticable to make further uſe of them, except to their own great inconvenience and detriment. HE therefore, with all due reſignation of mind, alloweth them to ſolicit their diſmiſſion in the dutiful and reſpectful manner they have done: and, like a friend, with all imaginable tenderneſs and humanity, not only *abſolves* them *from the oath* they have taken to him, but permits them, according to their prudence, to conſult their ſafety and intereſt, as far as may be poſſible, elſewhere *."

This *document* he ſubſcribed with his own hand, and affixed his ſeal to it, July 13, 1622

But to return from this digreſſion, which we hope carries novelty enough with it to procure its pardon, we will reſume the negotiations at the diet of Ratiſbon, where Brulart †, the French miniſter, diſcharged his duty with talents and induſtry: for, not to mention his private tranſactions and intrigues, he ſet himſelf in public only to prove this one propoſition, That France had not only an inherent affection for the empire, but power likewiſe to render it important ſervices; and that her interference formerly, now, and upon all future occaſions, had, did, and ever would proceed from the glorious and diſintereſted principle, of doing good to her neighbours. An oſtenſible doctrine ſhe has followed faithfully and invariably ever ſince!

* *Laurea Auſtriaca*, fol. p. 551.

† Charles Brulart, ſurnamed de Leon, became from an eccleſiaſtic a negotiator, and gained, during his reſidence at Venice, 25,000l. by means of carrying on a ſecret commerce with the merchants of the Levant. After having diſcharged this duty, he was appointed ambaſſador into Switzerland; and thence removed to Ratiſbon. Richelieu did not like him; and when Brulart's natural ſon carried to Paris the reſult of his father's negotiations at the diet there, the cardinal diſpatched him back with this ſtudied and malignant introduction to his verbal orders: *I beg you, Sir, on my part to inform your father—I mean, Sir, pray tell the ambaſſador.—Brulart* bequeathed, by will, five gold crowns to every perſon of his name, who appeared at the anniverſary celebration of his birthday. *Memoires Hiſt. & Polit. d'Amelot là Houſſaye.* tom. i. 540.

Father

Father Joſeph, cardinal Richelieu's better half in matters of politics, made his appearance at this diet, with a ſeparate commiſſion, whereby he was commanded to exhibit a long deduction of the reaſons that had induced France to afford protection and aſſiſtance to the duke of Mantua. He was charged likewiſe with one private inſtruction, to traverſe the deſigns of Walſtein's faction, the cardinal conſidering him as a perſon too haughty and untractable. To make the bait more alluring, he promiſed the emperor, on the part of his maſter, to facilitate the election of his ſon as king of the Romans *.

By virtue of theſe three commiſſions, for his buſineſs was only to interfere quietly, and penetrate dexterouſly into other men's deſigns, he contributed in part, as ſome people thought, to the removal of Walſtein; though in truth all parties wiſhed it, and the event might have happened without his aſſiſtance. He concluded a treaty with the emperor in reſpect to Italy, which all parties concerned thought fit to diſapprove, and the French king declared he would never ratify, except ſome articles were expunged relative to his allies and friends, amongſt whom Guſtavus was ſuppoſed to be principally alluded to. As to the election of a king of the Romans, he executed preciſely the very thing he propoſed; making abundance of promiſes, and keeping his actions in reſerve. Thus much is certain, he performed his buſineſs ſo confuſedly on the one hand, and ſo diſtinctly on the other, that Richelieu ever afterwards made him the partaker of his ſecrets, and the counſellor of his boſom †. How highly Louis XIII. reliſhed his negotiations at this diet, appears

* *Siri, Memor. Recond.* tom. vii. 229.

† This extraordinary man, according to a *Latin manuſcript life* I have of him, written by father Leon, a Carmelite, was deſcended from the noble and illuſtrious family of the Le Clercs, and born in the year 1577. He had the complete education of a gentleman and a ſcholar, and paſſed his youth alternately between the belles-lettres and ſciences, and the manly exerciſe and practice of arms. His Latin and Greek verſes were much admired in France, and he perfected himſelf in juriſprudence and mathematics at Padua. At Rome he ſtudied mankind and politics, and was much eſteemed by Clement VIII. His mother, without hurting her fortune, ſupplied him with money to make the tour of Germany and England; the conſtitutions of both which countries he knew to the bottom, and kept company with none but the great and beſt informed. In this latter voyage he formed a correct opinion of England in a religious ſenſe, and paved the foundation for that introduction of Popiſh emiſſaries, which afterwards gave ſuch an untoward turn to the affairs of Charles I.

Conſcious of his utility to the king and miniſter, he thought it redounded much more to his honour to perform the great things he did in the character of a private man, than to attract the formal obſervance of the

appears by the following paſſage in his epitaph, of which I have a tranſcript by me. *Valtelinæ motus compoſuit, Ratiſbonæ* QUÆ *rex optabat in ſolenni conventu à Germanis* EXPRESSIT; *& multo* ante Julio-dunenſem pacem & Andegavenſem procurabat——.

Whilſt this diet was ſitting, news came of Guſtavus's actual arrival in Germany. The aſſembly knew not which to admire moſt, the ſtrength and power of the emperor, or the heroic ambition of Guſtavus, whoſe peculiar turn it was to conſider few things removed beyond his reach. It was remarked likewiſe by all parties, that he knew how to fight, and how to be obeyed; and as to diſcipline, he maintained it in equal ſubordination and proportion, from the general to the meaneſt horſe-boy in the ſervice. He held it a maxim to allow no one perſon of his army to remain inactive*: for when the operations of the field ſtood ſtill, he conſtantly turned his men into pioneers and military architects; and when nothing of that nature preſented itſelf, every common ſoldier was his own mechanic, taylor, and ſempſtreſs. It may ſeem ridiculous, but it is inconteſtably true, that a Swediſh officer might often be ſeen, at hours of amuſement, knitting his own ſtockings, and weaving his own point-lace. With regard to the difficulties attending an invaſion, Guſtavus

people by the ſplendour of a mitre and a cardinal's hat, both which he refuſed with firmneſs; affecting, from a particular greatneſs of mind, to be conſiderable in his own way; and beſt pleaſed to receive viſits from Richelieu in a *private lodging*.

He made himſelf a Capuchin in the twenty-third year of his age, though not only his relations, but Louis XIII. himſelf, attempted to diſſuade him; and the more ſo, as he had paſſed through a campaign as a volunteer, with no ſmall applauſe. He procured great benefactions and endowments to the religious orders, and took upon himſelf the difficult taſk of ſending miſſionaries to the Eaſt-Indies. The duke d'Alençon, who was of the blood royal, and the wife of the conſtable Montmorenci, were his ſponſors at the font; and it is ſaid that in his youth he produced fruits and bloſſoms at the ſame time. He talked moſt of the modern languages with great correctneſs, and was remarkably acute in his theological diſputations. He had the humility to perform many journies on foot, but entertained ſuch high no ions of the glory of his country, that he entered into politics from that ſingle conſideration. He directed the conſtable De Luynes before he undertook the management of Richelieu; and died in 1639, being conſtantly viſited in his ſickneſs by the cardinals Richelieu and Bichi, the king's brother, the chancellor Seguier, the preſident Bouthilier, and the three ſecretaries of ſtate. In a word, his individual character was, that he ſeized the point in view at the firſt glance, even in caſes of the moſt trying and perilous nature, and never departed in any material reſpect from his original ideas.

Vita [MS^ta] R. P. JOSEPHI, Capuchini: incipit, *vir origine*—Explicit, *veri amantiſſimus ſcripſit.*

* *Le Barre, Hiſt. d'Allemagne*, tom. ix. 598.

Guſtavus contrived to render them very eaſy; for his proveditors and ſoldiers paid for every thing at the full market-price; and when they found themſelves ſtraitened either for neceſſaries or conveniencies, ſubmitted patiently, and took nothing by force. Thus the *invader* grew more acceptable to the country than the *perſon invaded*; nor do I find that the peaſants ever did the leaſt miſchief to the ſick, the ſtraggling, or wounded ſoldiers.

Guſtavus by this time appeared to have entered the empire in *earneſt*, and the Imperial party thought it neceſſary therefore to venture upon ſome preliminary meaſures, in order to check his progreſs. As the *command of rivers* greatly influenced the ſucceſs of war in thoſe days, the Auſtrian miniſtry diſpatched a meſſage to the duke of Pomerania, ſince the invaſion of the Swedes ſeemed to point his way, commanding him to deliver into the hands of Torquato de Conti, the Imperial general in thoſe parts, the ſtrong towns of Gartz and Griffenhagen, which two places made him maſter of the river Oder. Whilſt the duke heſitated in his anſwer, for his private wiſhes, as far as he durſt indulge them, attended Guſtavus, Torquato's troops entered the towns by force, but gave the prince all the tolls by way of ſatisfying him.

The Imperial party next propoſed, that the whole empire ſhould reſiſt Guſtavus as a common enemy. In order to obviate that attempt, the proteſtant *confederators* wiſely ſuggeſted a ſecond time, that the *edict of reſtitution* ſhould be reverſed: but the Auſtrians and repreſentatives of the catholic league continued immoveable on that ſubject. The tempeſt at length collected itſelf with united force, and all agreed, the emperor excepted, to permit it to diſcharge its fury on Walſtein's head. The better to pave the way to this important event, the arrival of Guſtavus being notified to the emperor, in due form, by the elector of Saxony, it was thought expedient to lend an attentive ear to the repreſentations of friends, and make ſome new laws in regard to military diſcipline. Theſe laws, in themſelves, were good enough, had it been as eaſy to enforce the practice of, as it was to compile them: but the troops were already abandoned to avarice, extortion, rapine, and cruelty, ſo that it was next to impoſſible to produce a reformation among them. Nevertheleſs, it was decreed by the diet, that the power of appointing and collecting the preſcribed quota, or contingent of men and money, from every province, ſhould be exerciſed by civil and not military officers; and that the emperor, having made a reduction of ſome ſuperfluous

fluous regiments, ſhould ſignify to each circle the ſum he propoſed to levy from it; whence it was expected, that the troops would all be paid punctually, and not in an irregular manner. Be this as it will, one misfortune attended theſe fine ſchemes, which was, they were never carried into execution.

All parties contributing towards the degradation of Walſtein, Ferdinand at length found himſelf obliged to pave the way gently for that general's diſcharge. The elector of Bavaria* hated him mortally, as an upſtart, as a general, and as a rival; and conſidered himſelf, Tilly being naturally modeſt, and his own creature and dependant, as the perſon that ought to be ſupreme general of the Auſtrian forces and the catholic league. The Spaniards favoured the archduke, inaſmuch as his marriage had rendered him ſubſervient to their intereſts; and the court of Madrid had the inſolence to ſtyle herſelf *Signora di orecchi di Ceſare*†. Wherefore, upon the whole, it may be ſafely ſaid that the major party ſeemed inclined to declare the elector of Bavaria generaliſſimo. That prince was, however, too ſagacious to accept an employment of ſo hazardous a nature; ſufficiently contented, that he had at his abſolute devotion a general, namely Tilly, whom he could mortify by his diſpleaſure, or perſuade with his plauſible and artful eloquence: for though war was not his talent, he was the moſt able and deſigning politician amongſt the Germans; alſo inſincere, diſſembling, artful, and ſelf-intereſted beyond meaſure.

In order to reconcile Walſtein's mind to ſuch a ſhock, his Imperial majeſty ſent to him privately the barons Verdenberg‡ and Queſtenberg §, both favourites and very par-

* Maximilian, elector of Bavaria, a prince ſelf-intereſted, it is true, and bigotted beyond imagination, but conſiderable likewiſe as being eſteemed the ſhrewdeſt and moſt artful politician at that time in the empire. He had parts ſufficient to have embroiled Germany more, if poſſible, than it then was; but his temperament was of ſuch a caſt, that he had always one perpetual difficulty upon his hands, and that was to harmonize religion and intereſt. His education had been ſomewhat above the princely level, for he underſtood all the dexterities of hiſtory and diplomacy; converſed in moſt of the modern languages, Engliſh alone excepted, extremely well, even the Hungarian and the Sclavonian; and was remarkable for a correct Latin ſtyle. He had the ſingular happineſs to outlive the very completion of the *thirty* years wars, which himſelf began: and died the third autumn after the concluſion of the peace of Munſter, in the ſeventy-eighth year of his age.

† *Pietro Pomo*; *Guerre di Germ.* tom. i. 23.

‡ John Baptiſta Verdenberg, privy-counſellor and Aulic Auſtrian chancellor.

§ Gerard Queſtenberg, privy-counſellor.

Theſe two miniſters were afterwards employed to intreat him to reſume the command.

ticular

ticular friends of the general, in fact, they had all reciprocally been friends and patrons to each other, and ordered them to insinuate the strong state reasons which compelled their common master to assent to so harsh and sudden a proceeding. Walstein, comforted a little by Sepler, who then served him in *quality of astrologer*, received the message with profound submission and resignation; at the same time inveighing bitterly against his own and master's enemies, who, to ruin him, destroyed the whole Imperial power. He had at that time retreated like a private nobleman to Memmingen, in order to watch the resolutions of the diet, and convey directions to his friends who made their appearance there; hoping to avert, if possible, the fatal blow that threatened him.

After some conference with the ministers of state, Walstein retired to a private room, and wrote to his master, beseeching him to shew so much justice and fortitude at least, as not to listen to those reports, which courts and factions create against a man of any consequence, whenever disgrace threatens him. That for his own part he concluded his employment to be *perpetual*; nevertheless, he now resigned it cheerfully, and without retrospect; affecting not to feel those certain pangs, which ambition usually gives men in its last struggles. "I beseech your Imperial majesty," continued he, "to dispose part of your army in the neighbourhood of Ratisbon, and distribute the rest on the confines of Bavaria, and near the territories of those princes who seem to have an inclination to counterwork your designs. One single motion of this nature will impose silence on them all. The watchword of the faction is to alarm your *Cæsarean* majesty with the name of *Gustavus*. *Let him advance further into the empire, and I will scourge him back with a rod.*"

Having sealed and directed this letter, he returned to his friends without delay; and, after entertaining them with extreme politeness, dismissed them with an undisturbed and open countenance, which was the more extraordinary, as his natural aspect was not of *that* cast in his most unguarded and tranquil moments. In consequence of all that had preceded, the emperor was obliged to command him to resign the investiture of the duchy of Mechlenburg, under pretence of not giving umbrage to his Swedish majesty, or the electoral college. He then removed him from the command of the army, part of which was ordered to be disbanded, and declared for the future, that contributions should depend on the regulations made by the circles, and not on the will of a

general; proteſting likewiſe, that he would wage no war, without apprizing the electors.

We ſhall obſerve elſewhere, that this diſcharge of a conſiderable part of the Imperial forces gave the firſt fatal ſtroke to the emperor's affairs, being one of thoſe unproſperous meaſures, where all that was not weakneſs in one part of the propoſers, proceeded from inſincerity in the other; no uncommon caſe in deliberations of ſtate. Nevertheleſs, the emperor ſtill retained an immenſe number of veteran troops, beſides garriſons, and excluſive of the army that belonged to the league; which at that time were eſteemed doubly or trebly ſufficient to have chaſed Guſtavus out of the empire. Yet the error was ſoon diſcovered by dear-bought experience; and the combined catholic armies, the campaigns enſuing, were advanced to the number of 160,000 fighting men.

One may attempt to account for Walſtein's profound ſubmiſſion ſeveral ways. In the firſt place, he found it impoſſible to ſtem the fury of the torrent; and in the ſecond, it is probable the emperor had given him private aſſurances of reſtoring him to power, as ſoon as the preſent tempeſt ſhould begin to diſperſe: laſtly, it appears from ſome accounts, that his own aſtrologer predicted a ſudden *emerſion* from this eclipſe; a circumſtance ſufficient to reſt his hopes on, if the caſt and turn of the age be duly conſidered!

At length, by the artful intrigues of Maximilian elector of Bavaria, whom the emperor all along ſuſpected of having an eye to the kingly power of the Romans, and of tampering with France in a ſiniſter manner, Tilly, who had been created a count at Vienna with the title of *Illuſtriſſimo**, was advanced to the ſupreme command of the Imperial armies in conjunction with that of the catholic league. He ſoon collected together a large body of forces, which lay diſperſed through Bavaria and the Palatinate, and advanced directly into Miſnia, in order to keep the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg in ſubmiſſion. Thus ended the diet of Ratiſbon, which met about June 19, 1630, and concluded November 13th next enſuing; giving birth to the aſſembly at Leipſic, convened February 8, 1630-1, and ending April 3d in the ſame year.

The proteſtants retired from Ratiſbon, not greatly ſatisfied in *four* particulars; for war was declared againſt Guſtavus at a time they hoped to propoſe ſome accommodation: The emperor likewiſe required from the electors of Saxony and

* *Status Regiminis Ferdinandi* II. 12°. 1637.

Brandenburg,

Brandenburg, money, proviſions, ammunition, and ſoldiers, which theſe princes conſidered as a new bill of a very diſagreeable nature. The enforcement of the edict of reſtitution was ſtill ſupported with vigour; and various reformations propoſed in reference to proteſtant churches, ſchools, and colleges; which laſt eſpecially were intended to be confirmed in a future diet, to be held at Francfort on the Mayne, the month of Auguſt enſuing.

We left his Swediſh majeſty in full preparation to embark for Stetin, the antient reſidence of the dukes of Pomerania, and the capital city of the inner duchy; into which place Torquato de Conti had attempted, without ſucceſs, to throw a large body of troops two days before; but the vigilance of his unwearied enemy prevented him.

On the very day the king propoſed to ſet ſail, the wind, which had been tempeſtuous for a long continuance, then happened to blow directly againſt him, which afflicted him to ſuch a degree, that he retired privately to his cloſet devotions*. Towards evening the gale changed point blank, and the whole fleet ran twenty miles in two hours, arriving before Stetin under full ſail in the moſt beautiful order. His majeſty, next morning, inveſted the town with all his army; upon which colonel Damitz, the governor, who had the command likewiſe of the ſurrounding diſtrict, diſpatched a trumpeter to him, with requeſt not to approach within the reach of cannot ſhot. The king with a tone of eagerneſs, demanded immediately, who ſent him? for the duke of Pomerania was in the city; and being informed of the governor's rank and condition, and that the meſſage came from him and from no other perſon, returned the trumpeter back with theſe inſtructions: *Tell Damitz, it is not my cuſtom to treat with men of his ſtamp by the intervention of an interpreter* †.

Puzzled with this anſwer, and the inuendo that lay concealed beneath it, the governor, without delay, waited on the king, who, pointing to his troops, ſaid, *Behold, Sir, there is the key of my admiſſion.* Nevertheleſs, he ſhook him by the hand at the ſame time.

Guſtavus preſſed Damitz to procure an interview betwixt himſelf and his maſter, *For, Sir,* ſaid he, *I treat only with principals*; and agreed either to viſit the duke in Stetin, having no fear of being taken priſoner, or give him a meet-

* *Arlanibæi Arma Suec.* p. 21. This prayer is preſerved in the *Hiſt. or Autbent. Relat.* tom. i. p. 167.

† *Soldat. Suedois*, p. 25. 8°. 1633. ſine loco.

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ing in the open fields. During this diſcourſe, the magiſtrates and citizens all flocked out to ſee the king, and were charmed with his affability and good manners; for he ſpoke courteouſly to the meaneſt inhabitant of the town; and being informed the *burgo-maſter* was mixed amongſt the crowd, ſoon made it his buſineſs to diſcover him, moved his hat, and ſhook him heartily by the hand, with aſſurances, *that he came to viſit him and the good people of Germany in the character of a friend, and not in that of a king**.

During this interval, the duke of Pomerania † arrived in a ſedan chair. The king had the politeneſs to meet him half way, and told him before all his ſubjects, *That he came to reſtore peace to the empire, and that his ſoldiers were neither ruffians nor banditti, as thoſe were which belonged to ſome other princes.* Upon this the duke begged to retire for a ſingle hour, in order to confer with his counſellors of ſtate upon ſo important an occaſion; in which requeſt he was indulged with great good humour. When he returned, he told the king he durſt not preſume to take a ſtep ſo harzardous. Guſtavus replied, *that though he ſhould poſſeſs his country, he would reſtore it to him upon his royal word:* deſiring nothing but a ſlight reward for his ſoldiers, and the prayers and thanks of the German nations; telling him likewiſe, that it was impoſſible for him to make reſiſtance, and pointing out to him every weak part in the fortifications ‡. The duke then petitioned, in the ſtrongeſt terms, to obtain the favour of continuing *neutral*. To which the king gave this ſhort anſwer, *He that is not with us, is againſt us.* Though this application of Holy Scripture may ſeem too light and ludicrous for a religious prince to make; yet my readers muſt obſerve, that it is a ſort of *proverbial expreſſion* in the High Dutch language.

* *Arlanibæi Arma Suecica*, p. 20. 4°.

† The duchy of Pomerania is about 200 miles long, and 50 or 60 miles broad. Conformably to an ancient treaty of *confraternity*, it was allowed to devolve upon the houſe of Brandenburg, in caſe the dukes of Pomerania became extinct: which event happened during the confuſion of the *thirty years* war. Nevertheleſs, the Swedes declined giving up the poſſeſſion of this commodious territory, partly as it was their firſt conqueſt in the empire, and partly as being the only ſure country into which they could retreat. At length, by the peace of Munſter, all *Outer* Pomerania was granted to the Swedes, and the *Inner* only was conferred on the elector of Brandenburg. However, by way of equivalent, the three biſhoprics, Magdeburg, Halberſtadt, and Minden, were ſecularized and beſtowed upon him. As the Swedes in theſe latter days have been almoſt ſqueezed inch by inch out of Germany; ſo the Pruſſians have no ways kept their eyes cloſed againſt ſuch favourable events.

‡ *Chemnitius*, tom. i. p. 50.

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To relieve the ſeriouſneſs of this converſation, the king, who obſerved the palace windows crowded with ladies, for the conference was held juſt under the city walls, touched the duke gently on the ſhoulder, and ſaid with a ſmile, pointing towards the caſtle, *Couſin, yonder fair defendants will not hold out three minutes againſt one company of my Dalecarnian infantry.* The duke was not to be drawn off from his purpoſe with a ſtroke of gallantry, ſtill urging the dilemma he was thrown into, and dwelling long upon his oath of allegiance, as well as the power and implacable reſentment of the houſe of Auſtria. The king, aſſuming a gravity of features, replied abruptly, *That he had* 30,000 *brave and good men under his command, who were ready, ſingly or conjointly, to ſacrifice their lives at one glance of his eye*. That the Supreme Power had made him a preſent of the iſle of Rugen before he entered Germany,* for Leſlie and the Stralſund troops had made themſelves maſters of it, *and that it would hardly become him at ſuch a juncture to leave his throat expoſed to the enemy's knife.* Well then, replied the duke, I muſt neceſſarily ſubmit to ſuperior power, and the will of Providence.

Being thus upon the point of taking leave, *Well, couſin,* ſaid the king with great compoſure, *keep your mind at eaſe, and give yourſelf no diſturbance; my truſt is, that God's providence will aſſiſt me, and proſper my deſigns. And, Sir,* added he, with an air of pleaſantry, *behave yourſelf with greater proweſs in the married ſtate,* for the duke was old and expected no iſſue, *or elſe permit me to addreſs you to adopt me for your ſon and ſucceſſor†.* A ſpeech apparently without meaning, and full of pleaſantry! and yet it is probable, that Guſtavus was never more ſincere than at the very moment he ſpoke it. It muſt be remembered, that the emperor had once made the ſame requeſt, but with leſs ſucceſs.

In the evening, when the duke returned, lord Reay ‡, privately inſtructed by the king, under pretence of eſcorting him with due military honour, entered the town attending his ſedan, at the head of 200 choſen men, all Scottiſh muſqueteers. Thus, ſecuring the outward gate for the reſt of the army, the garriſon immediately took the alarm, and ſubmitted, enrolling themſelves, to the number of 1200 men,

* *Schefferi Memorab. Suec. Gentis.* p. 181.

† *Mercure François*, tom. xvi. 285.

‡ Donald Mackey, lord Reay, colonel of the Scottiſh brigade, that was created afterwards in 1631. He was ſucceeded in that poſt by ſir John Hepburn. We owe great obligations to the memoirs and intelligence which this officer communicated to his friends in London.

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amongſt his majeſty's troops, and taking the oaths to the crown of Sweden. This regiment of infantry, from the colour of its enſigns, afterwards took the name of the *White brigade*. His majeſty then ordered his officers and ſoldiers to pitch their tents along the ramparts, becauſe he did not chuſe to incommode and moleſt the citizens, and for his own part ſlept aboard a ſhip in the mouth of the Oder, ſaying, with great good humour, *That a furred cloak for a general, and clean ſtraw for a ſoldier, made excellent beds for the ſubjects of a king who lay in an hammock.* Nor was another of his ſayings leſs remarkable; for though he entered Stetin on the Saturday night, he went thrice to church upon the Sunday, aſſigning this reaſon to his officers and ſoldiers, *That though war might be their amuſement, yet religion was their buſineſs.* As Torquato with his light troops ſurrounded the town on every ſide, he on that very account, by way of gallantry, ordered the city gates to be ſet open.

His majeſty upon a careful examination of this capital of Inner Pomerania, a place from its own nature and ſituation of great importance, ſoon perceived, that it was not fortified to his liking, and in the manner it really ought to be. Diſcovering alſo, that the citizens and peaſants were inexperienced in theſe matters, and of courſe not over induſtrious or zealous on the occaſion, he gave them to underſtand, that the town and diſtrict ought to raiſe money to defray the expences of the new fortifications, and that his own ſoldiers ſhould be architects and pioneers*. Calling for paper, he ſketched out a plan on the ſpot, and gave it his generals to reduce into practice without delay. As carriages and horſes were not to be procured, the removal and raiſing of earth was all performed by hand. His majeſty paſſed the whole day with his ſoldiers, and ordered each man, after twenty turns of carrying the earth baſket, a comfortable draught of Bremen or Dantzic ale. Thus this immenſe piece of work was advanced more with the air of a feſtival, than like a taſk of drudgery, being made ſuperior to the inſults of the enemy in a few days; and as Guſtavus was known to be the beſt engineer of that age, it received ſuch final additions and completions from his hands, that it was conſidered not only in the light of a town defenſible beyond a ſtate of danger, but as the model of juſt fortification during the ſucceeding part of the war.

Time was found, in the midſt of all this hurry, to publiſh a ſecond manifeſto on the part of Sweden, and conclude

* *Schefferi Memorab. Suec. Gentis*, p. 61.

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a public act of treaty * with the duke, of which the ſubſtance was, a renewal of all antient agreements then ſubſiſting between the kings of Sweden and dukes of Pomerania; a perpetual alliance for themſelves and ſucceſſors, defenſive and offenſive, ſo long as the emperor and empire ſhould exiſt in their preſent relative ſituation and connections; reſtitution, to the duke, under certain aſſurances, of all the places that ſhould be obtained in Pomerania; and, in caſe the ſaid duke ſhould die without heirs male, he being at that time without children, as we ſaid before, and advanced to the 50th year of his age, that his territory ſhould remain in the king's hands by way of *hypotheque*, or mortgage, till reparation might be made by the elector of Brandenburg, the inaugural ſucceſſor at all events, for all the expences incurred by Sweden in reſcuing the aforeſaid territory from the cruel perſecution of the houſe of Auſtria †. The addition of this latter article may be conſidered as a maſterpiece of policy, for it prepared, at due diſtance, the incident of tying up the elector of Brandenburg's hands, and naturally paved the way to ſome future accommodation with him.

Upon this event, Bogiſlaüs, duke of Pomerania, diſpatched a letter ‡ to the emperor, containing a long and full detail of the rapine and cruelty of the Imperial troops, repreſenting the ſudden approach of the Swediſh army on the one hand, and the negligence and inattention of the Auſtrian commander on the other; the impoſſibility of reſiſting a power ſo formidable as that of Guſtavus; not to mention fine promiſes of inviolable affection and allegiance; with a gentle inſinuation at laſt, ſomewhat in the air of a petition, gently hinting at the reſtitution of all the eſtates, which the Imperial houſe had uſurped from him §.

The emperor had more regard to hoſtilities and treaty-ſubſcriptions, than to repreſentations and remonſtrances, and ordered Torquato, whom Walſtein had made his ſubſtitute in thoſe parts, to treat the duke as a declared enemy, to the utmoſt of his power: which in the ſequel placed the Swedes in an amiable light, and made the Imperialiſts more odious. He had orders alſo to ruin the whole duchy of Po-

* APPENDIX, Art. IX.

† The whole treaty conſiſts of thirteen or (as ſome have it) fourteen articles. It may be peruſed in the *Corps Diplomatique*, tom. iv. p. 606. *Lundorpii Act. public.* fol. tom. iv. p. 79. and is preſerved likewiſe by *Arlanibæi in Armis Suecicis*, p. 23, &c. and in the *Mercure François*, tom. xvi. 286—290.

‡ APPENDIX, Art. X.

§ *Hiſtorical or Authent. Relat.* tom. i. p. 172.

merania; and he obeyed it with great exactneſs. Nevertheleſs, rendering the country deſolate, and deſtroying all forage and proviſions, did Guſtavus but little harm; for, as he was maſter of the ſea, he received plentiful ſupplies from his own dominions. Torquato did not by any means chooſe to give him battle. Equally timid and covetous, he dreaded to loſe the vaſt treaſure which he and his officers had amaſſed by rapine and plunder: a fatal effect of licentiouſneſs, which his majeſty of Sweden well foreſaw. Here ſome hiſtorians pretend not to underſtand why Walſtein did not defend his own duchy, and take the command upon him againſt Guſtavus; but to this difficulty we have given a ſolution in its proper place. He laid, all the time, at Memmingen near Ratiſbon, to watch the motions of the ſtorm gathering againſt him there: nor did he think it worth his while to act in the capacity of a general, when he daily expected to receive the news of his removal and diſgrace every day.

I ſhall now diſmiſs this ſubject with obſerving, that the ſtates readily confirmed the agreement betwixt their maſter and the king of Sweden. The town of Stetin advanced his majeſty £.8,316., and the diſtrict furniſhed him with an equal ſum; one half immediately, and the other half to be paid at the feaſt of St. Michael next enſuing. They allowed him alſo a portion of the ſea-duty on goods.

About this time the Pomeranian miniſters made many efforts to get Stralſund into their maſter's power, but Guſtavus, for certain reaſons, continued inflexible on that head. As to the government of Stetin, it was made a ſort of mixed government between the Swediſh commander, the duke, and the magiſtracy. To the latter was committed the civil government of the city, the care of erecting barracks for a garriſon of 4,000 men, whom the king was to pay, and the inhabitants to feed, and providing guards and watches for the inner parts of the town. The nominal ſupreme military command was allotted to the duke, as alſo the privilege of iſſuing out the watch-word. He and the magiſtrates had the cuſtody of the arſenal and city keys, with the proviſo, never to open the gates, except by the conſent of the Swediſh governor. Thus the duke was generaliſſimo in title, but without power. The ſoldiers were all to be tried at the court-martial of the commandant; who likewiſe had the prerogative, it being ſet forth, that he was a perſon of moſt conſummate experience, of diſpoſing the artillery and watches in ſuch places as beſt pleaſed him, with this further authority, that nothing, which was matter of military

uſe,

uſe, ſhould be moved out of the town without his privity and conſent *.

His majeſty, whilſt he continued at Stetin, began to grow impatient for action, and diſpatched Banier and lord Reay acroſs the Oder, at the head of 1,200 infantry, to make themſelves maſters of Dam, a ſmall fortification within ſight of Stetin, and about ſix miles diſtant from it on the ſouth-eaſt ſide. A peaſant offered to conduct this detachment over a moraſs, which, having one narrow cauſeway, was thought impaſſable in all other places. This propoſal happening to be known, the inhabitants, like good politicians, ſent Banier word, well aware that a town taken by ſtorm became ſubject to military plunder, that if he would poſtpone his viſit till evening, they would open a poſtern-gate for him. Meanwhile the Imperial garriſon perceiving how matters were like to proceed, diſlodged very prudently before ſun-ſet, and threw themſelves into Stargard, a ſtronger place, and more capable of reſiſtance. Some days before, the Italian colonel Piccolomini had unexpectedly conveyed a conſiderable garriſon into it, and having ſeized the city keys, which were in the magiſtrates poſſeſſion, exacted a contribution, from the inhabitants, amounting to £. 1,000. In conſequence of theſe ſeverities, a private expreſs was diſpatched to the king, requeſting him to turn his arms againſt Stargard. Guſtavus had ſome ſuſpicion of the townſmen's good faith, and he therefore thought fit to employ the governor and garriſon of Stetin, accompanied by a body of his own troops, in this expedition, partly as better acquainted with the town and its avenues, being leſs liable alſo from their knowledge of the people to be trifled with or miſled, and partly becauſe he was willing to engage the Pomeranian forces in ſome open act of hoſtility againſt the emperor, in order to ſecure them more faithfully to his intereſts. This little body of troops, having made a midnight march of about ten miles, ſcaled the walls at break of day, and put a conſiderable part of the garriſon to the ſword. Piccolomini, with two or three companies of infantry, retired to the caſtle, and at length capitulated. Some days before, the epiſcopal town of Camin, which lies on a promontory over againſt the iſland of Wollin, being the capital of a ſmall principality, alſo underwent the ſame fate. Stargard, being one of the principal towns of Outer Pomerania, was a more ſenſible loſs to the Imperial general; for it was the magazine of corn and proviſions, and laid in the road between his two camps.

* *Chemnitius*, tom. i. p. 53.

By this time, his Imperial majeſty plainly diſcovered he had been groſsly abuſed with reſpect to Guſtavus, whom he found to be formidable in every ſhape. Perplexed in his mind what meaſures to purſue, he at length diſpatched a letter* by the hands of one of his courtiers, requeſting a more full explanation of all the king's reaſons for invading the empire in ſo hoſtile a manner; alledging, that his Swediſh majeſty had no more to do with the affairs of Stralſund, and the inteſtine quarrels of the princes and ſtates of the empire, than the emperor had to do with the internal government of Sweden; admoniſhing him at the ſame time to withdraw his troops and conclude a peace, or elſe threatening to drive him and his army out of the empire, by ſending the whole weight of his mighty legions againſt him; inaſmuch as the affairs of Germany regarded only the Germanic body. Guſtavus received the letter with extreme politeneſs, and told the gentleman it required too many ſerious conſiderations and reconſiderations to be anſwered immediately: *Beſides, Sir,* ſaid he, *I am at this preſent juncture unable; but will not fail to ſend a proper reply to his Cæſarean majeſty the very firſt moment I am recovered of a wound, which an* EAGLE† *hath given me in the hand wherewith I hold my pen.* Upon this the courier, without ſaying a word more, made his obeiſances and retired, perceiving plainly, that this allegorical excuſe proceeded from the reſentments the king had entertained on account of the detachment which had been ſent into Poland under Arnheim's conduct; and the more ſo, as the Court of Vienna had denied the Swedes raiſing recruits in the empire during the Poliſh wars‡. It may not be improper here to relate a few paſſages with regard to Ferdinand II. emperor of Germany, whom, more from a ſenſe of his power, than from an idea of any extraordinary abilities in him, Guſtavus conſidered as his great antagoniſt. He ſucceeded Mathias in 1619. That monarch had two brothers, Maximilian, who died one year before him, and Albert; but neither of them had any children. Ferdinand was their couſin-german, firſt prince of their blood, ſon of the late archduke Charles, prince of Stiria, who was brother to the emperor Maximilian, and father of Mathias, Maximilian, and Albert. The ſaid emperor Maximilian and Charles prince of Stiria were brothers ſons of the

* See the original in the *Mercure François*, en l'an 1630, tom. xvi. p. 334. It bears date from Ratiſbon, Auguſt $\frac{1}{8}$. APPENDIX, Art. XIV.

† Alluding to the Auſtrian arms. See *Le Barre*, tom. ix. p. 601. *Riccio de Bellis Germ.* 199. ‡ *Heylmanni Leo Arctoüs*, 4°. p. 9.

emperor

emperor Ferdinand, and Anne, heireſs to the kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary; which made out Ferdinand's title to thoſe dominions.

This perſon had great concerns in hiſtory, and yet hiſtory reports little with reſpect to him. That he was a bigot is certain, as appears by a remark we have made elſewhere relative to cardinal Kleſel *; to which, another anecdote of the ſame nature, may be added. When the deciſions of the Bohemian judicature were tranſmitted to Vienna, with reference to the intended ſtate-maſſacre, which was decreed to complete the batttle of Prague, he ſent for his confeſſor, Lamormain, and adjured him by his conſcience to inform him, whether he could ſafely ſign the death warrants, or as ſafely grant an univerſal pardon. That worthy and generous eccleſiaſtic replied, *Utrumque in poteſtate tua eſt, Cæſar* †. Yet the unmerciful alternative took place. One hundred and eighty-five noble proteſtant families were ſent to beg their bread in foreign countries; and the principal perſonages of the kingdom ſigned the evangelical profeſſion with their beſt blood on a public ſcaffold; not merely like Greeks and Romans, but with a ſerenity and vivacity no ways unbecoming the primitive Chriſtians. I cannot refrain inſerting ſome few particulars, being ſuch as it is highly probable have occurred to few people in the courſe of their reading.

When the inquiſitors of juſtice examined count de Schlick with great rigour, he tore open his cloaths, and, laying bare his breaſt, made the following ſpeech in ſo many words: *Tear this body of mine into ten thouſand pieces; probe every vein and corner of my heart; you ſhall not find a ſingle ſentiment there, but what my right hand hath ſubſcribed at the bottom of the apology. The love of liberty, and of God's religion, and of my country, prompted that very hand to wield the ſword: and ſince it has pleaſed the Supreme Being to transfer ſucceſs to the emperor, and deliver us into your hands, I can only ſay with ſubmiſſion, reſignation, and reverence, the will of God be done* ‡.

Many other unfortunate priſoners ſpoke much to the ſame effect, and all proteſted, *That the juſtice of a national revolt could not derive its morality from the event of ſecond cauſes*; and, what is ſtill more remarkable, no one perſon acknowledged the crime of rebellion.

When that part of Schlick's ſentence was read, which pronounced his body to be torn to pieces by wild horſes,

* See p. 233, 234.

† *Hiſt. Perſecutionum Eccleſ. Bohem.* 12°. p. 211. 1632. ſine loco.

‡ Ib. &c. &c. *Laurea Auſtriaca*, fol. 460, &c.

and his limbs hung up in various places, he addreſſed, to his judges, with an air of ſerenity, a beautiful application from the claſſics,

FACILIS JACTURA SEPULCHRI.

When father Sedatius, chief of the Jeſuits, who had laboured much to bring about his converſion, cried out haſtily, at the time the executioner's hand was lifted up, *Domine comes, recordare adhuc*; he replied to him and his aſſociates with an air of ſeverity, *Jam me facite miſſum.*

When ſupper was ſerved up to theſe ſtate-criminals the evening before the execution, they all declared, that they had no need of a *material* repaſt. Nevertheleſs, leſt the public ſhould conclude their abſtinence to proceed from fear, they determined to take the refreſhment of the table, and then endeavour to obtain a good night's reſt. On the morning of execution they all dreſſed themſelves in their richeſt apparel, and thoſe, who were military men, wore ſuch part of their armour and habit as might not create any impediment to the executioner.

The chevalier Kapler received an offer of his life upon condition of perpetual impriſonment; but the anſwer he ſent the vice-roi, prince of Lichtenſtein, was, *That being an extremely old man, unable either to taſte wine or reliſh meat, walking with pain, and ſleeping with difficulty, he had but one favour to aſk, which was to be* BEHEADED. The venerable Michaelovitzki, whom the king of Bohemia particularly loved, when the officers came to conduct a young nobleman to the ſcaffold, ſtepped before him with an air of vivacity, and ſaid, *ſeniores, priores: I demand the precedency of age.* He had been one of the principal actors in all the public commotions next to Thurn, and had been joined with him as deputy-*burgrave* of Carlſtein caſtle, a poſt of ſingular honour and profit, as the regalia of the crown are there preſerved, and was one of the three ambaſſadors that had been ſent to Francfort at the election of Ferdinand.

Kutnar, a ſenator of old Prague, for ſome particular reaſons, was condemned to be hanged. When he mounted the ſcaffold, *My good friends and countrymen*, ſaid he to the ſpectators, *a ſtrange death is allotted me; for whether I am to be ſuſpended by the heels, the neck, or the ribs, is more than I know, and more than I care for, except it be, that I cannot have the reputation to leave the world as a gentleman ought to do.* Another criminal of ſuperior rank, when that part of the ſentence was pronounced againſt him, which mentioned tearing his body to pieces with wild horſes, made a very lively

anſwer without much emotion; *Gentlemen*, ſaid he, *ſend one limb to the pope, a ſecond to the emperor, a third to the king of Spain, and a fourth to the great Turk; yet the Supreme Being will know how to reunite them at the laſt day.*

To conclude theſe tragical ſcenes: the caſe of Dr. Jeſſen was ſtill more extraordinary. This gentleman, an Hungarian of noble extraction, celebrated for his learning and knowledge throughout all Europe, had been rector of the univerſity of Prague, and, being a phyſician, had amuſed himſelf with judicial aſtrology, according to the mode and practice of that age. In the year 1618, he had been ſent ambaſſador to the Hungarians, and, in his conferences with them, had executed his commiſſion with great ſucceſs and dexterity. It was his misfortune, in his return homewards, to be ſeized by ſome Imperial ſoldiers; and thus he became a ſtate-priſoner at Vienna. The houſe of Auſtria thought fit to exchange him for an Italian of conſequence, in the emperor's ſervice, and upon quitting the priſon he wrote on the chamber-walls, I. M. M. M.

The archduke Ferdinand, amongſt others, went to the priſon, in order to decypher and explain theſe initial letters, and at length declared their meaning to be IMPERATOR. MATHIAS. MENSE. MARTIO.* MORIETUR. He then with eagerneſs drew a pencil from his pocket, and added a ſecond reading and explanation: JESSENI. MENTIRIS. MALA. MORTE. MORIERIS.† which at leaſt ſhews that the future emperor had ſome readineſs and vivacity of parts.

Theſe circumſtances were recalled to men's minds, and much talked of, whilſt the doctor lay under condemnation. Nevertheleſs, his cuſtom was to give one general anſwer to all enquirers; *As my prophecy held good with relation to the death of Mathias, his Imperial majeſty, Ferdinand, will certainly take care to ſee his prediction verified in relation to poor Jeſſen.*

In a word, the perſecutions of the houſe of Auſtria had hardened the Bohemians into a ſtate of heroiſm. I ſhall relate but one ſtriking example more in regard to cruelty. Two officers held a naked infant by the legs, and one of them, ſplitting it through with a ſtroke of his ſabre, made uſe of this horrid expreſſion, *Jam habes ſub utrâque*; alluding to the communion, under *both* ſpecies, which the unhappy proteſtants had earneſtly requeſted ‡.

* He died the March enſuing, 1619. † He was executed in 1621.

‡ *Hiſpanicæ Dominationis Arcana*, p. 85.

Theſe ſhort inſtances may ſerve to give ſome idea of the temper and government of Ferdinand II. Meanwhile Guſtavus recived a joint letter *, ſubſcribed by the ſeveral electors, diſpatched from the ſame place with that of the emperor, and bearing date Auguſt 3: in which they had ſo far recovered their memories, as to give him the title of king; an honour they had withheld from him in their previous application. It was pretended, that the omiſſion of the regal title did not proceed from any diſregard or evil intention, but from a certain form and parade of dignity, which the electoral body had aſſumed, from time immemorial, in their correſpondence, even with crowned heads. But it is viſible to every reader, that the houſe of Auſtria held the pen, even in *this* letter, for the electors blamed him on account of his interference in regard to Stralſund, for interrupting the deliberations at Ratiſbon with an armed force, and for a needleſs interpoſition in reſpect to the reſtitution of his kinſmen, the dukes of Mechlenburg; and then adviſed him to evacuate the empire, and rely on the humanity and equity of his Imperial majeſty.

By this time, Guſtavus, it being near the middle of Auguſt, thought proper to form, under the walls of Stetin, one general camp, which he committed to the conduct of Guſtavus Horn; having received a reinforcement from him of 8000 freſh troops out of Livonia; himſelf making excurſions here and there, in order to reduce the neighbouring fortified towns into ſubjection. He had an earneſt deſire to make himſelf maſter of Gartz and Griffenhagen, two important cities, which commanded the river Oder; but did not think it expedient to hazard his troops, on ſo hard a ſervice, in the very infancy of an invaſion. He therefore left a part of his army encamped, as we obſerved before, to carry on the conqueſt of Pomerania, and applied himſelf, with the reſt of his forces, having firſt ordered a general faſt, to reduce the duchy of Mechlenburg, which lies contiguous to it, partly from a point of honour to recover the dominions of his kinſmen, the depoſed dukes, and partly with a view to attack Walſtein's new acquiſitions, an enterpriſe highly popular in the empire, and render himſelf maſter of the whole ſhore of the Baltic. Shaping his courſe, therefore, towards Stralſund, he attacked Wolgaſt, the capital of a duchy bearing the ſame name, whoſe fortreſs he had taken before, and

* It had been preceded by one dated July 10.—This letter is preſerved in the *Mecure François*, and in *Arnalibæus*, p. 37.

which

which town Banier had blockaded, and having made himself maſter of the city, at length took the caſtle by capitulation, after diſcharging 8000 cannon ſhot againſt its walls. Colonel Schleücter evacuated the place, at the head of five companies of infantry, which were reduced to 600 men; one half of whom immediately enliſted into his majeſty's ſervice. Upon this the caſtle was repaired and furniſhed for the reception of the Queen of Sweden, who was ſoon expected to make a viſit to her huſband, and become the partner of his good or bad fortunes

Torquato had now withdrawn from his camp at Anclam, and intrenched himſelf under the cannon of Gartz; and as he dreaded Guſtavus in open field, determined, according to the practice of his country, for he was an Italian, to overreach his enemy by fraud and ſtratagem, and either kill him, or make him priſoner. For this purpoſe, one of his officers, named Quinti Aligheri, ſome call him Quinti del Ponte, deſerted by permiſſion, under pretence of ſome diſguſt, and was admitted lieutenant colonel in Falkenberg's regiment of cavalry. He there found a countryman, a captain of horſe, one John Baptiſta, whom, according to the cuſtom of the wars, he choſe for his comrade, and imparted to him the whole plot which Conti and he had contrived. Some time afterwards Guſtavus had a deſire to view, in perſon, Torquato's lines, in order to form the ſiege of Damin, where all Quinti's ill-acquired wealth was depoſited *. This officer, who was a favourite with the king, being one of the party, contrived to leave his maſter; and, riding full ſpeed to the Imperial general, gave him a brief information of the intended expedition. As his majeſty had only ſeventy ſoldiers with him, Torquato immediately diſpatched 500 choſen Neapolitan cuiraſſiers, commanded by the traitor Aligheri †. The crafty Italian having made an ambuſcade, with great dexterity, for therein conſiſted great part of the military genius, before the arrival of Guſtavus, incloſed the king, on his return, in a narrow defile, where he could neither advance nor retreat. No private ſoldier ever made a braver defence than his majeſty; and in ſpite of numbers, more than ſix to one, the Swedes kept firm to their leaders, nor did a ſingle man behave ill. Their reſiſtance was ſo heroical and ſo obſtinate, that Quinti was obliged to change his original plan of taking his majeſty alive, and try, if poſſible, to cut him to pieces. He twice or thrice determined to ſhoot him; but his preſence of mind failed

* *Memorabilia Suec. Gentis*, p. 85. † *Riccio de Bellis Germ.* 201, &c.

him;

him*; for he dreaded the look of a man like Guſtavus, whom he had baſely betrayed; and greatly feared that the cries of the combatants, and briſk diſcharge of fire-arms, might collect ſome ſtraggling partiſans to the king's defence. Guſtavus, after his horſe was killed by two muſquet balls, fought for a conſiderable ſpace of time on foot, nor had his ſoldiers opportunity or power to remount him. He was for ſome moments taken priſoner, though unknown, and he never moved ſo ſullenly, as when the enemy wanted to carry him off; but his companions threw themſelves round him, like men in deſpair, and inſtantly recovered him; for every man, without conſulting his friends, had determined to die or conquer.

At length a Livonian colonel, poſted at the head of a detachment, by the king's orders, to ſecure a retreat, grew uneaſy at diſcovering no ſigns of his maſter's return. He commanded his men to advance with all convenient ſpeed, and diſpatched a troop of horſe before in full gallop to procure intelligence. Hearing the noiſe of the fire-arms, they followed it, and ſoon found his majeſty with a ſurviving handful of men preſſing about him, juſt upon the point of being overcome. The colonel appeared, and ſoon routed the Neapolitans, without attempting to purſue them, concluding it honour enough to have preſerved his ſovereign.

This action, in point of bravery, was conſidered by the army as a very extraordinary one; that ſeventy men, taken at a diſadvantage and by ſurprize, ſhould maintain a fight half an hour againſt 500 choſen troops, animated with the hopes of making priſoner no leſs perſon than the king of Sweden. As to Aligheri, or Quinti, he returned back to the Imperial ſervice, and there continued; but his comrade, John Baptiſta, according to the then military law, had the honour to loſe his head in the Swediſh camp. Two Imperial banners were gained in this encounter, and preſented to his majeſty, who, though charmed with the fidelity and bravery of his followers, received the compliment with an air of affliction; for other thoughts then poſſeſſed his mind, and obſtructed his joy. *I am ſorry*, ſaid he, *to have brought a ſet of brave men, for ſuch my companions truly were, ſo far from their reſpective homes, and ſee them cut to pieces by unequal numbers. What might they not have lived to perform, if the warmth of my temper had not delivered them inconſiderately to ſlaughter* †!

* *Schefferi Memorab.* 209, 210.

† *Hiſt. or Authent. Relat.* in Low Dutch, tom. i. 174. Nevertheleſs, the author, Danckaertz, has placed his ſpeech under a wrong paragraph.

A mis-

A misfortune, more inglorious ſtill, menaced his majeſty; for a German monk, born at Amberg, originally nothing better than a taylor, had formed a deſign to deprive him of his life*.

This man, in order to attract Guſtavus's obſervation, wandered about the camp under the diſguiſe of an exile, with a book in his hand, and always affecting to pore over it. Some ſay his purpoſe was to give the king a packet of poiſoned papers to peruſe; a practice then not uncommon† amongſt the Italian troops in the emperor's ſervice. Others aſſert, that his intention was to have recourſe to the ſtiletto. Be that as it may, the attempt was ſuſpected and believed.

Whilſt Guſtavus employed himſelf in conſidering the ſituation and fortifications of the town of Gartz, which as well as Griffenhagen the duke of Pomerania had beſought him to free from the Imperial garriſons, a Swediſh colonel had formed a deſign to take an outwork, belonging to the former place, by ſurprize; and in order to obtain what he thought the ſafeſt advice, imparted his project to ſeveral officers, that ſerved with him. By ſome accident, either of treachery or careleſsneſs, the ſecret was known, and the garriſon, being prepared for his coming, gave him a very unexpected reception. Nevertheleſs, he made his retreat like a man who underſtood the fighting part; and preſented two ſtandards to the king, who received them with a certain air of diſſatisfaction, obſerving to the generals that ſtood round him, *That no retreat or defence could juſtify a commander, who had not power to lock up a military ſecret in his own breaſt*‡.

His Imperial majeſty now thought it high time to cement his friendſhip more cloſely with the court of Madrid; and a contract of marriage was ſigned between Ferdinand his ſon, king of Hungary, and Anna Maria, ſiſter to Philip IV. king of Spain. This princeſs embarked at Barcelona with a very numerous and magnificent fleet; but not being able to land at Genoa, on account of the plague, then prevalent there, pointed her courſe to Naples, and aſked permiſſion of the Venetians to croſs the Adriatic§. That

* *Loccenii* Hiſt. Suecana, p. 571.

† I have been informed, that prince Eugene was once ſtunned with peruſing a poiſoned letter, purpoſely written in a hand ſo difficult that it required a very cloſe examination; and to this moment ſome great perſons in Italy break open ſuſpicious packets with their hands behind them, and leave them expoſed to the air for a time.

‡ *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relat.* tom. i. p. 174.

§ *Le Barre*, Hiſt. d'Allemagne, tom. ix. 692.

republic,

republic, whoſe maxim it was to talk highly at a time when other nations act with timidity, ordered Piſani, general of the iſlands, to give battle to the fair lady's ſquadron, without any ceremony. An offer was, notwithſtanding, made to convey her to Trieſte, in the galleys belonging to the ſtate. Upon this, couriers were diſpatched immediately to the courts of Vienna and Madrid; and as the politicians there did not chuſe to convert a wedding into a ſea fight, the eſcort of the republic, at its own expence, was accepted. Owing to theſe delays, the princeſs did not arrive at Vienna till the third week of the year enſuing, and the nuptials were then celebrated in full form.

Led by ſome evil deſtiny of war, a ſmall party of 300 Swedes entered the little town of Paſſewalk, where they began to fortify themſelves. A body of 3000 Imperialiſts, detached from Torquato's army, ſurrounded them unexpectedly; and either their reſiſtance was ſo extraordinary, or the cruelty of the Imperialiſts ſo great, *that not a ſingle perſon of the garriſon eſcaped.*

From this moment the war began to grow extremely vigorous and bloody. At length it was agreed, in conſequence of the repreſentations of the king of Sweden, to allow free and fair quarter on either ſide. The Imperialiſts, however, were cruel enough to except the ſoldiers of the duke of Pomerania, and Guſtavus, by way of retaliation, excluded the Croatians: *For if*, ſaid he, *the former are to be conſidered as a band of rebels, I ſhall look upon the latter as un horde of ſavages*†.

About this time a ſingular adventure happened to 700 Scots, who, in coaſting the Baltic from Pillau, in order to join the main body of the Swediſh army, had the misfortune to be ſhipwrecked near Rugenwalt‡; which was defended by an Imperial garriſon.

Theſe poor wretches loſt their ammunition and baggage, and, except a few wet muſquets, had only pikes and ſwords to defend themſelves with. Added to this, the enemies troops were quartered all round the country, and the king and his army were at a diſtance of eighty miles. In this

* *Le Barre*, Hiſt. d'Allemagne, tom. ix. 602.

† *Pietro Pomo*; *Guerre di Germania*, lib. i. p. 9.

‡ Rugenwalt is a large town, with a good harbour and caſtle, ſituated on a tract of land which projects into the Baltic, lying juſt half way between Stetin and Dantzic. It was then one of the duke's places of reſidence, and greatly embelliſhed with parks, waters, &c. Erich XIV. king of Sweden, held his court there twenty years, having left his country in 1439.

dilemma,

dilemma, Robert Monro*, their commander, ſent a meſſage to the late Pomeranian governor, who was ſtill in Rugenwalt with ſome ſoldiers, acting ſeemingly under the Imperial directions, to inform him, that if he would open a poſtern gate for him at night, and convey him fifty firelocks and ammunition, he would engage to clear the town of its new viſitants, and reſtore it in ſuch manner as their two reſpective maſters ſhould afterwards agree.

Thus Monro by a ſingular fortitude and preſence of mind took Rugenwalt by aſſault at midnight, and having diſpatched a meſſenger to apprize his majeſty of what had happened, obſtructed all the paſſes that approached the town, and maintained himſelf bravely and prudently there for the ſpace of nine weeks, till his countryman, colonel Hepburn, who commanded under Oxenſtiern in Livonia and the adjacent parts of Pruſſia, relieved him with his own regiment; and having drawn together a ſmall army of 6000 men, acted in concert with Kniphauſen, and blockaded Colbergen. Indeed, by peculiar good fortune, 400 German ſoldiers belonging to the Swediſh army were driven by ſtreſs of weather into the harbour near the town, which increaſed the garriſon to 1100 men. We may here obſerve, incidentally, that during the ſhipwreck of the Scottiſh troops, a ſerjeant's wife, without the aſſiſtance of any other woman, was delivered of a fine male child, which ſhe anxiouſly held in her arms, and conveyed ſafely to ſhore, and marched with it in the like manner four long miles the next day. When lord Reay gave the king an exact account of the extraordinary manner whereby the town of Rugenwalt fell into the poſſeſſion of the Swedes, his majeſty replied, with viſible marks of joy in his countenance, *He now began to hope, that the Supreme Being gave marks of approbation in the ſupport of his cauſe.*

About this time Guſtavus marched an army, conſiſting of 13,000 men, up to the very front of Torquato's lines, which ſtretched round the fortifications of Gartz, and uſed all ſorts of provocation and inducements to draw the cautious Italian to a pitched battle. Guſtavus performed this feat of chivalry merely to keep the troops in ſpirits; nor was it an unſucceſsful artifice, according to the practice of war in that age; for he clearly foreſaw, that Torquato would not quit the ſtrength of his intrenchments. However, on his return from this piece of military gallantry, he by chance

* *Author of the two expeditions.* Lond. fol. 1637. part 2. p. 3.

met

met a kinſman of Walſtein in a coach and ſix, eſcorted by part of a regiment. Orders were given to charge him inſtantly, and 150 perſons were taken priſoners; but the young man left his coach, and owed his eſcape to the fleetneſs of his horſe.

The greater part of Pomerania being now ſecured, his majeſty turned his thoughts towards an irruption into the duchy of Mechlenburg, and having rendered himſelf maſter of the ſtrong fortreſs of Stolpe, which commanded the narrow frith, through which he was to ſail from Stetin, embarked 12,000 choſen men on board his fleet, and, paſſing Wolgaſt and Stralſund, ſurprized Bart, and then took, by ſtorm, the important towns of Damgarten and Ribnitz. Theſe two places, connected by a bridge over a ſmall river bearing the ſame name with the laſt town, and removed from each other a diſtance of about three miles, were, in thoſe days, conſidered as the lock and key of admiſſion into the duchy of Mechlenburg on the Pomeranian ſide. To ſecure a paſſage over rivers was eſteemed, in thoſe days, the moſt material part of military prudence. Guſtavus attacked Ribnitz at midnight, and carried it after a very ſharp ſtruggle; for the Imperial colonel, Merodé, made an obſtinate reſiſtance, and was taken priſoner ſword in hand. It muſt not be forgotten, that in the confuſion of a night attack, ſome retaliations were made for the cruelties lately exerciſed at Paſſewalk. Nevertheleſs, the king ſoon repreſſed the fury of his troops; ſo that only a few Imperialiſts were put to the ſword.

The navigation from Stetin to Damgarten was a very difficult and dangerous undertaking, being all to be performed in a narrow channel, full of iſlands, ſand banks, and promontories, not to mention that in ſome places the whole Baltic ocean ſet in upon them, in caſe the wind blew from the north, or any points tending towards the north; but Guſtavus was, by this time, a kind of admiral; affecting independency alike both by ſea and land. Having thus obtained a tolerably ſecure footing in the duchy of Mechlenburg, he invited, by proclamations*, all the country to diſown Walſtein, and acknowledge their antient poſſeſſors.

It is true the duke and ſtates of Pomerania had beſought his majeſty to give Torquato battle, of which he made a proffer, without expecting it would be accepted, and drive him from the neighbourhood of Gartz, and Griffenhagen,

* See the original in *Arlanibæi's Armis Suecicis*, p. 42, 43.

for

for the general quiet of the country, and the ſecurity of Stetin in particular. The king however had not phlegm enough to waſte his time and ſacrifice his men in watching the motions of a wary intrenched Italian. Beſides, he knew from good authority, for no prince ever procured better intelligence, that the inhabitants of Mechlenburg wiſhed to ſee him. Their natural prince had been diſplaced, and the whole country long groaned under the tyranny of Walſtein. He foreſaw too, as he governed all his campaigns with politic good ſenſe, that a vigorous attack upon *that general*'s territories would be highly agreeable to ſome of the enemies, and all the friends of Sweden. He had an eye likewiſe to approach nearer to the territories of William landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel, whoſe father Maurice was then alive, but had reſigned the government to him in 1628. Herman Wolf, the landgrave's miniſter, ſought the king's protection and aſſiſtance, and made overtures of aſſiſtance with an army of 8000 men. A treaty was inſtantly committed to paper, without heſitation on either ſide, but was not ſigned and confirmed till the enſuing year.

Amelia Elizabeth of Hanau, the widow of this prince, for he died in 1637, proved the beſt ally that Sweden ever had in the courſe of twenty German campaigns. Her deſigns were great and generous, and executed with ſuch preciſion, firmneſs and fidelity, that ſhe became the ornament and glory of the proteſtant cauſe. Her huſband, William, left the minority of his ſon to her regency, and, if I miſtake not, the kings of England and France were requeſted to give their aid. She waged war boldly againſt the emperor and the landgrave of Heſſe Darmſtadt, concerning the diſtrict of Marpurg, and obtained, at the peace of Weſtphalia, the abbacy of Hirchfield, and four ſigniories to be annexed for ever to her dominions. She alſo gained, by way of indemnification, upwards of £. 90,000. to be raiſed in nine months, from the dioceſes of Mentz, Cologn, Paderborn, Munſter and Fulda; reſigning the power of government to her ſon, in 1650, and ſurviving duke Bernard de Weimar, who had an ambition to marry her, about twelve years*.

Meanwhile Torquato attacked Horn, in his intrenchments at Stetin, but was repulſed with conſiderable loſs; and having diſpatched the duke of Savelli into the duchy of Mechlenburg, which was, properly ſpeaking, the duke's diſtrict of command, in order to counteract the king's motions, waſted the reſt of the campaign in a ſort of deſponding

* *Imhoff Notit. Principum.* fol. 244.

inactivity,

inactivity, and took, here and there, a defenceleſs town merely for the ſake of extorting money; dealing in nothing except little incurſions, ſurprizes, plunder, and contribution.

The king next turned his attention towards Roſtock, by the natives ſuppoſed to ſignify the town of roſes, a conſiderable city and an univerſity; diſtant, from the Baltic about four miles, and from Ribnitz ſomething more than twenty. Savelli put a ſtop to this ſiege; for aſking permiſſion of the magiſtrates to march a detachment through their town, in order to ſecure Doberan, the thouſand horſe which entered firſt, violently ſeized the grand gate, and let in the infantry. His majeſty wrote on the occaſion to the magiſtrates, who ſeemed willing to admit him, but knew not how. Upon this, he changed the ſiege into a blockade; ordered part of his fleet to poſſeſs the harbour, and erected redoubts and ſtrong fortifications upon all the principal roads that approached the town. By theſe methods the garriſon began to be extremely ſtraitened, and Savelli, with a view to merit the good graces of Walſtein, diſpatched 4000 men to cut a paſſage for themſelves, and throw ſome relief both of proviſions and ſoldiers into the town. This detachment the Swedes handled very roughly, his majeſty being returned to his camp at Stetin, and Banier received orders to continue the blockade.

I ſhould have obſerved before, that Guſtavus, highly pleaſed with theſe proſperous beginnings, and confirmed in his good opinion of the loyalty of the Mechlenburgers, publiſhed a ſecond manifeſto, relative to his entrance into their territories, containing little more than a bitter invective againſt the uſurpation and tyranny of Walſtein, whoſe pretenſions to the dukedom he treated with contempt, and called his ſoldiers land-buccaniers, ruffians, and murderers *.

In the way to Stetin, the king reſted for a ſhort ſpace at Stralſund, and, after a conſideration of three and thirty days from the time of the date, diſpatched his reply † to the joint letter of the ſeveral electors. He here tells them, as, during his majeſty's ſilence, more letters had arrived, full of excuſes

* See the original in *Arlanibæi, Arma Suec.* 44, 45. *Hiſt. or Authent. Relat.* tom. i. p. 178.

† This reply is preſerved in the *Mercure François*, tom. xvi. p. 338; but as more letters had paſſed from the electors to the king, I chooſe to take my account from Loccenius, being an author of better repute, and who had nearer acceſs to the truth. *(Hiſt. Suec.* p. 574.) Nevertheleſs, I have preſerved the letter of the Mercure, in the *Appendix*, Article XII.

for

for omiſſion of terms of ceremony, and requeſting at the ſame time his departure from Germany, *That he was not diſpleaſed to find they had at length diſcovered him to be a king*, for *his* name in theſe ſecond letters was placed before *their own, and had not denied him the title which the Supreme Being had beſtowed on him.*

In addition to what has been already mentioned, the ſubſtance of his anſwer was, That the ſuppreſſion of the regal title was treating him ſlightly, which was want of reſpect and good manners, but neither degraded him, nor exalted them. He then enumerated the various cauſes and motives that induced him to enter the empire, and added with great frankneſs, that in caſe ſafe conditions could be procured for himſelf and his allies, he would diſcontinue the war as cheerfully as he had undertaken it.

Two days afterwards he wrote to Louis XIII. *, cardinal Richelieu *, and Charles I. As to the latter I can ſay nothing, it being only in my power to relate the fact. In his letter to the French king, He deſired leave to raiſe recruits in France; and told him roundly, he was ſurprized De Charnacé his ambaſſador had made a difficulty in point of mere form.

To underſtand this matter, which is only hinted at, in the letter, with equal delicacy and politeneſs, I muſt have recourſe, for the ſatisfaction of my readers, to other authorities †, and obſerve, that de Charnacé, in the rough draught of the treaty, had inſerted the word *protection* on the part of France; and inſiſted likewiſe, that the name of his maſter ſhould *precede* that of Guſtavus, even in the ratification which the latter was to ſign. To this his Swediſh majeſty anſwered ſpiritedly and with ſome emotion, *That he knew no protection but* that *of the Supreme Being*; *and as the two contracting parties were both kings, ſo they were both equal in dignity*; *and that precedence in this caſe was a thing not to be underſtood.* De Charnacé replied, conformably to the petulance of his nation, *That all ſcarlet was not of the ſame value.* Guſtavus, nettled to the quick with ſuch impertinence, and at the ſame time being the prince, in the world, the moſt jealous of his dignity, told him with a ſtern air, *That he choſe rather to diſpenſe with the aſſiſtance of France, than to tarniſh the glory of the antient crown of Sweden*; *it appearing*

* Theſe two Letters are preſerved in the Appendix, Articles XVI. XVII.

† Puffendorff, *Sur les alliances entre la France & la Suede*, p. 5. The latter part of this book, by anſwering Chanut in many places, renders that period of hiſtory more complete.

*matter of aſtoniſhment to him, that his Chriſtian majeſty ſhould deſire him to reſign a title which he held only from heaven.* Theſe difficulties being ſmoothed, or rather acceded to by the French, the treaty was concluded in the beginning of the next year.

In his letter to Richelieu*, he renews the ſame complaints concerning the wrong-headed obſtinacy of M. de Charnacé, and begs the cardinal to put an end to ſuch ridiculous obſtructions, which tend in their own nature to create delays and miſunderſtandings.

As Tilly had orders from Vienna and Munich to approach Torquato de Conti as expeditiouſly as poſſible, Guſtavus was determined to prevent that junction, at which he had reaſon to be alarmed; ſince two powerful armies in the neighbourhood of Saxony and Brandenburg might have hindered the electors from coming to an accommodation with him, which he earneſtly wiſhed, and was almoſt morally ſure of effecting, upon ſuppoſition that he could either obſtruct or traverſe the motions of Tilly. In order therefore to form a diverſion of this nature, he ſet himſelf to contrive ſome buſineſs for that general in the duchy of Magdeburg, and perſuaded the adminiſtrator, Chriſtian William of Brandenburg, to make himſelf maſter of the capital, and prevail on the inhabitants and their neighbours to take up arms. A Swediſh envoy attended him in this expedition. The magiſtrates and people ſoon complied, and raiſed a body of 2000 foot, and 2500 horſe.

The city of Magdeburg had been the ſubject of great conteſts, ſome years before; for the houſe of Brandenburg had fixed a kinſman in the adminiſtration there, who was uncle to the then elector, and had found his intereſt long declining at the court of Vienna, having made himſelf an aſſociate of the league at Lawenberg, and formed an alliance with Chriſtian king of Denmark. Upon this account Ferdinand recommended his ſon, the archduke Leopold, to be coadjutor; but the chapter remonſtrated againſt the propoſal, and petitioned for Auguſtus, ſecond ſon, then living, of the elector of Saxony, becauſe he was a proteſtant.

The old adminiſtrator had made a viſit to Guſtavus at Stockholm, juſt before the expedition into Germany, and had aſked aſſiſtances of men and money. He received great encouragement in both particulars; but the king charged him to check his reſentment for ſome time, and make a ſhow of ſubmiſſion†.

* See the Appendix. † *Chemnitius.* lib. ii.

His

His majeſty at that time either could not, or would not, anſwer the demands of the adminiſtrator, who required money to raiſe an army of 10,000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry. He nevertheleſs gave him letters of credit on ſeveral bankers and merchants, to raiſe part of the ſum; for the payment of which he made himſelf reſponſible *.

This exiled prince was kindly received by all the inhabitants of the duchy; and the troops he had collected, in the king's name and in his own, made ſeveral excurſions, and drove the enemy out of many important poſts. Their commander, though no young man, was a new warrior; undertaking more than he could conquer, and more than he could have maintained in caſe he had proved ſucceſsful in his firſt enterpriſes. The elector of Bavaria had long foreſeen the effects of this inſurrection, and ſent Pappenheim † at the head of 6000 men to check it, and to co-operate with Torquato and Savelli in ſuch a manner, as to give their troops free room to act. Pappenheim, the moſt able and active general in thoſe days, next to Guſtavus, ſoon compelled a novice in the art of war to contract his conqueſts, and at length reduced him to ſhelter his troops under the walls of Magdeburg, round which he formed a ſort of blockade.

His majeſty, perceiving the prince to be thus ſtraitened, and foreſeeing, that the preſervation of the duchy of Magdeburg might have great influence on the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel, diſpatched colonel Falkenberg, grand maréchal of the houſehold, an officer of approved bravery, to direct the adminiſtrator with his counſels, ſupport the ſpirit of the inhabitants, and promiſe them ſpeedy relief; which ſoon afterwards, from a ſtrange concurrence of circumſtances, it was not in his power to perform. I ſpeak not here of the grand relief which he deſtined to ſend to the inhabitants in the month of May enſuing, when Tilly beſieged the town in form; but merely with a view to the preſent blockade. Nevertheleſs, it was impoſſible for his majeſty to leave the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony to decide for themſelves, being both of them, at that time, in a ſtate of uncertainty; and, what was ſtill worſe, it was not in his power, juſt then,

* *Brachelii Hiſt. Noſt. Temp.* ad Ann. 1630.

† Godfrey Henry, count de Pappenheim, one of the moſt renowned warriors in that century. He was originally a baron, and got nothing of the emperor but the title of count, with the addition of *Illuſtriſſimo*. He married Ludomilla of the houſe of Colorath; but we ſhall recite more particulars concerning him in another place.

to convey to the inhabitants of the town a conſiderable ſum of money, which diſpleaſed the burghers, who expected prompt payment.

To make this diverſion in behalf of the Swediſh cauſe ſtill ſtronger, Francis Charles, duke of Saxe Lawenberg*, was employed to enliſt a body of ſoldiers in the diſtricts round Hamburg and Lubec. The prince had the good fortune to take Ratzburg, a place of reſidence belonging to his family, by ſurprize at midnight; a city of ſome conſequence and natural ſtrength, ſituated, like Mantua, in a large lake. Him, colonel Reinach was ſent to oppoſe and haraſs with his own regiment, newly raiſed in Frizeland, and a thouſand other ſoldiers. Pappenheim advanced to ſupport him, and, as he exceeded moſt generals in ſecrecy and ſpeedy marches, ſoon trod on the duke's heels, at a time when he expected nothing leſs than ſuch a viſit. The firſt ſtep of that vigilant commander was to ſurprize a convoy, on its way to Lawenberg; and then, making a forced march, he ſecured the foot of Ratzburg bridge, and the portcullis which defended it, before the garriſon perceived him. The poſſeſſion of this bridge, which was 300 paces long, and the only entrance into the town, ſoon gave him power to preſcribe laws to it. Upon this, duke Auguſtus,

* In theſe wars were ſeveral dukes of Saxe-Lawenberg; as the reigning duke, *Auguſtus*: and he, after many attempts towards neutrality, at length eſpouſed the Swediſh cauſe; as did alſo *Francis Charles*, the perſon here mentioned, who married the widow of Gabriel Bethlehem, with whom he received a fine dowry, and then the relict of colonel Teüffel, who was born counteſs of Megau. He became a convert to the church of Rome. *Francis Henry* was a Swediſh colonel, to whom Guſtavus gave the eſtates belonging to the convent of Marienſtyes in Pomerania. On the other hand, *Rodolphus Maximilian* ſerved under Tilly, as did alſo *Francis Julius*, who was killed by the peaſants near Lintz. Next came the youngeſt ſon, *Francis Albert*, whom we ſhall ſpeak of more minutely hereafter. In the year 1625, this prince commanded a regiment of light horſe under Wallſtein. He was an officer of good eſteem at the ſiege of Mantua, and acted next to Arnheim in the Poliſh campaign of 1629. As to the duchy of Lawenberg, it belongs now to his Britannic majeſty; the family of Lawenberg becoming extinct at the deceaſe of duke Francis Julius in 1689; which is the more extraordinary, as his grandfather, Francis II. had twelve ſons and ſeven daughters, many of whom married, and were bleſſed with a numerous offſpring. Yet the whole family was extinct in fifty years. On this event, only eight competitors preferred their claims to this territory, of whom the chief were, George William, duke of Zell, and Auguſtus, king of Poland, as elector of Saxony, who, being occupied in other matters, ſold his pretenſions to the duke of Zell for ſomething more than £. 150,000. As about this time a new electorate was erected in favour of the houſe of Brunſwic-Lunenberg, the duchies of Zell and Lawenberg, in the year 1715, on the death of George William, fell, with all rights of ſucceſſion, to the electoral branch of Hanover.

who

who not long before had refuſed to let his brother enter into the caſtle, found himſelf obliged to admit Pappenheim, for he did not care to exaſperate the emperor. Francis Charles made a ſhow of defending the town, though in truth it was not defenſible: but, when all things were prepared by the Imperialiſts for a general aſſault, he ſent to aſk a truce, which Pappenheim granted him for the ſpace of one ſingle quarter of an hour. In that interim the duke attempted to eſcape to Lubec in a ſmall pleaſure-boat; but the helmſman being killed by a falcon-ſhot, he thought it moſt prudent to drive on ſhore, and ſurrender himſelf to Pappenheim, who promiſed him, with the generoſity peculiar to brave men, that neither the emperor, nor elector of Bavaria, ſhould hurt him; engaging likewiſe for the ſecurity of his life, and an exemption from perpetual impriſonment.

The king, in order to be ſomething nearer to theſe operations, made a ſecond viſit to Stralſund, from whence, it being now the laſt day of October, he thought fit to anſwer * the emperor's letter, which bore date Auguſt the 8th, having delayed returning a reply to him eight and forty days from the time he had diſpatched his juſtification to the ſeveral electors. An indifference affected partly with a view to mortify the Auſtrian pride, as the emperor had only beſtowed upon him the title of *Our Prince*, and partly becauſe he ſaw no groundwork whereon to eſtabliſh a ſolid accommodation.

It may ſuffice to ſay, with reference to this extraordinary letter, that he upbraided the emperor with great ſpirit and acrimony at firſt ſetting out, and gave him to underſtand, That it became not the Cæſarean majeſty to ſuppreſs the title of king, in writing to him, ſince that implied a ſort of dependency on the Germanic empire; whereas at the time the letter was written, he was not maſter of a ſingle inch of land in the empire: nor was it a reaſon, if the caſe had been otherwiſe, that an affront ſhould have been offered to his regal character. Alledging afterwards in the ſtrongeſt terms, that the emperor had waged war againſt him in Poland and Pruſſia, without any formal declaration of hoſtilities. That for theſe reaſons he could not be accuſed of tranſgreſſing the laws of nature and nations, inaſmuch as he paid back a war, but did not commence one. He then briefly recapitulated the ſeveral arguments of his manifeſto,

* See the original in *Arm. Suecicis*, p. 54, &c. I have rather carried the abſtract of Loccenius in my eye. See a copy in the APPENDIX, Art. XIV.

but in a manner more pointed, more ſpirited, and more *ad hominem*; and finiſhed his letter with obſerving, that he had no diſlike to a general accommodation, if his allies, kinſmen, and friends, could be effectually redreſſed, and himſelf convinced of the Imperial friendſhip, which at preſent appeared to him equivocal; ſince the houſe of Auſtria raiſed armies, and pretended to wiſh for peace, at the ſame moment. That for his own part he would deal in realities, and not uncertainties, and conſent on no account to the propoſals of a truce, or the diſcharge of a ſingle ſoldier.

None but the truly brave and great can be thus firm and explicit in caſes of emergency! The ſhort and honeſt way is always the true one, if men have *abilities to reach their object.*

Highly ſatisfied therefore with affording the emperor ſo diſtinct an explanation, Guſtavus next gave audience to a public miniſter from Brandenburg, who congratulated him in the elector's name, and beſought him to conſider his maſter as a neutral power. His majeſty granted the requeſt with great frankneſs; *but, Sir,* ſaid he, *be pleaſed to tell the elector at the ſame time, that henceforward no connivances, no indulgences muſt be ſhewn to my enemies, and no advantages muſt reſult to them.—Tell him, moreover, effectually, and not ſuperficially, That he muſt diſmiſs the Imperialiſts from every part of his dominions, and allow them, under no pretext, either proviſions, quarters, or money. If he cedes one town to the emperor's convenience, let him reſign another of equivalent importance to me; and if he furniſhes the Imperialiſts on one hand, let him ſupply my Swedes on the other. Tell him, Sir, theſe are Guſtavus's notions of a* NEUTRALITY; *and upon theſe terms, though he does not offer* FRIENDSHIP, *he promiſes him* SAFETY.

It may readily be foreſeen, that the propoſals to the emperor on the part of Sweden were rejected with diſdain; and in conſequence Camerarius was ſent ambaſſador to the Hague, with a view to ſolicit powerful aſſiſtances from that quarter.

In this harangue *, dictated by the king and pronounced in full aſſembly of the ſtates general, he told them with an air of candour and firmneſs, that his majeſty, at that period, was attempting only to realize a ſcheme of ſupporting the diſtreſſed and afflicted, conformably to the requeſt and exhortation of their high mightineſſes ſome

* APPENDIX, Article XVIII. It was pronounced in October 1630.

years

years before.——That the ſaid prince his maſter had beſought them, in the month of May preceding, to diſpatch their repreſentatives to the conferences his Daniſh majeſty had procured to be held at Dantzic; whither, as it is ſuppoſed, no deputies ever arrived on behalf of the United Provinces.——He then acknowledges, that the letter of his maſter made its appearance at the Hague ſome days too late; but attributing that delay merely to accidents, inſiſts ſtrenuouſly, that no inconvenience had thence ariſen to the ſtates general; indirectly but politely expoſtulating with them on the ſubject of not returning an anſwer to his Swediſh majeſty.

Recovering from that digreſſion, which, though fully intended, had the appearance of being caſual, he exhorts them to make ſome important diverſions to the enterpriſes of Spain and Auſtria; ſince if the arms of Sweden ſhould prove unſucceſsful, the whole torrent of war might pour upon the Low Countries;—and he then obſerved, with great modeſty, that the king his maſter, far from flattering himſelf with preſumptuous hopes, conſidered the ſucceſs of the field as a periodical ſort of proſperity; nevertheleſs, that he had caſt the die, and paſſed not only a Rubicon, but the Baltic ocean.

As there are reaſons to think that Guſtavus was ſomewhat piqued at the inattention of the Dutch, both with regard to forms of reſpect, as well as due vigilance to the public welfare of Europe, Camerarius concludes with telling them, that being then on the wing of departure, it might not be improper to appoint deputies to hold a conference with him the firſt moment that appeared convenient. Thus the affair ended, in no degree to the diſadvantage of Guſtavus.

While his majeſty remained at Stralſund, a public faſt, for three days, was obſerved in Sweden; and on his return to Stetin he appointed a ſecond general humiliation, and ordered divine ſervice to be ſolemnly celebrated at the head of every regiment. He then gave directions to a part of his army to puſh on, vigorouſly, the blockade of Colbergen *, which Torquato de Conti, and all the troops that ſerved under him, had made their magazine of wealth and plunder. The garriſon conſiſted only of 1,700 infantry, and a few horſe.

* Colbergen is the third principal town in Ulterior Pomerania. It has a good port near the Baltic, and carries on a conſiderable trade. Moſt people think the fortreſs ſtrong; and the cathedral is eſteemed a good piece of Gothic architecture.

The Imperial general, for the reaſon before ſtated, was very deſirous to raiſe the blockade, or throw 7 or 800 dragoons into the town; but that attempt was difficult, as Kniphauſen and Bauditzen had cloſed up all the avenues with an army of about 12,000 men. It not being eaſy therefore to render this enterpriſe practicable, Erneſt, count de Montecuculi*, was diſpatched at the head of a detachment, conſiſting of 10,000 men, being the regiments of Coloredo, Iſolani, Goëtz, Spar, and Charles Walſtein, in full hopes of cutting the Swedes to pieces by ſurprize, and rendering ineffectual a very long and tedious blockade. Horn, who lay at Stetin, ſoon procured intelligence of this intention, and having ſummoned a council of war, ſent the generals advice to march out of their lines, and give the enemy battle. Upon this a draught was made of the *moiety* of ſoldiers in each regiment, for ſuch was the king's practice; every colonel being to conduct his own diviſion; and as they were commanded *men*, to uſe the language of the times, it was their cuſtom to march *without colours*. By theſe means a general, upon any emergency, had the choice of the better half of his army, and the more experienced officers of rank and ſeniority; who by their preſence not only kept the common men in ſpirits, but did them honour; and if the ſervice proved ſharp, a regiment was deſtroyed in part only†.

The army being thus draughted, the remaining moiety, with Leſlie at their head, and under the direction of their reſpective lieutenant-colonels, defended the lines of the camp; ſo that the Swediſh detachment, being reinforced from Horn's army, and by ſeveral ſmall parties of ſoldiers ſelected from the neighbouring garriſons, made in the whole about 11,000 effective men. Serjeant-major-general Kniphauſen, who commanded it in chief, conſidered well the nature of the road, by which the enemy intended to approach him, and having requeſted ſir John Hepburn to examine the paſs and fortreſs of Scheifelbein, orders were given to lieutenant-colonel Monro, to throw ſome companies of infantry into

* This officer, a perſon extremely accompliſhed, was deſcended from one of the beſt families in Modena, and paſſed regularly from the muſquet to the partiſan and baton; being at length general of the artillery and chief commander in Alſatia. His valour led him into an indiſcreet affair near Colmar, where, after having received two wounds from a ſword and three muſquet-ſhots, he had the misfortune to be taken priſoner, and died partly with grief, in the year 1633. He muſt not be confounded with his nephew, Raymond, count de Montecuculi, of whom we ſhall ſpeak hereafter in the ſtorming of Brandenburg, &c.

† *Pietro Pomo*; *Guerre di Ferd. II. & Coſtavo Adolpho.* 4°. Venet. 1638. pag. 2.

the

the town and caſtle: to which Kniphauſen gave a ſhort billet in writing to this effect; *Maintain the town as long as you can, but do not give up the caſtle whilſt a ſingle man continues with you* *.

Upon the whole, this place was not defenſible for a longer time than twenty-four hours; yet Monro, having taken poſſeſſion of it three days before Montecuculi's arrival, made a good ſhow of reſiſtance; and when the Imperial general had ranged his army round the walls, in order to make one general aſſault, and ſent a trumpeter to propoſe a treaty, the brave Scot replied with great plainneſs, *That the word* treaty *by ſome chance had happened to be omitted in his inſtructions, and that he had only powder and ball at the count de Montecuculi's ſervice.* Upon this, orders were given to commence a general ſtorm, but the Scottiſh troops behaved to admiration, and, having laid the town in aſhes, retired with great regularity into the caſtle. The Imperialiſts, perceiving the governor to be a man of reſolution, broke up their encampment, and quitted the ſiege.

This behaviour of Monro gave the Swedes a great advantage, for in that interim Kniphauſen received Horn's aſſiſtances, and obtained a ſhort ſpace for deliberation. It was no trivial error in Montecuculi to have loſt time in tampering with Monro, who had reſolved to give a reſpite to his comrades, or periſh in the ruins of Scheifelbein caſtle.

Both armies were now in full march, with different deſigns. The chief command of the Swedes was veſted in Kniphauſen; baron Teüffel led the German infantry, lord Reay the Engliſh and Scots, and Bauditzen conducted the horſe. About midnight they received intelligence from a peaſant, that the Imperialiſts had taken up their lodgings in ſome little dorps hard by; a piece of intelligence which was not unacceptable; ſince if theſe two bodies of troops had miſſed one another, the Imperialiſts might probably have forced the camp that remained round Colbergen, and thrown relief into the town. A council of war being ſummoned immediately, Kniphauſen gave it as his opinion, for he was an officer of equal calmneſs and valour, that a midnight battle might prove a tumultuous and indeciſive affair; ſince, ſuppoſing the worſt to happen, that could be imagined, it would ſtill be ſufficient glory to maintain the ſiege, and render the enemy's deſign abortive; obſerving further, that they knew neither the ſtrength, ſituation, nor

* *Monro's Expeditions*, part ii. p. 8.

precautions

precautions taken by their adverſaries; and if by any miſapprehenſion or error they ſhould chance to be defeated, that then Colbergen, and even Stetin, would be irrecoverably loſt. This opinion with ſome difficulty prevailed. Meanwhile the ſelf-ſame peaſant, as is imagined, deſerted to the Imperialiſts, who took the alarm, and at three in the morning left their camp in flames. All were ready to blame Kniphauſen, though perhaps unjuſtly; for appearances in war amount to demonſtrations in weak minds. Nevertheleſs, it was at laſt reſolved, to march in purſuit of the flying enemies; and the Swedes, next morning by eight o'clock, overtook them on a large heath, continuing their retreat with prudence and diligence, and ſkirmiſhing in good order.—Coming to a defile, where ſome carriages broke and ſtopped up the road, the Imperialiſts found themſelves obliged to confront their purſuers in good earneſt. The Croatians, unaccuſtomed to ſerious fighting, ſoon took to flight; but the foot ſoldiers, ranging themſelves in a marſhy plain, determined to obtain honourable conditions, or ſell their lives as dearly as they could. In this interim one of the darkeſt miſts ſprung up, that ever was known. The Imperial infantry aſked quarter, and offered to ſerve his Swediſh majeſty in the ſame rank, and under the ſame conditions they had ſerved the emperor; proteſting at the ſame time, if their propoſals were not accepted, they would maintain the fight to the laſt man. Whilſt theſe affairs were in agitation, Bauditzen, entirely ignorant of what had happened, returned from purſuing the Croatian horſe, and ſeeing the groſs of the enemies army drawn up in order of battle and unbroken, attacked them immediately with great reſolution. The Imperialiſts ſuſpecting treachery, and finding themſelves ſurrounded on every ſide, altered their firſt diſpoſition, and, forming immediately into Burgundian ſquares, returned a furious uninterrupted fire. Bauditzen nevertheleſs entered them with his body of cavalry; and upon theſe frequent charges, the other half of Bauditzen's horſemen, which compoſed the oppoſite wing of the Swediſh army, ſuppoſing the enemy to have halted, and put themſelves in a poſture of diſputing the victory, which opinion was confirmed by the flight and fear of diſperſed ſoldiers, as is uſual, fell immediately on the troops of their own army, who hemmed in the Imperialiſts on the point directly over-againſt Bauditzen. Thus a dreadful conflict enſued amongſt mutual friends, and ſervants to the ſame maſter, which coſt many a brave man his life. What cauſed the miſtake was, that the Swediſh army, as we hinted before, carried no colours on that day; ſuch being the cuſtom in

Guſtavus's ſervice, when armies of expedition were compoſed of battalions draughted from ſeveral regiments. In this confuſion and panic, all the Swediſh troops behaved, by turns, well and ill, excepting the van of the infantry commmanded by Teüffel, and Bauditzen's large brigade of horſe, led on by lord Reay, and ſir John Devereux an Engliſhman. The Imperialiſts, under favour of this miſt and miſtake, retired with comparatively little loſs.

The Swedes loſt a complete victory, partly by the ſpringing up of the miſt, and partly by not carrying the reſpective colours that belonged to each regiment: but whether the king ever altered this overſight, in caſe it be thought one, is more than we can take upon us at this lapſe of time to determine.

Thus concluded a rencounter of a very uncommon and diſagreeable nature, where comrade killed his comrade, and friend his friend: nor can I agree with a brave Scottiſh officer, who in his relation of this engagement, in which he happened to be preſent, calls it *a mighty pretty and comical ſort of a battle.* Be that as it will, public thankſgivings were made throughout the ſeveral Swediſh armies, with great ſerioufneſs and ſolemnity*.

During the interval which Monro's vigorous reſiſtance procured, the king flew to Horn's camp, and placed himſelf, in conjunction with that general, at the head of a body of cavalry, in order to bear a ſhare in ſo important a buſineſs; but an expreſs from Kniphauſen acquainted them on the road, that he had obliged the enemy to retire.

Upon this Kniphauſen returned to his antient camp, where he received a conſiderable reinforcement from his maſter, and was ſucceeded by Horn, who, having changed the blockade into a regular ſiege, and intercepted a convoy of 180 waggons laden with proviſions, took Colbergen, which had been three years in fortifying, by capitulation, agreed upon in the month of March the year enſuing, after an obſtinate reſiſtance of five months. The garriſon, conſiſting of 1500 good ſoldiers, was eſcorted to Landſberg. To increaſe the governor's chagrin, four Imperial ſhips arrived the day after the articles were ſigned, well provided with a reinforcement of ſoldiers and military ſtores. The Swediſh veſſels which guarded the coaſt, gave them full opportunity to ſteal into the harbour, which is formed by the mouth of the river

* *Heylmanni Leo Arctous*, p. 17.

Perſant;

Perſant; and thus they were entrapped between a naval and land fire, without a poſſibility of eſcape. Some time after that, the garriſon was arreſted at Friedberg in the New Marche, on account of the ſlaughter, committed by Tilly, in ſtorming of New Brandenburg.

But to return to the month of November 1630. His majeſty, having caſt his eyes a ſecond time on the duchy of Mechlenburg and the countries adjacent, went once more to Stralſund, and, thence directing his march to Stetin, took a freſh review of its fortifications. A perſon who had a diſcerning genius like Guſtavus, ſoon ſaw room for additions and improvements, and, in ſpite of a very rough approaching winter, turned his whole army into pioneers and military architects. During the main ſtreſs of this work, the king was told, that a captain had been impriſoned for ſetting his company a bad example, by complaining of the ſeverity of the ſeaſon, and the hardſhip and ſervility of the employment. *My good friend*, ſaid the king, *the earth is always frozen to thoſe that want induſtry. It is ridiculous to poſtpone till to-morrow what ought to be executed the preſent moment: on the contrary, it is impoſſible to purſue an object too earneſtly. Perſevering alacrity alone performs all that is great and ſhining. Moſt things might be effected by men, ſuppoſing indolence did not retard nor fear diſmay them**.

It was about this time, according to an hiſtorian† well verſed in the affairs of the preſent period, that his majeſty received from England the ſum of £.60,000. with advice likewiſe concerning the body of recruits then to be raiſed by the marquis of Hamilton. He was favoured alſo with a good ſupply of £.48,000. from another quarter; but whether from Sweden or elſewhere, I cannot ſay. Nevertheleſs, it induced him to make a general review of all his troops, and, having diſtributed part of theſe ſums among them with uncommon frankneſs and generoſity, the diſaffected and diſbanded Imperialiſts ſoon flocked to his enſigns from every quarter; inſomuch that ſixty cavaliers in a body, completely armed and mounted, made him a tender of their ſervices in one morning.

Aſtoniſhed with ſuch vigorous proceedings, old Torquato de Conti, weakened with infirmities, or, in truth, grown ſick of a war, where he made no figure, beſought the emperor to excuſe him from the command of the army. From thence

* *Loccenii* Hiſtoria Suecana, p. 577.
† *Soldat Suedois*, p. 38. *Arlanibai Arma Suecica*, 4°. p. 60.

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he retired to Rome, took an employment under the pope, where the ſervice was more pacific, and died there the laſt of his family. Hannibal count de Schomberg ſucceeded him in command, and, having removed his camp from Anclam, intrenched himſelf near Gartz; ill provided, according to the uſual management of the houſe of Auſtria, with proviſions, money, ammunition, baggage-waggons, and draught-horſes*.

About this period the king ſhowed an example of lenity and Chriſtian moderation towards the inhabitants of Lubec, who, though all proteſtants, had refuſed his officers the power of enliſting ſoldiers. It was eaſy at a ſingle ſtroke to have cruſhed them for this unkindneſs, which Guſtavus calls *inhumanity*; but on the contrary he graciouſly tells them, that though the proofs on his ſide were inconteſtable, ſtill ſomething privately aſſured him, that ſuch behaviour proceeded only from ſecret ill wiſhes to the glory of his cauſe, and not from the body of ſenators and patricians in general. *Wherefore*, concludes he, *I ſhall make no difficulty of reinſtating you all into my antient favour and good-will, upon condition, that what has been practiſed hitherto, may hereafter be omitted* †. He took care to cultivate a ſpirit of religion in his own army, and gave orders to the conſiſtory of clergy which attended his camp, to draw up a freſh body of prayers, three and twenty in number, by way of ſupplement to thoſe already publiſhed; moſt or all of them relating to war ‡.

It was now the 23d of December, but his majeſty paid little or no regard to the ſeverity of an uncommon German winter; for it was a cuſtomary ſaying with him, that he *could perform greater actions in a winter than in a ſummer campaign* §. Of courſe he croſſed the Oder, at a time the Imperialiſts concluded he would refreſh his troops in warm quarters, according to the common cuſtom of making war: and a ſecond time reviewing his ſtrength, which conſiſted of 12,000 infantry, 85 cornets of horſe, and 70 pieces of cannon, ordered public prayers to be offered up at the head of every regiment; and, after reſting ſome hours, made a midnight march, and inveſted Griffenhagen by break of day; notwithſtanding Schomberg lay encamped at Gartz in

* See his letter to Tilly, preſerved in the *Armis Suecicis*, p. 93—96, which concludes with theſe remarkable words: *An ego ſolus omnibus ſufficere poſſim, tua Excellentia judicet.*

† See the original letter in the *Armis Suecicis*, p. 87.

‡ Ibid. p. 77—87. *Hiſt. or Authent. Relat. in Low Dutch*, tom. ii. p. 34.

§ *Arlanibæi Arma Suecica*, p. 76, and 61.

ſuch

ſuch a manner, that the two armies were only ſeparated by the river Oder.

The town of Griffenhagen, whoſe ſituation is naturally ſtrong, ſtands on the north-eaſt ſide of the river, about twelve miles diſtant from Stetin. By means of its bridge it is alſo a paſs of great importance, as it communicates with the Marche on one ſide, and with Pomerania and Brandenburg on the other *.

What apparently rendered the ſiege more difficult, was the vicinity of Schomberg's forces; yet his majeſty had received private aſſurances, that the Imperial general, merely through the diſtreſs and poverty of his troops, for they durſt not plunder and commit outrages in the manner they had done before the Swedes arrived †, had diſperſed part of them into better quarters, at ſome diſtance from the main army. It was true he had the power of throwing as many men into the town before it was inveſted, as he thought fit; but Guſtavus was not to be deterred by an effort of this ſort, concluding thereby only to obtain a greater number of priſoners; ſince he took his meaſures ſo prudently, after having once inveſted the town, that Schomberg ſhould not paſs its bridges without permiſſion, it being in his own power to blow them up whenever he pleaſed. He, however, mixed conſideration and humanity with the ideas of precaution and ſafety, and looked upon deſtroying the bridges as ruining the intercourſe between two very conſiderable places, loſing the affections of the natives, and cramping his own marches to the eaſt and to the weſt, in caſe he became ſucceſsful. For theſe reaſons he moored his ſhips at proper diſtances along the ſides of the two bridges, with directions to fire from fixed batteries upon any extraordinary occaſion.

His majeſty ſoon examined the ſituation of the ground round the town, and having made choice of a convenient hill, thundered upon the city walls day and night, from the mouths of ſixty pieces of large battering cannon, with ſuch inexpreſſible fury, that he made an opening, which had the appearance of being ſufficiently wide. Nevertheleſs, to be more ſecure, and not ſacrifice the lives of his men out of pure gallantry, he ſent for Wildeſein, a Swiſs lieutenant-colonel

* It muſt be obſerved there were two bridges over the Oder, neither of them tending directly to the oppoſite town: for that from Griffenhagen abutted two miles above Gartz, and that from Gartz did juſt the ſame in regard to Griffenhagen. Guſtavus was ſatisfied to intrench a body of troops on the eaſtern foot of Gartz-bridge.

† *Brachelii Hiſtor. Noſtr. Temp.* p. 231.

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in his own regiment of guards, giving him orders to put on his armour, and take an exact ſurvey of the breach. As that officer brought back an unfavourable account, the fire was renewed a few hours more, and two entrances were then made by a couple of batteries, which mounted 20 pieces of cannon on each ſide of a tower. Theſe breaches were capable of admitting three men abreaſt. Wildeſein led the firſt muſqueteers, and his colonel, the gallant baron Teüffel, ſeconded him with a body of pikemen. Struck with ſuch aſtoniſhing reſolution, the Imperialiſts began by degrees to give ground, and fly out of the town by way of the Oder bridge. On that ſide ſir Alexander Leſlie was encamped, and attempted to clear the paſſage by ſuch ordnance as had been planted in the king's ſhips for that purpoſe. Before this could be effected to any conſiderable purpoſe, great part of the garriſon, conſiſting of 2,500 men, had got over, and drew up in battle array on the other ſide of the river, where the king's troops could not approach them. Leſlie then made himſelf maſter of an outwork, and getting between that and the town wall, near the place where the aſſailants had entered, an unlucky miſtake happened between his party and theirs, from conſequences natural enough in ſuch great confuſion; for they fired reciprocally on each other with incredible fury. The brave Wildeſein, and ſir Thomas Conway*, an Engliſhman, were both wounded; nor might the miſchief have ſtopped there, had not a Swede, who received a mortal ſtroke from a muſquet-ball, made ſome ejaculations to heaven in his own language, and thus the miſapprehenſion was diſcovered. Both parties then joined and ſoon cleared the town. The governor, Ferdinando di Capua, a Neapolitan, and knight of the order of St. James de Compoſtella, could keep only 5 or 600 ſoldiers about him; notwithſtanding, he fought it out to the laſt man, and died ſoon afterwards of the wound he received in his thigh. He was conveyed, at his own requeſt, to Stetin, which place, ſome weeks before, he had vainly boaſted to make himſelf maſter of with little or no difficulty. This brave man was much diſmayed at one circumſtance; he had been over-perſuaded, during the ſiege, to ſend his colours, for ſafety's ſake, to Schomberg's camp, and from that moment began to deſpair of the ſucceſs of his reſiſtance. This ſlight occurrence alſo, for *that* age was very ſuperſtitious,

* Sir Thomas commanded a regiment of Engliſh infantry. Some time afterwards he had the misfortune to loſe his life in a ſhipwreck on the coaſt of Denmark; and Sir John Caſſel, who was alſo an Engliſhman, ſucceeded him.

terrified

terrified and puzzled the common men to ſuch a degree, that they ſoon left their commander, and betook themſelves to flight. Signior Antonio, ſerjeant-major to the governor, was taken priſoner, and ſome few of the better ſort, whom the king, on account of their ranſoms, preſented to baron Teüffel. Amongſt the few that made a good reſiſtance, was a count La Torre, a youth of a moſt liberal countenance, in the fifteenth year of his age. His majeſty had an eye immediately to this young warrior, and, after giving orders to protect him from the fury of the ſoldiers, commanded him to be new cloathed according to his quality and merit, with permiſſion to wear his ſword, ſcarf, and plume.

The Imperialiſts had deputed a handful of men to ſet the town on fire in various places, but the flames were ſoon extinguiſhed by the vigilance of the Swedes. As the town was taken by aſſault, the ſoldiers were allowed free plunder for the ſpace of four hours; but no outrages were committed.

Immediately after Chriſtmas-day, his majeſty marched his whole army in high ſpirits towards Gartz, croſſing the river Oder at both bridges, in hopes to tempt Schomberg, who had more troops than himſelf, to a deciſive engagement; but that general retired immediately, and diſpatched a meſſenger to Tilly with an account of the ill ſtate of his troops. In the king's road ſtood a very important fort in a moraſs, called Capua's ſconce; but its real name was fort Morvitz. It was new, and though fortified upon the beſt principles then known, the garriſon made hardly any reſiſtance. A leſſer fort was taken by the king immediately afterwards. At ſupper time it was reported in his majeſty's tent, that the town of Gartz was all in flames. On this, the king, ſtarting up from table, beheld the lights, and heard great exploſions in the air. Schomberg was at that moment employing himſelf in decamping; and blew up ſome old turrets where the powder was lodged. In this, he was conſidered by many as behaving in an unſoldier-like manner, as alſo in not defending fort Capua; and in giving up a paſs, ſo important as Gartz was looked upon to be, without a blow. The king's intrepidity, good diſcipline, and perſeverance, had created a ſort of alarm in Schomberg's mind. He pretended too, that his troops were ill paid; that they were too libertine and diſſolute, and too much accuſtomed to cruelty and plunder. Of courſe, having firſt drawn off his garriſon, he ſunk his cannon in the river, deſtroyed all the ammunition he could not remove, burnt the bridge behind him, an act highly unpopular to the country, and made a long retreat,

which

which appeared rather too precipitate for a good commander, inaſmuch as it excited diſtruſt in his ſoldiers. What this general propoſed was, to lodge his troops in Francfort upon the Oder, and take upon him the defence of that city, not under the appearance of a garriſon, but in the light of an army that was to defend it. Suppoſing the idea to be right or wrong, Schomberg was not happy in the execution of it. Four of his regiments were overtaken in their march and handled ſeverely enough; 300 baggage waggons were loſt, and colonel Spar eſcaped with difficulty: and if, during the latter part of Schomberg's retreat, the town of Cuſtrin* had not opened its gates to him, Spar being detached on that occaſion, he had miſſed ſecuring that important paſſage, and loſt, in all probability, the greateſt part of his army†. On the other hand, Francfort and Landſberg had fallen of courſe into the poſſeſſion of the Swedes; and the fatal ſtorming of Magdeburg, which happened the May enſuing, had been prevented. But for the preſent, the unhappy timidity of the elector of Brandenburg counterworked, as far as it was poſſible, that great and aſtoniſhing plan of conqueſt, which Guſtavus had formed.

When his troops arrived at Cuſtrin in purſuit of the flying Imperialiſts, the garriſon cloſed the city-gates againſt him, which deprived him of the means of ruining Schomberg's army, and marching directly to Tilly with a view to give him battle. This diſappointment only ſharpened the king's induſtry, inſtead of diſmaying him.

Here ended the military operations of the year 1630; in which year died John count of Anholt, ſecond in authority to Tilly, and Rambold count Colalto, who had been commander in chief in the Mantuan war; as alſo Melchior, cardinal Kleſel, in the ſeventy-ſeventh year of his age, who had been prime miniſter and favourite to the emperors Rodolphus and Mathias, but was impriſoned by Ferdinand, and baniſhed,

* This town, ſituated about fourteen miles from Francfort, was then, and is ſince, conſidered as one of the moſt important paſſes in the empire; being placed in the middle of a great moraſs, at the confluence of the Warta and Oder. The fortreſs is acceſſible only by one cauſeway, which is five miles long; and in approaching it you croſs no leſs than thirty-two bridges. Moſt of its proprietors, the electors of Brandenburg, have made improvements in its fortifications, ſo that it is deemed upon the whole impregnable: and thus much is inconteſtably certain, it has never yet been taken by open force.

† This part of the hiſtory, with much afterwards enſuing, is taken from the account of a Britiſh officer, who was ſerjeant-major in the royal regiment of guards, under the command of baron Teuffel.

before that prince aſcended the throne; of which tranſaction we have ſpoken largely in another place, as likewiſe of his poverty, and how he exculpated himſelf before the ſee of Rome. He was recalled ſome years prior to his death, but never choſe, with the exception of his aſſiſting to overthrow Walſtein, to immerſe himſelf again in politics.

By way of a finiſhing paragraph for the year 1630, I ſhall only obſerve, that Charles I. by the interpoſition and perſuaſion of the court of Spain, ſent ſir Henry Vane to the electreſs Palatine, with orders to lay before her, in the moſt perſuaſive manner, the expediency of allowing her eldeſt ſon to be educated a papiſt at the court of Vienna, with a view to a match between him and one of the princeſſes of the houſe of Auſtria. A repreſentation to which ſhe replied heroically, *That rather than comply with ſo irreligious and mean a propoſal, ſhe would be her ſon's executioner with her own hands.*

The year 1631 opened with the common ſeverity of a German winter; but Guſtavus kept the war alive very briſkly. The night Griffenhagen was taken, he, for ſome reaſons, ſlept with his army in the open field, and next morning caſt his eye upon Landſberg, a ſtrong town ſituated on the river Warta. It was an object worth poſſeſſing, both as a place of importance, and as it was full of proviſions, ammunition, and artillery. But the attempt, upon a nearer view, appeared diſcouraging; for the garriſon had been increaſed by many fugitives from Gartz; ſo Horn, who had been ſent to beſiege it, was commanded back, and orders were given to blockade it with ſeveral regiments of foot and horſe.

1631.

The court of Vienna now began to conſider Guſtavus as ſomething more than a king of ſnow, the denomination which the Auſtrian miniſtry at firſt gave him; for he continued to gain ground every hour, and had collected together an army, which appeared to be formidable even in numbers, having improved it in the ſpace of ſix months, from a ſlight beginning of 13,000 men, to 34,400 infantry, and 11,800 cavalry, without including the Britiſh and German troops, that acted under Oxenſtiern in Pruſſia; the forces that Banier commanded in the reduction of Mechlenberg and about Magdeburg; and the eight regiments, employed in the blockade of Colbergen. He had likewiſe in Sweden a body of reſerve, amounting to 25,000 effective ſoldiers. Upon the whole, he was thought capable at this time, in caſe of emergency, to bring into the field

field a well inſtructed and well appointed army, amounting to 71,200 men; having at the ſame time iſſued out commiſſions to raiſe 10,600 freſh troops.*

Aſtoniſhed to behold a prince creating ſuch inconceivable reſources, and approaching more and more to the ſouthward every hour; the houſe of Auſtria, which ſaw no viſible marks of Guſtavus's diſſolution, began now ſincerely to repent, that ſhe had ever inclined an ear to the repreſentations of the catholic princes at Ratiſbon, which at that time were looked upon as mere memoir-work and matter of form. It is true, ſhe ſtruggled long and hard againſt ſwallowing this bitter preſcription, that was recommended to her: but as the cry, either at, or juſt before the arrival of Guſtavus, was ſo very loud, with regard to the enormous expences of maintaining a number of ſuperfluous and diſſolute ſoldiers, it was reſolved to diſband *a certain part of the army*. What was yet more unfortunate, the young and vigorous troops were retained, and many of the old weather-beaten Walloons were diſmiſſed, upon ſuppoſition that they had paſſed the flower of their age and ſervice; though perhaps one fourth part of theſe men were fit to be officers.—*By this ſingle error*, which no hiſtorian has taken notice of as to its conſequences, *the houſe of Auſtria ruined herſelf*. Theſe experienced veterans, who had been born in camps, and nurſed in war, knew nothing either of manufactures or of agriculture; and having ambition to live by the ſword, entered by little and little into the ſervice of Guſtavus and his allies. I mention this circumſtance a *ſecond time*, becauſe much depends upon it. The ſtep had been taken ſome months before.

When Guſtavus firſt engaged in the German invaſion, it was the faſhionable tone of raillery in the court-circle at Vienna to conſider him as a ſort of enthuſiaſtical adventurer, who with a handful of new-raiſed troops, that had fought only againſt Moſcovites, Poles, and Coſſacks, had formed a chimerical hope of defeating and deſtroying an inconceivable number of regular troops; who, to ſay the worſt of them, had been fluſhed with ſucceſs, and improved by the experience of twelve ſucceſſive campaigns, all crowned with uninterrupted victories.

The fatality of this diſbanding ſcheme was ſoon diſcovered, but the men were vaniſhed. However, by way of *ſuccedaneum*, the Imperial regulations in military matters were

* *Arlanibæi Arma Suecica*, p. 74.

made public *; the doctrine of levying contributions was propoſed to be made more reaſonable and equitable, and aſſurances of pay ſet forth to the ſoldiers upon better probability. Peace being by this time concluded in Italy, Aldringer and Galas had orders to march into Germany that army which had performed ſuch great ſervice at the ſiege of Mantua. The emperor then exhorted the electors and catholic princes to exert themſelves to the utmoſt at this criſis, "which in truth," ſaid he, "ought to annihilate all perſonal intereſts, as well as private animoſities." But what went moſt againſt his inclination was, to take off the edge and rigour of the edict of reſtitution; and yet the ſuppoſed convention of proteſtant princes, then talked of to be aſſembled at Leipſic, made ſomething neceſſary either to be done or promiſed on that head. Some moderate catholics ſincerely wiſhed to make a few conceſſions in good earneſt; for they ſaw a tempeſt gathering, which they had reaſon to be afraid of. The majority of the Auſtrian and Spaniſh faction was dazzled with the glittering hopes of univerſal monarchy, and the unbounded proſpect of confiſcation and plunder. Many were delighted with the total ſubverſion of hereſy; numbers confided in the fortune and experience of the Imperial troops, and feared their enemies the leſs, as their army was a confuſed collection of twenty different nations.

If we except the difficulties which Guſtavus found in the hope of beſieging Landſberg, it is worthy obſervation, that, in the ſhort ſpace of eight days, during the very depth of winter, he had cleared all Pomerania and the Marche from the Warta to the Oder, and opened a communication with Brandenburg, Sileſia, and Luſatia. By theſe means he gave the inhabitants of Pomerania breathing time to renew their commerce and agriculture, and drew from them very conſiderable ſupplies for the ſupport of his army.

Leaving Horn therefore with the groſs of his army about Landſberg, he ſhaped his courſe towards Stetin, and made himſelf maſter of New-Brandenburg, where colonel Marazini commanded with 1600 men, part of whom was his own regiment, which afterwards proved ſo fatal to the king at the battle of Lutzen. Pleaſed with this latter enterpriſe, he next took Clemptno, Trepto, and Loïtch, the town itſelf

* This edict, bearing date November 9, 1630, is to be ſeen in *Arlanibæi Arm. Suecic.* 4°. p. 67.

being

being of no consequence, but the fortress extremely strong. At this place a ridiculous accident happened, which first surprized the king, and then made him smile. One Pietro Perazzi, an Italian *, commanded the castle. A trumpeter was sent to exhort him to surrender; upon which Perazzi fell into a violent passion, called for his servants to help him on with his armour, sent for the ladies to behold him in his military dress, ordered the trumpets to sound a charge, and returned word back to the king; *That he was a man of honour, and would maintain the depositum committed to his charge at his enemy's peril, and for his master's glory, to the last moments of his life; since his purpose was to make a quite different figure from what the commandants had done at Clemptno and Trepto.* While the trumpeter was delivering his message he changed his mind, and sent word that he was ready to capitulate. Gustavus was astonished at a man of so unaccountable a character, and admitted the surrender upon one proviso, that Perazzi might be present at the signing of the articles; for he privately longed to see him. But greater was his astonishment, when Perazzi appeared, as gay, and as well dressed as any Frenchman, and without the least appearance of concern. A gentleman of fashion belonging to Gustavus's life-guard had no patience to see such a hero, and gently, but without ceremony, took off his rich scarf from his shoulders. His Majesty gave some secret mark of approbation, and Perazzi, not in the least disconcerted, made a low bow with a smile, and talked of something else. Thus ended this interview. The king was so divided betwixt the ridiculous and the incomprehensible, that he could not tell what to do or say; insomuch that it was a matter of question amongst his officers, whether the bravest person in Europe would have so perplexed him. Yet the famous Perazzi had passed among the Imperial troops for a true Italian *Spetza-ferro*. This recalls to my mind the behaviour of an half-countryman of his, one Pietro Ferrari, a Corsican †, who being asked, why he threw a commander of great distinction, whom he had taken prisoner, into a dark dungeon, which he did in order to get a ransom the sooner, feeding him only with bread and water, and appointing two wretched camp followers to attend him, one loathsome with his wounds, and one infected by the plague; made this answer to his friends: *Gentlemen, what shall I*

* *Chemnitius* calls him Peralta, and supposes him to be a Spaniard; but other very valuable historians pronounce him an Italian; and indeed the character is more consistent with that nation.

† *Mem. du duc de Grammont*, tom. i. p. 31, 32.

 *alledge?*

*alledge? My father is dead, and I have conſoled myſelf—My mother is dead, and I have conſoled myſelf—And if this raſcal, this becco cornuto,* I repeat his own words, *ſhould die of want, and a broken heart, I ſhall conſole myſelf likewiſe.*——

Thus much, though, muſt be obſerved, that we no where hear of the Ferrari's and the Perazzi's in the field of battle.

The month of January was now half over, and the king, who was alike induſtrious in the cabinet and in the field, had contrived to negotiate a treaty with the archbiſhop of Bremen, with George duke of Luneberg, and William landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel.

What next came upon the carpet were the articles of alliance between France and Sweden, the whole of the negotiation being left to the management of De Charnacé on the one part, and the generals Horn and Banier on the other. This affair was tranſacted at the camp of Berewalt, in the marquiſate of Brandenburg, having been projected in Sweden the preceding year *. The French ambaſſador ſtill inſiſted upon one part of his old nonſenſe, about refuſing the king his regal titles; but Guſtavus gave him to underſtand, *That if he brought nothing in his portmanteau but ſuch fooliſhneſs, he was maſter of the day and hour of returning to France without further ceremony.*

An Engliſh ambaſſador likewiſe made his appearance before Guſtavus, and preſented letters in behalf of his maſter, explaining, in a long ſeries of deductions, the motives that induced him to aſk the reſtitution of the Palatinates. His propoſals too were ſo chimerical, the ſupplies of men and money being likewiſe forgotten, that Guſtavus gave him leave to retire without delivering his papers, giving him his promiſe of honour to take the affair into his own hands, and act therein as to himſelf appeared beſt, or, in other words, as matters appeared moſt reaſonable and moſt convenient.

The tenor of the confederation between Sweden and France ran to this effect; that it was to continue in force for five years next enſuing, being to be ratified without delay by the two reſpective kings. Its principal articles were as follow †: That his majeſty of Sweden ſhould maintain an army on foot conſiſting of 30,000 infantry and 6000

* *Arnalibæi Arma Suecica*, p. 100. This appears likewiſe from the 10th article of the treaty.

† See the original treaty in the APPENDIX, Art. XIX.

cavalry;

cavalry; and that the French king ſhould furniſh him annually with 400,000 crowns, payable at Paris and Amſterdam in two ſeparate payments, at the choice of the king of Sweden.—The object of this armament was to be the liberty of Germany, the re-eſtabliſhment of oppreſſed princes and ſtates, the demolition of new forts and harbours on the coaſt of the Baltic, with an eye likewiſe to what had happened in the Valteline and the country of the Griſons. That a free reciprocal commerce ſhould be eſtabliſhed between the ſubjects of France and Sweden. That the catholic religion, in ſupport of which article Richelieu laboured extremely, with a view to render himſelf popular at home, ſhould continue *ſub eadem forma* in thoſe places where it had been antiently profeſſed; and that a good underſtanding ſhould be cultivated with the elector of Bavaria, at whoſe court ſome private intrigues were then carrying on to the detriment of Sweden. That neutrality ſhould be granted to ſuch princes of the league as deſired it, or that they might enter, as parties, into the ſaid confederacy;—And, laſtly, that the treaty ſhould be renewed; if a general peace was not concluded on, within the time expreſſed for its continuance.

This convention was fully aſſented to, January 13, 1631, yet the ratifications were not exchanged in due form till the May following. The whole caſt and form of this treaty has been conſidered a maſterpiece in the political ſcience; nor muſt it be here forgotten, that England and Holland, ſome few weeks afterwards, acceded thereto*.

During the debates which naturally attended this treaty, his majeſty took the field by day, and maintained his argument with De Charnacé in the evening. In that interval, or rather a few days before, Leſlie had rendered himſelf maſter of the caſtle of Lignitz, which the king made him a preſent of by way of country villa; and Bauditzen, by a general ſtorm, took Piritz, in the Vandal language ſignifying abundance of corn, a town of conſiderable importance, ſituated on the frontiers of Outer Pomerania, and garriſoned at that time by 1400 Imperialiſts.

Meanwhile Melk, a native of Mechlenburg, who from a common ſoldier roſe to be a *partiſan* of repute, being a perſon often made uſe of in ſuch affairs, performed an uncommon exploit upon Malchin, a ſtrong fort ſituated upon the banks of the Pene, and defended by two companies of dragoons. His little army conſiſted only of 300 foot and 36 horſemen;

* *Terſori Chron. S. in Vitam Guſt. ad annum* 1631.

but having aſked a good number of peaſants to aſſiſt him, and giving each of them two lighted matches in their hands, diſperſing them at the ſame time here and there in ſmall parties, and eſpecially along the grand avenue over a moraſs that approached the town, he ſummoned the garriſon, about four in the morning to capitulate, in the name of the king and all his forces, proteſting at the ſame time, that if they heſitated a ſingle moment, no quarter ſhould be given. The *commandant* ſoon complied, not permitting himſelf to examine into Melk's aſſertions. Thus he and his two companies were made priſoners of war; and, with the ſame facility they ſurrendered the town, enliſted themſelves in the Swediſh ſervice, not caring to rejoin their old companions, nor undergo their ſharp military ſarcaſms. Another ſlight example of this *leſſer kind of war* muſt not be omitted; particularly as Guſtavus conſidered it the very grammar of the military art, and the only ſure and expeditious method of obtaining the knowledge of men's abilities. One Braun, an enſign in young Thurn's regiment of muſqueteers, which regiment at that time carried wheel firelocks, and not matchlocks, taking with him fifteen reſolute companions, croſſed the Oder in a ſmall boat, and attacked by night the quarters of 200 Croatian horſe, with a colonel at their head. Entering the village without noiſe, he marched directly to the grand guard, and, miſſing the commander in chief, ſhot the enſign of the regiment dead with his own hand. His few men ſoon made terrible havock, and by the ſuddenneſs and terror of the onſet put to flight the Imperialiſts, who knew neither the number nor ſtrength of their aſſailants. Braun preſented the colours, on which was drawn a *ſable bipartite eagle in a ſilver field*, to the king, his maſter, at Berewalt, and received from him a very magnificent gold chain, and a commiſſion to take upon him the command of captain in his own regiment; the ſtipend of captain in the Swediſh ſervice being at that time a ſmall matter more than double the pay of an enſign*.

The extraordinary advances of Guſtavus, who paid no regard to one of the moſt ſevere winters that Germany had felt for many years, but on the contrary, derived advantages even from the froſt, by tranſporting his artillery over deep moraſſes otherwiſe impaſſable, as happened in particular in the ſiege of Damin, gave ſome faint glimmerings of hope to the proteſtant electors and princes, whom the terrors of the

* *Chemnitius*, tom. i. lib. ii. p. 95.

houſe

houſe of Auſtria had almoſt frozen into a ſtate of inactivity, and emboldened them to venture on an aſſembly, which was actually opened at Leipſic the eighth of February.

Whilſt the politicians at Bernwalt employed themſelves in the cabinet, his majeſty being joined by Kniphauſen, with a body of 2000 foot and 1000 cavalry, inveſted Damin, a place of great importance, on the banks of the Pene, ſituated between the duchies of Mechlenburg and Pomerania, and belonging at preſent to the king of Pruſſia. It was the key to the firſt-named duchy; and had been pitched upon likewiſe as the grand Imperial magazine on the coaſts of the Baltic*. This town had been fortified by the Imperialiſts at a great expence. The caſtle, which was ſeated in a deep moraſs, moſt men conſidered incapable of a regular ſiege, yet the Swedes found means to approach it by the aſſiſtance of the froſt. No leſs perſon than the duke of Savelli was governor, and the garriſon conſiſted of 1700 veteran troops, ſelected from his own regiment, and that of Holk. He had likewiſe proviſions and military ſtores in great abundance, not to mention a new ſupply of artillery, which he had received from Gripſwald; inſomuch that Tilly, who then laid near Francfort upon the Oder, and purpoſed to raiſe the ſiege of Damin, concluded the town, in his own judgment, capable of making a reſiſtance of twenty days. But the king, not that we need blame Tilly's opinion, was a warrior, who choſe very compendious methods of proceeding; though, to ſpeak the truth, part of his ſucceſs was juſtly owing to the froſt.

The Swedes arrived, inveſted the town, and beſieged it in form in one day. Upon the good or evil turn of this ſiege depended more than half the ſucceſs of Tilly's future operations. As it was that general's deſign to make a powerful diverſion about Magdeburg, and recal the enemy from advancing ſouthward, ſince otherwiſe the northern powers would naturally withdraw their allegiance from the emperor, having the Swediſh army between them and Vienna, he choſe, at the time of making this irruption to maintain a ſecure retreat into Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Saxony, with a view not only to check the progreſs of Guſtavus, but to keep the princes of the laſt-named countries under due ſubjection. The road of his retreat was directly through Damin.

His majeſty thundered againſt the town from his batteries all the firſt afternoon and night on the ſide next the river,

* *Heylmanni Leo Arctoüs*, p. 20.

where

where he placed himſelf: and Teüffel next morning made a lodgment in a half-moon, and repulſed the enemy in a general ſally, which Savelli ordered. Meanwhile Knip-hauſen played with equal fury upon the caſtle, having full room to ſpread himſelf round it, as the froſt ſupplied the place of bridges, which the Imperialiſts had broken down. By break of day, a lieutenant, at the head of 400 choſen muſqueteers, began the ſtorm; and, being well ſupported by his companions, made a lodgment in the fortifications. The garriſon ſecured the remainder by cutting off all connexion, and retiring, principally to an old tower, of which the walls were ſo thick, that it ſeemed impoſſible to uſe cannon with effect againſt them. The king ſurveyed this antique ſtructure with great attention, and gave immediate orders to undermine it, in ſpite of all the ſeverity of the weather. When ſome progreſs had been made in that work, the commandant thought proper to ſurrender with ſeven companies of Holk's infantry, who, as their colours could not be preſerved, conſented to enter into the Swediſh ſervice.

It may be aſked, why this garriſon did not retire into the city, where Savelli greatly wanted ſuch a reinforcement? To reſolve this queſtion, it muſt be obſerved, that the caſtle, ſituated in a deep moraſs, was removed from the city about 1,000 paces, and had no communication but by means of a cauſeway, in the middle of which a ſtrong *ſconce* was erected. His majeſty ſoon diſcovered the importance of ſuch a poſt, and ordered Teüffel's lieutenant-colonel, on the very afternoon of his arrival, to make himſelf maſter of it ſword in hand. The ſervice was extremely obſtinate on both ſides; and one Heatly, an Engliſh officer, gained great applauſe; for though he received, at the firſt onſet, a very dangerous muſquet ſhot, he ſtill continued to preſs on, and entered the fortreſs before the reſt of his comrades; nor could any one perſuade him to retire till the Imperialiſts were cleared to a ſingle man *.

Nor muſt I forget what happened to a Scottiſh officer, one Robert Roſs, who, the firſt day of the ſiege, in the midſt of a ſharp cannonade on both ſides, *ſate blowing tobacco* †, to uſe the words of the author I am copying from, at the head of his regiment, which lay within full reach of the enemy's artillery; but being ſuddenly ſtruck with a cannon-ball, he dropped his pipe with great tranquillity, and, crying only, *The Lord receive my ſoul!* expired in an inſtant.

* *Monro's Expeditions*, part ii. † *B. Jonſon* has the ſame expreſſion.

His

His majeſty having made himſelf maſter of the caſtle, took care to diſplay Holk's crimſon enſigns on one of his batteries, and then poſſeſſed himſelf of two important outworks; upon which the beſieged made a ſecond deſperate ſally, but Banier repulſed them with conſiderable loſs, conducting the whole engagement with ſo much valour and preſence of mind, that the king, who ſtood at a diſtance, and rarely cared to act the part of a ſpectator, paſſed the whole time in contemplating his conduct, and beſtowing upon it due commendations. Part of Monro's regiment, commanded by major Potley, an Engliſh cavalier, performed a gallant action in this rencounter; for a ſoldier of Banier's being in danger of remaining on the field mortally wounded, his countrymen refuſing the deſperate ſervice of bringing him off, the Scots formed themſelves by conſent into one body, recovered him from the enemy, and reſtored him to his comrades. The poor man died that night in great pain, admiring the generoſity of ſtrangers, and inveighing againſt his countrymen the Swedes.

A ridiculous circumſtance happened in this ſkirmiſh. As the Britiſh troops were marching down a ſteep hill, expoſed to a furious cannonade, one Liſle, an enſign, happened to tumble forwards, and the wind being extremely high carried away his peruke; upon which Potley ſwore a great oath, that an unfortunate cannon-ball had taken off the cavalier's head. The king laughed when he knew the whole. About the ſame time he eſcaped from an adventure not without difficulty *. Having an inclination to ſurvey, in perſon, the enemies works, by the aſſiſtance of a perſpective glaſs; the ice of a ſudden gave way, and down he ſunk to the arm-pits. One captain Dumaine, who was at the moſt advanced guard, ran immediately to his aſſiſtance; but the king, with extraordinary compoſure of mind, made a ſignal to him with his hand to retire to his poſt. In ſpite of this precaution nearly 1,000 muſquet-ſhots, at a conſiderable diſtance it is true, were diſcharged againſt his majeſty, who at length, with uncommon patience, wrought himſelf free from his incumbrances, and, making the beſt of his way to the guard-fire, called for cold meat and a goblet of Baccharah wine, and, having afterwards changed his cloaths, joined his troops, who were employed in repulſing the beſieged in a ſally.

Dumaine, who was a gentleman of ſpirit and good manners, took the liberty to remonſtrate with his maſter upon

* *Monro's Expeditions*, part ii.

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this accident, repreſenting to him, that the well-being of Europe depended upon the ſafety of his ſingle perſon. The king heard him with great complacency; *But, captain,* ſaid he, *I have a fooliſh ſort of a fancy, which tempts me to imagine, that nothing can be better ſeen than when I obſerve it myſelf.*

On the fourth morning after the ſiege, major Greenland, an Engliſh officer in the Imperial ſervice, waited upon the king from the duke de Savelli; and Guſtavus ſeemed to liſten to his propoſals, as the governor's defence had not been obſtinate; nevertheleſs it was ſtipulated, that Savelli and his officers ſhould give their promiſe in writing, not to ſerve againſt Sweden or its allies for the ſpace of three months. Conditions, in other reſpects honourable, were ſoon granted. The Swediſh army felt a particular joy upon this capitulation; for Quinti Aligheri, whom Chemnitius calls Quinti del Ponte, the traitor that attempted to deſtroy the king in an ambuſcade, had been admitted lieutenant-colonel in the regiment of Savelli, and was well known to be in the city, when it was firſt beſiged. By what methods he contrived to eſcape have never appeared. All we know is, that he was killed the May enſuing, in ſtorming the town of Magdeburg. On the ſurrender of Damin, the generals in a body repreſented to the king, that the wealth of the aſſaſſin, though he was only ſuch in his intentions, ought to be confiſcated to his majeſty's uſes, for, as we obſerved before, Aligheri was partly tempted to deſtroy Guſtavus, in order to ſave the rich harveſt of ten years plunder lodged by him in this city: but the anſwer was, *That all tranſactions in matter of capitulation implied ſacred and punctual obſervance; and as the exception had not been made during the conferences, the king choſe rather to enrich a villain, than to ſeize an advantage, which by the laws of religion and reaſon juſtly belonged to him*.*

His majeſty, it is ſaid, received a ſlight wound during the ſiege, and loſt about 300 very excellent ſoldiers. Letters were intercepted, from Tilly, to the governor, wherein he beſought him to hold out only four days longer, and promiſed him certain aſſiſtance. Be that as it will, the Imperial general lodged a proceſs againſt him before the council of war at Vienna, and brought his life in queſtion. Savelli made it appear he had private orders not to ſacrifice ſuch a choſen handful of troops: and the emperor, to ſhow that he approved of his conduct, diſpatched him on an honourable embaſſy to Italy, and employed him afterwards in military

* *Memorabilia Stec. Gentis*, p. 85.

ſervices.

ſervices. Nevertheleſs, he was to the laſt either injudicious or unfortunate in war.

When Savelli quitted the town at the head of his garriſon, with enſigns flying, and attended by all his baggage-waggons, and two pieces of cannon, Guſtavus received him on horſeback, and, having firſt made a courteous ſpeech to the magiſtrates, turned round, and deſired him to preſent his compliments to the emperor, with aſſurances, that he waged war againſt him merely for the ſake of civil and religious liberty, ſince he bore him no perſonal ill-will. He then told the duke, *That he looked upon him as a man intended by nature to ſhine rather at courts than in the field of battle**. It muſt be owned that this ſpeech has the appearance of deficiency in good-breeding. Savelli's defence of the town was neither good nor bad. But ſuppoſing the latter, the king was a better politician than to reproach an enemy for ſurrendering a town upon eaſy terms. The probable cauſe of this aſperity was as follows.

Duke Savelli, as I have ſeen by a painting and ſome prints of him, was almoſt the only general in thoſe wars, don Baltazar di Marradas excepted, who wore a large perriwig of that faſhion, which was afterwards called *Chedreux* † amongſt us in the beginning of the reign of Charles II. Guſtavus thought this head-dreſs rather too fantaſtical for a great commander; and therefore, not without ſome little indignation, pronounced him *a better courtier than a warrior*.

It is probable alſo that the king bore him ſome ill-will, as Savelli's character was unbecoming a nobleman of his rank. No perſon was more ſordid and avaricious in plundering the country, though to outward appearance the fine gentleman of the age. Once having received a quantity of horſes from the gentry and farmers of the diſtrict round him, by way of levying contributions, in which point the Imperial generals were very ſharp-ſighted, and finding them, by reaſon of their leanneſs and ill-plight, neither worth ſelling, nor worth redeeming, he ordered the hangman of his regiment to flay them, and put the money the hides ſold for into his pocket ‡. In a word, he was always conſidered as one of the inquiſitors of the duchy of Mechlenburg, and was alſo ſo odd a mixture of bigotry, as well as cruelty, that he would allow no child in his diſtrict to receive the rites of baptiſm from

* *Soldat Suedois*: and the *Swediſh Intelligencer*.

† Hence the expreſſion of *Chedreux* critic in the fineſt Engliſh proſe writer.

‡ *Chemnitius*, lib. i. p. 97.

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the hands of a Lutheran miniſter. Upon leaving Damin, he was obliged to deliver to the king abundance of proviſions and military ſtores, together with ſixty very fine pieces of braſs ordnance; and as Tilly was expected to march that way, and a general action ſuppoſed to be coming on, his majeſty made no leſs a perſon than Banier commander of Damin, and prepared himſelf in every ſhape for giving battle to Tilly. With good precaution, therefore*, he fixed Kniphauſen with his own regiment, and ſix companies of Engliſh and Scots, at New Brandenburg; placed major Sinclair with a ſmall body of infantry at Trepto†; lodged the royal regiment of horſe, and Monro's detachment of foot at Malchin; recalled Guſtavus Horn from the blockade of Landſberg, with orders to encamp at Fridland, each officer having expreſs inſtructions in writing, without any diſcretionary powers of departing from them; and laſtly, reſted for a few days with the main army at Paſſewald, a ſtrong paſs, which commanded the road between Pomerania and Mechlenburg.

Thus the king, in eight months time, which to many readers will appear incredible, conſidering what a force the Imperialiſts had to produce againſt him, made himſelf maſter of fourſcore cities, forts, and caſtles, and cleared the whole paſſage behind him even to the Baltic ocean; being a diſtrict of near 140 miles in breadth, not to mention the command of all the rivers and important paſſes. Theſe may be conſidered as entire conqueſts, if we except Colbergen, which ſurrendered at this juncture, and the town of Gripſwald, which Banier had firſt blockaded, and then Todt; nevertheleſs, it held out till the middle of ſummer.

Colbergen had reſiſted a blockade formed by Horn and other Swediſh generals, for the ſpace of five months. At length, proviſions growing ſcarce, and all hopes of relief vaniſhing, colonel St. Julian ‡, the governor, an old officer of repute at the battle of Prague, thought fit to ſurrender upon honourable terms, and preſerved a garriſon of about 1,500 men, of which one third were dragoons, whom the Swedes agreed to eſcort to Landſberg. They were ſtopped at Friedburg in the New March, by way of repriſal for Tilly's cruelty to the garriſons of New Brandenburg and

* *Ritratti & Elogii di capitani Illuſtri*, p. 381.

† This place muſt not be confounded with Tripto in Outer Pomerania.

‡ *Chemnitius*, tom. i. p. 100, calls him lieutenant-colonel Mors, which ſeems to be a miſtake. Mors and Boetius ſigned the articles of capitulation: the former being an Iriſhman, and belonging to the regiment of Hardeck.

Feldſberg;

Feldſberg; but it does not appear, that any man was put to death; they were only diſarmed. Colbergen, next to Stralſund, was looked upon as a town of the moſt conſequence of any in the whole dukedom of Pomerania. It was alſo ſtrongly fortified, in the manner of thoſe days, and was one of the keys of the Baltic ocean, which made Guſtavus exceſſively deſirous to call it his own. Indeed Bauditzen got it at a moſt critical time; for three days afterwards four ſhips well ſupplied with ſoldiers, and laden with proviſions, touched at Colbergen, ſupplies which might have preſerved the town, had they arrived a little ſooner; but the Imperial ſea-officers, perceiving the town to be no longer theirs, ſuddenly changed their courſe, and returned to the ocean. Yet his majeſty had taken all proper meaſures againſt an expedition of this nature; for vice-admiral Ulſpar laid in the harbour, with two ſhips of force, protected on each ſide by a new-raiſed mole, which was flanked with batteries and fortifications, erected under the ſuperintendance of colonel Boëtius. This officer, by his maſter's orders, was particularly cautious in the form of wording the capitulation, and carried his point in two affairs, that were partly uſeful, and partly matter of punctilio. The one related to the preſervation of all the Pomeranian archives, eccleſiaſtical and civil; and the other to the giving back a pair of colours, that belonged to a Swediſh regiment of cavalry, and which Guſtavus could not bear to ſee in the enemy's poſſeſſion; ſo jealous was he of the ſlighteſt diſgrace! Four hundred ſoldiers of the Imperial garriſon took the oaths of allegiance to the crown of Sweden, having the liberty to follow the fate of their colours, which Horn took care to ſee ſurrendered by article.

In the meanwhile Tilly decamped from Francfort on the Oder, with an army of 20,000 combatants; paid his men, contrary to the Auſtrian cuſtom, promptly and cheerfully; and advanced to raiſe the ſiege of Damin, or give Guſtavus battle. Hearing the town had capitulated, he turned ſhort on the caſtle of Feldſberg, near New Brandenburg, took it by ſtorm, and after that ſlaughter which naturally happens in an obſtinate reſiſtance, put fifty of the ſurviving Swediſh ſoldiers to the ſword. He then diſpatched camp-maſter general Cratz with 12,000 men to inveſt New Brandenburg, and followed him with the remaining part of the army. The garriſon conſiſted of 2,000 ſelect troops, and ſerjeant-major-general Kniphauſen, an approved officer, commanded them, and made incredible reſiſtance. He was a ſoldier of ſlow but excellent parts, and was looked upon

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as the beſt general under whom a young man could form himſelf. It was his maxim to leave little or nothing to fortune; and when other men were proſperous by mere chance, he uſed to ſay with emotion, "A dram of good luck enabled a commander to reach his object ſooner than an ounce of good ſenſe." He had an inveterate averſion to the Scottiſh nation, which made him ſome enemies. It is true, the king had ordered him to retire and ſave his men; but the meſſenger and the letter happened unfortunately to fall into Tilly's hands. Of courſe Kniphauſen, though deſtitute of artillery, acquitted himſelf like a man who had ſeen ſervice, concluding from the king's ſilence, that he ſhould certainly be relieved: and hence it was, that he refuſed honourable conditions, when the Imperial general propoſed them. The town was battered ſeveral days in a manner as furious as had been obſerved during the preceding courſe of the war; yet the breach was not aſſailable, and the rampart-wall was too high for ſcaling-ladders to be fixed againſt it with any hopes of ſucceſs. Nevertheleſs, chance and temerity brought about a ſtrange event; for as Tilly on the eighth day of the ſiege was riding round his lines, and making ſome neceſſary remarks, the ſoldiers ruſhed into the breach without orders, maintained their ground, and poured into the town, being ſupported by all the infantry of the army, who crowded to the walls in order to ſupport them. The young count of Montecuculi*, being now in the twenty-third year of his age, and having ſerved from ſixteen in the capacity of a common foot ſoldier, was the firſt man who mounted the walls, and preſented one of the keys of the city gates to his general. Kniphauſen, with his lady, daughter, and niece, his ſon, and ſeveral gentlewomen of condition, four captains, ſome lieutenants and enſigns, and ſixty common ſol-

* Raymond, count de Montecuculi. His ardour in the firſt battle of Leipſic carried him in ſo far among the Swedes, that he was taken priſoner; and it is a certain fact, though few hiſtorians know it, he being then only a colonel of horſe, that he had a principal hand, ſerving under Merci and John de Wert, in defeating Turenne at the battle of Mergentheim, or Mariendal, as the French hiſtorians are pleaſed to call it. His abilities and penetration at that time were ſo very great, that it was a common ſaying with the Swediſh and French generals, that Montecuculi entertained a familiar ſpirit in his ſervice, who made him acquainted with all their deſigns. From this period his hiſtory is tolerably well known; his campaign againſt Turenne being in itſelf an abridgment of all that is refined and exquiſite in the ſcience of war. His two favourite authors were Euclid and Tacitus. Nevertheleſs, his *Military Memoirs* no ways anſwer the idea of what he really practiſed. The truth is, *they* were drawn up in his earlier campaigns againſt the Turks; and it would have been no injuſtice to this great man's memory, to have omitted their publication.

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diers, threw themſelves into the town-houſe, and obtained quarter. He had not time to deſtroy his papers, which was looked upon as a mark of ill-fortune, and loſt nine colours, which gave his maſter no ſmall regret, as it was the firſt conſiderable accident of that kind, which had befallen him in Germany. Near 2000 Swedes and Germans were put to the ſword. Half lord Reay's regiment, 600 men, was here cut to pieces, almoſt without a ſingle exception. Lieutenant-colonel Lindſey, who commanded this corps in his colonel's abſence, was killed on the breach, as were alſo Moncrief, Keith, and Haydon, all Scots. Such as had the good fortune to ſurvive, were promoted immediately by the king's expreſs orders.

It is thought Tilly loſt 2000 men in ſtorming the town, which in fact was little more than a large unfortified village*. He did not ſhew himſelf that great commander the public expected to find him, in marching directly to Magdeburg, leaving the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony a ſacrifice to the Swedes, and allowing Guſtavus free paſſage to Francfort, and the hereditary dominions. The truth was, he ſaw too many ſuperior abilities in his Swediſh majeſty, and, at that juncture, dreaded the fatal deciſion of a general battle.

The king, who had arrived as far as Anclam, in order to relieve his ſerjeant-major-general, Kniphauſen, was ſo enraged at this maſſacre and that of Feldſberg, that he declared he would repay Tilly in his own kind, and teach him to make war like a perſon of humanity, and not like a Croatian.—The latter, agreeably to what we have obſerved before, finding it difficult to advance, as a detachment of the Swediſh army was directly in his way, at Schwet, turned back, and made a ſhew of directing his courſe towards Magdeburg, in which neighbourhood Pappenheim then laid. Upon this, the Swedes ſoon repoſſeſſed New Brandenburg, and the more eaſily, as the Imperialiſts had juſt diſmantled the principal parts of the fortification.

A general of Guſtavus's abilities, ſoon ſaw the evil effects of the ſiege of Magdeburg, in caſe the Imperial general ſhould venture to undertake it, and determined within himſelf to relieve that city after the reduction of Francfort, in caſe the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony did not counterwork his generous intentions. This event was

* This paſſage confirms what the king afterwards remarked to the Nurenbergers in their great diſtreſs and anxiety, when he left Kniphauſen to be their governor: *Gentlemen*, ſaid he, *this man*, laying his hand on the general's ſhoulders, *has defended a walled village againſt all the efforts of Tilly.*

left to fortune, for no conſiderations could deter him from advancing ſouthwards.

Tilly now laid at Rappen, undetermined whether to raiſe the intended ſiege of Francfort *, or inveſt the town of Magdeburg. The king, for excellent reaſons, had leſſened the main body of his forces upon this occaſion; one part being detached into Pomerania and the *March*, in order to prevent the Imperial troops, which lay in great numbers about Landſberg, and in Sileſia, from intercepting two little armies, which he expected from Pruſſia and England; and the other part, under the command of Guſtavus Horn, being ſtationed at the important paſs of Schwet, which holds the paſſage of the Oder, and gives an opening either to Stetin or Francfort, with a view to prevent Tilly from attacking him behind. Theſe precautions being thus wiſely taken, his majeſty, at the head of 18,000 men, ſhaped his courſe along the banks of the Oder to Francfort, carrying with him 200 pieces of cannon, and a bridge of boats, which he had built at Stetin, 180 feet long, and of width ſufficient for five horſemen to march over it abreaſt. Schomberg, as we obſerved before, commanded in Francfort, and had a garriſon under him of 9000 horſe and foot; Carve ſays, near 10,000, all choſen veteran troops: but Tieffenbach, then juſt declared camp-maſter-general of the Imperial army, had thrown himſelf, by Tilly's orders, into the town at this criſis †, namely, on the firſt day of the month of April; which occaſioned no ſmall matter of mirth among the Swediſh forces, being, ſaid a grave hiſtorian, *veteri Germanorum conſuetudine ludibrii plenu die* ‡. His firſt buſineſs was to ruin the ſuburbs, country-houſes, mills, vineyards, and orchards round the town, which many conſidered as a mark of fear.

No troops ever made a finer approach than the Swedes in inveſting the town. Guſtavus marched his whole body of forces, formed upon ſeveral columns, in complete battle-array; for he apprehended ſome obſtructions from a garriſon that might be conſidered as an army, and bore Tilly likewiſe in remembrance, who lay behind him. He himſelf performed

* Franckfort upon the Oder is a large town, eighty miles from Berlin, remarkable for its fairs. Its univerſity is not without learned men. The profeſſors of theology are of the Calviniſtical perſuaſion: but two extraordinary profeſſors of Lutheraniſm are allowed.

† Carve ſays, he threw himſelf into the town *opportune & diſpoſitione quaſi divina*; but how, or why, one cannot ſay. *Itin.* b. i. c. viii. p. 60.

‡ *Chemnitius*, &c. p. 106.

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upon the occaſion the duty of ſerjeant-major *di battaglia*, arranging every officer and band of ſoldiers in their proper places; and, having appointed a body of commanded muſqueteers to conſtitute the forlorn hope, and placed ſmall *peletons* of fifty foot ſoldiers between every ſquadron of horſe, arrived without obſtruction under the city walls, leaving all the cavalry, excepting only the Rhingrave's regiment, well poſted behind him at ſome miles diſtance, for fear Tilly ſhould approach unexpectedly. In this order he paid his viſit to the town the afternoon before Palm Sunday; and having made all proper diſpoſitions either for a ſiege or an aſſault, approached with Teüffel very near the enemy's works, in order to view the town walls and the Guben-gate. In the midſt of their obſervations, the baron received a muſquet ſhot in his left arm; and to ſhew of how much conſequence a great general thinks ſome individuals are upon certain occaſions, his Majeſty perfectly changed countenance, and cried, *Alas! now Teüffel is diſabled, what ſhall I do!* * Upon this the beſieged made a ſally; but major Sinclair, who ſtood juſt by the king at the head of a body of commanded muſqueteers, ſoon repulſed them, taking a lieutenant-colonel and a captain priſoners, and making a lodgment afterwards in a church-yard, which was near the enemy's outworks.

Next morning divine ſervice was twice celebrated throughout the Swediſh army; but the Imperialiſts, who gave themſelves very little trouble about religion, took this omiſſion of hoſtilities for the forerunner of a retreat, and, in the coarſe military way of drollery, hung out a wild gooſe on the ramparts, intimating, that the northern birds of paſſage ought now to think of leaving the country. Upon this ſome Scottiſh officers remarked pleaſantly enough, in the phraſeo-

* *Swediſh Intelligencer*, vol. i. p. 88. The four firſt parts of this work, which of themſelves make two conſiderable volumes in quarto, reach down to the death of Guſtavus. To theſe is uſually prefixed *the Swediſh Diſcipline, religious, civil, and military*, conſiſting of ninety pages. This book, though drawn up in a quaint and moſt inelegant ſtyle, for nothing can be meaner than its compoſition, is a treaſure entirely peculiar to our own nation; for great part of the accounts, till the king's deceaſe, were delivered to the author, who, I believe was a clergyman, ſee *Pref.* to the ſecond part, by Hepburn, lord Reay, Maſſham, Aſtley, and other Engliſh and Scottiſh officers, who bore command in Germany. After the unfortunate deciſion of Lutzen, the performance becomes leſs valuable; for the firſt writer deſiſted from his undertaking at that period; ſo that the continuation of it in various volumes is chiefly an extract from the *Mercurius Gallo Belgicus*, the *Mercure François*, &c. &c. As the ſeveral parts came out periodically, it is very rare to find the whole complete. The right honourable Mr. Nugent has an entire ſet, which belonged to ſecretary Craggs.

logy of their own country, *That for their own part they hoped ſoon to ſee an Imperial gooſe well roaſted and well ſauced.*

The king, who had made neither lines nor approaches, being inclined to allow the enemy ſmall time for recollection, determined to ſtorm the town ſword in hand that day, ſupported by twelve huge pieces of cannon directed againſt the Guben-gate, and ſeveral other batteries playing at the ſame time, in order to create a diverſion. Towards the Gate the Swediſh ſoldiers turned all their fury, whilſt the yellow and blue brigades were commanded to approach on the ſide of the vineyards next to Cuſtrin, a part lying by in order to repulſe the enemy's ſallies. Meanwhile the white brigade was appointed to lodge in the fore-town, and ſupport the commanded muſqueteers, which lay between them and danger; and Hepburn's brigade, the commanded muſqueteers belonging to it being conducted by major Sinclair, was deſtined to carry on the work as before mentioned; whilſt the Rhingrave's regiment of cavalry protected ſuch part of the train of artillery as was not uſed, and kept Tilly's approach conſtantly in their thoughts.

His majeſty reſerved himſelf for the main attack at the Guben-gate, leaving the conduct of other diviſions to tried commanders. He told his men, with a cheerful countenance, *that he only required their patience a few hours longer; and that then he hoped to give them wine for refreſhment, and not common water out of the Oder.*

The officers ſhewed ſo much alacrity on the occaſion, as to undertake this enterpriſe without their armour. Guſtavus, who had before mixed in the beginning of the aſſault with the common ſoldiers, careleſs of himſelf, but uneaſy for his commanders, remonſtrated to them in the kindeſt terms, *That he who loves the king, his maſter's ſervice, will not hazard his life out of pure gaiety. If my officers are killed, who ſhall command my ſoldiers?* Giving them therefore expreſs orders to wear their armour, the faſcines and ſcaling-ladders being all duly prepared, he called for Hepburn and Lumſdel by name: *Now,* ſaid he, *my valiant Scots, remember your countrymen ſlain at Old Brandenburg.* They both, in an inſtant, by the help of two petards, ſhivered the gate to pieces; and, as the aſtoniſhed enemy forgot to let fall the portcullis on the inſide, entered the town unhurt at the head of their reſpective regiments. Cloſe at their heels general Banier crowded in with a freſh body of muſqueteers; and, forming themſelves as well as the ſtreets could allow, they cut to pieces one regiment in the Imperial ſervice with

very little mercy *. Upon this a detachment was diſpatched to ſecure the bridge, but it arrived rather too late. Lumſdel's men alone took eighteen colours; and after the engagement was over, *his majeſty bade him aſk what he pleaſed and he would give it him.*

Meanwhile major Sinclair, and one Heatly an Engliſh lieutenant, ſcaled the walls in the quarter of the vineyards, and, entering the town at the head of only fifty muſquetcers, were attacked by an equal body of cuiraſſiers completely armed. They ranged themſelves againſt the walls of the houſes, and gave their enemies ſuch a continual fire, that they were forced to retreat. The conduct of one Andrew Aner, a Saxon lieutenant, muſt not be forgotten. He croſſed the town ditch, and gave chaſe to ſome Imperialiſts, that guarded it. The king, though naturally ſhort-ſighted, had ſoon eye-ſight enough to ſeize one of thoſe fortunate moments, which, when critically laid hold of, are equal to days and weeks in military operations. He pointed to his troops to follow Aner. The combat was renewed on either ſide with incredible fury; at length the beſieged gave ground, and the aſſailants entered the town with them. The Imperialiſts beat a parley twice, but the confuſion was ſo great no one could hear it. His Majeſty gave Aner a handſome gratuity of about £. 150. and as he was a man of ſuch alacrity, told him, *he ſhould remove him from the infantry, and try what exploits he could perform in the capacity of captain of horſe.*

At length the yellow and blue brigades entered, two bodies of troops highly eſteemed in the Swediſh army. It was their fortune to attack the quarter where colonel Butler was with his Iriſh regiment, who gave the Imperialiſts an example of reſolution, which might have ſaved the town, if it had been followed; for he ſtood his ground at the point of the pike till he had ſcarce a ſoldier left alive; nor did he ſubmit till he was ſhot through the arm with a muſquet-ball, and pierced with an halbert through the thigh. All things being thus ſecured, his majeſty, who made the tour of the ſeveral attacks on the outſide of the walls, entered the town at the head of the Rhingrave's regiment of horſe. Tieffenbach, Schomberg, and Montecuculi eſcaped over the bridge, which was fortified with a ſtrong redoubt on the oppoſite ſhore, and conducted their flying troops to Great Glogaw in Sileſia, diſtant from Francfort at leaſt ſixty miles: 1700 Imperial ſoldiers were left dead in the town, almoſt as many more

* This was Walter Butler's Iriſh regiment.

were never heard of; fifty colours were loſt; the colonels Walſtein, Jour, and Heydon, killed; and about ſixty officers and ſeven lieutenant-colonels taken priſoners. Amongſt the latter were found likewiſe major-general Spar, a native Swede, and the colonels Morval, ſome ſay Waldo, and Butler, not the elder brother, who had a hand in Walſtein's death; to which we may add about 700 common ſoldiers. His majeſty took infinite pains to prevent pillage, and exerciſed his baton upon his followers without remorſe; yet they plundered to the amount of £.30,000. in ſpite of all his endeavours; for many valuable goods were lodged in the town on account of the approaching fair. However, no woman's honour was violated, and only one burgher was killed, and that merely through his own imprudence and obſtinacy.

Ten baggage waggons were taken, containing the plate, &c. that belonged to the Imperial generals; for the flight was ſo precipitate, that the carriages choaked up the paſſage, when they came to croſs the bridge.

The king felt inexpreſſible uneaſineſs to ſee his troops diſband in hopes of plunder, for ſeveral enſigns were left alone without a man to guard the colours, and determined within himſelf from that time ſoon to adminiſter ſome effectual remedy to this notorious violation of military diſcipline. The tumult being at length compoſed, he diſtributed corn and wine to all the citizens out of the Imperial magazines, telling them he hoped they would ſupply ſomething towards his ſoldiers good ſupper and kind reception. A public thankſgiving was decreed next day in all the churches; and one circumſtance afterwards much delighted the whole body of proteſtants throughout the empire; for the *Leipſic concluſions** were ſigned at or near the time when Francfort was taken.

The Imperial garriſon upon this occaſion ſuffered greatly in their fortunes, as well as their perſons; as this town was an aſylum, where they had depoſited moſt of their ill-gotten wealth. The ſtreets, and bridge particularly, were ſo crowded with baggage and waggons, that the ſtreets were impaſſable; whence it happened, that numbers were taken priſoners. Some threw themſelves into the Oder, and there were loſt; ſome fell by the ſword, for the Swedes could not quite forget the maſſacre at New-Brandenburg; ſo that one way or other no very conſiderable part of the garriſon eſcaped. The Swedes loſt about 300 men, but no officer of note. Indeed Teüffel and Hepburn were wounded,

* Ten in number, and may be ſeen, together with the whole tranſactions of the diet, in the APPENDIX.

the

the former we mentioned before; and colonel Dargitz* was ſhot through the ſides. Nine hundred quintals of powder were found in the arſenal, abundance of arms, and eighteen pieces of great ordnance. A large body of troops was placed in the town by way of garriſon, and Leſlie commanded it, having received orders to repair and improve the fortifications.

Since the firſt publication of this work, the author has met with ſome freſh information relating to the ſtorming of Francfort, and the behaviour of the beſieged.

The Butler that made ſuch heroical reſiſtance was named *Walter*. He was of the Ormond family, and nearly related to James then earl of Ormond. Taken altogether, he was one of the braveſt officers in the Emperor's ſervice. As the Imperialiſts envied this gallant foreigner, care was had to place him in the very weakeſt part of the fortifications; or, to ſpeak more to the purpoſe, in a part hardly deſerving to be called a fortification. Butler cut trenches, and threw up parapets with incredible diligence; but being quite diſſatisfied with all he could do in one day, and that only with his own regiment, he went in the evening to Schomberg, and told him that the poſt was not defenſible, except a ſally was made *that very night*, and the Swedes prevented from advancing their works. He then offered, at the peril of his life, and loſs of his reputation, which was ſtill more, to conduct the ſally himſelf, at the head of five troops of cuiraſſiers, and as many of dragoons; alledging alſo, that by the ſucceſs of this attack he would compel the Swedes to raiſe the ſiege. As we obſerved before, the Germans envied him any honour, and received his gallant propoſal very ungraciouſly; for they committed the undertaking to one of their countrymen, and he miſcarried; loſing his own life imprudently, and alſo the lives of many of his men.

At twelve o'clock next day Guſtavus fell upon Butler's quarter, which he knew to be the weakeſt. Schomberg, Tieffenbach, Montecuculi† and Herberſtein, the four great Imperial officers then in the town, had juſt ſate down to dinner; and ſo much did they affect to deſpiſe the Swedes, that not a man left the table. Butler made a reſiſtance that is hardly credible; inſomuch that Guſtavus aſked a ſoldier,

* He was ſo called by the beſt hiſtorians; but in a liſt of the Swediſh colonels, made public about ſix months before, we find no ſuch name. He muſt therefore have been a lieutenant-colonel, or is miſtaken for Damitz, who commanded the white brigade that day.

† This was not the famous Raymond Montecuculi, but his uncle.

whom he had taken priſoner, *Who thoſe men could be that behaved ſo gallantly?* and being informed, that it was Butler and his Iriſh regiment, in which many Engliſh and Scottiſh were incorporated, he immediately drew his ſoldiers off, and propoſed to make the attack elſewhere. This was about half an hour after one.

Meanwhile Guſtavus changed his plan, and, having refreſhed his men, reſolved to attack a ſtrong part, which in all probability might not be defended ſo vigorouſly. Therefore, at four in the afternoon, he directed his main force againſt the Guben-gate, and entered the town: for he well foreſaw, that about that time the Imperial generals would be ſacrificing to Bacchus inſtead of Mars. This was confirmed to him by people who had deſerted that day.

When his majeſty broke into Francfort, Butler was almoſt the only officer of repute at his poſt. Two Imperial regiments that guarded the part where the Swedes entered, after having made a tolerable reſiſtance, were puſhed on till they came near to Butler's quarter. He, not knowing whether they were friends or enemies, learnt from lieutenant-colonel Wade, that they were Imperialiſts. Upon this, as they ſtill kept retiring towards him, he ordered his regiment to fire on them, and ſent Wade to aſſure them, that if they would maintain their ground and fight like men, he would lend them a hundred muſqueteers, and Wade ſhould command the whole corps; for it did not appear that their colonels were with them. Butler then incorporated theſe troops into his own, and maintained an obſtinate engagement for two hours. At length, Wade was killed, and Butler grievouſly wounded. With difficulty he obtained quarter, and ſaved the ſmall reſidue of his troops. During this time, neither the governor, Schomberg, field-marſhal Tieffenbach, nor the generals Montecuculi and Herberſtein, ever came near them. On the contrary, they roſe abruptly from table, mounted on horſeback, and fled to Sileſia. Three Iriſh lieutenant-colonels were killed, namely, Patrick, Carthy, and O'Neal; alſo the captain-lieutenants Grace and Brown; and enſign Butler; all Iriſh. Guſtavus now ſounded a retreat, and called off his men.

Notwithſtanding all that has been related to the honour of Butler, yet ſo *capricious* and *unfortunate* is the ſervice of war, that the Imperial generals, to exculpate themſelves, laid the whole blame upon Butler; pretending, which was not true, that the enemy entered the town at his quarter, becauſe it was the weakeſt; and, had it not been for a providential accident,

accident, he might have been degraded and beheaded, in ſpite of all his gallant ſervices. But Guſtavus, having that night all his chief officers at ſupper with him, proteſted, *That he could not eat a morſel till he ſaw the brave Iriſhman.* Upon this, an invitation was ſent to him; *And yet,* added the king, *I have ſomething to ſay to him, which perhaps he may not chooſe to hear.*

Butler, not being able to walk, by reaſon of his wounds, was carried to the king upon a couple of pikes, according to the military manner.

When he came in, Guſtavus looked upon him ſternly and angrily. *Sir,* ſaid he, *are you the* ELDER, *or the* YOUNGER *Butler?* "May it pleaſe your majeſty, ſaid he, I am the "younger." *God be praiſed! O thou brave man,* anſwered Guſtavus; *had you been the elder, I had reaſon to have run my ſword through your body*. Now my phyſician ſhall attend you, and nothing be withheld that can adminiſter to your eaſe and happineſs.*

Had this officer been a *proteſtant,* it is probable Guſtavus would have tempted him into his ſervice; for he was as remarkable for piety, as for bravery.

The Imperial generals, before they ran away, left word with the troops that ſtaid behind, "That Butler had occaſioned the loſs of Francfort." Every Shiboleth of faction has a uniform watch-word, and this was theirs. Butler, in the little converſation which he was able to hold with Guſtavus, expreſſed an uneaſineſs at ſuch a cruel piece of ſlander. *Sir,* ſaid the king, *it is in* MY *power to do your character a piece of juſtice in that reſpect, which,* I flatter myſelf, *will* NEVER *be controverted. I will bear full teſtimony to your valour under my hand and ſeal.* Then calling for pen, ink, paper, &c. he drew up a certificate in the moſt ample and ſtrongeſt form: ſetting forth the heroical behaviour of Butler, and adding alſo, "that if the Imperial generals, in-"ſtead of acting like poltroons, had performed but a fifth "part of what this gallant Iriſhman had done, he never "ſhould have been maſter of Francfort, but after an obſti-"nate ſiege." *But, Sir,* continued he, *more than this is due*

* What unſoldier-like action of the elder Butler is here alluded to, is not to be known from hiſtory. It muſt have been ſomewhat very notorious, or elſe Guſtavus would not have threatened to kill him with his own hand.—Time ſhowed us afterwards that the king knew *men* and their *characters* very well. *This* Butler, whoſe chriſtian name was *James,* had a principal hand in the aſſaſſination of Wallſtein and his four favourite colonels, notwithſtanding he had very great obligations to Wallſtein. More ſhall be ſaid of him in a note, when we ſpeak of that general's death.

to

*to a brave and injured man. Every general now in the room will take a pride in ſigning this paper as well as myſelf*; which was accordingly done.

The four Imperial generals ſtill held their firſt language at Vienna. Even Butler's elder brother, James, ſailed like a good courtier with the ſtream of the court: and before he had heard any thing of Guſtavus's certificate, wrote his brother a letter full of the moſt ungenerous reproaches: telling him in particular, "That he had tarniſhed the luſtre of the Imperial arms, as well as that of his own family; and that *Cæſar's court-martial* would make his name a bye word of reproach." Walter, touched to the quick with this inſolence and unkindneſs, haſtened to Guſtavus as faſt as he could, and ſhowed him the letter. The king, comforting him with a gracious ſmile, ſaid only this: *Butler, ſend my teſtimonial to the Emperor, for you have full leave, and give yourſelf no more trouble about the matter* *.

* All we know of Walter Butler after this period is, that when he left the Swediſh army, his firſt buſineſs was to ſend a challenge to colonel Behem, who had commanded a regiment at Francfort, and whom his enemies had pitched upon to be his accuſer. But the Swediſh teſtimonial had terrified Behem, and he ſigned a full recantation. Butler then went into Poland, and raiſed a very fine troop of cavalry at his own expence; but ran the riſk daily of being killed by the enraged peaſants. On his return, he took Prague, which made him more and more a favourite with Walſtein; and he afterwards married the counteſs of Phondona. He decided the victory in favour of the Imperialiſts at the famous battle of Nordlingen; where he ſtood firm without loſing an inch of ground, for three and twenty hours, during a continual fire, and though 16,000 ſoldiers were killed in that engagement. He died ſoon after.

Our Butler was at Prague when Walſtein was aſſaſſinated. The court of Vienna ſtrongly ſuſpected him to be in the generaliſſimo's intereſts; but in truth he was neither *for* him, nor *againſt* him. He ſaw Walſtein's *faults*, but knew how to preſerve his own perſonal *gratitude* at the ſame time. Not that he had any objection to his being removed, if the emperor ſo pleaſed, or tried in a *judicial* manner.

Had Butler not been a *very honeſt* man, he might have made a *great fortune* juſt before Walſtein fell. That general, who always gave the preference to foreign troops, beſought him to go to Ireland and raiſe a body of infantry; adding that he had bills of exchange at Hamburg, and ready money at his palace of Sagan, to make good the ſum he intended for that purpoſe; namely, *thirty-two thouſand pounds*, and upwards. Butler declined the employment, and turned it off very politely, by ſaying, "That poor Ireland had been drained too much of her men already."

This anecdote I learnt at Vienna, but the memorandum was miſlaid. I inſert it now, becauſe Carve confirms it; with this difference, that he labours to make Walter Butler a well-wiſher to his brother James's *glorious conſpiracy*, as he calls it. To *that* matter, one confutation may be given, even at this diſtance of time, namely, that Walter Butler never roſe in the army after Walſtein's death, nor obtained any place at court; though his *noble* family gave him pretenſions, that have great weight in Germany.

The

The taking of Francfort was a point of extraordinary conſequence to his majeſty's affairs. It extended his elbow-room into the rich provinces of Saxony, the Marche of Brandenburg, Luſatia, and Sileſia, and made him maſter of the Elbe and Oder on both ſides. Thus having cleared the neighbourhood of the two electors from the enemy, he reduced them to the neceſſity of joining him from principles of ſelf-preſervation, becauſe he was eventually, and in effect, their maſter and conqueror. It delighted him alſo not a little to have gained this important place on Palm-Sunday, and at the critical period when the proteſtant *confederators* were aſſembled at Leipſic. He wrote to them the very next morning, April the fourth, with uncommon ſatisfaction *; but, unfortunately for him, the aſſembly was diſſolved the day before.

Schomberg and Tieffenbach merited no great praiſe in defending Francfort. Their greateſt efforts ought to have been before the town was attacked ſword in hand. They had too many cavalry in the garriſon, which cauſed more confuſion than advantage, when once the enemy entered the town. They had alſo, according to the Imperial cuſtom, an immoderate number of females and ſuperfluous attendants in the army; and it may be further obſerved, that they confided too much in their number of troops, and deſpiſed the beſiegers to ſuch a degree, that when the Swediſh army appeared before the town, the officers thought proper to continue their mirth, and not riſe from table. This gallantry and gaiety of the beſieged, upon the firſt inveſting a town, very rarely keeps up the ſame ſpirit to the finiſhing and ſerious concluſion of the affair: and perhaps the Auſtrians might have defended Francfort better, if they had been more ſparing of their petulancies and vain-glorious ſpeeches. It may ſuffice, therefore, to remark here, that during this ſiege his majeſty ordered colonel Monro to employ himſelf and his regiment all night in forming what was then called a *running line of approach*. Monro kept his ſoldiers to their duty, as well as he could, and never ſate down till break of day. Yet the king was extremely diſpleaſed the next morning, when he ſaw how ſlowly the trench was advanced. Two very good obſervations have been made on this ſubject by perſons then employed in the Swediſh ſervice; that Guſtavus, being himſelf the beſt engineer of the age, expected a great deal from his officers in all ſieges, and was more impatient upon thoſe occaſions than

* See the Letter in *Armis Suecicis*, p. 126, 127.

in

in the day of battle. The ſecond obſervation was, that the Scots, however excellent in the open field, were too lazy and too proud to work, even in caſes of the utmoſt extremity; which materially abated their military merit.

Tilly had actually began his march in order to create a diverſion, but receiving, upon the road, the melancholy news of what had befallen Francfort, he returned and inveſted Magdeburg, hoping thereby to draw Guſtavus out of Pomerania. The king continued firm, nor did he chooſe to receive his motions from Tilly's dictating; on the contrary he renewed his applications to the proteſtant princes lately aſſembled at Leipſic, and exhorted them to make a peremptory deciſion in behalf of their civil and religious liberties. He then wrote to the magiſtrates of Magdeburg, and conjured them to acquit themſelves like men of honour and principle; aſſuring them, that if they could maintain their ground for two months, he would certainly relieve them; obſerving likewiſe, that before the time ſpecified, he could neither make the neceſſary diſpoſitions with regard to his new conqueſts, nor collect together a body of forces ſufficient to face Tilly.

It was now indeed high time for *that* general to take the field, and attempt to ſtop the torrent of Guſtavus's conqueſts. By orders therefore of the emperor, and his friend and patron the elector of Bavaria, he had drawn together all the troops he poſſibly could from Juliers and Eaſt Frizeland, the duchy of Bremen, and the circles of Suabia and Franconia. His firſt ſcheme was to give Guſtavus battle; but that the Swediſh hero prudently declined. He then purpoſed to hinder his enemy from diſturbing Pappenheim, who formed a ſort of blockade round the town of Magdeburg. New commotions in the meantime broke out in the internal parts of the empire, which he thought himſelf obliged to compoſe in good time; and this unhappy movement gave Guſtavus an opportunity to fix his footing at the courts of Dreſden and Berlin.

Guſtavus now, leaving a part of his army at Francfort under Banier's command, caſt a wiſtful eye towards Landſperg, garriſoned with 3000 foot, and 1500 dragoons. He had long wiſhed to make himſelf maſter of this important place; for as it lay between Pruſſia and Poland, it was a great thorn to him in his late Poliſh wars. He made one fruitleſs attempt upon it on his firſt arrival in Germany, but the detachment he ſent to ſurprize it miſcarried in the attack. A ſecond eſſay ſucceeded the foregoing, and was attended with the ſame ill ſucceſs. The town lies on the Warta,

Warta, and three years had been employed in its fortifications; the peaſants for ten miles round having performed the duty of pioneers and labourers all that time. The king and Hepburn poſted themſelves on one ſide; and Horn, who had commanded the blockade, lay on the other.

This undertaking was a very extraordinary attempt, in two particulars; for Guſtavus took with him only 3,200 commanded muſqueteers, and 800 horſemen; ſo that the garriſon exceeded him in number by five hundred men. We do not however reckon the people that attended the train of twelve pieces of battering cannon, under the direction of that excellent officer colonel Leonard Torſtenſon*.

He likewiſe contrived to march his troops near forty miles in two days†; tranſporting his artillery through roads then ſuppoſed to be impaſſable‡; and after he had effected his buſineſs returned to Francfort in the ſame time. In the way to Landſperg, his advanced guard defeated a regiment of Croatians, the colonel that commanded the party being mortally wounded. In their retreat, they had the precaution to break down every bridge after they had paſſed it.

A ſtrong fort, well guarded with cannon, was betwixt the king and the town. Monro inveſted it the firſt night, and the king left two horſemen with him, giving them expreſs orders to come and wake him, in caſe the enemy attempted a ſally. Next morning the batteries played violently againſt it; but the parapet of earth was ſo compact and hardened, that it was ſoon thought proper to diſcontinue the attempt on that ſide. In this difficulty, his majeſty made himſelf acquainted with a blackſmith, who adviſed him to throw a float-bridge over one part of a wide moraſs all covered with water. It muſt here be obſerved that the king brought a ſmall bridge from Stetin, as well as that large

* Monro calls him Leonard Richardſon; but ſuch a perſon we can no where find, either before or after this period. The Chriſtian name ſoon enabled me to correct the miſtake; for Leonard Torſtenſon was then general of the artillery. And here it muſt be obſerved, that the valiant Monro, who was no great orthographer, hardly ſpells any name right, of man or town, uſually following the German ſound in pronunciation. His very ſtyle is likewiſe German, as *Spruce* for Pruſſia, *Polack* for Polander, *leaguer* for camp, *ſtill ſtand* for truce, and *conſhaft* for intelligence. Nevertheleſs, our northern hiſtorian is very authentic in all his facts, and rarely relates any thing, which he did not ſee.

† *Diary of marches by Monro.* This little piece has been of extraordinary uſe to me, throughout the whole; though, to avoid tedioufneſs, I quote it only on this occaſion. It has proved in fact one of my beſt chonological tables.

‡ *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illuſtri.* 381.

one

one we have mentioned before. Thus advancing over ſhallow paſſes, which the honeſt mechanic well knew, the Swedes poſted themſelves unexpectedly on the weak ſide of the fort, between that and the town. Lieutenant-colonel Dewbatel and Monro followed the blackſmith with 500 men, half dragoons and half infantry, and Hepburn moved ſlowly after them, for his laſt wound was only a contuſion, at the head of one thouſand muſqueteers. The enemy's guard being ſoon routed, the fort ſurrendered by capitulation, and the king's troops made a lodgment under the town-wall. Young Cratz, the governor, a ſpirited officer, whom the ſoldiers placed much confidence in, being killed in a ſally, and 300 Imperial troops taken priſoners, propoſals of ſurrender were ſoon offered to the king. This ſhameful capitulation was owing to that great error which pervaded Tilly's and Walſtein's diſcipline; namely, allowing every regiment an undue number of ſervants, ſuttlers, and unneceſſary dependants of all ſorts. Theſe uſeleſs mouths were of no uſe in the field, and ſtarved them in beſieged towns; for when this garriſon marched out, and they were reputed ſome of the beſt troops in the Imperial ſervice, there were amongſt them half as many proſtitutes as ſoldiers. One circumſtance in this capitulation was hardly to be paralleled. The king had a mind to ſend for a detachment from his main army, before he allowed the Imperialiſts to march out of the town; for as the garriſon outnumbered him, he was not ſure but that they might give him battle in plain ground.

The town being thus evacuated, and the Imperial troops having marched to Great Glogau, in Sileſia, his majeſty, who ſeldom indulged in repaſts, but with politicians and ambaſſadors, in order to extract knowledge from them, allowed Banier, Bauditzen, and the other generals, to take a cheerful glaſs, as they had nothing material to do, and no enemy to fear that evening: nevertheleſs, he did not honour them with his preſence. However, he gave his guide, the blackſmith, one hundred pounds, and made him burgo-maſter, or, in plain Engliſh, lord-mayor of Landſperg. In the late ſecret attack, he had marched with a ſerene countenance at the head of the detachment, and bore the whiſtling of the cannons and muſquet-balls very well: but when the ſervice grew ſerious, and ſeveral ſoldiers fell by him, finding, as he ſaid, that the Swediſh muſquets, the powder being wet, did not make ſo briſk a report as the enemy's, he begged leave to run to the king, and bring a ſupply of better powder. It was well known what he meant by that good office.

It

It is amazing to reflect how much pioneer work was done during this ſhort ſiege, and with a few hands; inſomuch that it was obſerved on the occaſion, Guſtavus made his ſoldiers perform for nothing what would coſt another power many thouſand pounds*.

By this time the Imperialiſts began to find the Swedes a different ſort of ſoldiers from what they had firſt imagined. The emperor himſelf thought fit to lower his tone, and at length reſolved to give Guſtavus the appellation of king of Sweden, which he had formerly beſtowed on Sigiſmond his rival. Thoughts were alſo conceived of reſtoring Walſtein, who at that time threw out certain inuendos, as if he had a mind to enter into the Spaniſh ſervice.

The court of Vienna and the Catholic league began now to tremble in good earneſt; for Pappenheim, who ſeldom wrote in the dejected and deſponding ſtyle, informed the elector of Bavaria, "That the emperor muſt fall, except the whole united body of catholics ſupported him with all their money and forces. That Guſtavus at preſent was ſovereign arbiter of the fate of Germany; that Francfort and Landſperg were both in his poſſeſſion; that his Swediſh majeſty probably, as there was no ſufficient ſeparate army to oppoſe him, might attempt to raiſe the ſiege of Magdeburg; and then perhaps the flower of the Imperial ſoldiery might be cut off all at once. That he had it in his power to ſhape his victorious courſe whatever way he pleaſed. In a word, that the remaining towns ought to be well garriſoned; and that nothing leſs than two ſtrong armies could ſtop the violence of Guſtavus's progreſs. That the league only, and not the emperor, could preſerve the empire. That money, either in ſpecie or in bills of good currency, muſt be conveyed to Tilly and him; and that 6000 horſe, and foot in proportion, muſt be raiſed forthwith in the biſhopric of Liege or duchy of Lorain."

Pomerania and the *March* being now cleared, his majeſty had a fair entrance into Sileſia and Brandenburg. Into the firſt he diſpatched the Rhingrave and Bauditzen, who took Croſſen, a conſiderable city on the Oder, and made excurſions to Great Glogau and Walſtein's palace at Sagan. Into the ſecond his majeſty entered, throwing a bridge of boats over the Spree, and, by a trumpeter, ſummoned Wittenhorſt, governor of Brandenburg, to ſurrender in

* The expreſſion is a ton of gold, which denotes, in the hiſtorians of that age, if I miſtake not, about 9000 pounds ſterling.

twenty-

twenty-four hours. Wittenhorſt deſired a few days reſpite, in order to ſend an expreſs to Tilly; who firſt commanded him to acquit himſelf like a man of honour, but then directed him to capitulate, and haſten with all his garriſon to Magdeburg. The mention of that town always brought a cloud upon Guſtavus's brow: his natural ſprightlineſs had never deſerted him before; but he foreſaw its ruin, and could not prevent it.

In order to leave no human methods untried, having concluded a ſort of alliance with the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel, and duke William of Saxe-Weimar, he, from Brandenburg, pointed his courſe to Copnick, and about noon ſent count Ortemberg to Berlin to demand of the elector the two towns of Cuſtrin and Spandau; and inſiſt likewiſe upon ſubſiſtence, and one month's pay for his army, with a promiſe to redeliver thoſe places at two months end, or when the ſiege of Magdeburg ſhould be raiſed. This demand not ſucceeding, Guſtavus Horn was diſpatched the next morning at break of day to renew the ſolicitation, but returned without ſucceſs. His orders were to make the elector an offer of the reverſional poſſeſſion of the dukedom of Pomerania; but this prince, who was remarkably reſerved and ſhy in advancing a ſingle ſtep towards his Swediſh majeſty, excuſed himſelf, alledging, That he could enter into no engagement without the participation and full conſent of the elector of Saxony. The king waſted the two ſucceeding days in contriving what to do, and then marched briſkly towards Berlin at the head of five cornets of horſe, one thouſand muſqueteers, and four field-pieces, not to make uſe of apparent force and compulſion. He had ſome objection to undertaking this enterpriſe on a *Sunday*, but the approaching fate of Magdeburg determined him.

Guſtavus for cogent reaſons wiſhed to poſſeſs Cuſtrin, not only as it was one of the ſtrongeſt fortifications in the empire, being protected with 150 pieces of cannon, having an arſenal furniſhed with arms ſufficient to equip 20,000 men, and ſtored with proviſions in abundance, but becauſe it was alſo that very important paſs, by means whereof the Imperial army had been preſerved, in its flight before him from Gartz; when he had not intereſt enough to obtain it.

Guſtavus had other great deſigns in poſſeſſing Cuſtrin; for as, through the timidity of his allies, he began to ſuſpect he ſhould not be able to raiſe the ſiege of Magdeburg, it was then plain, that Tilly, after making himſelf maſter of that town, might by this paſſage march directly to him without interruption, and ſhake the good faith of his expected ally.

It

It was at length agreed, that his majeſty and the elector ſhould have an interview in Cognick-grove, about a mile from Berlin. The elector made no advances; for, to ſay truth, the cruelties and rapines, which the houſe of Auſtria exerciſed according to antient cuſtom, had frightened the German princes out of all common preſence of mind; ſo that Guſtavus was on the very point of breaking off the converſation, which had laſted an hour, when the elector begged a ſingle half hour to conſider the affair. *Sir*, ſaid the king, *I perceive your mind to be greatly agitated, and compaſſionate the irreſolution you labour under. It muſt be acknowledged, that my propoſals are alarming and hazardous; but the neceſſity of times and circumſtances demand them. It is you whom I am extricating from deſtruction, and not the ſubjects of Sweden.* Then turning round to Albert duke of Mechlenburg, who ſtood by, *Couſin*, added he, *be pleaſed to obſerve I take this extraordinary ſtep for the preſervation of poor Magdeburg and the proteſtant religion. For if I think fit to retreat to the Baltic, where are the troops that can obſtruct my retiring? If I entrench myſelf on whatever tract of ground I chooſe, the renowned and invincible Tilly will reflect twice or thrice before he attacks me; and if peace can once be imagined to have taken poſſeſſion of my thoughts, certain it is, I may have the power of preſcribing every ſingle condition to his Imperial majeſty. But how will you two ſovereigns anſwer at the laſt day, for the total extirpation of the reformed and evangelical religion? Forget me as much as you pleaſe—but remember the goſpel: and remember too, that the type of your temporal deſtruction makes its firſt and certain appearance at the downfall of Magdeburg**. —— During the ſudden aſtoniſhment, which this ſpeech occaſioned, the electreſs, accompanied by her mother and ſome court ladies, came into the room and ſurprized Guſtavus†, who was too well bred not to liſten to the repreſentations of the fair ſex, eſpecially as the electreſs diſcovered *that* ſpirit of heroiſm, which her huſband wanted. Terms were ſoon agreed on, and his majeſty was deſired to ſleep in Berlin that night, and bring with him his thouſand muſqueteers and the five troops of horſe for his guard.

At parting, Guſtavus, laughing very heartily, told the electreſs and her train of ladies, *That they did mighty well to bring about this accommodation; for in caſe they had not been inclined to ſuch meaſures, his intention was to have ſent them and the elector to have paſſed a ſummer in the cooler regions of*

* *Hiſt. or Authent. Relat.* in Low Dutch, fol. tom. i. p. 49.
† *Pietro Pomo*; Guerre di Germania, lib. i. p. 19.

*Sweden*. When the cavalcade retired to court, Guſtavus paid his honours to the fair ſex by a general ſalute of his little train of artillery; but as the engineer had forgotten to turn his cannon from Berlin, the approach being firſt made in an hoſtile manner, he diſmantled the tops of one or two houſes; which vexed the king, and put the ladies into ſome confuſion*. Nevertheleſs, nothing now remained for the elector but to convey his apology to the court of Vienna, from whence it was coldly anſwered him, That the Swedes would ſpare the *Marches* no more than the Imperialiſts had done formerly.

In the courſe of this negotiation Spandau was granted, in all appearance, to his majeſty during the continuance of the war, and colonel Axel Lilly was pitched upon to be governor; but Cuſtrin could not be obtained, except for the ſpace of a ſingle month. Without dwelling on this incident, firm aſſurances were given, that its gates ſhould always be open at the command of his majeſty, who was allowed unmoleſted paſſage throughout the whole electorate. The elector made a copious libation that night to Bacchus, and Guſtavus parted at break of day for Stetin, where he had ſome buſineſs to tranſact with the Moſcovite ambaſſador.

In one of the pauſes of the converſation above mentioned, as the elector was timorous and unwilling to conſent, Guſtavus gave a ſudden ſtart, and turned his eyes towards Magdeburg: *Let us march yonder, Sir*, ſaid he, *without a moment's delay or heſitation: let us free Magdeburg, not only for our own ſakes, but for the ſake of the proteſtant cauſe. Upon ſuppoſition, that no man aſſiſts us, and the attempt ſhould prove unſucceſsful*, (which neither you nor I ought to fear) *at worſt, Sir, we can return hither; place ſtrong garriſons in all the conquered towns; and make a peace with the emperor upon our own terms. Thus are you ſafe at all events. But invert the teleſcope, and contemplate things in another manner. I can retire to Stockholm, and live and die peaceably in ſpite of the emperor. And then there will remain a certain prince, who muſt be exhauſted and plundered without remorſe, who has ſacrificed the proteſtant religion in the moſt conſiderable part of Europe, and who muſt one day anſwer for his neglect or timidity at God's tribunal.* To this the elector either durſt not, or could not anſwer.

Guſtavus marched next to Potſdam, and thence ſummoned the elector of Saxony to join him, or allow him free paſſage, as he was fully determined to raiſe the ſiege of Magdeburg; both which requeſts this prince *denied* him: His

* *Memoirs* of the Houſe of Brandenburg.

pretext

pretext was, that he could not abſolve himſelf from the oath of fidelity he had taken to the emperor. When an interview was preſſed on him, he declined accepting it, on account of being obliged to have a review of all his army. He dreaded another circumſtance too; the war being brought into his own country. In a word, he was like a man bewildered in a dangerous foreſt, knowing not which track to purſue. By this fatal reſolution Magdeburg was loſt. It gave many a pang to the generous and manly heart of Guſtavus, who unboſomed himſelf to the public in one of the beſt reaſoned manifeſtos * of that age, and then, to waſte no farther time in fruitleſs complaints, ſat himſelf ſeriouſly, earneſtly, and inflexibly, to make amends for the defaults of others. He forced the elector of Saxony to ſee his error, and formed a plan, which made him proſperous and victorious againſt his will, and contrary to his firſt intentions.

During Guſtavus's political tranſactions at Stetin, it may be proper to obſerve, that in the month of February †, the elector of Saxony, in the name of all the proteſtant princes, had convened the friends of liberty and Guſtavus to one general aſſembly at Leipſic ‡. This meeting was both auguſt and formidable. It conſiſted of the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, the margrave of Bareith, the dukes of Weimar, John, Bernard, and William; the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, the margrave of Baden-Dourlach, the prince of Anhalt, and the dukes of Altenberg, Coburg, and Sultzbach. All theſe appeared in perſon. The archbiſhop of Bremen ſent his deputy, as did the dukes of Brunſwick, Lunenberg, and Mechlenburg, the margrave of Anſpach, the new adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg, duke Julius not being yet ſettled, and, though laſt, not leaſt in proteſtant zeal, the good princeſs, abbeſs of Quedlingberg §. Deputies appeared likewiſe

* APPENDIX, Art. XXI.

† *Bougeant*, tom. i. p. 229. 8°. miſplaces the period of this convention under the articles of the year 1630.

‡ Hiſtory of the Diet of Leipſic, tranſlated from the Latin, and publiſhed at London, 4°. 1632, containing 19 pages. APPENDIX, Art. XX. This diet began February 8, 1630, and ended April 3, 1631.

§ The abbeſs of this illuſtrious proteſtant convent is always a princeſs, and holds it immediately under the empire. The emperor Henry the Fowler founded the convent, and his daughter Matilda was the firſt abbeſs. It is endowed with a pretty territory that ſurrounds it. The principal perſons in it, after the abbeſs, are a prioreſs, deaneſs, and canoneſs, who have all handſome houſes and good revenue. The number of conventual ladies depends upon the will of the abbeſs, preſent Anna Amelia, princeſs of Pruſſia; whoſe brother is now protector for the elector of Saxony, who ſold his right in 1697, againſt which the late abbeſs, Maria Elizabeth of Holſtein-Gottorp, proteſted

likewiſe from the circles of Suabia and Franconia, from various ſovereign counts of the empire, and from the free towns of Straſburg, Nurenberg, Francfort, Lubec, Bremen, Brunſwick, Hildeſheim, Northauſen, Mulhauſen, and Augſburg, &c. Dr. Mathias Hoe, the elector of Saxony's domeſtic chaplain, opened the aſſembly with a very ſpirited diſcourſe, from a well choſen text.

*Deus, quis ſimilis erit tibi? Nè taceas neque compeſcaris, Deus: quoniam ecce inimici tui ſonuerunt: & qui oderunt te, extulerunt caput. Super populum tuum malignaverunt conſilium, & cogitaverunt adverſus ſanctos; dixerunt, venite, & diſperdamus eos,* &c *. The ſtreets were all barricadoed, the city keys delivered every night to the elector, and no man whoſe buſineſs was not known allowed to enter the town. Nothing was ſo much dreaded upon this occaſion as an Imperial ſpy. Yet the zealous, able, and turbulent eccleſiaſtic, Mathias Hoe, notwithſtanding the fine ſpirit, apparent in his text, was ſuppoſed, being director of the elector's conſcience, to have received ſome gratuities from the court of Vienna. Thus much is certain, he traverſed Guſtavus on the preſent occaſion, though the full intent of it tended to eſtabliſh a cloſer union between the Lutherans and the Calviniſts: to which purpoſe one Duræas, as Grotius calls him †, had been ſent to the aſſembly held at Francfort upon the Mayne not long before, furniſhed with conciliatory letters from the Engliſh prelates. The opinion of Grotius concerning this convention was as follows: *Rex Sueciæ Magnus Guſtavus . . . . . non multum ante mortem, Lipſiæ convertum inſtituerat utriuſque ſententiæ proteſtantium . . . . . Effecit ſua auctoritate ut amice diſcederetur, cum magna ſpe reſtituendæ unitatis. Sed triſtis exitus tanti regis ſalubre hoc cœptum interſcidit.*

Nevertheleſs, the houſe of Auſtria made no great efforts in oppoſition to this aſſembly; taking it for granted, injudiciouſly enough, that the proteſtant princes had no other point in view than to propoſe ſome mitigations in regard to the *edict of reſtitution*; whereas their objections on this head were little more than mere pretexts, every perſon convened having a private view to form ſome connections, as far as he

proteſted more times than once, but always in vain. This abbey ſends a deputy to the diet; and its contingent, upon the military eſtabliſhment of the empire, is one horſeman and ten foot ſoldiers; a ſmall number of knights-errant, conſidering the fine ladies of family and conſequence they are to protect.

* *Brachelii* Hiſtor. noſtr. temp. p. 246. Pſalm lxxxiii. 1, 2, &c.

† *Epiſtol.* lxiv.

he durſt, with the king of Sweden. No prince had the courage to be the firſt propoſer of any public ſpirited and generous reſolution, being fearful of becoming the immediate victim of the emperor's reſentments, before the proteſtants could effectually join their forces, and with a ſincere intention of making good their engagements *.

The firſt points agitated were theſe. To obviate the ſchemes, which the catholics propoſed to form at their aſſembly, intended to be held at Francfort upon the Mayne; and to implore the emperor either to annihilate the edict of reſtitution, or to mitigate its rigour. And upon the ſuppoſition the court of Vienna ſhould remain inflexible, then to conclude on proper meaſures for diverting the ſtroke that hung over them. Alſo how to clear their reſpective dominions of the Imperial ſoldiers, who ravaged and deſtroyed every thing within their reach, contrary to the laws of the Germanic ſyſtem, and *the Pacta Conventa* of the emperor, ſolemnly ſworn to at his coronation.

It was repreſented likewiſe, in a memorial tranſmitted to the emperor, That the Imperial conſtitutions and the laws of the Golden Bull had been violated, and the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg cruelly oppreſſed; the latter, though the king of Sweden poſſeſſed good part of his territories, namely, the Old and New Marches, being obliged to pay his *whole* contribution without abatement; which reduced him to ſuch difficulties, that he was compelled to make retrenchments at his own table and diminiſh his family. Nor was he able to maintain a ſufficient garriſon for the protection of his capital: and ſeveral princes of the houſe of Saxony, thoſe, for example, of Altenberg, Weymar, and Coburg, had, upon complaining of their inability to diſcharge their reſpective contributions, been threatened with the exaction of a quadruple proportion; whereas the emperor behaved with great mildneſs and partiality towards the ſubjects of his own hereditary dominions. It was agreed further, that the proteſtant clergy had been treated with unbecoming ſeverity, and that new impoſitions were produced every day, at the arbitrary diſcretion of the Imperial commiſſaries, without conſulting, conformably to the Germanic conſtitutions, the parties and provinces concerned. That the catholic armies defended ſhamefully to-day the very countries they devoured but yeſterday; and that lands had been aſſigned to generals and ſoldiers upon the footing of conqueſt. That they had been forced to con-

* *Le Barre, Hiſt. d'Allemagne*, tom. ix. p. 604.

tribute to the ſupport of ineffectual or imaginary regiments; and that ſums had been levied, after the nullity of the demand had been evinced; upon which military exaction enſued. That the commiſſaries general entered countries, and aſſigned quarters, without leave firſt obtained from the reſpective ſovereigns. That outrages, thefts, and rapes, were matters of common practice; and that agriculture and commerce were both baniſhed from the territories of the empire. Nevertheleſs, the whole was repreſented modeſtly in the ſupplicatory ſtyle, each perſon being determined, ſo far as was conſiſtent with public good and private conſcience, to maintain due loyalty and obedience to the emperor *.

Guſtavus took care to add fuel to this proteſtant flame, and privately ſent Chemnitius and other politicians, charged with theſe ſecret inſtructions. Firſt, by way of preliminary, having mentioned the alliance concluded with France, to cultivate the elector's, of Saxony, good graces with particular attention, as the princes and deputies all took the lead from him. Secondly, upon which the king moſt ſet his heart, to induce the ſeveral aſſembled proteſtants at once to drop the maſk, unite with him, and declare war againſt the emperor. Thirdly, if ſome ſhould think theſe meaſures over-violent, and inconſiſtent with that obedience which the Germanic body owes its chief, then to perſuade them to raiſe troops for the protection of their reſpective territories, and allow him, Guſtavus, who alone defended their religion, lives, and properties, a certain annual penſion or ſubſcription for the ſupport of the common cauſe, as alſo free paſſage, proviſions, forage, and permiſſion likewiſe to enter into fortified towns in caſe of a retreat. Laſtly, if neither the *bold* nor the *moderate* propoſal ſhould pleaſe them, to ſuggeſt a ſtill more gentle method, and inſiſt upon their forming amongſt themſelves ſeparate alliances, which they were to keep ſecret till time of need.

Never were propoſals better adapted either by a brave or by a cautious man. How they were reliſhed, or how they were anſwered, cannot be aſcertained from hiſtory; but ſure we are, that this account of the affair was allowed, by Oxenſtiern, to be genuine. What could be done with a prince of ſuch ſtrange diſpoſitions as the elector of Saxony, who, though he opened the aſſembly with a promiſing ſpeech, was

* March 18, 1631.

of

of ſuch a temper, that it was extremely difficult to manage him! He hated war, and was greatly addicted to the pleaſures of hunting and drinking. He placed implicit confidence in the king of Denmark, and entertained a radical diſguſt towards the king of Sweden; and the rather, as their pretenſions claſhed with reſpect to the biſhoprics of Magdeburg and Halberſtadt. He had, moreover, conceived both dread and jealouſy againſt the houſe of Weimar, under pretence, that the princes of the union, in the *Anhaltine* papers found at the battle of Prague, had promiſed his electorate, concerning which promiſe we know nothing certain, to a duke of Saxe-Weimar, deſcended from that line, which Charles V. had cut off. He was partial likewiſe to the Imperial intereſts, from antient habit; and was further induced thereto by ſome private reaſons; for Bohemia and the incorporated provinces laid contiguous to his territories, and he always hoped to obtain ſome grants upon them, in caſe the houſe of Auſtria grew proſperous in her victories. To complete this, he profeſſed an averſion to all foreign interferences in the empire, and, what was ſtill more, had one favourite principle at heart, which was to bring about a general peace in Germany, and transfer the ſeat of war into ſome foreign country, as Sweden, Poland, the Valteline and Italy. In this object he had two views, a diverſion to the enterpriſing ambition of the Auſtrian family, and the maintenance of his own country in repoſe till he could indemnify himſelf for the fatigues, expences, and depopulations of a tedious war. Theſe were Arnheim's maxims rather than his own. Beſides all this, the landgrave of Heſſe-Darmſtadt, who was the elector's ſon-in-law, held a ſtrict correſpondence with the Imperial miniſtry; and Francis Albert, duke of Saxe-Lauenberg, who then ſerved under Guſtavus, was ſtill more liable to ſuſpicion. What embroiled matters more at the court of Dreſden, was, that Arnheim, general in chief of the Saxon army, had ſerved may years under Walſtein, in the capacity of his obſequious creature and moſt implicit follower. His mean pliability of temper might not have made him formidable; but his artifices and diſſimulation were unparalleled. Richelieu uſed to ſay, "The church loſt in him "the completeſt Jeſuit that ever lived*;" and, having been often

* Or, as Grotius has delivered down the anecdote in a private conference, "Robbed the world of a more inſidious and negotiating cardinal, than the "ſee of Rome could ever produce."

John George Arnheim was a gentleman of Brandenburg. He had an inventive head in matters of diſſimulation, artifice, and deceit, and may be conſidered

often perplexed with his tergiverſation and ſhifting, rejoiced, and made little geſticulations like a child, when the Swedes took him priſoner. Nor was the general alone inſincere to the Swediſh cauſe; for the elector's chaplain had his ſhare, and the miniſtry likewiſe.

Upon the whole, it may ſuffice to obſerve, that the elector of Saxony wanted to pleaſe, and not diſpleaſe the contending parties; a taſk unworthy of a great man, becauſe of the improbable ſucceſs which attends it; and too difficult to be executed by a weak or timorous man, the reſult of whoſe wonderful cunning and addreſs is, to render each party diſcontented.

After various debates, it was at length agreed by univerſal conſent, "To petition for the revocation of the *edict*, to relieve the proteſtant princes and ſtates, that were oppreſſed; and

ſidered as the prime author of all the Saxon elector's duplicity. Amongſt other things, he betrayed the Swedes in 1633, and negotiated the alliance between his maſter and the emperor; being always a creature who ſubjected himſelf to the *ferula* of Walſtein. His behaviour to count Thurn and Dewbatel was highly ungenerous; for he attacked them in the night whilſt they were his allies and ſerving him; took all their ſoldiers priſoners, and tranſferred them to the Imperial ſervice. Walſtein, who was magnificent in all his actions, where his private paſſions were unconcerned, was ſo aſhamed of this action, that he diſmiſſed the officers without ranſom; a circumſtance of private hiſtory, which few hiſtorians have been able to account for, as no priſoner would have been ſo acceptable as Thurn to the emperor.

Arnheim being taken by the Swedes about the year 1638, was conducted with great joy to Stockholm, and made a ſtate priſoner in the caſtle. M. du Maurier tells us*, that he often ſaw him at his window reclining his head on his hand, and muſing like a man loſt in meditation. He at length gave a new proof of his abilities in ſtratagem; for, pretending to be in a ſort of dying condition, he ſignified to the miniſtry, that he could make a diſpoſition of part of his eſtate by ſale greatly to his advantage, if they would grant a paſſport to one of the gentlemen of his retinue to croſs over into Germany, having inveſted the ſaid truſty perſon with proper authorities. The regency made no difficulty in complying with ſo reaſonable a requeſt, and Arnheim artfully choſe a day to diſpatch his agent, when great rejoicings were made for the birth of a dauphin of France. Upon this pretext Arnheim's retinue made a public dinner, and diſtributed rich wines in great abundance to the perſons appointed to guard their maſter, and in the cloſe of the evening, Arnheim, who was ſuppoſed to be dying, iſſued out with the gentleman, his agent, in the character of his livery footman, well muffled in a large riding coat. He reached the ſea coaſt with great celerity, and tranſported himſelf in a little veſſel into Germany. The remainder of his family at Stockholm carried on the farce with great ſolemnity; and as his pretended illneſs kept him from viſitants, too much time elapſed to give the miniſtry any opportunity of retaking him. The ſucceſs of this artifice threw Oxenſtiern into great diſquietude†.

* *Memoires*, p. 259. † *Lotich. de reb. Germ.* fol. tom. ii. p. 521.

and maintain the Augſburg confeſſion in its full vigour and purity. To demand, that the Imperial troops ſhould be removed; otherwiſe not to grant them paſſage, proviſions, or quarters. To preſerve the liberties of the Germanic body without infringing the prerogative of the emperor. To reſtore peace conſiſtently with law, and renew old friendſhips with the papiſts. To find expedients, whereby they might ſubſtantiate the propoſals made at the diet of Ratiſbon; and, above all, to put themſelves in a poſture of defence, in order to preſerve their eccleſiaſtical poſſeſſions, and oppoſe the edict of reſtitution."

Each circle, prince, and ſtate, was to ſubſcribe a certain contingent of men and money in defence of their lives, their properties, religion, and liberty, conformably to the laws of the Germanic ſyſtem, and the common principles of ſelf-preſervation.

They then entered into a common treaty to aſſiſt and vindicate one another, and a choſen junto, of a few only, was appointed for the more ſpeedy diſpatch of important buſineſs, veſted with full authority to act for the reſt.—Laſtly, it was reſolved, by way of corroborating their intereſts, and giving ſanction to their determinations, to invite the king of Denmark, the duke of Holſtein, and the maritime towns of the Auguſtan poſſeſſion, to accede; and that letters ſhould be addreſſed to all foreign proteſtant princes and ſtates upon the ſame ſubject. Nor muſt I omit, that it was determined to raiſe an army of 40,000 men*, which was apparently to act only in a defenſive capacity. Care was taken likewiſe not to mention a ſingle ſyllable with reference to the irruption of Guſtavus into Lower-Saxony; nor was the leaſt promiſe made of affording any aſſiſtance to the emperor.

Thus ended the famous Leipſic concluſions; and the aſſembly was diſſolved on Palm-Sunday, the 3d of April.—Of all the proceedings the elector of Saxony ſent the emperor and the catholic electors a ſeemingly minute and circumſtantial account; imploring the former, in terms as ſtrongly conceived as can be imagined, to exert the greateſt power the Supreme Being had been pleaſed to beſtow on any

* The number of this army can only be gueſſed at, but not poſitively aſcertained. All we find is, making an equal proportion of foot and horſe; the regiments of the former being ordered to conſiſt of 3000 men, and thoſe of the latter 1000; that Saxony was to raiſe ſix regiments; Brandenburgh three; the circles of Suabia, Franconia, and the Rhine, three each; and the circle of Lower-Saxony to levy money for raiſing and paying one regiment.

prince

prince in Europe, in a manner worthy the giver and the poſſeſſor, ſo as to reſtore the empire to its antient peace, and prevent a ſcene of bloodſhed and ruin, the moſt extenſively dreadful in its conſequences, that the world might, perhaps, ever ſee. He then obſerved, that the confederation made at Leipſic turned wholly on the defenſive ſide of the queſtion; and what had been there determined, related only to perſonal preſervation, and not to the deſtruction of others. Be that as it may, this laſt attempt was unſucceſsful; for the emperor would not expunge one tittle in the edict of reſtitution. Of courſe the Saxon letter was filled with a repetition of old complaints, and the Imperial anſwer, which conſiſted of two monitory epiſtles, conceived and expreſſed with great acrimony againſt the ſeveral princes lately aſſembled at Leipſic, breathed nothing but reſentment and indignation. To this ſucceeded a prohibition of raiſing troops; directed againſt each and every potentate of the evangelical, and the reformed perſuaſion; and ſtrict injunctions were addreſſed to the catholic powers, commanding them to withhold all aſſiſtance from the proteſtants, under pain of the confiſcation of their reſpective fiefs. During this difference of ſentiments, ſome foreign powers interfered, with a view to make theſe diſtractions more unfavourable to the houſe of Auſtria, at whoſe overgrown power they had reaſon to be alarmed; and all the advantage Guſtavus could obtain from the elector of Saxony was, permiſſion to tranſport proviſions and powder, through his dominions, to the diſtreſſed garriſon at Magdeburg. As for money he refuſed to contribute a ſingle farthing; nor would he agree to unite his troops with thoſe of his majeſty, and raiſe the ſiege. The king petitioned like a ſuppliant for free poſſeſſion of Deſſaubridge, and entreated the elector to meet him and his army on the oppoſite banks of the Elbe, from whence he purpoſed, that they ſhould march conjointly to Magdeburg; requeſting likewiſe to have leave given him to embark his artillery and heavy baggage at Wittemberg, and promiſing to give him draughts on the bankers of Hamburg or Amſterdam for immediate payment of all the expences. The elector remained like a man petrified, and referred entirely to the example of the elector of Brandenburg *.

During this interval Guſtavus had no patience to ſee the diſtreſs of the unhappy town of Magdeburg, and renewing his ſolicitations by a ſecond letter, far more urgent than the former, told the elector, that he conſidered his firſt denials

* *Chemnitius*, tom. i. p. 120.

as

as marks of politeneſs and reſpect to the emperor; but that a higher obligation now ought to influence his actions, namely, his duty to God, and his affection to his faithful ſubjects. As to the approach of Aldringer and the German army, that had ſerved in Italy, he confeſſed himſelf to be no way diſmayed at ſuch an event, and recommending a perſonal interview to his electoral highneſs, as buſineſs of conſequence could not be carried on by the intercourſe of letters, and the tedious perplexities of public miniſters, beſought him in one word *to remember his ſons* and *the archbiſhopric of Magdeburg**.

Meanwhile Tilly employed himſelf ſeriouſly about the ſiege of Magdeburg†, a town of great ſtrength, in one of the moſt populous and fertile parts of North Germany, ſituated between the electorates of Saxony and Brandenburg. The Imperal general's ſcheme was not amiſs. He wanted to ſtrike ſome blow of conſequence, to counterbalance the glory of Guſtavus, and raiſe the reputation and ſpirits of his own army. He hoped likewiſe, by a deciſive action of this ſort, to fix the two wavering electors to the intereſts of the houſe of Auſtria; but in the ſequel he overturned all this plan by his own eagerneſs and indiſcretion.

Pappenheim had formed a blockade round this city ſome weeks before, and, as he always relied upon the pen as well as the ſword, had made the governor an offer, by letter, of vaſt ſums of money, and the title of count of the empire. Upon this occaſion, Falkenberg acted both with prudence and ſpirit; for he examined the trumpeter, who delivered the letter in preſence of all his officers, ſending word back to Pappenheim, for he did not write, "that he might find the ſort of men he wanted at home, but that Falkenberg was not a perſon of that character; and, friend," ſaid he to the meſſenger, "whoever comes here again upon ſuch an errand, ſhall receive an halter, inſtead of a gold chain;" which in thoſe days was the preſent of honour‡.

* *Chemnitius*, tom. i. p. 120.

† Magdeburg, or *Maiden-town*, bears for arms a virgin crowned, ſuppoſed to be Venus, who was worſhipped in this country till the reign of Charlemagne, who converted ſome of the Saxons to Chriſtianity. Its duchy is 180 miles long and 96 broad. In the town there is extant a painting of Venus, which was preſerved here in a place unnoticed till the year 780. In this picture was a golden car, drawn by two ſwans, and two white doves. A naked Venus leans forward, having a roſe in her mouth, and a myrtle garland on her head; the treſſes of her hair waving. In her left hand ſhe holds the terreſtrial globe; in her right three golden apples. On her left breaſt is a pointed dart, on her right a blazing torch. Behind the car ſtand the three Graces with their arms folded.

‡ *Chemnitius*, tom. i. p. 123.

Tilly

Tilly inveſted Magdeburg about the beginning of March, and ſoon made himſelf maſter of various forts and outworks. One, from its peculiar ſtrength, was called *Pappenheim's Fort**, ſo named in order to imply, that it was an object worthy to be attacked by that general. Nevertheleſs, Pappenheim took it ſword in hand. Another called *Tilly's Diſguſt*, underwent the ſame fate. The Tollſconce, which the Imperial general attacked laſt, coſt him 500 men. It was defended vigorouſly by Falkenberg† the governor; who had thrown himſelf into the town in the habit of a peaſant ſeveral weeks before; yet he ought to have maintained this outwork, which commanded the bridge, at all hazards, ſince from the moment it became in the enemy's power, the city, which was of great extent, though commanded by no eminence, was left naked to the enemy, being defended only by the town walls and a rampart, not extremely ſtrong.

Though the governor was a good officer, matters did not go on very much to his ſatisfaction within the walls. His garriſon, conſiſting of but 2000 foot and 250 horſe, new raiſed levies, was weak, and ill paid. The money promiſed by Guſtavus to the adminiſtrator‡ could not be conveyed to him at the day appointed; for the enemy had ſurrounded the town ſooner than was expected. Tilly had penſioners among the magiſtrates, who diſcovered what was debated in every council. The town was ill ſupplied with proviſions. The commander wanted powder; which was partly owing to an indiſcreet enterpriſe in one of his officers, who, juſt before Tilly's army invironed the town, went with a detachment to fetch 200 quintals, that were lodged in the bailiwic of Gomern, ten miles from Magdeburg: and then, out of courage and bravado, hearing that count Ladron, a Bavarian colonel, was coming down the Elbe with a party of troops, quitted the object of his journey, and killed him and moſt of his eſcort within ſight of Deſſau bridge, in whoſe fortreſs the Imperialiſts had a garriſon; whilſt the powder unfortunately fell into the enemy's hands.

Amongſt other views, this raſh adventurer conceived a vain hope of ſeizing papers of great conſequence from the

* *Waſſembergii Florus Germ.* p. 229.

† Falkenberg was a German by birth, and grand maréchal of the court at Stockholm.

‡ Chriſtian William, uncle of the elector of Brandenburg, adminiſtrator and archbiſhop of Magdeburg, was a layman. The emperor had proſcribed him for not ſubmitting to the edict of reſtitution.

elector

elector of Bavaria to Tilly: but a ſingle line of conſequence wat never diſcovered; and not being able, by reaſon of going out of his way, to paſs through the enemy's troops, and enter Magdeburg, he retired with great diſorder of mind to Leipſic, for it is thought he killed Ladron and his men in a very unſoldierlike manner, and, being there ſeized with the plague, died delirious in remorſe and horror.

Meanwhile, according to the cuſtom of the times, many furious ſallies were made, ſome ſucceſsful and ſome otherwiſe. Falkenberg conducted one or two, which ſhewed more zeal than diſcretion. However, Pappenheim in a particular rencounter had like to have been killed or taken priſoner; which ſingle event might have given a turn to the whole ſtate of affairs.

In about a month Tilly began to cannonade the town very furiouſly; having raiſed four batteries againſt the new city, each mounted with ſixteen pieces of large artillery. On the ſeventh day from that period, he carried his intrenchments to the foot of the wall, the town ditch being dry*; yet the breach was not practicable. Nevertheleſs, he flattered himſelf, that the city would then ſurrender; having negotiated an accommodation by means of the Hanſe-towns; but it was only the deluſion of falſe hope. The troops did their duty with incredible ſpirit on both ſides, ſo fierce and ſo uninterrupted a firing had not been ſeen in thoſe wars before. There was likewiſe great mining and countermining; for Guſtavus had taught both enemies and friends to be more compendious in the affair of ſieges. Tilly wrote divers letters to the adminiſtrator and chief magiſtrates, but they rejected all accommodation, and ordered the cannoneers to fire with double diligence. He had obſerved particularly, that Falkenberg owed allegiance to the emperor, as being a German born; to which the governor returned this ſhort anſwer: *I agree with the adminiſtrator and the ſenators; and will take care neither to hurt my conſcience as a Chriſtian, nor my reputation as a ſoldier*†. In conſequence of this, Tilly, on the eighth of May, ſent a trumpeter, in form, to propoſe a capitulation. He was detained in town till the tenth before a proper anſwer could be diſpatched to the Imperial general. During this interval, the batteries played night and day without intermiſſion. At length the tower and baſtion of the

* *Brief, but Authentic Relation of the Siege and Storming of Magdeburg*, in High Dutch, 4°. This work muſt not be confounded with the *Hiſt. but Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, three tomes, fol.

† *Chemnitius*, tom. i. p. 127.

new

new gate were overthrown, the Imperialiſts crowded from all parts to begin the ſtorm, but the breach was not to be entered with common ſafety. By this time too, powder grew ſo ſcarce within the city, that the inhabitants were forced to grind it with hand-mills

During the detention of Tilly's trumpeter, the adminiſtrator diſpatched another to him, offering to enter into terms, on condition Tilly preſerved the privileges of the city, and left him in poſſeſſion of the archbiſhopric; proteſting further, that he would abide by any ſubſequent articles, that the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg ſhould agree to. The Imperial general did not chuſe to aſſent to this propoſal, having previouſly felt the pulſes of theſe princes, who excuſed themſelves, and requeſted the favour of continuing neutral, partly through fear of diſobliging their proteſtant brethren, and partly becauſe the aſpect of things appeared at that time ſomewhat diſturbed on the Imperial ſide.

Thus Tilly ſtill kept up an uninterrupted fire, and made galleries along the foſſé, that fronted the Sudenburg and the new town. He then ceaſed firing.

The citizens vainly hoped, that the Imperialiſts had formed a deſign to raiſe the ſiege. It is more than probable, that Tilly intended they ſhould think ſo. He the ſame night ſummoned a general council of war; the reſult of which was, that an univerſal attack ſhould be made the next morning at break of day, when it was ſuppoſed, and not without reaſon, that half the garriſon would be aſleep; not only becauſe the beſieged were extremely fatigued, but becauſe moſt of them were perſuaded, the enemy was determined to ſhift his quarters; a circumſtance, which Tilly's agents, within the walls, took care to propagate with additions and improvements.

On the tenth of May the Imperial general held another council of war at one in the morning, with a view, that no ſecret might have time to ſpread itſelf abroad. The important affair was debated and reconſidered once more: and the majority, with Pappenheim at their head, reſolved, as at the laſt council, in the affirmative; though all agreed, that the breaches were not in that condition, which a prudent beſieger would wiſh. Pappenheim, who had an appetite for danger, and *who thought many things were done by the mere reſolution to do them,* declared ſtrenuouſly, as was uſually his cuſtom, for fighting. His perſonal courage made him the darling of the ſoldiers, and his great experience, prudence, preſence of mind in danger,

and above all, his inventive faculty in military ſtratagems, made the other generals liſten to him with reſpect and pleaſure.

At the head of Savelli's, Wrangel's, and Gronsfelt's regiments, and when we ſpeak of Imperial regiments it muſt be obſerved, that they were at leaſt double in number to thoſe of Guſtavus, he began the attack on the late-erected fortifications of the new city, which was near the banks of the Elbe, and where the adminiſtrator commanded, preciſely at five in the morning, one piece of cannon being diſcharged by way of ſignal to all the troops. His watch-word was Jeſu Maria, the ſame afterwards uſed at the battle of Leipſic, and each ſoldier wore a white ribbon on his right-arm*.

At the ſame inſtant two other attacks were commenced with an equal number of troops, conducted by Adolphus duke of Holſtein, and count Mansfelt. The latter attempted the Sudenburg-quarter near the great cathedral, where Falkenberg commanded, and the former directed his force againſt the Cröcken-gate, which watch-maſter-general Amſteroth undertook to maintain. The defence of the banks of the Elbe, that river not being ſuppoſed paſſable by reaſon of its depth, and for want of boats, was left to the care of fiſhermen, and ſome few other inhabitants†. Tilly diſmiſſed his officers with a ſhort ſpeech, and kept aloof at the head of a reſerve, in order to convey ſupport and aſſiſtance wherever it might be wanted.

Meanwhile all things kept as quiet within the town, as if nothing had been in agitation. Falkenberg, after watching the whole night in the ramparts, was unfortunately gone to a council held at the town-hall, in order to diſpatch the trumpeter above-mentioned to Tilly, as was alſo the adminiſtrator.

Pappenheim, meanwhile, in the poſt of honour allotted for him, having ordered all his cavalry to diſmount, in an inſtant, drove the city ſoldiers out of the *fauſſebraie*, and obliged them to retreat behind the upper wall. He next cauſed the new work to be attacked, and then filing along under the town-wall, upon which was ranged a battery of cannon, made one furious effort upon the laſt parapet. Hither Falkenberg flew from the ſenate-houſe, with all the troops he could collect together, and repulſed him beyond

* *Brief, but Authentic Relation of the Siege of Magdeburg*, in High Dutch, 4°. Magd. 1709.

† *Chemnitius*, 126. *Brachel.* 251.

the

the new work, marching over the bodies of a hundred ſlaughtered Imperialiſts. At length being mortally wounded, he was obliged to be carried back to the neareſt part of the town, where he continued to give his orders with unparalleled reſolution*.

Meanwhile, Pappenheim, perceiving the courage of the beſieged to ſlacken, and making a ſecond attempt with greater ſucceſs than he could have flattered himſelf, entered the ſtreets about ſeven in the morning†. It was then that Falkenberg greatly wanted his cavalry, which might have borne down the enemies before their own horſe were admitted; but he found, to his great mortification in his dying moments, that ſome perfidious citizens had barricadoed the ſtreets with chains. All we know further with reſpect to him is, that his body periſhed in the flames.

During this rencounter one captain Smith greatly ſignalized himſelf. He repulſed the Imperialiſts a ſecond time, but an unfortunate ſhot ſoon put an end to his generous efforts; and when the alarum-bell began to ſound, the citizens loſt all courage, and each man provided for his individual ſafety by retiring to his own houſe, or attempting to abſcond and ſhelter his perſon elſewhere. The duke of Holſtein‡, with Pappenheim's aſſiſtance, then entered the Hamburg-gate, after having made ſeveral unſucceſsful attempts before, and pointed the cannon of the ramparts againſt the ſtreets. At length Mansfelt got into the town, and in the interim the cavalry broke in like a torrent through the Hamburg-gate. This prevented the remaining part of the garriſon from uniting, and making one general defence in the public ſquare.

The adminiſtrator, at the beginning of the firſt attack, had his thigh ruffled with a cannon-ball, and received afterwards ſeveral muſquet-ſhots, one particularly in the left leg. He was at length taken priſoner, under promiſe of kind and humane uſage ſuitable to his quality; yet ſoon after ſome freſh ſoldiers fell upon him, and only killed his domeſtics who attended him, but gave him two wounds in cold blood, one with a piſtol in the leg, and one with a battle-axe on the head. They then ſtripped him almoſt naked, and would have diſ-

* In this conflict fell the traitor Quinti Aligheri, who, as Chemnitz tells us, was lieutenant-colonel in the regiment of Savelli: but a ſubſequent account, page 237, gives that poſt to don Joſeph de Ainſa. Nevertheleſs the difficulty may be eaſily ſolved. Theodanus in his narrative calls Ainſa the lieutenant-colonel, ſome days after the action, by which time the general might have filled up the vacant commiſſion.

† *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illuſtri*, 4°. 377.

‡ Afterwards killed at Leipſic.

patched

patched him without remorſe, if Pappenheim had not flown to his aſſiſtance, and ordered him to be carried on two pikes to his tent, fainting, and half-naked. Next morning Pappenheim conveyed him in a coach to Wolmerſtadt, and ordered his own chaplain and gentleman of the bed-chamber to attend him. The dukes of Holſtein and Saxony* had the brutality to reproach him in groſs terms; but he defended the juſtice of his cauſe with manly anſwers, and acquitted himſelf conformably to the ſpirit of a prince and a man of honour.

Some time afterwards, Pappenheim aſked him, how he could be ſo ill-adviſed as to expoſe his life, and all that he poſſeſſed, for the ſake of perſons, who ſold him every day; and informed the beſiegers of the order of the guard, the numbers deſtined to the ſupport of each ſtation, the weakneſs of the fortifications, and the ſeveral inconveniencies they laboured under. That, agreeably to theſe reports, he had laid the plan of the laſt attack, and thereby judged preciſely when and where to make it.

When the adminiſtrator was brought before Tilly, he told him and his generals boldly; *That the Supreme Being would take vengeance upon them. That blood could only be expiated by blood; that acts of cruelty were fatal to armies; and that ſooner or later the catholic forces would juſtly ſuffer an equal degree of chaſtiſement with what they had inflicted. That the Imperial cauſe was verging towards its decline, and the glory of Tilly lay interred in the ruins of Magdeburg.*

Now began a maſſacre not to be paralleled in modern ages. I know nothing approaching to it but the ſtorm of Drogheda by Cromwell, who ſeems to have copied Tilly in the very meaneſt part of his character. The ſoldiers fired promiſcuouſly in the ſtreets, churches and ſquares, upon perſons of all ages, ſex, and conditions, with the ſame fury as in the day of battle. The very beſt troops, the old Walloons, behaved the leaſt like men, and, as there may be a juſtice ſometimes in cruelty, ſpared not their own friends, namely, the informers, in the general maſſacre. The Croatians exerciſed barbarities unknown to ſavages. The young men and the new-raiſed ſoldiers were the only people that ſhewed any viſible ſigns of compaſſion. When the ſtreets and public places were filled with dead bodies, and this ſcene may be conſidered as the very mildeſt part

* Rodolph, duke of Saxe Lauenberg. He performed wonders at the battle of Leipſic, and with two or three horſemen reſcued Tilly when taken priſoner.

of their cruelty, the troops diſbanded themſelves, and began to enter the houſes. Here began a more deliberate perpetration of murther; even the aged, the ſick, and the young, found no mercy. One ſoldier held an infant by the legs, with the head downwards, and another cleft the body with his ſword. Eight Croatians violated a poor girl, and then transfixed her to the ground with a halbert. A young lady of quality was ſeized by an officer, but as he dragged her over the Elbe-bridge, ſhe begged leave to have the uſe of her hands to take out her handkerchief and wipe her eyes, and that inſtant plunged herſelf into the river, and expired. Another young woman of faſhion, remarkable for her beauty, knowing that in ſuch a caſe her charms were the leaſt part of her protection, deliberately plunged into a well: and twenty young girls, who were aſſembled together * at a houſe near the banks of the Elbe, ruſhed out of the doors all at once, and, embracing each other, threw themſelves into the river.

By this time the whole city was in flames. Moſt hiſtorians attribute this to accident; but as the fire began in various places at once, many may be inclined to conſider it as a part of the beſieger's cruelty. Thus periſhed the few, who had concealed themſelves; and by the juſtice of Providence, the Imperialiſts loſt the greater part not only of what they had plundered, but of what the inhabitants had hidden.

Nothing remained of the town but the cathedral, the church and convent of Notre Dame, ſome few houſes that ſtood round it, and about eighty or a hundred fiſhermen's cottages on the banks of the Elbe. Out of 40,000 inhabitants † it is thought ſcarcely 800 eſcaped. Some retired to

* The author of the *Memoirs of the Houſe of Brandenburg* is pleaſed to do more honour to the heroic virtue of the fair ſex than my collections can authorize me to ſet forth; for he makes the number of theſe Clelias amount, according to ſome relations, to 1200.

† When I ſay 40,000 inhabitants, I ſpeak only from others, it being my own private opinion, that, including the garriſon, there could not be above that number in the town. Nevertheleſs many gentry in the neighbourhood, and many country people, who had connexions with the citizens, took refuge with them. It may be proper therefore upon this occaſion to give a tranſcript verbatim from the German writer, whom I have twice quoted already. "It is impoſſible to aſcertain the number of perſons that periſhed in the city; for the ſword and fire made equal ravages, and the flames, perhaps, deſtroyed as many perſons, if not more, than the cruelty of the barbarians; for when the vaults and cellars came to be opened, in moſt of them were found three, four, or five women and children, who had been ſuffocated. The number of the dead cannot be judged from the liſt of burials;

to the cathedral; ſome obtained quarter, in hopes of ranſom; ſome eſcaped over the walls; ſome were dug out of the ruins; and ſome few were preſerved by the ſeeming interpoſition of Providence. A handful of the garriſon, which held out to the very laſt man, obtained conditions; but all the officers were put to the ſword, excepting Amſteroth, who was taken priſoner, and died the next day, and a lieutenant-colonel and major, whoſe lives were ſpared.

When one conſiders Tilly's bigotry and extreme averſion to the proteſtants, Pappenheim may be eaſily excuſed from being the author of this monſtrous ſcene of cruelty. Why elſe did Tilly make but a moment's viſit to the town, when his preſence was neceſſary there for two or three days? or why, when ſome of the officers made remonſtrances to him, did he reply coldly and indifferently: *The town muſt bleed: it has not yet made ſufficient atonement. Let the ſoldiers perſiſt another hour, and then we will reconſider the matter!*

Some have ſaid in behalf of the Imperial general, and Cromwell is reported to have made the ſame excuſe, that ſeverities of this kind were exerciſed only *in terrorem*. If that had been the caſe, the garriſon alone was the true object of reſentment; an act, even in that light, highly unjuſtifiable, diſgraceful to common humanity, and irreconcileable with the prudence of a great commander, who knows the revolution of chances in war, and never deſires to make *it* more bloody than it is well known to be in its own nature.

Three days after the aſſault, the Imperial general made his public entrance into the town, and went directly to the cathedral, where about 400 people of both ſexes had locked and

burials; for ſome ſuppoſe 6,440 bodies to be thrown into the Elbe, not to mention thoſe, which the fire conſumed, and others, that were buried in the ruins; ſo that a quarter of a year elapſed before many could be found. From the few ſurvivors we might have received ſome certain intelligence, but moſt of them were carried into different camps, from whence they eſcaped and diſperſed themſelves over Germany and Europe. According to the common opinion and report, it was judged, that about 400 citizens remained alive," *meaning thoſe that Tilly found in the great cathedral*, " part whereof were detained priſoners with their wives and children: ſome were ranſomed, and others made their flight under favour of the night, and by means of a fire, which broke out in Tilly's camp at Fermerſleben, on the fourth day after the town was taken, which conſumed the greateſt part of that plunder, for whoſe ſake the ſoldier had exchanged his honour and his humanity.—In a word, the deſtruction of the beautiful and illuſtrious town of Magdeburg, can only be compared with the deſtruction of the cities of Troy, Saguntum, and Jeruſalem."

and barricadoed themſelves in, having neither eat nor drank ſince the city was ſtormed. He ordered them ſome proviſions, impriſoned the men in the adminiſtrator's palace, and ſent the women and children into his camp. He is ſaid to have repeated the following paſſages from Virgil on the occaſion, which might very well happen, as he had received his education among the Jeſuits;

*Venit ſumma dies & ineluctabile fatum.*
*——— fuit Ilium, & ingens*
*Gloria Parthenopes*.*

He examined the few ſurviving ſoldiers of the garriſon with great attention, being determined to make an example of all deſerters, and reproached them, though without reaſon, for making, as he ſaid, ſo poor a defence; and then gave his orders, that plunder ſhould ceaſe from that moment. Next morning a dreadful fire broke out in his camp, fortunately enough for Stalman the Swediſh reſident, who had been confined there under a cloſe guard; for amidſt the extraordinary hurry and confuſion he recovered his liberty, and rejoined his maſter †.

Theſe barbarities touched the king of Sweden to the very heart, and raiſed his indignation to ſuch a pitch, that he proteſted, with a tone of anger, That he would be revenged *on the old corporal* for this maſſacre, or loſe his life in the attempt. To give vent to his paſſion, he publiſhed a ſenſible and well reaſoned manifeſto, wherein he plainly ſhewed, that the citizens of Magdeburg in general had behaved very inſincerely with him, having made no ſubſcription for their common defence, nor given any proper accommodations to the garriſon till the town was actually inveſted; and then ſuch aſſiſtances were granted reluctantly, and came too late—That they had turned a deaf ear to the repreſentations of the adminiſtrator laſt ſummer; who, if his remonſtrances could have carried any weight with them, would have fruſtrated Pappenheim in the blockade he then formed, and allowed his majeſty to have planned out ſome fortifications, which might have rendered the town impregnable, and conſequently have removed the ſeat of war into ſome other country. He taxed the inhabitants with infidelity to the proteſtant cauſe, and reminded them of the ſupplies he formerly drew for them from the banks of Hamburg and

* Tranſlated literally Parthenopolis; Magdeburg ſignifying, in the German language, *Virgin's town.*

† *Brief, but Authentic Relation*, 4°.

Lubec-

Lubec. As to any promiſe of raiſing the ſiege, he deſired the public to reflect, that ſuch engagements are, in the nature of war, conditional; and muſt be regulated by convenience, poſſibility, and the ſtate of things. He obſerved, incidentally, that after having made himſelf maſter of Gartz and Griffenhagen, he ſhould certainly have ruined the ſeparate army under Schomberg, and conſequently have raiſed the ſiege of Magdeburg too, if the governor of Cuſtrin, which belonged to the elector of Brandenburg, had not denied him poſſeſſion of that town at ſo critical a conjuncture. He then continued to remark, that it was incumbent upon him, before he marched to relieve Magdeburg, to take Francfort; clear the Imperial troops diſperſed along the banks of the Oder and the Sileſian ſide of the Worta, and defeat Schomberg, who was ſuperior to him in cavalry; and of courſe, had the power of haraſſing the rear of his army, or diſturbing his quarters every moment—That Tilly during this interval had greatly ſtrengthened the *army of obſervation*, which laid near Francfort; ſo that it was dangerous to make long marches, when a ſuperior force had always the power to tread on his heels. Such, notwithſtanding, was his Swediſh majeſty's zeal, that for the ſake of relieving Magdeburg, he made that haſty and furious ſtorm of Francfort, and thence marched to Spandau, where he found a cold reception from the elector of Brandenburg: adding likewiſe, that the duke of Saxony had denied him proviſions, and boats to convey his troops down the Elbe, and refuſed him a paſſage over that large river, either at Wittemberg or the Deſſau-bridge; ſo that hitherto he could conclude nothing with certainty concerning thoſe two princes, till they had ſpirit and magnanimity enough to take off the maſk, and act as open enemies or declared friends. * Laſtly, all the world might ſee, that his intereſt and inclination were both equally concerned in the relief of Magdeburg, ſince upon the news of its being taken, he was obliged to cauſe his army to retreat, and vary the whole plan of his operations. He even then, however, had relieved Magdeburg, if the electors had co-operated with him, or indulged him only with a free paſſage through their territories †.

Many preceding accidents and prodigies were called to mind when Magdeburg was taken, according to the reigning

* *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illuſtri*, 382.

† *Chemnit. de Bello Sueco Germ.* tom. i. 134, *&c. Swediſh Intelligencer*, part i. p. 96, *&c.*

diſpoſition of that age. Some weeks before the blockade was formed, part of the city wall tumbled down without any viſible reaſon*.

When the adminiſtrator mounted his horſe at Hamburg, in order to take poſſeſſion of the town, two loud ſudden thunder-claps were heard in a clear ſky.

Whilſt Tilly held his council of war at Hamelen in company with Pappenheim, Gronsfelt, commiſſary-general Rupa, and others, and determined at once to undertake the ſiege, immediately aroſe a hurricane, which overturned a magazine of powder with ſuch force, that the falling ſtones ſtruck fire, and ſuch an explosion enſued, that they all fell down on their knees, and offered up their prayers, ſuppoſing it to be an earthquake. The ſame ſtorm reached Magdeburg; for Falkenberg, who happened at that time to be riding in the fields, was thrice blown off his horſe: and the ſtatues of the wiſe virgins, which ſtood in Paradiſe-chapel, belonging to the great cathedral, were overturned, and their lamps thrown out of their hands †.

But the prodigy, which puzzled all men, and concerning which we have ſpoken in another place, was what happened to an *exempt* corporal's wife, who died in labour with inexpreſſible agonies, in the new city which Pappenheim ſtormed, requeſting above all things, that her body might be opened; when it was found to contain a boy as large as a child of three years old, cloathed in armour of fleſh like a coat of mail; and if the reader chuſes to peruſe the account in its original form, for all authors mention it, he may find the moſt exact deſcription in the places referred to at the bottom of the page ‡.

In the opinion of many judicious readers, I may be thought to violate the dignity of hiſtory, by inſerting here two narratives, which contain a diſtinct account of the ſtorming of Magdeburg: The one written by M. Theodanus, then miniſter of the church of Saint Catharine, and the other by a fiſherman, who died about the year 1720, having ſurvived the deſtruction of his native town at leaſt ninety years. The two relations appear to me ſo very intereſting, and ſo ſtrongly marked with authenticity, that I cannot allow myſelf to ſuppreſs them.

* *Waſſenbergii Florus Germ.* de Bello Magdeburgico, 12°. Francofurt, 1648.

† *Arma Suecica*, p. 66, 67.

‡ *Brief, but Authentic Relation*, in High Dutch, 4°. *Chemnitius*, tom. i. *Brachel.* p. 254.

" Going

" Going * out of church, immediately after ſermon †, ſome people of St. James's pariſh paſſed by, and told me the enemy had entered the town. With difficulty could I perſuade myſelf, that this was any thing more than a falſe alarm; but the news unfortunately proved too true. I then loſt my preſence of mind, and as my wife and maid-ſervant were with me, we ran directly to my colleague M. Malſio's houſe, and left our own houſe open. At M. Malſio's we found many people, who had fled to him in great perplexity. We comforted and exhorted each other, as far as the terror of our minds would give us leave. I was ſummoned thence to diſcharge the laſt duties to a colonel, who lay dangerouſly wounded. I reſolved to go, and ſent my maid to fetch my gown: but before my departure from my wife and neighbours, I told them, that the affair appeared to me to be concluded, and that we ſhould meet no more in this world. My wife reproached me in a flood of tears, crying, *Can you prevail on yourſelf to leave me to periſh all alone? You muſt anſwer for it before God!* I repreſented to her the obligations of my function, and the importance of the moments I was called upon to give my aſſiſtance in.

" As I croſſed the great ſtreet, a multitude of matrons and young women flocked round me, and beſought me, in all the agonies of diſtreſs, to adviſe them what to do—I told them, my beſt advice was to recommend themſelves to God's protecting grace, and prepare for death. At length I entered the colonel's lodgings, and found him ſtretched on the floor, and very weak. I gave him ſuch conſolation as the diſorders of my mind would permit me: he heard me with great attention, and ordered a ſmall preſent of gold to be given me, which I left on the table. In this interval the enemy poured in by crowds at the Hamburg gate, and fired upon the multitude as upon beaſts of prey. Suddenly my wife and maid ſervant entered the room, and perſuaded me to remove immediately, alledging we ſhould meet with no quarter, if the enemy found us in an apartment filled with arms. We run down into the court-yard of the houſe, and placed ourſelves in the gateway. Our enemies ſoon burſt the gate open, with an eagerneſs that cannot be deſcribed. The firſt compellation they be-

* *Angeli*; *Hiſt. de la Ville de Magdeburg*, 12°. 1714.

† Hübner mentions the text that was preached on;—*The ſnare is broken, and we are delivered*, Pſalm cxxiv. 7. which proved to be unfortunately choſen, although it plainly ſhews, that the prevalent opinion then was, that the enemy intended to raiſe the ſiege. *Geogr. de Hübner.* tom. vi. 190.

ſtowed on me was, *Prieſt, deliver thy money.* I gave them about four-and-twenty ſhillings in a little box, which they accepted with good will; but when they opened the box, and found only ſilver, they raiſed their tone of language, and demanded gold. I repreſented to them, that I was at ſome diſtance from my houſe, and that at preſent I could not poſſibly give them more. They were reaſonable enough to be contented with my anſwer, and left us, after having plundered the houſe, without offering us any inſult. There was a well-looking youth among the crowd, to whom my wife addreſſed herſelf, and beſought him in God's name to protect us: *My dear child,* ſaid he, *it is a thing impoſſible: we muſt purſue our enemies*; and ſo they retired.

"In that moment another party of ſoldiers ruſhed in, who demanded alſo our money. We contented them with ſeven ſhillings, and a couple of ſilver ſpoons, which the maid fortunately had concealed in her pocket. They were ſcarce gone, before a ſoldier entered alone, with the moſt furious countenance I ever ſaw. Each cheek was puffed out with a muſquet-ball, and he carried two muſquets on his ſhoulder. The moment he perceived me, he cried with a voice of thunder, *Prieſt, give thy money, or thou art dead.* As I had nothing to give him, I made my apology in the moſt affecting manner: he levelled a piece to ſhoot me, but my wife luckily turned it with her hand, and the ball paſſed over my head. At length, finding we had no money, he aſked for plate: my wife gave him ſome ſilver trinkets, and he went his way.

"A little after came four or five ſoldiers, who only ſaid, *Wicked prieſt, what doſt thou here?* Having ſaid thus much, they departed.

"We now reſolved to ſhelter ourſelves in the uppermoſt rooms of the houſe, hoping to be there leſs expoſed, and better concealed. We entered a chamber, that had ſeveral beds in it, and paſſed ſome time there in the moſt inſupportable agonies. Nothing was heard in the ſtreets but the diſcharge of muſquets, and the cries of expiring people: nor were the houſes much more quiet; every thing was burſt open, or cut to pieces. We were ſoon diſcovered in our retirement: a number of ſoldiers poured in, and one, who carried an hatchet, made an attempt to cleave my ſkull; but a companion hindered him, and ſaid, *Comrade, what are you doing? Don't you perceive that he is a clergyman!*

"When theſe were gone, a ſingle ſoldier came in, to whom my wife gave a crape handkerchief off her neck: upon which he retired without offering us any injury.—

He that followed was not ſo reaſonable; for, entering the chamber with his ſword drawn, he immediately diſcharged a blow on my head, ſaying, *Prieſt, give me thy money.* The ſtroke ſtunned me, the blood guſhed out in abundance, and frightened my wife and ſervant to that degree, that they both continued motionleſs. The barbarian turned round to my wife, aimed a blow at her, but it glanced fortunately on her gown, which happened to be lined with furs, and wounded her not. Amazed to ſee us ſo ſubmiſſive and patient, he looked at us fixedly for ſome moments. I laid hold of this interval to repreſent to him, that I was not in my own houſe, being come to the place where I was, to diſcharge my duty to a dying perſon; but if he would grant us quarter, and protect us to our home, I would then beſtow upon him all I had. *Agreed, prieſt,* ſaid he, *give me thy wealth, and I will give thee the watch-word: it is* Jeſu Maria; *pronounce that, and no one will hurt thee.* We went down ſtairs directly, highly contented to have found ſuch a protector. The ſtreet was covered with the dead and dying; their cries were enough to have pierced the hearts of the greateſt barbarians. We walked over the bodies, and when we arrived at the church of St. Catharine, met an officer of diſtinction on horſeback. This generous perſon ſoon diſcovered us, and ſeeing me covered with blood, ſaid to the perſon who conducted us, *Fellow ſoldier, fellow ſoldier, take care what you do to theſe perſons.* At the ſame time he ſaid to my wife; *Madam, is yonder houſe yours?* My wife having anſwered it was: *Well,* added he, *take hold of my ſtirrup, conduct me thither, and you ſhall have quarter.* Then turning to me, and making a ſign to the ſoldiers with his hand, he ſaid to me, *Gentlemen of Magdeburg, you yourſelves are the occaſion of this deſtruction; you might have acted otherwiſe.* The ſoldier, who had uſed me ill, took this opportunity to ſteal away. Upon entering my houſe, we found it filled with a multitude of plunderers, whom the officer (who was a colonel*) ordered away. He then ſaid he would take up his lodging with us, and having poſted two ſoldiers for a guard to us, left us with a promiſe to return forthwith. We gave, with great cheerfulneſs, a good breakfaſt to our ſentinels, who complimented us on the lucky fortune of falling into their colonel's hands; at the ſame time repreſenting to us, that their fellow-ſoldiers made a conſiderable booty, whilſt they continued inactive, merely as a ſafeguard to us, and

* He was only a lieutenant-colonel.

therefore

therefore beſeeching us to make them ſome equivalent more or leſs. Upon this I gave them four roſe-nobles, with which they were well contented, and ſhewed ſo much humanity, as to make us an offer to go and ſearch for any acquaintance, whom we deſired to place in ſafety with us. I told them I had one particular friend, who had eſcaped to the cathedral, as I conjectured; and promiſed them a good gratuity on his part, if they ſaved his life. One of them, accompanied by my ſervant-maid, went to the church, and called my friend often by name; but it was all in vain, no one anſwered, and we never heard mention of him from that period.

"Some moments after our colonel returned, and demanded, whether any perſon had offered us the leaſt incivility. After we had ſpoken well of the ſoldiers in this reſpect, he haſtened abroad to ſee, if there was any poſſibility to extinguiſh the fire, which had already ſeized great part of the city: he had hardly got into the ſtreet, when he returned with uncommon haſte, and ſaid, *Shew me the way out of town, for I ſee plainly we ſhall periſh in the flames, if we ſtay here a few minutes longer.* Upon this we threw the beſt of our goods and moveables into a vaulted cellar, covered the trap-door with earth, and made our eſcape. My wife took nothing with her but my gown; my maid ſeized a neighbour's infant-child by the hand, whom we found crying at his father's door, and led him away. We found it impoſſible to paſs through the gates of the town, which were all in a flame, and the ſtreets burnt with great fury on either ſide. In a word, the heat was ſo intenſe, that it was with difficulty we were able to breathe. Having made ſeveral unſucceſsful attempts, we determined at laſt to make our eſcape on the ſide of the town next the Elbe. The ſtreets were clogged with dead bodies, and the groans of the dying were inſupportable. The Walloons and Croatians attacked us every moment, but our generous colonel protected us from their fury. When we gained the baſtion, which ſtands on the banks of the Elbe, we deſcended by the ſcaling ladders, which the Imperaliſts had made uſe of in the aſſault, and arrived at length in the enemy's camp near Rottenſee, thoroughly fatigued, and extremely terrified.

"The colonel made us enter into his tent, and preſented us ſome refreſhments. That ceremony being over; *Well*, ſaid he, *having ſaved your lives, what return do you make me?* We told him, that for the preſent we had nothing

to

to beſtow, but that we would transfer to him all the money and plate that we had buried in the cellar, which was the whole of our worldly poſſeſſions. At this inſtant many Imperial officers came in, and one chanced to ſay to me, *Ego tibi condoleo, ego ſum addictus Fidei Auguſtanæ.* The depreſſed ſtate I found myſelf in, made me unable to give a proper reply to the condolences of a man, who carried arms againſt thoſe, whoſe religion he profeſſed, and whoſe hard fortune he pretended to deplore.

" Next day the colonel ſent one of his domeſtics with my maid-ſervant to ſearch for the treaſure we had buried in the cellar; but they returned without ſucceſs, becauſe, as the fire ſtill continued, they could not get near the trap-door. In the meanwhile the colonel made us his gueſts at his own table, and during our whole ſtay treated us not as priſoners, but as intimate friends.

" One day at dinner an officer of the company happened to ſay, *That our ſins were the cauſe of all the evil we ſuffered, and that God had made uſe of the catholic army to chaſtiſe us:* to whom my wife replied, that the obſervation perhaps was but too true: *However, take care,* continued ſhe, *leſt God in the end ſhould throw that very ſcourge into the flames.* This ſort of female prophecy was fulfilled ſoon afterwards on the ſelfſame Imperial army, which was almoſt totally deſtroyed at the battle of Leipſic*.

" At length I ventured one day to aſk our colonel to give us leave to depart; he complied immediately, upon condition we paid our ranſom. Next morning I ſent my maid into town to try, if there was any poſſibility of getting into the cellar. She was more fortunate that day, and returned with all our wealth.

" Having returned our thanks to our deliverer, he immediately ordered a paſſport to be prepared for us, with permiſſion to retire to whatever place we ſhould think proper, and made us a preſent of a crown to defray the expence of our journey. This brave Spaniard was colonel of the regiment of Savelli, and named Don Joſeph de Ainſa†.

I ſhall

* There is reaſon to think our Spaniſh officer was killed there, for many accounts reckon Savelli, in whoſe regiment he ſerved as lieutenant-colonel, among the dead; but Savelli in truth was then abſent, being gone to Vienna in order to be examined concerning the ſurrender of Damin. Thus the ſubſtitute might be confounded with the commander he repreſented.

† I find Don Joſeph de Ainſa only once mentioned in the thirty years wars, and that was in 1625, when Spinelli and he commanded a body of troops of 5000 men, and had a deſign to attack Mansfelt near Namur. The reader

I ſhall next give my readers the fiſherman's ſhort narrative verbatim, in its own natural caſt of expreſſion*.

" The tenth of May, early in the morning, at the time the regent or maſter of our ſchool was reading prayers, a report flew through the ſtreets, that the town was taken, which was confirmed by the ringing of the alarum bells. Our regent diſmiſſed us all in a moment, ſaying, *My dear children, haſten to your homes, and recommend yourſelves to the protection of God; for it is highly probable we ſhall meet no more except in heaven.* In an inſtant we all diſappeared, ſome one way, and ſome another way. For my own part, I took my courſe with ſpeed along the high ſtreet, and found, where the public ſtyllyards are, (and where the grand guard of the city was kept,) a conſiderable body of troops, with their ſwords drawn; and ſaw near them, and at a diſtance round them, a great number of ſoldiers ſtretched dead on the pavement. Terrified with ſo melancholy a ſight, I ſhaped my courſe down the ſtreet, called Pelican, with a view to conceal myſelf in my father's houſe; but had hardly advanced a few ſteps, before I fell in with a band of ſoldiers, who had that moment murdered a man, whom I ſaw weltering in his blood. This ſight ſhocked me to ſuch a degree, that I had not power to move forwards; but, ſheltering myſelf in an houſe oppoſite to the Pelican-inn, found a kind-ſpeaking aged man, who ſaid to me, *Child, why comeſt thou hither? Save thyſelf before the ſoldiers ſeize thee.* I was ſtrongly tempted to put his advice in practice; but in that moment a party of Croatians ruſhed in, and holding a ſabre to his throat, demanded his wealth. The old man immediately opened a coffer to them full of gold, and ſilver, and precious ſtones. They crammed their pockets with his riches; yet, as the coffer was not emptied, they filled a ſmall baſket with the part that remained, and then ſhot the poor old man through the head. I ſtole away

reader at this time of day may conſider our Spaniſh hero, as no ſuch example and pattern of generoſity; and may be ſurprized at the gratitude the good paſtor ſhews him in his narrative, and at the expreſſions of protector, deliverer, *&c.* as the ſaid officer, after all his courteſies, took from him the whole he poſſeſſed, if we except liberty and life. The ſtate of war, and the manners of that age, were greatly different from what has ſince been practiſed. The commanders then made no ceremony of living by their ſwords. Many of them conſidered conqueſt as matter of real right and property: but political œconomy, natural humanity, and public utility, not to mention the example of Guſtavus, ſoon changed theſe practices to a certain degree: yet room for amendment ſtill remained, and yet remains.

* *Angeli*; *Hiſt. de la Ville de Magdeburg*, 12°. 1714.

away behind them, hoping to ſeek a place of ſafety amongſt ſome empty caſks; and found there a young lady, perfectly handſome, who conjured me to remove, and make no mention of her. Anxiouſly reflecting where to diſpoſe of myſelf, the ſame Croatians ſurprized me again, and one of them ſaid, *Baſtardly dog, carry this baſket for us.* I took it up immediately, and followed them wherever they went. They entered ſeveral cellars, and rifled women, maidens, and all perſons, that fell in their hands, without remorſe. As we aſcended from one of theſe cellars, we ſaw, with aſtoniſhment, that the flames had ſeized the whole fore part of the houſe. We ruſhed through the fire, and ſaved ourſelves. In all probability, every ſoul was deſtroyed, that remained within doors. As to my father, mother, and relations, I never heard a ſyllable concerning them from that time to the preſent."

Thus ended the ſiege and ſtorming of Magdeburg. The aſſault may be looked upon as the moſt amazing and moſt bloody ſcene in modern hiſtory. Upon this occaſion it was ſaid of Tilly with great juſtice, that moſt generals, who have enjoyed uninterrupted proſperity in battle, become cruel and revengeful upon the firſt reverſe of fortune. Tilly, long before the ſtorming of Magdeburg, ſaw the die of fortune very inclinable to vary to his diſadvantage; his temper grew four and reſerved; his natural cheerfulneſs deſerted him. He beheld, with infinite regret, a young, vigilant, intrepid, and able adverſary, reſolved to make a trial of ſkill, in the ſight of all Europe, againſt an old man, who was obliged to ſee with other people's eyes, and commit the execution of the moſt important actions to inferior commanders: and, finally, what completed his unhappineſs was, his troops began to withdraw their confidence and obedience from him. Being glutted with rapine, and fleſhed with cruelty, like children over indulged in vices by a fond parent, they deſpiſed that lawful authority, which had a ſort of natural right to their ſervices. Cromwell's cruelty at Drogheda was not much inferior to that which was exerciſed at Magdeburg; and even Turenne's character will be for ever tarniſhed by the fatal irruption made by him into the Palatinate; in all which caſes one cannot help lamenting with the hiſtorian, *ne tanti facinoris immanitas aut non extitiſſe, aut non vindicata fuiſſe videatur.*

The ſiege of Magdeburg being over, which little ſucceſs on the Auſtrian ſide did not deter the ſtates of Holland from ſubſcribing

ſubſcribing 50,000 guilders a month to the uſe of Guſtavus*, all things fell into new confuſion between Brandenburg and Sweden: for the elector, much diſmayed at Tilly's ſucceſs, redemanded the fort of Spandau, the time ſtipulated being rendered void by the reduction of the aforeſaid city.

Spandau was a place of extreme conſequence both to Tilly and the King; ſince, to all human appearances, the poſſeſſion of it ſeemed to determine the fortune of theſe two contending warriors. His majeſty had in it his *own* garriſon, conſiſting only of 400 men, for fear his neighbours might think him too encroaching on one hand, or too diffident of their ſincerity on the other; and from the rights of convenience and urgent neceſſity, he might have kept it, and juſtified his conduct to the public. Leſs matter would have furniſhed a very plauſible manifeſto; and a timorous or unconſcientious perſon would have ſeized this opportunity at all hazards; eſpecially as the elector of Brandenburg was no leſs than brother-in-law to the king of Sweden. Guſtavus, determined to obſerve the ſtricteſt rules of honour, knew not how to purchaſe ſucceſs, though the fate of his army and his whole military character lay at ſtake, at the expence of his reputation and good faith. Conſidering likewiſe, that his garriſon had taken an oath to the elector, which he looked upon as matter of indiſpenſable obligation even in the emergencies of war, he, who had always the gift of deciding in an inſtant, ſent the elector word, by a trumpeter, with an air of anger and diſdain, for the mortification he felt was inexpreſſible, *That he was at full liberty to repoſſeſs Spandau; but that himſelf in perſon would make a viſit to Berlin; proteſting, in the ſame breath, that the effuſion of innocent blood ſhould not be laid to his charge.* At the heels of this meſſenger he diſpatched count Thurn with more ample orders, commanding him to tell the elector, *That the* neutrality between them was now underſtood to ceaſe: *and as whatever turned out to the* detriment *of Sweden and its allies, muſt conſequently prove* advantageous *to the houſe of Auſtria; of courſe the elector muſt excuſe him, if he ſeized paſſes, took towns, and quartered his troops according to his own convenience. He now made a declaration of* hoſtilities *in form, and allowed him only* three days *to return a definitive anſwer, without any regard to the future concurrence and co-operation of the court of Dreſden.*

The elector no ways reliſhed ſuch compendious methods of proceeding; but Tilly's removal into the foreſt of Hartz,

* *Hiſtorical and Authentic Relation*, &c. in Low Dutch, fol. part ii. 77.

which

which may be conſidered as an *indiſcretion*, with a view to terrify the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel, leſſened the terrors he had conceived of the houſe of Auſtria; ſo, as Arnheim happened to be then at Berlin, he beſought the favour of him, as to all appearance, though not in truth ſo, a diſintereſted perſon, and one well known to the public in the character of a dexterous negotiator, to undertake to mollify the king, and induce him to enter into ſome new agreement. Arnheim, who in fact was ſent to Berlin in order to *counterwork* the Swediſh meaſures, took poſt-horſes, and reached the king forthwith, but could obtain *no* conceſſions. His majeſty then, conformably to his plan, ſoon brought matters to a ſhort concluſion; for he marched directly to Berlin at the head of five troops of horſe, one thouſand commanded muſqueteers, and four field-pieces, thinking it moſt prudent not to make uſe of too much force and compulſion. The aſtoniſhed elector negotiated three days to very little purpoſe. At length his conſort* and the exiled mother of the elector Palatine, who had made Berlin her place of refuge, accompanied by ſome ladies of diſtinguiſhed quality, addreſſing themſelves a ſecond time to Guſtavus, ſoon made ſome impreſſion on his heart; and effected, partly by perſuaſion and partly by tears, what the men had in vain laboured to bring about. In conſequence of this application, Spandau was granted to the king during the continuance of the war, the gates of Cuſtrin were ordered to be open to him upon all demands, and the elector was obliged to pay the Swediſh army, a certain contribution, amounting to about £.3000. a month†, till articles of treaty could be completed in form. Soon afterwards the whole royal army croſſed the Spree, and encamped round Berlin‡. The new aſſignment of Spandau and Cuſtrin determined the king to paſs forwards into Saxony, inaſmuch as he poſſeſſed Spandau in reality, and Cuſtrin in effect; having full power to march ſouthwards, that being his private deſire, and little to fear in returning northwards, in caſe the elector of Saxony ſhould join Tilly, and reduce him to the neceſſity of retiring nearer towards the Baltic; it being then his intention to carry on a defenſive war in the duchies of Mechlenberg, Pomerania and Magdeburg.

* She was ſiſter to the unfortunate Frederic V. king of Bohemia and elector Palatine.

† *Arlâuibæi Arma Suecica*, p. 161.

‡ *Danckaertz's Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation, &c. publiſhed in Low Dutch*, 1642, folio, with fifty maps and plans, beſides heads.

Yet

Yet the king, in ſpite of his ſucceſſes, met with more difficulties and afflictions than one; for the peſtilence, which then raged violently in Berlin, made ſurprizing havock in his camp, which was near the city walls, inſomuch that ſome regiments loſt each of them thirty men in the courſe of a week. About this time the ſoldiers too began to grow inſolent and rapacious, being much elated with an uninterrupted ſeries of ſucceſs and proſperity, and took the liberty to plunder ſome Hamburg and Engliſh merchants of a conſiderable quantity of valuable effects, that were then carrying, as is moſt probable, to the enſuing fair at Leipſic. Upon this the king added eighteen new articles of a more ſevere nature to his military code*; and compelled his men to reſtore all the goods unembezzled, and in the ſtate they ſeized them. Struck with ſuch a high example of juſtice and humanity, the German traders were ſoon prevailed upon to lend his majeſty a ſum, then preciſely convenient for the purpoſes of the war, amounting to ſomething more than £.30,000. But the Engliſh merchants could *not* be induced to advance him a ſingle farthing. Nevertheleſs, out of reſpect to their brave countrymen, who then fought under the Swediſh enſigns, Guſtavus took the opportunity to acknowledge his gratitude, and made no difference between the merchants of London and thoſe of Hamburg†, &c.

Meanwhile the general Tilly, beſides removing into the foreſt of Hartz, had committed *another* overſight on the very day that Magdeburg was taken, which ſhews, that he wanted ſpirit to run a hazard, and procured likewiſe but indifferent intelligence. Not being ſure of maſtering the town, and fearing upon ſome falſe alarm, leſt Guſtavus ſhould unexpectedly approach him, he *deſtroyed the Deſſaubridge*, a paſs of great importance‡, laying acroſs the confluence of the Multa and the Elbe, and conſiſting of ſeveral fortifications; *that* on the Elbe ſide being extremely large and ſtrong. After his ſucceſs in ſtorming Magdeburg, he looked back with much affliction on this timid precaution‖, ſince it excluded him from obſtructing the conqueſts of the Swedes on the other ſide of that river, and debarred him from the opportunity of approaching to the aſſiſtance of the two fluctuating electors, namely, thoſe of Saxony and Brandenburg.

* They are preſerved in the *Armis Suecicis*, p. 96, &c.
† *Monro's Expeditions*, part ii. p. 45.
‡ Here Walſtein beat Erneſt count Mansfelt in 1626.
‖ *Pietro Pomo*; *Guerre di Germania*, lib. i. p. 22.

The

The Imperial general found himſelf ſufficiently exhauſted and fatigued with the ſiege of Magdeburg, which had thinned his army where the loſs is moſt conſiderably felt, good part of his *veteran* troops having been deſtroyed. He therefore judged it more convenient to omit ſieges of long duration for the future, and decamping from Magdeburg in the end of May, left 5000 men in the town by way of garriſon; and then directed his courſe, through the country of Hartz, taking Allenſleben* and Mansfelt in his way; and entering into conference with ſeveral deputies from the free towns and the elector of Saxony, proceeded onwards as far as Erfurt, where the magiſtracy formed ſome engagements with him. In his paſſage through the foreſt of Hartz, the peaſants, in order to be revenged for the cruelties exerciſed at Magdeburg, killed ſuch a number of diſperſed and ſtraggling ſoldiers, that the fields adjoining the road were ſtrewn with dead bodies; ſo that he loſt as many men in this march, as if he had engaged in a moderate battle†. At length he turned his thoughts to deviſe by what means he might alarm and terrify the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel, who had given ſome indications of bearing a ſecret good will to the Swediſh cauſe. He formed a ſcheme of entering that prince's territories ſword in hand; but a letter from Pappenheim, giving him an account of the king's progreſs on the banks of the Elbe, made him change his plan, and reflect ſeriouſly on the conduct of *another* potentate, of much greater importance in the Germanic ſyſtem than the *landgrave* could be. The letters he ſent to the elector of Saxony on the occaſion, ſeemed rather to put him on his guard than diſmay him; for that prince, merely on account of this letter, raiſed an army of 20,000 men, and placed Arnheim at their head. The troops were young, healthy and vigorous; they were well paid and well cloathed; but wanting the habit of valour, and deſtitute of experienced and good ſubaltern officers, they were hardly able at the battle of Leipſic to look in the face Tilly's hardy and experienced veterans, *whoſe cloaths*, as ſomebody has remarked, *were torn and dirty, but their muſquets always clean and bright.*

Tilly not being able, or not having means to gain over the elector of Saxony, only hurt himſelf and the catholic

* I fancy it muſt be read Alverſlaben, that town lying directly in his road on the banks of the river Bever. It muſt not be confounded with Aſcherleben in the principality of Halberſtadt.

† *Brief, but Authentic Relation*, in High Dutch, 4°.

league, by alarming him juſt enough to force him to adopt ſome ſalutary meaſures at ſo critical a juncture. Of this we have a manifeſt proof; for the elector by letter ſoon ſignified to the emperor, "That the *edict of reſtitution* deſerved well to be reviſed, before it was carried into full activity—That, by preceding capitulations and Imperial conſtitutions, the princes and ſtates of the Germanic body were not obliged to ſubſiſt and reinforce the emperor's armies—That the proteſtants at Leipſic had only formed an union in contradiſtinction to a prior league among the papiſts, with this difference, that the former propoſed to proceed *defenſively*, as the latter had determined to *act the part of aggreſſors*." The court of Vienna underſtood the import of this letter without an interpreter.

Meanwhile his majeſty, having been ſplendidly entertained in the electoral garden at Berlin, that evening being devoted to extraordinary rejoicings, and having appointed Horn, with an army of 10,000 men, to watch Schomberg's motions, and cover the conqueſts lately made on the frontiers of Sileſia, left Berlin at day-break, and making a ſpeedy viſit to Stetin, gave audience to Fedor Adreovitzki *, the Moſcovite ambaſſador, who coming from a barbarous part of the world, then leſs known than at preſent, aſtoniſhed the Swedes with half a dozen coaches and ſix, and a retinue of one hundred and fifty perſons extremely well dreſſed. In reſpect to his embaſſy, nothing can be pronounced diſtinctly. An offer was made of ſoldiers and money, and Guſtavus appeared highly delighted with it. The ambaſſador, however, died in the Auguſt following, and the whole propoſal and agreement vaniſhed into air †. With the ſame peſtilential fever, in the ſame month, died the beautiful and virtuous Chriſtina, wife to Guſtavus Horn, and daughter of the high-chancellor Oxenſtiern. She thought it her duty to attend her huſband in all his wars. Indeed they were a ſhining example of reciprocal conjugal happineſs and fidelity. She breathed her laſt breath in the arms of her conſort, yet he had the good fortune to eſcape the contagion; and though young, rich, accompliſhed, and handſome, never could bring himſelf to venture on a ſecond marriage. The body of the deceaſed was ſent to Sweden in a marble coffin.

As ſoon as the king had concluded his conference with the Moſcovite ambaſſador, and regaled him at an entertain-

* *Hiſtorical, but Authentic Relation*, tom. ii. p. 104.
† *Chemnitius*, lib. i. p. 143.

ment

ment full as magnificent as a ſoldier ought to give, or as the times would then admit, he haſtened with his uſual induſtry to the camp before Gripſwald, which town had been blockaded, ſome months, by Banier, and was the only city that remained to the emperor in all Pomerania. Peruſi, a colonel of Croatians, knight of the Golden Fleece, commanded in it. He was brave to a degree of gallantry, but the country hated him, for he had the misfortune to be miſerably avaricious. Nevertheleſs, his love of military fame always got the better of his paſſion for riches, eſpecially in competitions where the honour of a ſoldier was concerned. For this reaſon, though he had heaped up much wealth in the town, he ſhewed himſelf quite inflexible to ſurrender, having never once allowed that idea to enter into his thoughts. To relieve the exigencies of his garriſon in ſo long a blockade, he had coined tin money, with this inſcription, NECESSITAS GRYPHISWALDENSIS; and had opened ſome old ſalt ſprings, that were within the city walls, which proved of great uſe in preſerving proviſions for the garriſon. Beſides all this, he was an excellent military architect, and had fortified his town ſo well, that Guſtavus, no ill judge in thoſe matters, confeſſed himſelf greatly ſurprized, when he examined the works, having ſeen nothing amongſt his enemies contrived upon the ſame principle before.

Banier, who had been ſent hither to aſſiſt Todt, who formed the original blockade, wrote a civil letter to colonel Peruſi, inſinuating, that he had intereſt enough with the king his maſter to procure for him very ſoldier-like conditions, in caſe of a capitulation. He exhorted him not to ſacrifice a body of brave troops under his command; and repreſented to him the unchriſtian depopulations and cruelties, which he had exerciſed throughout the whole diſtrict that lies round Gripſwald*. Peruſi's anſwer was very laconic; That it was not convenient for him to leave the town ſo ſuddenly. If permiſſion were given him, he would conſult Tilly on the occaſion.

Some Swedes, well knowing the governor's appetite for fighting, right or wrong, preſented themſelves before the walls, and tempted him to make a very raſh and deſperate ſally, in the execution of which, according to the cuſtom of war at that time, he was drawn, by degrees, into an ambuſcade. He was imprudent enough, upon this occaſion, to wear his gold chain and *order* above his armour;

* This letter is preſerved in the *Armis Suecicis*, p. 107.

which in all probability coſt him his life, as every common ſoldier ſtrove to poſſeſs ſo valuable a booty; and hence moſt people conclude, that he believed his body, according to a report propagated concerning him in both armies, to have been rendered invulnerable by incantations and magical ſignatures*. Being a native of Italy, he gave more eaſily into theſe vain imaginations; for the Italian aſtrologers were greatly reſpected among the German troops, of which we have an uncommon example in Walſtein's practice, who undertook nothing of moment, till he had firſt conſulted Battiſta Seni, to whom he allowed a table, a coach and ſix horſes, and all the appointments of a general officer.

Though Peruſi had the misfortune to be drawn into an ambuſcade, accompanied by his *camerade*, a knight of Malta, who fell firſt, yet he died heroically, and fought, with his colours by him, to the laſt gaſp, though his Croatian cavalry, according to cuſtom, had deſerted him, and thrown themſelves into the river Rick, which divides the beautiful valley of Roſendal into two parts.

Peruſi's ſucceſſor, whoever he was, though, if I miſtake not, he was only a captain, named Dracklted, made a good ſhew of reſiſtance. Being required to ſurrender, he ſent word back, that the loſs of the late commander was merely perſonal, and that the honour and reſolution of the garriſon did not expire ſympathetically with him. Notwithſtanding, after ſome rencounters, not to mention a very furious ſally, which miſſed little of ſucceeding, he thought it prudent to capitulate, and marched out with more military diſtinctions than are uſually allowed in ſuch circumſtances, the Croatians, upon this occaſion, as the Swedes greatly wanted to poſſeſs Gripſwald, being permitted to *receive conditions*. As the eſcort, which conveyed the governor and his ſoldiers, was not ſtrong enough to preſcribe laws to him, for it conſiſted only of one hundred and fifty horſemen, he changed his mind on the road, and ſhaped his courſe to Havelburg, and not to Roſtock, the place agreed upon in the articles of ſurrender. By way of puniſhment for thus violating the laws of honour and good faith, colonel Hall thought it allowable to attack him,

* His body was ſuppoſed to be rendered ſhot-free by myſtical words and charms of magic, which the Germans elegantly call *gefrorn*, i. e. *frozen*. He bore the firſt muſquet-ball very well, but the ſecond killed him. Honeſt Lotichius, unwilling to give up the doctrine of incantations, pretends, that Peruſi was only *gefrorn* with reſpect to ſwords and pikes; for though the ball, ſaith he, tranſpierced his body, he expired without bleeding, and only groaned once or twice. *De Rebus German.* tom. i. 915.

eſpecially

eſpecially as Banier, under whom he then ſerved, had a particular deſire to ſecure Havelburg, which would help to protect the camp his maſter propoſed to fix at Werben. In this rencounter, a conſiderable number of the German garriſon, which was very numerous, loſt their lives, particularly Drackſted, who commanded them in chief; and about fifteen hundred ſoldiers ſubmitted to be diſarmed; of whom the greater part enrolled themſelves under the Swediſh enſigns. Thus the generality of writers relate the ſtory; but I have ſome doubts concerning its accuracy in one or two particulars, my private conjecture being, that the officer who commanded the eſcort, for Hall's action ſeems to be out of the queſtion, had committed ſome outrage, which induced the Imperial commander to think, that he might abſolve himſelf from making good the remaining part of the conditions. Had not the fact ſtood preciſely thus, it is not to be comprehended, why the king, though it is certain his mercy always kept pace with his valour, ſhould order general Todt to impriſon captain Smith, who commanded the eſcort, as alſo all the officers and ſoldiers who had been employed in that expedition, with this remarkably ſevere clauſe, that they were to be ſent to the royal camp either dead or alive! Yet after all this, a new doubt preſents itſelf, for it does not appear, that Smith or any of his ſoldiers were ever puniſhed. One hiſtorian * tells us, that private notice had been given them of their maſter's reſentment, and that they all abſconded till the king had forgotten his anger. He immediately ſummoned the imperial officers to appear before him, aſſuring them, that if any ſoldier belonging to their garriſon had entered into the Swediſh ſervice contrary to his real inclinations, he from that moment might conſider himſelf as *free*, and had leave to *depart without ranſom*; *but, gentlemen*, continued he, *if my men have injured you, your complaint muſt be lodged in* my *court-martial*; *for I alone am the legal and competent judge*; *and you muſt ſign a paper, as cavaliers of honour, not to traduce, even in private converſation, by the moſt diſtant inuendos, me, or my army in general, merely for the tranſgreſſion of orders in a few individuals.*

To leave the further diſcuſſion of this matter to more enlightened hiſtorians, for Chemnitius's † way of ſolving the difficulty gives me no content, as it is the aſſignation of *non cauſa pro cauſa*, except it relates to Smith, and not to Hall, the Swedes at length, by poſſeſſing Gripſwald, had

* *Chemnitius*, de Bello Suec. Germ. tom. i. p. 144. † Idem, ibidem.

rendered themſelves maſters of every inch of territory in the duchy of Pomerania; in conſequence whereof Guſtavus appointed a ſolemn thankſgiving to God throughout all his dominions *.

It was about this time, that his majeſty entertained freſh ſuſpicions of the king of Denmark, who ſent forth a fleet of twenty ſhips, under pretence of guarding his dominions from pirates and invaders: but Guſtavus aſked ſuch pertinent queſtions concerning the deſtination of this naval armament, that his Daniſh majeſty ſoon promiſed to be a true and faithful neighbour, in proportion as ſuch conduct was conſiſtent with the allegiance he owed the emperor. True it was, he hated Guſtavus, but then he dreaded him likewiſe: and the report of reinforcements from France, England, Sweden, and Holland, quite deterred him from purſuing the reſolutions, whatever they might be, which he had firſt conceived †.

Meanwhile John-Albert and Adolphus, the two diſpoſſeſſed dukes of Mechlenburg, who had lived the life of exiles at Lubec, did not remain idle; for neither they, nor their ſubjects, could perſuade themſelves to acquieſce with common patience under the inſolence of Walſtein.

Having gathered together a ſmall army, and united themſelves with colonel Todt, who by this time had given the finiſhing ſtroke to the reduction of Pomerania, they made themſelves maſters of ſeveral towns and fortreſſes. At length Guſtavus joined them, ſo that the new uſurper poſſeſſed nothing in their territories, except Wiſmar, Roſtock, and Dœmitz. At the ſame time it muſt be obſerved, that the two firſt of theſe places were the largeſt and faireſt towns in the duchy. Dœmitz indeed was only a ſmall fortreſs, but its ſituation was fortunate, and its importance great; for, beſides commanding the Elbe, juſt where the Elda falls into it, it was poſſible likewiſe to float the country all round, and convey private ſupplies into it by means of the firſt-mentioned river.

His Swediſh majeſty being arrived at Guſtrow, which journey he undertook merely to relieve the oppreſſed, applied himſelf in good earneſt to reinſtate the two proſcribed princes into their lawful dominions ‡. As that age loved pomp,

* *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, p. 105.

† *Loccenii Hiſt. Suecan.* lib. viii. 583.

‡ The emperor conferred this duchy on Walſtein, together with the duchy of Sagan, in Sileſia, as a fief, towards the latter end of the year 1628. The Imperial general ſoon made ſure of his inveſtiture, for he diſpatched immediately two lawyers, well-furniſhed with edicts and manifeſtos, and

pomp, the ceremony of their ſecond inauguration was more ſplendid and expenſive than one could have imagined in the midſt of a war. The clergy, the ſenators, and the nobility, the latter only amounting to the number of eight hundred, began the proceſſion; then ſucceeded the elder duke, attended by thirty-ſix halberdiers. To ſhew his humility, he that day wore a ſuit of black clothes. Next came the ſame number of trumpeters in different liveries. Then followed the king of Sweden on horſeback, dreſt in green, with a blue and white plume in his hat, attended by twenty-four running footmen, and eighteen horſe-ſoldiers. Him the junior duke of Mechlenburg marched after, accompanied by the prince of Denmark*, the dukes of Pomerania and Courland, the princes and princeſſes of the houſe of Mechlenburg, and two colonels. The ladies of quality and faſhion cloſed the proceſſion in one hundred and thirty coaches, guarded by a body of eighteen hundred horſemen, all well mounted and well cloathed. This cavalcade marched firſt to the great church, where divine ſervice was performed, and a ſermon preached on the following text, *They that ſow in tears, ſhall reap in joy:* Pſalm cxxvi. 5. Departing thence they ranged themſelves in the town-hall, where the great chancellor Oxenſtiern made his appearance, and exhorted all the ſubjects of the duchy to diſclaim Walſtein, and re-acknowledge their natural maſters; which requeſt was complied with univerſally and joyfully. Medals were thrown to the populace, having the heads of the two reigning princes on one ſide, and a pelican upon the reverſe, piercing two human breaſts with its beak, and feeding its young ones with ſtreams of blood. Guſtavus commanded expreſsly, that all parents ſhould explain the nature of this reſtoration to their children, that they might remember with tranſports of thankfulneſs, the reſtoration of their lawful maſters, of their religion, and of their liberty †.

His

and three favourite colonels, Aldringer, St. Julian, and Walmrode, to ſecure his poſſeſſion. The crime of theſe unfortunate princes was aſſiſting Chriſtian king of Denmark. In vain the elder brother made an offer of humiliating himſelf before the emperor. The court of Vienna had acquired an habitual deafneſs, and Walſtein, to ſay the leaſt of him, wanted to ſhine as a ſecond or third rate ſtar in the German hemiſphere.

* Ulric, third ſon of Chriſtian IV. He was killed afterwards with a piſtol-ball by Piccolomini's buffoon, as he came out of that general's tent, where he had been to confer upon buſineſs in behalf of the elector of Saxony, in whoſe army he ſerved as volunteer.

† *Arlanibæi Arma Suecica*, p. 167, &c.

His majeſty in the midſt of all theſe rejoicings had his eye conſtantly fixed on the tranſactions of the campaign, and having iſſued out orders for the blockade of Roſtock and Wiſmar, returned without delay to his ſeparate camps, at and near New Brandenburg. Thence colonel Bernard Oxenſtiern, a relation of the chancellor, was diſpatched, in a public character, to the French king at Lyons, being privately inſtructed to ſee the finiſhing hand given to the treaty of Berewalt, and to ſolicit the ſpeedy and punctual payment of the contingent ſubſcribed to the German war. This miniſter was received with great marks of eſteem at Lyons, and entertained at the public expence during his whole continuance there, though Curtius, the Imperial reſident, in conjunction with an agent ſent from Munich, tried to perplex him, and overturn his meaſures more than once; but all their efforts were unſucceſsful. At length being thoroughly baffled, they had the mortification to ſee all the promiſes on the part of France duly fulfilled; for Richelieu as yet had not conceived a jealouſy againſt Guſtavus, and Oxenſtiern returned with a conſiderable ſum of money, which the court of Verſailles had advanced for the ſupport of the proteſtant cauſe in Germany.

By the perſuaſion of Louis XIII. or in conſequence of his becoming reſponſible for others, the chevalier de Rache was diſpatched by Guſtavus to the republic of Venice; but the refined and ſelf-intereſted politicians of that government concluded, not unreaſonably, that the ſcene of war lay too far from them, to be looked upon as dangerous. They alledged likewiſe the inability of the ſtate to undertake campaigns, when the peſtilence had made ſuch ravages in all the dominions belonging to it; and diſcovered at the ſame time a determined unwillingneſs to engage in ſuch meaſures; inaſmuch as the peace of Italy, far from being matured, could be conſidered only in a progreſſive ſtate of ripening at a diſtance of time then uncertain.

In the meantime the emperor wrote to all the confederates, lately aſſembled at Leipſic *, requeſting them to diſband their troops, or all unite in one common alliance, to expel Guſtavus out of the empire. He entreated them likewiſe to grant the Imperial armies free paſſage, and ſupply them with proviſions, forage, and money: obſerving, that

* *Diet of Leipſic*, 4°. Lond. 1632. APPENDIX, Art. XX.

the

the former licentiouſneſs of his ſoldiers, ſuppoſing that allegation to be true, could not juſtify them in undertaking an avowed rebellion againſt him, who was their ſovereign, chieftain, and head; and that their real intention, though concealed under a cloud of pretexts, was literally and truly to elude the edict of reſtitution, and extort a new religious peace from the catholics. Then followed a mandate directed to all princes, magiſtrates, and commanders of note, enjoining them to iſſue out no freſh commiſſions for the enliſting of ſoldiers; but, on the contrary, to deny paſſage and quarters to ſuch as had been lately levied, abſolving them, by his own plenitude of power, from the military oath they had taken to Guſtavus and his allies*. The catholic electors wrote one and all to the ſame effect, and conjured the new aſſociators not to puſh matters to the extremities of a rebellion.

Theſe ſort of anodynes were not ſufficient to compoſe the uneaſineſſes among the proteſtants: on the contrary, they conſidered them as the effects of timidity and deſpondence in the emperor. The people of Miſnia, Franconia, and Suabia levied troops with freſh vigour; and the free towns, where manufactures, trade, and arts, flouriſhed, exerted themſelves with a degree of zeal ſtill more diſtinguiſhable. Nettled at ſuch obſtinacy, the emperor now began to loſe his temper, and ordered Furſtenberg, at the head of the army lately arrived from Mantua, to march directly into the territories of the more zealous proteſtants, and deſtroy all before him with fire and ſword. That commander fulfilled his inſtructions to a tittle, and ſoon obliged the towns of Memmingen, Kempten, and Ulm, the inhabitants of Franconia, and even the duke of Wirtemberg, to renounce the *concluſions* of Leipſic; but as theſe ſubmiſſions proceeded from fear and compulſion, rather than from a ſenſe of obligation and obedience, they immediately revoked all their promiſes upon receiving the account of Tilly's defeat in Saxony.

Here perhaps, without being thought to violate the dignity of hiſtory, it may be allowable to introduce the recital of a ridiculous accident, that happened at Hildeſheim, which the Imperialiſts, who were then ſuperſtitious to a ſurprizing degree, interpreted in a manner very inauſpicious

* A ſecond edict was publiſhed afterwards to abſolve all feudatory perſons from complying with the commands of their reſpective ſovereigns, inaſmuch as the emperor only was *ſupremus feudorum dominus*.

to

to their cauſe. Moſt people know the low taſte of the German drama. The jeſuits college in this city acted a farce, where two hobby-horſe men repreſented Guſtavus and Tilly. The latter gave the former very ill language, and reproached him for preſuming to have any thing to do with the Holy Roman Empire. Words, according to the poet's plan, ſoon came to action and blows; piſtols, loaded with powder only, were reciprocally diſcharged. Unluckily, and againſt the intention of the dramatiſts, he that perſonated Guſtavus was the better cavalier, and more valorous combatant, for in the heat of his theatrical fury he gave Tilly a violent blow, and unhorſed him. Upon this the houſe broke up in diſorder, and every ſpectator returned diſſatisfied home; fearing *ſomething* that might prove as diſtaſtrous as the battle of Leipſic*.

Some authors tell a ſimilar ſtory with additional circumſtances, varying the year wherein the event happened, and laying the ſcene at the town of Cham in Lower Bavaria. It was permitted the children, ſay they, by the burgomaſter, to enrol themſelves into two mock armies, each boy being left at full liberty to enliſt himſelf under the Imperial or Swediſh enſigns; and as the town was entirely in the Bavarian intereſts, the *Pſeudo-Tilly*, ſon to the chief magiſtrate, ſoon collected one hundred and fifty well-looking followers, whereas the *mock Guſtavus*, who had been forced to take the name by drawing lots, could gather together no more than thirty combatants, of ſmaller ſtature, and mean appearance. But the perſonated king copied his original in the very ſhining part of excellency; for having well intrenched his companions in a field adjoining the city, he invited the enemy by ſound of trumpet to force his lines. The prieſts gave a bleſſing to the Tillian party as they marched from the town, and exhorted them to acquit themſelves like warriors of ſpirit. After repulſe upon repulſe, they ſtill perſevered to lead the children on, till at length the whole corps diſunited, and the unconquerable Tilly became a priſoner. On this the young Guſtavus commanded his hands to be bound, and having led him to the houſe of his father, refuſed to deliver him without a ranſom†.

By this time his majeſty began to open his grand project of advancing ſouthwards, and having united, into one army, his ſeveral little camps around Brandenburg, ſhaped his courſe towards Saxony, carefully ſecuring his progreſs as he

* *Arlanibæi Arma Suecica*, p. 175.

† *Theatr. Europæ*, p. 518, &c. by *Mat. Marian.*

went

went along. On this account, with a view to procure more certain intelligence of the enemy's motions, he firſt explored the country at the head of all his cavalry and one thouſand commanded muſqueteers, as far as the monaſtery of Jericho, and then to the bridge of Magdeburg city, into which place he forced Pappenheim to retreat for ſhelter. Finding no ſigns of being much moleſted from thoſe parts, he left Oxenſtiern behind him with one army in Pruſſia, and Horn with another in Sileſia, and, fording the Elbe, took the town of Tangermund, a place of great importance to him, by fixing a petard to one of the gates. Upon this event the garriſon lay at the mercy of the aſſailants, and ſuch as ſurvived, about threeſcore in number, threw themſelves in a crowd round Guſtavus, for the Swediſh ſoldiers could not yet forget the ſlaughter at Magdeburg, and begged for quarter: which the king granted them in a moment, obſerving at the ſame time, *That he ſhould not preſume to counterwork God's providence, which had preſerved them from the rage of his ſoldiers by a ſort of miracle**. He then flung a bridge of boats over the Elbe, for the convenience of paſſing his infantry; but ordered his cavalry and artillery to go through the river. The bare recital of this act of intrepidity, for nothing was loſt, but here and there an empty waggon, amazed Tilly beyond meaſure, as the ſtream in that part was not ſuppoſed to be fordable.

The king, who loved great ſtrokes in the military way, here conceived the idea of aſtoniſhing Europe by retaking Magdeburg†, and the rather, as it was thinly garriſoned, and the fortifications had not been thoroughly repaired ſince the late diſaſter. The town likewiſe ſtood conveniently for him, as it afforded an excellent paſſage acroſs the Elbe, which half determined a campaign in that age, circumſtanced as his majeſty then was: and there was ſomething of the illuſtrious and magnificent in the very action itſelf. But ſerious and mature reflexion ſoon threw a gloom over theſe dazzling appearances; for in the town was Pappenheim, whom Guſtavus conſidered a ſecond garriſon, though it conſiſted only of one man;

*——— concurrere bellum,*
*Atque virum ———:*

Nor was Tilly far off. He laid encamped at Mulhauſen. What he feared moſt, was allowing the elector of Saxony

* *Heylmanni Leo Arctoüs*, p. 30.
† *Chemnit.* de Bello Suec. Germ. tom. i. p. 147.

time

time to indulge his private diſinclination to the Swediſh cauſe, as alſo his natural timidity and inconſtancy. Therefore, making a ſacrifice all at once of his ambition, he preferred convenience to glory, and progreſſive ſecurity to fortunate rapidity; which is the more to be wondered at, as the natural turn of his temper was haſty and enterpriſing.

Upon this preſent plan the poſſeſſion of Havelburg and Werben were conſidered two excellent preliminary ſteps: for, being encamped at or near one of thoſe towns, the latter indeed was his object, as it was almoſt upon the angle of the Elbe and the Havel where they join, his back being guarded by both thoſe rivers, he had the command of the archbiſhopric of Magdeburg, and the Old Marche in front, and on his right hand; and his left ſide was protected by the Havel, which run through a friendly country, namely, the Middle Marche. By means of this river, he had power to convey down the ſtream what proviſions and forage he thought neceſſary for the ſubſiſtence of his troops. He was environed likewiſe by rich and plentiful towns: and, what was ſtill more, the poſt he had choſen was ſo protected by nature, that though the Imperialiſts had two armies, one on his right hand in Thuringia, and one on his left hand in Sileſia, he feared neither, inaſmuch as it was in his power to diſpute the paſſage of the rivers, before any great action could be brought on.

In order to ſecure himſelf in this deſirable ſituation, he commanded Banier to take Havelburg by aſſault, ſince by poſſeſſing that place he became maſter of the Havel on the eaſtern ſide, having already ſecured the weſtern banks of that river as far upwards as Spandau. The attack was made, ſword in hand, at day-break, and Winkel's blue brigade of infantry not liking the enemy's fire at a diſtance, croſſed the river with aſtoniſhing reſolution, though the water reached up to the men's ſhoulders. The action was briſk on both ſides whilſt it laſted. Four hundred and forty of the garriſon were taken priſoners. Colonel Cag, who had under him his own regiment, and Fowle's regiment of Scots, was appointed governor. Why Pappenheim left Havelburg a few days before, cannot be accounted for, except he conſidered it indefenſible, at leaſt as matters were then circumſtanced.

Havelburg being thus ſecured, his majeſty, according to his original plan, employed two good officers, Bauditzen and count Ortemberg, to take the town of Werben ſword in hand. They carried their point, after having met with a very obſtinate reſiſtance, killing and making priſoners two hundred

dred horſemen belonging to the regiment of Munichhauſen. As the diſpute had continued long, and the weather proved then extremely warm, it being the laſt day of June, theſe two officers had a fancy to bathe in the Elbe, and then crowned the performance with a debauch in Baccharah wine. Of courſe they both fell into violent fevers; the former eſcaped by the ſkill of his phyſician, or ſtrength of conſtitution; but the latter expired ſoon afterwards at Berlin, to the great regret of Guſtavus, who loved him extremely, as well for his abilities in the cabinet, as for his courageous and enterpriſing diſpoſition. He commanded the royal regiment of foot-guards.

By this time the Imperial general found himſelf forced to give ſome check, if poſſible, to the progreſs made by Guſtavus on the banks of the Elbe, and having dropped his enterpriſe againſt the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, advanced as far as Wolmerſtadt, a ſmall town ten miles north-weſt of Magdeburg, and about forty miles from the Swediſh camp. The van-guard of his army, conſiſting of four choſen regiments *, the very flower of the Imperial cavalry, had advanced a conſiderable way before their general, which Guſtavus being apprized of, immediately conceived the thought of attacking them in an evening or two, for he never failed of procuring the beſt intelligence. For this purpoſe he ordered two thouſand five hundred choſen troops, horſe, dragoons, and muſqueteers, to aſſemble at Arnſberg in the Old Marche, and at nine at night joined them privately, and conducted them to a village four miles beyond Tangermund. Nevertheleſs, whatever ſecrecy this expedition might require, as the next day proved to be *Sunday*, and the enemy's advanced troops happened to be ſtationed at ſixteen miles diſtance, the king choſe to lie by privately, and ſet apart a certain number of hours for his devotions; diſpatching the watch-maſter general of the army with the royal regiment of horſe-guards to procure intelligence.—This officer returned about five in the evening with ſeveral priſoners, who gave information, that the Imperialiſts had taken up their quarters within the diſtance of two hours eaſy march.

They were conducted by colonel Bernſtein, a brave and enterpriſing commander, who took up his lodgings at three different villages, at a ſlight diſtance one from the other: and as theſe places chanced to be upon a line, the Swediſh party divided itſelf into three bodies, with the intention

* Pappenheim, Montecucu'i, Holk, and Coronini.

to

to cut off all communication between the Imperial regiments at the right and left, the very inſtant the attack was begun.

At the point of time agreed, one body of Swedes made a furious onſet on the regiment of Montecuculi *, which was partly routed and partly cut to pieces, before the men could mount, and range themſelves in any tolerable order. But as no concerted attacks can well commence at a preciſe moment, Bernſtein heard the exploſion of the firſt fire-arms, and having cauſed his men to mount immediately, made a judicious diſpoſition of the better half of them, and at the head of one troop of his cavalry, marched to the entrance of the village, and gallantly received the enemy; but the impreſſion was ſo violent, the Swediſh troops being prepared and freſh, and Bernſtein's men both hurried and fatigued, that after a very briſk and obſtinate diſpute, the latter ſoon broke and began to ſhift for themſelves. The chance of eſcaping under favour of darkneſs is a great temptation to ſoldiers thus attacked, to behave themſelves *ill*; eſpecially when in ſuch confuſion it is hardly poſſible to diſtinguiſh particular offenders; conſequently the advantage is at leaſt two to one in behalf of the aſſailants, who have fixed their reſolution and advance like determined men. Be that as it will, Bernſtein ſtayed till the very laſt man, and was killed probably without being known. In him periſhed a family, for he had no kindred. He was an officer of approved ſervice, or otherwiſe Pappenheim would not have allowed him to have conducted his regiment of cuiraſſiers, and a body of troops, that belonged to his *own* ſeparate army.

Meanwhile Holk † made a reſiſtance, which appears incredible; for during the other attacks he had ſome leiſure minutes to draw out his men. He received the Rhingrave

* The count de Montecuculi, who belonged to this regiment, was the uncle of him who ſerved againſt Turenne. He was not preſent in the action.

† Holk (Henry) ſerved the king of Denmark as governor of Stralſund, but on ſome diſguſt accepted of a regiment of infantry under Walſtein. It was thought matter of levity in him to eſpouſe a young wife, at the time when the town he defended was reduced to the utmoſt danger. He gained immenſe wealth in the plunder of Leipſic. As to his religion, he changed it twice; for on his death-bed, being ſeized with the plague, he declared himſelf a proteſtant, and diſpatching round the country ſeveral troops of horſe, offered 100l. for the charitable aſſiſtance of a Lutheran miniſter in his laſt hours; but he had committed ſuch outrages, that no eccleſiaſtic would come near him till it was too late; and though he was at the head of an army of 20,000 men, all his officers and domeſtics deſerted him, excepting a young woman, whom ſome ſuppoſed to be his miſtreſs. In the Imperial patent, by virtue of which he was created a count, his name is ſpelt Holka.

with

with firmneſs: and diſputed the honour of the field inch by inch. In this rough engagement he had the misfortune to loſe two pair of colours, on one of which was painted the goddeſs *Fortune*, and the word AUDACTER inſcribed beneath; the other was ſtill more elegant, and more particular, both as to its emblem and motto; for a *ſerpent* writhed in ſpires rolled itſelf round a *drawn ſword*, alluding to the wiſdom of the animal, and the bravery which the weapon implied, and the device was, HIS DUCIBUS, SITIS IMPERTERRITI.

His majeſty, for fear the ſoldiers might quit their ranks in queſt of plunder, gave private orders to ſet the villages on fire: for if the men had deſerted their ſtation in hopes of booty, a detachment from the enemy's camp, part of which lay hard by, might have robbed the Swedes of a conſiderable victory. Much plate was found, and a private ſoldier ſeized one thouſand pounds in Hungarian ducats. Abundance of excellent horſes fell likewiſe into the hands of the conquerors *.

His majeſty commanded perſonally in this engagement, but where or how far cannot be learned. Nevertheleſs, as the poſt of importance was the attack of the middle village, and cutting off the communication, it is natural to think, that he fell upon Bernſtein's quarters †. He was extremely affected at the death of Charles, prince Palatine of Lautrech ‡, his own ſiſter's ſon, who received two piſtol-balls in that obſtinate reſiſtance which Holk made. He fought at the head of the Rhingrave's regiment, and a few moments before his death killed a cornet of the enemy hand to hand; but the cornet's *camerade*, as moſt officers in that age had a gentleman volunteer, who ſerved with them under *that* title, ſoon revenged his friend, according to the manner above related. His corpſe was carried to Stetin, where the queen of Sweden, of whoſe arrival in the empire we ſhall ſpeak immediately, thought fit to honour it with a magnificent funeral.

It muſt be obſerved, that this victory at Rheindorf or Angern, ſuch being the names of the principal villages where the Imperialiſts lay, was chiefly gained by the means of muſqueteers *intermingled with the cavalry*; and by the aſſiſtance

* *Arlanibæi Arma Suecica*, p. 173.

† Since writing this paſſage, I find my conjecture verified. Rex cum ſuis, in Rheindorfium, Bernſteinianæ legionis hoſpitium, impegit, &c. *Loticbius*, tom. i. 720.

‡ That branch of the Palatine family became extinct in the year 1694. It had three little poſſeſſions, the duchy of Veldentz, the town of Lautrech, which now belongs to the elector Palatine, and the county of Lutzelſtein; at preſent divided between the houſes of Birckenfeld and Sultzbach.

of

of ſmall parties of them, who filled up the avenues, where horſemen could not well be ſtationed. Fifteen hundred men were killed, and twenty-eight colours taken, Tilly being advanced almoſt within hearing the diſcharge of the fire-arms; which mortified him not a little.

This action, not to mention its gallantry, did the king great ſervice. It aſtoniſhed the Imperialiſts to ſuch a degree, that he gained four days to make additions to the intrenchments and fortifications round his camp at Werben; for which labour he was afterwards repaid with abundant intereſt. He procured opportunity likewiſe to draft all the neighbouring garriſons, and ſummon to his aſſiſtance ſeveral ſcattered regiments that were near him; ſo that in truth, and thus it often happens in the conduct of great generals, the *little* action at Rheindorf facilitated the prudent *encampment* made at Werben, and both together *paved the way* to that more important deciſion, which happened at Leipſic, and completed the operations of the year 1631. All good campaigns, if rightly and thoroughly conſidered, are nothing leſs than one continued ſeries of judicious cauſes, and fortunate effects *.

One cannot ſufficiently admire the king's great military judgment, in fixing his camp preciſely on that ſpot he had long wiſhed to occupy. Having thrown a bridge of boats over the Elbe, he had it in his power at one and the ſame time to attack either the Imperialiſts, or the elector of Saxony, who could not well conclude a treaty at ſuch a diſtance and under ſuch circumſtances; nor could Tilly advance without giving Guſtavus the *choice* of a battle. I have before obſerved, that the camp of Werben could not eaſily be diſtreſſed for want of proviſions and forage, and ſhall remark here, that it had two of the beſt *natural* foſſés behind it, that a general could wiſh for, namely, the Elbe, and the Havel. Theſe rivers likewiſe protected its flanks. As to the front, it was guarded one part in three by the town of Werben, which was fortified; ſo that a ſmall tract of ground only required the aſſiſtance of art, and that the king ſtrengthened by deep intrenchments, diſpoſing large batteries of cannon here and there. In this ſituation he commanded not only

* I remember in my youth to have heard the great earl of Peterborough make a very lively compariſon upon the occaſion: "Pope," ſaid he, for Mr. Pope was then ſitting at table, "always fixes firſt on the laſt rhyme of his couplet, and the general caſt of the ſecond line: and thus," continued he, "a good commander, at the very dawning of a campaign, ſhould prefigure to himſelf by what action he propoſes to conclude it; for the laſt ſtroke always reckons for ſomething in the year enſuing."

the

the Elbe and the Havel, but had an eye likewiſe to the Oder and the Warta; and, at the ſame time, the whole electorate of Brandenburg laid directly under his protection*.

During theſe occurrences, Maria Eleonora, queen of Sweden †, like a conſort worthy of the hero ſhe had eſpouſed, left the pleaſures of the court of Stockholm, in order to alleviate the fatigue and cares of her huſband, and brought with her a reinforcement of 8000 men, half of whom joined the grand army, and the other half were employed in the ſervice of the dukes of Mechlenburg, with a view to facilitate the conqueſts of Roſtock and Wiſmar. This lady, who was a pattern of conjugal affection, had her ſhare likewiſe of reſolution and magnanimity: for inſtantly on her embarkation from Sweden, one large ſhip, ſurnamed the VASA, laden with heavy artillery and military ſtores, in a day entirely calm, at about two miles diſtance from ſhore, ſunk directly to the bottom, without any previous warning, and never ſtriking upon ſhelf or rock. The ſudden unaccountable loſs of a veſſel, that bore ſuch an illuſtrious family name, might have terrified a poor woman, eſpecially in an age ſo unfortunately ingenious in expounding omens and prodigies; but the queen heroically purſued her courſe; nor did ſhe balance a moment between female fears, and the aſſiſtance due to her great Guſtavus ‡.

On her arrival at Wolgaſt, where ſhe made ſome ſhort ſtay, for the duke of Pomerania had ſent his deputies to ſee her well entertained, and her huſband had taken care that a palace ſhould be fitted up for her reception, ſhe was agreeably ſurprized with the celebration of a public thankſgiving throughout all Pomerania, on account that it was the day *twelvemonth* after Guſtavus landed in Germany. By way of counter check for the ſatisfaction ſhe felt, her tenderneſs was alarmed and put to the trial; having been indiſcreetly told by ſome of her courtiers, that a jeſuit, diſguiſed in the habit of a cavalier, had been diſcovered by Bauditzen: and that he had three more companions of his order with him, who probably had a deſign to aſſaſſinate the king.

Meanwhile Tilly, touched to the heart with the late diſgrace his troops had received at Angern, wiſhed to repay the Swedes in like manner; as he found himſelf ſtill at the head of 24,000 ſoldiers, who breathed nothing but

* *Loccenii Hiſt. Suecan.* lib. viii. p. 582.

† Daughter of John Sigiſmond, elector of Brandenburg. She ſurvived her huſband three and twenty years.

‡ *Schefferi* Memorab. Suec. Gentis, p. 21, 22.

revenge and fury. It was time likewiſe to perform ſomething brilliant; all Europe expected an action of this nature, and his very ſoldiers demanded it. In addition to this it muſt be obſerved, that Pappenheim had perſuaded him to cruſh the king of Sweden firſt, and then reduce the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel to reaſon at ſome more convenient opportunity. He therefore marched his army in full battle-array up to the Swediſh lines, and made his enemy the offer of an engagement upon equal terms. The king, who never tranſgreſſed military prudence, when the welfare of the ſyſtem was concerned, and who huſbanded the lives of his officers and ſoldiers, though he dealt freely enough with his own perſon, choſe rather to confide in his intrenchments, and gave Tilly the choice of running, if he pleaſed, upon his own deſtruction; which he hoped might happen from the extraordinary ardour of Pappenheim. Beſides, his grand object was, firſt to fix a firm alliance with the two *proteſtant* electors, and then give battle whenever a favourable opportunity preſented itſelf. What he thus wiſely foreſaw, was very ſoon brought to paſs. Tilly being determined to make one trial of ſkill, led his troops up to the front of the king's camp at Werben, which, according to a plan * I have ſeen of it, was completely fortified by art and nature, being ſomething in the ſhape of a bow, protected on the ſtraight ſide by the town of Werben, which had walls and outworks, as alſo by ſtrong redoubts and ditches; and guarded on the elliptical part by the river Elbe, and part of the Havel.

When Tilly brought his greater artillery to act, the cannonading was deſperate on both ſides. From one battery of thirty-two pieces, he raked the king's camp in ſuch a manner, that the major part of the troops was obliged to draw up in order of battle behind the walls of Werben. The king, who could only oppoſe the Imperialiſts with half the number of forces that they had, for his whole army amounted to little more than 12,000 men, never loſt his vivacity and preſence of mind for a ſingle moment; nor did he call in his advanced guards of cavalry and muſketeers, relieving them only at proper diſtances of time, and giving each and all the officers at parting theſe particular inſtructions, namely, to retreat inch by inch, in caſe the Imperialiſts ſhould overpower

* One thing is remarkable in this plan; the king's tent was erected in a large area, defended with a ditch and parapet, almoſt in the center of his camp. Some general officers had their tents likewiſe in the ſame encloſure; but whether this was his majeſty's conſtant practice I cannot ſay.

them

them by numbers, but never to turn their backs to the enemy.

Wearied out and chagrined with indecisive skirmishes, Tilly at length determined to force the king's lines: and though this general had dealt too long in realities to rely greatly upon visionary expectancies, yet on this occasion he had amused himself with the hope of corrupting some peasants to nail the Swedish cannon, and set fire to their camp in various places, just before the grand attack should begin. It was not easy, even by the most clandestine correspondence, to frustrate the vigilance of Gustavus, who upon this and all occasions had the presence of mind to turn to his own advantage those very incidents, that were calculated to distress him; for having discovered both the conspiracy and the conspirators, one of them, from what motive I know not, making full confession of the fact, he ordered fires to be kindled in various parts of his camp, and instructed the rabble of the army to imitate confusion, and make horrid noises. What is more remarkable, he imparted the discovery of this treachery to no one of his generals *, but allowed his assailants to approach the very mouth of his cannon, without returning any fire excepting that of his musqueteers. Then, in an instant, broke forth a terrible discharge of grape shot; the consequences of which, far from being described, cannot well be imagined. It is true, the Imperialists advanced with determined resolution, and an air of confidence; but after this unexpected reception, it was impossible for their commanders to restore the ranks, or bring the men on to action a second time. In this scene of confusion and slaughter, some Swedish troops, conducted by Bauditzen and the Rhingrave, passed the lines, and fell upon the enemy's rear with great resolution; but Tilly, with equal bravery and capacity, made his soldiers halt, and having brought his artillery to act, soon convinced the assailants, that every *retreat* was not a *flight*. Thus for once he escaped a disgrace, which might have proved as mortifying as that which befel him afterwards on the plains of Leipsic. The conflict was extremely sharp and obstinate. Bauditzen, in the transports of courage, mixed so far among the enemy's troops without reflexion, that at length he was taken prisoner by two horsemen; but young Wildesein, a youth of quality, for in point of years he hardly merited the name of a man, who served under him in the capacity of a volunteer, soon rescued his general, who fought

* *Mercure François*, tom. xvii. 170.

his way back with unparalleled reſolution; and having killed an Imperial commander of note, brought little more than the haft of his ſword out of his body. His good fortune, all things conſidered, was very particular, for he eſcaped without a wound; yet two balls carried away the pommel of his ſaddle, and the rowel of one of his ſpurs, and his horſe was ſhot in four places. Here Bernard, duke of Saxe Weimar*, gave

* This gallant prince inherited an irreconcileable hatred to the houſe of Auſtria, being deſcended from *that* elector of Saxony, who was taken priſoner at the battle of Muhlberg, and deprived of his electorate and the greater part of his other poſſeſſions. He was the youngeſt of eleven brothers, who all, except ſuch as died young, carried arms againſt the emperor. His mother, Dorothea, daughter of the prince of Anhalt, was left a widow in his infancy, yet gave him, and all her children, a moſt accompliſhed education. His laſt action, the ſiege of Briſac, may be conſidered as one of the fineſt military performances of that age; for he won four pitched battles, whilſt he inveſted the town; and ſent the four Imperial generals, namely, John de Wert, the duke Savelli, Furſtenberg, and Sperreuter, priſoners into France. In the laſt of theſe engagements, he was obliged to mount ſix different horſes; and one being dazzled with a piſtol, that was fired cloſe to his eyes, reared up and fell backwards upon his rider; but the troops formed themſelves round their general to ſuch a degree, that it was impoſſible for the enemy to take him priſoner. Afterwards, John de Wert and he ſingled out each other, and maintained a combat hand to hand with ſo much bravery and obſtinacy, that the troops for a ſhort time pauſed, as it were, by conſent, to obſerve the behaviour of two ſuch diſtinguiſhed warriors.

When he took Briſac, and choſe not to convey it by way of *depoſitum* into French hands, his anſwer to Richelieu was very noble: *Aſk a virgin to make a ſacrifice of her chaſtity?* Upon this, the cardinal loſt all patience, and obſerved decorum no longer. One remonſtrated againſt the advancement of money, and one urged the *quantum meruit* of the performance. Great propoſals were made the duke, if he would come to Paris; but he ſaw the net that was ſpread for him, and peremptorily refuſed to undertake the journey. He knew the court of Verſailles, and that court had known him before this period; for he did not chuſe, in the year 1636, to give precedency to Richelieu: and when he had his audience from the king, well conſidering what honours were due to his birth, as prince of the houſe of Saxony, and ſuppoſed to deſcend, by the Miſnian branch, from the race Imperial, he thought proper to rank himſelf on the ſame footing, upon which the French had lately placed the duke of Parma. (*Memoires touchant les Ambaſſadeurs*, tom. i. p. 122.) This event was foreſeen and dreaded; but the miniſtry did not care to ſound his ſentiments upon that topic, for fear of ſuggeſting an idea to him, which perhaps had not then found entrance into his imagination. Truſting therefore to pure chance, they thought it ſafeſt to allow him admiſſion without any previous diſcuſſion of difficulties. Of courſe, the moment the king covered himſelf, he, with great compoſure, put on his hat. The court was ſtruck dumb with aſtoniſhment; but there was no room at that time for open reſentment, ſince France more needed the duke's aſſiſtance, than the duke wanted her's.

Upon occaſions of a like nature, there were ſome miſunderſtandings too between him and Oxenſtiern, to whom, after the king's death, he gave the lead with great reluctance; and it was in conſequence of that unfortunate competition, that he threw himſelf into the arms of France.

This

gave the firſt diſtinguiſhing marks of that military genius, which procured him afterwards the ſurname of *ſucceſſor to the great Guſtavus*. He had one horſe killed under him with a cannon-ball, and mounting a ſecond was forced to quit him, for the horſe was wounded whilſt the duke was mounting him. The king, who had the quickeſt eye to diſcover merit, of any prince or general upon earth, gave *him* orders immediately to raiſe three regiments, and repair to the aſſiſtance of the landgrave of Heſſe; yet gently reprimanded both him and Bauditzen, partly for acting without orders, and partly for expoſing their perſons with too much confidence. Happy, could he have *practiſed* himſelf what he *taught* others with ſo much affection, and ſuch great clearneſs of reaſon!

Tilly now began to feel the manifeſt ſuperiority of Guſtavus, and diſcovered at length, that it was equally in *his* power, I will not ſay in his choice, to act the offenſive or defenſive part; being compoſed and phlegmatic, warm and active, juſt as *ſuch conduct* beſt agreed with his ſituation. He learned moreover, by bitter experience, after having ſerved upwards

This heroic prince died in 1639, in the thirty-ſixth year of his age, having waged war againſt the emperor juſt half that time. Upon the approach of death he made his will, performed all the duties of a good Chriſtian, and pronounced a dying ſpeech to his officers on the ſubject of expilations, avarice, and military jealouſies. Theſe brave men all ſhed tears on the occaſion. It was thought, about that time, he was entering into ſome negotiation with the emperor; but it is more probable, as I have fully obſerved in another place, that he was attempting to carry on the grand project of marrying the unparalleled Amelia, landgraveſs of Heſſe-Caſſel, who had juſt then quitted her weeds of widowhood; which alarmed the French miniſter beyond all deſcription. He complained of ſome fiſh ſauce he had eaten. If there be any thing diſhonourable in that circumſtance, it muſt be attributed to Richelieu. His body was full of livid ſpots, which ſome phyſicians called the plague. The reader muſt take that part of the probability, which agrees beſt with his judgment. He bequeathed *Raven*, a poor miller's horſe he always fought upon, to count Naſſau, and his ſword to Guébriant. He left colonel Ohem 3000l. and then deviſed to Naſſau, Roſa, and Erlach, 2000l. each, 800l. to his chaplain, and ſomething conſiderable to all his friends and domeſtics. He conſtituted the four colonels above-mentioned commanders of his army, proviſionally, till France and Sweden ſhould agree upon a proper general. Commanders, I ſay, of that very army, which Richelieu, by the means of Erlach, ſeduced into the French intereſts; as he did alſo, the town and garriſon of Briſac. He beſtowed on every other colonel that ſerved under him, 1000l. and having ordered the ſoldiers to take an oath to their new leaders, bequeathed to each man a month's pay, which made upon the whole a ſum not much leſs than 20,000l. *Itinerarium Thomæ Carve*, tom. ii. c. 40.

It is certain, that M. de Turenne always acknowledged the duke de Weimar to have been his preceptor in the art of war: and the prince de Condé profeſſed the ſame obligations to another diſciple of Guſtavus, namely, Gaſſion. *Memoires de la Farre*, p. 23. 24.

upwards of *fifty* campaigns, and gained no leſs than *ſix and thirty battles*, that a ſuperior genius, with an army not half equal in number to that of the aſſailants, cannot be *compelled* into a deciſive action, except he chuſes to embrace the offer. Beſides all this, it was manifeſt to Tilly, even in his own judgment, that the king greatly exceeded him in the methods of *ſubſiſting* an army, in the arts of *intrenchment*, and in the management of his *artillery*; and for theſe reaſons bent his thoughts from this moment to tempt him to an engagement on *plain ground*. Conformably to this plan, he afterwards ſent him a romantic ſort of a challenge, and deſired to have the honour to diſpute the fate of the empire with him in open field, drawing up his troops in fair battle-array at half a mile diſtance from the Swediſh lines; but the king was reſerved, and checked his natural ardour with great command of temper, for he expected Horn and Todt to join him with a reinforcement of 14,000 men, drawn from the garriſons of Pomerania and Brandenburg.

Tilly, correcting his judgment at the expence of loſing 6000 men, the very flower of the Imperial army, in the two laſt recited actions, gave over, for the future, all thoughts of forcing his Swediſh majeſty's intrenchments, and waited with impatience for the reinforcements, that were coming to his aſſiſtance from all parts, in order to give the deciſive ſtroke at once, expecting ſucceſs from ſome fortunate unforeſeen event, or hoping by the dexterity of his marches, and the frequency of ſhifting from place to place, to ſurprize his majeſty unprepared, and upon equal ground. For theſe reaſons, and partly for want of proviſions to ſupport his army, whilſt Guſtavus drew food and forage in great plenty from the diſtrict round Havelburg, not to mention the actual arrival of Horn and Todt, he marched directly to Halle, with an intention to take Leipſic, and compel the elector of Saxony to give up the cauſe of Sweden. But the king ſaw through his deſigns, and having paſſed the Elbe at Wittemberg, joined the Saxons, as will appear hereafter; whilſt general Banier kept all open behind him, even to the Baltic ocean. Upon this, Tilly retired to Tangermund, and thence to Magdeburg. The king, not contented to continue idle a ſingle moment, requeſted the ſtates-general of the United Provinces, by letter, not to diſcharge their troops then in pay, but on the contrary, to maintain them a little longer for the ſafety of the continent, or allow him to hire them*.

* *Hiſtorical Authentic Relation*, fol. part i. p. 113.

That

That we may not break the context of our hiſtory, we will reſume our narrative for a ſhort ſpace back, taking notice of the expedition of the marquis of Hamilton from England, and concluding that piece of Britiſh hiſtory once for all, though it reaches to the middle of the month of September in the enſuing year. However I may, perhaps, diſagree with biſhop Burnet* in various places, yet I ſhall expreſs myſelf with the ſame candour, as if the author were now living, and had the opportunity of peruſing theſe papers; ſince it is impoſſible to be too guarded, or too modeſt, when one reviews the performances of a writer, who can no longer juſtify himſelf. The marquis of Hamilton had the honour to be allied to the royal family, and was ſo much eſteemed by the queen of Bohemia, for attachment to her intereſts, and a certain heroic gallantry of diſpoſition, that ſhe treated him as a kinſman, an adviſer, and a friend. Charles I. had not ſpirit enough to levy and tranſport abroad a body of troops openly and avowedly for the reſtitution of the Palatinate: of courſe he ſupplied the marquis with money, and the means of raiſing money underhand; and was deſirous that Europe ſhould conſider him as a *perſon removed entirely out of the queſtion.* This method of proceeding ſeems to me to have ariſen purely from timidity and irreſolution, even though it contradicts *that* unhappy prince's paſt conduct: for certain it is, that he ſent ſir Thomas Roe ambaſſador to Guſtavus merely upon the ſubject of the *German invaſion,* which ſaid public miniſter continued at Stockholm till the month of June 1630†. As he was a man of parts and ſpirit, he greatly reliſhed a Swediſh expedition into Germany, and upon all occaſions informed his court, that Guſtavus was an intrepid and judicious commander; one, who ſuſtained in his own perſon all the offices of ſoldier and ſtateſman, being, to uſe his own words, *Vir ad magnas res & revolutiones natus*‡.

He repreſents further, with no ſmall uneaſineſs, the preſſing neceſſity of ſupplying Guſtavus with no inconſiderable ſums of money, in order to determine him to undertake the *invaſion,* which at that time employed his thoughts, and appears much diſcontented leſt De Charnacé ſhould‖ conclude an agreement between France and Sweden, and rob England of an honour which *ought* to belong to her.

* *Memoirs of the Duke of Hamilton,* by Burnet. Fol.

† *Sir Thomas Roe's MS. papers.*

‡ *Letter to the earl of Carliſle,* October 27, 1629.

‖ *MS. Letter* to lord viſcount Dorcheſter, ſecretary of ſtate, April 20-30, 1630.

That ſir Thomas fully comprehended the true part he was to act, may be inferred not only from the jealouſy he conceived againſt De Charnacé, who performed *that* for France, which our countryman wiſhed to effect in behalf of his own nation, but from the regard Guſtavus had for him, honouring him with a preſent to the value of two thouſand five hundred pounds, eſteeming him beyond doubt as the promoter and encourager of the German expedition*. This preſent was accompanied with a letter from Oxenſtiern, wherein are to be found theſe remarkable words; *Quæ inter nos mutuis colloquiis ac diſcurſibus acta ſunt ratione belli à S. R. majeſtate, domino meo clementiſſimo, in Germaniam transferendi; cujus auctor & impulſor illuſtritas veſtra* NOMINE *ſereniſſimi regis ſui ſtrenuus extitit.*

Nevertheleſs, whatever commiſſion his Britannic majeſty might give ſir Thomas, it is plain that miniſter, as ſuch inſtructions were conformable to his own ſenſe of things, promoted their taking effect with ſo much ſincerity and vigour, that the king his maſter was ſtartled, when he began to think of realizing them in good earneſt. By way of expedient therefore to get clear from ſuch bold and enterpriſing meaſures, he allowed himſelf, as indeed he had done at intervals for two years before, to be amuſed by his enemies, almoſt as much as his father had been, and lent a liſtening ear one while to Spaniſh, and one while to Auſtrian cajolements; and this, notwithſtanding the ſteps he had taken to perſuade Guſtavus to interpoſe in the empire, who, to do him juſtice, laid open his whole plan to Charles, and urged effectual, not ſuperficial, aſſiſtances from England in the ſtrongeſt manner, partly by the applications of the elector Palatine, and partly by the repreſentations of † Spence, his ambaſſador, and Curtius, his reſident.

His Britannic majeſty, in the ſecond place, had *great expectations* from the interference of ſir Robert Anſtruther, who, according to the laſt-named plan, was diſpatched to the diet of Ratiſbon, and laboured to bring about the reſtitution of the Palatinate in an amicable manner, at the very moment when Guſtavus firſt ſet his foot in Germany; and to give a new turn to the ill ſucceſſes, which attended this miniſter, ſir Henry Vane was deputed ambaſſador extraordinary to the king of Sweden, and landed at Hamburg in the month of

* *MS. Letter* to the earl of Dorcheſter, ſecretary of ſtate, Auguſt 16, 1631. *(In the Paper Office.)*

† I take this perſon to be ſir James Spence, who was colonel of a Scottiſh regiment in the Swediſh ſervice.

October

October 1631, ſome few weeks after the battle of Leipſic. This gentleman was conſidered as a more proper political implement to work with at *that* time, and on the ſyſtem *then* adopted, than Roe appeared to be. Nor did Vane obtain his new employment, but by the old court-trick of undermining his predeceſſor, who, in a letter to the queen of Bohemia explains the whole myſtery, and gives vent to his juſt reſentments in that ſort of language, which uſually occurs to an honeſt man, who thinks himſelf ſupplanted. He calls ſir Henry Vane "*a bold undertaker*; *Though I know*," continues he, "*he cannot build upon my foundations. This blow came from Vienna upon new pretences, That the proſperity of the king of Sweden would make our treaty eaſy, if a man were employed, that would advance* peace, *to which I was eſteemed an* enemy.—*I have honour enough in the* ſincerity *of my* negotiations, *and that God had bleſſed them, and made me one inſtrument*; *though I boaſted not, until another would take my honour of bringing the* brave king into Germany, *which I had rather have inſcribed on my tomb, than titles dearly bought at the loſs of honour* *." And ſome months before this, he wrote to my lord Dorcheſter in the following words; "*I have received the encloſed from the chancellor of Sweden, wherein I have honour enough done me, that I was the agent to bring that brave king into Germany* †."

At length his Britannic majeſty, amuſed by reſtleſs ſhiftings to and fro, but not relieved, gave the marquis of Hamilton private inſtructions to levy a body of troops, and conduct them into Germany. Upon this the Scottiſh nobleman diſpatched colonel Alexander Hamilton ‡, Chemnitz gives him that Chriſtian name, brother to the earl of Hadinton, to the king of Sweden, and afterwards employed David Ramſay on the ſame errand the May following. Guſtavus took the propoſal in good part, and immediately wrote back his own limitations and conditions of acceptance, of which, if I am allowed only to remark, with the above cited hiſtorian ‖, that the king reſerved to himſelf the *ſupreme power of command*, the more material ſubſtance was as follows; That as the marquis had generouſly propoſed to raiſe 6000 men at his *own* expence, to be employed againſt the Imperialiſts, and any other enemies of Sweden, it was highly proper, by way of

* London, Nov. 20, 1631. *(Paper Office.)*

† Auguſt 16, 1631. *Ibidem.*

‡ There were five Hamiltons colonels under Guſtavus; Alexander, Frederic, James, John, and Hugh. The four former were knights.

‖ *Chemnitius*, tom. i. p. 160.

preli-

preliminary, that the intended place of landing ſhould be firſt ſpecified; that 4000 infantry ſhould conduct him to the Swediſh army, or wherever his troops were commanded to act; and that this eſcort was to be paid one whole year at the Swediſh expence—That as the marquis ſuppoſes 2000 horſe abſolutely neceſſary for the protection of his infantry, *expedients ſhould be ſought*, to procure ſuch a number of cavalry—That the marquis ſhall not only have full command over this army in the king's abſence, *but a counſellor ſhall be added to him, in order to render his deliberations more expeditious, and leſs liable to objections.* Whatever the marquis *conquers ſhall belong to Sweden*, but the emoluments and contributions ſhall appertain to him and his army; provided, at the ſame time, that no outrages or extortions be committed. Laſtly, *the ſaid marquis and his troops ſhall take an oath of fidelity to the crown of Sweden* *.

I never could procure a ſight of the marquis's original propoſals, which produced theſe conditions and limitations on the part of his Swediſh majeſty; but there is a ſpirit in the latter, and a political ability, which ſhew that Guſtavus did not conſider himſelf in the ſituation of a *ſuppliant* prince. Not one ſyllable is mentioned in regard to the *Palatinate*, the only true and oſtenſible object of Great Britain's interference. It is however probable, notwithſtanding all Burnet's inſinuations to the contrary, that the promiſe of an eſcort, and the aſſiſtance of 4000 men in Swediſh pay, was always intended, as will appear more fully by and by, becauſe it was afterwards made good, which the biſhop does not allow. As to the clauſe relating to the addition of 2000 cavalry to the marquis's infantry, it is conceived in ſuch vague and indeterminate expreſſions, namely, *that, upon condition they ſhould be found neceſſary, expedients ſhall be ſought to procure them*; that it appears to me, and ought ſo *then* to have been underſtood, a ſort of offer merely eventual, which the king intended to fulfil, or omit, as beſt agreed with the exigencies of war. *The joining of a counſellor*, who probably was a man of the ſword, *with the marquis*, is a plain proof too, that it was never propoſed, that the Britiſh general ſhould have the *ſupreme command.* And that no *conqueſts*, ſhould belong to him, or to the parties whoſe cauſe he more immediately eſpouſed, was a farther proof, that nothing he *might do* could have any effect in procuring the recovery of the Palatinate. The laſt article, *that of taking the oath of fidelity to the crown of Sweden*, proves the leaſt exceptionable of any one, that is

* See the treaty at large in Burnet's Memoirs of the duke of Hamilton.

to

to be found in the whole collection; yet even that gave ſome *additional* weight to his majeſty's power. Nor is it uſually inſiſted upon, when a leſſer allied army co-operates with a larger body of troops; yet in this caſe Guſtavus aſked no more than he granted himſelf in regard to the garriſon, which he placed in Spandau.

In the body of the treaty, I paſſed over a circumſtance which at that moment ſeemed too minute to be taken notice of; but as in the courſe of making theſe remarks one cannot but be ſtruck with the independent ſpirit, and ſuperior air of authority in Guſtavus, not to mention the firmneſs of his mind, even at a time when he was greatly diſtreſſed, and requeſting a favour, I muſt juſt obſerve, that though the king had promiſed the marquis bills of exchange to buy ammunition, and had alſo agreed to provide him with a great number of muſquets, pikes, cannon-balls, and a certain quantity of iron and utenſils to make ſome warlike inſtruments of that nobleman's own invention; yet in the ſame paragraph it was alſo ſtipulated, that if the treaty then agitating at Dantzic between the Swedes and Imperialiſts ſhould *take effect*, and a general peace be concluded, the marquis ſhould *refund* to his majeſty the particular ſums of money that had been expended in making theſe military inſtruments. Guſtavus clearly choſe to *preſcribe* laws, and not *receive* them: and as he perceived the king of England wanted magnanimity to appear as he ought in ſo glorious a cauſe, he choſe either to make him ſubſervient, or not depend on him at all.

The March following, in the year 1631, the marquis at length, with the concurrence of the king his maſter, accepted the above-mentioned propoſals, and engaged to land his troops at the place agreed on, in the month of June next enſuing *. He commented a little here and there upon an article, and made a few ſlight explanations and enlargements upon ſeveral paſſages, to which *no* anſwer was returned, ſo far as I can diſcover at this diſtance of time: but nothing ſyſtematic was advanced upon the whole, nor any one objection duly urged againſt *thoſe* various clauſes, which I have made my obſervations upon, as carrying with them the marks not only of great ability, but of ſuperior commanding authority in Guſtavus. Nevertheleſs, this omiſſion muſt be referred to the king and his miniſtry, as indeed it ought, and not to the marquis of Hamilton.

*. He left England July 16, touched at Oreſund, and landed at Wolgaſt the ſecond and third of Auguſt.

Donald, lord Reay, whoſe family name was Mackay, and David Ramſay, who both ſerved in the Swediſh army, were now employed by Guſtavus, in Great Britain, to facilitate the turn of affairs in his behalf, and encourage the new general in raiſing recruits. On this account, in reſpect to ſome words ſpoken of the marquis, aroſe that noted quarrel between them, which ended in an appeal to ſingle combat, authorized by a royal commiſſion *, concerning which all our hiſtorians expreſs themſelves with ſo much minuteneſs, that I ſhall purpoſely paſs it by without further notice. It is true biſhop Burnet gives them both extremely bad characters, which repreſentation at this diſtance of time it is not in my power to contradict. All I know of them is, they were ſoldiers of approved ſervice, and Guſtavus valued them both, eſpecially the former; a circumſtance many people will think ſufficient to confront a hearſay report, delivered down to us by a very able, but prejudiced hiſtorian, who paints with great warmth, and, ſnatching one point of view, finiſhes his portrait, without conſulting what particular lights and attitudes the ſubject may admit of.

In the ſpring months of the year 1631, Hamilton employed himſelf with great diligence to raiſe an army; and the *cauſe in itſelf* was ſo agreeable to the people of England and Scotland, that his drums ſoon drew together a conſiderable number of troops, and many experienced officers flocked to him both from Holland and the Low Countries. He then diſpatched an agent, ſays Burnet, to beſeech Guſtavus to order the eſcort of 4000 men to be ready to join him on his firſt landing in Germany; and, in caſe ſuch a body of forces

* At the day of trial, Ramſay called Reay *liar, and barbarous villain*, and, throwing down his glove, proteſted, *to gar him dy for what he had ſaid, if he had him in a place for that purpoſe*. But Reay preſerved an entire dominion over his temper, and replied only, without ſigns of paſſion and diſcompoſure, *Mr. Ramſay, we will not contend here; anſwer my bill. Sanderſon's Hiſtory of England*, p. 167.

Upon the whole, it was improbable that Reay ſhould want to attach himſelf to the marquis any further than out of pure affection to a nobleman of his own country, for he knew the king of Sweden would never allow Hamilton a ſeparate command, and he had better employments under Guſtavus, being a colonel of two regiments, than he could hope to obtain in the Britiſh army. So that if there was any treaſon at bottom, which I no way ſuſpect, it certainly lies at Ramſay's door.

The dreſs of the appellant and defendant on the day of trial was very conformable to the taſte of chivalry at that time. Ramſay was cloathed in ſcarlet, laced with ſilver ſo thick, that the ground of the cloth could hardly be ſeen. The lining was a ſky-coloured pluſh. Lord Reay was apparelled in black velvet with ſilver trimmings and buttons, his ſword hung in a ſilver-embroidered belt; and he wore the order of a Scottiſh baronet about his neck. *Ibid.*

could

could not be ſpared, to ſend him letters of exchange, whereby he might be enabled to levy the aforeſaid number of men.

On the other hand, as matters now drew near their criſis in the empire, for the generals knew by the interpretation of each other's motions, that a deciſive battle muſt ſoon happen, the king wrote ſeveral preſſing letters to the marquis, conjuring him to complete his levies, and embark with all poſſible expedition. At the ſame time lord Reay was ſent into Denmark and Holland to raiſe recruits; and a like commiſſion was given to colonel Farenbach, concerning whoſe deſigns on the king's perſon we have ſpoken more diſtinctly in another place *. This bold and unaccountable adventurer, who likewiſe had orders to paſs into England, and levy troops there, received his majeſty's money to raiſe four regiments, very myſteriouſly diſappeared, and returned to the Imperial ſervice, where he had borne command under the emperor Mathias, and thence went into the ſervice of Sigiſmond king of Poland.

It is more than probable, that *theſe* regiments were intended to join Hamilton; for the countries, in which they were to be raiſed, were near the place where the junction was to be made. Their number likewiſe correſponded with the number of troops promiſed; for, as a Swediſh regiment then contained 1008 men, of courſe this body of ſoldiers amounted preciſely to the due contingent, with an addition only of two and thirty perſons more than were mentioned in the ſtipulation. Guſtavus could only expect any uſe or aſſiſtance from theſe new-raiſed recruits, upon ſuppoſition they were to unite with the marquis; and then both theſe little armies might render themſelves ſuperior to inſult, and march to the place aſſigned them, according to the king's orders. Four thouſand men, raiſed in Holland, Frizeland, and Bremen, and unſupported by the Britiſh troops, could not, without great good fortune, have joined the king or Banier; inaſmuch as Tilly was between them and the former, and Pappenheim and Boninghauſen betwixt them and the latter. Theſe are little remarks, which tend much to the explanation of hiſtory, and cannot eaſily be made, except the ſubject is thoroughly underſtood, and what each general was about, and where every body of troops was ſtationed at a certain period, is preciſely known. My exactneſs here is due to the MILITARY TABLE AND DIARY OF THE WAR †.

* Vide ſupra, pp. 100 & 101.

† It was written about the year 1631, by ſome Engliſh, Scottiſh, or Iriſh officer, in Guſtavus's ſervice.

By

By this time Guſtavus began to find great inconvenience in the ſituation of his affairs, inaſmuch as Charles was ſo extremely cautious in declaring his intentions. Upon this occaſion, too, the proteſtant princes in Germany put on a cold, reſerved, and ambiguous air, reflecting, not without wiſdom, how extremely dangerous any armament, or the publication of any one ſimple memorial, might prove to them, when the king of Great Britain, environed by the ſea, and removed at ſo conſiderable a diſtance from every ill effect that could proceed from the houſes of Auſtria and Spain, ventured only to act behind the ſcene, and ſcreened himſelf with ſubterfuges and excuſes. Beſides, they diſcovered plainly, that as he did not declare boldly and avowedly for them, he was to be underſtood as acting to a certain degree againſt them. Guſtavus therefore preſſed hard, by means of Camerarius his ambaſſador in Holland, and Salvius his agent at Hamburg, to bring Charles into an explicit and open treaty, by which 10,000 men, to be paid by Great Britain, were to be added to the marquis's army, and the eſcort abovementioned: over all which troops the marquis, *in caſe theſe propoſals were accepted*, was then to be declared general in chief, with this *ſubſequent proviſion*, for the *honour of England, that no peace ſhould be concluded with the emperor, till the elector Palatine was reinſtated in his patrimonial dominions*. Charles liſtened to theſe propoſals with an air of approbation, allowing himſelf at the ſame time to be cajoled by the Auſtrian and Spaniſh miniſtry. But inſtead of conſenting in a comprehenſive manner, which ſingle ſtroke of politics, and not a very *bold* one, would have cruſhed all the ambitious projects formed at Vienna and Munich, and quickly produced the reſtoration of the Palatinate, he promiſed, in imitation of his father, to ſend an ambaſſador to finiſh the agreement. Whether any ſuch miniſter went merely at that time, and on that errand, is more than I can take upon me to aſſert. Henry Vane was charged with a public commiſſion to Guſtavus, about half a year afterwards: but the critical opportunity had then vaniſhed, and the elector of Saxony had declared for Sweden.

On July 16, the marquis, after having reviewed his troops, ſet ſail from Yarmouth with a fleet of forty ſhips. In his way he ſtopped at Elſineür, and went aſhore to deliver letters from his maſter, in order to obtain a free paſſage, and pay his reſpects to Chriſtian, king of Denmark. Guſtavus had appointed him to land at Bremen, and had diſpatched thither Leſlie, afterwards earl of Leven, to negotiate with the archbiſhop concerning the means of ſupplying the Engliſh

liſh army with proviſions; and it was well known, that he amaſſed great quantities of bread and beer from Bremen and Hamburg. When the marquis found, that the eſcort of 4000 men had not been ſent according to promiſe, and that the enemy's troops covered a large tract of country between him and the grand Swediſh camp, he thought proper, from his own impulſe, having juſt touched at Oreſund, to proceed onwards in his voyage, and landed in the mouth of the Oder, between Wolgaſt and the iſle of Uſedom. This greatly piqued Guſtavus, for the archbiſhop of Bremen privately favoured the Swediſh cauſe; and as the Imperial troops were but weak, in and near that dioceſe, he wanted above all things to carve out work for Tilly on the banks of the Weſer, and divert him from marching into Saxony *. But Burnet either knew nothing of the king's reaſons for being angry, or kept them a ſecret.

Indeed I cannot ſay there was any conſiderable body of Swediſh troops then in Bremen; but Leſlie, governor of Stralſund, appeared there in perſon by his maſter's orders. Todt likewiſe, and Banier, were ſtationed at ſome diſtance with no contemptible armies; and all the world knows, Guſtavus was too good a general to run the riſk of ſacrificing ſuch a brave body of allies, by leaving them in a forlorn and defenceleſs ſtate. Meanwhile, Leſlie was not a little aſtoniſhed to ſee the king's plan broken in the very firſt ſtep the marquis took. Therefore, without ceremony, he embarked in a ſmall veſſel for Stetin, and thence haſtened by land to the king, in order to know what he propoſed to do, as his original deſign was fruſtrated. His majeſty from that moment diſliked the marquis for not placing due confidence in him; but having the talent never to be ſurprized by common accidents, he changed his plan in an inſtant, and ordered the Britiſh troops to ſerve on the banks of the Oder inſtead of the Weſer.

The fame of this little army, whoſe numbers were trebly magnified, ſtruck great terror into the Imperial troops, and contributed more than can be well imagined, to obtaining the battle of Leipſic. Tilly thought himſelf obliged in conſequence, to detach ſix or ſeven thouſand men into Sileſia, to ſtrengthen his army there, and reinforce ſeveral garriſons on the occaſion; the want of which ſoldiers greatly diſtreſſed him, when the deciſive hour of action arrived.

The marquis landed 6000 men, Engliſh and Scottiſh, all in good health and ſpirits, only two having died during the voyage. This diminutive army conſiſted of four regiments,

* *Chemnitius* de Bello Sueco-German. tom. i. 160.

each

each of which contained ten companies, and every company amounted to 150 men *. Burnet, who naturally favours his hero the marquis, no where allows, that the ſtipulated eſcort of 4000 Swedes joined the Engliſh after their landing. This miſtake aroſe either from ignorance or deſign; for 4000 Swedes joined him, according to ſtipulation †, and arrived ſome few days after the reinforcement that the queen brought; and then the combined troops marched firſt to Stetin, and afterwards into Sileſia, where Horn at that time was, and whom Banier replaced.

It is true, numbers of the Engliſh periſhed by eating German bread, which is heavier, darker-coloured, and ſourer than that of their own country. They ſuffered too by an immoderate fondneſs for new honey, of which they found great abundance in thoſe parts; nor did the German beer agree with their conſtitutions. They likewiſe came freſh into a country, that was infected by the peſtilence. Of courſe this body of troops proved but of little ſervice in the ſequel of the war. They were new-raiſed recruits, the very off-ſcum of the people. In order to juſtify this aſſertion, it muſt be obſerved, that Guſtavus had no intention to make uſe of them upon trying occaſions, and about his perſon, till they had been better ſeaſoned and diſciplined in the art of war.

The magnificence of Hamilton's table, his equipage, and liveries, appeared to have more the air of a prince, than of a ſubject. He had forty gentlemen's ſons by way of pages and volunteers, and a body of guards, which amounted to 200 men. He was received in the camp at Werben, whither he went without his army, in a manner the moſt affectionate and polite, that can be conceived. Guſtavus made him a thouſand apologies, for the bareneſs and ſcantineſs of the quarters allotted to his troops; and having conferred with him many hours in private, ſhewed him the diſpoſitions he had made in order to give Tilly a ſoldierlike reception. By this time the Britiſh troops were advanced to the banks of the Oder, and the marquis haſtened to take the command of them upon himſelf ‡; but never could obtain the power of being declared general in chief, when the junction was to be formed betwixt him and the Swediſh commander; that honour being ſtrenuouſly denied him, except his Britannic majeſty ſhould think fit to add 10,000

* *Chemnitius* de Bello Sueco-German. tom. i.
† *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part i. p. 109.
‡ *Monro's Second Expedition*, part ii. 52, 53.

freſh

freſh men, according to the propoſal lately made by Guſtavus, as we mentioned tranſiently in the narrative.

Some little time after the deciſive engagement at Leipſic, the king ordered the marquis to ſupply the deficiency amongſt his Britiſh troops with German recruits, for the expences of which he promiſed to become reſponſible. We may thence infer, that his Britannic majeſty only ſent an army into Germany, but was not extremely punctual in remitting the payment that belonged to it. Soon after this, the marquis received inſtructions to quit the banks of the Oder, and make what acquiſitions he could in Sileſia; but his army, from the cauſes already aſſigned, was reduced to little more than two complete regiments; and, what was worſe, had ſubſiſted ever ſince its arrival in countries infected with the plague, and where the proviſions had been twice conſumed by enemies and friends: neither could he, in this new expedition, obtain more than 500 auxiliary troops to co-operate with him. However, he and his Britons were delighted with the thoughts of making an invaſion into Sileſia, a duchy* extremely fertile in itſelf, and little, if at all, impoveriſhed by the preceding wars. He there had the good fortune to raiſe the ſiege of Croſſen, which was more eaſily effected, as moſt of the inhabitants were proteſtants. He then took Guben, the ſecond and beſt-peopled town in Lower Luſatia, by ſurprize; and had probably made himſelf maſter of Glogau †, if Guſtavus, for political reaſons, had not recalled him; at the ſame time giving him to underſtand, that the elector of Saxony had undertaken to make the conqueſt of Sileſia, as that province laid moſt convenient for him.

The Scottiſh nobleman was quite in a rage, to ſee himſelf reduced to quit ſo plentiful a country. He even had a mind to have continued there in oppoſition to his majeſty's orders; but that deſign would have amounted to nothing, for the Swediſh commanders in the ſeveral garriſons, had authority given them, in caſe of his being refractory, not to acknowledge

* Some modern writers have aſſured us, that this duchy, which is about 240 miles long by 60 broad, more or leſs, contains 100 well-peopled cities and towns, 353 ſmall market towns and larger villages, 4000 gentlemen's houſes, including 863 caſtles, and an infinite number of little villages and hamlets. The reader is deſired not to take this account upon my authority, for the computation appears to me to be exaggerated.

† This town gives name to a conſiderable duchy, which the emperor had conferred on Walſtein, as a remuneration in part for his great ſervices. Walſtein had fitted up the caſtle with his uſual magnificence. There is one particularity in this duchy; the daughters inherit preferably to the collateral males. The preſent princeſs of Furſtenberg (as the prince her huſband informed me) is an heireſs of the houſe of Walſtein.

him as an ally. If this conduct of Guſtavus ſhould chance to puzzle the reader, he will upon a moment's reflection diſcover that the Swediſh policy was not amiſs in this reſpect. As no explicit agreement had been made about reinſtating Frederic, either as elector Palatine, or king of Bohemia; and as Sileſia belonged to the crown of Bohemia, as an *incorporated* and *annexed* province, Guſtavus wiſely foreſaw, that what the Engliſh conquered there, would be ſuppoſed by that nation to be conquered for the Palatine's uſe. Beſides, his ſcheme was not to contract for the reſtoration of Frederic, though he had that event ſincerely and really at heart, till Charles thought fit to engage more openly and ſtrenuouſly in the war, and advance larger and more regular ſupplies of men and money.

Hamilton therefore, with manifeſt ill-will, marched to Magdeburg at the head of 1500 Britiſh troops, and 2000 or more German infantry, which he had levied according to the orders of the king of Sweden, and at his expence. His inſtructions were to join Banier, who conducted about the ſame number of troops, and co-operate with him in forming the blockade of the aforeſaid city, about ſix months after Tilly had taken it by ſtorm. Little good was to be expected from this project, for the ſoldiers within and under the walls, not to mention out-guards and advanced parties, were almoſt as numerous as thoſe that blockaded the avenues of the town; ſo that the moſt Guſtavus could propoſe, fortunate chances excepted, was to reduce the garriſon, and the troops encamped under the walls, to the ſtraits of hunger, and hinder them from making excurſions and levying contributions round the country.

The marquis's reſentment was now thoroughly awakened; for he found, that Banier not only affected the ſuperior command, but was determined to poſſeſs it; and he carried the king's authority in his pocket, to be produced and uſed in caſe diſputes ſhould proceed to extremity.

Upon this, coldneſs and reſerve ſoon gave birth to expoſtulations and recriminations. At length their reciprocal ill-will amounted to a mortal hatred, and each would have been glad to have ſacrificed his antagoniſt to private paſſion. Banier, who was extremely well born, would not bate the marquis one jot in the articles of pride, and ſelf-opinion: not to mention, that he conſidered himſelf, and juſtly too, one of the ableſt generals then in Europe. Though the marquis poſſeſſed all the gallantry, magnificence, and perſonal bravery, that ought to adorn the man of quality; yet he was then only entered into the twenty-

fourth or twenty-fifth year of his age, and for that reaſon Guſtavus, in the original draught of the articles between them, choſe to join an adviſer or counſellor with him; that is to ſay, in other words, an able man, and an older general. In vain the Britiſh nobleman added remonſtrance to remonſtrance, in order to obtain the ſupreme direction of the armies. He was told by Guſtavus, that the contrary practice was highly expedient to the public ſervice; and in conſequence of this declaration, letters were diſpatched to London, deſiring Charles to recommend the doctrine of ſubordination to his general, and exhorting him likewiſe to tranſmit the pay of the troops, not to the marquis of Hamilton, but to the king of Sweden; propoſals which, as ſome hiſtorians aſſert, were agreed to *. This, I think, was acting *upon too high a footing*, even in Guſtavus Adolphus.

In the courſe of theſe reſentments, the marquis behaved in a very ſpirited manner againſt Banier, who, contrary to the judgment of *his* Britiſh colleague, had declined giving battle to Pappenheim, who then advanced in order to raiſe the blockade of Magdeburg. Banier produced his orders not to hazard the Swediſh and German troops, and immediately commanded a retreat to be ſounded. The truth was, which either Burnet did not know, or choſe to ſuppreſs, that Boninghauſen, after an obſtinate conflict, had thrown 1300 men into the town. Banier then paſſed the Sala, and requeſted the ſame of the marquis, who refuſed him poſitively, being aſſured by ſir Jacob Aſtley, as an eye witneſs, that the paſs, through which he was to march his diviſion, was ſo ſecure and ſo defenſible, that he might purſue his journey at a quarter of an hour's notice, and bid defiance to all Pappenheim's attacks. However that may be, Pappenheim, whoſe army was much weaker than that of the combined nations, though it was always his policy to double the number of his men in common reports, had, in reality, no other object in view than to raiſe the blockade and carry off the garriſon, which amounted to 3000 well diſciplined troops: independent of ſuch bodies of ſoldiers as were ſtationed in ſtrong poſts and important paſſes round the town.

Thus ended the campain of 1631, with reſpect to the marquis, who paid a viſit to the king, and was received with politeneſs.

About the middle of September, 1632, Henry Vane arrived at Wurtzburg, in his ambaſſadorial capacity. His propoſals were, that Guſtavus ſhould give the marquis a

* *High Dutch Hiſtorical and Authentic Relation*, part i. p. 113.

ſeparate army, and a ſeparate command; and that the ſaid army, in conjunction with ſuch troops as might hereafter be ſent from England, and with ſuch as were levied and ſupported with Engliſh money, ſhould act uniformly and zealouſly for the recovery of the Palatinate. Guſtavus took the matter up in a higher tone than he had made uſe of formerly; ſo that Vane and he parted upon very ill terms: in conſequence whereof, he declined giving the marquis a commiſſion to levy a new army, and excuſed himſelf from paying the money that was expended in Sileſia to form a body of recruits there. Oxenſtiern alſo told the Britiſh general, with ſome warmth, that he had received large ſums from Charles his maſter, and muſt not pretend to amuſe them with an account of having advanced a great deal of money from his own private fortune.

Thus that nobleman, as early as the month of April, in the year we are now ſpeaking of, found himſelf to be neither a *general* nor even a *colonel*, for his whole corps was reduced to one Engliſh and one Scottiſh regiment. Bellandin, afterwards created a peer, commanded one, and Hamilton, brother to the earl of Hadinton, commanded the other.—Both regiments being incorporated into duke Bernard's army, the marquis contented himſelf to follow Guſtavus as a volunteer.

His Britannic majeſty made an indirect reply to all the diſputes which Oxenſtiern's rough ſpeech had occaſioned. He gave the money as king, and did not give the money as king; he acted one day openly, and one day with reſerve. The marquis in one light was accountable to the nation, and in one light was not accountable to the nation. But the poſtſcript of one of the king's letters at this period contains ſomething that appears uncommon. The words are theſe:

"I hope ſhortly you will be in a poſſibility to perform your promiſe, concerning pictures and ſtatues at M[illegible] (Munich): therefore now, in earneſt, do not forget it."

As this letter bears date April 30, 1632*, it is plain the king of Sweden had entered Bavaria, and even paſſed the Lech almoſt a month before it was written. The ſeeming interpretation of the letter is, that his majeſty had a mind for ſomething, out of that collection, which was worth ſending. Nothing farther need be ſaid upon this occaſion; and if the bare mention thereof had not fallen immediately and eſſentially within the courſe of my narrative, I ſhould have paſſed by a circumſtance relating to a prince, whom, in the character of a reſtorer and protector of the fine arts, every man of taſte ought for ever to reſpect. Nevertheleſs, the

* *Memoirs by Burnet*, p. 22.

ſcheme

ſcheme or idea, whatever it might be, was in all probability rendered abortive by a peremptory diſapprobation on the part of Guſtavus; which one cannot affect to be ſorry for, ſince the Trenks and Mentzels of our own age, when they made an irruption into Bavaria at the head of a rapacious band of Croatians, Pandours, and Talpatches, made no ſcruple to behave like men of honour in this reſpect at leaſt.

*Non obtuſa adeo geſtabant pectora Pœni,*
*Nec tam averſus equos Tyriis ſol junxit ab oris.*

Not but that the elector of Bavaria deſerved ſuch uſage from the elector Palatine more than any prince then alive; for he had plundered and ſent to the Vaticum the library at Heidelberg, which was the proteſtant glory of Europe.

Much more happened at this time with reference to Great Britain, wherein the marquis was partly concerned, and his Swediſh majeſty. That will preſent itſelf more regularly when we undertake to give a full account of ſir Henry Vane's embaſſy. It may ſuffice therefore to conclude with obſerving, That ſome months before Oxenſtiern had ſhown ſuch warmth of temper, Charles had conceived a ſtrong inclination to recal the marquis, plainly perceiving, that he ſtood on no good footing with Guſtavus, and that there was little hope of procuring a ſeparate command for him. As he had, in common with his father, a mighty turn for new negotiations, viſionary projects, and temporary expedients, he propoſed to his general to ſend him, with a new army, into the Lower Palatinate, in order to aſſiſt the French, who had promiſed to conquer, and make it over to him by way of *depoſitum*; though at the ſame time he adds, that he cannot conſider French promiſes as matters of authenticity. Nor did he judge amiſs in this reſpect; for as the ſcheme was chimerical, ſo it ended in nothing.

Chancellor Oxenſtiern now propoſed a freſh league, offenſive and defenſive, between Sweden and England, but in a higher tone, and with more exceptions and limitations than he had uſed formerly: for *then* the power of concluding peace was to be veſted reciprocally in each contracting party, now it was to reſide entirely in his Swediſh majeſty's breaſt. As this altered the whole ſtate of the queſtion, Vane and he parted with much ill-will. The marquis petitioned for a new army, and Guſtavus amuſed him with new delay. He urged remonſtrance upon remonſtrance; all was vain. Guſtavus ſpoke of Charles, his brother-king, in terms of anger and bitterneſs, but at the ſame time told the marquis, that he was thoroughly ſenſible of his ſervices; and at all diſtances,

diſtances, and in all places, ſhould conſider him as one, that peculiarly belonged to him. Upon this, the Engliſh general, all accommodation being cut off, reſpectfully took his leave at Neuſtadt, about the middle of September 1632, ſix weeks before the king's death, being eſcorted four miles by all the Engliſh and Scottiſh officers in the Swediſh ſervice; and taking with him the colonels ſir James Hamilton and ſir James Ramſey, the latter ſurnamed the Fair, and the valiant colonel Hepburn, who, as we ſhall obſerve hereafter, in ſpite of all repreſentations and applications, never could be induced to forgive the king the affront, real or imaginary, which took poſſeſſion of his mind. In a word, as matters ſtood upon this diſagreeable footing between the ſovereigns of Great Britain and Sweden, one cannot blame the marquis *for declining the poſt of volunteer for life*. Nevertheleſs, his few remaining ſoldiers entertained no thought, that their general or their country had been ill uſed; for they all incorporated themſelves into the Swediſh ſervice. Nor did the Scottiſh nation withdraw themſelves from Guſtavus's ſervice upon this occaſion, though at that time three or four of them were *officers of the field*, as the language then ran, and upwards of twenty ſerved the king in the capacity of colonels. Not that ſo many occur in the courſe of this hiſtory, for ſome acted in ſeparate armies under Oxenſtiern, Horn, Banier, and others, and ſome were quartered in Livonia and Sweden *.

Thus ended the fortunes of the ſeparate army, chiefly Engliſh, which the marquis commanded; whereas, if Charles had made a bold and explicit treaty at firſt, in his own name, and authorized it by regal ſanction and that of a parliament; if a proper fund had been ſettled for the ſupport of theſe auxiliary troops, and a Britiſh commiſſary been ſent to pay them weekly or monthly; if the diſpoſal of all vacant commiſſions had been veſted in the national general, and him only; then Charles, I ſay, might have made points of the recovery and reſtoration of the Palatinate. He might have employed his own ſoldiers in that particular deſtination; he might have flattered the partiality of his ſubjects, by giving them a commander of their own iſland. Had he inſiſted upon this, and many other points of a like nature, at that time, when aſſiſtance would have come with its true grace, and at a proper ſeaſon, certain and undeniable it is, that Guſtavus and Oxenſtiern would have embraced his propoſals with uncommon joy. But the misfortune of our king was, that he often

* *Monro's Expedition.*

ſaw

ſaw and did what was right; but was always unlucky both in the *manner of propoſing*, and *the time of performing*.

To return to our German part of the hiſtory. Whilſt Guſtavus lay intrenched within the angle, which is formed by the confluence of the Elbe and the Havel, and as he was walking on the banks of one of theſe rivers, all alone, in a meditating mood, according to his cuſtom; he was ſurprized with hearing the voices of ten or twelve young cavaliers, who were talking with a great deal of vivacity, and ſeemed to ſhape their courſe towards the Swediſh quarters. The king diſpatched a ſentinel or two to ſummon them to him; but as theſe volunteers talked neither German nor Swediſh, they could only anſwer by ſigns. Guſtavus gueſſing their errand, ſpoke to them very politely in Latin, and offered to incorporate them that very day into the beſt body of troops then in the ſervice. It was remarkable in this prince, that he ſtudied the phyſiognomy, and watched the conduct of every young man of faſhion, that carried arms under him, and aſked the reſpective colonels every day, what turn of mind, and what kind of military genius they diſcovered in theſe new adventurers, during their apprenticeſhip in the art of war. Nor was this all; he often converſed with the meaneſt of his ſoldiers, and knew numbers of them by their names. Having well conſidered theſe new volunteers, he conceived a very favourable opinion of one of them, and preſented him ſoon afterwards with two fine war-horſes, ſaying, at the ſame time, *Sir, I do not give them you; I only pay you for the merit I ſee you have.* This young man was Gaſſion, afterwards maréchal of France, one of the moſt intrepid and enterpriſing warriors of that age*. The king gave him a variety of employment, made him a ſort of brigadier in his own regiment of guards, deſtined him for the ſharpeſt ſervices, and honoured him with a great ſhare of his private confidence†.

In one of thoſe ſharp encounters, which happened almoſt every day between the two armies, his majeſty recommended

* Gaſſion, John, had the good fortune, though a proteſtant, to attain the honour of being a maréchal of France. He ſerved firſt in the Genoeſe war, under the conſtable Leſdiguieres; acted afterwards with the duke de Rohan, in Languedoc, and bore a ſhare through all the campaigns in Savoy and Piémont, till the peace of Queraſque was concluded. He then conceived a deſire of aſking a command under the emperor, but the maréchal de Thoiras diſſuaded him; and in the 23d year of his age, he preſented himſelf to the king of Sweden. Richelieu mortally hated the abrupt impetuoſities of this officer; and, being adviſed one day to confer the command of Rantzau's army upon him, replied haſtily in the negative, *I know Rantzau gets drunk ſometimes, but Gaſſion was born drunk.* See more in *Folard*, tom. i. 219.

† *Hiſt. du Maréchal Gaſſion (par Michael le Pure)* tom. i. 45, &c. 12°.

him

him very particularly to the care of the commander of the party. Gaſſion had the good fortune to take a German officer priſoner, a young man of conſiderable eſtate and quality: and as ranſoms at that time ran very high with reſpect to people of faſhion, Guſtavus gave the whole profit to *the young Frenchman*, as he uſed to call him; and was greatly pleaſed, when Gaſſion told him, that he liked the air and manners of his priſoner ſo well, that, poor as he was, he was determined to forgive him all the debt, provided the ſaid officer would do him the favour to inſtruct him in the Swediſh and German languages, that thereby he might be the better enabled both to give and receive orders. Upon this event, in concurrence with ſome other promiſing indications, Guſtavus in a few days conceived ſo high an opinion of Gaſſion, that he ordered him to come privately on horſeback to his tent at midnight, where, after ſome ſhort diſcourſe, he ſent him out on an expedition of conſequence, which was conducted by the baron de Teüffel, one of his favourite colonels.

By this time the affair of Werben came to an end. Tilly found himſelf greatly exceeded, not only in the military art, but in the method of encamping and ſubſiſting an army. In vain he had boaſted of having defeated and ruined two kings, and that he ſhould cruſh a third, who was a young man. The event did not juſtify the falſe hope. True it is, he attacked Guſtavus more times than one, but was never able to carry his point. He tempted him to fight upon plain ground: but the king kept his poſt with inflexible firmneſs; for, though naturally brave and jealous of affronts to the higheſt degree, yet he had too great a game at ſtake to allow the warmth of his temper to get the better of his judgment. As it was now no time to indulge a romantic gallantry, he ſubmitted patiently to become an object of aſtoniſhment to his own troops, whoſe ardour, as we obſerved before, he could but juſt keep under on this occaſion. Nevertheleſs, that he might the better convince his officers, and compoſe their minds, he convened a council of war, a practice not very frequent with him, the night before Tilly attacked him, and there explained his whole plan to his generals, with ſuch ſuperiority of reaſoning, that every perſon retired to his tent not only contented but entirely ſatisfied.

END OF VOLUME I.

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# GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS,

# King of Sweden.

VOL. II.



THE

# HISTORY

OF

# GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS,

## *KING OF SWEDEN,*

## SURNAMED THE GREAT.

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED,

*AN ESSAY ON THE MILITARY STATE OF EUROPE,*

CONTAINING

THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS

IN THE EARLY PART OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

BY THE REV. WALTER HARTE, M. A.

CANON OF WINDSOR.

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HIS ASHES IN A PEACEFUL URN SHALL REST;
HIS NAME A GREAT EXAMPLE STANDS TO SHOW,
HOW STRANGELY HIGH ENDEAVOURS MAY BE BLEST,
WHERE PIETY AND VALOUR JOINTLY GO.

*Dryden.*

# THE HISTORY OF

## *THE LIFE OF*

# GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

AT length the Imperial General, unable to bring on an engagement, and not willing to ſee his troops periſh by hunger, made a march by way of feint, as if he propoſed to return to Magdeburg. The King could not be allured from his well-choſen ſituation. He remained firm in his poſt, and allowed his enemy to make what motions he thought beſt on that ſide of his empire. This coolneſs of the king diſappointed Tilly, and mortified him likewiſe. At length, not knowing well what ſteps to purſue, he pointed his courſe in earneſt, firſt to Tangermund *, and then to Einſleben, a town famous for its magnificent Gothic tombs erected to the honour of the counts of Mansfelt †, but more renowned for being the place of Martin Luther's nativity.

During theſe tranſactions the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, amongſt whoſe ſubjects at that time general Tilly fomented a revolt ‡, fought the protection and aſſiſtance of Guſtavus, who received him graciouſly, and after the concluſion of a treaty between them, diſmiſſed him with a reinforcement of three complete regiments, commanded by duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who, when he had joined the Heſſian troops at Caſſel, made an irruption into the chapter lands of the convent of Hirſchfeld ‖. Shaping his

* This well-peopled town lies at the confluence of the Elbe and Tanger. Charles IV. had a ſcheme to make it a commercial depôt between Bohemia and Lower Saxony, and thence to extend its communication to the Northern ſea. If death had not cut ſhort this emperor's project, perhaps Tangermund had been preciſely what Hamburg now is.

† The ſmall county of Mansfelt was ſequeſtered in 1570, and continues under ſequeſtration to this very day. Part belongs to Saxony, and part to Brandenburg. The preſent prince of Mansfelt poſſeſſes a few bailiwics, which happened not to be recited in the ſequeſtration, and exerciſes ſome rights, principally conſiſtorial ones, over the county.

‡ *High Dutch Hiſtorical Authentic Relation*, Part i. 114, 115.

‖ Theſe lands were ſecularized at the peace of Munſter, and being erected into a principality, were conferred on the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel as indemnification for the expences, which the war had occaſioned to him and his family.

courſe thence to Fulda*, he compelled the abbot to redeem his territories from plunder; and then raiſed a contribution of £.2000. from a neighbouring prelate in the electorate of Mentz.

The treaty above-mentioned, the full ſubſtance of which, in reference to the contracting powers on either ſide, Chemnitius has thought fit to preſerve †, may be conſidered as the groundwork, whereupon Guſtavus, and the German princes, all built their future alliances. The main draught of it had been contrived and reduced to articles many months before, but it never arrived to any actual concluſion, till now at Werben.

Upon this, Fugger, watch-maſter general of the army of the league, with a view to prevent the landgrave from infuſing new life into the ſubjects of Saxony, by declaring ſo explicitly in behalf of Guſtavus, advanced with ten regiments, raiſed by the ſaid league, and marched as far as Vacha in Lower-Heſſe. Not truſting over-much in new-raiſed troops, he tried what might be done by perſuaſion, and ſent letters from Tilly to the ſtates of the province, exhorting them to make amends for the indiſcretion of their prince by returning immediately to the emperor's protection. Count Furſtenberg at the head of a conſiderable body of Imperialiſts, having compelled the circles of Suabia and Franconia to renounce the *concluſions* agreed upon at Leipſic, intended to make another irruption into Heſſe on the ſide of Fulda. This ſtorm ſoon blew over, for the latter general received counter-orders to march and join Tilly, and carried with him forty-one troops of horſe, and thirty-five companies of foot. Tieffenbach formed another corps for the ſame

* The abbacy of Fulda is about ninety miles over either way. The abbot is more powerful than many biſhops, and formerly diſputed precedency with the archbiſhop of Magdeburg and the biſhop of Hildeſheim. But ſince thoſe alterations, he has been allowed, in order to prevent diſputes, to ſit in the diet, at the foot of the Imperial throne. He is a prince of the empire, and in virtue of high-chancellor to the empreſs, has a right to crown her in quality of firſt official. He is alſo primate of all the German abbies. After his election, he pays the pope, his only eccleſiaſtical ſuperior, the inconſiderable ſum of about 40l. The pope in 1727 allowed him the power of cauſing himſelf to be choſen ſuffragan or vicar-general. All the members of his abbey, which is of the Benedictine order, muſt be *noble*; and in them is veſted the power of election. The abbot in Guſtavus's time, Bernard Schenk, choſen March 12, 1623, made no ceremony of cloathing himſelf in armour, and following the fortunes of Tilly and Wallſtein. He was killed at the battle of Lutzen not very gloriously; for having mounted the ſtaircaſe of the wind-mills, that ſtood at ſome diſtance from the main action, and which are to be ſeen at this moment, he had his head ſtruck off by a cannon-ball.

† Tom. i. pag. 162, &c. APPENDIX, Art. xxiii.

purpoſe

purpoſe out of the garriſons of Sileſia and Luſatia; and John, baron Aldringer*, with all poſſible expedition marched an

* Born of obſcure parents in the county of Luxemberg, was originally valet de chambre, and then ſecretary to a French nobleman, but roſe, at length, upon Cratz being ſuperſeded, to the ſupreme command of the Bavarian army. He applied himſelf intenſely to reading, and was employed in the *chancery* at Trent. As he was a man of ready and enterpriſing parts, his colleagues ſoon conceived a jealouſy againſt him, and counterworked and traverſed him ſo much, that in a rage, conformably to the ſuperſtition of thoſe times, he quitted his employment, and determined to take up the profeſſion of the firſt man he met upon the road. In his way to Inſpruch, he fell in with a ſoldier croſſing a bridge, and accompanied him into Italy. His pen rendered him very ſerviceable in the regiment wherein he inliſted, and ſoon raiſed him to a lieutenancy. Having, at the head of fifty men, defended a poſt to admiration, he was choſen by a nephew of the archbiſhop of Saltzburg to be his military director, and advanced, by him, to the place of ſerjeant-major. He then roſe to the rank of colonel, an employment of great importance and honour in thoſe days, ſome colonels having commanded a body of twelve or fifteen thouſand men; and in the year 1630 had, jointly with Galas, upon the death of Colalto, the chief direction of affairs before Mantua.

He was the beſt debater of the age, in a council of war, and was thought neceſſary in Bavaria to compoſe the miſunderſtandings between that court and Vienna. He had the misfortune to be wounded in the head at the paſſage of the Lech, being then a general, and grand-maſter of the artillery. The ſame campaign, he joined Walſtein in Bohemia, notwithſtanding all the efforts that were made to counteract him, but returned to Bavaria to oppoſe Horn. His beſt exploit as a general, after my period of hiſtory concludes, was his contributing to raiſe the ſiege of Conſtance in 1633. He then ſerved under the duke of Feria, who conducted the Spaniſh troops, and by Walſtein's orders contrived to thwart and perplex him to ſuch a degree, as to break his heart: for the duke was a perſon of very delicate ſenſations in point of honour and all engagements between man and man. The public eſteemed him one of the fineſt gentlemen of that age, and it was his character to be humane and merciful beyond deſcription. He was known at home to be the beſt politician in the court of Madrid, but it was his misfortune to reſort late to the profeſſion of arms, merely by the compulſion of his maſter. He died of grief at Munich, much in the manner of his predeceſſor and inſtructor, the great Spinola, at Scrivia, and of the ſelf-ſame malady.

Aldringer was killed in the ſame year, 1634, on the bridge at Landſhut, whether by the Swedes or his own men, is uncertain. The latter may be ſuſpected, for with all his parts, and ſeveral good qualities, he was auſtere, paſſionate, and revengeful. He attempted to kill Sirot for drawing on a lieutenant-colonel in his preſence, though the provocation was great and ſudden, and never could be induced to ſpare his life, ſo far as was in his power, either at the council of war in Italy, or in his repreſentations to the ſupreme council at Vienna. His parts were ſo ſolid, adroit, penetrating, and lively, that he was uſually called the *Spaniard Italianiſed*. Which puts me in mind of a very figurative obſervation, (which comes nearer to Aldringer's caſe) made, if I miſtake not, by the author of the Memoirs of the duke de Grammont, for not having the work before me, I take the liberty to quote my memory; *Un Allemand depaïſé & Italieniſé eſt un diable incarné.*

I muſt obſerve, laſtly, that he drew up moſt of the political papers and manifeſtos, that were publiſhed in behalf of the catholic league. He amaſſed vaſt wealth in the plunder of Mantua, not much to his honour. Neverthe-

army of 8000 men, propoſing and expecting to reach his generaliſſimo in about three weeks. Many of theſe troops were men of approved ſervice, and had performed great things, in Italy, under their commander.

Ever ſince the publication of the Leipſic concluſions, the houſe of Auſtria had not been inattentive to the part, which the court of Saxony might think fit to act; and of courſe Hagenmüller, one of the interior council at Vienna, had been diſpatched to the elector with inſtructions to beg him and his colleagues to diſcontinue levying of ſoldiers, and allow free paſſage and ſubſiſtence to the Imperial armies; requeſting him likewiſe to perform the part of a mediator, and bring about a peace between Guſtavus and the emperor. The latter propoſal was not diſagreeable to the elector's private caſt of politics, nor did it croſs the opinion of Arnheim, who was in effect his prime-miniſter, as well as his general. Still this prince had not courage to declare openly on either ſide. He accordingly made freſh profeſſions of loyalty and obedience to the houſe of Auſtria, ſecretly inclined to do it ſervice, if a fair opportunity preſented itſelf; but this was only a tranſient private wiſh, and not a ſettled political principle; for, at the ſame time, he knew Guſtavus, and feared to diſoblige him. On this account he gave himſelf up to that fluctuation of mind, which is uſually determined by the doctrine of apparent convenience. Something likewiſe was inſinuated, as if the houſe of Auſtria ſhould conſider certain meaſures, ſuppoſing them to be taken, a ſort of high treaſon againſt the empire; and, what was ſtill leſs politic, the letters from Munich took the liberty to adopt the ſame tone*.

All the catholic troops before mentioned, were intended to overpower the elector of Saxony, and the Imperialiſts had the preſumption to call themſelves *the invincible army*. Meanwhile Tilly attempted to draw the elector into the catholic intereſts, by gentle means, and, with that view, requeſted him, as he was then at Merſburg, to give an audience to three perſons, deputed from him with full authority to treat and ratify; namely, John Reinart, baron of Metternich, catholic adminiſtrator of the dioceſe of Magdeburg, Otho Frederic, baron de Schomberg, grand-maſter of the artillery, who was killed at Leipſic, and Bernardi,

leſs he ſpent it with magnificence and profuſion, and yet left conſiderable ſums in the banks of Genoa and Venice. After receiving the fatal wound, he paſſed the little time he lived in making ſtrict enquiries after the perſon who ſhot him. He was buried with great marks of honour. The emperor had created him firſt a baron, and then a count.

* *Memoires d'Electrice Palatine*, 290.

nardi, Tilly's ſecretary. The elector, who loved hoſpitality, made them welcome, and diſſembled his reſentment extremely well; but after dinner told them coolly, that he conſidered himſelf and the emperor as Ulyſſes and Polyphemus, *and that the only favour he had to expect, was to be devoured the laſt.* Saxony, continued he, is reſerved as the deſert, which is to crown the Imperial banquet. Remember, gentlemen, that in the fruits that help to compoſe a deſert, ſome are auſtere and of dangerous digeſtion, and ſome have ſtones, that can only be cracked to the detriment of the teeth *.

He pronounced theſe words with ſo forbidding an air, that the commiſſioners hardly cared to proceed to buſineſs. However, at length they explained to him Tilly's propoſals, which, when compared to what had happened, and what naturally might happen, with reference to the conduct of the houſe of Auſtria, were conſidered as mere ſounds, and not realities.

Enraged at this diffidence in the court of Dreſden, the Imperial general was tempted to make a falſe ſtep as a politician, and ruined himſelf and his maſter's cauſe, greatly to the diſapprobation of that wiſe and artful prince the duke of Bavaria †. His buſineſs was mildly to have allured the elector into the catholic intereſts by all ſorts of promiſes, conceſſions, and gratifications; and, in caſe nothing of that nature could have ſucceeded, then to have removed his arms from Saxony, which ſingle circumſtance might have pacified the elector, who wiſhed nothing more than to be exempted from war, and carried the ſcene of action into Pomerania and Mechlenburg, ſince, by ſuch a diverſion Guſtavus in the long run muſt have been obliged to follow him; for in thoſe days he could not have ſubſiſted, if the intercourſe had been cut off between him and Sweden. Tilly's genius and fortune both began to decline. Either ill luck made this general iraſcible, or his fretfulneſs blinded his judgment, and rendered him unlucky. However that may be, he delivered himſelf up to the peeviſhneſs of old age. Of courſe, without waiting for the return of the deputies, he, on the ſide of Leipſic, having united Furſtenberg's army, which conſiſted of 10,000 men, with his own forces; and Holk ‡ and

* *Memoires d'Electrice Palatine*, 301.

† *Adelzreiter, Annal. Bavar.* Part iii. lib. 16. Fol. Lipſ. 1710.

‡ As Holk's cruelties ſurpaſſed all credibility, it is a misfortune, that Tilly, ſpeaking in the perſon of the tutelar deity of Saxony, had not made uſe of Taſſo's words, in his inſtructions to this general:

Guarda tu le mei leggi, e i ſacri tempi
Fa, ch'io del ſangue mio non bagni e lavi:

and Galas * joining him on the ſide of Miſnia, they poured into the electorate like two raging torrents, and ſpread nothing round them but devaſtation; having upon the whole at leaſt 40,000 ſoldiers under their command. No military execution ever reſembled this irruption, except that unhappy one, which Turenne was obliged to make into the Palatinate in 1674, and which continues an everlaſting reproach to the humanity of his nature and the politeneſs of the nation which he ſerved. Though courts are in the end principally to be blamed for theſe barbarities, yet the generals, who carry them into execution, can neither be juſtified by their friends, nor can they exculpate themſelves to their own conſciences. As if Providence ordained that ſuch actions ſhould counterwork the very intentions of their contrivers, the inhabitants of Saxony, far from being terrified, were thereby rather hardened againſt the emperor. Nevertheleſs, when their deputies remonſtrated to Tilly, on the depopulation and ravages committed by his ſoldiers, he replied with an ill-natured countenance, That his Walloons and Burgundians were not birds; nor could they ſubſiſt on air: and then diſmiſſed the remonſtrators with an adage of Cato, deſiring it might make ſome impreſſion on their memories, *Fronte capillatâ, poſt eſt occaſio calva.* Thus a neceſſity of the houſe of Auſtria's own creation, for Tilly owns in a letter dated ſeventeen days after the battle of Leipſic, that he entered Saxony in obedience to a mandate from Vienna.

Aſſecura le vergini da gli empii
E i ſepoleri e le ceneri de gli avi,
A te piangendo i lor paſſati tempi.
Monſtran la brancha chioma i vecchi gravi,
A te la moglie le mammolle e'l petto,
Le cune e il figli e'l marital ſuo letto. *Cant.* xx.

* Mathias, count Galas, a native of the biſhopric of Trent, whoſe real name was Galaſſo. He ſucceeded Colalto, in conjunction with Aldringer, at the ſiege of Mantua, and roſe at length to one of the ſupreme commands in the Imperial army. He releaſed old count Thurn, whom he happened to take priſoner in Sileſia, either from greatneſs of mind, as he did not chooſe a brave enemy ſhould die ignominiouſly on a ſcaffold, or from the fear probably, as has been elſewhere ſuggeſted, of diſobliging Walſtein. This retarded his preferment for ſome months; but on the aſſaſſination of that general, in whoſe death he would take no public part, though it is thought by ſome, that he indirectly promoted his fall, the court thought it worth while to make uſe of his aſſiſtance. He died in 1646, and left behind him one of the fineſt palaces in Prague, where the family is ſtill ſettled.

The king of Hungary gave him the chief command at the famous battle of Nordlingen, as did alſo the cardinal infant at the ſame king's requeſt. His diſpoſition was ſo fine, that Leganez, a renowned general, could not help crying out, "The beſt officer in the world might learn ſomething from Galas."

Vienna *, forced the elector into the arms of the king of Sweden, to whom, as he ſtill continued in his camp at Werben, being determined not to move till he was firſt invited, Arnheim was immediately diſpatched on poſt-horſes, to implore his aſſiſtance, and beſeech him to raiſe the ſiege of Leipſic. That town, the moſt important in Saxony of wealth and commerce, was then actually inveſted by the Imperial general; whom a large cannon-ball happened to miſs, but killed a cavalier on horſeback cloſe by him, and reſerved him for the mortification of ſurviving his military glory in the fatal battle, which afterwards took place on the plains of Leipſic.

Guſtavus received Arnheim with a dignified air, coolly obſerving, *that nothing had happened but what he foreſaw, and had predicted to his maſter on various occaſions. He made no ſcruple to own, that he had taken his motions with a view to force this event into exiſtence; and that if the elector had lent a favourable ear to his repreſentations, neither Magdeburg had been taken, nor Saxony endangered.* He then interperſed a few condolences artfully enough, and concluded with ſaying, *That he had formed a plan of employing his troops to great advantage elſewhere, being obliged out of gratitude to ſupport the elector of Brandenburg, and the princes of Lower Saxony: yet he was always ready, as a man of honour and generoſity, to forgive and protect the unfortunate.* He expected, nevertheleſs, upon ſuch conceſſions and advances made on his part, *That the electoral prince ſhould ſerve in his army as an hoſtage. That the town of Wittemberg ſhould be conſigned to him for a place of retreat* †. *That the elector ſhould furniſh his troops with three months pay. That he ſhould produce the traitors of the Auſtrian faction, who had given him evil counſel; and that he, Guſtavus, ſhould be their judge* ‡. *Laſtly, that a treaty ſhould be ſigned, offenſive and defenſive, between the king of Sweden and the elector of Saxony.*

Arnheim flew to his maſter on wings of joy, if his own account might be credited, and returned directly with the following anſwers: *That the elector as well as the prince his ſon would take up their reſidence in the Swediſh army. That not Wittemberg only, but the whole electorate ſhould*

* *Lettre du Comte de Tilly à un ſien ami.* De Halberſtadt, le 24 Sept. 1631.

† As Deſſau bridge had been broken down, vol. i. p. 352, here was the only convenient bridge in thoſe parts over the Elbe.

‡ This was meant at Arnheim and others *in terrorem*, for the king never intended to inſiſt ſincerely on this head; as, if he had, he muſt have ſtripped the elector at once of his generaliſſimo, his prime-miniſter, count Swartzerberg, and Dr. Hoe his firſt chaplain.

*be open to the Swedes in case of a retreat. That a month's pay should be advanced immediately, and security given for the residue. That a specification should be delivered in of the several traitors: who should all be punished in the most exemplary manner* *: and, finally, the elector empowered Arnheim to declare, *that he would embark his life and fortunes in the cause of Sweden;* concluding with equal candour and politeness, *that his obligations to Gustavus were proportionate to his distresses.*

These preliminaries being adjusted, it was added farther, on the part of the elector, from his own free impulse, "That he would undertake to subsist the Swedish army so long as they continued in Saxony, and undertook the defence thereof; that he would resign to the king all the rights of supreme command, rendering himself conformable to his will as far as all human compliance could carry him; and in the last place gave his honour to conclude no peace without his majesty's concurrence."

To all these replies and proposals, Gustavus answered in a few words, without a moment's pause: *That the elector must pardon him for taking the liberty to insist upon securities, as he had so long kept his attention on the perpetual alarm. Nevertheless, if he advanced but a month's pay to his soldiers, he would take upon him to promise, that they should earn it well; provided always, the supreme direction vested in himself alone*; for there the king would have no competitor.

It may appear matter of astonishment to many, that the elector of Saxony did not join Gustavus sooner! But observers of this description allow themselves to be imposed upon by the superficial appearances of things; *Qui ad pauca respiciunt, de facili pronuntiant*, says the historian. Upon closer examination, it appears to me, that the Saxon ministers, if you can excuse them being *pensioners* to the court of Vienna, were neither weak men nor cowards. A neutrality, had it been possible, was the wisest measure they could have pursued; they had no desire to crush Gustavus or the house of Austria. Matters at length proceeded to such extremities, that there remained no middle course to steer. The Imperial resentments broke forth in earnest on one side, insomuch that when Hagenmüller, the Austrian ambassador, made an offer to kiss the elector's hand on his return to Vienna, he plainly told him it was the kiss of Judas, and Gustavus, on the other, was a monarch, neither to be trifled with nor cajoled. The former conduct of John George, the present elector, whether by accident

* *Arlanbæi Arma Suecica*, 184.

or

or prudence, I will not take upon me to aſſert, had occaſioned no material diſadvantage to the king of Sweden, if we except the mortification and diſappointment his majeſty underwent with reference to Magdeburg. The entire diſbelief that this prince, and the other proteſtant powers, would ever preſume to join Guſtavus, till after the occurrence of ſome event very unfavourable to the houſe of Auſtria, was the ſecret reaſon, which gave that monarch time and leiſure to take root and flouriſh, like a tree, unobſerved; for at firſt, Tilly, Walſtein, and their maſters, all overlooked him and deſpiſed him. It is even probable our hero would have been greatly retarded in the execution of his enterpriſe, if the *Leipſic confederation* had openly eſpouſed the Swediſh cauſe; for three Imperial generals were then hovering round the electorate we are now ſpeaking of; and Tilly, in caſe he had omitted the ſiege of Magdeburg, might have poſted himſelf between Pomerania and Saxony. Hence it appears, that the Dreſden miniſters were not ſuch weak or unſucceſsful politicians, at this trying conjuncture, as moſt people have been apt to imagine.

The aſpect of the German hemiſphere began now to preſage a ſtorm; upon foreſeeing which, the Imperialiſts and princes of the league were reſolved to make a conſiderable effort. The emperor ſent his prime-miniſter, the prince of Eggenberg*, into Stiria, Carinthia, and Carniola, in order to collect a freſh ſupply of men. The ſame was done in Bohemia, Hungary, Moravia, and Sileſia. Cardinal Ditrichſtein† raiſed ſome regiments himſelf: and the new levied Bavarian recruits, both of infantry and cavalry, were pronounced in appearance the fineſt that Europe had hitherto ſeen.

Tilly, at the head of 44,000 veteran troops, having miſcarried in the attempt to croſs the Elbe at Torgau, which Arnheim's vigilance prevented, made himſelf maſter of Zeitz and Merſburg; and then inveſting Leipſic, ſent word to the commander, that, unleſs he ſurrendered immediately, he muſt expect the fate of Magdeburg. The governor requeſted leave to aſk advice of the elector; who was en-

* John Ulric, duke of Crommau, prince of Eggenberg, knight of the Golden Fleece, director of the council, &c.

† Francis, biſhop of Olmutz, privy-counſellor, protector of the hereditary dominions, plenipotentiary-governor and commiſſary-general of Moravia, firſt baron in that country, &c. and, in the emperor's abſence, lieutenant of the Lower Auſtria. This prelate was ſeverely queſtioned by the Moravians, whether he acted in concert with Walſtein or not, in 1619, had a guard placed round him, and was obliged to give his parole of honour, which he did with tears, not to quit the country without the privity of the ſtates. He roſe upon the diſgrace of cardinal Kleſel.

camped

camped at Torgau, about thirty miles from him; but that indulgence was denied him. He afterwards made ſome ſlight reſiſtance; and a cannon-ball, unfortunately for Tilly's reputation, miſſed killing him, as was before obſerved, by an hair's breadth. The town was given up the ſecond day; three meſſengers bearing exhortations from the elector to the governor, to acquit himſelf like a man of honour, were hanged; and the caſtle of Pleiſſenberg, which might have made a week's reſiſtance, ſurrendered in the ſame infamous manner. Yet ſo relaxed was the diſcipline of the Saxon army in thoſe days, that the ſame man, whoſe name I think was Vopel, was reſtored to his government after the battle of Leipſic, and delivered up the citadel a ſecond time in the ſame manner to general Holk, the enſuing year. The unhappy town redeemed itſelf from plunder, by paying 32,000 l. or thereabouts.

Oxenſtiern had no hand in the important and critical negotiation, already mentioned, betwixt his maſter and the elector of Saxony; he was then in command of a ſeparate army in *Regal* Pruſſia, being directed to obſerve the countenance of the Polanders. So great indeed were Guſtavus's parts in all reſpects, that he had rarely occaſion for *him* as a politician even on the moſt preſſing emergencies, any further than to free himſelf from a multiplicity of trouble and buſineſs. Whilſt Oxenſtiern ſecured the eaſtern part of Germany, which borders on the Baltic, Horn and Banier were commanded to clear the weſtern part: for his Swediſh majeſty, in the midſt of his conqueſts, always ſecured the poſſibility of a good retreat. Theſe two generals eſtabliſhed a regency in the provinces of Magdeburg and Halberſtadt. Banier blockaded the former, but Pappenheim obliged him to raiſe the ſiege. When the duke of Lunenberg joined him with a ſmall but well-conducted army, the Imperial general was compelled to evacuate Magdeburg, abandon the open country, and retire to Weſtphalia and Franconia, into which circles the Swedes purſued him ſtep by ſtep. Magdeburg being thus re-conquered, the few of its ſurviving inhabitants returned, for all admired the lenity of the Swediſh government; many old emigrants flocked in from other countries; and under ſuch protection every perſon ſet to work to revive trade and rebuild the town.

Tilly's firſt object was to make his irruption into Saxony by Torgau, where there was a bridge over the Elbe; hoping, with great reaſon, to prevent the junction of the Swediſh and Saxon armies, by poſting his troops midway betwixt them

them both. Arnheim foreſtalled him in that attempt, by previouſly poſſeſſing himſelf of a paſs of ſuch great importance. Meanwhile, Guſtavus laid by as a reſerved and cautious ſpectator at Wittemberg; and the elector of Brandenburg was with him. The elector of Saxony joined them there; and they all entered into as ſtrong an union as could be deviſed. The Swediſh army paſſed the Elbe, and joined the Saxon forces near Dieben, a ſmall town lying on the great road to Berlin, about twelve miles from Leipſic. Here Guſtavus invited the two electors into his own apartment; and held, at the ſame time, a grand political debate, and a council of war. With all the coolneſs of an experienced ſtateſman, he propoſed to act upon the *defenſive* principle, ſupporting his ideas of the matter to this effect. That, as Tilly had taken care to poſt himſelf very advantageouſly, having by this time entered Saxony by way of Merſburg and Halle, and inveſted Leipſic, the judicious part would be, either to wait for ſome favourable opportunity to attack him by ſurprize, or lead him on by artifice into plain ground, and decide the affair upon equal terms. Such an old and prudent general, continued Guſtavus, will never ſacrifice the flower of the Imperial troops, and the fair reputation of an uninterrupted ſeries of victories for thirteen years paſt, except the neceſſity be great and urgent:—and if he ſhould happen to overcome us, you two princes are loſt beyond redemption. The elector of Saxony, impatient and enraged to the laſt degree, to ſee his country depopulated, and his ſubjects ruined by a ſort of military inquiſition, declared ſtrenuouſly for a ſpeedy and deciſive battle. This opinion, *being privately that of Guſtavus,* was, after ſome objections and repreſentations, frankly complied with; and the rather, as Aldringer, who then lay at Erfurt, had not arrived with his part of the Imperial army. Guſtavus and John George, the elector of Brandenburg, for ſome private reaſons being returned home, marched their combined troops within ſight of the enemy, who, having conquered Leipſic town and caſtle forty-eight hours before, had advanced that day as far as Breitenfeld, a ſmall town about four miles from Leipſic; which was thought by many a great overſight, whereof we ſhall give a diſtinct account hereafter. It is ſtill more remarkable, that Tilly knew nothing of the junction of the Swedes and Saxons till towards noon *, when he received intelligence from ſome of his *partiſans* who were ſcouring the country, that the *united* troops had been diſcovered in full march againſt him; and this he acknow-

* *Arma Sueçica*, 189.

ledges

ledges in a letter, which we have cited ſome pages before. Of courſe, he had removed from Leipſic with a view to encounter only the elector of Saxony, who indeed had declared he would attack the Imperialiſts, in caſe Guſtavus refuſed to join him. The old Walloon expected nothing more impatiently than this event; for the electoral army amounted to ſomething leſs than half the number of his; nor were the commanders, Arnheim excepted, and his military character was not without blemiſh, a ſet of men much renowned in war; and as to the common ſoldiers, they were new raiſed levies, and without experience.

No general ever acted with more coolneſs and prudence than Guſtavus, in all the ſteps he took, previous to this great event. He determined, from the moment Tilly pointed his invaſion into Saxony, in good earneſt, to advance near enough the elector, to be enabled to join him; and yet at the ſame time reſolved, never to effect that junction, except after the moſt preſſing and repeated ſolicitations; which indeed he wiſely foreſaw muſt ſoon be made in the common nature of things. Having therefore reduced his thoughts to a ſyſtem on this occaſion, he made a ſpeedy march, at the head of the beſt part of the cavalry that belonged to the camp at Werben, and 2000 dragoons, to the important paſs of Wittemberg, leaving Bauditzen to command ſuch regiments of horſe as remained in their lines, and Hepburn the infantry, and ſecured his point before Tilly had received intelligence of his motions. He at the ſame time iſſued out orders to Horn and Banier, to meet him immediately with their reſpective armies, at a place of rendezvous, ſixteen miles from Wittemberg; and conveyed ſimilar inſtructions to colonel Cag, who then laid at Havelburg with his own regiment and that of Monro. Here the king joined them, attended only by a few followers, and employed a week not only in reviewing and modelling them, but in giving the finiſhing hand to the treaty then in agitation betwixt him and John George. This march to Wittemberg may be conſidered as the key, which opened to Guſtavus the door to his future path of renown and glory. Yet ſo delicate was he in point of honour, and ſo extremely averſe to make uſe of compulſive meaſures, in ſpite of all *that* ſuperiority, which Providence had given him, that, having once ſecured the bridge of Wittemberg, he commanded his army to encamp on the weſtern ſide of the Elbe, the elector and his forces being lodged on the eaſtern ſide, nor did he permit his troops to croſs the river, till he received authority to march, from the duke of Saxony.

When this junction was formed, it was matter of ſurprize to contemplate the appearance of the two combined armies. The

The Swedes had ſlept all night upon a duſty new-ploughed field, for the ſeaſon of the year was extremely dry, inſomuch that every regiment ſeemed to be cloathed in one dirty uniform of the ſame brown colour; not to mention the duſt they had raiſed in a march of eighteen miles that day. The Saxons, on the other hand, were well lodged and new apparelled, even to a fantaſtic degree of oſtentation. The officers had ornamented themſelves with more plumes than heroes on a theatre; but neither they nor their ſoldiers fulfilled the obſervation of the hiſtorian, *etiam uncti pugnabunt.*

It was here the king received undoubted intelligence, that Tilly had taken Leipſic, and advanced to Breitenfeld. Not diſpleaſed to find, that an aged and experienced general had quitted a ſituation ſo extremely advantageous as that near Leipſic, he, in ſpite of all fatigues, laid hold of the ardour of his troops, whilſt they were in good humour and high ſpirits, *that being his maxim,* and marched them twelve miles the next morning, till he came in ſight of the Imperial camp; having ſpent the early part of the day in cloſe devotion, and commanded public prayers throughout the army.

Being now ſure of coming to a general deciſion, inaſmuch as Tilly had diſlodged from a more commodious encampment, he left all his baggage and tents behind him under a proper guard, partly that his retreat, in caſe of accidents, might not be encumbered; and partly, becauſe it was his fixed reſolution to ſleep without tents in the open fields, and keep the ardour of his followers on the full ſtretch, till the termination of the affair, which he had the power to bring on the next day. Thus, by a ſort of conduct very determined, it appeared plainly to the meaneſt ſoldiers, that their maſter had reſolved to decide the fate of Germany in a leſs ſpace of time than eight and forty hours.

Some days before this nearer approach of the proteſtant army, it is reported, that Tilly ſent a trumpeter to the king, and, * according to a cuſtom, not uncommon in thoſe times, invited him, as a *brave cavalier,* to march forwards, and give him battle. *Friend,* ſaid Guſtavus to the meſſenger, with an air of diſdain, *tell your maſter I am a KING, as well as a cavalier, and ſhall make it my buſineſs to find him ſoon.* After this military herald was diſmiſſed, he turned round, in a ſort of pique, to his generals, and ſaid, *That he ſhould advance with pleaſure, to make a colliſion betwixt a crown and two electoral bonnets on the one ſide, and the carcaſs of an old corporal on the other* †.

* *Soldat. Suedois. Swed. Diſcipline,* part iii. p. 7.

† It was a common ſaying with Guſtavus, that Tilly was an *old corporal,*

Wallen

Thoſe of Tilly's army, who were influenced by ſuperſtitious preſages, were much dejected, when it appeared that the general, by mere chance, had held his council of war, two evenings before the battle, in the houſe of a poor man, whoſe buſineſs it was to be gentleman uſher to the funerals in the ſuburbs of Leipſic. The very houſe, if I miſtake not, is ſtill ſhewn, and the outſide walls appear to have been decorated with ſkulls, coffins, hour-glaſſes, and ſhank-bones, painted in freſco. It has been obſerved, that the *undaunted* Pappenheim was never known to ſhow ſigns of uneaſineſs but upon this occaſion. Till that moment, he had conſidered all preſages and omens as the effects of melancholy and weakneſs. Some remarked too, that the battle of Leipſic might happen preciſely the ſame day twelve months with the maſſacre at Paſwalk.

The king's troops were much elated, ſome few minutes before the engagement, to ſee a bird of ſo wild and timorous a nature as the ring-dove, perch itſelf on one of the royal ſtandards; a trifling circumſtance, which appeared to the Swediſh ſoldiers a certain omen of victory.

A deciſive battle ſeemed now to be ſettled, for great generals require but a ſingle glance to comprehend each other's motions and intentions. This ſort of military intuition is acquired by knowing, preciſely, the abilities and intereſts of their adverſary, and by a ſubſtitution of themſelves in his place, with the ſame wants, and the ſame degree of capacity, as he has. Hence it is, that feints and falſe marches rarely alarm, or draw them into a diſagreeable ſituation. Tilly was ſo circumſtanced as to excite compaſſion. He was now entering his ſeventieth year, and in vain ſought for himſelf in his own breaſt. The affair of Magdeburg hung heavy on his ſpirits, and age had *leſſened* his authority over the army. Pappenheim's appetite for danger forced him into perpetual hazards, and the petulant deſire of fighting, right or wrong, in the younger officers, ſeemed tacitly to reproach him, either with the *want* of reſolution, or with *not* being the hero he had *once* been. What emotions this general felt, under ſuch circumſtances, is beyond my ability to deſcribe! He had never yet incurred a military diſgrace, but, on the contrary, had been victorious in *thirty-ſix ſignal engagements and pitched battles.* One of the greateſt misfortunes

Walſtein a *madman*, but Pappenheim, a *ſoldier*; and that he feared no general belonging to the enemy, excepting this *Balafré*, or *cicatricibus deformem*, as Waſſenberg tranſlates it: (Florus German. p. 316.) for Pappenheim carried on his body the marks of an hundred wounds, though at that time, being of the ſame age with Guſtavus, he had entered only into his thirty-ſeventh year.

tunes that can befal a general, is to outlive his profperity, or to continue in the exercife of the military command when too old. Thus Alexander, prince of Parma, had died the moft illuftrious warrior of his age, if, after the fine fiege of Antwerp, he had bade farewell to war, as his friends adviſed him; ſince he made no conſiderable figure afterwards in the Low Countries, but, on the contrary, loſt Zutphen, Deventer, Hulſt, Nimeguen, Breda, &c. Such likewiſe was Tilly's unhappineſs, in having miſſed what Tacitus ſomewhere elegantly calls the *opportunitatem mortis**. It now was his deſtiny to have to do with a warrior, in whom the ſupreme command was inveſted without any reſerve or abridgment of power: a hero, vigilant, ſkilful, intrepid, in the very flower both of activity and judgment. Though the Imperial troops were the fierceſt and beſt ſeaſoned of any that Europe had ever ſeen, many having ſerved in the Low-Country wars twenty years and more, in Germany, from the year 1618, and all, in every battle, bating the feweſt exceptions, invincible; yet there were reaſons to dread a body of men, who, though comparatively novices in military practice, were ſober, patient, and virtuous; better diſciplined, cloathed, and fed; bearing an entire ſubmiſſion to their leader, and placing an abſolute confidence in him, who was moreover Tilly's ſuperior in the management of artillery, and in the diſpoſition and arrangement of his troops. All Europe ſtood aloof at this moſt intereſting event; and when theſe circumſtances are combined together, can the reader be aſtoniſhed, if poor old Tilly turned *pale* once or twice, when he ſaw the Swediſh army advance to the attack, drawn up in the moſt beautiful array, and ranged upon principles, to him, then unknown, approach-

* What has been ſaid in like circumſtances of Spinola's bodily torments, and mental perturbation, on a death-bed, may, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to Tilly and the prince of Parma. Nor is the picture of the former inelegantly delineated by a poet of that age:

Sive illum ſua ſors, ſeu ſpes decepta Caſalis
Abſtulerit, virtus ſive indignata domari,
Incertum eſt;—doluit longa obſidione teneri
Caſalias arces: deſperatoque triumpho
Sollicitum invaſit morbus; convellitur imis
Viſceribus, penituſque virum vis ignea vexat;
Arma amens petit, armatis trepida undique cingi
Caſtra putat: Francoſque ſuo cum Rege ruentes
Ægra mente videt; patriamque elatus in urbem
Poſt tot devictos populos, tot bella, tot hoſtes,
Oppida tot, tot caſtra, urbeſque arceſque ſubactas,
Vincitur a fato invictus, vitæque ſupremam
Heic ubi primam hauſit, clauſit Dux *Spinola* lucem.

*Caſalum Bis Liberatum*, p. 142. octavo.

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ing ſlowly and ſilently, with that conſiderate determined countenance, which preſages no good to the army that is to engage with them?——Although ſome writers* mention the circumſtance of Tilly's changing colour upon ſuch a proſpect, invidiouſly, yet it is probable this diſcompoſure aroſe not from fear, as appears by his future conduct in the battle, but from conviction of the error, which the younger officers had drawn him into, and from the probability of ſetting the greateſt ſhare of military ſucceſs, that perhaps any one man had ever poſſeſſed, upon the chance of a ſingle die, that very chance not judiciouſly choſen, himſelf being ſo far advanced in years, that he could never hope to reſtore his character by future ſervices!

For theſe reaſons, he wiſely determined within himſelf, either to fortify his camp, or evade a battle; and the rather, as he expected Aldringer and Tieffenbach to join him with 12,000 experienced troops. Pappenheim's impetuoſity, however, was irreſiſtible, nor was it in his power, without totally loſing the hearts of his army, to put in practice his favourite maxim, never to dip his foot in water, till he had made ſome experiment of the degree of cold; or, as other hiſtorians relate the ſaying, "never to wade in a ſtream, except his eye-ſight could command the bottom."

His firſt purpoſe in the council of war held at the gravedigger's houſe, and which appears to have been the beſt, his private opinion being in truth his real intereſt and duty as a general, was to have maintained his original intrenchments, with, at his elbow, the rich town of Leipſic; whence he might have drawn proviſions in the ſame manner, having his own garriſon in the town, as the king ſupported himſelf in the lines of Werben. During that interval, it is poſſible likewiſe, that the troops of Cologne might have arrived. Nor could he, in this camp, have extended his front in the imprudent manner he did afterwards on the field of battle. He ſaw plainly too, that it was not his buſineſs to fight, except urged thereto by ſome extraordinary and almoſt irreſiſtible neceſſity. He well remembered the cruelty and outrages which the Imperial army had committed, and concluded every peaſant, in an enemy's territory, an enliſted ſoldier againſt him, in caſe of a defeat. All the world knows, that ill ſucceſs is doubly dangerous in an hoſtile country; and, what is yet more, he wanted nothing in the camp near Leipſic. It is thought too, winter being then faſt approaching, that if he had declined a battle, and in-

* Hiſtoire des Guerres & des Traittez qui precedérent la Paix de Munſter, par Pere *Bougeant*, iii. tom. 4°. There is no authority for this aſſertion.

trenched

trenched himſelf wiſely, the elector of Saxony would have been tired of his new gueſts long before the ſpring*. Pappenheim, ſeemingly impeaching the courage of the generaliſſimo, touched his ſenſibility to the very quick, and induced him to relinquiſh his firſt camp; the old man ſtill determined, within himſelf, not to bring on a general engagement.

The ſelf-ſame debate was reſumed on the approach of Guſtavus, and the new camp near Breitenfeld was protected with ſome temporary intrenchments the day before the battle. Schomberg, and ſome of the elder officers, concurred with Tilly in the opinion of declining a general battle, if it were poſſible: but Pappenheim drew the count de Furſtenberg, who aimed at ſucceeding Tilly, and the younger colonels into a contrary opinion, and though the majority inclined to countenance the commander in chief, his great zeal contrived the next day, to accompliſh that event in the field, which he had fruitleſsly laboured to effect in a council of war†.

A fair champaign country ſpreads itſelf all round the ſide of Leipſic, where the imperial general fixed his camp; but part, as it was now the month of September, had been freſh ploughed. It was the very ſpot, according to ſome hiſtorians, and named, if I miſtake not, *God's acre*, where Charles V. overthrew Frederic, elector of Saxony, and took him and Philip, landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, priſoners, diveſting the former both of the duchy and the electorate.

The two armies being now within three miles of each other, his majeſty, the evening before the battle, aſſembled all the generals that ſerved under him, and having ranged them round him in a circle in the middle of the plain, for the Swedes ſlept that night in the open air, told them plainly, ſince he diſcovered a ſpirit of reſolution in their countenances, *That they were to fight with troops, to-morrow, of a different ſtamp from Polanders and Coſſacks. Fellow Soldiers*, ſaid he, *I ſhall not diſſemble the danger; you will have a day's work, that is worthy of you. It is not my temper to diminiſh the merit of veteran troops like the Imperialiſts; but I know my officers at bottom, and ſcorn the thoughts of deceiving them. I foreſee too, that our numbers will prove inferior to thoſe of the enemy; but my friends, God is juſt,*——AND REMEMBER MAGDEBURG‡!

* *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 171.

† *Letter from an Imperial Officer to a Friend. Halberſtadt, September* 22, 1631.

‡ I have only given the more material ſubſtance of this ſpeech, which *Chemnitz* ſets forth at large, tom. i. 170.

Some few minutes before, he made the tour of his army, and told every body of troops, with a peculiar cheerfulneſs on his countenance, what particular duties they were to perform the next day. He ſeemed moſt in pain for one large diviſion of cavalry, the horſemen being unarmed, and the horſes of a ſlight make; well knowing, that the Imperial cuiraſſiers, covered with iron from head to foot, and mounted upon beaſts of a conſiderable bulk, would ſoon diſunite them by the ſimple effort of ſqueezing. His advice therefore was *to advance briſkly up to the enemy without firing*, and apply their ſabres with an oblique ſliding motion to their horſes noſes, heads, and necks. Thus, ſays he, the Imperial ranks will ſoon be broken, and the diſmounted cavalier will find his armour too cumberſome to be enabled to moleſt you, during the remaining part of the engagement*. What highly deſerves obſervation, is, that the beſt commentator on the military life of Guſtavus makes uſe of this very practice in the diſcipline of the Pruſſian cavalry. The king flanked theſe troops with good bodies of infantry, and interlined others amongſt them at various intervals.

The elector of Brandenburg, for ſome private reaſons, returned home the very day before the engagement. The king's army ſlept in battle-array, on the bare ground; and the king himſelf paſſed the whole night in his coach, diſcourſing at intervals with Horn, Banier, and Teüffel, who ſate with him. Immediately after the dawn of day the troops were formed, and each of the combined armies received orders to march, the Swedes making a column on the right, and the Saxons one on the left, each army amounting to about 15,000 men. The king had 7000 horſe and 8000 foot, and the elector 11,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry†. The vanguard conſiſted of three regiments, two Scottiſh and one German, all conducted by Scots officers, namely, ſir James Ramſey, ſurnamed the Black, ſir John Hamilton, and Robert Monro, baron of Fowles. The troops, in order to diſtinguiſh one another, wore a ſmall green branch on their heads. All hiſtorians agree, that the king dreamt, in his coach, that he and Tilly engaged with fiſts; and, in the morning he told his companions, that having thrown his adverſary to the ground, he received a bite from him in his left breaſt; which was interpreted, afterwards, to ſignify the Saxon army, which advanced on the left of the Swedes.

* *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 173.

† Some writers enlarge the number of the Saxons: but this miſtake ſeems to ariſe from the abſence of Solmes's and Hofkirck's regiments, the one infantry and the other cavalry, which had been detached towards Bohemia.

There

There was a little rivulet and dirty ſwampy paſs where only a few men could march in front, at a ſmall village called Schortza, which lay between the king and Tilly. As the *latter*, not caring to bring on a general engagement, did not chooſe to diſpute it with all the vigour he was capable of exerting, which has been reckoned by ſome amongſt the overſights of the day, the Swediſh and Saxon armies ſoon cleared this paſs, and when word was brought of it to Tilly, he turned round to his ſoldiers, and ſaid, *Now, my old friends, we muſt look for blows.*

About ten in the morning, his majeſty cleared the paſs at Schortza, and having examined Arnheim's plan of the diſpoſition of the Saxon army, and interlined here and there a few remarks, with his pencil, drew up his own army in complete order of battle, giving directions for placing his artillery in the moſt convenient ſituations, during the courſe of the engagement; paying little or no regard to the field-maréchals and ſerjeant-majors *di battaglia*, but leading up every brigade and column of troops himſelf, diſpoſing them in their reſpective ſtations, and leaving general inſtructions to their commanders. The king then rode up and down his own lines, and aſked his men, with a cheerful and animated countenance, *if they felt a diſpoſition within them to perform a hard day's ſervice?*—one univerſal *vivat* ſpread itſelf immediately through the army: upon which Guſtavus, in order to keep his men in ſpirits, and humour the practice of the age, beckoned to a trumpeter, in the front of all his troops, and taking ſomething out of his pocket, bid him carry that little note to Tilly, *for he wanted to ſpeak with him.* Tilly returned word back, readily enough, *that he was always prepared to receive his majeſty's commands, when notified by him:* which looks as if he was determined not to fight, except upon compulſion; and thus ended the military ceremonial *.

It was at this battle Guſtavus put in practice the principal part of all thoſe fine inventions in the military art, which he had meditated and reaſoned upon a thouſand times before. It is the *inventive* and *creating* power, which makes a man great in any ſcience or profeſſion; and in this light, our hero ſhone diſtinguiſhed. He exhibited, in the courſe of one day's action, more knowledge in the tactical and fighting parts, and in that branch of war, which relates to artillery, than mankind had diſcovered from the time of the Romans, till the invention of gunpowder, and from that period, till the day's ſervice at Leipſic.

The king's *inventive* genius in war had made its appearance, in many inſtances, before this period. His grand ruling prin-

* *Swed. Diſcipline*, 4°. Lond. 1632. Part iii. 12.

ciple was, to make an enemy's country the *ſeat* of hoſtilities; the invaders being always ſuppoſed to undertake their buſineſs with greater ſpirit, and more determined reſolution than the defendants. He was the firſt, it is commonly thought, who *intermixed* infantry amongſt the horſe; which, if I remember right, he practiſed at the very beginning of the Poliſh war; but as my authority for this aſſertion, which I diſcovered in ſome good author, has eſcaped me, after various reſearches and enquiries, I can only venture to preſent it to the reader upon the like footing it comes to me. Mansfelt, at or near the ſame time, as has been hinted elſewhere, had ſome idea of a ſimilar practice; ſince in a famous picture of the battle of Prague, now in the poſſeſſion of lord Cheſterfield, and which appears to me to be better painted than thoſe, with which the houſe of Auſtria has adorned the pavilion in the *ſtar-park*, where the main ſtreſs of the action laid, ſomething of this kind may be diſcovered in the arrangement of the troops. Guſtavus likewiſe was the firſt who altered the muſquets of the cavalry to *carbines*. He was diſſatisfied alſo with the *Imperial cuiraſſiers*, who were completely caſed in armour from head to foot; and commanded his own men to carry only a breaſt-plate and a head-piece. He relieved the cavalry of their uſeleſs incumbrance of *pikes*; and ordered his ſoldiers, for the expreſſion came firſt from him, *never to give fire, till they could ſee their own image in the pupil of their enemy's eye**. He changed alſo into a pouch, which contained a certain number of cartridges, thoſe ſenſeleſs utenſils called *bandileers*, which made a clattering in the time of action, and entangled themſelves one with another; giving a military man the appearance of a High German rhymer, or an Italian zani. He ridiculed greatly the *forked reſts*, uſed to ſupport the muſquets in giving fire; and when his officers, who had a ſecret hankering to continue old cuſtoms, made an attempt to ſatisfy him by reducing the ſize and weight of thoſe reſts, ſo as to render them of a more manageable nature, he aboliſhed them, once for all, by a ſupreme act of authority.

Yet an higher inſtance, not of the *improving* but *inventive* nature, remains behind: and though all the world talks much of the LEIPSIC-BRIGADE, or COLUMN of Guſtavus, which latter word is not preciſely agreeable to the original nature of the ſubject in queſtion, and commenced only to become a term in vogue, towards the concluſion of the laſt century, yet I flatter myſelf, that there is no true and faithful drawing of this column extant, but what I here pre-

* *Loccen.* Hiſt. p. 587. 4°. *Schefferi* Memorab. Sueciæ Gentis, p. 42, &c.

ſent

ſent to the reader; to its authenticity no ſolid objection can ever be made. Lord Reay, who drew it, was one of the king's favourite colonels, and the draught is ſo preciſely exact and minute, that a letter of the alphabet is placed for every ſingle man; and the poſt of each officer may be aſſigned and aſcertained to the diſtance of a foot ſquare. Indeed the intervals between corps and corps in the original are unduly wide and ſpacious; but his lordſhip found himſelf obliged to reſerve theſe vacuums, in order to inſert the *letters*, which denote the poſition of each particular commander. Yet, as I obſerved before, the word COLUMN is not the proper expreſſion, whereby to denominate the LEIPSIC-BRIGADE, except we comprehend it in the ſenſe and configuration, into which Folard ſuppoſes Guſtavus to have improved it before he fought the battle of Lutzen, for which I can produce neither authority, nor corroborating proof. Here I hope to obtain the reader's pardon for bringing to light a true repreſentation of the LEIPSIC-COLUMN, ſo long diſuſed, if not totally forgotten. Nor ought one to compoſe the life of Guſtavus, and overlook that great man in the character of a *field-officer*.—All we contend for is, that the idea was GREAT and NEW.

The opinion of military men concerning the brigade of Guſtavus in that age, was as follows; if you attempt to attack it in front or rear, it will preſent a head at either end, like the *amphiſbena*: and if you undertake to aſſault its flanks and angles, you only ſeize a bunch of thorns which will give you a wound wherever you think fit to graſp it.

The plain, on which the battle was fought, extends itſelf in a line almoſt entirely through Miſnia, and even in a clear day it is hardly poſſible to diſtinguiſh a mountain in the whole neighbourhood round it; ſince, at moſt, it is only diverſified here and there with ſmall elevations and declivities. As the combined armies propoſed to commence the attack, the Imperial general had the choice of the ground. Of courſe he poſſeſſed the ſlope of a gently riſing hill to the ſouth-weſt of Podelwitz, which extended itſelf near two miles; foreſeeing, as the battle could hardly become ſerious till after midday, that he ſhould have the advantage of the *ſun*, a matter then ſuppoſed to be of great conſequence in the art of war. He had the good fortune alſo, according to the opinion of thoſe times, to gain the *wind* right in his favour; for, as it blew that day extremely briſk, it carried the ſmoke and duſt, of which there was enough that day, directly from him: and in thoſe times generals were ſo fond of theſe advantages, that they very often ſhifted their troops in the heat of action,

which ſort of movements, by the way, are extremely dangerous, in order to gain a point of wind and ſun. Guſtavus was in no degree diſmayed to ſee theſe little advantages ſnatched from him. It muſt not be diſſembled, that he knew the convenience of this elevated ſlope, and the wood behind it, as well as his adverſary who laid near it, and had ordered an advanced party to poſſeſs it by all poſſible means; but in that attempt the Imperial general foreſtalled him: for he was maſter of that poſt a day before the battle. Guſtavus could not make greater expedition than he did after ſigning the treaty with the elector of Saxony, for he marched thirty miles in a day and an half, and fought his enemy the afternoon of the ſecond day. The Swediſh dragoons made a deſperate attack upon the ſpot of ground we have mentioned, but were obliged to deſiſt, when they ſaw the whole army of the Imperialiſts prepared to pour upon, and cut them to pieces*. Here Tilly intrenched his Walloon infantry, having planted two large batteries, conſiſting of forty pieces of heavy artillery, on the ſummit of the riſing ſlope behind him at very conſiderable diſtances. One fronted the right wing of the Swedes in a direct line, where he concluded the king would command, that being with *him*, for reaſons to me unknown, the poſt of honour, and the place where he affected to place himſelf, as he did afterwards at the battle of Lutzen, and the other, being advanced more forward, according to the natural turn of the hill, cut the Saxon and Swediſh army obliquely. Behind him was a large wood, which he propoſed for a rallying place in caſe of defeat. His army conſiſted of 44,000 fighting men, and the enemy produced only three-fourths of that number to oppoſe him. His watchword was Jeſu Maria, the ſame he had uſed at Magdeburg; and his men, in imitation of their former practice in ſtorming that town, wore white ribbons on their hats and helmets, and white ſtrings round their right arms. The watchword of the Swedes was *Emanuel*, or *God with us*, which was always carried inſcribed on the colours. They wore green branches on their hats and helmets. The Imperial general followed the old diſcipline of the Low Country wars, of drawing up his men in great ſquare bodies, which in part contributed to his ruin. Not that the diſcipline was then bad, but the diſpoſitions of Guſtavus were better. Two highways paſſed through the field of battle, but as they went upon the ſame lines, by which the combined army advanced, the convenience and inconveniency of them were juſt reciprocal to either party.

* *Burgi Mars Sueco-German.* L. ii. 128. Leod. 1633. 12°.

Tilly,




Neele sculp. Strand.

A. *Swedish Army.*

B. *Imperial Army.*

L. *Millars House.*

M. *Walstein's great masses of Infantry.*



Tilly, who formed his main body and the two wings into three ſeparate armies, making only one mighty front, which reached from Sohauſen to Lindenthal, a vaſtneſs of extent hardly to be believed*, rejecting the aſſiſtance of a ſecond line and corps de reſerve, poſted himſelf on the eminence before-mentioned, with the wood behind him.

As to the Saxon army, it performed ſo little, that I ſhall only obſerve that the elector led the right wing, Bindauf the left, and Arnheim conducted the main body. Yet to ſhew that prince's parts, and Arnheim's invidious temper, the troops were drawn up nearly upon the ſame principle with the Imperialiſts. The king made ſome objections to this diſpoſition; but the Saxon general, who had paſſed his apprenticeſhip under Walſtein, choſe rather to abide by the more received and eſtabliſhed forms.

Such, as had a talent for war, ſoon perceived a manifeſt ſuperiority between the arrangement of the king's troops and thoſe under Tilly's command: for the latter were as much beaten by genius as by valour. It was the cuſtom of the beſt generals, before this engagement, to draw up their forces in huge ſquare bodies, which they called *tertias*; the very unwieldineſs of which maſſes of troops helped to deſtroy them: for upon any great confuſion each man overturned his neighbour, and when the whole corps was jumbled into one chaos, no officers could move from one ſituation to another, nor reduce the men into their former places. Whereas the king's army was interſected and divided into numberleſs ſtraight lines and avenues, ſome greater and ſome ſmaller, like the uniform ground-plot of a regular city or parterre: and the troops could advance, retreat, or move from ſide to ſide, juſt as if they were in a defile between two hedges or walls. Thus the whole army was one complicated but unperplexed machine, conſiſting of innumerable parties or *peletons* of men, all little ſyſtems by themſelves, all acting under a chieftain of their own, yet all contributing to the grand eſtabliſhment of the *whole together*. By theſe means, and by the power of moving eaſily from place to place, he brought more hands to act than the enemy poſſibly could; and though his men might be *killed*, yet, ſcientifically ſpeaking, they could not well be *routed*, for help was ever at hand, and the deſtruction of one part did not neceſſarily involve the deſtruction of another. The directions of the general had always free paſſage, as the blood is poured firſt from the heart, and then regularly diſperſed, not only through arteries and veins, but even through

* It was, ſaith Monro, two Engliſh miles in length, Part ii.

the ſmalleſt capillaries*. In proof of how much this grand invention avoided confuſion in the very firſt experiment, only one regiment amongſt all the royal forces was ſqueezed out of its place, and that was Callenbach's regiment of horſe.

This reduction of an army to one piece of machinery, in the day of battle was the *vis vivida*, the diſtinguiſhing individuating principle of Guſtavus's creative genius. Nevertheleſs, he diſplayed his talents in exhibiting many collateral military inventions in the battle of Leipſic, which deſerve highly to be mentioned by an exact hiſtorian. He found wonderfully good effects from mixing his muſqueteers amongſt the horſe, as alſo from flanking the horſe with muſqueteers. Upon the principles of his plan, there were always openings for them to retreat, in caſe they were in danger of being overpowered. Theſe muſqueteers, intermingled with the cavalry, performed great ſervice in the *times* we are ſpeaking of; for the Imperial cuiraſſiers being completely cloathed in armour that was piſtol-proof, marched up to the Swediſh cavalry with abſolute unconcern, and, regardleſs of their firearms, parted their ranks and ſqueezed them out of their places by mere ſtreſs of weight. The *calibre* of the muſquets of the infantry being *then* larger than *now*, enabled the muſqueteers to deliver a ball, which at piſtol-ſhot diſtance, the diſtance cavalry generally engage at, would often pierce the beſt armour, and always make contuſions, which were very painful and inconvenient. Tilly received *one* in this very battle, which tormented him more than all his wounds, and in his flight was obliged to ſend for the town-ſurgeon at Halle, who cut out all the bruiſed fleſh; and Guſtavus loſt his life from the effects of *another*; for on the day of the battle of Lutzen he determined to fight in his common wearing apparel, an elk-ſkin waiſtcoat excepted, having lately received a contuſion in his ſhoulder, which rendered the leaſt wrench of his cuiraſs inſupportable. Before Guſtavus introduced this alteration in the art of war, it was ſufficient that the armour of the Imperial cuiraſſiers was *piſtol-proof*.

This was alſo the firſt time, that any general had ventured to thin the depth of his files, which the king reduced to ſix deep, the brigades or columns excepted; whereas the Imperialiſts, though drawn up in one front only, oppoſed him with at leaſt thrice the ſame number. It was objected to his

* See ſome curious remarks made on this ſubject by a German officer, who viſited the camp of Guſtavus as early as the month of November 1630.



majeſty,

majeſty, that ſuch a comparatively thin body of men could not reſiſt a ponderous impreſſion; but his anſwer was, for it muſt be remembered he fought upon two lines, independent of the bodies of reſerve, that upon his principle, paſſages were always open for new troops to advance and ſuſtain their companions; that he could ſtop a leak in his army with as much eaſe as a ſea-captain could prevent the ill effects of one in his ſhip; and that the power of bringing more hands to act, abundantly counterbalanced the weight of the objection. His field-artillery, made of *hardened leather*, rendered him alſo excellent ſervice, being ſo very portable, that he could remove a little battery, or make a new one, in ten minutes time, or advance it occaſionally before his troops, here and there, juſt when a freſh attack was forming againſt him. Here too for the firſt time, except in reviews, was practiſed in good earneſt the method of firing in *platoons*. In a word, nothing of conſequence eſcaped Guſtavus in the whole ſyſtem of the fighting part, from the battle of Leipſic till the preſent hour, except the invention of the *bayonet*, which probably was overlooked by a ſearching and ſpeculative genius, merely becauſe it was ſimple and obvious. Though many are of opinion*, that ſomething between the pike and the partizan might be invented, which would prove more uſeful in repulſing the cavalry. It is highly natural to imagine, that Guſtavus knew this: for he ſhortened the handle, and varied the figure of the head of the pike, according to the idea I have juſt mentioned†.

To return to the battle itſelf. Tilly upon this occaſion made ſome *miſtakes* as a general, which may properly be called his *own*, and *ſome* he was enſnared into by the raſhneſs and impetuoſity of younger men. As to the latter, I have, and ſhall explain myſelf more fully concerning them in their reſpective places, remarking here, in addition to ſome overſights of the Imperial commander already ſpecified, that he was worſe ſerved with intelligence than he ought to have been, even in an enemy's country; for his Swediſh majeſty approached him unexpectedly ‡; whence it happened, that no contemptible body of troops was employed in foraging at a diſtance, and not to be recalled in time convenient, and that Holk with a conſiderable party had been detached to make conqueſts about Naumburg‖. Tilly did ill likewiſe

* *Chevalier de Folard, &c.* † *Schefferi* Memorab. Suecicæ Gentis.

‡ *Lettre de Tilli.* Halberſtadt, Sept. 24, 1631.

‖ *Lettre d'un capitaine Imperial à un ſien ami.* Sept. 22, 1631. This account muſt be read with care, as it wants to be ſupported by other authorities. For example,

wiſe not to order an army, that laid idle in Sileſia, to have attacked the electorate on that ſide, which would have incapacitated half the Saxon forces from joining Guſtavus. It may be obſerved further, that when Pappenheim violated his orders, and forced him to deſcend from his eminence, his preſence of mind, which was doubtleſs diſcompoſed by ſo vexatious an incident, ſeems to have deſerted him a few minutes; for being compelled, firſt by teaſing and artifice, and then by dint of neceſſity, to make a ſacrifice of his prudence and judgment, he commanded his troops to advance with ſo much ardour and confuſion, that the beſt and moſt proper regiments were not placed in their reſpective ſituations, excepting the regiments of Piccolomini, Schomberg, and Cronenberg, which were eſteemed the flower of the Imperial cavalry. In a word, Tilly was too *old* for his employment.

In conſequence of this precipitate meaſure, the main body, which even at this time was not diſtinctly formed, made an irregular advance; for the cavalry deſtined to ſupport it received no orders to keep pace with the infantry. To underſtand this paſſage the better, the reader muſt be informed, that the center was ſuſtained by ſix regiments of horſe, which had no connexion with the wings of the army. From hence it likewiſe followed, that there was no time to appoint a proper body of reſerve; nor were any infantry interſperſed among the cavalry. The beſt troops oppoſed the new raiſed Saxons, which may be conſidered as an extraordinary overſight*. "I aſked ſeveral commanders," ſaid one who was an eye-witneſs of the battle, "if they knew their inſtructions; but by their anſwers it appeared they had none. Seemingly to me the hope was, that God would work miracles in proportion to the errors we had committed." Pappenheim, as maréchal of the field, made the diſpoſition of the battle: and when it was told him that his own wing was too weak in itſelf, and unſupported likewiſe by any reſerve, his anſwer was, that he had taken care to provide a reinforcement; whether truly or not cannot be aſcertained; yet ſure it is, that no reinforcement ever appeared; except it

example, he names *ſix regiments of cavalry independent of the wings*, and we apprehend he ought to know his own army; yet in a ſingle ſheet plan, engraven almoſt under the king's eye immediately after the battle, by Olave Hans of Leipſic, his chief quarter-maſter and engineer, and long before any book appeared on the ſubject, we cannot diſcover theſe regiments; ſo that after the firſt ſhock or tumult, they muſt have united themſelves to the extreme parts of the two wings, which ſeem by the plan to be more extended than the front line of the allied army.

* Riccio de Bellis German, 271.

proved

proved ſome of the regiments we have mentioned by way of note in the preceding page.

The laſt error, which in truth may be conſidered as a misfortune, was that Furſtenberg, who was a friend of Pappenheim, but wanted the ſpirit of that commander, diſliked the orders of the generaliſſimo, yet had not reſolution to diſobey them. Chance brought about what he privately wiſhed to ſee effected; for an old colonel at length told him, that he would begin the battle without his orders. This raſh departure from inſtructions in either wing compelled Tilly to deſcend from his eminence; for if Furſtenberg had not engaged, it is more than probable Tilly would have left Pappenheim to the mercy of Guſtavus: but perceiving the battle to thicken round him, and dreading the reproaches of ſacrificing the better part of the Imperial army, for the public always favours fighting people, right or wrong, he at length determined to order his main body of infantry to advance. Part of it conſiſted of 8000 troops, till then ſuppoſed to be invincible, and which in truth might have performed wonders, if the cavalry attached to had received commands to march forwards and ſupport them: but that circumſtance, in the hurry, happened to be totally forgotten.

Having thus ſketched out the previous ideas neceſſary for comprehending one of the moſt important battles, which the world had then ſeen, I may by this time, and perhaps with little difficulty, obtain my reader's permiſſion to enter into a diſtinct deſcription of the action itſelf; inaſmuch as the plan here annexed will give a more exact idea of the field diſpoſitions than can be deſcribed in words.

This battle was fought on Wedneſday the ſeventh of September, which the Germans call *dies reginæ*. The front of each army extended itſelf nearly two Engliſh miles in breadth. Many old officers declared, that the mighty battle, at the *white mountain* near Prague in 1620, was but a ſort of pantomime in compariſon to this*. As the intermingled muſqueteers carried no colours, the Imperialiſts did not diſcover them till it was too late. Tilly had the advantage of ground, wind, and ſun†; but Guſtavus performed great things with his artillery, and exceeded the Auſtrian general, who piqued himſelf particularly in that reſpect. The victory was principally owing to the eaſy ſhifting and quick diſcharge of the new-invented leather cannon, and the intermingled muſqueteers,

* *Arlanibæi Arma Suecica*, 138, 4°.
† *Monro's Expedition*, ii. 64.

whoſe

# TABLE of REFERENCE
TO THE
# FIELD-DISPOSITION at LEIPSIC.

## IMPERIAL ARMY.

Horse.
1. Regiment of Renconi,
2. Merodé,
3. New Saxon,
4. Baumgarten,
5. Piccolomini,
6. Strozzi,

Infantry.
7. Holſtein,
8. Chieſa,
9. Galas,
10. Furſtenberg,
11. Montecuculi,
12. Balderon and Ditrichſtein united,
13. Tilly,
14. Coronini,
15. Goëtz,
16. Coloredo,
17. Eruitz,
18. Savelli,
19. Blancard,
20. Pappenheim,
21. Haracour,
22. Rynach and Comargo,
23. Wallis,
24. Wrangler,

Horse.
25. Late Bernſtein,
26. Schomberg,
27. Cronenberg,
28. Old Saxon,
29. Wingarti,
30. Two Regiments of Croats,
31. Reformed Dragoons,

## SWEDISH ARMY.

32. 400 Finland Horſe.
33. 400 Finland Horſe.
34. 180 commanded Muſqueteers of Banier.
35. 400 of Tod's Horſe.
36. The ſame.
37. The ſame.
38. 180 commanded Muſqueteers of Banier's.
39. 800 Weſt-Gothland Horſe.
40. 180 Muſqueteers, Banier's.
41. 800 Smaland Horſe, Steinboch's.
42. 180 commanded Muſqueteers, Halle's.
43. 400 Eaſt-Gothland Cavalry.
44. *Lily's Brigade.*
45. *Teuffel's Brigade, Pretorian Guards.*
46. *Halle's Brigade.*
47. *Wincle's Brigade.*
48. 200 Horſe, Horne's.
49. 500 Horſe, Callenbach's.
50. 360 commanded Muſqueteers.
51. 500 Horſe, Callenbach's
52. 280 Muſqueteers, Oxenſtiern.
53. 300 Horſe, Bauditzen.
54. 300 Foot, Erichuiſen's.
55. 300 Horſe, Bauditzen.
56. 300 Muſqueteers, Erichuiſen's.
57. 300 Horſe, Bauditzen.
58. 360 Muſqueteers, Hamilton's.
59. 500 Horſe of the King's own Regiment.
60. 400 Muſqueteers, Monro's.
61. 500 Horſe of the King's own Regiment.
62. 350 Muſqueteers, Ramſey's.
63. 400 Horſe, Rhingrave's.
64. 400 the ſame.
65. 400 the ſame.
66. 400 Livonian Horſe.
67. 400 Courland Horſe.
68. 500 Horſe, Damitz.
69. 400 Horſe, Sperrëuter's
70. *Brigade, Halle, Walſtein, Thurn,* &c.
71. *Brigade, Damitz, Hepburn,* &c.
72. *Brigade, Mitzval, Vitzdum, Ruthven.*
73. 600 Horſe, Halle's.
74. 600 Horſe, ditto.
75. 400 Horſe, Courville's
76. 500 Horſe, Schafman, Reſerve.
77. 500 Horſe, Cochtitzki, Reſerve.

## SAXON ARMY.

78. — Horſe, Steinau.
79. — Horſe, ditto.
80. 400 Horſe, Bindauf.
81. 400 Horſe, ditto.
82. 400 Horſe, Provincial Gentry.
83. — Horſe, Arnheim.
84. Infantry, ditto.
85. Infantry, ditto.
86. 350 Foot, Schwalbach.
87. 350 Foot, ditto.
88. 700 Foot, Löſers.
89. 600 Foot, Electoral Regiment.
90. 350 Foot, Glitzingen.
91. 350 Foot, ditto.
92. 350 Foot, Starchedel.
93. 350 Foot, ditto.
94. 400 Horſe, Provincial Gentry.
95. 400 Horſe, Sax-Altenberg.
96. 400 Horſe, ditto.
97. 400 Horſe, Electoral Regiment.
98. 400 Horſe, ditto
99. 400 Horſe, ditto.

A minute Plan of the Battle of *Leipſic* is a thing greatly to be wiſhed for, inaſmuch as his *Swediſh* Majeſty that day exhibited an art of war entirely new and thoroughly ſcientific.

*Folard's* Ichnography illuſtrates, in no degree, the important truths I am mentioning; ſince the ſize of the ſquares bears not any proportion to the number of troops contained in them, and the ground itſelf is partly ideal. We do not know horſe from foot: an inaccuracy to be remarked in moſt Plans; beſides, without a juſt idea of the preciſe quantity of men in each peloton, and in what places the infantry were intermingled with the cavalry, it is impoſſible to comprehend the fine diſpoſition then made by *Guſtavus*, who added more to the art of war in this day's ſervice, than had been diſcovered ſince the time of *Julius Cæſar*.

whoſe fire was too heavy and violent to be oppoſed by the piſtol-ſhots of cavalry. It was likewiſe enjoined the Swedes firſt to receive the enemy's diſcharge, and return it afterwards *.

Tilly exceeded the two combined armies by *ten or twelve* thouſand men at leaſt †, according to Monro, who was then preſent; but our computation, which we profeſs to have rated very low, makes the ſuperiority about *five* thouſand. The whole Saxon army fled, excepting only their maſter's guards, and one other regiment. His majeſty obtained the victory at the head of two and twenty thouſand men, and, what is very remarkable, not a Swediſh ſoldier behaved ill, and only one regiment was ſqueezed out of its place, and that was Callenbach's; whereas, on the other hand, the four Walloon bodies, that retired at laſt to the wood, had been poſted at conſiderable diſtances one from the other ‡.

After a furious cannonade of no ſmall duration, the king, cloathed in a new ſuit of grey cloth, wearing a green plumage on his beaver, and mounted on a horſe *de poil d'étourneau* ‖, began the attack on Pappenheim ſword in hand, and, after a deſperate reſiſtance from that intrepid and moſt experienced commander, compelled him to retreat to ſuch a diſtance, as procured a point of the wind in his majeſty's favour. What induced the king to puſh this onſet forwards with a degree of fury that can hardly be paralleled, was partly to avoid the wind and duſt, which were both perplexing that day beyond imagination; and partly to ſecure the left flank of his wing (N°. 41, &c.) from Tilly's great battery, which traverſed it obliquely §.

This advance of the Swedes cauſed a larger opening than appeared at firſt, between the king's line, and the corps poſted behind him under the direction of Banier; and of courſe the brave duke of Holſtein, whoſe regiment of foot

* *Schefferi Mem. Suec. Gentis.* † *Monro's Expedition*, ii. 64.

‡ Namely at N°. 8. 12. 15. 19.

‖ What the grooms call a *flea-bitten* colour. It was certainly a falſe affectation in his majeſty, and in that reſpect Pappenheim copied him, either from a contempt of danger, or in order to be better diſcerned by his troops, ever to ride a ſteed which carried ſome diſtinguiſhing marks; as may be obſerved not only here, but at the ſiege of Ingoldſtadt, and the fatal battle of Lutzen. It was probably on this account, that the artful Richelieu and father Joſeph ſent a horſe to be ſold, in the Swediſh camp, very uncommonly marked. As they foreſaw, his majeſty purchaſed it in a moment; but Gaſſion ſtanding then high in his favour, he beſtowed it on him, and the horſe was killed under the Frenchman in the next day's cannonade. *Mem. de Gaſſion par M. le Pure*, 12 tom. i. 110, 111.

§ *Soldat Suedois*, 128.

is

is deſcribed in the plan N°. 7, at the extremity of Tilly's main body, and flanking Pappenheim's wing of cavalry, made a motion, it is thought, from his own opinion, and quitting his line of battle, fell furiouſly on the king's rear. But a part of his majeſty's corps facing about immediately, and Banier, who ſupported his maſter at a proper diſtance, advancing with three diviſions of the Rhingrave's horſe, the Imperial regiment was ſoon cut to pieces, and the duke of Holſtein mortally wounded.

Pappenheim being thus forced out of his line, edged round to the king's right flank; where Guſtavus ſoon made proper evolutions to confront him, and Banier having by this time cut to pieces the duke of Holſtein's regiment, co-operated vigorouſly with his royal maſter. Thenceforwards the Imperial left wing acquitted itſelf manfully, yet never turned the ſcale againſt the army of Sweden. Pappenheim returned to the charge ſeven times ſucceſſively. In the third attack, which was conducted with great readineſs and impetuoſity, he miſſed little of overpowering his opponents; for he was quicker in rallying, than the Swedes could be in purſuing their advantage; ſo that Banier was obliged to fly once more to ſuccour his monarch, and the reinforcement was as roughly handled as the party to whoſe aſſiſtance it marched. It was in the heat of this rencounter that Pappenheim and Gaſſion fought hand to hand *.

About fifteen minutes from the commencement of Pappenheim's firſt attack, the count de Furſtenberg fell upon the Saxon army, and after a ſhort conflict intirely diſperſed the right wing, which part of his troops purſued farther than good ſoldiers ought to have done. The occaſion of this ſudden defeat may be attributed ſolely to the inexperience and puſillanimity of the provincial Saxon horſe, which had been raiſed by vaſſals †. Notwithſtanding, indeciſive as this ſlight advantage may appear, it tempted Tilly to diſpatch part of his main body to overpower the reſidue of the Saxon forces, and induced him likewiſe, which may be conſidered an indiſcretion ‡, to deſcend from his convenient and well-choſen eminence, and let looſe on Horn, who commanded the left wing of the Swediſh army, part of thoſe veteran bands of infantry, which had made all Germany tremble for the ſpace of thirteen years.

* *Hiſt. du maréchal Gaſſion*, p. 52. tom. i.

† *Heylmanni Leo Arctoüs*, 4°. 34.

‡ *Waſſembergii* Florus German. 255. Franc. 1648.

The

The Imperial generaliſſimo ſoon diſperſed the Saxon forces, and when his troops appeared over-eager in purſuing the fugitives, *Turn back*, ſaid he, *comrades; let us beat the Swedes, and the empire is our own**. He never recovered ſo many purſuers, as, unqueſtionably, he wiſhed to recal. Meanwhile the Saxons, like excellent ſoldiers, took the liberty to plunder their own waggons, and then conſulted their ſafety by flight. Their electoral maſter was the firſt man, who carried the news of the defeat to Eülenburg†, a little town on the banks of the Molda, about ten miles from the field of action. Arnheim having ſaved two, or as ſome ſay four, regiments, and placed them under Horn's protection, flew immediately to the king to aſk his advice and aſſiſtance‡. All the Imperialiſts, however, did not purſue the Saxons; for Furſtenberg, with his Italian cavalry, and Cronenberg, whoſe regiment of German horſe was eſteemed the very flower of the Auſtrian army, ſtopped their troops in full career, and attacked Horn, who ſoon made proper evolutions, and received them ſo bravely ‖, that Guſtavus ever afterwards acknowledged that he was indebted to him for the victory. Tilly likewiſe bent part of his efforts on this left-wing of the Swedes, which by the flight of the Saxons was for a time expoſed in one flank, yet it was protected a little with a high road and hedges; which Guſtavus probably foreſaw in the firſt diſpoſitions he made, and conſequently deſtined them as a ſmall line of partition between his own and the electoral forces.

It may naturally be aſked, what ſufficient reaſon could induce Tilly to decline attacking the main body of the royal army conducted by Teüffel? To which may be aſſigned a very juſt and ſatisfactory anſwer: namely, that the centre was protected, as will appear by the plan, with one entire line of large artillery §.

Meanwhile Guſtavus, who had greatly checked the impetuoſity of Pappenheim, and who, foreſeeing his preſence might be neceſſary in more places than one, had made Banier, proviſionally, commander over the right wing, receiving advice upon advice of the miſbehaviour and defeat of the Saxons, ſent a meſſage to Teüffel to lead the centre** on

* *Swed. Diſcipline*, part iii. 19.
† *Introd. de Puffendorf*, tom. iv. 140.
‡ Idem ibid.
‖ *See Horn's Letter in the Swed. Diſcipline*, part iii. 20, 21.
§ *Arlanibæi Arm. Suecica*, 4°. 187.
** It is remarkable, that two battalions of pioneers were poſted in the centre, intermixt with N^os^ 47, 45, 50, 53. *Hiſt. Authentic Relation*, tom. ii. 122. This peculiarity has paſſed, hitherto, unobſerved.

to

to the charge; but that brave officer was ſtruck dead by a muſket-ball as he was liſtening attentively to the king's meſſage *. His majeſty, unapprized of this event, purſued his courſe down the interval behind the front line, crying out with an air of ſprightlineſs in his countenance as he rode along, *Alegramente, ſoldiers, alegramente:* to which the troops replied with alacrity, *Vivat! vivat!* At the ſame time, with a view to ſtrengthen Horn's flank, he ordered the foot regiment of Hepburn, and half that of Vitzdum †, to march from the rear of the centre ‡: as likewiſe the regiment of Weſtergothian horſe from his own wing (N°. 39.) having cut to pieces the regiment that confronted it; namely, Holſtein's (N°. 7.) and pretty well blunted the edge of Pappenheim's violence.

Being arrived in that part of Horn's wing ‖ where Callenbach commanded, he cried out with a tone of eagerneſs, *Callenbach! charge, man, in God's name! Charge, man, in God's name!* That officer ſoon obeyed the royal orders, but fell, unfortunately, in the firſt fire **.

The king, notwithſtanding the clouds of duſt that annoyed him, diſcovered ſome large maſſes of troops, that ſeemed to advance. He aſked the perſons round him, who they might be, and what they thought of them? Their anſwer was, they concluded them to be Swedes. Guſtavus knew, that this did not agree with his own plan, and galloping his horſe at ſome diſtance beyond the lines, for his eye-ſight was by no means the moſt perfect, returned and arranged his troops in order to receive them: *They are Imperialiſts*, added he, *I have diſcovered the Burgundian* †† *croſs amongſt their enſigns.* This ſaid, he returned to ſuch places where he thought his preſence moſt neceſſary. Here it was, namely, in the ſharp conflict betwixt Horn and Tilly, that the Scottiſh regiments firſt practiſed firing in *platoons* ‡‡, which amazed the Imperialiſts to ſuch a degree, that they hardly knew how to conduct themſelves.

* *Vernulæus de Bell. Sueco-Germ.* 150. 4°. Cologn. 1643. Others ſay the king ſent for him to Horn's left wing, and having ordered him to reconnoitre a large body of troops ſuppoſed to be the Imperial, that he obeyed his maſter's commands with alacrity, but was killed in returning. *Monro's Second Expedition*, 66. *Swed. Diſcipline*, part iii. 23.

† N° 82 and 85. See the plan. ‡ *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 176.

‖ It is plain Bougeant knew nothing of this battle, for he makes Horn command the centre, tom. i. 267.

** *Swed. Diſcipline*, part iii. p. 22.

†† The Auſtrian eagle, when Ferdinand II. entered Ratiſbon, June 19, 1630, at the great diet convened there, carried on its breaſt a ſcutcheon half Auſtrian and half Burgundian.

‡‡ *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part i. 124. *Swed. Diſcipline*, part iii, 25, 26.

Yet

Still the main body of the Swedes, as we obſerved before, and the major part of Tilly's Walloon infantry, which ſtood over-againſt them, remained ſpectators of each other, if we except only their cannonade, and the detachment of certain bodies occaſionally, as urgent neceſſities here and there ſeemed to demand ſuch ſorts of aſſiſtance.

Some few minutes after four o'clock the king perceived matters drawing towards a favourable concluſion: for having ſqueezed Pappenheim quite out of his place, and advanced half way towards the village of Little Weideritch, he judged it expedient to attack on every ſide that great maſs of Imperial infantry, which compoſed the centre, and conſiſted originally of eighteen regiments, looked upon by all next to invincible *. What followed, was rather obſtinacy than fighting; and the conteſt was ſo very warm, that narrators who were there preſent, neither are, nor pretended to be exact in their accounts. However, it is natural to ſuppoſe, that the king brought his whole centre to act, conjointly with ſuch other forces as he could then produce †.

It was now more than the duſk of the evening, it was almoſt dark ‡; and though the Imperialiſts had been broken through and through various times, ſuch was their reſiſtance, that the victory hardly yet appeared deciſive; for four regiments of infantry, though poſted at conſiderable diſtances from each other ||, formed themſelves merely by the habitude and inſtinct of war, and, without the aſſiſtance of any one principal commander, retired gloomily and ſullenly to the ſkirts of the wood which laid behind them. There they repulſed the united efforts of the Swedes, without ever mentioning the word *quarter*, and continued to fight on, even when half-diſabled, and overthrown. It is certain, that Tilly behaved with great intrepidity to the laſt moment §, and burſt into tears, when he ſaw the ſlaughter his ſoldiers optionally

* N° 8, 12, 15, 19. *Swed Diſcipl.* part iii. 27. and thus Baumgarten's regiment, N° 4, in the middle part of Pappenheim's wing, was ſqueezed almoſt into the centre of Furſtenberg's wing, between the regiments of Schomberg and Cronenberg, N° 26, 27, which two points made almoſt the extremities of the line. *Ibid.*

† *Monro*, part ii. 66. *Swed. Diſcip.* part iii. 23, 24, &c.

‡ *Riccio de Bell. Germ.* 269. 4°.

|| *Pietro Pomo, Guerre di Germania*, 4°. p. 33.

§ *Hiſt. de Galeazzo Gualdo*, tom. ii. 53. 4°.

 ſubmitted

ſubmitted to*. At length, under the protection of darkneſs, the valiant Cronenberg carried him off at the head of theſe unconquerable Walloons, who were reduced now to 600 men. The battle laſted, not to mention the cannonading, from twelve at noon till after ſix; and for the firſt two hours of cloſe engagement the victory was doubtful †.

We ſhall conclude with obſerving, that his majeſty, on this occaſion, cauſed a medal to be ſtruck; which, far from carrying the leaſt tincture of vain glory with it, appears to me rather an example of religious humility to ſucceeding conquerors. On one ſide was the following inſcription; DEO. TER. OPT. MAX. GLORIA. ET. LAUS. QUI. GUSTAVO. ADOLPHO. SUECORUM. VANDALORUMQUE. REGI. CONTRA. CÆSAREANUM. AC. LIGUSTICUM. EXERCITUM. VICTORIAM. TRIBUIT. AD. LIPSIAM. DIE. VII. SEPTEMBRIS. ANNO. MDCXXXI. On the other ſide was engraven the word JEHOVAH, half concealed beneath clouds that intermix themſelves with ſun-ſhine, and this lemma underneath; A. DOMINO. FACTUM. EST. ISTUD ‡.

There was a circumſtance preceding this battle, that explains Tilly's conduct, and which few hiſtorians ſeem to know. As the Imperial general, far from being the aggreſſor, had determined not to fight, except compelled by unavoidable neceſſity; how happened it, that he engaged in the manner all writers mention, when Pappenheim had no power to preſcribe laws to him? I always knew there was ſome omiſſion of hiſtory in this important point; and though the true reaſon occurred to me from the natural reſult of probabilities, yet I did not care to hazard my conjectures till I could ground them upon ſome ſubſtantial authority §. Now the reader may remember, that if Tilly had choſen to fight, he ought above all things to have diſputed the ſwampy paſs at Scholka ‖. This employment Pappenheim ardently ſought, but Tilly gave him an abſolute denial; nevertheleſs, being of a nature no ways arbitrary, he conſented, after repeated ſolicitations, to allow Pappenheim, at his own preſſing requeſt, and under ſtrict promiſe of not *engaging in earneſt*,

* *Hiſt. de Galeazzo Gualdo*, tom. ii. 53. 4°. Bologn. 1641. *Swed. Diſcipline*, part iii. 31.

† *Burgi Mars Sueco Germ.* 134. *Lettre du Baron de Cronenberg.*

‡ *Memoirs communicated.*

§ *Relation de la Battaille donnée pres de Leipſic & de la retraite, eſcrite par un capitaine de l'armée Imperiale à un ſien ami.* D'Halberſtadt le 22 de Septembre, 1631.

‖ *Introduction de Puffendorf*, tom. iv. 138. Some call the village Zſchortza.

to

to obſerve the numbers and countenance of the enemies as they paſſed the rivulet, allowing him only 2000 cavalry for that ſervice, and proteſting, that even ſuch a permiſſion was too much for a commander in chief to grant.

Pappenheim's appetite for glory, joined to the natural impetuoſity of his temper, ſoon brought on a very dangerous ſkirmiſh; inſomuch, that he was obliged at length to inform the generaliſſimo, that if he did not ſend him 2000 freſh horſemen, he, and a couple of the beſt regiments in the Imperial ſervice, muſt be cut to pieces or taken priſoners. In this perplexity, which from its ſudden appearance ſcarcely admitted an alternative, Tilly had no time for liberty of choice: and as the clamour and inſinuations of the younger officers almoſt diſtracted him, he decided wrong merely for preſent eaſe; nevertheleſs, not wanting ſpirit to charge the colonel, who commanded the reinforcement, to tell Pappenheim, that in caſe he failed to diſengage himſelf at all events, he muſt expect to lay down his life as a ſacrifice for his raſhneſs and diſobedience, in a ſolemn trial before a court-martial. The good old man ſoon forgave this conſtitutional warmth of his lieutenant-general, and in a letter he wrote, under great anguiſh of mind, not more than ſixteen days after the defeat, did not allow the moſt remote hint to fall from his pen to the diſadvantage of Pappenheim. It is a letter worth reading, as a pattern of Chriſtian reſignation in a great commander, who had never met with a repulſe during the courſe of thirty very ſignal engagements. It is addreſſed to a friend, and runs thus:

"SIR,

"I was in great hopes, after ſuch a ſeries of fatiguing and intricate affairs, which I have been obliged to ſtruggle with through the whole preceding campaign, and which in truth hindered me from keeping up an epiſtolary intercourſe, to have conveyed to you at laſt ſome important news of an advantageous nature. But the Supreme Being has thought fit to give things another turn, and viſit us at length with a ſignal chaſtiſement; inaſmuch as when on the ſeventh of this month I had made myſelf maſter of the town and caſtle of Leipſic, with a view, according to my orders, to compel the elector of Saxony to obey the mandate of his Imperial majeſty, and renounce the treaty of Leipſic, the king of Sweden, ſupported by the forces of the ſaid elector and the elector of Brandenburg, advanced upon me all at once, and compelled me to enter into a general engagement, wherein, after a long and obſtinate diſpute, it

was the misfortune of our troops, much inferior in point of numbers, and greatly incommoded by clouds of duſt, and the continual fire of the enemy's artillery, to fall into diſorder by imperceptible degrees, and at length quit the field of battle. This may be termed the reverſe of all our paſt proſperities: over which we allowed ourſelves to ſlumber, without purſuing our point vigorouſly. May God, who propoſes, perhaps, to awaken us, and ſharpen us by this diſaſter, inſpire us for the future with a double quantity of attention and zeal.——The loſſes and confuſion on the enemy's ſide, were very conſiderable: nor did they purſue their blow with ſuch expedition, as to prevent a party of our troops from retiring in ſafety, whom I am now modelling and reducing to order in the beſt manner I can. As to my perſon, God has preſerved me ſo far, that out of two ſhots, that happened to ſtrike me, one only pierced my cloaths, and the other gave me a contuſion on the reins, which ſeems to be attended with no ſymptoms of danger†‡.

"Your faithful friend and ſervant,

"JOHN, COUNT DE TILLI."

Nor was the letter Guſtavus wrote to Charles I. on the ſame event, leſs modeſt, or leſs moderate. The Imperial general was not dejected, and the Swediſh monarch appears not to be elated. The reader, if he pleaſe, may caſt his eye over it by way of contraſt.

"Moſt ſerene prince, brother,
kinſman, and deareſt friend,

"As we know well the affection your ſerenity bears not only to us, but to the common cauſe, and as we are aſſured likewiſe, that you feel for us in all our ſucceſſes and hazards relative to the public ſafety; it would be un-

* Though this circumſtance may at firſt ſight appear as a minute and trifling incident, yet it muſt be remembered, that the battle was fought in a dry ſeaſon, on a vaſt plain, reduced to powder by ſeveral ploughings; and the wind being briſk during the time of action, it is incredible to ſay how great an obſcurity was raiſed among the Imperialiſts after the king gained two points of the wind. See *Galeazzo Gualdo Priorato*, lib. ii. 4°. 53.

† *Lettre du comte de Tilli à un ſien ami, eſcrite de Halberſtadt, le 24 de Septembre*, 1631.

‡ Here Tilly is a little inſincere; for he mentions nothing of the blows Langfritz gave him with the butt-end of his carabine, from which bruiſes he received unſpeakable torment. The veteran commander well knew the delicate feelings of honour; *Lex non ſupponit odioſa.*

pardon-

pardonable at the preſent juncture not to inform you of that ſignal and memorable victory, which the divine bounty in theſe days has beſtowed upon us. In a word, after the elector of Saxony had joined his troops with ours, and the combined armies had marched forwards in order to give the enemy battle, the Imperial general * thought proper to advance five miles at the head of all his troops from his camp at Leipſic, and oppoſe his whole force againſt ours. The battle began with great fury, and was maintained four hours on each ſide with uncommon obſtinacy †, till at length the Imperial army, as the favour of Divine Providence ſeemed to co-operate with the unwearied reſolution of my ſoldiers, began by degrees to break its ranks and diſappear. Our troops purſued their adverſaries to the very walls of Leipſic, and rendered themſelves maſters of their artillery, baggage-waggons, and a great number of colours.

"The general having received a wound, thought proper to point his courſe towards the biſhopric of Halberſtadt, leaving the troops, that were afterwards to follow him, to our clemency, and the mercy of war. Great numbers of the enemy fell on the field of battle, amongſt whom was the watch-maſter general ‡, and ſome other commanders of note. The number of priſoners amounts to ſeveral thouſands, and under that head may be mentioned the duke of Holſtein, and various officers of no ſmall diſtinction.—For all which ſeries of ſucceſſes, let us give thanks to God, as the real author and promoter of them, and aſcribe entirely, as we juſtly ought, to his benignity, that not only the long-expected hope, ſo ardently conceived by thouſands, of the reſtoration of civil and religious liberty, at length preſents itſelf afreſh to our imagination, but that there appears likewiſe no *difficult proſpect of undertaking a ſecond time the re-eſtabliſhment of the oppreſſed Palatine family.*

"We doubt not, but your ſerenity will receive the news of this victory with affection and joy; that you will conſider the preſent opportunity as a circumſtance not to be *neglected*, directing your whole attention to this ſingle ob-

* As Guſtavus neither loved nor eſteemed Tilly, on account of the barbarities committed by him in the ſtorming of Magdeburg, it has been obſerved elſewhere, that he uſually ſtyled him the *Old Walloon* and *Old Corporal*. Even in this letter it is very evident, he affects twice to avoid calling him by his proper name.

† His majeſty includes neither the cannonade nor the defeat.

‡ Erwitz.

ject, and making it your royal care to advance the good of the Chriſtian world, and promote the welfare of your own relations, by aſſiſtance in *men* and *money*, and by *magnanimous reſolutions*. For our own part, from henceforwards, we will never allow ourſelves to be thought remiſs in regard to you and yours, recommending your ſerenity to divine protection, in full expectation, that things may continue to take a turn ſtill more proſperous in our behalf *.

" Your affectionate brother and kinſman,

" At Halle in Saxony,
Sept. 13, 1631." " GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS."

Tilly left 7000 men dead in the field: but the number of ſlain does not always conſtitute the real loſs that attends a defeat. Men may be procured and purchaſed again: but the loſs of ſuch a number of veteran troops, infantry eſpecially, is *never* to be recovered during an old general's life. Few people extend this remark through military hiſtory, though the conſequences are, humanly ſpeaking, almoſt infallible. The emperor half ruined his fortunes juſt before Guſtavus arrived, by diſbanding a body of 17,000 well ſeaſoned and experienced troops, with a view to pleaſe the diet at Ratiſbon; and Spain afterwards received a mortal wound by loſing a reſpectable body of Walloons at the battle of Rocroy †, nor had ſhe recovered her loſs even at the time when the peace of Munſter was concluded.

It has been ‡ remarked, by ſome hiſtorians, that in the courſe and conſequences of this defeat, the Imperialiſts loſt more men under the article of priſoners than in the action itſelf; for out of forty thouſand effective ſoldiers, according to their computation, Tilly, by Pappenheim's confeſſion, preſerved no more than *one half*. Great numbers of the enemy

* From a *MS. Latin letter in the Aſhmole collection* at Oxford. APPENDIX, Art. XXIV.

† The marquis de Fontaines commanded the centre, compoſed of Walloon infantry, which body of troops, when both wings were defeated, maintained their poſt to the laſt man. Next morning the general, who had been afflicted with the gout, was found dead in his arm chair at the head of his ſoldiers, who lay all ſtretched round him in regular lines, covering the ſame ground which they had occupied whilſt alive.

‡ The court of Vienna ſuſtained another loſs of this kind ſoon after the peace of Utrecht, being induced from arguments of economy to diſmiſs about 18,000 troops, which had diſtinguiſhed themſelves through the *war of the ſucceſſion*. Prince Eugene made remonſtrance after remonſtrance, and condeſcended even to intercede and ſupplicate for their continuance; but receiving in a private audience a poſitive denial from the emperor, he left the cabinet with great emotion, and ſhed tears on the occaſion.

took

took the opportunity to desert a sinking cause; 3000 persons were taken prisoners in the day of battle, to whom the king granted quarter without the effusion of a drop of blood. Some likewise were killed in their flight; for Gustavus pursued the Imperialists eight and thirty miles, and at Mersburg particularly, destroyed a thousand more, and compelled fifteen hundred to surrender.

The camp of the enemy was taken standing, so that the officers and soldiers lost great part of their ill-acquired plunder. In a word, there was hardly a soldier amongst the killed, or prisoners, who had less than ten ducats in his pockets, and more was found concealed in their girdles and their saddles. Almost all the baggage-waggons fell into the hands of the Swedes, as also 100 ensigns and cornets, and more than two thirds of the train of artillery. The victors were pleased to find many of the latter, inscribed with the names, and decorated with the arms of their friends and enemies; as the king of Bohemia, elector of Brandenburg, and duke of Brunswick, on the one hand, and of the dukes of Bavaria and Fridland, also of his Imperial majesty, on the other. The king divided the spoils of Tilly's camp amongst his men in a manner remarkably equitable and uncommon: for, being apprized of the lodgment and disposition of the enemy's troops, he appointed each Swedish regiment to occupy the same ground which an Imperial regiment had possessed before; and no man was allowed to plunder out of his own district, under the most severe military pains and penalties *.

The Swedes, who behaved well, lost only 1000 men in this engagement; and the Saxons, who faced the enemy only a few minutes, verified the old observation,

*Mors & fugacem persequitur virum,*

for their loss amounted to at least 2000. Amongst the dead on the Imperial side, may be reckoned Adolphus duke of Holstein, a Protestant, who expired some few hours after he was taken †; sergeant-major general Schoenberg, watch master general Erwitz, Baumgarten general of the artillery, the colonels Blancard and Coloredo, Lerma aid-de-camp, and the marquis of Gonzaga; Lieutenant-colonels,

* *Monro*'s *Expedition*, part ii. p. 71.

† This does not clash with the king's account to Charles I. who considered him only in the light of a prisoner. It is said Gustavus Horn questioned him severely in his last hours for serving under the Roman catholics. His answer was, for in all probability he had reconciled himself to the Romish opinions, that a man of the sword, and a professor of theology, were two different beings.

the baron de Grotta, Caratelli, and don Joſeph de Ainſa, who commanded the regiment of Savelli in the duke's abſence; adjutant-general Zinzendorf, and the commiſſary-generals Walmerode and Graff, were taken priſoners; as were alſo then, and a few days afterwards, at Leipſic and Halle, Coronini, Cratz, and ſix other colonels, together with Bernardi, ſecretary and treaſurer to Tilly, and ſeveral eccleſiaſtics, who were immediately diſmiſſed without ranſom. Amongſt the Swedes were killed Maximilian Teüffel *, who commanded the royal regiment of foot guards, Hall, Callenbach, Aldergaſt, and Damitz, all colonels. Courville was taken priſoner, for, having received a glancing ſhot acroſs the forehead, and being blinded with the blood that ſtreamed down upon his eyes, he mixed with the enemy's troops without knowing them. Colonel Lumſdel, and lieutenant-colonel Moſtyn, were both wounded. The elector of Saxony loſt ſerjeant-major general Bindhauf, Loëſel, Dieſkau, the two Starchedels, and ſome other colonels.

Tilly received, ſome ſay, three wounds from muſquet-balls and piſtol-ſhots, and a very diſagreeable contuſion on his neck from the butt-end of a horſeman's carbine. He was once taken priſoner by one Frederic, a captain of cavalry in the Rhingrave's regiment, whom the army, on account of his ſtature, ſurnamed Langfritz †; who, knowing him, made him an offer of quarter, and upon Tilly's refuſal gave him the blow above-mentioned; but Rodolphus duke of Saxe-Lauenberg flew to his aſſiſtance with two or three horſemen, and bravely reſcued him, killing Langfritz with a piſtol-ſhot, taking, even in ſuch confuſion, ſo true an aim, that the bullet entered one ear, and paſſed through the other. Pappenheim received ſix or ſeven wounds, *according to cuſtom* ‡; and the count de Furſtenberg was wounded, but not mortally. Cronenberg carried off the general at the head of the unconquerable Walloons, who were reduced

* Baron of Ginderſdorf and Weyerſberg. This brave man was a German born, but left the Imperial ſervice upon ſome diſguſt. Lanſperg, who loved the turgid ſtyle, ſpeaks very pompouſly of this hero, upon ſuppoſition, that his real name, Teüffel, i. e. Devil, was a *nom de guerre*. Suedorum nonnullus ex primariis occubuit: cæteriſque inſignior Maximilianus cognomento DIABOLUS, medii agminis (quod monui) duƈtor, regi ob fortitudinem chariſſimus. It was a common ſaying with the German wits, that Guſtavus muſt counterwork and defeat his enemies, ſince one of his generals was *Death, (Todt)* and the other the *Devil, (Teüffel)*. *Guſt. Magn. Bellum Germ.* 1650, p. 329.

† Long-ſides.

‡ He received *the like number* of wounds at the battle of Prague, and laid for a conſiderable time ſtripped and undiſtinguiſhed amongſt the ſlain.

to

to 600 men, and lodged him by break of day at twenty-one miles diſtance in the town of Halle. Furſtenberg attended Tilly in another coach, and the duke of Saxe-Lauenberg aſſiſted Cronenberg in conducting the party. The regiment of Schoenberg ſoon followed them, but the major part of the broken troops pointed their courſe towards Halberſtadt.

In this confuſion ſixteen troops of horſe formed themſelves between the field of battle and the town of Leipſic, but they had no officers to command them; and neither the generaliſſimo, nor maréchal de camp, nor ſerjeant-major di battaglia were to be found. At length Pappenheim appeared, and, having mounted a freſh horſe, led them on to make a final effort. That attempt not ſucceeding, he carried them off under favour of the night, purſuing the road which we have juſt mentioned. All ſuppoſed the general to be dead, nor did Pappenheim appear much afflicted at that report; for Tilly and he had never agreed ſince he diſſuaded the former to deſiſt from his enterpriſe on the king's camp at Werben *.

The king, according to ſome accounts †, ſlept all the night ſucceeding the battle near a little fire made of fragments of wood, which his ſoldiers had collected together; having firſt diſpatched a body of troops to purſue the fugitives. Others tell us, that he invited the elector of Saxony to take part of a cold repaſt with him in his tent; and all who knew his majeſty's warmth of temper, expected he would throw out an oblique hint or two on the miſbehaviour of the Saxon troops; but, on the contrary, he told the elector, *That his men, conſidering they were chiefly new-raiſed recruits, behaved extremely well:* and then aſked him, *how he liked* his *conduct in that day's ſervice; proteſting at the ſame time, he would follow his point vigorouſly, and purſue the old corporal to the utmoſt limits of the world.* Next morning, after public prayers, and a ſolemn act of thankſgiving at the head of his army, he mounted on horſeback, and returned thanks to his *men*, regiment by regiment; and notwithſtanding the Imperial army ſuffered at that time a ſort of general wreck, and every moment was precious to a conqueror, in order to render his victory more complete upon eaſier terms, yet this wiſe and religious prince could not allow himſelf to purſue the ſtroke at the very inſtant his arm was lifted up, till he had firſt returned his acknowledgment to the Supreme

* *Mercure François*, 1631, p. 690.
† *Continuation of the Laurea Auſtriaca*, fol. p. 26, &c.

Being,

Being, and diſcharged the debt of gratitude, which he owed to his faithful ſoldiers; beſtowing particular encomiums on the Swediſh and Finland horſe conducted by Horn, as alſo on that brave body of Scottiſh infantry which Hepburn commanded.

Thus ended one of the greateſt battles that Europe had then ſeen. It laſted indeed only four hours and an half; for we will not include the two hours employed in cannonading. It was in this reſpect that Tilly prided himſelf particularly: and, what was ſtill more, ſome of his artillery appeared to be of the heavieſt ſort then in uſe, and all his batteries were ready fixed; but after the firſt carnage was paſſed over, the king's portable cannons performed wonders*, as Tilly himſelf acknowledges in his letter. It is true, he ſays nothing of his majeſty's peculiar method of fighting that day in *columns*, of which the king had made an experiment before in an engagement with the duke de Savelli, nor of ſome *evolutions*, which were then eſteemed extraordinary†. This ſilence is not to be wondered at, ſince it was impoſſible for Tilly to have commended Guſtavus in theſe preſent circumſtances, without depreciating his own merit. The ground, if we except the rivulet and the moraſs of Scholka, the elevation of the Imperial batteries, and the advantage of the wood where the troops rallied, may be conſidered tolerably equal; nor were any intrenchments made uſe of on either ſide, there being indeed no time to prepare them. Many regiments charged *ten* or *fifteen* times, and ſome fought with only momentary intermiſſions, from the beginning of the battle to the end. What is worth remarking, no officer or ſoldier in the Swediſh or Imperial armies was ever afterwards called to an account for *miſbehaviour*. It may likewiſe be obſerved, that the Swediſh cavalry

* We have never had the fortune to meet with a ſufficient reaſon for the diſcontinuance of the leather cannon, which this prince invented. It certainly had its uſe in point of portability, and was highly neceſſary for the ſake of ſhifting, varying the attack, and rallying; as alſo in deep and miry countries with ſmall armies, and upon ſudden expeditions. See note to p. 156 of vol. i. We have inquired likewiſe of ſeveral excellent German officers, what they thought of this uncommon ſort of artillery. Their anſwer was, That they did not know the ſecret whereby the king conſtructed it, and ſuppoſed the peculiar method of making it, to have been long loſt in oblivion. That, conformably to their own ideas at preſent, no artiſt could form a cannon of this ſort that could be diſcharged many times ſucceſſively.—Yet thoſe of Guſtavus were fired ſeven or eight times in the ſame day's ſervice. *Memoires communicated.* One Braunius, a German, has publiſhed a diſſertation on the ſubject, but we never could procure it.

† *Lanſbergii Guſt. Magn. Bellum Germ.* p. 324, 325, 12°. Rot. 1652.

did

did not diſcharge a piſtol till they had received their adverſaries fire, and almoſt touched the heads of their horſes. The effect was the more fatal, as the *peletons* of intermixt muſqueteers diſunited and broke the enemy's line by mere weight of ball, when oppoſed to the ſhort pieces of carbineers and the piſtols of horſemen. It alike deſerves notice, that neither the king nor his troops diſcovered the leaſt *diſmay* upon the flight of the Saxons, though Horn's left wing was thereby laid open and naked, and though the number of the electoral forces was half equal, to ſay the leaſt of them, to that of the Swedes. It is probable his majeſty poſted theſe troops by themſelves, becauſe he ſuſpected they might not do their duty.

The loſs of this battle, ſtruck the whole catholic league dumb, after an uninterrupted ſeries of victory for thirteen ſucceſſive years; and cauſed ſo great an aſtoniſhment even in the court of Vienna, that the emperor, not thinking himſelf ſecure in his capital, removed his houſhold to Gratz, the metropolis of Stiria.

The king, having employed himſelf the morning after the battle according to the manner we have related, diſtributed the 3000 Imperial priſoners amongſt his troops. In all theſe corps were only three ſubjects of his Britannic majeſty, though conſiderable numbers, Iriſh eſpecially, then ſerved in the emperor's armies. This finiſhed, he permitted his ſoldiers, who had ſlept all night on the bare ground, and had eaten nothing worth mentioning for two days, to take poſſeſſion of the Imperialiſts camp near Leipſic, where they found abundant proviſions of every kind. He then, at the head of part of his cavalry, inveſted Leipſic, but leaving the ſiege to the elector of Saxony, who by this time was returned from Eülenberg, to which place he and his army had fled on the afternoon of the battle, he puſhed on, the next morning, as far as Merſburg*, whoſe governor, the baron de Palant, received orders from Tilly to withdraw his garriſon. Pappenheim, who at that period was in effect general over the generaliſſimo, paſſing through Merſburg after Tilly, left counter-orders with the baron, which that commander thinking fit to comply with, made a reſiſtance more becoming a man of honour than a man of prudence; for not only he and

* Three days afterwards the caſtle of Merſburg was taken, by which means colonel Uſlar regained his liberty, having been captive there ever ſince the ſtorming of Magdeburg. Guſtavus ſent the governor of the caſtle, who was a ſubject of Saxony, to plead his cauſe, and make his excuſes to the elector his maſter.

his

his garriſon, but ſeveral broken companies which had ſtraggled thither after the battle of Leipſic, were all made priſoners of war.

The king, out of pure politeneſs, left the reconquering of Leipſic to its lawful poſſeſſor, inaſmuch as it was pretty certain, that town muſt ſubmit of courſe; and in effect Wangler, the Imperial commander, ſurrendered after a deliberation of two days, and ſaved 3000 good troops, upon condition that, thenceforwards, they were never to bear arms againſt the crown of Sweden; ſuch commanders and ſoldiers excepted, as did not belong *bona fide* to the garriſon. So that about one hundred perſons, chiefly officers, were detained as priſoners; and many brave Swedes were releaſed, who had been confined there ever ſince the ſtorming of Magdeburg; and by this time the king, as Monro, who was there preſent, aſſures us, had increaſed his army ſince the battle of Leipſic, with an addition of 7000 Imperial forces, including priſoners.

In the meantime his majeſty, at the head of 15,000 men, attended by an army of 10,000 more, advanced as far as Halle, and made himſelf maſter of the town and caſtle with no great difficulty. Here he refreſhed his men for ſome days, and returned public thanks to God in the great cathedral, employing every leiſure moment in planning and adjuſting his future operations. Before he left the town, many proteſtant princes, with the elector of Saxony at their head, made him a viſit; and here it was, that meaſures were taken for the completion of the great work, which was to come on. What is yet more, this mighty plan was all reduced to form in one evening, though that evening was dedicated to feſtivity; for the elector of Saxony loved the enjoyments of the table above meaſure. Some minutes before ſupper, colonel Monro entered the room out of curioſity, and the king, who diſliked drinking, took him by the ſhoulder, and ſaid with a whiſper, *I wiſh, Monro, you could be maſter of the bottles and glaſſes to night, in the abſence of old major-general ſir Patrick Ruthven; but you want a ſtrength of head to relieve me on ſuch an occaſion.* Then turning round to the elector, he made a long encomium on the Scottiſh nation; and beckoning to colonel Hepburn, who ſtood in another part of the room, recapitulated the purport of his diſcourſe, and recommended him, Lumſdel, and Monro, to the elector's more immediate notice.

At length it was agreed on all hands, that as to purſue Tilly was only loſs of time, it was therefore more expedient, ſince the emperor and the catholic league could not produce

duce a freſh army very ſoon, to fall upon the reſpective dominions of certain popiſh princes, while their minds were ſtrongly impreſſed with terror. Before this great work could be undertaken, it was concluded neceſſary to employ part of the troops in ſecuring the princes of the houſe of Anhalt, as likewiſe the two dioceſes of Magdeburg and Halberſtadt; and then Guſtavus determined to march, in perſon, at the head of the reſidue of his army, even into Bavaria, if that were poſſible, with an intent to give laws, at the ſame time, as he went along, to the eccleſiaſtical electors, and the biſhops of Wurtzburg and Bamberg; and it was allotted the elector of Saxony to carry on the war in Luſatia, Sileſia, and Bohemia. What induced Guſtavus, who was then aſcending to the zenith of his power, and abſolute in his deciſions in the aſſembly at Halle, to aſſign this department, and in effect the high road which led to Vienna, to the elector of Saxony, has been a point beyond the power of moſt hiſtorians to explain fully; and many perſons have been the more perplexed in their conſiderations of it, inaſmuch as the great Oxenſtiern pronounced it to be a *falſe meaſure* *. Nevertheleſs, we ſhall ſpeak more amply concerning this difficulty hereafter, not in the leaſt to his Swediſh majeſty's diſhonour, but, on the contrary, very abundantly to his glory.

We will now for a moment turn to the unfortunate Tilly, who, reaching Halle in the beſt manner he could before break of day; ſent for the town-ſurgeon to dreſs his wounds, and make an inciſion into his contuſion, which then gave him inexpreſſible torments. Upon examining the bruiſed fleſh, the ſagacious operator pronounced the general's body to be *gefrorn*, that is to ſay, in other words, to have been rendered impenetrable by magical incantations, and taliſmanical ſignatures † ‡.

From Halle the Imperial commander fled to Halberſtadt in a litter, and there, having juſt ſufficient ſtrength to bear being placed on a horſe for a ſingle hour, made a review of his ſhattered troops, which amounted to 5000 cavalry, if we include ten cornetcies of horſe juſt arrived from Cologne, and ſome broken bodies of infantry; for the greater part of the army, concluding it more ſafe to adhere to Pappenheim, purſued another route under that officer's protection.

* Sueeum vincere, victoriâ uti neſciviſſe. Loccen. 587.

† *Swediſh Intelligencer.*

‡ Quod militiæ dehoneſtamentum quantum a Tillio abfuerit, ſciunt qui hominem novêre. *Brachel.* Hiſt. noſtr. temp. p. 266.

The

The little handful of men reaſſembled at Halle expreſſed great joy to behold once more their aged general; who, when he arrived at Aſcherleben, diſpatched the Cologne regiment to join Pappenheim at Mansfelt, and ſupport his retreat. When Pappenheim received this reinforcement, it is aſſerted by ſome *, that he diſcovered very viſible ſigns of diſtaſte upon being ſo certainly aſſured, that the generaliſſimo was *living*. Be that as it may, Tilly in two days ſent four expreſſes to Aldringer, requeſting he would join him at his general rendezvous in the duchy of Brunſwick, which diſtreſſed unfortunate country he conſidered partly as his own; for the emperor had beſtowed upon him, by way of gratuity, a conſiderable part of the territories of the brave duke Chriſtian, who was alſo biſhop of Halberſtadt. From Aſcherleben he ſhaped his courſe through the dioceſe of Hildeſheim, and arrived, in ten days after the battle, at Alvede, a little town on the river Leyne, which afterwards runs through Hanover. This journey may be conſidered more as a flight than a march, for in that time he led his troops 140 miles.

The king of Poland had long lain in wait for the event of a deciſive battle; hoping, if Tilly had proved once ſucceſsful, to have recovered all that the Swedes poſſeſſed in Pruſſia. Matters taking a contrary turn, he thought proper to offer up his incenſe to the conquering party. His Daniſh majeſty made public rejoicings at Copenhagen; yet ſo deeply rooted was his jealouſy of Guſtavus, that he privately wiſhed well to the houſe of Auſtria. Guſtavus knew both theſe kings to the very bottom, and choſe to build upon their *fears* much rather than upon their compliments. On the other hand, the dukes of Brunſwick and Lunenberg were more explicit; and the prince of Anhalt, with all his family, made no ceremony of eſpouſing the cauſe of Sweden by public treaty; wherein it was declared by him, That, repoſing himſelf upon the protection of Guſtavus, his intention was to contribute his contingency towards the expences of the war, allowing the Swedes to erect fortifications wherever the king pleaſed, and conſtruct a bridge over the Elbe; towards the completing of which work he agreed to furniſh both men and money †. Guſtavus, moderate in proſperity, as well as undiſmayed in adverſity, received all theſe princes with thankfulneſs, and careſſed them all; and though the elector of Saxony after the battle, expected, as we obſerved before, but cold reception

* *Lettre d'un Capitaine*, &c. *à un ſien ami.*
† *Chemnitius*, tom. i. 179.

from

from a prince of ſo much valour, ſeverity, and frankneſs, yet our hero commended him for the infinite pains he took to rally his men, and for the ſenſible regret he manifeſted upon account of their miſbehaviour. The elector, charmed with a treatment ſo unexpected, vowed to follow the fortune of Guſtavus to his laſt moments, and offered the whole of his aſſiſtance to procure him to be elected king of the Romans. The Saxon generals and miniſters, who were moſt of them penſioners to the court of Vienna, ſoon however perſuaded their maſter to change his mind: nevertheleſs, to all outward appearance the two princes lived together in perfect cordiality, *manente in ſpeciem concordia.*

By this time, as a ſort of natural conſequence from the victory of Leipſic, Guſtavus began to diſcover, that civil affairs increaſed upon his hands, as well as the military; and for theſe reaſons ordered Oxenſtiern, who had been abſent from him ever ſince his arrival in Germany, to quit his warlike command in Pruſſia, and take upon him the office of director-general in the new-conquered countries; or, as others ſay, *legatus ab exercitu.* The chancellor ſet out immediately upon this charge, which ſeemed more ſuitable to his inclinations, and natural abilities; yet did not reach Halle till the king had croſſed Thuringia, and conquered great part of Franconia.

It was debated in the evening of the entertainment we have lately mentioned, by what methods, and through what inroads the Swediſh and Saxon troops ſhould invade the empire, and the allies of the Imperial family; proper departments being already aſſigned to the elector of Brandenburg, the landgrave of Heſſe, and the dukes of Mechlenburg. On both hands it was quickly agreed, that to purſue Tilly into Lower-Saxony would remove the ſeat of war too far from Vienna and Munich, and revive a new ſcene of diſtreſs and miſery among the proteſtant princes of that circle. This ſcheme therefore being conſidered as injudicious and chimerical, only two roads preſented themſelves, whereby it was poſſible to invade and annoy the houſe of Auſtria and the catholic league; namely, the *left-hand* paſſage by way of Bohemia, ſtraight to Vienna, which appeared at firſt ſight moſt practicable, as the road, except ſuch defiles and mountains as you find on the northern and ſouthern frontiers, was plain and wide, the country itſelf abounding in good proviſions of all ſorts; the Imperialiſts having prepared no troops in thoſe parts by way of oppoſition;—and the *right-hand* entrance into Thuringia, which might lead ultimately as far as Munich, but where many bye conqueſts were

to be made, and princes of various characters to be cajoled or threatened: added likewiſe, that the vaſt dreary foreſt of Thuringia, commonly called the *Duringer-Walt*, was to be croſſed; and laſtly, that the roads were narrow, winding, rocky in ſome places, and miry in others; eſpecially in and near Bavaria, which abounds in rivers and moraſſes.

The elector of Saxony not daring, or not chooſing to exaſperate the houſe of Auſtria more than was needful, frankly made the king an offer of reſigning to him the Bohemian paſſage into Auſtria, which Guſtavus poſitively rejected without aſſigning any reaſons. It is thought by many, that he entertained no high opinion of Arnheim's honeſty, and placed as little confidence in the elector's abilities or ſincerity. Nor was he ſatisfied, in caſe theſe difficulties could have been removed, that either Arnheim or his maſter were capable of reducing to obedience even the ſingle circle of Franconia, inaſmuch as Tilly, when he had once joined his troops with thoſe of Aldringer, Fugger, and the Lorainers, might return upon them, as neareſt to him, with great force, and give them, in all probability, a total overthrow. He ſaw too plainly in the day's ſervice at Leipſic, that the Saxon generals and ſoldiers, however well intentioned, could perform but little in oppoſition to the rough and well-ſeaſoned veterans of the Imperial army. For theſe reaſons, he thought it prudent to engage their honeſty no farther than his own eye could ſuperintend it, nor embark them ſo deeply, as to run the riſk of ſacrificing the whole upon any miſcarriage on their part; concluding it more adviſable to keep them in breath by maintaining a diverſion, and inure them to an apprenticeſhip in war, before they ſate up for principals and maſters in ſuch a difficult profeſſion.—Having therefore well arranged and digeſted all theſe ideas in his own mind, he pronounced only the reſult of his private reaſonings to the aſſembly, declaring in a few words, That as the princes and orders of Sileſia had conſidered the elector of Saxony as the firſt protector of the proteſtant cauſe ever ſince the breaking out of the Bohemian troubles, it was highly incumbent on the elector to fix his footing in Sileſia, and then extend his conqueſt into Bohemia.——That for his own part, with the concurrence of his electoral highneſs, he had reſolved once for all to penetrate through Thuringia into Franconia, having already prepared every thing neceſſary for ſuch an expedition; being determined not only to allow a breathing-ſpace to the princes and ſtates of Upper-Germany, but to make the enemy a viſit in his own lodgings, and give Tilly a ſecond chance, if he thought proper to confront him in the field

of

of battle*. Thus ſpoke the king, and as no man replied, both the debate and the converſation ended, though the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, the dukes of Mechlenburg, and the princes of the houſe of Anhalt and Weimar were all preſent at this auguſt aſſembly.

About this time Chriſtian, margrave of Culmbach, entered into a *confederation* with his majeſty upon the ſame footing as that which had been concluded with the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, whereto the adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg afterwards acceded. This gave the Swedes great credit in the circle of Suabia. The biſhop of Bamberg † made a pretence too of copying their examples, and ſaved himſelf for that time by a mean act of equivocation: but the Swedes remembered him at a more convenient ſeaſon, ſo that upon the whole he loſt the reputation of a man of honour, and gained nothing but the character of a diſſembler, who weakly attempted to overreach a prince of ſuperior talents.

The king then diſpatched Chemnitz‡, and another deputy, named Relinghen, to the margrave of Brandenburg's‖ place of reſidence. From Bareüth he inſtructed them to go forwards and ſound the intentions of the Nurenbergers, and other proteſtants, with orders to uſe both kind words and menaces. Chemnitz acquitted himſelf very well in the embaſſies, but the Nurenbergers at firſt had not courage to make any declarations againſt the houſe of Auſtria: for indeed they had only juſt tranſmitted a paper of allegiance to Aldringer, ſealed and ſigned in due form by the whole body of their patricians. Poppy alſo, an Imperial deputy who then reſided at Amberg, conſtantly reminded them of this ſolemn engagement; ſo that the moſt they offered was a ſpecies of neutrality, upon which the king wrote them a letter with his own hand, obſerving, *That he ſaw through the ſurfaces of their hearts the Imperial intereſts in full proportion and diſtinctneſs at bottom; and that the middle courſe, which they propoſed to ſteer, was calculated upon no other principle, than to amuſe and deceive him.* "*For my own part,*" continued he, "*I look upon all neutralities with an eye of contempt, and ſhall treat neutral proteſtants upon the footing of enemies, wherever I find them.*" This letter being read in the public ſenate-houſe,

* *Chemnitius*, tom. i. p. 180.

† John George de Dornheim, elected 1622, died 1633.

‡ This was not the hiſtorian, but one Martin Von Chemnitz, a privy-counſellor.

‖ Chriſtian, Margrave of Brandenburg.

in preſence of an aſſembly of 200 patricians, either terrified them into reaſon, or ſerved as a pretext to juſtify them for quitting the intereſts of the houſe of Auſtria. Upon this the whole magiſtracy unanimouſly inclined to the cauſe of Sweden, and ſigned afterwards a treaty of alliance in conjunction with the other orders and ſtates of the circle of Franconia. Chemnitz then received freſh inſtructions to continue at Nurenberg, and the other deputy went on to Ulm, and thence to Guntzburg, in which journey, being by profeſſion a captain of horſe, he fell, with his little eſcort, on an Imperial commiſſary, guarded by a body of twenty muſqueteers, and having killed the officer with a piſtol-ball, carried along with him to Straſburg the ſtrong box, containing upwards of a thouſand pounds, and generouſly applied the whole ſum to his maſter's ſervice.

Meanwhile the king, conformably to his late plan, it being only ten days after the battle of Leipſic, advanced at the head of his army to make himſelf maſter of Erfurt, a large city in the famous foreſt of Thuringia, dependant by dubious and diſputable tenure on the elector of Mentz*, which prelate was the firſt prince of the catholic league, againſt whom Guſtavus thought proper to begin hoſtilities. Before it was poſſible for him to demand admiſſion, a body of delegated magiſtrates reſpectfully told him, that he was extremely welcome to make his reſidence among them in *perſon*, but begged to be excuſed from admitting a garriſon. His anſwer was, *That he came as a friend, and not as an enemy: and more for their advantage than his own; that it was never his cuſtom to make ſtrangers his guards, and place himſelf in ſuch a ſituation as to be obliged to receive laws from other men; Alterius non ſit, qui ſuus eſſe poteſt.* Theſe were the very words he made uſe of on the occaſion; and upon the departure of the ſenators, he ordered duke William of Saxe Weimar, under pretence of eſcorting them with a body of horſe, to take poſſeſſion of the city at the ſame time that they entered. He then told the inhabitants in a long ſpeech, which may be conſidered not only as a public juſtification of himſelf for entering Germany, but as a pattern of chriſtian magnanimity, and religious moderation: That the public might be curious to be informed of what nature thoſe motives were, which induced him firſt to interpoſe in the Germanic ſyſtem.

* Frederick Greiffenclau, biſhop of Worms; elected by the chapter 1626 in the room of John Suicard, whoſe family name was Cronenberg.

For the various claims and pretenſions to Erfurt the reader may conſult *La Geographie de Hubner*, tom. vi. p. 258.

"I em-

"*I embark,*" faid he, "*in a war, far from my native dominions, and ſeem to court thoſe dangers and difficulties, which another man might labour to decline; but the Searcher of the human heart well ſees and knows, that it was neither ambition, that tempted me, nor the avarice of extending my dominions, nor the appetite of fighting, nor the miſchievous temper of loving to interfere in my neighbours concerns. Other object I had none, than to ſupport the afflicted and oppreſſed, to maintain the religious and civil rights of ſociety, and bear my teſtimony againſt a* tyranny over the whole human race. *The Supreme Being hitherto has conferred upon me the marks of a providential concurrence, and has rendered me the willing, but unworthy inſtrument of reſtoring liberty both* corporeal *and* mental *to the late unhappy inhabitants in the various provinces of Lower-Germany. Let us, my friends, always remember, that in this general wreck of mankind, no one intereſted perſon muſt propoſe to glean any ruins to himſelf, nor ſit, abjectly, lamenting, with folded arms, when the helm requires one man, when the anchor aſks a ſecond, and the ſails a third. As is well known, I ſolicited for peace before my army entered Germany; I aſked for it a ſecond time very near the period of the inhuman maſſacre at Magdeburg; and am open to receive it now, even fourteen days after the deciſive victory of Leipſic.——The inſtinct of God prompts me ſtill to continue amongſt you, and the neceſſity of things, in the firſt chain of which I had no concern, compels me to protect and make conditions for my allies, my kinſmen, and brethren in religion: nor will I ever deſert them, till God reſumes that exiſtence, which at preſent he has thought fit to make my portion.—I acknowledge, with gratitude to the Supreme Being, that my mind is yet firm, and my body robuſt. I thank him likewiſe for having bleſſed me with no vulgar ſucceſs, and for enduing me with abilities capable of applying* that *ſucceſs to ſuitable purpoſes. Nevertheleſs, I am neither vain-glorious in my paſt proſperities, nor inapprehenſive of the future frowns of Providence. It is certain too, that I contend with an army of veteran troops, rendered maſters of their profeſſion by experience, and ſharpened afreſh by diſappointment and deſpair: and beſides all this, it is a point incontestable,* that war, in the very beſt hands, is a game of uncertainty.——*If I oppreſs any man, merely through the neceſſity of affairs, it is* I *that* feel, *as well as* he:——*if I request you to receive a garriſon, and expend ſome money in new fortifying your city, it is becauſe I would make good* that *protection which I ſincerely promiſe you. It has never been my cuſtom firſt to* conquer, *and then* enſlave; *and of this the town of Riga is an irrefragable inſtance. You may repoſe on the ſincerity of my protection when I aſſure you, that I intend to leave among you, as a pledge or depoſitum, the invaluable object of all my*

*affections in this world, and that is, the* QUEEN OF SWEDEN*†.

His majesty, when the town-deputies met him between Halle and Erfurt, graciously gave them his word of honour to protect the liberties of the people, and not interrupt the established religion, with which the magistrates appeared highly contented. Being extremely delicate with regard to all imputations of subterfuge and retraction, he reduced his engagements, under nine distinct articles, into writing‡, which, being duly signed and sealed, gave such satisfaction to the principal inhabitants of the town and district, that they presented on their side a counterpart protestation, wherein, after having first obliged themselves, by oath, to continue faithful and obedient to him, his heirs, his crown and allies, during the whole period of this religious war, they engaged to defend their town *bona fide* against all hostile attacks; to attempt nothing to the detriment of his majesty's arms, but, on the contrary, to make discovery of all things, that tended to his prejudice; concluding with this general protest, that they enrolled themselves under the king's protection with submission and gratitude, sincerely, candidly, and irreproachably, in a manner befitting liberal persons, and men of honour‖.

The king, who always made the tour of every city the first leisure moment after he had conquered it, for he loved to *see* the populace, and found it his interest likewise to be *seen* by them, directed his steps, as some think by design, into the church of St. Peter, and meeting the abbot at his first entrance, requested him to advise his sovereign *to withdraw his troops from the army of the league, and not strengthen the enemies of the protestants. That for his own part he bore no ill-will to the electoral body, and should be greatly mortified, if necessitated to use them contrary to his intentions. That the emperor only, was his man and his object; and as the Imperial soldiers had robbed him of a beaver hat* § *in Pomerania, he was come thus far to recover it and carry it home***.

When the jesuits threw themselves at his feet, he raised them from the ground, and said, *They had much to answer for*

* *Chemnit.* tom. i. pag. 184—187.

† When her majesty arrived, the seat of war was removed so far from Erfurt, that the completion of the promise seemed entirely unnecessary.

‡ The author of the *Swedish Intelligencer* gives us twelve, part ii. p. 4.

‖ *Chemnit.* tom. i. 188.

§ See the rencounter between him and Sirot, in that officer's *Memoirs.*

** *Le Soldat Suedois*, p. 147.

*before*

*before God's tribunal, on account of the commotions they had raiſed, and the blood they had occaſioned to be ſpilt throughout the world. That for his own part he was ſo far a* jeſuit, *as to be able to comprehend, that their projects were ill-intentioned, their proceedings ſiniſter, and their maxims dangerous. That it would become them better to peruſe their breviaries, and handle their roſaries, in imitation of the decorum and moderation of other good catholic eccleſiaſtics, than to embroil themſelves in the intrigues of ſtate, and make the world a ſea of blood: exhorting them to continue in quiet, and advertiſe their brethren of this diſcourſe, ſince if they remained inactive, and in profound ſubmiſſion, ſtrict care ſhould be taken, that no perſon ſhould moleſt them**.

Things being thus adjuſted and explained, he gave the papiſts aſſurances, that they had free liberty to continue, undiſturbed, in the exerciſes of their religion, or to ſell their eſtates and effects, and retire into what country they pleaſed; but as to ſuch, as had deſerted their places of abode without waiting for an explanation, he ſhould make no ſcruple to confiſcate their goods in order to fit up the manſion deſtined for the reception of his royal conſort. With regard to the proteſtant clergy, as likewiſe ſchoolmaſters and profeſſors in the univerſity, he placed them, with ſingular honour, under his own immediate protection, and exempted them from the hardſhip of quartering ſoldiers, or contributing in any ſhape towards the expences of the war. In reſpect to the catholic eccleſiaſtics, he contented himſelf with their ſolemn declaration, that they would no ways prejudice the Swediſh crown, nor the allies of Sweden. He then in the laſt place, having made a treaty with the dukes of Saxe-Weimar, appointed William, the elder brother, a prince extremely popular, and who had many connexions in thoſe parts, governor of the city and diſtrict of Erfurt, which contains about ſeventy-three pariſhes, and the whole province of Thuringia: nominating the count of Lowenſtein to be commander of the garriſon†, and referring all civil matters to Sternberg, who acted in the double capacity of judge and public miniſter. In like manner, ſome days before, he created Lewis, prince of Anhalt, ſtadtholder of Halle, and director of the duchy of Magdeburg, joining with him Stalman as chancel-

* *Le Soldat Suedois*, p. 148.

† The garriſon conſiſted of Fowle's Scottiſh regiment, conſiſting of 1500 men. For the preſervation of the province of Thuringia, were left behind, Courville's and Lowenſtein's regiments of cavalry; Mitzval's, Monro's, and Forbes's regiments of infantry, with four companies of foot, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Chemnitz; all veteran troops of eſtabliſhed reputation.

lor, and colonel Sneydwin * as military commander in the city, preciſely for the ſame reaſons; *cautiouſly avoiding to put native Swedes into ſuch employment, for fear of giving umbrage to the Germans.*

His majeſty now † turned all his thoughts towards the reduction of Franconia, a circle of more importance to the Imperialiſts than any other, as it afforded them means of reſiſting and retarding their aggreſſors, partly from the abundance of narrow defiles and difficult paſſes, and partly from the rocky and unequal nature of the ground in various places. Yet although one half of the country be wild, woody, and ſcantily peopled, which renders the march of an enemy highly diſagreeable, yet the other half, at the ſame time, vies with any tract or territory in the empire, both for populouſneſs of inhabitants, and for a plentiful ſupply of corn and forage; all which are reaſons why the Imperial troops ſhould not have evacuated that circle. Tilly had overſhot theſe objects in marching ſo precipitately to the north-weſt, which may be conſidered as a *ſignal overſight*; for on his return to relieve Wurtzburg, he found Guſtavus had adjuſted his game in ſuch a manner, that he had reſerved to himſelf the power of ſtarving the Imperialiſts, and declining an engagement.

The king, partly to extend his conqueſts, and partly to ſubſiſt his army, which conſiſted of 20,000 effective men, through the fatigues of a long and painful march, where proviſions were to be obtained with difficulty, and the roads were deep and miry, judged extremely well to divide his forces into two bodies, in order to croſs, with greater conveniency, the vaſt foreſt of Thuringia, which had few villages, and only here and there a market-town, or city. The column, which took the right-hand road, was committed to the care of Bauditzen, as commander in chief, and colonel Hepburn. Bauditzen made himſelf maſter of Smalcalden, Meinungen, Newſtadt, Hamelburg, Gemund, and Carlſtadt, in his route. This general was as cool in reflection, and as brave in execution, as any officer under the king; but in money matters he was of a low rapacious temper ‡. Hence it was, that in order to

* He had been an old officer under the governor of Magdeburg.

† *i. e.* Fourteen days after the battle of Leipſic.

‡ He married Mademoiſelle Rantzau, a lady born in Holſtein, who (though a co-heireſs with three other ſiſters) brought him an extraordinary fortune, for that age and country; namely, £.16,000. ſterling.

ſqueeze

ſqueeze contributions from the inhabitants of the principal cities, through which his courſe laid, he conſented to quarter his ſoldiers in little dorps and open fields; and thus, in a march of only eight days *, he contrived to put five thouſand pounds in his pocket without the privity of his royal maſter; nor did he give a ſingle dollar to the brave Hepburn, and ſuch other officers as acted under him; probably, indeed, they would not have taken it. When the king heard the ſtory, he thought proper to remove him to a more remote command in Pomerania, partly from abhorrence of ſuch practices, and partly becauſe the troops proteſted they did not care to ſerve under ſuch a general. Nevertheleſs, it muſt be obſerved, upon the whole, that the land officers in that age dealt a little too largely in prize-money; which hung like a dead weight on his majeſty's ſpirits, who wiſely foreſaw, when troops were warmly cloathed, well fed, and punctually paid, that ſuch kind of practices muſt in time ſubvert all diſcipline, all principle, and all military enthuſiaſm: for nothing renders ſoldiers ſo cruel, and ſo puſillanimous, as the love of money;

—— *Ibit, qui zonam perdidit, aiunt.*

Therefore it was with Guſtavus, a ſort of maxim, which he always threw out to his officers, as they ſtood round him; *That the ſcience of war was an humane and liberal profeſſion; and that he ever drew a line of partition between the man of ſervice and the ruffian; the hero and the Croatian.* Nor did the king in this exception lay any reſtraint on the freedom of his own conduct; for he, Pappenheim, Horn, Gaſſion, &c. were all men of very exact and regular lives, and ſo was Tilly, if we except his bigotry and cruelty at the ſiege of Magdeburg. They performed far greater exploits in the field, than "thoſe extraordinary heroes, whoſe immoralities," ſays an ingenious author †, "make almoſt as much noiſe as their victories."

* There is ſomething ſurprizingly rapid in Guſtavus's motions, even in bad roads, and at a time when he was encumbered with very heavy artillery. From a diary of this march it appears, that Bauditzen croſſed the foreſt, twent-ſeven miles, in two days; laid the third night at Meinungen, thirteen miles and a half; the fourth at Millerſtadt, thirteen miles and a half; the fifth at Newſtadt, thirteen miles and a half; the ſixth at Gemund, thirteen miles; the ſeventh at Carlſtadt, nine miles; and the eighth at Wurtzburg, nine miles. So that in this expedition he marched *one hundred and eleven miles and a half* in eight days, and received the capitulations of ſix conſiderable towns as he went along. He reached Wurtzburg, and took it before his lieutenant-general arrived.

† M. *Bayle*, under the article of Henry IV.

The morning his majeſty left Erfurt, he ſent a meſſage to the count of Schwartzenberg *, that he purpoſed to take a bed in his caſtle of Gunter near Arnſtadt, the enſuing evening. The nobleman was very uneaſy at this unexpected frankneſs, becauſe one of his anceſtors had done the Swedes great miſchief in a former war. He was weak enough to make his apologies on that head; but Guſtavus told him, with a ſmile and compoſure, *That he had nothing to fear, inaſmuch as his predeceſſor had acted like a man of honour and fidelity; and that he only deſired ſuch a brave and affectionate ſet of officers under himſelf.* During this viſit, a party, detached from the main army, took Gotha by ſurprize; and the king diſpatched letters of accommodation to the two principal perſonages of the catholic league in Franconia; namely, the biſhops of Wurtzburg † and Bamberg. He then, having refreſhed his men a little at Ilmenau, croſſed the Duringer-Walt; and as the troops broke up their quarters early, and reached them late, the road they were to take was illuminated mornings and nights with matches faſtened to trees, and lanterns erected on poſts ſtationed at proper diſtances. The difficulties of carrying the artillery through this foreſt, as appeared plainly to me at the time I croſſed it, were ſufficient to have diſmayed any general leſs enterpriſing than Guſtavus. Nevertheleſs, he ſurmounted the rocks and hills, ſteered his courſe dexterouſly along the precipices, and glided between the thick woods in ſo ſerpentine and judicious a manner, that he reached the ſouth-weſt boundaries of this wild or foreſt on the third evening; having preſented himſelf as he paſſed along, before the ſtrong caſtle of Masfelt, which being ſince diſmantled, now is a heap of ruins, whilſt an advanced party of his light-horſe had the good fortune to ſeize Dacoſta, governor of the fortreſs, and commiſſary over the diſtrict round it, who at that time, like a vigilant warrior, was amuſing himſelf in courſing a hare. In conſequence of ſuch unparalleled careleſſneſs on the part of the commander, this important ſtrong-hold ſurrendered to the conqueror upon

* He or one of the name had been the Imperial ambaſſador to England. He offended the French ambaſſador much at London, in 1622, by paying his compliments to the Spaniſh ambaſſador firſt. Some of this nobleman's predeceſſors, their family names were Gunter, ſettled in England with the Saxons. This branch enjoyed conſiderable poſſeſſions in Berkſhire and elſewhere in the beginning of the laſt century. The chief of the family was created a prince in 1671; and the country has been ſince ſtyled a principality. The old Engliſh hiſtorians call the Gunters, *Guthrumni*.

† Francis Hatzfelt.

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eaſy terms. His majeſty purſued his journey next morning to Koënigſhofen; not the Koënigſhofen, which ſtands on the Tauber, for there are two towns of the name in the circle of Franconia, but that which belongs to the biſhop of Wurtzburg, and is the key to that dioceſe, and the dioceſe of Bamberg. As the numerous garriſons in the town and caſtle ſeemed to make preparations for no common reſiſtance, the king thundered upon them by break of day from ſuch batteries as he could erect the preceding night; for he wanted this town exceedingly, it being victualled for a twelvemonth's ſiege, which was no ſmall allurement to an hungry army. However during this momentary ſiege, whilſt his mind was kept upon the ſtretch of impatience, he gave the public a very particular example of humanity. Having battered down one of the principal towers, he ſent word to the garriſon, *That his intention was to lay the whole city in aſhes; but if they would ſend out the women and children, he would give them a courteous and hoſpitable reception**.

Struck with ſuch marks of benignity joined to a valour and firmneſs, which they had thoroughly experienced, the beſieged immediately capitulated without ceremony; though few places of the ſame ſize with Koënigſhofen, it being the magazine and arſenal of the dioceſe of Wurtzburg, as well as the principal fortreſs, could be ſuppoſed to be better furniſhed with ammunition, proviſions, arms, and artillery. In this ſuppoſed aſylum was depoſited great part of the wealth and rich moveables, that belonged to the nobility and gentry, who lived in the diſtrict round about it. One good regiment was left in the town by way of garriſon, and Erneſt, another prince of the houſe of Saxe Weimar, and brother to William and Bernard, was appointed governor. It was during this ſiege, that the king gave an extraordinary proof not only of his intrepidity, but that he imagined no ſoldiers, even thoſe belonging to the enemy, could be guilty of a cowardly and illiberal action. For riding up within half a muſquet-ſhot of the town-gate, after he had ſent a trumpeter to ſummon the garriſon to capitulate, he obſerved the guards blowing their matches to give fire againſt his perſon; *Sacrament*†, cried he, the only time

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 151. *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 7.

† Though I cite this paſſage in the manner I find it, yet it is doubtful to me, whether the king made uſe of the ſort of oath, not uncommon in German mouths, which is here mentioned. It was remarked of him [*Merc. Fran. Tom. XVI.*] that far from digreſſing into any raſh oath in the ordinary courſe of converſation, he was rarely or never known to be betrayed into a ſingle expreſſion of that kind, even under the influence of paſſion, or when any extraordinary event ſurprized him; and as a proof of this, ſince it is hardly

time he was ever known to ſwear, *if you diſcharge one piece, the king ſhall know it*; *and he has made a vow, that in caſe ſuch an accident ſhould happen, not a ſingle ſoul ſhall receive quarter; but if you treat fairly, your own conditions ſhall then be granted you* *.

Next morning, for the ſiege and capitulation laſted only one day, his majeſty, willing to improve by the enemy's conſternation, and to verify what was ſaid of him, partly out of ſpite to Tilly, by the partiſans of Walſtein; *namely, that he conquered the firſt circle of the empire, before the expreſſes could carry the news of his irruption to the court of Vienna*; purſued his road to Sweinfurt very briſkly. He marched his army twenty-ſix miles in one day, three weeks after the autumnal equinox, and that, in ſpite of the hard ſervice of the day preceding, and the march the day before that, namely, from Schleüſſing to Koënigſhofen, which may be computed at twenty miles and a half.

In the ſpace of a ſingle hour, his majeſty inveſted Sweinfurt, and admitted the governor into a capitulation, allowing the garriſon to retire to Wurtzburg, and appointing Charles Harte commander of the town, at the head of a regiment well approved and thoroughly experienced. In the middle of the day's march to this place, an old Imperial captain with one eye, aſſiſted by ſuch reſolute peaſants as he could aſſemble, took poſſeſſion of a wooden houſe, that projected into the ſtreet of a little village or dorp, called Lauringen, through which place lay a narrow and difficult paſs, and ſtopped the whole van-guard of the Swediſh cavalry for a very conſiderable time, till at length the dragoons found themſelves obliged to diſmount, and cut this diminutive garriſon to pieces. When the king refreſhed himſelf at Lauringen ſome hours afterwards, and learnt what retardment had been occaſioned to his progreſs by the inflexible obſtinacy of a ſingle man, he vowed, with the view, as it is thought, to acquire the knowledge of ſome ſecrets, to put the *one-eyed* officer to death, for ſacrificing the poor peaſants, and making a reſiſtance, which favoured more of the madman than the ſoldier. In the tranſports therefore of his reſentment, he ſent for the provoſt-marſhal and the executioner; but neither one

hardly probable he would have counterworked his own example, it was a point of diſcipline with him, that whenever any ſoldier had been proved guilty either of curſing or ſwearing, he was condemned to ſtand for a conſiderable time, with his hands tied up againſt a pike in ſuch manner, as if he implored the divine forgiveneſs.

* *Appendix to the Swediſh Intelligencer*, part iii. p. 187.

one nor the other could be found *. During the time employed in theſe enquiries and ſearches, the captain contrived to make his peace with his majeſty, by informing him of the ſtrength of Wurtzburg, and the approaches that led to the fortifications: and thus the affair ended, with reciprocal ſatisfaction on either ſide.

The amazing rapidity of the king's conqueſts diſſolved immediately the catholic part of the aſſembly *then* convened at Franckfort upon the Mayne, it being agreed both by papiſts and proteſtants, that the ſword might cut through the difficulties of the *edict of reſtitution* much ſooner than the nice hands of the *jus-publiciſts* could pretend to unravel them. The firſt perſon that fled was the grand-maſter of the Teutonic order †, who ſate as preſident in this aſſembly, conſcious of an irreligious and unguarded ſpeech he had once made, namely, That the holy empire would never ſee a peaceable moment, till every proteſtant was maſſacred, who had arrived to the ſeventh year of his age. On this account he had no deſire to pay his compliments to a man of ſpirit like Guſtavus. Nor did the biſhop of Wurtzburg, who had diſtinguiſhed himſelf by an uncommon zeal for the cauſe of the *league*, chooſe to receive a Swediſh viſit in his own metropolis; but diſlodging, juſt before the letter of ſummons reached the town, threw himſelf, boldly enough, into the army of the houſe of Auſtria, and for this reaſon, in the month of January following, was ſent ambaſſador into France in the name of all the catholic electors.

The biſhop of Bamberg, who had parts inferior to this prelate, and leſs firmneſs, ſheltered himſelf, as perſons of little minds are apt to do, under the low arts of duplicity and evaſion. Having agreed by his deputies, according to his own propoſals, not only to advance the king three tons

* *Chemnit.* tom. i. This very circumſtance ſerves to confirm us, that the king's anger was only aſſumed; for there were four provoſts and an executioner then belonging to every regiment that acted under him. Nor is it to be ſuppoſed, that he, who never committed one act of cruelty in all his campaigns, ſhould have put to death a brave old Walloon, who at that very inſtant was mortally wounded. Well knowing, that the man deſpiſed ſimple death as much as himſelf, he choſe to operate upon him by propoſing a ſort of exit which carried with it an idea of diſgrace; and counterfeited anger for a few moments, in order to palliate and juſtify a reſolution, to the poor man's apprehenſion, which would otherwiſe have argued an inſenſibility in the heart, and an obliquity in the judgment of the great Guſtavus.

† John Caſpar, prince of Anhalt: ſee the *Court Regiſter of Vienna*, Anno 1632. *Hiſt. or Authentic Relat.* in Low Dutch, fol. tom. i. 126. *Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XIII. par le Vaſſor.* tom. vii. p. 54.

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of gold *, and pay the ſame monthly contingent he paid the army of the *league*, but to recal his forces from the catholic ſervice, and deliver up the ſtrong fortreſſes of Forcheim and Cronach; he ſuddenly, upon the approach of Tilly, renounced all that he had ſtipulated. This infamous violation of faith gave the king not only vexation, but new employment, and obliged him to detach Horne from the main army in order to carry on a freſh war in the epiſcopal territories.

Guſtavus by this time was greatly pleaſed to find himſelf within one day's march of the town of Wurtzburg. Nevertheleſs, he had a previous work ſtill upon his hands, a nice point of the higheſt importance to him, an adopted favourite idea in one branch of his military ſyſtem; that was, to ſecure the *free navigation of rivers*, and the Mayne eſpecially, at the preſent conjuncture; for it was a doctrine with him, as war was *then* circumſtanced, few towns being fortified ſo as to make more than a fortnight's reſiſtance, That the general, who commanded the great rivers, commanded more or leſs the countries adjacent; poſſeſſing himſelf of the moſt fruitful tracts in corn and herbage, enabled to receive proviſions from remote territories, and tranſport his heavy artillery with no conſiderable difficulty. *I obſerve*, ſaid he, and the obſervation was true at the time, *that countries are conquered* upon the ſame principle they were firſt peopled, *the method of* war *and the method of* nature *being in theſe caſes the ſame. Rivers are the great ducts and arteries in the ſyſtem of the world. On the banks of rivers ſtand always the richeſt and moſt populous cities; nor can a general be compelled to fight, when one half of his intrenchments is the beſt natural foſſe in the world ready made to his hands; namely, a large and deep body of water*†. Upon this principle therefore his majeſty, influenced by other reaſons above aſſigned, not to mention, that he choſe to have the Mayne between him and Tilly, commanded Banditzen to purſue a ſeparate route on the banks of the river for the ſpace of thirty miles below Wurtzburg, himſelf directing his courſe the ſame number of miles on the banks of the ſame river above the town, for the Mayne here forms a fort of an horſeſhoe, ſo that about one and the ſame time he and his lieutenant-general made themſelves maſters of Haſfurt, Gemund, Lohr, Volkach, Kitzing, Oxenfurt, Remlingen, and Carlſtadt, all places of importance, which

* About twenty-ſeven thouſand pounds ſterling.

† *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 8.

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commanded the navigation of the Mayne. Nor were theſe precautions unworthy of Guſtavus; for Tilly, by this time being joined by Aldringer, Fugger, and the troops of Lorrain, advanced full ſpeed at the head of 50,000 men, in order to ſtop or raiſe the ſiege of Wurtzburg. The king, contented with poſſeſſing the bridges and paſſes, and not diſpleaſed with placing ſo deep a river as the Mayne between himſelf and his enemy, purſued his journey to Wurtzburg without diſmay, and having inveſted the city, and *petarded* one of its gates before nine in the morning, received a viſit from father Ogleby, abbot of the Scotch monaſtery, and a citizen, whom the magiſtracy had deputed to ſign terms of capitulation with him. Of courſe all hoſtilities were ordered to ceaſe, and articles were agreed upon without delay, upon the plan of thoſe which had lately been concluded at Erfurt.

The rich and populous city of Wurtzburg lies in a ſemicircle, of which the Mayne forms the diameter. The town, in point of ſtrength, was *no great object*, ſo that the magiſtrates ſent the keys by Ogleby, after a very ſlight reſiſtance: during which, the Bohemian colonel Schevaliſki, an officer of great repute, was ſtruck in the ſide by an *arquébuſe à croc*, as he was making ſome remarks to Guſtavus. The caſtle called Marienberg was *really ſomething*. It ſtands to the weſtward of the city, and communicates with it, by means of a fine large bridge, conſiſting of ſix arches, and wide enough to admit threeſcore men to march in front. It is miſtreſs of the city beneath it, and is commanded by no adjacent hill. Being looked upon as inacceſſible, all the wealth of the country was heaped up in it. The only approach was on the ſide of the city, and that was extremely hazardous. The garriſon conſiſted of a thouſand men, abundantly ſupplied with ammunition and proviſions for a ſiege equal in duration to that of Oſtend. His majeſty ſent captain Keller, the commandant, the general compliment which happens at the beginning of all ſieges; namely, a polite offer of honourable terms, in caſe he thought fit to ſurrender. The brave German received the Swediſh deputies with great civility, and gave them a handſome ſupper at the beſt inn in the town; but perſiſted inflexible againſt all their propoſals, and during the courſe of the repaſt blew up one arch of the bridge. Next morning he tormented the aſſailants above meaſure by a perpetual diſcharge of artillery, which, to make it ſtill worſe, raked the bridge from one end to the other; ſo that, as the Swedes could only place one plank over the broken arch, and that plank was

forty-eight feet above the ſurface of the water, there ſeemed to be a mixture of wantonneſs and raſhneſs to attempt to paſs over it. Guſtavus ſeemed irreſolute for ſome moments what to do, for Tilly and the duke of Lorrain were in full march againſt him, at the diſtance of only three days journey from Wurtzburg. After a ſlight pauſe he cut the dilemma ſhort, as Bauditzen and his army were expected to arrive the next day, by determining to take the caſtle at all hazards; and with this view employed one Ramſay, who talked excellent German, a Scots lieutenant in the regiment of Sir James Ramſay, to paſs over the plank in diſguiſe, and procure a boat or two from the neighbouring peaſants and fiſhermen: for the king ſaw plainly, that the watry ordeal of paſſing the plank would be extremely ſlow and hazardous, and that one company of Keller's men, poſted on the oppoſite ſide of the bridge, would overturn his ſingle ſoldiers as faſt as they arrived. He foreſaw too, that the uncommonly dangerous, and, to hardened veteran troops like his, ridiculous nature of the paſſage would engage the whole army's attention very unprofitably, as it might turn a ſerious attack into a ſort of military pantomime. Nevertheleſs, the honeſt North-Briton, undertook his commiſſion with great cheerfulneſs; but as he was endued with more courage than foreſight, he forgot to change a fine waiſtcoat, which the Imperialiſts ſoon diſcovered. Thus was he thereby made priſoner; nor did he recover his liberty till the caſtle of Marienberg was taken by ſtorm. Other expedients were found out, and a boat at length arrived, in which Guſtavus ſent over handfuls of men by little and little, who made a lodgment, and increaſing imperceptibly, defended themſelves ſo well, that though Keller deſcended from his eminence to the foot of the rock, he found it impoſſible to force them. After a ſharp engagement, the beſieged mounted a half moon about mid-way up the precipice, and in that ſituation night came on. Before this, when the Swediſh ſoldiers in the town ſaw their comrades had croſſed the water, and began to entrench themſelves, they run over the plank like men poſſeſſed; ſo that no inconſiderable body of troops paſſed the river one by one in the afternoon *. At night care was taken to repair this paſſage in a better manner; but the king could not ſpare a moment's leiſure for that purpoſe the preceding day, waiting the arrival of Bauditzen, and being in ſome ſuſpence about Tilly.

Having now fixed his footing on the ſouth ſide of the Mayne,

* For the minute circumſtances of this ſiege, ſee *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 192. *Monro*, part ii. p. 78, &c. and *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 10—15.

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he began to ſtudy the fortifications of Marienberg* with great attention, ſoon perceiving, that nature had done wonders, and art but little, if we except a deep *graff* or moat hewn out of the ſolid rock, which environed the caſtle, and of ſuch a depth and breadth, that there was no croſſing it, but in front of the main fortifications by means of a narrow drawbridge. If this foſsè, and the works that protected the drawbridge, had been out of the queſtion, the caſtle was nothing more than a magnificent Gothic palace, flanked at the angles with four principal towers in the antient taſte. Upon one of theſe towers, the king thundered all that night and two ſucceſſive days, reaſonably expecting, that the fall of this antique ſtructure might fill the ditch with rubbiſh and ruins. The event, though the tower was at length levelled, did not anſwer the idea which he had formed. Removing therefore the intended attack from that quarter, he fixed his whole attention, the line of circumvallation being now finiſhed, firſt on the half-moon abovementioned, and then on the caſtle gate and ſtone bridge over the ditch. In the firſt of theſe attacks, ſir James Ramſay, for the Scots, in conjunction with Axel Lily's regiment, had the honour of the action, had the misfortune to be ſhot through the left arm; but his companion, ſir John Hamilton, carried on the aſſault with unparalleled bravery, and in two hours this important outwork was taken. The king ſurveyed the action at a few paces diſtance, peeping through the ruins of an old gateway between the bridge and the caſtle. Projecting his head and part of his body, to iſſue his orders more diſtinctly, a cannon ball flew directly towards him, and covered him with mortar and rubbiſh. He then ſtepped out to give ſome additional directions, and a muſquet bullet ſtruck the top of his buff leather glove, and tore it off his hand. Scheffer aſſures us, that at this ſiege, fighting, in one attack, at the head of his men, he received an ugly wound in the fleſhy part of his breaſt, and that the waiſtcoat ſtained with royal blood is ſtill preſerved in Sweden †.

Next morning he determined, at the head of his troops ‡ to make a ſecond general attack, ſword in hand, one hour before break of day, allotting this honour to Axel Lily's regiment, and the old blue brigade, ſupported afterwards by the whole body of Swediſh and German infantry, having firſt ſent a trumpeter to Keller, with propoſals of ſuch a nature as might be liſtened to by a brave commander and a reſolute

* *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, tom. i. fol. 145.
† *Memorabilia Suec. Gentis*, p. 95.
‡ *Merc. Franc.*

garriſon;

garriſon; but the governor had no ear for an accommodation. Chance very often produces wonderful events to the reſolute and determined; or, in other words, in certain enterpriſes of extreme peril, unforeſeen accidents preſent themſelves; but their paſſage is ſo ſwift, and their exiſtence ſo ſhort, that only the intrepid or the ſagacious man can ſeize them flying.

In the midſt of the beſiegers' preparations, and about half an hour before the general attack, a Swediſh lieutenant, born of Scottiſh parents *, with only ſeven followers †, for what reaſons cannot be gueſſed, approached, in the dark, the drawbridge leading into the outward court of the caſtle, wherein were lodged near two hundred Imperialiſts. Being challenged, according to the word of the night, and aſked, who he and his party were, he replied abruptly and naturally, without any ſcheme or foreſight, *That they were Swedes:* whence may be fairly imagined, he had never prepared himſelf to return an anſwer to ſuch ſort of queſtions; being a hero better calculated for blows than diſcuſſions. Upon this, the officer, who commanded the party within, immediately attempted to draw up the bridge, but the Life-lander jumped upon it with an extraordinary effort of activity, and his companions followed him: in conſequence whereof, the enemy were ſtruck with a ſudden panic, which darkneſs contributed to increaſe, and fell back with ſome confuſion, ſuppoſing great numbers to be ruſhing in. The lieutenant called loudly to a large body of Swedes, ſtationed at no great diſtance from him; and thus the outward court of the caſtle was ſecured in an inſtant. Of courſe the fortreſs of Marienberg was now, as it were, taken: yet the king, who always had a great abhorrence to bloodſhed and tumultuous murder, made freſh ſignals of accommodation to the garriſon; but Keller continued inflexible to the very laſt. Some hundreds of Imperialiſts threw away their lives with uncommon obſtinacy, till at length the Swedes cried out in a rage, *Magdeburg-quarter, Magdeburg-quarter.* Amongſt the dead were found at leaſt twenty friars, who had occaſionally handled the pike and the muſquet. The commander, Keller, was taken priſoner ſword in hand, by colonel Torſtenſon ‡, who generouſly protected him, on condition, that he ſhould diſcover

* *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 14, &c.

† His majeſty hearing of this ſucceſs, entered, the *ninth* man, into the caſtle. Ibid.

‡ Leonard Torſtenſon, then general of artillery. He proved afterwards one of Guſtavus's moſt able ſucceſſors. The reader muſt be informed, that Monro, by miſtake, always calls him Richardſon.

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a certain ſecret vault hewn into the rock, where ineſtimable treaſures, in plate and money, were concealed. Great part of the wealth of the dioceſe was here depoſited, as alſo the ſum which the elector of Bavaria had ſent to Tilly in order to repair his ſhattered army after the unfortunate defeat at Leipſic. Corn and proviſions were found in abundance, and a very large quantity of wine*. An equerry belonging to the biſhop made freſh diſcoveries, and amongſt other things, gave information of a certain coffer, well filled with ducats, which Guſtavus had an idea of appropriating to the uſes of his own privy purſe; but its weight in the removal burſt the bottom; and as the ſoldiers caſt a longing eye on theſe glittering reliques, and began to pick them up for their maſter's uſe, with a private view to ſecrete here and there a few for themſelves, the king made a merit of neceſſity, and ſaid with a loud laugh, *I ſee plainly it muſt be ſo: let the rogues convert them to their own property* †.

Having allowed his ſoldiers to plunder, with moderation, for the ſpace of one hour, he reſerved nothing for his own uſe but the fine library of books, which was ſent to the univerſity of Upſal‡, by way of repriſal upon Tilly, who had tranſported the Palatine collection to the Vatican, as alſo the biſhop's magnificent ſervice of plate, and a ſtable of horſes, thought ſuperior to any in the empire: beſides the artillery, which amounted to thirty large pieces, and all the ſmall arms, being a quantity ſufficient to furniſh at leaſt 7000 men. It may be worth remarking, that amidſt all this ſcene of bloodſhed, confuſion, and plunder, not a nun was violated, though the nuns had taken refuge in this aſylum from all parts of the dioceſe‖, not a matron affronted, nor a child frightened; the king's orders being expreſsly to the contrary: and what may alike merit obſervation, all the valuable effects, in the vault, belonging to the inhabitants of the city, were reſtored to them. Free exerciſe of the Romiſh religion was granted to all that made profeſſion of it, and a new chamber of juſtice was erected, conſiſting of twelve

* Honeſt Ferrand Spence, who worked in the bookſeller's manufactory of the laſt century, in tranſlating *Du Prade's Life of* Guſtavus, having heard ſomething of the common random accounts of German hard-drinking, conceived a reſolution to ſtock the biſhop's cellars very copiouſly; for he ſays there were found in them ſome *millions of pipes of wine*, [*quelques milliers de tonneaux de vin.*]

† *Kiccius de Bellis Germanicis.*

‡ *Scheffleri Memorab.* 149, 150.

‖ *Mercure François*, ii partie du tome xvii. p. 78.

members, half proteſtants and half papiſts; half gentlemen, and half civilians.

Two other circumſtances, which took their riſe from this ſiege, muſt not be omitted. Hamilton was ſo offended, that the Scottiſh ſoldiers had not the honour of conducting the laſt aſſault, that he demanded his diſmiſſal from Guſtavus, who immediately allowed it: ſecondly, when the king entered the caſtle, the very inſtant after it was ſtormed, he perceived, that the pavement of the court-yard was all covered with ſeemingly dead men; but, inſpecting them more narrowly, diſcovered that ſome of the men, who did not care to be quite ſo much in earneſt as their commander, looked very florid in the countenance. Being by this time convinced, that part of the number only counterfeited death, he commanded them, with a cheerful accent of voice, *to ariſe, for their lives were ſafe.* In conſequence, a conſiderable number ſtarted up from the ground, and returned his majeſty their beſt acknowledgments.

Upon taking Wurtzburg and ſeveral other Roman catholic towns, ſome of the king's generals perſuaded him to lay heavy contributions on the citizens for making profeſſion of an erroneous and perſecuting religion. His anſwer upon theſe occaſions was always to one effect: *It is now my city, and appertains no longer to the enemy. I came to* unfetter *the conſciences of my fellow-creatures, and not to* enſlave *them. Let free beings live as beſt pleaſes them, conformably to their antient habits. I change no religious laws to thoſe who act conſiſtently with ſuch as they have hitherto profeſſed*;—a new, though a better ſhoe, may pinch too much at firſt. He ſometimes added, *that papiſts and proteſtants, ſuppoſing them ſincere in their ſearch after truth, and in its practice, were all God's workmanſhip.* In effect, when he conquered a country, the Romaniſts loſt nothing but their prince, which ſome did not greatly regret; and the proteſtants regained the free exerciſe of their religion. Thus one party was tranſported with joy, and the other felt very little ſorrow. The humane and prudent deportment of Guſtavus recals to my mind a ſimilar piece of conduct in one of his predeceſſors, and that no leſs perſon than Theodoric, king of the Goths, who ſhared the Roman empire with Juſtinian. A ſtrange and remote example, mankind may be apt to ſay! and yet not unworthy of being produced on this occaſion; for in one of his reſcripts he expreſſes himſelf preciſely thus: *Aliorum forte regum prælia captarum civitatum prædas appetunt aut ruinas: nobis*

*propoſitum eſt, Deo juvante, ſic vincere ut ſubjecti ſe doleant noſtrum dominium tardius acquiſiſſe* *.

His Swediſh majeſty, if we conſider how zealouſly the biſhop of Wurtzburg † had appeared againſt him, ſent him terms upon the reduction of Marienberg, which were neither ſevere nor ungenerous, ſince it was only propoſed, that he ſhould pay the proteſtant army the ſame contingent that he had ſubſcribed to the forces of the league, in the like proportions as he had contributed formerly, and at the ſame times of payment. In conſequence of this, he was likewiſe to diſclaim all connexions with the king's enemies, and redeem his territories from plunder at the expence of ſomething more or leſs than thirty-ſix thouſand pounds. Hatzfield, the then biſhop, profeſſed to enter into a fair and candid accommodation; but it was only a pretext to gain time till Tilly, who was then only at nine miles diſtance, could take ſome opportunity to croſs the Mayne, and drive Guſtavus out of Franconia.

Before we leave Wurtzburg, it may not be improper to obſerve, that ſir Henry Vane was admitted to his firſt audience ‡ with Guſtavus in this place, though the German, French, and Italian hiſtorians all ſuppoſe their firſt conference to have been held at Francfort. This new negotiator appeared to many but poorly qualified for the embaſſy he was engaged in, inaſmuch as he was a perfect iſlander, and fulfilled to a tittle Barclay's obſervation upon us in the Euphormio, "*Angli ſua ſuoſque impensè mirantur, cæteras nationes deſpectui habent.*" Of courſe, which is a practice not uncommon to weak minds, he proceeded upon principles diametrically oppoſite to thoſe of his predeceſſor, ſir Thomas Roe, who was a man of a ſolid and enterpriſing genius; whilſt Vane, on the other hand, was of a haughty and teaſing temper. *Neſcivit, quod bene ceſſit, relinquere*; inſolent and national, narrow-minded, and prejudiced to the higheſt degree. Hence it was that Guſtavus *hated* him for his prejudices in home affairs, and *deſpiſed* him for his weakneſſes in foreign ones. He was a navigator, who ſailed by no general wind in the ocean of politics, but affected to lie becalmed in the briſkeſt gales; veering a little, or advancing a little, juſt as the breath blew from the court of Whitehall; which, as it was well known at that time, rarely did more than diſturb the ſurface

* *Caſſiodor.* lib. iii. epiſt. 43.

† Philip Adolphus de Ehrenberg, elected December 29, 1622, died 1631, when Francis Hatzfield was choſen.

‡ November 7, 1631. See his letters in the *Paper-Office*. MSS.

of the water; ſufficient to render objects indiſtinct and muddled, but not forcible enough to purify and make them clear. Roe, by dint of judgment, and without gueſs-work, knew this politician to a tittle; and though ſome acrimony may be allowed him, as Vane ſupplanted him by mean court artifices in the continuance of his embaſſy to Guſtavus, yet in his letter * to the queen of Bohemia he ſpeaks the words of good ſenſe, and manly reſentment; for he pronounces Vane *to be a bold undertaker*; by which expreſſion, he means no more than a ſervile and fooliſh one. "I know," ſays he, "he cannot build upon my foundations.——This blow came from Vienna, upon new pretences, that the proſperity of the king of Sweden would make our treaty eaſy, with reſpect to the Palatinate, if a man were employed, that would advance *peace*, to which I was eſteemed an enemy. I have honour enough in the ſincerity of my negotiations, and that God hath bleſſed me, and made me the inſtrument; though I boaſted not, until another would take my honour of bringing the brave king into Germany †; ——which I would rather have *inſcribed on my tomb*, than titles dearly bought with the loſs of honour."

To comprehend theſe two miniſters' conduct and characters more diſtinctly, it may not be amiſs to obſerve, that Roe, who had ſerved an apprenticeſhip in the arts of foreign negotiation, and, conſiſtently with the intereſts of his own country, had contented the kings of Denmark and Sweden, one the moſt *experienced* prince in Europe, and the other the moſt *able*, was a ſincere, ſolid, and ſenſible man, cool and compoſed in doubtful matters, but warm, fiery, enterpriſing, and undiſmayed in affairs of importance. Such an ambaſſador was not born under an horoſcope that agreed with the temper of the king and his miniſters at *that* time, who, as they wanted courage to tread the *open road*, weakly and timo-

* Dated London, November 20, 1631. MS.

† He has ſaid more in other letters to this effect. "I have received the incloſed from the chancellor of Sweden, wherein I have honour enough done me, that I was the agent to bring that brave king into Germany." *To lord Dorcheſter, Aug.* 16, 1631.

*And in another to Mr. Dinely at the Hague*, 1631-2, *Febr.* 24. That he had received from the king of Sweden a preſent worth £. 2,500. with a letter from the chancellor of Sweden, wherein are inſerted theſe remarkable words; "Quæ inter nos mutuis colloquiis & diſcurſibus acta ſunt ratione belli a S.R. majeſtate, domino meo clementiſſimo, in Germaniam transferendi; cujus auctor & impulſor illuſtritas veſtra nomine ſereniſſimi regis ſui ſtrenuus extitit."

rouſly

rouſly purſued the bye one; hating the heroical parts of war ſo much, that it was common for them, by way of deriſion, to call Guſtavus the *dragoon king**.

Such was the uniform language of the Engliſh court: for ſir Toby Matthew†, in a letter of March 25, from London, to ſir Henry Vane, inſerts therein the following paſſage; "Yeſternight I waited at ſupper on my good lord of Carliſle, your true friend; and there we had ſir Jacob Aſhley at large. He ſeems a very worthy gentleman, and a great lover of my lord marquis, of Hamilton, and you: he ſpeaks highly well of the courage and other both intellectual and experimental abilities of the king of Sweden: *but I have heard no wiſe man ſay any ſuch thing yet of that prince, as may totally exclude covetouſneſs, and arrogancy, and inordinate ambition from him* ‡."

Vane therefore was a perſon formed expreſsly by nature to ſuit the purpoſes of an adminiſtration, which relied wholly upon mean and temporary expedients. Roe was for giving Guſtavus conſiderable ſums of money, well knowing he would earn them nobly. Vane profeſſed to withhold all pecuniary aſſiſtance, and propoſed the tranſportation of Britiſh troops, which the king of Sweden never expected to arrive. Roe, by Oxenſtiern's own acknowledgment, brought Guſtavus into the empire; Vane, by the uniform tendency of his actions, repined at his glory, and wiſhed him reconveyed to his regions of the north. Roe was eſteemed by the king, and beloved by Oxenſtiern; the former of which diſliked Vane, and the latter ſhunned him.

This phenomenon of a miniſter, furniſhed, as himſelf owns, with inſtructions of *hearing* rather than *propoſing* ‖,

* Letter from the earl of Carliſle to ſir Henry Vane. *Paper Office.*

† Sir John Suckling in his *Seſſion of the Poets* has characterized this infant politician to the life. He embraced the religion of the church of Rome about the thirtieth year of his age, and was called from his travels, in 1621, to aſſiſt James I. in matters of politics; was knighted for his zeal towards the Spaniſh match, and attended lord Strafford in Ireland as political director.

‡ With reſpect to *covetouſneſs*, the king ſolemnly declared before all his officers, and they were judges of the truth of his aſſertion, that he had not ſecreted to himſelf a ſingle pound, from the commencement of the war till the month of Auguſt 1632, but, on the contrary, had expended *de proprio* £. 360,000. ſterling, a ſum no ways inconſiderable in thoſe days.—As to *arrogance*, except *that* be confounded with a right ſenſe of indignities from crowned heads, &c. we have proved him in every part of his life to be more condeſcending and affable than any of his generals.—Laſtly, as to *ambition*, poſterity muſt be left in doubt, ſince he never lived to ſhow what his ultimate views were.

‖ The following narrative is extracted from his own diſpatches. Ibid.

landed at Hamburg in the month of October 1631; and there received the news of the famous victory at Leipſic. As he was comptroller of the king's houſhold, and a member of the privy-council, it was thought proper to inveſt him with the character of ambaſſador extraordinary; but by his own accounts, he had no title to the qualification of plenipotentiary. The occaſion of ſending him took its birth from the wonderful proſperity of Guſtavus, and from ſome letters of his to the king and marquis of Hamilton, relative to that nobleman's expedition.

Vane employed twenty-five days in travelling from Hamburg to Wurtzburg; nor could he well perform the journey in leſs time, for the roads were difficult and dangerous, and flying parties of *marauders* * abounded ſo in every quarter, that it was neceſſary for him to provide a large retinue of horſemen, well mounted and completely armed; nor could he diſpatch an expreſs to Guſtavus or his generals without manifeſt hazard to the undertaker's life or liberty. He complains in a ſubſequent letter, the year enſuing, that he could not travel with a ſmaller retinue than fifty horſemen, nor expend leſs on the road than twenty pounds each day.

On the ſeventh of November 1631, he had the honour to be admitted to his firſt private audience, in which the king told him, That if his maſter wiſhed to bring about the reſtitution of the Palatinate ſincerely, and with good faith, he muſt afford him ſuch aſſiſtance, as juſtly merited the appellation of *royal*, and not only ſupply him with four or five tons of gold †, ſums far from being very important to a king of England ſo nearly concerned, if thoroughly in earneſt, but ſend too, early in the enſuing ſpring, a body of national troops, amounting at leaſt to 12,000 men: and then, Guſtavus added, that he would engage never to ſheathe his ſword, till the Palatinate ſhould be reconquered, and delivered back to the hands of its lawful poſſeſſor.

* According to ſtrict orthography, we ought to write *merodeurs*, and not *marauders*. The truth is, theſe partiſans took their name from a count de Merodé, a brutal and licentious officer in theſe wars, who was killed in a drunken quarrel by John de Wert. From this man's practice a plunderer and raviſher was ſurnamed *Merodiſta* by the Spaniſh and Italian ſoldiers, who ſerved then under the emperor: whence came the French word, *marauder*, which the maréchal de Luxemburg always ſpelt *merodeur*. *Reflections Militaires & Politiques de Santa Cruz*, tom. iii.

† A *ton* of gold is about £. 9000. ſterling.

Having

Having thus explained himſelf with reference to the reſtitution of Frederic to his patrimonial inheritances, he made it his requeſt, that the ſaid unfortunate prince ſhould repair immediately to the Swediſh army, and march with it into his own dominions; inaſmuch as, according to the beſt information then to be obtained, his ſubjects ſtill preſerved an extraordinary zeal and affection for him.

Vane ſtood thunderſtruck at theſe propoſals, and at length brought forth his excuſe and reply with no ſmall difficulty; namely, That his inſtructions were rather to *hear* what the king had to offer, than to *propoſe* any thing himſelf: that he would not fail to advertiſe his court, and procure an anſwer with all poſſible expedition.

Little as this man loved Guſtavus, and prejudiced as he was againſt him, yet in his letters to England, at or near this period, he finds himſelf obliged to do ſome juſtice to that prince's character in the capacity of a ſoldier; for having obſerved, that the Swediſh army conſiſted of 12,000 foot, and 8,000 horſe, he remarked afterwards, That bettter men, and better cloathed, he never ſaw: and there was not a ſick man, nor boy amongſt them. Their king let them live at diſcretion*: they ſpared neither friend nor foe; only he did not ſuffer them to touch the churches, nor moleſt the catholics in the exerciſe of their religion. They were ſo obedient to diſcipline, that the beat of a drum called them off at any time from plunder; which in truth carries no reſemblance to the conduct of troops who lived at diſcretion, and allowed themſelves, or were allowed by their maſter, to exerciſe all ſorts of outrage and violence without reſtriction. There ſtill remains an almoſt inconteſtable proof, that the king's ſoldiers rarely or never practiſed extortions and cruelties, ſince we rarely find, that even a ſingle ſtraggler was maſſacred by enraged peaſants; or that a town, or province, after their firſt reduction, ever revolted from him. Sir Henry, on ſome other occaſion, delivers himſelf in a manner leſs liable to exception than many of the paſſages above cited. That "with regard to Guſtavus's ac-

* All hiſtory contradicts this report. In a comparative ſenſe, the Swediſh troops were mild and tractable, whilſt the Imperial ſoldiers were haughty and ſavage. The military laws of Guſtavus are levelled with full force againſt rapine, extortions and plunder. He removed a favourite general ſome few days before this happened, for dealing a little too freely with contributions; and hanged two foot ſoldiers, ſome days afterwards, for entering a houſe in Francfort-ſtreets, though they took nothing. So that part of theſe repreſentations ſeems to proceed from peeviſhneſs and unkindneſs.

tions and enterpriſes, all ſeaſons were alike to him, as well as the moſt difficult achievements ſeemed to him eaſy, if he once took them in hand; and as the courage of the ſoldiers under ſo daring a leader is great, ſo is the fear of his enemies, who every day came to ſerve him: and though other armies are diminiſhed by marching, his increaſed; ſo that he was able to ſupply the towns he took in with garriſons, and obliged them to maintain the ſame *."

This remark is not the leſs valuable, though at that time it was common in the mouths of all the officers that ſerved under Guſtavus. Monro makes the ſame obſervation, and ſays, "That the king, after marches, aſſaults, and ſieges of forty days duration, found himſelf at the head of more ſoldiers when he came to Francfort, than he brought with him from Erfurt, though he croſſed the vaſt Duringer Walt, without loſing, as far as appears, a ſingle ſoldier by deſertion."

To return to the negotiation. Vane contented himſelf to conclude his diſpatches with obſerving, That he thought nothing was to be expected from Guſtavus, but what was ſtipulated: and by no means adviſed the putting of tons of gold into his hands, but rather the ſending over an Engliſh army to act in conjunction with the Swediſh. He ſuggeſted afterwards, "if Charles was reſolved to put himſelf in action, the readieſt and cheapeſt way would be, to ſend the king of Bohemia *up into Germany*, into Upper Germany, ſpeedily, to make levies; for that he was expected by his ſubjects with much zeal and devotion, and divers officers came to the ambaſſadors, meaning the Palatin one as well as himſelf, to offer their ſervices in his behalf." With this ſuggeſtion the Britannic miniſtry complied, as the king of Bohemia's miniſter was inveſted with no powers; for it was a *ſlight expedient*, and coſt them nothing; and thus the negotiation continued both at Francfort and Mentz, diverſified with infinite changes, but attended with no one ſolid event. I ſhall ſpeak tranſiently concerning it hereafter, and in ſuch proportion as it may ſeem to merit; obſerving only, and for this remark I am indebted to the Swediſh and German hiſtorians, that the ſtateſmen of Whitehall judged extremely ill, in commanding Vane to impart his inſtructions to, and act in concert with the marquis of Hamilton; for though the king had a high

* See a ſubſequent MS. letter in the *Paper Office*.

value

value for that illuſtrious and enterpriſing nobleman, and no ſmall obligations to him; yet he could not bear, that a ſubordinate officer ſhould have an inſight into the myſteries of the Swediſh cabinet.

We will now reſume the military part of our hiſtory; and deſire the reader to recollect, that we left Tilly at Alvede, where he had aſſembled hardly more than 8,000 men, out of all thoſe victorious bands which had fought under him at the battle of Leipſic. Thence he wrote to the elector of Cologn, aſcribing his late misfortune, firſt, to the impetuoſity of Pappenheim; and, ſecondly, to want of firmneſs in the Croatian horſe; beſeeching him, at the ſame time, to ſend a ſtrong reinforcement, in order to raiſe the ſpirits of his dejected army. Upon this, the elector ſent him a ſecond ſupply of cavalry, and a conſiderable body of infantry. Tilly then, having deputed Gronſfelt to protect the banks of the Weſer, where George, duke of Lunenburg, and the archbiſhop of Bremen*, had ſhown an inclination of eſpouſing the cauſe of Guſtavus, paſſed his army from the dioceſe of Paderborn over a bridge of boats at Corvey†, and ſtrengthening his train of artillery with twelve large battering pieces taken from the town of Hamelen, directed his ſteps to Warpurg. Soon afterwards he invaded Heſſe, and having joined Aldringer, Fugger, and Mansfelt, advanced, whilſt his majeſty inveſted Marienberg, as far as Fulda, in order to ſuccour the biſhop of Wurtzburg, and protect the electors of Cologn, Mentz, and Triers. In ſhort, this great commander in the preſent conjuncture hardly knew what ſteps to take: mortified

* This prelate had adhered firmly to the houſe of Auſtria through the former part of the thirty years wars; inſomuch that the king of Denmark, by way of revenge, when peace was concluded at Lubec, ſtill kept the iſle of Femor to himſelf, although it was a part of the archbiſhop's patrimony. When this eccleſiaſtic began to conſider ſeriouſly the drift and intentions of the *edict of reſtitution*; he then ſaw, without the gift of divination, that archduke Leopold, the emperor's ſon, would annex the dioceſe of Bremen to thoſe of Magdeburg, Halberſtadt, &c. and allow the true owner a ſmall annual ſtipend; not ſo much by way of *acknowledged right*, as under the appearance of an act of compaſſion. It was upon this account, therefore, that he kept up a correſpondence with Guſtavus ever ſince the year 1629, and entered into a private agreement offenſive and defenſive with the famous Salvius, ſome months before the battle of Leipſic. (For an abſtract of the articles then concluded, ſee *Chemnitius*, tom. i. p. 214.) This was the true reaſon, which Burnet knew nothing of, or no way cared to own, why the king intended, *bonâ fide*, to land the Britiſh troops at Bremen, in order to protect his new ally from the inſults of the Imperialiſts. *Chemnitz*, *ibid.* where it plainly appears that the marquis of Hamilton contravened the king's intentions.

† This abbey, famous for its convent of Benedictines, ſtands between the duchy of Bruniſwic and the biſhopric of Paderborn. In its library is the *only manuſcript of the annals of Tacitus.*

with

with misfortunes, and piqued to the heart upon having made a ſhipwreck of one half of his glory, he was quite bewildered in his own ideas, having nothing certain to reſolve upon, except it was to regain his character by ſome ſervice of a deſperate nature. This he, manifeſtly, ought to have attempted; but the Lorrainers did not join him quite ſo ſoon as he wiſhed *, and when that junction was formed at Miltenberg, he fell ſuddenly into a kind of deſpondency, for he did not like the look of his new aſſiſtants.

Here it may be neceſſary, once for all, to give the reader a clear idea of this romantic expedition of Charles IV. duke of Lorrain, from the beginning to the concluſion. For a mixture of courage and irreſolution, hardineſs to undertake, and inconſtancy to execute, he ſeems to have been the epitome of all mankind in thoſe ſeveral paſſions and qualities. The duke of Bavaria propoſed both immediate and remote advantages from introducing this hero, who was his nephew, upon the grand theatre of action. He greatly wanted a ſupport for Tilly, and to re-eſtabliſh, if poſſible, the reputation of the league; having an inclination, likewiſe, to alarm France, with ſo powerful an armament on her confines; and hoping, by means of free paſſage through Lorrain, in caſe ſucceſs ſhould attend the catholic armies in Germany, to have the power of entering the *three* biſhoprics, which had already began *to change their livery*, if I may be allowed to make uſe of Spanheim's expreſſion on the occaſion †. France, of courſe, took umbrage at the armament which this prince was preparing; and inſiſted that he ſhould either diſband his troops, or declare what they were intended for ‡. Charles, whether according to his firſt intentions, or not, cannot be ſaid, thought it neceſſary, however, to pacify ſo intermeddling and capricious a neighbour; but being allured by the promiſe of an *electoral bonnet*, for the emperor had privately threatened to proſcribe the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, he marched an army of 17,000 well-conditioned men, all furniſhed with good apparel and arms, in order to ſupport Tilly in his preſent exigencies. As, on the one hand, his imagination was flattered with the late extinction of one proteſtant elector; ſo it was ſuggeſted to him by his new allies on the other, that as the promiſed electorate would make him a principal member of the

* Not till October 17, nine days after Wurtzburg and Marienberg were taken.

† *Memoires d'Electrice Palatine*, p. 300.

‡ *Memoires de Beauvau*, 8°. p. 16, &c.

empire;

empire; of courſe, the whole empire would be obliged to ſupport him againſt the encroachments of his *moſt Chriſtian neighbour:* inſinuating at the ſame time, that a prince of Lorrain was really and truly a part of the Germanic body by virtue of an incorporation ſubſiſting, antecedently even to thoſe connections we have above ſpecified. For theſe reaſons, he choſe to ſhelter himſelf under the wings of the Auſtrian eagle; and, animated with romantic hopes, paſſed the Rhine over a bridge of boats at Worms, where the biſhop of Wurtzburg made his application to him immediately, and offered all the treaſure contained in his capital, upon condition he could ſucceed in raiſing the ſiege. The induſtry and bravery of the aſſailants prevented this ſcheme from taking effect, though Charles made long marches to join Tilly, and reſtore the ſpirits of his ſhattered troops by ſo conſiderable a reinforcement as that which he conducted. Aldringer alſo, in conjunction with Fugger, had haſtened with all poſſible expedition to meet them, leading under his command thoſe veteran troops, which had performed ſuch wonders at the ſiege of Mantua. The whole three bodies, united, were ſuppoſed to make 50,000 men, and their train of artillery was very good. Nevertheleſs, whether it was that the Imperial troops had not recovered their courage ſince the battle of Leipſic, or whether the elector of Bavaria, who in fact was generaliſſimo over the generaliſſimo, allowed himſelf to be ſeduced by St. Etienne the French ambaſſador, having hampered himſelf by a clandeſtine treaty: whether he waited to make a better market with the emperor, and therefore choſe not to hazard his troops; or whether orders had been diſpatched from Vienna, commanding Tilly to hold himſelf upon the cautious and defenſive part, and run no riſques in ſo critical a conjuncture, all which reaſons appear to me more or leſs probable and cogent, ſure it is, that though his Swediſh majeſty then conducted an army only of about 25,000 effective men, yet nothing conſiderable was either performed or attempted by the Imperial party. It had the mortification and diſgrace to ſtand gazing aloof, whilſt Wurtzburg was firſt taken, and Mentz afterwards fell a ſacrifice: inſomuch that the partiſans of Walſtein continually cried out, That Guſtavus marched, and never fought; and provinces were conquered before couriers could carry news to Vienna that the enemy had entered them.

Some tell us, that this want of courage in the Imperialiſts, or want of ſincerity in the Bavarian, added to the

the delays, and caution affected by the court of Vienna, ſo exaſperated Charles, that, whilſt the troops laid inactive in winter quarters, he poſted away to the elector, who was his uncle *, at Munich, with a view to put matters on a better footing; but obtained nothing from him but good words and hoſpitable entertainment. To add a keener edge to the mortification he then felt, his favourite lieutenant-general, the prince of Phaltzburg, died during this interval; as alſo M. de Berry, knight of Malta. The former was a natural ſon of cardinal Lorrain, and having married the amiable Henrietta, Charles's eldeſt ſiſter, might have poſſeſſed the dukedom, if his modeſty and equity had not induced him to decline the offer. The latter was Charles's natural ſon, a young man of great hopes and diſtinguiſhed bravery.

In addition to theſe misfortunes, he met with no ſmall diſgrace in his return home; for as his army paſſed the bridge of Straſburg, the inhabitants and peaſants fell upon his baggage, plundering and deſtroying no inconſiderable part of it; and a waggoner took the liberty to whip the duke's horſe, aſſigning this remarkable reaſon for ſo doing: *Sir, a perſon ought to make more haſte when he is flying before the great Guſtavus* †. In this inglorious retreat he had the unhappineſs, ſome weeks, to be denied entrance into the village of Lichtenau near Nurenberg, where one of his regiments then was in winter quarters. In vain Charles menaced the *corps de garde*; they ſaluted him with a briſk diſcharge of their fire-arms, which, though it ſpared his perſon, terrified his horſe to ſuch a degree, that he fell under his maſter: they were both ſome moments expoſed, for the garriſon continued firing.

If all things are rightly conſidered, neither he nor his army deſerved better uſage, nor greater ſucceſs. They ſet out, at firſt, in the ſtyle of novices and bluſterers; inſolently boaſting to chaſtiſe his Swediſh majeſty, and ſend him back to his hereditary regions of froſt and ſnow. No troops looked fiercer when they marched undiſturbed through neutral dominions: they ſeemed, likewiſe, to have a talent for plunder, outrage, violation, and murder. Their ignorance of foreign countries kept pace with their inſolence; for, amongſt other things, they aſked the Germans, *What ſort of animal a landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel was, and if he was deſcended from a*

* The elector of Bavaria married Elizabeth princeſs of Lorrain, Charles's aunt.

† *Vittorio Siri*; Memoire Recondite, tom. vii. p. 446, &c.

good

*good family**. Their extortions too were not trifling; for his Imperial majeſty ſent commiſſary general Oſſa to join them, and pay them according to agreement; but the miſfortune was, the commiſſary had no money, and the Lorrainers were obliged to feed themſelves at the point of their ſwords. Old Tilly ſuſpected theſe troops from the firſt moment he ſaw them; for they began to lower their note, in proportion as they approached the Swediſh army. He therefore placed them, generally, out of the reach of harm; and hiſtory aſſures us, they diſcovered no reſentment on the occaſion. When the wary Walloon once left them, the vigilant Swedes ſoon made their advantage; gave them two violent midnight attacks, and drove them ignominiouſly out of Franconia to purſue their *route* to the luxurious retreat of Nanci.

Here is a faithful picture of an army undiſciplined, immoral, and unpaid; collected from a country of eaſe, idleneſs, and extravagance; and plunged, in a moment, into the ſtrict, ſharp, and regular ſervice of war. In theſe caſes, the *theory* and *practice* ſoon correſponded. Vice and neglect of diſcipline ruin not only the *troops*, but the *cauſe*. The *troops* are loſt through want of vigilance, ſobriety, military punctuality, and ſubordination; and the *cauſe* is ſacrificed by thoſe repeated acts of exceſs, plunder, and cruelty, which make every peaſant an enliſted ſoldier in the enemy's behalf. Thus, after an expedition of only a few months, and without engaging in a ſingle battle or ſiege, Charles carried back to Lorrain little more than one moiety of his army. Whereas, if theſe troops had been intrinſically good, and Tilly could have been ſuppoſed to have placed confidence in them, Guſtavus might have been extremely embarraſſed by ſuperior numbers. There were two reaſons for Charles's return, which hiſtorians have not penetrated into. Richelieu plainly ſaw, that he had opened too much of his plan in giving Guſtavus uneaſy apprehenſions about his tampering with Bavaria, for the time was not yet come, that he had conceived a ſettled jealouſy againſt Sweden, and conſequently drew the duke of Lorrain back, partly by good words, and partly by movements, as if he deſigned to take Moyenvic; which he actually made himſelf maſter of ſoon

* *Soldat Suedois*, 194. This puts me in mind of a learned man, of what country is immaterial, who, thinking he muſt ſay ſomething civil to a Bavarian nobleman, aſked him very modeſtly, *If the elector, his Maſter, kept a coach? Yes, Sir*, replied the man of quality, *and* 25,000 *ſoldiers to run before it.*

after,

after, notwithſtanding Merci's obſtinate defence *. What inclined Charles ſtill more to return homewards, was his diſcontent upon Walſtein's promotion; for, in truth, he expected that command himſelf; and for theſe reaſons, took a cold farewel of his electoral uncle; ſince all he could obtain from the court of Vienna, was, the ſeparate command of his own army, when joined with Tilly; and the poſt of lieutenant-general, in caſe he ſerved under Walſtein.

Thus ended the unſucceſsful expedition of the duke of Lorrain, if we except only two remarkable letters, that paſſed between him and Guſtavus; which ſhall be taken notice of in their chronological order. The king being advanced ſo far in the conqueſt of Franconia, publiſhed a very ſenſible manifeſto, for it was his cuſtom always to make the pen keep pace with the ſword, wherein it was alledged principally, after a full recapitulation of the motives that induced him to enter Germany, that his Swediſh majeſty expected aſſiſtance from all true patriots, catholic as well as proteſtant, in the reduction of the exorbitant power, and unmerciful tyranny of the houſe of Auſtria; concluding alſo, that the former would withdraw their troops from the emperor's ſervice, conformably to the declaration of the electoral college made at Ratiſbon, where all conteſts with the crown of Sweden were publicly diſavowed.—That in conſequence of ſeeing this promiſe realized, he had engaged with France to ſeparate the intereſts of the *leaguers* in a private manner from thoſe of the emperor, and live in perfect harmony with the catholic electors and princes: but they, on the other hand, had neglected his repreſentations, and commanded their troops to fight under the Imperial enſigns at the battle of Leipſic.—Influenced by the ſucceſs of that engagement, he had purſued his enemies into Franconia, with a view to conſtrain them to comprehend their own intereſts, and to detach themſelves from the court of Vienna.——That he had courteouſly advertiſed the biſhops of Wurtzburg and Bamberg, of his propoſing to act towards them in a manner conformable to the ſtricteſt laws of humanity and generoſity, but that each of theſe prelates ſtill continued to ſhew himſelf a moſt active and determined opponent of the Swediſh intereſts. —That finally, upon poſſeſſing the town and dioceſe of

* Francis, baron Merci, afterwards proved one of the greateſt generals the world ever knew. It is a misfortune in the art of war, that his life was never written.

Wurtz-

Wurtzburg, he had practiſed no one ſort of retaliation, nor exerciſed any ſingle act of ſeverity; ſuch proceedings being contrary not only to the natural turn of his heart, but to the dictates of his common ſenſe, and the very drift and nature of his plan, which was to relieve, rather than to torment and perſecute, his fellow-creatures *."

Some few days after Wurtzburg was taken, the Imperial general and the duke of Lorrain approached Guſtavus ſo nearly on the oppoſite banks of the Maine, that the king, at the head of a good body of horſe and dragoons, croſſed the river privately in the night, and defeated four regiments of the enemy's cavalry †. The cloſe neighbourhood of ſo numerous an hoſtile army gave Guſtavus no ſmall ſolicitude; his chief conſolation conſiſting only in ſeeing the river Maine between him and Tilly: and for theſe reaſons he kept an attentive eye on all the known paſſes above and below Wurtzburg.

That the reader may form ſome notion of his majeſty's vigilance, I ſhall here remark, that having concluded from very diſtinct information, that Tilly would attempt to croſs the river, both at Wurtzburg and Oxenford, and being in great pain for the preſervation of the latter town, diſtant from the former about ſixteen miles, he came in the evening on horſeback, attended only by a ſingle groom, to Monro's lodgings, in the moſt remote part of Wurtzburg, and having ordered his ſervant to call Monro down from ſupper, commanded him to draw up Hepburn's brigade, and appoint Hepburn to wait on him in the ſquare before the houſe with all poſſible expedition. This little party, conſiſting only of 800 men, was drawn up and formed without delay, the pikemen and colours being left behind; when the king in an inſtant ordered Hepburn and Monro to march without giving them time to ſend either for their horſes or ſervants. Having walked briſkly about two miles, the king then imparted his deſign to Hepburn, and being joined there by an eſcort of eighty horſemen, continued to march on ſeven hours without halting, and reached Oxenford before two o'clock that morning. There is ſomething in this march of a very uncommon nature; namely, that a body of infantry ſhould without notice march ſixteen miles in a dark night after the autumnal equinox, without having the opportunity of repoſing themſelves a ſingle hour. The reaſons were as urgent on the one ſide, as the march was extraordinary

* *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 16, &c. *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 196.

† *Monro's Expedition*, part ii. p. 80, 81.

dinary on the other; for the town and paſs were guarded only at that moment by 150 muſqueteers, whom the king thought too weak to make any deciſive reſiſtance; and hence it was, that the brigade, at its arrival, had not time to take the leaſt refreſhment, being ordered to poſſeſs the bridge and market-place, and continue under arms till break of day *. Then the king repulſed the enemy with great vigour, and ordering Hepburn to defend himſelf like a man of honour, with permiſſion to blow up the bridge, and retreat to the head-quarters, in caſe the ſervice proved deſperate, returned with all poſſible diligence to Würtzburg, from whence diſpatches paſſed night and day between Hepburn and himſelf.

It has been obſerved by an old colonel who ſerved under Guſtavus, that he never ſaw his maſter's mind ſo greatly agitated as in this affair of Oxenford: for which, I think, very good reaſons may be aſſigned. It is true, we juſt before remarked, that the king conducted an army of twenty-five or twenty-ſix thouſand men into Franconia: but it muſt be remembered that he had to defend a tract of river which extended itſelf near forty miles; and as one regiment was garriſoned in *this* city, where there was a bridge, and another ſtationed at *that* paſs where there was a ford, Horn being detached with a ſmall army to reduce the dioceſe of Bamberg, it appears, to me, extremely plain, that the king had not more than eight or ten thouſand ſoldiers in his head-quarters at Wurtzburg, wherewith to oppoſe the combined army of the league, which amounted at that time to fifty thouſand men. Nevertheleſs the king, who, though he was ſenſible of danger, never loſt his preſence of mind, reſolved at firſt ſight, with that ſort of intuition peculiar to himſelf and ſome few great commanders, to remain firm and unmoved at Wurtzburg; and augment his out-parties, if that were poſſible, rather than call them in to his own aſſiſtance.

He thus continued three days in a ſtate of patient perſeverance, when Tilly, who now began to think ſeriouſly of covering Bavaria, broke up his camp at a minute's warning in the cloſe of the evening; and preſented his whole army, by break of day, before Oxenford, under appearance of attacking the town ſword in hand; but, for the reaſon above aſſigned, not to mention, that the Swedes, by their maſter's orders, had thrown up ſome very good temporary fortifications, he only made the preparations and ſhew of a general

* *Monro*'s Second Expedition, p. 83.

ſtorm

ſtorm, and ſuddenly purſued his intended journey with diligence. The king being ſoon appriſed of the enemy's decampment, began to feel a ſecond uneaſineſs for the brave Scotch brigade left in Oxenford, and diſpatching at the moment a reinforcement of 500 muſqueteers to Hepburn, enjoined him to diſlodge forthwith, under favour of the darkneſs, and file along unobſerved on the ſame line with the enemy, ſo as to occupy the town of Weinſheim, a march of about ſixteen miles, before Tilly could arrive thither. As the Imperial general laid at that time cloſe to Oxenford, being advanced further than the king imagined, Hepburn uſed his own diſcretion, without attempting to move a ſingle ſtep; foreſeeing plainly, that an enterpriſe of ſuch a ſort was not to be undertaken with prudence and ſafety. The king likewiſe, after a ſhort review of his former thoughts, diſpatched a ſecond meſſage to the colonel, thereby requeſting him, in caſe the enemy continued to advance towards Weinſheim, to bring his little party to the head-quarters at Wurtzburg, where he had intrenched himſelf upon the ſame principles, which he formerly adopted in the famous encampment near Werben.

Hepburn's officers and ſoldiers were all amazed at the king *revoking* his firſt orders, it being remarked by them, that they had rarely or never known him change a military diſpoſition, after he had once framed it; a certain, and no inconſiderable proof of that prince's uncommon genius in the art of war.

His majeſty having received aſſurances from the cities of Nurenberg, Ulm, Stratburg, and Francfort, determined at length to advance to the laſt-mentioned place; but the town of Hanau was conſidered an obſtacle, being ſituated on a paſs acroſs the river Kintz, at the diſtance of about one day's eaſy march from Francfort. It was neceſſary firſt to procure the key of admiſſion, and that was to conquer Hanau: which the Imperialiſts, about three years before, had blockaded in vain for no leſs a ſpace than ſeventeen weeks.

Towards the acquiſition of this place Guſtavus directed his whole attention, and for theſe purpoſes entertained a ſecret correſpondence with Philip Ludowic *, its count, who, being born and educated a proteſtant, had conſented privately, that the garriſon ſhould be ſurprized without blood-

* Others ſay Philip Maurice; brother to the celebrated AMELIA, landgraveſs of Heſſe-Caſſel. He died in 1638, aged thirty-three. *Imhoff, Not. Proc.* folio, p. 400.

ſhed, it being agreed, that a certain poſtern-gate ſhould be left open, unknown to Brandeis, who commanded a thouſand Imperialiſts, whom Tilly had formerly ſqueezed into the town. It is true, the Imperial general preſſed hard to introduce four companies more, which, it is thought, he would have ſwelled to twelve hundred ſoldiers at leaſt; but the count, who was a perſon of ſome conſequence, his territory being eſteemed one of the moſt fruitful in thoſe parts of Germany, refuſed him admittance; for Tilly had by force ſurprized the town and caſtle of Babenhauſen, which had been mortgaged to the count by one of his relations.

His majeſty gave the conduct of this expedition to lieutenant-colonel Dewbatel*, who had riſen to that command from a ſimple ſerjeant in the ſhort ſpace of four years. To him were allotted ſix cornetcies of Bauditzen's cavalry, and 1500 *ſelected* muſqueteers, who ſerved on horſeback. Dewbatel made a march of fifty miles in four and twenty hours, and croſſing the Kintz, according to directions, the city being moſt acceſſible on that ſide, entered the poſtern-gate with great dexterity, and giving the garriſon on that part of Hanau called the old town, a very deſperate attack at five in the morning, it being now the firſt day of November, cut to pieces two companies of Imperial infantry; ſeized and ſecured the gate, which parted the old and new town, and made the count, to all outward appearances, a priſoner by force. Brandeis, a captain of infantry, governor of both towns, but reſiding in the new, would by no means, on the firſt intelligence, allow the enterprize to be practicable. It appearing to him almoſt morally impoſſible for men to have made ſuch an extraordinary march in ſo ſhort a time. Another circumſtance conſpired likewiſe to miſguide his judgment. He had unfortunately ſent, the day before, to demand a reinforcement from the garriſon of Aſchaffenberg, and concluded naturally, that theſe new comers were his own aſſociates. For this reaſon, when informed of the confuſion in the old town, he forbade his officers to take the alarm and ſound to arms. At break of day he perceived his error, and prepared to make a vigorous defence, having diſpatched one of his domeſtics, who croſſed the town-ditch by ſwimming, to the town of Steinheim, where was a conſiderable body of Imperialiſts†, ſufficient in number to give battle to the

* We have ſpoken of this enterpriſing officer in a preceding note, and therein expreſſed our doubts, whether *Dewbatel*, *Tubadel*, *Dewal*, *Tubal*, *Hubalt*, and *Howbald*, were the ſame perſon or not.

† The regiment of Einot, and ſome companies belonging to other regiments.

Swedes,

Swedes, at the diſtance only of about ſixteen miles. Whether it was that the king's commander had an eye, or not, to this event, thus much is certain, he proteſted he would agree only to a momentary parley, and took care to give Brandeis, from the town walls, a ſhort interview with the count, who told him artfully, that being a priſoner, he ſhould not take upon him to preſcribe what he ought to do; but nevertheleſs, adviſed him to make the beſt terms he could. Upon this the garriſon was obliged to ſurrender at diſcretion, and reſign both colours and arms at the city gate, for Dewbatel told them all conditions muſt proceed from himſelf. The officers had their ſwords returned, and ſo had the ſoldiers. According to the uſage of that age, as the colours were delivered to the conqueror, their military oath to the emperor was ſuppoſed to be void; and of courſe moſt of the men enliſted themſelves into the Swediſh ſervice, excepting about forty papiſts, and all the officers. Amongſt the priſoners was Francis baron de Merci, whom we have mentioned in the expedition of the Lorrainers, then ſerjeant-major to the regiment of Piccolomini. He had no command, having retired hither, with ſeveral other of Tilly's officers, on account of the wounds he had received in the day's ſervice at Leipſic.

In conſequence of this ſpirited undertaking the king preferred Dewbatel to be colonel of his own regiment of guards, in the room of Teüffel, who had been lately killed; and giving him commiſſion to raiſe two or three new regiments, advanced him likewiſe to the government of the city he had juſt ſurprized. This officer in the end, however, proved very ungrateful to the memory of his patron and maſter, and left the Swediſh ſervice at a time when his aſſiſtance was moſt wanted. With regard to the count de Hanau, who had acceded to the king's party with ſo good a grace, his majeſty made him a preſent of a ſignory contiguous to his own territory, in terms ſo gracious, that the manner of conferring the favour far exceeded the favour itſelf.

The regal army being now greatly ſhattered, and a conſiderable number of native Swedes deſtroyed, ſeveral regiments, with their reſpective officers, were incorporated into one corps, and called a *Brigade* *; which ſaid *brigade*, if complete, conſiſted of 2016 men †, and carried the colours

* *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 28, 29.

† Before this period, his majeſty allowed ſeventy-two muſqueteers, and fifty-four pikemen to a company, and eight companies to a regiment, which, excluſive of officers, made preciſely 1008 common ſoldiers.

of the oldeſt colonel. Here the king improved his favourite *doctrine* of brigades, and formed five of theſe brigades, in his own army; namely, the brigade of *guards*, the *green*, which Hepburn commanded as ſenior colonel, the *blue*, the *white*, and the *red*. When a brigade is mentioned in the courſe of theſe wars, as it was commonly more or leſs incomplete, according to the fortune of a campaign, the reader muſt, at a medium, ſuppoſe it to contain about 1800 men. Be that as it will, at this firſt inſtitution, his majeſty's ſtrength was ſo diminiſhed, that he could only make theſe incorporated bodies of troops amount, each of them, ſomething more or leſs, to about 1500 perſons. The more entire regiments continued ſtill to be undiſturbed; and, as new corps were levying daily in various parts, care was taken to tranſplant into them the junior colonels from the ſeveral brigades.

Some few days before this reformation was made, his majeſty caſt his eyes on the town of Wertheim, and ſurprized in it the Italian colonel Piccolomini *, who there loſt good part of his regiment. Rottenberg upon the Tauber was taken next, and a body of 9000 Lorrainers were attacked in their retreat homewards,

* Octavio Piccolomini. This gallant young man, whoſe family at Sienna took its riſe from Catharine ſiſter of pope Pius II., proved afterwards a general of great repute. His father was maſter of the bedchamber to Coſmo, grand duke of Tuſcany, and general of his cavalry; and had ſerved with great reputation in the Low Countries, Hungary, Tranſylvania, and Barbary.

By the original picture I have ſeen of the ſon, he was gracefully made, and of a very agreeable countenance. He had the eyes of his country, of the fineſt ſort, bright, piercing, yet not ferocious. He dreſſed out of the pedantry of the then mode, and has ſo much the look of a fine gentleman and perſon of faſhion, that it ſeems to confirm an uncommon letter of Mazarine to him, which the cardinal writes with a politeneſs which ſeemed proper to Piccolomini, and tells him, that ſince it was the fate of war, that the French army ſhould be defeated, he had rather Piccolomini ſhould obtain that honour than any other general in Europe, being certain the priſoners would fall into the hands of a perſon of diſtinguiſhed manners and humanity.

He was not only of a robuſt and healthy conſtitution, but ſo very alert and dexterous in the art of horſemanſhip, that, completely cloathed in armour, which in thoſe days was none of the lighteſt, he could throw himſelf on the ſaddle of any common war-horſe without touching the ſtirrup. He perſonally ſaved the battle of Lutzen from concluding in a total overthrow. At the head of 1000 cuiraſſiers completely armed, he made good the very point, where Guſtavus in perſon made the moſt violent impreſſion. Broken by freſh ſupplies of the enemy, and reciprocally breaking them, he kept his troops in ſpirits till the 10th or 12th attack, nor ever departed from the ground, where he had the honour to be firſt placed, though covered all over with wounds, and three horſes had been killed under him. Wal-

homewards, with the loſs of Maſon, their commiſſary-general, whom the Swedes took priſoner, and their military cheſt. Meanwhile the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel co-operated vigorouſly with the king at the head of 10,000 men, and kept Gronsfelt in full employment about Paderborn. Roſtock at length capitulated, to the great joy of Guſtavus. The duke of Mecklenburg and Todt * had beſieged and blockaded it a long time: but Virmond the governor made a moſt obſtinate defence, and fought during the whole ſiege under *red* colours, which in thoſe days was conſidered as a mark of never liſtening to an accommodation. At length the citizens and garriſon began to mutiny, having loſt all hope, after the deciſion at Leipſic. Nevertheleſs, Virmond had addreſs enough to procure excellent conditions for himſelf and ſoldiers, and ſaved three thouſand two hundred men, who were conveyed to Wolfenbuttle, where, by Mansfelt's orders, he joined Boninghauſen. They then all acted againſt Banier; whilſt Oxenſtiern advanced to bring the king a reinforcement of 12,000 men; and the elector of Bavaria, on the other hand, aſtoniſhed at the progreſs made in Franconia, aſſembled

ſtein was ſo ſenſible, that ſuch a ſoldier was in effect an army, that next morning he ſent him, as a token of his eſteem, from his own private generoſity, a preſent of 1600l. ſterling. On account of this and other kindneſſes he never departed from his gratitude to the generaliſſimo, nor would he give any connivance to his aſſaſſination, though the emperor and his miniſters were the contrivers and cauſe of it. Great as this man was in the ſubaltern duties of war, his character afterwards did not riſe in proportion to his elevation: ſomething more may ſtill be wanting to form the commander in chief. However, we muſt obſerve, in honour to his memory, that he generally acted in conjunction with the archduke Leopold, and was often overruled and fettered by him. By peculiar good fortune he ſurvived the thirty years wars, though preſent in moſt actions of importance: and not only rencounters then, but pitched battles too, were much more frequent, and more bloody than they have been ſince.

He was thought a perſon of ſo much parts and addreſs, as to be ſent plenipotentiary to Nurenberg, in order to meet Charles Guſtavus, prince Palatine of Sweden, and make good the ſtipulations entered into at Munſter about drawing off the troops, and evacuating the various garriſons in the empire. Never did any work require more extenſive knowledge in detail, or greater patience and dexterity. Moſt of the generals on both ſides traverſed all advances towards a good underſtanding; inaſmuch as in thoſe days they lived by the ſword, and grew rich by the ſword to *ſuch a degree*, as, God be praiſed, has never happened ſince in the land-ſervice. Yet Piccolomini ſoon gave the finiſhing ſtroke to this immenſe and difficult undertaking. He then married Maria Benigna, daughter of the duke of Saxony, and died a year afterwards in the 56th year of his age. *Azioni egregie da generali e da ſoldati Italiani dall anno 1600 ſino al 1700*, 4 *Ven.* 1742.

* Todt, Achatius, (Ahaz) deſcended from a daughter of Eric, the degraded king of Sweden, whoſe epitaph was the following text of ſcripture; *Tranſlatum eſt regnum, et factum, eſt fratris ejus: a domino conſtitutum eſt ei.*

bled an army of 20,000 fighting men near Donawert, and offered a garriſon to the inhabitants of Ratiſbon, which they declined. The people of Augſburg returned the ſame excuſe to Galas.

Having mentioned Roſtock, I muſt juſt take notice of a ſtrange accident, which happened there in the beginning of this year. One Jacob Vermeyer, a native of Oſnabrug, had conceived a mortal hatred againſt the Imperial colonel Hatzfeld *, for which no reaſon could be aſſigned. He artfully concealed his reſentment a long time, and inſinuated himſelf into that commander's good opinion, which emboldened him to aſk for ſome employment by way of amanuenſis. It happened one day, in the abſence of the domeſtics, as that officer was intent on ſorting ſome papers, that Vermeyer came behind him with an axe, which he procured for the purpoſe, and, as he was ſtooping, ſtunned him with one blow, and then cutting off his head, carried it away in a cloth, hid it in a ſenator's houſe, and concealed himſelf. Being diſcovered, and queſtioned why he had committed ſo horrid a murther, he replied coolly, *that Hatzfeld had deſerved it*. More than this not even the torture could extract from him †.

Before we return to Guſtavus, it may not be amiſs to look for a moment on what was doing by the elector of Saxony ‡: who, at Arnheim's inſtigation, artfully choſe the reduction of Luſatia, which by the way the emperor had given him as his ſhare of proteſtant plunder about eight years before, and the invaſion of Bohemia, for his departments. Having conquered all that he loſt in Miſnia, he received an extraordinary declaration from his Imperial majeſty by colonel Paradeiſer; who, to ſave appearances, had been diſpatched to Dreſden in a miniſterial capacity, and acted under the interpoſition of Cadretta, the Spaniſh ambaſſador then reſiding at Vienna. Cadretta, to uſe the language of thoſe times, was, as we ſuppoſe, an *Italianized Spaniard*; for this memorial may be conſidered as an equal mixture of ſubtle falſhood and high Caſtilian rhodomontade; ſince it was hereby declared ‖, That Tilly had invaded Saxony *without orders* §, for which temerity he ſhould receive a proper reprimand one day or other; as the haſte of

* There was another colonel Hatzfeld, who was afterwards a general of ſome renown.

† *Brachelii Hiſt. Noſtr. Tem.* p. 279.

‡ *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, fol. part i. p. 149.

‖ *Solaat Suedois*, 178, *&c.*

§ Tilly declares expreſsly the contrary, in his letter from Halberſtadt, which we have publiſhed.

that

that man had forced the elector into the arms of a *mere ſtranger*, who could neither protect his friends, nor deſtroy his enemies, and upon whoſe precarious exiſtence the whole fortune of a fatal war depended. That the houſe of Auſtria, on the contrary, confided in a ſtrength which was inſurmountable; and had reſources to boaſt of that were inexhauſtible; renowned likewiſe, and admired in all ages, for the hereditary character *d'une debonnaireté particulière*. Such are the author's * own words, and ſorry I am, that I want an equivalent expreſſion whereby to tranſlate them. The memorial then proceeded as follows; namely, That to evince this latter aſſertion, more diſtinct orders were then diſpatched to the Imperial commanders in Luſatia, and this was really the fact, namely, to withdraw their troops, and leave the country to the elector's devotion: beſeeching him to remember the ſolemn oath he had taken to the emperor and empire, with a promiſe ſubjoined of making all matters eaſy to the once oppreſſed and afflicted proteſtants.

To theſe declarations the duke of Saxony, with reſpect to outward appearances, replied boldly and honeſtly enough. Alſo to a convention propoſed, where Cadretta intended to be preſent in the character of a mediator, after having given, according to his cuſtom, ſome good dinners and ſuppers, he beſought colonel Paradeiſer to inform the courts of Vienna and Madrid, as follows, That having incurred, than which nothing could be more true, the ſuſpicions and reflections of all good proteſtants, he had ſerved his Imperial majeſty faithfully, and had been rewarded inſincerely: That a declaration of this ſort ought to have preceded, and not ſucceeded, the battle of Leipſic: That he knew the warineſs of Tilly's old age too well, to ſuppoſe him capable of taking ſo raſh a ſtep without poſitive inſtructions; ſince if the victory of that day had once fallen to the ſhare of the Imperial party, Cæſar, and not Cæſar's general, would have claimed the glory of breaking into Miſnia, and laying all waſte with fire and ſword †. That he had joined Guſtavus partly through reſentment, and partly from a principle of ſelf-preſervation; nor was he at liberty to withdraw from him without incurring the imputation of ingratitude: ſo much the rather, as the accommodation propoſed, for which, it muſt be confeſſed, Paradeiſer appeared to be furniſhed with full authorities, tended not to the eſtabliſhment

* *Frederic Spanheim*, then profeſſor of theology at Geneva.
† *Soldat Suedois*, p. 183—188. *Le Vaſſor*, tom. vii. p. 60—63.

of an univerſal peace, but was only calculated to form a private union between the houſe of Auſtria and that of Dreſden. Nor was he to be informed, that a ſecret diſpoſition had been projected, whereby it was contrived to transfer the electoral bonnets of Brandenburg and Saxony to other wearers; concluding with this ſhort inſinuation, that it was much eaſier to *deſpiſe* Guſtavus than to *conquer* him; being a prince alike reſpectable in his friendſhips, and formidable in his animoſities *.

Nothing could be more pointedly worded than this ſpirited reply; and yet the Elector and Arnheim had, even *then*, a private inclination to become falſe to the cauſe of Sweden.

Meanwhile the prince we are ſpeaking of, having reduced Luſatia, where Tieffenbach and Goëtz made but an imperfect reſiſtance, entered Bohemia, and joined with old count Thurn, who was now lieutenant-general to Guſtavus, and commanded a little army of Swedes, on ſome occaſions, ſeparate from that of Arnheim, which union inclined the Bohemians to give the elector a more favourable reception; ſince, at the very inſtant he inveſted Prague, the inhabitants opened their gates with great cheerfulneſs, ſo that don Balthazar di Maradas, the chief Imperial commander in that kingdom, and count de Michna, firſt commiſſary-general, were obliged to eſcape with all the garriſon.

Walſtein, previouſly to this, returned to his palace juſt before the electoral army approached Prague, and, by the part he acted, ſmoothed the way for aſcending a ſecond time to his maſter's favour. He exhorted the officers and ſoldiers to perform their duty like men of honour, told them fine ſtories of aſſiſtance from Hungary and Poland, and threatened ſevere puniſhments to ſuch as ſhould behave with remiſſneſs or cowardice. At the ſame time he plainly ſaw, that the inhabitants were ill-affected towards his maſter, and that a garriſon trebly ſuperior to that at preſent was not ſufficient to defend ſuch an extent of walls. Nevertheleſs, to ſupport the ſpirit of his party, he made ſemblance firſt to enter into an accommodation with count Thurn, and left Prague under pretence of diverting the ſiege by concluding a deciſive treaty with Saxony; whereas, inſtead of attempting one project or the other, he pointed his journey

* *Chemnitius* de Bello Sueco-German. tom. i. 218. Indeed *the king of ſnow*, as the Spaniards and Auſtrians affected to call him, performed his wonders in due time, and plucked the beſt feathers from the wings of the Imperial eagle:

——— gelida rex Suevus ab Arcto
Incumbit, ſacramque aquilam melioribus alis
Expoliat ———

to

to Budweiſs and not the Saxon camp, having removed privately the whole *cancellaria*, or papers of ſtate.

The elector then took up his reſidence in this nobleman's palace, and deſtroyed the chapel called *Bella Victoria*, which had been erected in memory of the battle of Prague*. Count Thurn ſucceeded Michna in the poſſeſſion of his own houſe, which had been confiſcated; and cauſed the heads of his proteſtant friends, that had been fixed upon the town gates, to be decently buried in the church of the Huſſites. I muſt mention one remarkable circumſtance; namely, that the city of Prague was *loſt* and *retaken*, *changed* and *received its religion*, *the ſelfſame day*, at *eleven years* diſtance. Thus the marſhal Saxe took Prague at nearly an hundred years diſtance, the *very ſame day* that his anceſtor had taken it. The kingdom ſoon followed the example of the metropolis, with exception only of Pilſen, Budweiſs, and Tabor. The proſcribed nobility and gentry returned, and took poſſeſſion of their eſtates and houſes. The goods of ſuch Poliſh eccleſiaſtics, as abſented themſelves, were made a ſacrifice to the fury of the populace; which paid alſo very little reſpect to the Imperial ſoldiery. Upon this account Thurn iſſued a general protection in the name of Guſtavus†; and denounced ſevere puniſhments againſt all violators of the public peace. Though the people adored him as the genius of Liberty and their tutelar angel, yet two Imperial privy-counſellors could not eſcape their reſentment, for the multitude had been perſecuted and exaſperated beyond all imagination ſince the battle of Prague.

Guſtavus now began thoroughly to ſuſpect the elector of Saxony, who had waſted too much time at firſt ſetting out, under pretence of puniſhing his own ſubjects, and amuſed himſelf with feaſting and rioting in Walſtein's palace, when he ought to have been caſed in armour, at the head of his forces, in the middle of Auſtria. The vigilant Croatians miſſed little of taking him priſoner, whilſt he was idle enough, in the hurry of an important campaign, to amuſe himſelf with ſtag-hunting; upon which interruption, in order to enjoy his ſports and Baccharah wine with greater ſecurity, he retired nearer home, as far as Leütmeritz, leaving the conduct of the army to Arnheim, who gained ſome advantage over the Imperialiſts near Limburg, and placing Hofkirck, an Auſtrian baron, with a ſtrong garriſon at Prague. Thus ended an expedition, more famous for the effuſion of wine, than of human blood.

* *Mercure François*, tom. xvii. part ii. 123.
† *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. 204, &c.

While

While the elector of Saxony was thus employed, we will conſider, for a moment, the operations of the Swediſh and Imperial forces in other parts. Horn laid near Bamberg, between Guſtavus and Tilly, in order to cover his maſter's flanks; and watch the motions of the latter. Banier, Todt, Hamilton, Leſlie, the dukes of Mechlenburg and Lunenberg, not to mention the troops of Bremen, the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, and the chancellor Oxenſtiern, who indeed was now marching to eſcort the queen and join the king, all commanded little ſeparate armies in the northern and north-eaſt parts of Germany, and were oppoſed in their turns by no leſs perſons than Pappenheim, Tieffenbach, Goëtz, Gronsfelt, Boninghauſen, Mansfelt, and others. To enter into an abſtract only of their proceedings would make a multiplicity of wars, which the reader's mind could hardly comprehend; the king having at that time eight or nine ſeparate armies on foot, each of them in full employment againſt an equal number of enemies; independent of efforts made on both ſides in Suabia, where old ſir Patrick Ruthven, and the duke of Wirtemberg, oppoſed the elder Montecuculi, and commiſſary Oſſa.

Midſt the confuſion and tumult of wars, the landgrave of Heſſe Darmſtadt, who, not to degenerate from the character of his father, was always a ſecret well-wiſher to the courts of Vienna and Mentz, and found no ſmall advantage in playing ſo artful a game, made propoſals of accommodation betwixt all the contending parties then in the empire. Himſelf and the margrave of Culmbach were to be appointed the repreſentatives on the proteſtant ſide, and the archduke Leopold and the duke of Neuburg were to act the ſame parts in the catholic intereſts; but the whole project ſoon vaniſhed into air. At the ſame time the Engliſh ambaſſador *, then reſiding at Vienna, ſent his ſecretary, Richard Hurſt, to London, accompanied by a Capuchin friar, with inſtructions to make freſh propoſals concerning the reſtitution of the Palatinate. Couriers alſo were diſpatched upon the ſame errand to Madrid and Bruſſels. From all theſe proceedings nothing reſulted, except that the Engliſh laughers had their jeſt, and ſaid, that "the emperor could not be extremely warm in his circumſtances, when he was obliged to employ a plenipotentiary who was not maſter of a ſingle ſhirt †."

At this time her Swediſh majeſty arrived at Stetin; and the duke of Pomerania, with great politeneſs, paid his compli-

* Sir Robert Anſtruther. † *Memoires d'Electrice Palatine.*

ments

ments to her immediately, and beſought her to ſtay one day, and honour with her preſence a comedy and *ballet*, which he had appointed for her amuſement. She anſwered like the illuſtrious conſort of the Great Guſtavus; *that the ſtate of the times required prayers and public humiliations more than interludes and* bergamaſcos*. *That in the midſt of his feſtivities, ſhe ſhould be reflecting on the dangers which her huſband was hourly expoſed to, and conſequently be alone and abſent, although ſurrounded by* crowded theatres. Matters of public honour and ceremony being thus abruptly, but civilly decided, the duke made her majeſty a preſent of a rich caſket, and ſeveral valuable pictures in miniature; and the queen, not to be wanting in magnificence, ſent him back a vaſe and baſin of maſſy gold: and to exceed him, if poſſible, in politeneſs, ſent the ducheſs a fine coach and ſix horſes, that were moſt beautifully dappled. From Stetin ſhe paſſed on to Berlin, the place of her nativity, and thence to Dreſden.

We will now return to Guſtavus, who, till the town of Hanau was taken, had great doubts what ſteps to purſue: nor were his perplexities quite removed when Dewbatel conquered it; for though he had his choice of two routes, either to Nurenberg or Francfort, in the diſtricts round the former of which lay the temporal princes, and in the latter, the three ſpiritual electors, yet he could not eaſily determine which part of the alternative to embrace. Tilly well foreſaw, that each of theſe plans would occur to the king, for great generals want no intelligence, whereby to be informed of the nicer operations of a campaign, and therefore of courſe, when Guſtavus approached Nurenberg, he, in conſequence of that motion, filed off to Francfort; and when he perceived, that the king declined advancing to the former place, paſſed him by a forced march in the night, and placed his army directly in the road to the latter†. In this dilemma, where the ſword might not ſo conveniently take effect, for the Imperial general was extremely cautious and wary, the king applied himſelf a ſecond or third time to the arts of negotiation, and at length procured a final ratification of the treaty, which had been long agitating, on his ſide at leaſt, with the patricians of Nurenberg, whereby he gave his honour to relieve them or periſh, in caſe Tilly ſhould beſiege them.

His peace of mind being thus recovered, and all greater difficulties quieted, he appointed Axel Lilly to be governor

* That is to ſay, *maſques à la façon de Bergame*, a town in Italy. The word occurs both in Shakeſpeare and Johnſon.

† *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 20, &c.

of

of Wurtzburg, and leaving Horn as general, *by deputation*, in the circle of Franconia, embarked Torſtenſon on the Maine with all his artillery, and marched his army in two columns, on either ſide of the river, as far as Aſchaffenberg, himſelf leading *that* diviſion, which marched next to Tilly. The body of troops he then conducted amounted only to 7000 infantry, and 4000 horſe. He had few native Swedes with him, having ſent the major part to Horn, Banier, Leſlie*, Todt, and his other generals. Never army made a quieter march in an hoſtile country, for Horn was encamped at Bamberg betwixt his maſter and Tilly; ſo that one would have imagined the king was making a proceſſion in his own dominions, at the head of his ſubjects; inſomuch, that an old colonel in the Swediſh ſervice has declared, that the five days' march under Guſtavus from Wurtzburg to Aſchaffenberg, had more the aſpect of a journey of pleaſure than a military expedition.

At Aſchaffenberg, where the elector of Mentz had one of the fineſt palaces in the empire, was expected, on account of the wealth therein contained, a ſort of reſiſtance by no means contemptible; particularly as the garriſon conſiſted of one regiment of Tilly's old Burgundians, and twice the number of electoral forces; but they all diſlodged under the protection of the night, and Banier's regiment of infantry was made the garriſon.

The town of Steinheim was next taken by force, and 600 ſoldiers, who made two-thirds of the garriſon, entered into the Swediſh ſervice. His majeſty made a compliment of the caſtle and demeſnes round it to the count de Hanau's mother, unto whoſe family they antiently belonged: and this act of generoſity ſo attached that nobleman, who was no inconſiderable proteſtant prince, having five earldoms, and about 700 villages, under him†, that he, and the ſeventeen counts of Veteravia‡, ſome of whom were Lutherans, and ſome Calviniſts, entered into a public treaty§ with Guſtavus;—made over to him all their paſſes and fortreſſes; agreed to pay a contingent of £. 2500. a month during the wars, and recal ſuch ſubjects as then ſerved under

* Sir Alexander; an old Scottiſh general, governor of Stralſund when Guſtavus entered Germany.

† *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 35.

‡ Some of theſe families had more earldoms than one, as the Naſſaus, Waldecks, Solmes's, Iſenbergs, &c.

§ It was not ſigned till the Swediſh army arrived at Francfort, and conſiſted of a long preamble by way of manifeſto, and eleven diſtinct articles that had been mutually exchanged.

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the emperor. They even had the boldneſs to aſſert, in their counterpart of articles given to Guſtavus, that this prince was compelled by mere force of conſcience to enter Germany; and that the houſe of Auſtria aimed at nothing leſs than univerſal tyranny over the minds and liberties of mankind; having ſeized the territories of the ſaid contractors, purely to ſhew what, and how much, arbitrary power can effect, either with or without reaſon, and beſtowed patrimonial inheritances, that were never forfeited, upon a ſet of *new* men, who till that time were hardly known to the empire.

From Steinheim the king advanced to Hanau, where he only ſupped, to the great mortification of the magiſtrates; and then cauſing all his drums to beat, marched ſeven miles farther that night, till he reached Offenbach-caſtle, ſituate at no great diſtance from Francfort. Here he reſted one day, having ſent the count de Solmes before to prepare his admiſſion. The magiſtrates then entreated Guſtavus to conſider their oaths to the emperor, and not only leave their town in a ſtate of neutrality, but pay ſome regard to their annual fairs, which were the chief means of their ſubſiſtence. The king replied, *That the tacit compact of their obligation to his Imperial majeſty had been already violated; that the word* neutrality *conveyed an odious ſound to his ears; and that he was ſhocked to be informed by them, that their fairs had more weight with them than their liberty, and their conſciences, ſince they conſidered things more in a private light as tradeſmen and merchants, than in a public light as members of the world and Chriſtians*.* Upon this the commiſſioners interceded for time to conſider and conſult the elector of Mentz, their eccleſiaſtical ſovereign; but the king, who ſeized all incidents in their flight by him, cut them ſhort by obſerving, and here he raiſed his voice a little with a tone of authority, *That he could eaſily excuſe them from taking ſo much trouble: for being maſter of Aſchaffenberg, their prince's place of reſidence, there was no elector of Mentz, except Guſtavus; and that he would give them a more plenary and effectual abſolution in government matters than the aforeſaid prelate could pretend to do†.*

Upon this the magiſtrates conſented without delay, in the names of themſelves, and the people, not only to take an oath of fidelity, but to allow the Swediſh army ingreſs and egreſs, and admit 600 ſoldiers into Saxenhauſen, a pleaſing and elegant part of the ſuburbs, divided from the city by a large bridge.

* *Le Soldat Suedois*, p. 266. † *Ibidem.*

As

As this town might, in one reſpect, be conſidered the moſt renowned city in Germany, it being a common ſaying, That "he who poſſeſſes Francfort a year and a day is maſter of the empire," the king, in order to make his public entrance and proceſſion with greater ſolemnity, paſſed through it, riding all the way with his head uncovered; bowing to the better ſort of people as they ſaluted him, and ſpeaking courteouſly to the merchants, tradeſmen, and populace*. This cavalcade was preceded by fifty-ſix pieces of artillery, the more heavy cannon being carried down the Maine in boats, and then followed ſeventy-four enſigns of foot, and forty-five cornetcies of horſe. The whole ceremony being performed with ſlowneſs and regularity, a larger body of forces than this could not march through the town in one day; and of courſe, to preſerve the greater decorum, the next morning twenty-ſix more troops of cavalry cloſed the proceſſion. All of them together, according to the beſt calculation I can make, not including the corps that guarded the artillery along the river, amounted to about 14,000 effective men: ſome of which the king had gleaned up in the ſhort ſpace ſince he left Wurtzburg. Only two ſoldiers, in their march from Wurtzburg, quitted the army for a moment in order to pilfer; and both were condemned, by martial law, to ſuffer death the next day.

The magiſtracy fitted up the Imperial palace of Braunfels† to receive the king, who dined there the very day he entered the town, making choice of the ſame room where the emperor eats at his coronation. When they preſſed him to ſleep there the enſuing night, as the place of reſidence during his ſtay, he declined the requeſt, and courteouſly told them, *That he could repoſe himſelf contentedly in the open fields, and deſired no other apartments than what his pioneers made for him;* adding, *that the body of an army could not ſubſiſt without its head; and that he was obliged to take his chance in common with*

* It was uſually his cuſtom to diſcourſe with all the town's people, that flocked round him, and aſk them a thouſand little queſtions, that meant nothing but affability. He diſliked flattery and compliments; and when thoſe, who affected the courtly and polite ſtyle, accoſted him in ſuch language, he generally deſired them with a ſmile, *to reſerve that ſort of diſcourſe for her majeſty and her maids of honour.*

† Guſtavus, who afterwards lodged there, was ſo delighted with it, that he aſked his generals one day, if they ſaw any defect in it? When they returned their anſwer in the negative, he replied gravely, *that he perceived one, which quite diſſatisfied him; for as the palace was not built upon wheels, he could not poſſibly conceive to roll it to the ſea-ſhore of the Baltic, and thence tranſport it to the city of Stockholm.*

*the meaneſt ſoldier that ſerved under him* *. This was at that time nothing more nor leſs than a political pretext. It was his intention, with the moſt profound ſecrecy, to inveſt the ſtrong town of Hoëchſt; which he ſurrounded by ten o'clock that evening, as it was at no great diſtance from Francfort, and made himſelf maſter of it the day ſucceeding. For this reaſon, it was under pretence of doing himſelf and the city an honour, that he marched his forces through the town, and made them ſtand to their arms at the oppoſite gate till night came on, and then, without giving the neighbourhood the leaſt apprehenſions, conducted them unexpectedly to the walls of Hoëchſt.

It was here that George, the landgrave of Heſſe-Darmſtadt, though others, it muſt be confeſſed, ſuppoſe the place to be Steinheim, which appears to me not ſo probable, ſent a meſſage of propoſals, by one of the gentlemen of his bedchamber, to the king; who being ſomewhat diſpleaſed at an application ſo devoid of ceremony, aſked Swalbach, for that was the perſon's name, not without a certain degree of warmth, *if his maſter thought it beneath him to make a viſit in perſon?* Upon this, the landgrave, whoſe character we have touched upon in a preceding paragraph, poſted away to Francfort, where his majeſty, who by this time was returned thither, took the opportunity to inſinuate, during the courſe of a repaſt, *That it might have proved more prudent for him to have joined the other proteſtant princes, who entered into the Leipſic confederation, and truſted to a manly and ſpirited reſolution, than thus to have played a ſeparate clandeſtine game, and lent an ear to the vain and illuſory promiſes of the court of Vienna* †. The landgrave was one of thoſe men who have always *more laſt words* to ſay, ſo that by ſhifting backwards and forwards, reaſoning and confirming his reaſonings over and over, with abundance of reſervations, excuſes, ſubterfuges, palliations, and promiſes, &c., he tormented Guſtavus to ſuch a degree, that the latter, merely for the ſake of holding this Proteus in any ſhape, who happened to be ſon-in-law to the elector of Saxony, a prince, who then required to be dexterouſly managed ‡, conſented to allow him a ſort of neutrality, and abſolved him from paying the common military contingent, which all other contracting powers had agreed to furniſh. In conſequence of this, the landgrave aſſigned to the Swedes the ſtrong caſtle of Ruſſelheim, in much the ſame manner as has been mentioned before with regard to

* *Le Soldat Suedois*, p. 269. † Ibid. p. 272.

‡ *Puffendorf* de Rebus Suecicis, l. iii. p. 54.

Cuſtrin

Cuſtrin and Spandau, and ceded to his majeſty free poſſeſſion of all the forts and paſſages in his territories*.

At Francfort, a more explicit ſort of perſonage joined Guſtavus, who for one day had made a ſecond journey to Hoëchſt, in order to return God thanks for his victories without the interruption of a crowd of ſpectators; and that was William, landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel; who conducted with him all the troops he could conveniently ſpare, amounting perhaps in the whole to about 6000 foot, and 3000 horſe. This prince had not been inactive whilſt Tilly attempted to raiſe the ſiege of Marienberg: for during that interval he made himſelf maſter of Minden and Goëtingen, and advanced thence into the Palatinate, where he ſurprized the town of Vacha.

A treaty being now ſigned betwixt his majeſty and the people of Francfort†, great care was immediately taken of the trade and commerce of this famous city; for the king publiſhed an order with relation to the two annual fairs, wherein he allowed an impartial toleration of religion to all mankind, granting the merchants of every ſect and perſuaſion, Jews as well as Chriſtians, free unmoleſted paſſage for themſelves and their goods, and ſignifying the ſame under pain of the higheſt diſpleaſure to all his commanders. He confirmed it next year by a ſecond edict, giving his generals to underſtand, in their ſeveral diſtricts, that if any travellers were plundered, or their effects detained by force, they themſelves ſhould be anſwerable for the loſs in their own perſons‡. Hence it happened, in conſequence of this extraordinary care and generoſity, that the city of Francfort, for the ſpace of three years, engroſſed great part of the *wealth* and *ſubſtance* of the four upper circles in the German empire.

The poſſeſſion of a town like Francfort, without the loſs of a ſingle perſon, produced congratulations and compliments to his majeſty from all quarters; and upon this occaſion, ſome of thoſe court-ſycophants, who are always buzzing in royal ears, told him with a fooliſh countenance of admiration, that he reſembled Alexander the Great, not only in the greatneſs, but in the rapidity of his conqueſts; adding moreover, with a particular emphaſis, that he poſſeſſed, or had at his devotion, the two places, where the Imperial crown was kept, and where the emperor received his conſecration. Upon this the king, who often dealt in the ironical ſtyle, replied

* *Chemnit.* tom. i. p. 200. † Ibid. p. 202.

‡ Ibid. p. 205.

gravely,

gravely, and without ſeeming to be affected, *That hitherto, God be praiſed, he had not been ambitious, like the deſtructive and ravaging heroes of antiquity; but contented himſelf with that diminutive ſpot, which lies wedged in between the Rhine and the Baltic* *.

Whilſt things went on thus peaceably at Francfort, Tilly ravaged the marquiſate of Anſpach, and found in and near the capital abundance of arms, and a conſiderable number of excellent horſes. In this irruption, the very tombs and vaults of the reigning family were plundered; nor was the *cordon* of diamonds ſpared, which decorated the body of the old general, who, though he had commanded againſt the emperor at the battle of Prague, yet afterwards, by means of his recantation, merited better terms from the troops of the houſe of Auſtria. Tilly thence ſent the adminiſtrator of Magdeburg, whom he had carried round the empire, as a trophy ever ſince the ſtorming of Magdeburg, to Ingolſtadt; and here the coldneſs between him and Pappenheim, to whoſe impetuoſity he attributed the ill ſucceſs at Leipſic, proceeded to ſuch diſguſt and diſagreement, that the latter thought fit to retire with a ſeparate army into Weſtphalia, and left the ſiege of Nurenberg to Tilly, who hoped thereby to draw Guſtavus from the banks of the Rhine; but the patricians of Nurenberg had raiſed a little army in their own defence, and received a count de Solmes as governor on the part of Sweden. The Imperial general ſummoned the magiſtrates to ſurrender their city in his maſter's name, and demanded £.15,000. by way of contribution. The only anſwer made, conſiſted of a briſk diſcharge of artillery, ſo that one of the cannon-balls pierced the horſe-litter where Tilly ſate. Being partly diſappointed at ſuch a reſiſtance, for the town had lately given Aldringer aſſurances of fidelity and loyalty, and partly chagrined, as a priſoner in the Swediſh intereſts had ſet fire to his magazine of powder, he found himſelf obliged to direct his intentions to ſome ſecond object; or, in other words, to diſpoſe his troops into winter-quarters; part filing off towards Bohemia to watch the Saxons, and the reſt being diſperſed through the Upper Palatinate. As far as we can now diſcover, he had no apparent reaſons for his reſolution, excepting that he hoped, as a report was then ſpread of Walſtein's being recalled, to throw the king upon *that* general's hands, and entice him far off from the metropolis of his friend and patron, the duke of Bavaria. If this was the real intention, for

* *Fred. Spanheim*, Soldat Suedois, p. 275.

many think he feared to engage the king in a ſecond pitched battle*, it proved afterwards to be either ill contrived or unfortunate; for it gave Guſtavus an idea of entering into Bavaria, part of which by this movement was left naked and defenceleſs, ſome weeks ſooner than he firſt propoſed. Indeed, from the beginning to the end of this affair, he ſhewed himſelf to be no way puzzled with Tilly's ſhifting; well aware that Walſtein could perform but little till the ſpring enſuing. Of courſe, the inſtant he received the news that Nurenberg was inveſted, he diſpatched the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel with his army to watch Tilly's motions; declaring ſolemnly he would himſelf march to raiſe the ſiege in caſe there appeared any occaſion; and the moment the Imperial forces decamped towards Bohemia and the Higher Palatinate, he formed the ſcheme of croſſing the Danube in thoſe places where it was weakly defended.

It is now high time to obſerve, that the loſs of the battle of Leipſic had given the emperor inexpreſſible uneaſineſs, as it had ruined the rich harveſts of twelve the moſt proſperous, though not the moſt glorious, campaigns, that are to be met with in hiſtory. Upon reviewing what had preceded, he found himſelf without reſource of men and money. Many of the veteran legions, which in the courſe of *one* war are hardly ever to be replaced, had been careleſsly and wantonly diſbanded; and his torrent of ſucceſſes had been uninterrupted to ſuch a degree, that none of his miniſters thought it neceſſary to lay up proviſion of wealth in the exchequer. The civil and military officers lived by plunder, extortion, and confiſcation, and arrogantly concluded that their incomes could never be exhauſted.

Prodigies and omens, according to the interpretation of thoſe times, increaſed the horrors of a ſuperſtitious prince. The eruption of Mount Veſuvius, which chanced to happen ſoon after the battle of Leipſic, put all Europe into a new conſternation †. A woman was delivered of a ſtrange monſter near Vienna; and one of the emperor's counſellors of ſtate dropt down dead at his feet, as they were diſcourſing about a tower ‡, which had been erected as a trophy to his

* *Galeazzo Gualdo*, part i. l. 2. 4°. Bologn. 1641.

† Nani, Hiſtoria Veneta, tom. viii.

‡ The inſcription was,

TROPHÆUM
DEO VICTORI OPT. MAX.
IN MEMORIAM B. VIRG. MARIÆ, SS. IGNATII,
ET FRANCISCI XAVERII,
FERDINAND. II. IMPERAT.
MDC.XXVII.

The tower belonged to the Jeſuits new college at Prague.

glory;

glory; and, beſides prodigies, Maximilian, elector of Bavaria, was attempting to negotiate a ſeparate treaty with France. Upon this, he began to talk in a new ſtyle to Anſtruther, the Engliſh ambaſſador, about the reſtitution of the Palatinate; paid his court to Guſtavus, by means of the landgrave of Heſſe-Darmſtadt; made applications to the elector of Saxony, through the interpoſition of the Spaniſh ambaſſador: and diſpatching, laſtly, the baron Curtius with freſh propoſals to the court of Verſailles, ordered him to expreſs himſelf in a very different ſtyle from what the court of Furſtenberg had formerly uſed, after the reduction of Mantua. Gabriel Oxenſtiern, the Swediſh plenipotentiary, was much better received; for France knew how to diſtinguiſh between the pretended intereſts of religion, and the real advantages of the houſe of Auſtria *.

In the next place, the emperor reformed all the offices of his court, and aboliſhed thoſe that were ſuperfluous. He reduced the number of the noblemen of his bedchamber from twenty-nine to ſix; and humbly requeſted contributions from all the princes of his own houſe, as alſo from the princes and ſtates of Italy, and the pope. The king of Spain and the king of Hungary, in conjunction with his conſort, furniſhed him each with £.150,000. The grand duke of Tuſcany ſubſcribed very generouſly; but when the Hungarian cardinal Paſman † was ſent to make an eſſay on the pope's purſe, the holy father ‡, artfully enough, refuſed to receive a *cardinal* as an *ambaſſador*; and inſiſted moreover, that the preſent war could not be conſidered *a war of religion*. Paſman replied, like a man of probity, ability, and ſpirit; for he was not only a profound politician, but, which was then rare, as well as now, a politician that led an exemplary and irreproachable life; and of courſe the public paid great regard to all he ſaid and did. He told the pope in ſo many words, That he valued himſelf on having ſpirit enough to engage *in ſecular matters*, when they were ſo *nearly connected* with his duty as a *Chriſtian*; and juſtified himſelf with ſo much firmneſs, that Urban immediately granted him an audience; ſagaciouſly foreſeeing, that it was leſs

* *Memoires d'Electrice Palatine*, &c. 366.

† Archbiſhop of Gran, or Strigonium. Some ſay his family name was Harrach, and that he was brother-in-law to Walſtein. The baron de Rabata, who paid his viſit to the other Italian princes, attended him.—*Le Vaſſor*, tom. vii. 110.

‡ Urban VIII. who had been nuncio to Clement VIII. in France, and held Lewis XIII. at the baptiſmal font.

dangerous to *hear* his arguments, than to reject them *unheard*. In conſequence of this, the unſucceſsful prelate had only the empty ſatisfaction to proteſt aloud to all mankind, "That the holy and infallible father had extracted more notions of doctrines from *Tacitus* and *Machiavel*, than from the *Evangeliſts* and the *Apoſtles*."

The emperor then condeſcended to aſk ſupplies from his own ſubjects. Cardinal Ditrichſtein * ſubſcribed eight thouſand pounds; the prince of Eggenberg † fifty thouſand; count Michna ſixteen thouſand; the biſhop of Vienna ‡ thirteen thouſand; and Stralendorf ‖, vice-chancellor of the empire, nine thouſand pounds.

As Tilly grew old, and was neglected by the army; as he was unſucceſsful in his laſt great campaign, and devoted beſides to the Bavarian intereſts; one ſupreme commander was wanted, to make ſome counterpoiſe at leaſt, againſt the powerful good fortune of Guſtavus. The Spaniſh faction propoſed Ferdinand, king of Hungary, the emperor's ſon; who had married the infanta, ſiſter of Philip IV. and had patronized and ſtrengthened the intereſts of Madrid at the court of Vienna. The German party recommended Walſtein, as a general of great experience and unbounded generoſity; for which reaſon he was peculiarly happy in levying troops at the ſhorteſt notice, that could be imagined. Indeed, if we except Pappenheim, Tilly being ſuppoſed to be out of the queſtion, there was no alternative of choice: and Pappenheim, to give him his due, deſpiſed courtiers, court applications, and court intrigues. He wanted to be *illuſtrious*, but not *rich*. *Glory* was his *object*, and *that* he procured by the point of his ſword. Of courſe, in all this caballing, and all theſe diſtreſſes, not unhappily perhaps even for Guſtavus, HE was neither recommended by a ſingle perſon, nor even thought of; yet, deriving his reputation *only* from *himſelf*,

* Francis, cardinal and prince of Ditrichſtein, biſhop of Olmutz, protector of the hereditary dominions, commiſſary-general and plenipotentiary-governor of Moravia, &c. See more in a preceding note.

† John, duke of Cromman, and prince of Eggenberg; one of the fourteen cabinet counſellors, director of the council, knight of the order of the Golden Fleece, hereditary maréchal of both the Auſtrias, &c. &c. *Court Kalendar of Vienna*, 1632. It was he who adviſed the Mantuan war. *Paganino Gaudentio*; *Singolarita delle guerre di Germania*, 171.

‡ Antony, prince and abbot of Crembs-Munſter, privy-counſellor, and director of the privy-council. He had great grants out of the forfeited lands in Franconia.

‖ Peter Henry, baron, privy-counſellor, vice-preſident of the aulic council, &c. &c.

he

he never once murmured or remonſtrated; never once entertained a thought of reſigning, or quitting the ſervice; but quietly, patiently, and ſteadily, performed his duty; and died, as he lived, a faithful ſubject, an inferior commander, but a HERO. How little do princes know their true friends! Had it not been for Pappenheim, it is probable, the emperor had been dethroned, and wandered round the world like a poor proſcribed elector Palatine. Pappenheim always knew this, and yet ſerved him. I ſay he *knew* it, as appears from the dying meſſage he ſent to Walſtein.

Charles of Lorrain wiſhed, without ſucceſs, for Walſtein's employment, as we obſerved before; and count Furſtenberg, who had ſerved under Tilly, amuſed himſelf with the hope of being choſen a ſort of generaliſſimo, by the help of his kinſman of the ſame name, who was then preſident in the cabinet of the king of Hungary; for he aſpired to no other poſt than to be military counſellor and director to that prince; but, miſcarrying in this project, he reſigned his commiſſion and retired from affairs.

The Spaniards were much ſtartled with the thoughts of Walſtein's recall; for they formerly, jointly with the elector of Bavaria, had contrived his diſgrace: nevertheleſs, like good courtiers, they ſubmitted with ſeeming complacency; and, to diſſemble better their conſciouſneſs of paſt affronts, made him a compliment of the *order* of the Golden Fleece; for they knew the ſpirit of the man, and his vindictive temper. They ſaw likewiſe, that Ferdinand was young and inexperienced, and that he could not make a campaign without vaſt expence.

To pay court ſtill further to the generaliſſimo, who loved no foreign troops except Italians, whoſe quickneſs of parts he admired, and whoſe connexions with their reſpective princes he knew to be inconſiderable, they made him an offer, by the capuchin Zuiroga, to pay annually £.100,000. into the military cheſt, by way of equivalent for a body of forces, that were to have marched from the Low Countries *; which alternative he thought fit to embrace. Thus ended this cabal of faction; and moſt readers will be apt to imagine, that the German party prevailed by mere ſuperiority of reaſon. Perhaps neither *their* repreſentations, nor *thoſe* of the Spaniards, determined the important affair in queſtion; for it is probable, the emperor gave the preference to Walſtein purpoſely on account of a favourable horoſcope, which his aſtrologer had erected for that general: and the rather,

* *Le Vaſſor*, tom. vii. 135.

becauſe it is well known, he was very unwilling to humble himſelf before a ſubject, and ſubmit to aſk his pardon *.

Upon this, Maximilian, count Walſtein, maſter of the horſe to the king of Hungary, who was the general's nephew and favourite; the baron de Queſtenberg †, privy-counſellor and aulic-chancellor, who had been, and ſtill continued his patron at court; and the prince of Eggenberg, were all diſpatched to him with full authorities to make him an offer of the principal command, and a ſalary of £.100,000, a year ‡. Walſtein was then at his palace at Znaïm in Moravia, the Saxons having diſlodged him from his fine places of reſidence at Prague, and in Sileſia. He coldly declined a viſit to Vienna, pretending humility, and proteſting the title of *his highneſs*, as duke of Mechlenburg, would offend his ears; ſince it would be a ſenſible mortification to him, to be treated upon the footing of a prince of the empire. This was mere grimace and affectation; for few people were deſirous of giving him the title, and many conteſted it.

He then entertained them with a tedious homily on the inſtability of human greatneſs, the charms and advantages of retirement and ſelf-recollection, and the vanity of ambition. He lamented the ill ſucceſs of his maſter's arms, and inveighed bitterly againſt his own perſonal enemies; obſerving, haughtily enough, that if he undertook to remedy all the blunders of Tilly, and the elector of Bavaria, he ſhould juſtly merit to have his name fixed, by way of infamy, to every gibbet in the empire. Adding, that the emperor had cut off his right-arm, and now wanted to fight a duel hand to hand with the Great Guſtavus. He nevertheleſs condeſcended, under the name of the king of Hungary §, and not otherwiſe, to undertake the command for three

* *Puffendorf de Rebus Suecicis*, fol. p. 58.

† The very perſon, who formerly carried him his diſmiſſion, when he had been caſhiered by the intrigues of the diet at Ratiſbon. He was a miniſter of parts, and acquitted himſelf very ably in his embaſſy to England, after the death of Guſtavus.

‡ *Le Soldat Suedois*, 298. *Mercure Franc.* tom. xviii. p. 94. Strictly ſpeaking, the ſum amounted to 108,000l. *per annum*; but it was agreed to pay him 9000l. or 100,000 florins, at the end of each month. This ſalary carries with it the ſhew of a very high and haughty demand; yet whoever coolly conſiders the propoſals, which this man makes the emperor in the next page, and under which his Imperial majeſty thought fit to acquieſce, will not be ſurtled at the ſight of a ſtipend ſo very extraordinary at its firſt appearance.

§ This prince took the ſupreme command of the army upon him after Walſtein's death, and ſucceeded his father to the Imperial throne, in 1637, under the title of Ferdinand III.

months;

months; and at length ſeeming to be fatigued, and over-perſuaded by the ſolicitation of his friends, accepted the employ, as a ſort of *perpetual dictatorſhip;* the terms of which, conſidering them to proceed from a diſgraced ſubject to the firſt monarch in Europe, are ſuch perhaps as can be hardly *equalled* in hiſtory. He was to be *Spaniſh* and *Imperial* generaliſſimo in Germany, and ſole maſter in concluding a *peace*—His Imperial majeſty, and the king of Hungary his ſon, were reſtricted *never* to enter the camp;—and his *rewards* were to be given him, either in the lands he conquered, or in the hereditary dominions;——all confiſcations were to be at his *diſpoſal*, and that without the *concurrence* of the *chamber of Spires*, or the *Imperial council*—He was to *grant* protections, paſſports, and pardons, without *dependency*——His demands for proviſions and money, were always to be *anſwered*;——and, in caſe of a *retreat*, the *hereditary dominions* were to be open for the reception of his army*. All this could hardly have been granted, except the court of Vienna had reſolved to murder him when their turn was ſerved.

He then, in his letter to the emperor, told him, after having pauſed nearly ſix weeks, on the propoſals that had been made him, namely, from the beginning of November till the middle of December, that, for his own part, he had been over-perſuaded into compliance, and ſacrificed his private judgment to the partiality and affection of prince Eggenberg; indirectly reminding his maſter, that his actions, whether more or leſs meritorious, had not been repaid with any proportionate acknowledgments or remunerations†; and that with reſpect to himſelf, he felt great unwillingneſs to hazard his perſon, his quiet, and his honour, a ſecond time; adding further, that his principal wiſh was, to ſee a good peace ſoon eſtabliſhed; and far from any vanity of conducting great armies, and making a figure in future hiſtory, he choſe rather to collect this body of troops, and then reſign the command into the hands of the king of Hungary. In ſhort, which is a caſe not very common, he bore his proſperity with much greater philoſophy and diſſimulation, than he did his adverſity; though

* See *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 242.

† This was talking in a high ſtyle; for in a few years, from a ſimple gentleman and page, he had been created generaliſſimo of the Imperial forces, duke of Fridland, Sagan, and Glogau, with rich donations in land, and the power of coining money, in gold as well as ſilver; and inveſted, laſtly, with a principality of the empire, whoſe revenue, in times of peace, might amount to 100,000l. a year.

in the latter he had acquitted himſelf to the admiration of all courtiers and politicians.

His propoſals to the miniſtry for ſupplies of money were magnificent and extravagant like himſelf. He demanded three millions for raiſing, equipping, and maintaining an army of 70,000 men. He propoſed to have five regiments of Walloon cuiraſſiers completely armed; and had another project, of levying ten regiments of Coſſacks: but this ſcheme, if I remember right, never took place. However, except I am much miſtaken, Uladiſlaüs, king of Poland, made a promiſe of ſending ſuch a ſupply to the Imperial army.

About this time a report was current, that when the emperor lamented to him, that he could not raiſe a ſufficient number of forces, wherewith to oppoſe Guſtavus in the full career of his proſperity; he aſked his Imperial majeſty, how many men he deſired to levy? The quantity of troops wiſhed for, being ſpecified; Walſtein replied, with great vivacity, *Let me beſeech you, Ceſar, to raiſe juſt double that number: it is true you cannot maintain* 50,000 *freſh men*; *but* 100,000 *freſh men will ſupport themſelves in the enemies' countries**. Be this as it may, he requeſted in the laſt place, and that favour had not been granted in the preceding part of the war, that twelve regiments ſhould be quartered in Moravia, fourteen in Sileſia, ſix in Upper Auſtria, as many in the Lower, and the reſt in Bohemia: for the empire was devoured from one end to the other; and his intent was, that his men and his horſes ſhould be ſupported and maintained in good heart and high ſpirits. Never did a ſubject open a campaign with ſuch powers and advantages; and as he knew, that great numbers of Imperial officers and ſoldiers ſerved under Guſtavus, he publiſhed a placard to announce a general amneſty; and that all of them ſhould be received by him with open arms. Upon this the emperor invited him to make his appearance at the public diet, that he might in perſon receive a confirmation and ſanction of his new command from the electors and princes of the empire, there aſſembled; in reply to which propoſal, Walſtein alledged, that he wanted no countenance but from his own maſter; and then, to preſerve decencies a little, made a viſit for a month, under pretence of ill health †, to the famous *Caroline* baths ‡ near Egra.

The

* *Reflections Militaires & Politiques* de Santa Cruz, tom. iv. p. 7.

† *Itinerarium Thomæ Carve*, &c. tom. i. 81. We ſhall ſpeak more of this ſcarce book in a ſucceeding note.

‡ *Carlſbad*; in Latin *Thermæ Carolinæ*. Theſe waters are eſteemed to be ſome

The Spaniards expreſſed tranſports of joy, having taken a little time to digeſt their chagrin and reſentments, upon this recall of Walſtein: for the ſame natural acuteneſs and ſubtilty, which made them in the preceding century the inventors and finiſhers of *ſcholaſtic* learning, rendered them likewiſe in this age the maſters of civil artifice and negotiation; ſince in truth they in ſome reſpect governed England, France, Germany, and all Europe. Even the elector of Bavaria affected to put on a good countenance, in order to conceal a very afflicted heart.

Upon this, Walſtein careſſed all the officers of note, that had ſerved under him; as Gallas, whom he had made his deputy or lieutenant-general, Montecuculi the elder, Tieffenbach, againſt whom he felt ſome diſguſt. Baltazar di Maradas, Holk, Piccolomini, Terſica * his brother-in-law, and Iſolani general of the Croatians; giving them commiſſions to levy a conſiderable body of freſh forces, and to recall all thoſe, if poſſible, who had quitted the Imperial enſigns; and appointing Znaim in Moravia for the general place of rendezvous. He then furniſhed the above-named officers with large ſums of money out of his own coffers; and in three months time got together 30,000 approved troops, moſt of them veteran ſoldiers, with a good train of artillery: for although he was remarkably ſevere in his puniſhments, yet the men of ſervice were all ambitious to act under him, for he rewarded with a bounty rarely to be met with in a ſovereign prince. By way of diſplaying the extent of his power upon his re-eſtabliſhment, he made ſome alterations, till then unheard of, amongſt the ſubordinate generals, who before that time were very few; one only being allotted to each particular army, and therefore, without conſulting the emperor or Imperial miniſtry, he created at once four generals of artillery, and eight ſerjeant-major-generals *di battaglia*; which latter officers, as we ſhall mention them upon various occaſions, had command over all colonels, were inveſted with the power of raiſing recruits, and diſpoſed and ranged the troops in the day of battle †.

It

ſome of the beſt in Europe, both externally and internally. They were diſcovered anno 1370, in the reign of Charles IV. by means of a little ſpaniel, who, as he was purſuing his game, burnt his feet in croſſing the ſource, and howled exceedingly. The accommodations there for ſtrangers are very paſſable, the country round romantic, and the proviſions excellent.

* So the Latin and Italian writers call him; but his true name was Tertzky, and ſuch name we ſhall give him, in the ſubſequent part of this ſtory.

† *Hiſt. delle Guerre di Ferd. II. &c.* by Galeazzo Gualdo, p. 59.

It may be adviſable now to ſay ſomething, more at large, concerning the life and conduct of this extraordinary phenomenon, previous to the time our period of hiſtory commences. Sarraſin, it is true, in a very ſpirited eſſay *, performed a part of this taſk for me, about a century ago; but as I have found nothing amongſt my materials, whereby to corroborate the better half of what he aſſerts, it is my duty to conſider him in the character of a lively writer, whoſe principal view was to ſurprize and aſtoniſh the reader. Of courſe it is probable, if I may be allowed to indulge a private thought, and hazard a ſlight conjecture, that he, who was at that period a French reſident in Germany †, proceeded upon the groundwork hereafter mentioned. At the time this general's diſgrace was contriving at the diet of Ratiſbon, 1630, there was a little pamphlet ‡ handed about by the Spaniſh, French, and Bavarian faction, whether publiſhed or not, I want authority to ſay, which contained an exaggerated detail of Walſtein's life and actions; of his eſtates, buildings, and equipage; of his humours, and ſeverities; extravagancies, and profuſions. As this eſſay was compiled chiefly *ad invidiam*, with a view to promote the intrigues of a party; it is natural to conclude, that though it contained many ſtriking truths, yet it overcharged matters in various inſtances. Wherefore under this claſs may be placed the following aſſertions in Sarraſin, De Prade, and others, that his palace was built on the ruins of an hundred houſes, and was the moſt magnificent ſtructure that belonged to a ſubject: that the ſtable ſurpaſſed all deſcription: that each horſe, as the *Inamorato*, the *Orlando*, the *Belladonna*, the *Spetzaferro*, &c. had a rack and manger of poliſhed ſteel; that the ſtalls were divided by intercolumniations of Bohemian marble ‖; and that behind each horſe was placed its picture painted in full proportion by the beſt Italian and German maſters: that Walſtein had ordered an officer to be put to death for appearing at his levee with *jingling ſpurs*, and hung a valet de chambre for preſuming to wake him without directions §.

* *La Conſpiration de Walſtein.*

† This appears from the MS. papers of Sir Thomas Roe, who correſponded with him.

‡ See *a Relation of the diet of Ratiſbon*, in the year 1630, faithfully tranſlated out of the Latin printed copy, with marginal notes, 4°. London, 1632, containing ten pages.

‖ The Bohemian marble equals, if not exceeds, any ſort that is now found; of which the curious, who paſs through Tuſcany, may ſee a proof in the chapel of St. Laurence.

§ He only ſtruck him. *Galeazzo Gualdo*, 42.

If

If the palace of Walſtein, now at Prague, be the place in queſtion, it is nothing more than a nobleman's fine houſe; nor were the offices and gardens uncommonly extenſive, even at that time, for a perſon of Walſtein's rank and fortunes. The counteſs of Walſtein very politely allowed the author to examine all the apartments, where nothing ſtruck him of the extraordinary kind, either in the ſize of the rooms, or in their number, or magnificence. The ſtables are good, and that is all: and as to the pictures of the horſes, the moſt knowing perſons at Prague appeared to have heard leſs of them than the enquirer.

Probably, the original palace might be ruined, or granted away to ſome other family upon the general's diſgrace; though, if I miſtake not, the prince of Furſtenberg once told me, that Walſtein's land poſſeſſions, at leaſt, were permitted to deſcend to his ſucceſſors; and that his wife, born counteſs of Walſtein, enjoyed a very conſiderable part of her anceſtor's eſtates *. Nevertheleſs, Carve, who ſaw this place in the days of its owner's proſperity, tells us, that the ſaloon was furniſhed with excellent paintings, and the cabinet moſt richly carved and gilt. In the antichamber ſtood fifty guards, all cloathed in one ſumptuous uniform; and more immediately round the general's perſon attended daily ſix barons and ſix knights, as likewiſe threeſcore pages, the ſons of gentlemen, who ſtrove to place them in the way of fortune: for theſe young people were all inſtructed in the manners of a court, and the military exerciſes. At the innermoſt door of the antichamber were placed four perſons in the character of gentlemen-uſhers, who aſked the title, quality, and buſineſs of viſitants, and introduced them accordingly. Ten halberdiers conſtantly made the tour of the diſtrict round the palace; for Walſtein was as impatient of noiſe as any humoriſt that hath ever been repreſented upon a public theatre. Whenever he made a journey, which was uſually on matters of buſineſs, for he loved ſolitude, he affected to be attended by fifty coaches, drawn by ſix horſes; and as many waggons carried his plate, and the equipage of his tents and kitchens. He had moreover ten glaſs coaches of ſtate, which fifty grooms attended, each mounted on a fine ſteed, and leading another †. Theſe horſes were all lodged, at

* Nearly fifteen thouſand pounds a year.

† I have ſeen myſelf a certain *con-commiſſary*, and the reader, who knows the empire, may eaſily gueſs *where*, whoſe brother then acted as a *negotiant*, ride out for a ſingle mile to take the air, attended by an empty coach and ſix, two running footmen, and ſix grooms, each leading a fine horſe: which, all things conſidered, makes Walſtein's affectation leſs extraordinary.

Prague,

Prague, in one magnificent ſtable, adorned with marble mangers, into each of which a *jet d'eau* conveyed clear water at pleaſure. The garden was large, and elegantly decorated with ſtatues, fountains, and fiſh-ponds. In the midſt of it ſtood a large aviary, incloſed above and round with an arabeſque fret-work of gilt wire. His table likewiſe was ſerved magnificently; and the writers of that age mention one *uncommon* piece of pomp attending it, namely, that he had clean cloths and napkins curiouſly folded and impreſſed at every freſh repaſt. He erected a ſecond palace at Gedſin, upon the ſame principle with that at Prague, except that it was adorned with a large park, which afforded range to 300 horſes, a tower being erected in the middle, where a groom always lodged, who ſummoned them morning and evening with the ſound of a bugle-horn to come to the ſtables to be cleaned, and eat their food. He purpoſed to have performed greater wonders ſtill at the caſtle of Sagan, had not death prevented him *.

With reſpect to Walſtein's education and life †, what appears to me confirmed by good authority is, that he was born the ſon of a Bohemian knight, and educated a proteſtant. He was of a ſpirited and turbulent diſpoſition from his childhood, and mortally hated all literature and private tutors. Upon this, his father placed him as a companion with the children of the marquis of Burgau, ſon of Ferdinand, archduke of Auſtria. Here he ſtayed ſome years, and minded religious matters no more than claſſical ones; for ſitting one day at a ſermon preached in the family, the chapel being at the top of the houſe, he dropped aſleep, and tumbled out at a window, which had been opened on account of the violent heat: but receiving no ſort of harm from ſo ſtupendous a fall, he, who from his childhood was ſingular in all things, took occaſion from this event to conform immediately to the popiſh religion. He then made the tour of France, Holland, England, and Italy, and fixed at Padua, fully convinced of the expediency and advantages of learning. Here he applied himſelf to claſſical and hiſtorical erudition with infinite aſſiduity, making judicial aſtrology his recreation and amuſement. Previous to this, he had ſtudied at Altdorf near Nurenberg, where a new priſon had been erected for offending ſtudents; and the rector of the univerſity, *in terrorem*, had given orders, that it ſhould take its name from the party who ſhould firſt be confined therein. Walſtein's impetuoſity ſoon made him a delinquent, and, as the

* *Itinerarium Thomæ Carve*, tom. i. p. 90, &c.

† Vita Walſteinii ex Italic. Galeacii Guaido, 8°. Roſtoch, 1668.

beadles

beadles were conducting him into this apartment, he made a ſtop at the entrance under ſome pretence; kicked a little ſpaniel, that belonged to him, into the room, and ſhut the door; "Now, gentlemen, ſaid he, the priſon muſt take the dog's name, and not Walſtein's." Returning home from his travels, more ambitious than rich, he paid his addreſſes to a Bohemian widow advanced in years, but an heireſs in her own right, and with a good fortune; for Bohemia, next to England, makes the beſt proviſion for the fair ſex of any country in the world. At length, getting the better of a rival greatly ſuperior to himſelf in birth and wealth, he had the good ſucceſs to marry her; but having no children, jealouſies enſued, and our adventurer was ſuppoſed to ſuffer conſiderably from the effects of a philtre, which the incenſed lady contrived to give him. Nevertheleſs, at her death he found himſelf maſter, without exception, of her whole fortune, which was a very conſiderable one; and in the Venetian war he raiſed a regiment at his own expence, and carried it to the ſervice of the archduke, where he behaved with great reputation, and was created a baron by the emperor. He was then made governor of Moravia, and being accuſed of having received bribes, and acting in a very arbitrary manner, procured his peace at court by a timely ſacrifice of rix-dollars in abundance to the miniſtry*. The proteſtant party fixed their eyes, principally, upon him at the firſt breaking out of the Bohemian troubles; but he attached himſelf immoveably to the intereſts of the houſe of Auſtria, and underwent a confiſcation of his goods and eſtates in Bohemia; where, ſome aſſure us, he performed a notable piece of ſervice to the emperor by pure chance; for having raiſed a company of cuiraſſiers at his own expence, he happened to enter Prague juſt at the inſtant when count Thurn and an armed band of nobility forced their way into the palace, where they propoſed terms of very hard digeſtion to the viceroy, the prince of Lichtenſtein; and the count particularly, at the end of his remonſtrance, pointed with his right hand to the hilt of the ſword, which hung by his ſide: but upon hearing the ſudden trampling of horſes, he and his followers ſuppoſed themſelves to be betrayed, and betook themſelves to flight. Walſtein then marched 5000 Moravians to join Bucquoy, the Im-

* He was cited to Vienna, it is thought, by the prince of Lichtenſtein, then viceroy of Bohemia: and count Nogaroſa, firſt colonel under him, uſed to declare, that he refunded ten thouſand pounds on this occaſion. *Arnadii Vita Wallenſteinii*, p. 31.

perial

perial general; but they all deſerted him upon being informed what meaſures their countrymen had taken at home in defence of their liberties. However, Walſtein poſted on to Vienna with the military cheſt: and upon this the Moravians ſeized the cardinal Ditrichſtein, who was then amongſt them, by way of pledge. Some authors likewiſe obſerve, that at the beginning of theſe civil diſcords and diſſenſions, he made his maſter an offer of levying a body of 30,000 men at his own expence, upon condition, that he was made a general*. This account can hardly be looked upon as true. Nevertheleſs, it is certain, that in 1621, he defeated a part of Gabriel Bethlem's cavalry in Moravia, and being accuſed a ſecond time at court, reſtored himſelf into favour by the ſame means he practiſed before, and cultivated the good graces of count Harrach †, one of the Auſtrian prime-miniſters and grand maréchal of the court, with ſo much addreſs, that he eſpouſed his daughter with an immenſe fortune: which was nevertheleſs exceeded by her beauty, piety, and virtue. It was he alone, who made the peace of Lubec, thereby reconciling the emperor and king of Denmark: which great event, in caſe a Guſtavus had not exiſted, might have erected the houſe of Auſtria into an univerſal monarchy: and, on this account, he was created duke of Fridland and Sagan, and received afterwards the inveſtiture of the duchy of Mechlenburg. From this moment he roſe apace in military command, and ſucceeded the marquis of Montenegro on his diſmiſſal. What relates to him from that period, has, and will appear, in the courſe of this hiſtory, except only the affair of his aſſaſſination, which happened two years after the death of Guſtavus.

It is remarkable of Walſtein, that he roſe upon no man's ruin; and as to treaſon, ſuppoſing there was *any*, moſt people imagine he caſt himſelf down the precipice, merely becauſe he diſcovered his deſtruction to be inevitable; and with regard to his firſt diſgrace at Ratiſbon, it was partly owing to the private contrivances of cardinal Kleſel, who, on being recalled from exile, concerned himſelf in no other political matter ‡. Walſtein,

* At that time the poſt of a field-general was very great: for the commander of one army had under him only a lieutenant-general, who was probably ſerjeant-major *di battaglia*, and general of artillery, and then came the colonels.

† Leonard Charles; who was alſo hereditary maſter of the horſe for Lower Auſtria. *Court Calendar of Vienna*, 1632.

‡ This cardinal, as we have obſerved elſewhere, was biſhop of Vienna, prime-miniſter, and favourite to the emperors Rodolphus and Mathias, but

Walſtein, though bred in courts, deteſted all court promiſes and compliments; often inſiſting, that rewards magnificently beſtowed, and diſcipline, by which he meant puniſhments, ſeverely kept up and obſerved, were the only machines requiſite to keep an army in order and credit. It was a maxim alſo with him, that a commander in chief ſhould never familiarize himſelf with his generals: and for this reaſon, without being an humoriſt in the preſent caſe, as ſome have repreſented him, but purely to keep his officers at ſomething more than a reſpectful diſtance, he affected to eat alone, and profeſſed a ſort of natural antipathy to noiſe: inſomuch, that his generals and colonels, when they went to his levee, ſilenced the muſic of their ſpurs, large jingling rowels being then in uſe, by the application of a bit of ſilk twiſt, in order to pay court to their commander's ſingularity.

He loved to be obeyed in the meaneſt trifle: and having ſignified one day, that he preferred a plain red ſcarf to any other, an inferior officer, upon hearing the report, took off a very rich ſcarf, embroidered with gold, and trampled it that moment in the dirt. Walſtein ſent for him forthwith, and made him a colonel. Nevertheleſs, he had ſome ſeverities and particularities, that bordered upon madneſs: for when any perſon made a noiſe, he uſed to cry, *Hang that brute*; and diſcarded an horſe-officer for appearing in his preſence-chamber without his boots.

He had a magnificence and generoſity beyond whatever appeared in any ſubject. He ſent Piccolomini £.1600. the day after the battle of Lutzen: and as Iſolani, with his Croatians, had haraſſed Guſtavus extremely in his camp near Nurenberg, he made him a preſent of £.600. and a fine Spaniſh horſe. When an officer had performed any remarkable ſervice, it was cuſtomary for the commiſſary-general to give him an entertainment, and there was a ſort of honorary wine allowed by the government, or the commander in chief, on the occaſion. After this repaſt at count Michna's, for he was then commiſſary-general, cards and dice were produced, and Iſolani loſt all his money. Walſtein heard of it, and ſent him, whilſt he continued in company, £.300. more; which ſo aſtoniſhed the Croatian commander, that he vowed he would never gamble from that moment, and haſtened directly to the general's tent to return his thanks.

At

but diſplaced by Ferdinand. He was recalled ſome years before his death; but declined all concern with ſtate affairs, except in the inſtance here alluded to. Gregory XIV. paſſed an ample juſtification in his favour, which was one of the laſt acts he ſigned, having had his cauſe under deliberation four years. He died in 1630, aged 77.

At that inſtant advice came in, that a Swediſh convoy was marching from Wurtzburg. Iſolani, without orders, for he knew Walſtein loved to be anticipated upon ſuch occaſions, leaped on his horſe, which waited at the tent door, conducted a body of troops, that ſtood always in readineſs, and beat the enemy.

When Peroni, the manager of his family, hired Battiſta Seni at Vienna to be his *aſtrologer extraordinary*, and agreed with him for a penſion of ſeven pounds ten ſhillings a month, Walſtein told him, with a countenance of anger, that he was not to exerciſe his Florentine economy under his roof, and particularly towards men of letters. He then ordered Seni ſixty pounds for the expence of his journey, which was only forty miles, allowed him ever afterwards a coach and ſix horſes, and paid him his annual ſalary of three hundred and fifty pounds beforehand.

He maintained the ſubordination of diſcipline with religious exactneſs, and degraded more inferior officers than one for ſlight degrees of negligence; ſo that the higher ſort found themſelves obliged to ſtudy his looks as well as his words, for he affected taciturnity upon all occaſions, except eſſential ones. He copied Scipio in rewards, and Hannibal in puniſhments: he loved ſpirit in a military man, even at a time when it was culpable to ſhew it, and releaſed a Walloon captain, who choſe rather to die by a manly reſiſtance, than ſubmit to bodily chaſtiſement. The ſtory in a few words was thus. This officer conducted the part of an eſcort which attended Walſtein, but riding to ſee ſomething out of the high road, the general ordered a perſon ſuperior in command to ſtrike him; upon which the Walloon drew his ſword, and attacked him and his ſervants. Walſtein then with a nod put a ſtop to all further proceedings; and as he diſcovered ſo high a ſpirit in the delinquent, not only forgave him, but made him a preſent of £.200.*

As to his religion, he had abjured *one*, and practiſed the *other*, as the catholics thought, very imperfectly: for he diſliked many ceremonies in the popiſh church, and deteſted the jeſuits above all men, conſtantly inſinuating, that perſecution ought ever to give place to civil prudence. He loved the ſplendor of a magnificent table, but reſtrained himſelf to ſtrict moderation both in eating and drinking. With reſpect to the fair ſex, he never indulged any unlawful amours: nor was *that* the faſhion of military men in the age I am ſpeaking of. Indeed the ſervice was ſo ſharp, and ſo uninterrupted, that there was no time for them, nor was it cuſtomary then for officers to ſpend the winter ſeaſon luxuri-

* *Galeazzo Gualdo*, p. 43.

ouſly

ouſly in their own metropolis. We read but of two commanders in the Imperial and Swediſh ſervice, who kept their paramours, and thoſe were Holk and Coningſmarc; which latter durſt not have done ſo, till many years after the death of Guſtavus. Nor did two men ever more miſtake themſelves in the talents of gallantry; for Holk was diſfigured with the loſs of an eye, and Coningſmarc was ugly beyond deſcription. Now it is plain their brother generals envied them not theſe ſort of pleaſures, but rather conſidered ſuch intercourſes as beneath the attention of an able and vigilant officer: for when Coningſmarc quarrelled with the maréchal de Guébriant, and ſeparated his forces from him in a very abrupt and rude manner, the maréchal ſaid aloud, at the head of his troops, "Let him go—I wiſh him and his whores a good journey—I want the aſſiſtance of no ſuch heroes as himſelf;—but let him take his army of ſtrumpets with him."

We find * in Walſtein the ſame diſapprobation on a like occaſion. For when he was at Prague or Znaïm, one of his generals, ſuppoſed to be Holk, ſent him a letter to requeſt the favour of paſſing a few days with him; to whom Walſtein, underſtanding that Holk's miſtreſs bore him company, returned this ſhort meſſage; "That he and his lady would be pleaſed to point their courſe to his other palace at Gedſin; for as he was erecting a fine ediſice there, and purpoſed to people the village adjoining, he thought that place in Bohemia the moſt proper for them, and moſt agreeable to their inclinations."

We may obſerve further with regard to Walſtein, that he allowed no precedence of quality throughout the army, not even in princes; but ordered each officer to take his place according to the military rank and ſtation then ſubſiſting. He knew the value of good *intelligence*, and never ſpared his purſe upon that head: inſomuch that Chieſa, one of his favourite colonels, tells us, that he had obſerved him more than once appropriate a thouſand pounds a month to ſuch purpoſes: and hence it was, that he apprized the emperor minutely of Guſtavus's invaſion, when the Auſtrian and Spaniſh politicians had never once dreamt of ſuch a viſit. He loved an enemy, if he was a brave man; and on this account himſelf walked at Pappenheim's funeral proceſſion.

* *Hiſt. du maréchal de Guébriant*, par Jean de Laboreur, fol. Par. 1684. The ſame author wrote the *curious voyage* of Madam the maréchale Guébriant, ambaſſadreſs extraordinary and plenipotentiary into Poland, 4°. Par. 1648.

That he had arrogance is not to be diſputed; for he once declared, that he would ſcourge Guſtavus out of Germany: nor was it uncommon for him to reject a colonel, who brought to him the Imperial recommendation in his pocket. When ſome ſycophants, a ſet of men he mortally hated, attempted to ruin an officer, who had forgot to return him thanks for a commiſſion lately beſtowed, his anſwer was, That "the poor man is ſo overcome with gratitude, that he has not power to return his acknowledgments."

He was rather ſucceſsful, than great or inventive in the art of war, and much better qualified to raiſe and ſubſiſt an army, in which talents he was admirable, than to conduct it ſcientifically in the day of battle. He fought upon the Low-Country principles, of ranging men in great ſquare maſſes, but placed much confidence in the ſize and number of his field-artillery. His character, for perſonal courage, has been depreciated by ſome, becauſe he ſate in a horſe-litter during the important deciſion at Lutzen; but it is probable a fit of the gout compelled him to appear in that ſituation. Some likewiſe have impeached him of cruelty, and alledge as a proof the courts-martial, which he held at Prague after the defeat above mentioned. But the generality of writers are inclined to conjecture, that the philtre which his firſt wife gave him, diſcompoſed his intellects to a certain degree. However that may be, true it is, Guſtavus always conſidered him as diſturbed in his intellects: and this perhaps may account for his boaſting to take Stralſund, "though it hung from heaven by an adamantine chain;" and for the extraordinary anſwer likewiſe, which he gave an officer, who told him, by miſtake, that the king of Sweden had ſtormed an old caſtle * thought to be inacceſſible, which made a part of his camp near Nurenberg; "Sir," ſaid he, abruptly, "the Supreme Being cannot take that caſtle:" a profaneneſs of expreſſion, which nothing would have allowed me to inſert here, had it not been my purpoſe to ſuggeſt that Walſtein approached very near the verge of madneſs.

As he rarely ſpoke in company, but kept his attention fixed on other men's diſcourſe, Sarraſin has given him the character of being *at once penetrating and impenetrable*; which is a pretty antitheſis, but not founded on truth, in regard to Walſtein, who had the *penſieri ſtretti*, but not the *ſciolto viſo*. Guſtavus, Oxenſtiern, and Richelieu, were bold and open; Walſtein, Gondemar, and Mazarin, were reſerved and ſhy; for they had not parts to be great! and when true greatneſs is

* Altenberg.

wanting,

wanting, then low cunning muſt ſhuffle and diſtribute the cards as well as it can.

To give the finiſhing hand to this digreſſion: the Imperial general, after the death of Guſtavus, grew ſo powerful, that the court of Vienna from that moment determined to put an end to his authority, or his exiſtence; and after reflecting two years, decided at length in favour of an *aſſaſſination*, attended with circumſtances ſo extraordinary, that it has been repreſented on public theatres in more countries than one *. To bring the ſtory into a ſhorter compaſs, I muſt obſerve, as I have ſuggeſted before, that when Walſtein found his ruin unavoidable, he tried to ſecure himſelf by the fidelity of his ſoldiers, and made diſtant attempts, as ſome ſay, to feel the pulſes of the Swedes and Saxons: for the emperor and his miniſters had raiſed him *ſo high*, and were ſo much *obliged to him*, that they had no expedient remaining, as *politicians*, but to *kill* him. To enter into the whole point minutely would demand a diſtinct work; for no part of hiſtory is leſs known than the ſuppoſed defection and treaſon of Walſtein; ſince the accounts are ſo various, the repugnancies ſo manifeſt, and the methods of acting on his ſide ſo abſurd and hazardous, that no man can pronounce any thing with the leaſt degree of certainty on *that* ſide of the queſtion, except, in caſe there was a real intention to rebel, any original writings are preſerved in the archives of Vienna and Dreſden. Such papers, after all my enquiries, I never could hear of. M. Baron de Firmian put Carve's † book into my hands as the only real aſſiſtance that could be given me; and I aſked this favour of him with ſome earneſtneſs, becauſe my friend M. de Voltaire has declared, "that the conſpiracy of Walſtein is received as

* There is an Engliſh tragedy on the ſubject. No plot, I know of, falls ſo well within the compaſs of the *three unities*, as the death of Walſtein.

† The title of this work is as follows: *Itinerarium* R. D. THOMÆ CARVE, *Tripperarienſis, Sacellani majoris in fortiſſima juxta ac nobiliſſima legione Domini Colonelli D. Walteri* DEVEROUX, *ſub ſacra Ceſaréa majeſtate ſtipendia merentis; cum hiſtoria facti Butleri, Gordon, Leſly & aliorum.* Impenſis auctoris, Mogunt. 1639 and 1641. Tom. ii. 12°.

This curious and very ſcarce book was firſt ſhown me at Vienna, and then given me, by Charles, baron de FIRMIAN, nephew to the late archbiſhop of Saltzburg, aulic counſellor, &c. and Imperial miniſter now in Spain; to which excellent perſon, who, without flattery, may be pronounced one of the beſt hiſtorians in the empire, I acknowledge myſelf in this, and many other reſpects, to have ſingular obligations.——I ſaw another work of Carve's at Vienna, entitled, *Lyra, ſeu Anacephaloſis Hibernica, in qua de origine, nomine, moribus gentis Hibernicæ tractatur; nec non annales Hiberniæ ab anno* 1148 *ad* 1650. Viennæ, 4°. 1664, and Sultzbaci, 4°. 1666.

an hiſtorical fact, and yet the world hath been long ignorant of what kind it was."

That Walſtein was of a violent and overbearing temper is very certain. It is plain alſo, that he thought himſelf diſreſpected and ill uſed *, after the death of Guſtavus; for then the houſe of Auſtria did not much want him. It ſeems probable likewiſe that he intended to continue generaliſſimo againſt his *maſter's will*, but it no where appears that he had thoughts of *injuring him*; for, could that have been proved, a legal decapitation would have been more decent, and full as effectual.

Carve cooks up a treaty in form between Walſtein and the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg †; but the point is, how he came by it; for there is neither date, nor ſignature. We ſuppoſe therefore that what he has amaſſed together, was the common language of the court-party at that time.

As the report of Walſtein's diſgrace was whiſpered abroad more or leſs in every place, it may be true, that the major part of his officers ſent a proteſt to him againſt his reſignation; and Carve ſays that Leſlie and three colonels carried it. In this paper it was declared, that they would juſtify his non-reſignation at the expence of their lives and fortunes; and though ſuch an action would have been criminal in another country, yet it muſt be remembered, that when Walſtein accepted the poſt of generaliſſimo, he inſiſted, and the emperor agreed, that all the army ſhould take an oath of fidelity and obedience to him. In confirmation of which there is a remarkable paſſage on the occaſion in the emperor's letter to the army, dated Jan, 24, 1634:

"Having been informed, ſays he, that ſome of our principal commanders *gave into propoſals and conceſſions ſomewhat farther than became them*, yet, as we eaſily perceive, that they were induced ſo to do by flattering promiſes, and a falſe conception of things, we of courſe graciouſly pardon them, as alſo every thing which *by chance* they may have done either againſt us or our authority; two perſons only excepted, whom we ſhall examine and puniſh."

Who theſe two perſons were, appears not from hiſtory. It is probable they were a couple of Walſtein's friends in the cabinet or aulic council; for we find each military officer of note ſtill continued in his employment.

* Amongſt other things Walſtein had aſked the title of count for his friend colonel Illo, but was peremptorily refuſed.

† Any proof of this ſort would have laid the foundation of a juſtifiable proceſs in forms of law.

We will now endeavour to trace our ſtory ſomewhat nearer its ſource: taking Carve's account to be in many reſpects the moſt authentic; for he was chaplain to Devoreux who killed Walſtein. Nevertheleſs his whole narrative muſt be read with caution, for it was natural in him, from his *religion* as well as *private obligations*, to favour the houſe of Auſtria and her agents, and therefore it is that I have followed ſome hiſtorians that are leſs prejudiced than Carve; the whole of what they ſay amounting to this.

It being determined at Vienna, to make Walſtein a ſacrifice, care was taken to ſound the inclinations of the generals. Galas and Piccolomini, both Italians, and officers of repute then ſerving under him, refuſed, the firſt gently, and the other peremptorily, to have any hand in ſo unſoldierlike an action; but the former, as I obſerved, expreſſed a ſort of acquieſcence, in caſe *other* perſons might be found who would undertake the taſk; and of courſe withdrew from his general under various pretences.

It was now high time for the Imperial miniſtry to ruffle Walſtein's temper, in order to force him into ſome acts of extravagance. Of courſe a ſnare was ſpread for him, and that not unartfully*; for the emperor commanded him, under pretence of favouring the hereditary dominions, as the power of the Swedes was conſiderably weakened, and as the elector of Saxony began to waver in his friendſhip towards them, to diſpatch a ſmall army againſt duke Bernard, near Paſſau, and appropriate 6000 choſen cavalry, to act under the cardinal infant in the Low-Countries; than which no ſcheme could be better calculated, either with a view to weaken Walſtein's hands, or facilitate the aſſaſſination that was then projected. The Imperial general *now comprehended*, what before he *ſuſpected only*; but, diſſembling his more private thoughts, contented himſelf with exclaiming, that his abilities as a ſoldier were called in queſtion; and that his poor troops would be haraſſed and ſtarved; which affected the colonels that were with him, ſo deeply, eſpecially ſuch as were his friends and favourites, that they made him an offer, as we obſerved before, of *not* deſerting him, under any affront or diſgrace. This happened at Pilſen, Jan. 12, 1634.

Walſtein then, for ſome ſecret reaſons preferring Egra†, made a viſit to it in the Chriſtmas holidays; and as he

* *Brachelii* Hiſt. noſtr. Temp. p. 309.

† *M. de Voltaire*, in his *Annals of the Empire*, tom. ii. ſays, Walſtein reſided at Egra; but he only ſlept there one night.

always confided more in foreigners than native Germans, ordered colonel James Butler, not him who behaved ſo well at Francfort upon the Oder, to attend him with an eſcort of horſe and infantry, all Iriſh. John Gordon at that time commanded the garriſon of Egra, an officer in whom Walſtein placed no ſmall confidence, as he had raiſed him from a private foot ſoldier *, and made him lieutenant-colonel of his brother's †, Tertzky's regiment; and in conjunction with Gordon, Leſlie, who ſerved in the capacity of watch-maſter general ‡, acted in the ſame regiment.

By this time Walſtein began to feel great uneaſineſs; for Galas, who had engaged to bring Aldringer with him from Vienna, was not arrived; Piccolomini and Coloredo had both abſented themſelves upon various reaſons or pretences; and therefore, before he left Pilſen he ſent for Gordon and Leſlie ſeparately, in order to fix them more in his intereſts. Here it muſt be obſerved, that Leſlie had received ſome private intelligence from Vienna, relating to the ſtorm that then hung over Walſtein's head: but kept the affair in his own breaſt §.

Leſlie now being better inſtructed, and hoping to penetrate farther into the general's deſigns, received with no ſmall ſatisfaction a meſſage from Walſtein, with an invitation to viſit him at Pilſen; but, after having travelled nine miles, he met his general coming to Egra in his horſe-litter according to cuſtom; and eſcorted by colonel James Butler, with 50 horſemen and 200 infantry, all of Butler's Iriſh regiment of dragoons. Walſtein ſaluted Leſlie in the moſt cordial manner, and after a little private diſcourſe ſent him back to Egra to prepare things for his reception.

As Walſtein travelled ſlowly and with no ſmall ſolemnity, Leſlie returned, and, bringing Gordon with him, conducted

* *Puffendorf*, p. 139.—Gordon, ſays Paganino Gaudentio, might have anſwered the propoſals of the Imperial miniſtry more nobly, and more honeſtly, in the words of Grillon, colonel of the guards to Henry III. who, being requeſted to murder the duke of Guiſe, replied frankly, that he was a ſoldier of honour, and would never imbrue his hands in the blood of a perſon from whom he had received many ſignal benefits. *Le Singolarita delle Guerre di Germania*, 4°. 1640.

"Gordon" (ſays Carve) "was *nobiliſſima proſapia oriundus*. He had many relations of his own name in the Imperial ſervice: *e.g.* one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, one watch-maſter, &c." *Itin.* tom. i. p. 56.

† Tertzky and Walſtein married two daughters of count Harrach.

‡ M. de Voltaire calls him *Lacy*, which is a common French negligence in ſpelling *proper* names; and by miſtake makes him captain of the guard to Walſtein. (*Annales d'Empire*, tom. ii.)

§ *Itinerarium*, tom. i. p. 95.

their

their general to his lodgings; where being aſked to ſtay, they converſed an hour or more with Walſtein, who then unboſomed himſelf, and complained with ſome acrimony of his ill-uſage. In conſequence thereof, Leſlie, who ſeemed to anſwer for Gordon and Butler, told him, that all the world, and eſpecially ſtrangers, had partaken of his liberalities; that he had left his country to advance his fortunes; and that upon ſuppoſition his oath to the emperor was rendered void, he would ſerve a ſecond maſter with like fidelity*. Meanwhile, Butler felt ſome ſurprize within himſelf at this diſcourſe; and as they walked from the general's apartments to the caſtle, dropped ſome random hints in Walſtein's favour, for he ſuſpected both his friends, as they were rigid proteſtants; to which Gordon replied with ſome emotion, and as being governor of the town, he was then the principal perſon amongſt them; "You, gentlemen, may do as you pleaſe; but death itſelf ſhall never alienate me from my duty and affection to the emperor:" upon which, Butler produced a letter from Galas, wherein his Imperial majeſty authoriſed all his officers to withdraw their *allegiance* † from Walſtein.

The conſpirators having thus underſtood each other, determined to deſtroy their general without delay. It was firſt reſolved to poiſon ‡, or ſend him and his aſſociates priſoners to Vienna; but immediate death was then conſidered as a more effectual way of going to work §. Upon this, Gordon was pitched upon to give a public ſupper in the caſtle, it being then the feſtival days ſucceeding Chriſtmas; and Butler was deſired to bring Walſtein's four favourites, namely, the colonels Tertzky, Illo, Kinſky, and Nieman, which latter was the general's ſecretary. As the caſtle was a fortification within a fortification, no place could be more convenient for the perpetration of ſuch an action; and Gordon took care, not only to fill it, more or leſs, with ſuch ſoldiers as he could beſt confide in, but, after the cloſe of the evening, conveyed ſecretly into the caſtle, by a poſtern gate, captain Walter Devoreux, and watch-maſter Robert Geraldine, at the head of fifteen men, ſelected for ſo deſperate

* *Carve*, ut ſupra.

† This particular expreſſion was made uſe of, becauſe all the generals, officers, and ſoldiers, had taken an oath to Walſtein, by the emperor's orders, when he was inveſted the ſecond time with the ſupreme command.

‡ *Carve*, tom. i. p. 103.

§ Mutarunt tunc paulo poſt id conſilii, ſtatueruntq; jurati omnes morte plectere: ut totum malum ſimul tolleretur. *Ibid.* The ſame author owns afterwards, that Butler acknowledged to the garriſon and his own regiment, that the fact was committed JUSSU CÆSARIS.

an enterprise *; whilst captain Edmond Burk, with an hundred soldiers, was ordered to keep the streets quiet. This had no suspicious appearance, for Walstein above all things hated noise. Burk at the same time had private instructions to crush any mutiny or insurrection in its infancy; in case the soldiers should resent the deaths either of their general, or colonel; for Tertzky's whole regiment of dragoons laid then in the town. Burk well knew what he was to do, but it is probable his soldiers did not: for if any one man had betrayed the conspiracy to Walstein, whose generosity, to say the least of it, was equal, if not superior to that of an emperor, the general himself might not only have escaped, but destroyed all the conspirators, and perhaps the house of Austria likewise. Burk, through a sort of soldierlike punctiliousness, right or wrong, kept his promise inviolable, as also the secret with which he was intrusted.

In the course of the desert, at about half an hour after ten, Gordon, or Leslie, proposed the health of the elector of Saxony; upon which, the better to conceal their intentions, Butler professed to be greatly surprized, and declared he would drink to no man's prosperity, who was an enemy to *Cæsar*. On a sudden the conversation grew loud and vehement, which being agreed upon as a signal to Devoreux and Geraldine, in an instant two doors opened on either side of the room, and Devoreux and Geraldine entered; the latter with a partisan in his hand, and the former with a sword, attended each by seven or eight soldiers, who had their swords drawn. *Long live Ferdinand the second!* cried Devoreux, *And long prosper the house of Austria!* replied Geraldine. Butler, Gordon, and Leslie, seized the candles, and held them aloft. The table then was overturned in a moment, whilst Illo had presence of mind to fly to his sword, which hung up against the wall; but in reaching it, was pierced through the body, and expired with it undrawn in his hand. Tertzky was equally brave, and more fortunate; for, seizing his sword, which hung up in the same manner, he planted himself in a corner, maintained the combat so long till he killed three of the assailants, the idea of his being invulnerable † greatly

* Walstein, as generalissimo, had issued out the watch-word of the night; but to carry on their purposes the better, the conspirators changed it with respect to their party.

† Some historians give Tertzky's resistance to Illo, and Illo's to Tertzky; but the character agrees best with Tertzky, who, on account of his presence of mind, and intrepidity, was reputed to be *gefrorn*. *Bertius de Bellis Germ.* 4°. 545. Having mentioned this popular error of the age more than once,

greatly diſmaying them, and in the pauſes of his defence, for he fought like an enraged lion, beſought the ſoldiers, *to deſiſt for a moment, and he would "undertake, hand to hand, Gordon and Leſlie*;*" for Butler appeared to him to be honeſt; *"after that, gentlemen, you are a great many in number, and have full power and liberty to kill me. But, Gordon,* ſaid he, looking ſternly on him, *"is this the way of giving your friends a ſupper?* †" Kinſky reſiſted manfully, but unſucceſsfully. Nieman made an effort to eſcape, but was ſeized in the attempt. He begged hard for his life, and deſired to be conſidered in the character of an amanuenſis, rather than a ſoldier; but the conſpirators had no ears for ſuch diſtinctions. A duke of Lerida was mortally wounded by Tertzky in the conflict, whom we ſuppoſe to have been a young volunteer in the emperor's army ‡.

In an inſtant, Devoreux, to whom the honour of murdering Walſtein had been allotted, to uſe Carve's words, having broken his ſword in the late rencounter, ſnatched a partiſan from one of the ſoldiers, and taking with him thirty freſh men, which had been concealed for that purpoſe, flew directly to the general's lodgings; when, juſt as he entered the porch, a muſquet, which belonged to one of his followers, happened to go off, but gave no alarm to the domeſtics within. Knocking abruptly at the outward door, the porter admitted him; but knowing his maſter's delicacy in regard to noiſe, bid him take care what he did; "Friend, ſaid Devoreux, this is a time *for noiſe, and not for ſleeping:*" and upon that, all his ſoldiers ruſhed in after him. He then haſtened

once, it may not be unentertaining juſt to obſerve, how the invulnerability here ſpoken of was obtained; and to what degree the incantation extended. The party, requiring to be *frozen*, procured a magician to mark his body with taliſmanical ſignatures; and whenever any immediate danger was expected to approach, ſwallowed four paper pills, containing each an enchanted verſe, of which the tutelary effects laſted ſix times the ſame number of hours. During that period, neither ball, nor ſword, &c. entered the fleſh; and the contuſions being touched by a penknife, and ſqueezed, healed themſelves immediately.

Nor did the death of Tertzky diſprove the belief of his being *gefrorn*; for, ſaid the wiſe maintainers of that doctrine, as he came to a *friendly* entertainment, he had no need to ſwallow a doſe of paper labels by way of precaution.

*M. de Voltaire*, contrary to all hiſtory, tells us, that Walſtein's friends were *ſtrangled*. Ann. d'Emp. tom. ii.

* Theſe two officers were proteſtants. *Ab orthodoxa diſſentientes fide.* CARVE. † *Merc. Frqn.*

‡ Carve ſays, that amongſt all theſe people who had an hand in Walſtein's death, &c. and whom he calls *gloriæ ſocios*, there was no German nor Italian, and only one Spaniard; whom we ſuppoſe to be the young duke here mentioned. How he happened to be one of the party, ſeems to be accounted for in the *Military Eſſay*.

up

up the ſtaircaſe, and finding the door faſtened, for Walſtein, who had heard the muſquet, and the confuſion below, had doubly bolted it, demanded where the gentleman of the bedchamber was, who kept the key? but that perſon not appearing, he knocked rudely at the door with great furiouſneſs*. Meanwhile, the report of what happened had reached the neighbouring apartments, where Tertzky's and Illo's wives were lodged, who made the ſtreets reſound with their ſhrieks and lamentations; and therefore whilſt Devoreux remained in ſuſpenſe at the chamber-door, Walſtein examined the windows in hopes to eſcape; but ſoon recollected the depth to be ſuch, that it was impoſſible for him to ſave his life by an attempt of that nature. He then put his head twice out of the caſement, and cried aloud, "Is no man my friend? Will no one aſſiſt me?" Upon which, Devoreux, growing impatient, knocked thrice, but received no anſwer. He then commanded his ſoldiers, who made five attempts without ſucceſs, to burſt the door; but applying himſelf to the taſk with them, and directing his ſtrength juſt againſt the lock, he flung it into the room with great vehemence.

As Walſtein's gentleman of the bedchamber was retired, it is concluded that the general had compoſed himſelf to reſt, and was alarmed by the noiſe. When the aſſaſſins broke in, he ſtood in his night-gown and ſhirt near a table; and, which is very remarkable, had neither ſword nor piſtols with him; which looks as if he was not conſcious of any rebellion, or feared a deſign againſt his life. He truſted to human gratitude and promiſes, but in the event found them mere chimeras. The worſt which he thought could befal him, was to be ſent a ſtate-priſoner to Vienna; for had he entertained any ſuſpicions, he had Tertzky's favourite regiment of dragoons then in the town. On the contrary, he had not a ſentinel at the door of his lodgings, though at all other times he uſed to mount a guard of an hundred men; nay, what is more, he had hardly a ſervant about his perſon. Thus he fulfilled the old Latin ſaying, *Quos Deus vult perdere prius dementat*; or, as it is more elegantly expreſſed by a poet of our own country;

> For thoſe whom Heaven for ruin hath deſign'd,
> It fits for fate, and firſt deſtroys the mind.
>
> DRYDEN.

When Devoreux broke into the chamber, he accoſted him abruptly thus; *Are not you the betrayer of the emperor, and the*

* The author of the *Mercure François* ſays, that Butler attended below.

*empire?*

*empire?* To which no anſwer was returned. He then made him an offer of a few moments to ſay his prayers; but Walſtein extended his arms in order to open his naked breaſt, and received Devoreux's partiſan through his heart; having not ſpoken one word from firſt to laſt, and expiring with a groan which terrified all the accomplices that ſtood round. Ferdinand II. who was really his murderer, ordered 3000 maſſes to be ſaid for his ſoul, and thus the tragedy ended.

The actors in it were rewarded as follows: Butler and Devoreux haſtened immediately to Vienna. The emperor was at church. I ſuppoſe the ſervice was juſt over; though Carve does not mention that circumſtance. Upon ſeeing Butler, he cried out, *Deus conſervet & benedicat dilectum nobis caput, Butlerum noſtrum.* He then carried the two officers into his palace, and ordered the archbiſhop of Vienna, who had performed divine ſervice that morning, to place a magnificent gold chain on Butler's neck, and add thereto his benediction. Next he gave him his medal, ſaying at the ſame time, "You ſhall wear this in memory of an emperor, whom you preſerved from ruin, as well as all his family." He then created him a count; gave him the gold key of the bedchamber, and large confiſcated demeſnes in Bohemia *.— Another gold chain was beſtowed on captain Devoreux; beſides other ample rewards; which, to preſerve *a little*, a *very little decency*, were kept ſecret †.

* We have ſpoken of this officer and his brother in the ſtorming of Francfort upon the Oder, vol. i. and have obſerved there, that the king of Sweden, probably for juſt reaſons, had a perſonal hatred to him. He enjoyed his countſhip, and the large confiſcations made over to him, not above one year after Walſtein's death: for Carve left Ireland in Auguſt 1634, as appears by the Apoſtolic vicar's teſtimonial, and having wandered over Poland, Bohemia, and great part of Germany, found our James Butler dead in the dutchy of Wirtemberg. Carve, by the way, was ſent for from Ireland, to be made chaplain to Butler's regiment.

Butler bequeathed a part of his riches as follows: Thoſe *pious* riches, ſays Carve, *quas* æquiſſimo *Marte* maſcula ſua manu *acquiſierat*. He left a memorial of 20 pounds value to Lumormain, the emperor's confeſſor; 3,300*l.* to the Iriſh and Scottiſh college at Prague; 500*l.* to be diſtributed to Iriſh ſtudents then reſident there; 1000*l.* to his ſiſter; and 150*l.* to Walter Devoreux, who killed Walſtein. His widow, whom he left very rich, carried his body into Bohemia, being guarded by a troop of dragoons; and buried him there with great pomp. *Itin.* ut ſupra, tom. i. c. 7.

† What appears from hiſtory is, that he was immediately made a lieutenant-colonel, and afterwards a colonel; he had alſo the gold key of the bedchamber given him. When he was created a colonel, he appointed Carve chaplain to his regiment; and hence it is ſuppoſed, that Carve knew more of Walſtein's death than any other writer. I find Devoreux alive in 1638, by the teſtimonial he gave this chaplain when he returned to Ireland, and whom he had raiſed at laſt to be chaplain-general to all the Engliſh, Scottiſh, and Iriſh forces in the Imperial ſervice. *Itin.* tom. ii. p. 354.

To

To Leſlie were given large eſtates in Hungary and Stiria; and Gordon had a good part of Tertzky's eſtate, which was a very great one. Each captain had two thouſand pounds and upwards paid him down in ready money. The inferior officers and ſoldiers were rewarded in proportion.

An epitaph was handed about on the occaſion, which has its merit. It was a French production, and came from the pen of Sarraſin, or father Joſeph, the famous negotiator.

*Vitam privatam odit animus regius,*
*Magnanimus ardua molitur:*
*Ambitionis nec meta, nec regreſſus,*
*Aut pereundum, aut regnandum:*
*Non judicanda eventu, quæ ratione acta ſunt;*
*ACTIONES SUNT VIRTUTIS, EVENTUS FORTUNÆ.*
*Juſtum erat ut Sceptrum regium quæreret,*
*Qui Cæſarem dedit.*
*Quod fecit, licet,*
*Quia fecit, ut regnaret.*
*Cæſarem cadentem erexit Walſtein,*
*Cæſar evectus proſternit Walſtein,*
*Qui in adverſis ſocium habuit, in proſperis ſervum non ſuſtinet:*
*Voluit perdere, quem non potuit remunerari:*
*Nimium meritum odium peperit:*
*Dum victoriam alteri parat,*
*Invidiam ſibi ſtruxit;*
*Gloriam dedit Imperio, Imperium ſibi ruinam.*
*Vitam, opes, amicos pro Cæſare toties expoſuit:*
*Vitam, opes, amicos Cæſar ſemel abſtulit:*
*Vita ceſſat, Fama durat.*
*Quis neſcit tua virtute partum, auctum, firmatum Imperium?*
*Nihil aliud injuſtum feciſti,*
*Niſi quod ingrato nimium fideliter ſerviebas.*

In ſhort, Walſtein was a compoſition of the *great* and *little*: theſe two words decide his character. His naked body, and the bodies of his four colonels, were carried in a dung-cart through the principal ſtreets of Egra with all manner of inſults, and then thrown into a ditch *.

I may by this time perhaps obtain the reader's permiſſion to return to his majeſty at Francfort; who, paying but ſlight regard to the ſevere beginning of winter, croſſed the Maine the firſt day of December, and made himſelf maſter of ſeveral important places in the Palatinate, which the Spaniſh garri-

* *Continuatio Laureæ Auſtriacæ*, p. 36. fol.

ſons

ſons cautiouſly evacuated, at the very rumour of his approach: ſo that in three days he conquered that romantic tract of mountains called the Bergſtraſs, extending, more or leſs, from Darmſtadt to Heidelberg; which town, at that time, it was his purpoſe to beſiege, and then reſtore the Lower Palatinate to its unhappy owner: the former intention he told Vane, and, I believe, without diſſimulation*; yet his prudence would not allow him to leave Oppenheim, and its ſtrong fortreſs † behind him; as the Spaniards were then maſters of the river, and could pour forces upon him on either ſide. Therefore, all on a ſudden he turned ſhort, and directed his courſe to Oppenheim, betwixt which and him the Rhine was, as alſo the fortreſs above named, defended by a garriſon of 1000 men, and protected by deep foſſes, and good fortifications. The cannon in the town took effect croſs the river, and raked the flanks of the aſſailants of the fort in more places than one; and as Hepburn and Monro were ſitting together at ſupper, a ball of twenty-two pounds weight paſſed betwixt their ſhoulders, in the midſt of their converſation, but hurt neither to a conſiderable degree, for its force, though ſufficient to kill a man, was nearly ſpent. It is remarkable, that Guſtavus would employ neither general nor engineer to take a ſurvey either of the town or fort; the paſſage of the Rhine being of great conſequence to him, but, on the contrary, examined every thing with his own eyes, and diſcharged, in his own perſon, the duty of a common corporal, or a peaſant: yet the king made only a feint of croſſing the Rhine at this place, having privately provided himſelf with boats at Gernſheim, a ſmall town about five miles to the ſouthwards. He was determined to perform this adventurous exploit at all hazards, by way of giving reputation to his troops, and ſpreading terror amongſt his enemies; knowing likewiſe, that Tilly was too far off to obſtruct his project in any ſhape; and wiſely foreſeeing, that on the completion of this event both Oppenheim and the fort muſt fall of courſe, as alſo the whole Lower Palatinate, and the electorate of Mentz. The fort ſurrendered the next day, and Oppenheim, being firſt petarded, was taken ſword in hand. Nine hundred Italian ſoldiers threw down their arms, and aſked for quarter. As the *firſt* circumſtance abſolved them from their allegiance to the emperor, the king made a

* Spanheim, who wrote from the archives of the Palatine-court, always ſuppoſes Guſtavus to be ſincere, concerning the reſtitution of the elector to his patrimonial dominions. *Mem. de Louiſe Juliane*, 4°. 306, &c.

† Stern-Sconce. N. B. Great part of this account was communicated to England by capt. Maſham, who then ſerved under Hepburn.

preſent

preſent of them to Hepburn, in order to refit his broken brigade; but theſe birds of paſſage, not liking the ſeverity of a German winter, and Swediſh campaign, all took their flight to a warmer region at the approach of ſpring.

His majeſty then had the curioſity and ambition to croſs the Rhine, firſt in a ſmall wherry, in order to reconnoitre, in perſon, the ſhore oppoſite to him, being attended only by four perſons*; but the Spaniſh ſentries ſoon forced him to retire, and poſtpone his more general embarkation till the next morning. He then puſhed over 300 men under the conduct of count Brahé, in one large boat, that the Spaniards had ſunk, and which an honeſt fiſherman, whom he rewarded very bountifully, had diſcovered to him; and ſome few minutes afterwards, tranſported the ſame number in another boat of equal ſize, all picked ſoldiers, draughted from the regiments of Ramſay, Spenſe, and lord Reay. This body of troops, being all infantry, with the king at their head, ſeized a hedge, which happened to run parallel to the banks of the river, and by the help of this natural intrenchment, defended themſelves with amazing intrepidity, in ſpite of all the efforts of a thouſand horſe and dragoons. It is true, the king acknowledged more than once, that he found it a diſagreeable piece of ſervice, to oppoſe cavalry and muſqueteers on horſeback with half the number of infantry, and expreſſed ſome uneaſineſs to his officers upon that occaſion: nevertheleſs, he purſued his point with aſtoniſhing firmneſs; nor had he loſt once inch of ground, when a reinforcement arrived, which ſoon brought the affair to a deciſion. In conſequence of this he commanded public prayers throughout his army†; and ordered a triumphal column to be erected, as a memorial of his croſſing the Rhine. It was ſixty feet high, raiſed on a ſquare of ruſtic work, and crowned at top with a ſtatue of the Swediſh lion. Here, an ingenious Italian author, in his *Singularities of the Thirty Years Wars*‡, prefers Guſtavus to all the Roman generals; ſince *the former*, ſays he, in the ſpace of two campaigns, croſſed the Elbe, the Oder, the Rhine, the Danube, and the Lech; whereas the *latter* never had power to paſs over the two rivers firſt mentioned; nor could they penetrate into Pomerania, much leſs to the ſhores of the Baltic ocean.

Being now arrived in the Palatinate, the king, ſay ſome hiſtorians, told the elector very gallantly, That he conſidered himſelf as a man of chivalry, and deſpiſed the re-

* *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 203.
† *Heylmanni* Leo Arctoüs, 4°. p. 47. *Schefferi* Memorab. 99. 124.
‡ *Le Singolarita della Guerre di Germania*, p. 177.

ſentments

ſentments of Auſtria and Spain, whilſt he employed his troops in reſtoring an *injured princeſs*, meaning the *electreſs*, to her dominions, after a baniſhment of the ſame duration with the ſiege of Troy. Let hiſtorians aſſert what they pleaſe, it is more probable that Guſtavus made this ſpeech on ſome other occaſion; for at the preſent period, there appears to us an anachroniſm therein; for that prince did not arrive till eight weeks afterwards, and paid his firſt viſit to Guſtavus, at Mentz, on the tenth of February, 1632. Indeed, honeſt Monro * clears up the whole difficulty; for he tells us, the king made this declaration to the Engliſh and Scots officers, the evening after he croſſed the Rhine, in order to animate them with a freſh zeal for their countrywoman's, the queen of Bohemia's ſervice.

Stockſtadt and Worms being next taken, concerning the chronology of which I am not perfectly aſſured, as accounts differ, and Oppenheim, as the king predicted, and the fort, that belonged to it; his majeſty then marched directly to Mentz, which he had blocked up, on the Francfort ſide, by the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel's army, and a little navy of boats ſtationed on the Rhine. Here Don Philip de Sylva, the Spaniſh general in thoſe parts, having thrown the overplus of the country garriſons into Frankendale, placed himſelf at the head of 2000 ſelect men, in behalf of the elector, Anſelm Caſimir, who, being a prince of foreſight, had contrived, at that time, to make a viſit to his brother, at Cologn. Guſtavus loſt many ſoldiers in the beginning of the ſiege, and the Spaniards made a ſhew of the old Caſtilian reſiſtance. This town was inveſted in the midſt of as ſevere a winter as had almoſt ever been known: the landgrave diſcharged his duty very briſkly on the oppoſite ſhore, and ſome batteries, which the king contrived to erect on a platform of boats in the river, annoyed the beſieged from a quarter, where they had no apprehenſions of being moleſted; inſomuch, that a general aſſault being once prepared, don Philip, in ſpite of his boaſt to fix the pillar of limits to Guſtavus's progreſs, found himſelf on a ſudden much puzzled, and ſurrendered upon terms not extremely honourable; for the troops obliged themſelves to ſerve no more againſt the crown of Sweden. In truth, this governor perceived at firſt glance, that Guſtavus had not ſerved his apprenticeſhip in the Low-Country wars, the practice of which was the model of military perfection, in the Spaniſh and Auſtrian ſervices; but that he had other reſources, other inventions, and a quite different ſort of con-

* Part ii. p. 93.

duct,

duct, both in ſieges and battles. Of courſe, he repented now of the ſpeech he had made the elector, who aſked him, if 2000 ſoldiers were ſufficient to defend the town againſt Guſtavus? "Sir," ſaid he, "by that timorous queſtion I know you to be a churchman; I have men enough to repulſe three kings of Sweden."

Next day*, which made the king complete thirty-ſeven years of age, his majeſty entered the town in great pomp, and ſet apart the Friday enſuing for a general act of thankſgiving. As the ſeverity of the cold was ſcarcely to be borne, he repoſed his infantry, by turns, within the town-walls till the beginning of March; nor would he ſo much as hear of don Sylva's capitulation, till he had promiſed for himſelf and garriſon to do no miſchief, either at their departure, or before it. Thus Guſtavus ſubdued the electorate of Mentz, and two thirds of the Lower Palatinate, at one ſtroke; which amazing rapidity of conqueſts, here and elſewhere, forced a very ſolid hiſtorian † to break out into the ſeeming raptures of a rhetorician; although it is certain, that he contained himſelf within the ſtrict bounds of truth: "The king," ſays Nani, "turned his motions towards Upper Germany, where, making a tour of pleaſure, rather than a campaign, he rendered himſelf maſter of all Franconia, and the adjacent countries: inſomuch, that *Fame*, according to moſt men's judgments, required more time to publiſh his progreſs, than he employed in ſubduing provinces."

Great ſtore of proviſions was found in Mentz, beſides 80 pieces of artillery, and 600 quintals of powder. The inhabitants paid about £.8000. by way of freeing themſelves from military plunder; and the elector's fine library was beſtowed, by the king, on chancellor Oxenſtiern, who intended it as a preſent to the univerſity of.....‡, but it was loſt unfortunately in croſſing the Baltic‖. His majeſty treated the eccleſiaſtics with great lenity, but forced the *ſpirituality* of the Jews, as it was then called, to contribute near £.3000. towards defraying the expences of the ſiege. He incurred ſome danger by approaching too near the walls; for one of his pages was killed by a muſquet-ball, as he preſented a let-

* Wedneſday, December 14. Others make his birth-day the 9th.

† *Hiſt. della Republica Venetta*, libr. vii. 466.

‡ My account ſays Academiæ Arrhuſienſi, yet ſtill one is at a loſs to know what univerſity this could be; ſince, in the times of Guſtavus, we recollect none in Sweden, except Upſal and Dorpt. There is a town, named in Latin *Arroſia*, which correſponds with the adjective *Arrhuſienſis*, and which the Swedes call Weſteroahs, but no univerſity is to be found there. *Mem. communicated.*

‖ *Heylmanni* Leo Arctoüs, 4°. p. 44.

ter

ter into his hands; upon which De Pau, the Dutch minister, who then happened to be standing by, took the opportunity, to advise his majesty to be more careful of a life so valuable. *My lord ambassador*, said Gustavus, *towns are not taken by drawing diagrams in a private lodging; and if the school-master is absent, the children will be tempted to close their books: and besides, Sir, no king, hitherto, has ever been killed by a cannon-ball**. Colonel Axel Lily†, an officer of good repute, was less fortunate. He came only to receive his master's commands, in some other parts of Germany, and as he was sitting at supper with Hepburn, and remarking to some friends, that he had no peculiar business in a place, which happened to be exposed to the fury of one of the town-batteries, a cannon-ball pierced the tent that instant, and carried away one of his knees: but the king made him amends, as far as he could, by heaping on him military employments to so considerable a value, that honest Monro‡ complains of Axel Lily's very singular good fortune, and that with an air of envy and peevishness.

The king then strengthened Mentz, in a manner equally expeditious and surprizing; for he drew lines round some hills that commanded the city, and having joined them to the old fortifications, rendered that space capable of containing an army of 20,000 men‖. In the next place, he fixed two bridges over the two rivers. *That* across the Rhine, consisted of sixty-one arches, raised on huge flat-bottomed boats, and at the extremity of it he traced out and fortified another camp, large enough to contain 10,000 soldiers; and *that* which passed over the Maine, rested on great piles, for a considerable space, at either end, and was then built upon fifteen large boats, in that point where the current ran extremely strong; and on the angle, formed by the confluence of the rivers, was erected a royal fort with six bulwarks, which commanded the navigation of either stream; and gave laws besides to the landgraviate of Darmstadt, and the countries adjoining §.

Here the king, for the first time, opened all the splendor of a magnificent court, which was rendered brilliant by the

* *Bertius* de Bell. German. 320.

† The author of the *Mercure François* & *De Prade* do him the honour to call him M. De Lisle.

‡ *Expeditions*, part ii. p. 95.

‖ The famous engraver, Matthew Merian, about this time published an elevation, or what is called a bird's-eye view, of the town and bridge, as well as of the old and new fortifications.

§ *Historical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, tom. ii. p. 31. fol.

appearance of five ſovereign German princes, who came to treat with him, or depended upon him for their well being: nor muſt we forget, that political buſineſs intermingled itſelf with courtly pomp; for you might have beheld here, at the ſame period, twelve or thirteen foreign miniſters and ambaſſadors; not diſpatched hither by way of compliment, but intruſted, each and all of them, with tranſactions of the utmoſt importance. Such, amongſt others, were ſir Robert Anſtruther, who came to render an account of his negotiation at Vienna, and Vane, from England; De Brezé, and De Charnacé, in behalf of France; De Pau, and many more in the ſame character, whom we ſhall conſider, more or leſs, in proportion to their buſineſs; and laſtly, arrived the queen of Sweden*, the Riks-chancellor Oxenſtiern, and the king of Bohemia †.

Anſtruther, who had been formerly reſident at Copenhagen, and then ambaſſador to the diet of Ratiſbon ‡, from whence he had paſſed on to Vienna, in order to ſolicit the reſtitution of the Palatinate, which, after the Swedes entered the empire, ought to have been redemanded by the Engliſh, ſword in hand, had nothing to impart to Guſtavus, but what provoked and raiſed his indignation ‖. For this miniſter had been inſtructed, at Whitehall, to uſe the moſt tender, the moſt pacific, and the moſt humiliating expreſſions; being commanded not to ſolicit an act of juſtice, but to requeſt a favour from pure, free, gratuitous benignity. Indeed, his condeſcenſions and applications were ſo mean and plaintive, that it is probable the emperor might have inclined an ear, and the rather as Guſtavus began to be formidable to the houſe of Auſtria, if it had been in his *power* to have reſtored the Palatinate, *under certain reſtrictions*, to its antient poſſeſſor. Great Britain, by the tampering of fruitleſs negotiations, pacific interruptions, temporary compliances, and idle expedients, had played the game out of its hands; and what the poet has remarked, on the mangled

* Jan. 10, 1632. † Feb. 10, 1632.

‡ The diet of Ratiſbon began in June, 1630, but on what day we cannot preciſely aſcertain, there being an error of calculation in the *Mercure François*, (tom. xvi. pag. 233, &c.) Wedneſday, June 29, being placed for Wedneſday, June 19. Nor is it ſure, whether the author computed by the new ſtyle, or the old: nevertheleſs, the diet certainly ended the 3d of Nov. O. S. next enſuing; and then Anſtruther removed to Vienna, and delivered the ſpeech we here allude to, which is preſerved at full length in the APPENDIX, Art. XV.

‖ *Lotichius*, tom. i. p. 913, 914. *Memoires d'Electrice Palatine*, p. 302.

body

body of Deiphobus, might be applied with greater juſtice, to the diſfigured and diſmembered Palatinate:

——— *Laniatum corpore toto,*
*Deiphobum vidi, lacerum crudeliter ora;*
*Ora manuſque ambas, populataque tempora raptis*
*Auribus, & truncos inhoneſto vulnere nares;*
*Vix adeo agnovi pavitantem, & dira tegentem*
*Supplicia.*——— Virg. Æneid. lib. vi. l. 494.

Not to mention how the dominions of the lawful owner had been doled out in leſſer parcels, the infanta of Spain laid claim to the Lower Palatinate; and the electors of Bavaria, and Mentz, poſſeſſed the higher. So that Anſtruther found juſt that reception, which a weak man merits, who undertakes to diſcharge a fooliſh commiſſion.

The next perſon, who made his appearance on this public theatre, was the marquis De Brezé, ambaſſador extraordinary from the French king; concerning whom it may be worth while to remark, that he was more a man of good fortune, than a negotiator; for he had the advantage to marry Richelieu's ſiſter, and commanded the king's own regiment of guards; being, likewiſe, a councellor of ſtate, marechal de camp in the French armies, and governor of Saumur. The occaſion of his embaſſy into Germany, where De Charnacé then was, aroſe from a deputation the catholic princes of the empire had ſent to Louis XIII. to recommend to him the cauſe of their religion; and implore him not to favour the proteſtant intereſts, which were then become too predominant. Of courſe, it was urged by the prelate, who undertook the employment, with whom co-operated all the ſecret enemies of Richelieu, and the ſeveral miniſters diſpatched to Vienna by the catholic princes*, that Guſtavus had determined to extirpate the Romiſh religion, from its very lowermoſt roots; that he entertained a private correſpondence with all proteſtants, in the various parts of Europe; that he had an eye indirectly to France and Italy, as well as to the territories of Bavaria, the catholic electors, and the houſe of Auſtria. Wherefore elſe did he omit, for a ſeaſon, to undertake his principal enemy, the emperor, in his hereditary dominions, and transfer the ſeat of action to the Upper Rhine?

Inſinuations of this ſort ſtartled a mind inclined to bigotry; and of courſe Louis gave ſome indications of being

* *Bernard*, Hiſt. de Louis XIII. liv. xv.

alarmed: but Richelieu ſoon raiſed him, at leaſt for a ſhort ſpace, beyond a ſtate of fluctuation and timidity, and aſſured the German biſhop, that the king his maſter had the beſt intentions imaginable towards the catholic religion; and that he, the cardinal, ſhould conſtantly ſupport and cheriſh them with indefatigable zeal. On the other hand, he took care to inform him, from the plentitude of his own power and knowledge, that the king of Sweden had no object in view, but the houſe of Auſtria; from whence the princes of the league might detach themſelves, in caſe they maintained an *exact neutrality*: but if, on the contrary, they ſupplied the emperor, tacitly or clandeſtinely, with men and money, allowing likewiſe to his troops quarters and paſſage, it was then natural for a man of ſpirit, like Guſtavus, to moleſt and attack his adverſaries. Nevertheleſs, far from being difficult, added he, it is eaſy too, not only to ſupport the Romiſh religion, but give it the predominance alſo in the empire, and that independently of the enormous power of Ferdinand, which increaſes itſelf day by day: ſo that catholics and proteſtants are all alike intereſted to repreſs the boundleſs ambition of the houſe of Auſtria *.

Upon this, the biſhop of Wurtzburg, whom Louis received ſo very graciouſly as to allow him to be *covered*, returned to his conſtituents, ſilenced at leaſt, but neither ſatisfied, nor convinced; and they, for their parts, ſtill continued to caſt a wiſhful eye towards the interpoſition of France, which threw out allurements for them without number; whilſt Guſtavus, who then had no miſgiving with regard to *that* power, appeared, as was really the truth, to ſuſpect nothing. Therefore, upon the ſame views they diſpatched at or near this time, the biſhop of Oſnaburg to the infanta of Bruſſells; but as this prelate, who underſtood heraldry better than church affairs, or political matters, valued himſelf greatly on his birth and ſtation, it was his misfortune to viſit a court which then happened to be *genealogically* mad; ſo that the Spaniards, inſtead of giving him the compellation of *highneſs*, which he expected, conſidered him rather as a poor ſupplicant. He therefore returned unſucceſsful, and as thoroughly diſpleaſed as the Poliſh ambaſſador, whom we lately mentioned on the ſame occaſion.

France, after the biſhop of Wurtzburg retired into Germany, had many reaſons, beſide *ſuch* as her own hiſtorians chuſe to mention, for interfering, more or leſs, with the affairs of the empire, and the progreſs of Guſ-

* *Le Vaſſor*, tom. vii. p. 75.

tavus.

tavus. It was one thing to ſee the emperor *humbled*, and quite another thing to ſee him *deſtroyed*. Some check given to the houſe of Auſtria appeared highly deſirable; and the unbounded rapidity of a certain proteſtant prince's conqueſts ſeemed to portend a ſecond and more formidable houſe of Auſtria. But the paſſage of the Rhine, of which France was *jealous* beyond deſcription, was conſidered a ſymptom, that menaced her very diſſolution; and upon that event, even Richelieu grew alarmed, and conceived not only a diſinclination to the Swediſh cauſe, but a mortal jealouſy againſt the king himſelf. Of courſe, means were to be found, and ſuch was Guſtavus's temper, that it was abſolutely neceſſary to keep theſe means a ſecret, whereby to divert, or check the ſucceſſes of our northern hero;—to withdraw the elector of Bavaria from his attachments to the Imperial intereſts, and make him a precarious and dependent being on the court of Verſailles; and, laſtly, to admit, as lying nearer to her, the three eccleſiaſtical electors under the wings of her all-healing influence; ever bearing in memory, how dexterouſly ſhe had ſwallowed the *delicious* morſel of three adjacent biſhoprics *, on a like occaſion, in the preceding century.

Of courſe, the cardinal, in order to divert the conqueſts of Guſtavus, always inſinuated an opinion tinctured with ſome wrong advice, whenever an opening preſented itſelf; and the better to check the rapidity of his progreſſes, he took care to pay the ſtipulated *ſubſidy* at great diſtances of time, and in ſmall proportions.

To theſe delays, occaſioned by jealouſy, other circumſtances helped to contribute; for the elector of Bavaria, at certain times, conſidered the houſe of Auſtria as overpowerful; and of courſe he, as well as his catholic electoral brethren, looked upon France, in caſe of extreme danger, as a ſort of protection againſt the emperor. Allurements were thrown out to them, in abundance, by the French miniſter; and no dexterity of private negotiation was once omitted. At length a private treaty was concluded † between the Courts of Verſailles and Munich, about the time Guſtavus alarmed the empire by ſtorming ſword in hand the ſtrong and important town of Francfort on the Oder.

As the tranſaction hitherto has hardly been taken notice of in hiſtory, that a ſecret negotiation had been carried on, previous to this treaty, more than a year and a half,

* Metz, Toule, and Verdun.

† Signed at Munich, by the elector, May 8, 1631. APPEND. Art. XXII. and by Louis XIII. May 30, 1631, at Fontainebleau.

betwixt Louis XIII. and Maximilian of Bavaria; conducted on the ſide of France, who appears to be the projector, by cardinal Bagni, *, a friend and confident of Richelieu; and managed, in behalf of the electoral intereſts, by one Joëcher, who was conſidered by his maſter, not only as a well-read *jus-publiciſt*, but as an artful ſtateſman. This private intercourſe had laſted from the middle of October, 1629, till the end of December, the ſame year. So that Richelieu played a deep game in the empire before Guſtavus landed in Pomerania; and it is remarkable, that Joëcher afterwards ſigned the very treaty of 1631, which we are now conſidering. As this politician was a principal manager in the publication of the *Anhaltine Cancellaria* taken by the Auſtrians in the battle of Prague †, whereby much injury was done to the elector Palatine, king of Bohemia. Ruſdorf, who was that prince's miniſter both in England and the empire, took the liberty, by way of repriſal, to exhibit to the public the original letters, and preliminary agreements, that paſſed between Bagni and Joëcher, and made the *Cancellaria Bavarica* ‡ not only a counterpart to the *Cancellaria Anhaltina*, but a ſort of ſupplement to the *Vindiciæ Palatinæ:* which work may be conſidered as a maſterpiece in point of method, beautiful Latinity, and a clear arrangement of facts and arguments.

Thus matters ſtood till the beginning of May, 1631; when Maximilian, the moſt politic prince in Germany, found himſelf upon the point of being reduced to a ſituation, that required all his parts and addreſs. On one hand Guſtavus was approaching to the ſouthward; and on the other hand, he, Maximilian, was to make friends at Paris and Vienna, and, if poſſible, overreach them *both*. He had

* To this illuſtrious politician, Gabriel Naudé pretends to addreſs his famous work, entitled, *Conſiderations politiques ſur les Coups d'Etat*; though, in truth, he compoſed it at the requeſt of M. d'Emery, ſuperintendant of the finances, Bagni being dead at the time this treatiſe was publiſhed: which, except a few printed copies diſtributed to private friends, made its firſt appearance in Holland, 1667, and has ſince arrived to the 12th edition, if not further.

† In the Library at Munich is preſerved a military and political journal of all extraordinary tranſactions, from the firſt beginning of the thirty years wars, till the period here mentioned; written by the prince of Anhalt, a general of high repute in the army of the union, and conſidered till this moment, by the Bavarians, a valuable MS. as indeed it is. There is no queſtion but it was taken in the defeat on the *white mountain*, near Prague, 1620.

‡ Added, by way of appendix, to the *Vindiciæ Cauſæ Palatinæ*, fol. 1640, ſine loco.

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engaged too deeply with the emperor, to retreat openly; nor did he care to loſe *that delicious morſel*, the Upper Palatinate: yet, at the ſame time, he ſaw himſelf on the edge of a precipice, and that only France, in caſe of a very probable accident, the invaſion of Bavaria, could ſupport him from falling. This treaty, between Louis and Maximilian, was of the defenſive nature only, and determinable at the end of eight years: their reciprocal engagements were, not to ſuccour their reſpective enemies in any manner; but, on the contrary, to furniſh troops to each other, in proportion as the hereditary or *acquired* dominions of either party, ſhould happen to be attacked*. Nani indeed tell us, and Puffendorf† confirms the account, that France engaged to fix the Imperial diadem, in caſe of a vacancy, on the head of Maximilian: but this does not appear upon the face of the treaty itſelf, and of courſe muſt have been contained in ſome ſeparate article mutually ratified and interchanged as a diſtinct convention; which is not unlikely, from the following words: *Quandoquidem ex urgentiſſimis cauſis neceſſarium eſt, ut hæc amicitia & defenſio hoc tempore tantum inter regem & electorem Bavariæ concluſa, nulli pateat, ſed ſecretiſſima maneat*, &c.— Nevertheleſs, the whole agreement either way was diametrically contrary to what had been ſtipulated between his Chriſtian majeſty and Guſtavus at the treaty of Berewalt. And this was the private myſtery, that induced France to perſuade the king of Sweden to ſign a *neutrality of fourteen days* ſome time afterwards with the elector of Bavaria, and the other heads of the catholic league; a breach of faith, which Guſtavus reſented extremely, though juſt then he did not comprehend the intricate motives upon which De Brezé's negotiation was founded.

All theſe artifices could not however overcome the bold good ſenſe and honeſt policy of Guſtavus, ſince Bavaria reaped no fruits from the abovementioned treaty: for, when the criſis came, *ſhe* durſt not diſmember herſelf from the houſe of Auſtria; inaſmuch as France talked two languages, in proportion as the danger was remote, or as it approached nearer; notwithſtanding Maximilian had engaged to ſupply 3000 foot, and 1000 horſe, or the equivalent expence in ready money, in caſe France was attacked in her hereditary do-

* See the original treaty in the APPENDIX, Art. XXII.

† *Differt. ſur les alliances entre la France & la Suede*, 12°. 1709. This, which I take to be *one of Puffendorf's beſt performances*, is as juſt a ſatire upon the interfering and intermeddling temper of France, as can be peruſed: it was written originally in Latin.

minions, or in her conquered ones: and Louis had articled to ſupport Maximilian in his electoral dignity, againſt all invaders; and maintain him, not only in his original poſſeſſions, but in his *new* conqueſts; furniſhing a contingent of 9000 infantry, and 3000 cavalry. Hence it happened, that when Kutner the Bavarian envoy, upon the nearer approach of the Swedes, made a requiſition of the troops which France had ſtipulated to produce, Richelieu, who knew how to diſtinguiſh as well as Maximilian, for they were both ſchoolmen in the art of politics, pronounced with a firm and deciſive air,—That the convention, betwixt France and Bavaria, was *purely defenſive*, and regarded only the houſe of Auſtria, and not the crown of Sweden: for as Tilly, added he, detaches troops from the army of the league, againſt the elector of Saxony, without the conſent or privity of *my* maſter; of courſe, his moſt Chriſtian majeſty is not obliged to extricate the prince you ſerve from the perplexities and embarraſſment into which his imprudence has plunged him.

Upon the whole, it ſeems aſtoniſhing to many, that the cardinal ſhould have allowed his maſter to have concluded with Bavaria, upon any terms, an agreement ſo directly oppoſite to the intereſts of his great ally the king of Sweden, and ſo deſtructive of the Palatine's pretenſions, which Guſtavus was determined to ſupport, upon the principles of a man of honour, and a Chriſtian: and, indeed, in general it may ſuffice to ſay, that the whole tribe of French hiſtorians ſeems to chew upon this treaty, in order to ſwallow it, as if it was ſomething of a very unpalatable taſte. But Richelieu * wanted, at all hazards, having firſt ſecured the

* The life of this ſtateſman has been ſo often written, that I ſhall only ſubjoin a ſhort note concerning him, which may contain ſome few things, that are not to be found in every hiſtory.

This man's birth, and education, promiſed nothing; but he had the ſecret of introducing himſelf into favour, even againſt the inclination of the prince that raiſed him. He had the power of tears, equal to Cromwell; and preferred war, merely becauſe men had not then time to ſcrutinize his actions, and form cabals againſt him. It may be ſaid of him, that he ſaved and united France, ſupported Italy, checked and betrayed Sweden, plunged Germany and England into confuſion, and weakened Spain; being an inſtrument of Providence, ſays a diſcerning and acute Italian, Battiſta Nani, allowed to exiſt for the glory of his own country, and the ruin of Europe in general.

He is ſuppoſed, by many, in his early days, to have written a ſatire againſt the conſtable Des Luynes; drawing a parallel between him and the conſtable De Luna, a Spaniard: which his enemies afterwards took care to reprint, *mutatis mutandis*, and applied to himſelf; but the true author of this invective was Le Sieur Chaintreau.

He

the duke of Bavaria, to preclude the emperor from the power of ſending troops to diſturb the ſiege of Moyenvic; and deſired likewiſe, but with all due diſſimulation and ſecrecy, to counterwork Guſtavus, and clog the rapidity of his conqueſts; for the paſſage of the Rhine, if God had pleaſed to prolong his Swediſh majeſty's life, muſt have broken all the ſchemes of that miniſter, who never foreſaw that matters could proceed ſo far; and muſt likewiſe have checked and humbled France to *ſuch* a degree, that we might have felt the good effects of it to this very moment.

De Brezé propoſed in general, with great appearance of friendſhip, an amicable accommodation with the duke of Bavaria, and the other princes of the catholic league, under the form of *neutrality*; which was to ſubſiſt according to the duration agreed upon: but the anſwer made him was, that indiſputable proof could be produced of the inſincerity of theſe perſons; who, in truth, intended nothing but to protract time; collect their forces; and procure freſh and more advantageous terms from the court of Vienna. The French miniſter, ſtill continuing to urge this grand ſcheme of a preliminary pacification *, ventured at length to aſſure Guſtavus, that in caſe he and his friends thought fit to accept the terms propoſed, and might happen afterwards to be aſſaulted by the troops of the houſe of Auſtria, or the catholic league, then his maſter ſhould pay the ſubſidies ſtipulated at Berewalt, in ſuch manner and proportions, as the king and French ambaſſadors ſhould, at the preſent conjuncture, agree on; upon condition his Swediſh majeſty, at the ſame time engaged to ſupport France by retaliation of hoſtilities againſt the emperor and his aſſociates, upon ſuppoſition they directed their arms to the prejudice of the former †.

He is believed, by many, to have left behind him a *civil* and *military* plan, which France follows, more or leſs, to this hour. When he had gained Alſatia, he was heard to ſay, that he had extended the French dominions, as far to the eaſtward, as could be ſuppoſed maintainable; and protected them with a fine natural foſſé, called the Rhine; foretelling, at the ſame time, that the armies of his nation could rarely proſper in the empire; which effects might ariſe from the coldneſs of the country, and the difficulty of retreating; from the change of white bread to black, and light pleaſant wines for wretched ſmall-beer. The Engliſh army ſuffered in a ſimilar manner under the marquis of Hamilton, and periſhed of the ſame malady, which their anceſtors underwent at the battle of Creſſi, but with leſs glory; for the diſaſter ſprung, not from ſuch local cauſes as we have already aſſigned, but from an immoderate affection *for new honey*.

* *Chemnit.* tom. ii. p. 227.

† *Ibid.* tom. ii. p. 227.

Guſtavus

Guſtavus ſoon perceived ſome fallacy, but could not preciſely unravel it. He foreſaw, in general, the reſult of the the three artifices above mentioned; and had ſome apprehenſions from the politic Iſabella, who was making great preparations towards ſome expedition in the Low Countries. His own uncommon good ſenſe reminded him too, that the terms propoſed were over advantageous, on the proteſtant ſide, to be deemed real: yet, out of pure politeneſs to the French king, and in order to convince Europe of his pacific and generous intentions, he ſketched out to De Brezé a *ſlight plan** of what he propoſed; namely, That the Imperialiſts, and princes of the league ſhould invade no country which has not been hitherto the ſeat of war; and that he would reſign into the hands of the duke of Bavaria ſuch places as he had conquered in the Lower Palatinate, till an amicable adjuſtment could be ſettled between that prince and the king of Bohemia; and that he would reſtore to the elector of Triers all the towns he had made himſelf maſter of in his dominions, excepting Spires. But then, continued he, I muſt exclude the biſhop of Bamberg from all participation of theſe conceſſions; for that prelate has amuſed me diſhonourably, and deceived me baſely. He then ſubjoined, with reſpect to the houſes of Auſtria and Bavaria, that not only the hereditary dominions of Sweden, but the provinces acquired by the Swedes in the German war, muſt be alike comprehended in every ſubſequent and general ſyſtem of pacification; as alſo each degree and branch of intereſt that could be ſuppoſed to bear a reference to his good ally, the elector of Saxony—That all uſurpations made upon the proteſtants in Lower Saxony, from the breaking out of the Bohemian troubles in 1618, ſhould be reſtored back to them, with full reparation of loſſes, and diſcharge of arrears—That the emperor and princes of the catholic league ſhould give a diſcharge to all ſoldiers that had been forced from their native territories; and give up eleven or twelve thouſand priſoners which were at preſent artfully incorporated, in ſmall parcels, among their troops—That no temptations ſhould be made uſe of, to allure them back into the Imperial ſervice—That the king's conqueſts ſhould remain in his own hands, till a final deciſion could be agreed on—That communication and free commerce ſhould be opened between all countries then

* As this memorable fragment is not preſerved in the *vaſt collections of treaties*, we have ſpoken of it more at large than had otherwiſe appeared to be neceſſary.

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engaged in hoſtilities; and priſoners diſmiſſed on either ſide without ranſom *.

In addition to all which, the king had the wonderful conſideration, as well as quickneſs of thought, to make terms in expreſs words for the unfortunate adminiſtrator of Magdeburg, who was then a priſoner: but that prince had ſo little truſt in his protector, and ſuch unſettled notions of the proteſtant religion, that he deſtroyed Guſtavus's generous efforts in his behalf, by making himſelf a convert, at, or near this period, to the church of Rome †.

France was made arbitreſs of this general pacification, and avenger of frauds on either ſide. Whilſt the king reaſoned upon a ſubſtantial, and univerſal peace, the Bavarian miniſter preſented him a paper, in his maſter's hand-writing, which related only to a *neutrality* for himſelf and aſſociates, as a ſort of preliminary; drawn up and worded in ſuch a manner, as required a reſignation of all conquered countries on the part of Guſtavus, to be voided, *ipſo facto*, upon

* *Chemnit.* tom. ii. p. 227, &c.

I have ſeen a ſecond account of this plan, which, though equally ſpirited and ſenſible, differs from the preſent in many reſpects. If the reader pleaſes, it ſhall be laid before him in my own words, ſelected from another part of my hiſtory, in the firſt MS. draught of it.

As no attempts and efforts were ſpared, from various quarters, to induce the king to give a general peace to the emperor and the catholic leaguers, it is reported, though I do not preſume to recite this paragraph upon indiſputable authority, that Guſtavus delivered to De Brezé and the German miniſters a rough ſketch of the following particulars.

"That the Imperial edict, touching the reſtitution of the *Bona Eccleſiaſtica*, ſhould be retracted. That perſecution ſhould be aboliſhed, and free exerciſe of religion granted to all men. That Bohemia, and the annexed provinces, ſhould be advanced to their priſtine ſituation, and the baniſhed proteſtants reinſtated in their antient poſſeſſions. That the elector Palatine ſhould be reſtored to his patrimony and dignities, and that the duke of Bavaria ſhould make reſtitution of the electoral title. That the town of Augſburg ſhould be permitted to return to its former liberty, and manner of government. That the jeſuits, as public incendiaries, and enemies to the repoſe of mankind, ſhould be baniſhed the empire, and their poſſeſſions transferred to the religious of other orders. That the monaſteries forcibly ſeized, in the duchy of Wirtemberg, ſhould be reaſſigned to the diſpoſition of the prince. That the members of the cathedral church ſhould be half papiſts, and half proteſtants. And, laſtly, that his Majeſty of Sweden ſhould be choſen king of the Romans, by way of acknowledgment for the cares and dangers he had paſſed through, in procuring peace and liberty to the empire." The reader may find a third copy of this plan in the *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 62. It conſiſts of fifteen articles, and has the appearance of being genuine. In truth, all the copies ſeem to be modifications of the ſame general deſign, drawn up at different times, and retouched in various places. *Soldat. Sued.* p. 375, &c.

† *Chemnit.* tom. ii. p. 227, &c.

ſigning

ſigning the articles. This put the king out of all temper, and matters hung in ſuſpence for about a fortnight: which produced to the emperor and duke of Bavaria a part of thoſe advantages they propoſed to reap, by creating momentary intervals from buſineſs, and imperceptible delays.

During this ſhort pauſe of negotiation with reſpect to Bavaria more particularly, other perſons made their appearance on this political theatre; but before we enter into an exact detail of their ſeveral important and intereſting tranſactions, it may be worth while to obſerve, that at this time the moſt renowned of all ſtateſmen, the high-chancellor Oxenſtiern, came to Mentz to receive his maſter's orders, and bear a part with him in the fatigues of buſineſs. This great man, whom, on account of his wiſdom and ſagacity, one ſuppoſes to be aged, was but eleven years older than Guſtavus. He had the advantage to be deſcended from one of the beſt families in Sweden; but greater ſtill was the advantage when I inform the reader, that he was a miniſter of the king's own finding out, and of his own forming. He was, at one and the ſame time, both ſtateſman and general; in which latter capacity he chiefly acted, after his ſovereign had entered Germany; for he conducted a ſmall ſeparate army in Poliſh Pruſſia. When political and civil matters began to multiply on the king's hands, as well as military operations, he was commanded to reſide at Erfurt, in the old Roman capacity of *legatus ab exercitu*, to which place he conducted the queen of Sweden at the head of his troops; and then afterwards appeared at Mentz, not having ſeen his royal maſter during the ſpace of ten months and upwards. It cannot be ſaid, that the king abſolutely wanted this great man's advice, by way of inſtruction, which will appear from what ſhall be related in their firſt interview; yet ſtill he had uncommon occaſions for his aſſiſtance, having more political buſineſs to execute than any ſingle perſon could well perform; and purpoſing likewiſe, which was ſomething more, to negotiate only a few days at Mentz and Francfort, and then ſhew the Germans, for the firſt time, what mighty things might be brought about in a winter's campaign.

Inſtead of drawing Oxenſtiern's character, which, according to cuſtom, I ſhall leave the reader to combine from various parts of the preſent hiſtory, it may ſuffice to obſerve, that the French themſelves, even to this day, give him the preference to Richelieu; and, as to other nations, they have never ſuppoſed him to have had any rival in political reputation. This, indeed, is ſaying the whole that can be ſaid, in a ſingle period: nevertheleſs, it may not be diſagreeable

to relate ſome things concerning him, which are not common, and ſome things likewiſe, which appear to me entirely new.

After the king's death, it may juſtly be ſaid, that Oxenſtiern had half the affairs of Europe upon his hands, till the concluſion of the peace at Munſter, which made a period of ſixteen years duration. He induced the proteſtant princes of Upper Germany to ſubſcribe to the treaty of Heilbrun in 1633, conformably to a plan his maſter had ſketched out a few months before his death; and this was the grand foundation of an union, which ſubſiſted, more or leſs, till the concluſion of the wars. In 1635, he held a conference with Richelieu at Compeigne*. Theſe great men knew each other too well, and of courſe agreed in a moment; for the cardinal trembled at the thoughts of attempting to overreach a ſtateſman, whom he found endued with talents far ſuperior to his own; and moreover, they had each of them in the main the ſame parts to act, the ſame inclinations, and the ſame intereſts.

His anſwer to the Poliſh ambaſſadors, at the treaty of Stumbſdorf†, ſhewed great good breeding, preſence of mind, and a turn for ſeverity. The high-chancellor of Poland, at his firſt entrance into the chamber, where a triangular table was placed in order to avoid precedency in ſitting, began thus: *Ut a nobis incipiat humanitas, precamur vobis, domini Sueci,* BONUM *diem*; to whom Oxenſtiern replied with great livelineſs, *Et nos, ut non ſimus ingrati, precamur vobis itidem* BONUM *mentem!*

It was his private opinion, that Sweden ought to have no farther concerns with France in the courſe of the war, than in receiving good penſions from her: and when affairs were reduced to the loweſt ebb after the fatal defeat of Nordlingen, he ſtill kept firm to this doctrine, but artfully concealed it; well foreſeeing that France would preſcribe him laws, and wreſt Alſatia out of his hands by little and little, whenever ſhe joined the Swedes with a large military force. Nevertheleſs, the *reformed council* that acted with him, nine of the twelve being native Germans, ſoon allowed themſelves to be dazzled with the gratuities and promiſes which Fiquiere the French miniſter ſcattered plentifully among them; and thus our ſtateſman was at length compelled to reſign Philipſburg to

* From that time he always took pleaſure to tell the French, that the dried ſalmon of the Baltic, recommended by a well-taſted poivrade, greatly excelled the *ſuperb biſques*, which he had the honour to partake of at the cardinal's table.

† Anno 1635.

the

the houſe of Bourbon, which he did with inconceivable reluctance, and after a thouſand delays of his own creating. He then ſent his ſon*, or nephew†, I am not certain which, into England, to ſolicit ſuccours: but as he had no letters of credence from her Swediſh majeſty, the court of London affected not to comprehend how Oxenſtiern could *create* ambaſſadors. The ſagacious prime-miniſter ſoon perceived this demur to be a mere evaſion, and recalled his delegate without giving his miſtreſs Chriſtina the leaſt trouble.

When he ſent his ſon, a young man of great hope, in conjunction with Salvius, to the treaty of Munſter, this new negotiator was much diſmayed upon conſidering his want of age and experience, and ſtartled likewiſe at the gravity of the Spaniſh plenipotentiaries on the one hand, and the quickneſs and penetration of the French miniſters on the other hand. He therefore petitioned his father by letter, either to recall him, or ſend him ſome aged and able director, to which the chancellor replied only in a few words, having briefly touched upon other matters; *Mi Fili, parvo mundus regitur intellectu* ‡.

Here I will juſt venture to relate another traditional Swediſh anecdote. The chancellor had a ſtrong inclination to marry this ſon, who, by his picture, was not handſome, to queen Chriſtina; but ſhe, who was an original in every ſort of caprice, happened to be prepoſſeſſed in favour of another nobleman, whoſe name was Todt; whether ſon, or not, of the general who ſerved under her father Guſtavus, I cannot ſay. Be that as it will, this private inclination of her's touched old Oxenſtiern to the very heart, and of courſe he took care upon all occaſions to traverſe her inclinations, diſturb her repoſe, and perplex her affairs in ſuch a manner, that at length he paved the way *remotely* to her future abdication §.

To return to the tranſactions in Germany: the king received Oxenſtiern with great marks of affection and eſteem, and having ſent his own coach and equipage to meet him, paſſed whole days with him in the cabinet. This miniſter, in his journey from Pruſſia, had held a conference with Arnheim, which, one may venture to pronounce, was managed with uncommon dexterity and ability on either ſide; for the former was renowned for *artifice*, and the latter, on

* His ſon was named John, † and his nephew, Bernard. There was alſo a Gabriel Oxenſtiern employed as a miniſter.

‡ *Memoirs* communicated to the author. § *Ibid.*

account

account of his *ſolidity*, was ſuppoſed to have no ſuperior, except his maſter.

When Oxenſtiern arrived at Mentz, there happened an extraordinary trial of political ſkill; for the *ſubject* had a ſecret inclination to gain and keep the *aſcendancy* in point of genius over his *ſovereign*. This was an example of *human vanity* which may be pardoned; but one thing muſt be obſerved, incidentally, to the advantage of Guſtavus; namely, that the miniſter had weighed the difficulty propoſed, and turned it, and ſtated it to himſelf in every light for three months ſucceſſively; whereas the king appears to be attacked altogether by ſurprize, and yet returned an unpremeditated anſwer with a force of reaſon irreſiſtible.

To underſtand this curious piece of hiſtory better, it may not be amiſs to advertiſe the reader, that it appeared an *error* to moſt generals and politicians in thoſe days, that Guſtavus, immediately after the battle of Leipſic, ſhould point his courſe to the banks of the Rhine, and not have marched directly into the hereditary dominions of the houſe of Auſtria, and ſo on to the metropolis. It was the ſame fault, alledged they, which Hannibal committed after the battle of Cannæ *. The great Oxenſtiern was of this opinion †; for the moment the king allowed him to converſe in private, *Sire*, ſaid he, *I ſhould have been much better pleaſed to have paid my duty to you at Vienna, than at Mentz* ‡. His majeſty, who pierced into the drift of this ſpeech with a ſingle glance, told the chancellor coolly, notwithſtanding his natural haſtineſs of temper, for he knew the perſon he ſpoke to had parts enough to judge of things, and receive conviction: *That for his own part he had weighed matters with great exactneſs, and that only ſuperficial appearances appeared againſt him. I know my men*, continued he, *in the elector of Saxony, and Arnheim his generaliſſimo: the one is irreſolute, and does not love me; the other is inſincere, and mortally hates me. They may do very well to keep the proteſtant ſpirit alive in Bohemia and the* incorporated *provinces, where all that I can expect from them, is, that they ſhould produce a ſort of revulſion, which may ſerve to adminiſter force againſt the Imperial troops, till Providence allows me to give a ſecond and more deciſive ſtroke in ſome ſignal engagement. But change the ſcene; ſuppoſe the elector on the banks of the Rhine, and I in Auſtria or Bohemia. The whole ſtate of the queſtion is then entirely*

* *Vittorio Siri*; Memoire Recondite. Tom. vii. 350—52.

† In the ſame ſentiment is the ingenious author of the *Hiſtoire politique du Siècle*, à Londr. 4°. 1757.

‡ *Le Vaſſor*, tom. vii.

*altered*;

*altered; for there is not a proteſtant prince in all the diſtrict where the elector of Saxony now commands; ſo that, in caſe of any infidelity, he can engage no one power to follow his example. Here he would be in the very centre of all the princes and ſtates who entered into the confederacy at Leipſic: and he and Arnheim, who leads him blindfolded, and is a better jeſuit than a ſoldier, are both timid enough to ſubmit meanly if they are defeated; and ſelf-intereſted enough to ſell me and my cauſe, in exchange for ſome good acquiſition, in caſe the enemy ſhould obtain any eminent ſucceſs. In either part of which alternative, the* princes of the union *would naturally copy the conduct of the firſt proteſtant power in Germany; and upon this elector's defection, I, being in Bohemia, Moravia, or Auſtria, how is a retreat to be conducted from thence to the Baltic, the only reſource that would be left me, with Walſtein in my rear, and Arnheim in my front?—No, Sir, in the game Guſtavus is to play, he muſt be* AMONG *the proteſtant princes himſelf, and muſt be the* FIRST *man among them too.*

Oxenſtiern, ſtruck with conviction, ſtood for ſome moments aſtoniſhed, and never afterwards made the leaſt reply: for though he had revolved this ſubject in his mind from September till December, yet he plainly ſaw, that Guſtavus was not only a better warrior, but a greater politician than himſelf; ſince a momentary deciſion, in a critical point like this, is greatly ſuperior to a long ſeries of negotiations, where there are frequent opportunities of reviſing and retouching, and where things in their own fluctuating nature often help out themſelves. It was this circumſtance, probably, that made Nani break forth into the following political rapture, *Stando le ſue virtu conſolidate et unite, non ſi ſopeva diſcernere ſe alla militare peritia a alla civile attribuerſi doveſſe la palma**. Upon a like occaſion, the moſt ſenſible, candid, and correct Caraffa expreſſes himſelf as follows; *Parem Guſtavo Suecia nullum, reliquus orbis paucos dabit*†

The next perſon who made his appearance, was, the baron de Sclavata, in behalf of the elector Palatine, to make that prince's compliments to Guſtavus on account of his extraordinary ſucceſſes, and ſolicit ſome proviſional agreement, with reference to the reconquering of the Lower Palatinate. Him the king received with uncommon teſtimonies of humanity and courteſy, and ordered Hor-

* *Hiſt. Ven.* libr. ix.

† *Caraffæ Coment.* de Germ. Sacra Reſtaurata, 12°. Col. Agrip. 1639. p. 479.

neck,

neck, one of his colonels, to return with him to the Hague, where Frederic then was, inſtructed in what manner to ſettle ſeveral preliminary difficulties, and commanded to requeſt the elector to haſten to the Swediſh camp with all poſſible expedition: *for*, ſaid the king, *I am determined to reſtore that unfortunate prince to his poſſeſſions and dignities: but let me beſeech him firſt to make ſure of England, who muſt advance ſome money, as well as diſcharge ſome old arrears* *.

This ſtep gave the moſt lively terrors to the duke of Bavaria, and induced him, probably, to forget his convention with France, and adhere to the emperor without reſerve; and the rather, as his new acquiſition, the Upper Palatinate, appeared to be intended for the firſt ſacrifice; and as Guſtavus treated his adverſary with all that reſpect and ceremony, that could be ſuppoſed due to a king of Bohemia.

The duke of Neuburg attempted next to obtain a neutrality, building much on the intereſt of his brother Auguſtus, who ſerved under the king, and had the good fortune to be a favourite: but as this prince had permitted the Imperial army to retreat through his dominions, Auguſtus knew Guſtavus too well to venture to apply. The duke thought him inſincere, being conſcious he had injured him in fulfilling his father's will, and therefore petitioned humbly to appear in perſon; but the king denied him †.

The deputies of the elector of Triers ‡ were treated in their turn with a higher degree of juſt reſentment, for this prince had maintained avowed hoſtilities againſt Sweden. Some of his troops had taken the caſtle of Moltzberg by ſurprize, and others had killed young count Solmes and all his companions. The elector accompanied the negotiation of his deputies with a letter to the king, conceived in terms of haughtineſs and indifference, alluding likewiſe to certain *promiſes*, which ſome perſons had made to a *nameleſs* power. Upon which Guſtavus gave Stock, chief of the deputation, and one of the gentlemen of the bed-chamber to the elector, the following anſwer unpremeditated; *That his maſter's letter was a ſort of petition preſented to him ſword in hand: that he knew well enough what was meant by inſinuations of promiſes and engagements; and that underſtanding his own buſineſs without a tutor, and what France had a right to expect from him, and what ſhe had not, he ſhould fulfil his inclinations in the*

* *Le Soldat Suedois.* † Ibid. 354.
† *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation*, in High Dutch, part ii. p. 20.
‡ Philip Chriſtopher de Sottern. He was alſo biſhop of Spires.

*manner he thought beſt, and bring ſome viſitants into the electorate who would expect good cheer and warm lodgings**.

He then granted certain conditions of neutrality to Ferdinand elector of Cologn, brother to the duke of Bavaria; the terms whereof were extremely rigid, but as things then ſtood, it was thought expedient to admit them; for the proteſtants were to enjoy free exerciſe of religion and commerce; no ſupplies were to be allowed the emperor, and the catholic league; the dioceſe was to be open to the troops of Sweden; and agents on the king's part were to reſide in the metropolis, in order to ſee all the articles juſtly performed.

At other intervals from more important buſineſs care was taken to cultivate all ſubordinate collateral intereſts; for by this time the ſtates of Lower Saxony, and the Hanſe Towns, in conſequence of the concluſions agreed upon at Leipſic, had determined to raiſe 12,000 men under the conduct of George duke of Lunenberg; and the rather as they had ſome reaſon to hope, though that hope was built only on outward appearances, that a good underſtanding had been eſtabliſhed between the kings of Denmark and Sweden.

Now whoever conſiders attentively all theſe various tranſactions of politics, great in their conſequences, various in their nature, extenſive in their operations, and referring likewiſe not only to that incoherent maſs of intereſts the Germanic body, but to France and England, and all the powerful ſtates in Europe, will, I may venture to ſay, find it difficult to convince themſelves, that the whole of this vaſt work was fully examined, and effectually adjuſted within the compaſs of a *ſingle fortnight*, and ſomething more. Nor was the king even then unmindful of military matters, nor did he conſume the holidays of Chriſtmas in riotings and feſtivals; but, on the contrary, repaired the fortifications of Mentz, iſſued orders for raiſing new regiments, and kept the face of a campaign in the parts round him under his own inſpection; whilſt the good diſcipline, the temperance, the decent and religious deportment of his ſoldiers charmed not only the catholics in general, but even the jeſuits, who made panegyrics upon them in the pulpit: but whether through gratitude or neceſſity is more than I ſhall take upon me to determine.

The king next made himſelf maſter of the caſtle of Koeningſtein near Francfort, which, after a fortreſs of the ſame name in Saxony, Hohentweil in Suabia, and Harmanſtein

* *F. Spanheim*, 358. *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation*, tom. ii.

ſtein * in the electorate of Triers, ſeems to me to have been as ſtrongly ſituated by nature, as it is poſſible to imagine. No ſooner had his majeſty entered Koëningſtein, but a repreſentation was made to him by the counts of Stolberg, that the electors of Mentz in 1581 † had uſurped this ſtrong place from them, and that it was a part of their lawful patrimony: upon which, without any remonſtrance, excuſe, delay, or explanation, he reſtored it to them, reſerving to himſelf nothing more than all the artillery and ſtores of war. Pappenheim and colonel Cronenberg had made this fortreſs their favourite magazine, where they repoſited their military acquiſitions; which ſaid plunder, as it belonged to *brave men*, the king beſtowed generouſly on the *moſt courageous perſons* he could diſcover among his officers and ſoldiers; and thus made a fine compliment both to enemies and friends. Indeed, it is highly probable, that his regard for Pappenheim was ſo great, that if he had not dexterouſly hit upon this expedient, he would have contrived means to have reſtored his effects to him by ſome uncommon kind of warlike gallantry.

Nor had the landgrave of Heſſe been idle during the preceding ſummer and autumn; for having cleared his own country of Imperialiſts, he made irruptions into Weſtphalia, and the abbacy of Fulda. As he joined the Swedes with 12,000 men, and did good ſervice at the ſiege of Mentz, his majeſty purpoſed to make uſe of his troops in order to raiſe the ſiege of Nurenberg; but finding the alarm falſe, after a march of three days, allowed him to return to the protection of his own dominions, and extend his little conqueſts near home.

As to Tilly, we left him paſſing along in full march by the town of Oxenfurt ‡, whilſt Guſtavus Horn, with an army of 8000 men, attended his motions in the biſhopric of Bamberg, and kept alive only a defenſive war. Upon this, Tilly, general of the league, inveſted Nurenberg; but as the king had thrown 3000 troops into the town, with a good governor, and a conſiderable number of experienced engineers, ſo that the garriſon, in conjunction with the burghers and neighbouring peaſants, made 10,000 effective ſoldiers, he ſoon found himſelf obliged to deſiſt from his enterpriſes, having loſt Schlavata, a colonel of Croates in one attack, and upwards of 500 private men. Soon after-

* It is called by the Germans Ehrenbreitſtein.

† Géographie Univerſelle de *Hubner*, tom. v. 435.

‡ November 6.

wards one of his magazines blew up at Schwabach*, containing twelve hundred quintals of powder, upon which he ſaid, with a deep ſigh, "That fortune at length had thought fit to deſert him." Dividing his army therefore not unſkilfully into two parts, if retreating towards Bavaria may be called an act of true judgment, he commanded Cratz and Aldringer to obſerve the motions of Horn near Bamberg and the Upper Palatinate: and retired himſelf to Nordlingen, having firſt had an interview with his electoral maſter, in order to guard the dukedom of Bavaria from all invaſions on the part of Guſtavus, who, as he ſuppoſed, intended to make his irruption on the Wirtemberg ſide, becauſe he had many well-wiſhers in that territory, and abundance of ſincere aſſiſtants. Meanwhile the ſubtle elector of Bavaria convened a diet of catholic leaguers at Ingolſtadt†; and having concerted meaſures with De Charnacé, St. Etienne, De Liſle, and other French miniſters and agents then at Munich, formed the project of obtaining, by means of France, a ſhort *armiſtice* from Guſtavus, and in the interim diſpatched his chancellor to Vienna in order to conclude a freſh bargain there, by which he might be enabled to deſert France the moment he could acquire all the advantages which ſhe had the power of procuring for him.

As to Lower Saxony and Weſtphalia, the dukes of Mechlenburg and general Todt inveſted Wiſmar, where colonel Graham made ſeveral furious ſallies, but at length ſurrendered upon condition, that a month's ſpace ſhould be allowed him to conſult Tieffenbach on the occaſion. After Graham had evacuated the place, Todt found him guilty of breach of articles in various inſtances, and being ſo fortunate as to overtake him on his journey, gave his troops a total overthrow, and detained him priſoner till he could receive his majeſty's orders. Graham, the Imperial colonel, offered £.2000. for his ranſom, but could not obtain it. Todt then joined the archbiſhop of Bremen, who brought him a reinforcement of five incomplete regiments, which made in the whole, it is probable, about 2000 men.

As to Banier's operations in theſe parts, we have ſpoken already under the article of the marquis of Hamilton's campaign: but when Pappenheim perceived that Lunenberg and Todt had joined the Swediſh general, he

* There is a type in printing, called the Schwabach character, there being in this town formerly a famous foundery for caſting letters.

† December 12, 1631.

made

made ſeveral forced marches, in which part of military conduct he had no equal, and with great dexterity eſcaped from them.

The Saxons found but ſlight reſiſtance in Bohemia, and if Arnheim had acted the ſincere and honeſt part, he ought to have marched directly into Moravia, which the king adviſed him to do by letter, where he might have diſturbed and ruined all Walſtein's new recruits, cantoned in that duchy. Walſtein, on the other hand, thinned the Saxon army, by offering all deſerters double pay, and the ſame rank they poſſeſſed among their friends. Tieffenbach ſpared no pains to levy ſoldiers in Hungary, but there was no money to put them in motion; and without that previous viaticum, neither man nor horſe could find the uſe of their limbs. Upon this account a national diet was convened, but the ſtates declared they could produce neither ſoldiers nor ducats, fearing the incurſions of the Turks on the one hand, and the warlike preparations of Ragotzki on the other hand; inſiſting alſo on the privilege of not being obliged to defend their ſovereign out of the limits of their country; and adding moreover, which ſhewed they ſpared no pains to find excuſes, "That there had always been a good underſtanding between the crowns of Hungary and Sweden." Nor was this unlikely, conſidering the ſea and a thouſand miles of *terra firma* were ſpread between them.

Walſtein, to the infinite mortification of the houſe of Auſtria, quartered all his troops in the hereditary dominions, excepting only a circle of twelve miles round Vienna. Merodé was then diſpatched into the Low Countries to levy 5000 cuiraſſiers, and Dhona made a journey into Poland in queſt of the Coſſacks. A ſecond attempt too was levelled againſt the virtue of the elector of Saxony; and as his kinſman Francis Albert, duke of Saxe-Lauenberg, who had ſerved the emperor both in Poland and Italy, was thought to be the moſt proper ſolicitor that could be found, he was authoriſed, ſay various authors*, to reſign his employ upon ſome pretended diſguſt, and undertake this negotiation in the beſt manner he could. Arnheim durſt not venture to ſet his maſter to ſale upon ſo abrupt an application: and indeed the affairs of Sweden at that time were too proſperous to allow the general and miniſter, for Arnheim united both

* We ſpeak this with certain precautions, becauſe Francis Albert's character, with reference to the death of Guſtavus, demands to be conſidered with uncommon impartiality, as well as exactneſs.

theſe characters in his own perſon, to embark in a meaſure ſo extremely hazardous.

We now come to the concluſion of the year 1631, which, from the feaſt of St. John Baptiſt, the day Guſtavus landed, to the eve of the new year, may be conſidered as a period the moſt fruitful in events of any campaign that is to be found in modern hiſtory. The king in ſix months ſpace had traverſed from Stralſund and the mouth of the Elbe to the Upper Rhine, or in effect was maſter of Germany from the ſhore of the Baltic ocean almoſt to the lake of Conſtance; which in truth made an extent of country not much inferior to the whole kingdom of France. To recite the circumſtantial progreſs of his conqueſts would carry with it more the appearance of a tedious elaborate index than of an inſtructive or amuſing hiſtory; for it would exceed the catalogue of ſhips in Homer; and who has Homer's ſecret of making ſuch a minute detail agreeable? ſince the king in his own perſon, not including the tranſactions of his generals in other places, had conquered all the principal cities and fortreſſes in Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony and Mechlenburg; ſubdued, more or leſs, the four circles of Franconia, Suabia, and the two Rhines; chaſed the elector of Mentz out of his country; reduced the whole Lower Palatinate, and propoſed to open the enſuing campaign, which was to commence on new year's day, by an irruption into Bavaria. Louis XIII. as well as the elector of Bavaria, ſtood both thunderſtruck at the rapidity of theſe conqueſts; and Italy too began to tremble at the aſtoniſhing progreſs of this new Alaric, as the pope ſaid, who was ready to ſet his foot upon the ſtaircaſe of the Alps. Yet whatever the merits of the cauſe might be, an humane and compaſſionate writer cannot but lament the miſeries and ſufferings of mankind, as well as the effuſion of blood upon this occaſion; ſince it is highly probable, if we comprehend the havock made by peſtilence famine, and other accidents, that near half a million of people were ſuppoſed to loſe their lives in Germany only, in the courſe of this ſingle year 1631.

The new year had hardly began a few minutes, when duke Bernard ſurprized the important town of Manheim with extraordinary addreſs; for ordering 500 horſemen to approach the city gates at midnight in full gallop, they pretended to be Imperialiſts, who had been broken to pieces in an engagement with the Swedes, and that their enemies in the very inſtant were preſſing at their heels. The gate was immediately opened on ſuch a repreſentation, and the Swedes entering pell-mell made a dreadful ſlaughter among the Spaniards. Yet the garriſon ſoon recovered their terror, and

and made no contemptible reſiſtance; but in the interim, duke Bernard ſcaled the walls, and poured in a freſh ſupply of aſſailants on all ſides. Maravalla the governor was taken priſoner, and having paid his ranſom, returned to his ſuperiors with all the punctuality of a good Caſtilian; nevertheleſs his head was publicly ſtruck off at Heidelberg; and indeed there was ſomething truly pitiable in his caſe, for an inferior officer had opened the town gate without his knowledge.

Frankendal and Heidelberg were then ſlightly blockaded; and as to Spires, perceiving with what alacrity the Swedes conquered towns, it prudently thought fit to enter into an accommodation ſome few days before Manheim was ſurprized.

During this tumult of buſineſs, his majeſty could neither digeſt nor forget the needleſs and petulant interference of the duke of Lorrain, who had marched a conſiderable army to Tilly's aſſiſtance. He therefore diſpatched a letter *, the ſubſtance of which, together with the anſwer the duke returned to it, may prove perhaps no ways unentertaining to the more curious part of my readers. He there tells Charles, whom he calls his *kinſman* and *thrice dear friend*, *That he omitted writing to him, whilſt he marched in armour at the head of his Lorrainers, for fear ſuch a politeneſs might be miſconſtrued into timidity: but as he was now repoſing himſelf in his own dominions, he thought it but reaſonable to ſuggeſt to him, that being a prince independent, and unfettered with connexions and obligations, it ſeemed to him extremely ſtrange, that he ſhould carry hoſtilities into a climate hardly known to him, and embroil himſelf in quarrels, that did not concern him, merely out of enthuſiaſtic gallantry and gaiety of ſpirits, without any motives deducible either from religion, or other valuable conſiderations:—ſubjoining, at the ſame time, that it was impoſſible for him to be ignorant of the juſtice of the Swediſh cauſe, and of the atrocious violence of the enemy; of the tender humanity, moderation and liberty of conſcience he had ſhewn the catholics; and of the extraordinary conceſſions he had made the chieftains of the league, with a view to eſtabliſh peace and Chriſtian benevolence through the empire; and that he deſired, as he now approached the frontiers of Lorrain, the favour of being made acquainted with his preſent and ulterior determinations; and that explicitly, without any reſerve, ſubterfuge and exception, ſince a categorical anſwer of this nature would determine the next ſtep he propoſed to take* †."

* *Riccius* de Bellis German. 345, 346.

† This letter bears date from Mentz, December 29, 1631.

Charles, who was ſqueezed, if one may ſo ſay, into a dilemma between Sweden and France, conſidered this propoſal as a providential deliverance, and replied in a tranſport of joy—

That he was charmed with the honour of receiving a letter from ſo illuſtrious and great a king, beſeeching him to aſſure himſelf, that though appearances were againſt him, and he might juſtly ſeem to merit ſome reproof for preſuming to enter into the liſts of combat with ſo renowned a warrior; yet all this proceeded from the laudable ambition of deſiring to emulate his majeſty's valour, and that he never once conceived an unkind or ungenerous thought concerning him; and conſequently hoped he ſhould incur no blame for attempting to aſſiſt the unfortunate and diſtreſſed, ſince that very principle made one diſtinguiſhing point of view in his majeſty's character. That, for his own part, he thought it neither ſafe nor honeſt to refuſe to ſatisfy the emperor's requeſts, and give activity to the treaties that had long ſubſiſted between the courts of Vienna and Nanci, eſpecially when ſolemnly called upon to fulfil his own engagements, and thoſe of his family: and that, beſides all this, he had been well informed from indiſputable authority, that ſome ſteps had been taken in the aſſembly at Leipſic, prejudicial to his honour, and the tranquillity of his ſubjects. For theſe reaſons, as the war admitted of no alternative, he thought it baſeneſs to poſtpone, and generoſity to begin it:—— nevertheleſs, he embraced the offer of his majeſty's friendſhip with all poſſible gratitude and reſpect, and ſo much the rather, as the progreſs of the Swediſh arms portended no deſtruction to the catholic religion. Of courſe he ſhould refuſe no propoſal, provided it was compatible, as he well foreſaw it would be, with the juſtice and reputation of a prince, whom he reſpected beyond expreſſion, and who had done him the honour to acknowledge him for a relation *.

This letter wanted neither ſagacity, politeneſs, addreſs, nor diſſimulation. Guſtavus was politician enough to take it in part of ſufficient payment, and the rather, as France requeſted him ſo to do: for which the reaſon ſhall be aſſigned immediately. This procedure was highly gracious in Guſtavus, for his army breathed ſuch a ſpirit of revenge againſt the duke of Lorrain's troops, on account of the incredible ravages and outrages they had committed in

* Nanci, Jan. 21, 1632. *Mercure François*, tom. xviii. 144—5.

Germany,

Germany, that ſome regiments quartered near Worms, who expected orders for making an irruption every moment, had procured colours, where a man was repreſented cloven in two with the ſtroke of an axe, and a body of ſoldiers, with lighted torches in their hands, marching againſt the word LORRAIN, which was written in large letters oppoſite to them *.

The real reaſon of Charles's complaiſance was owing purely to the treaty of Vic †, which he had ſigned with France juſt one and twenty days before he anſwered the king's letter. By this agreement, ſeveral articles were crammed down his throat of very difficult digeſtion; for he was to renounce the intereſts of the emperor, Spain, and the catholic league ‡, and make no future treaty without the conſent of France; who, on the other hand, obliged herſelf to aſſiſt him upon condition only, that his dominions were attacked; and took care to inſert a clauſe, that free paſſage ſhould be granted to the French army, whenever it was thought expedient to march troops into Germany.

About this time the landgrave of Heſſe Darmſtadt renewed his ſolicitations for the public tranquillity, being in truth a ſecret penſioner to the court of Vienna, and the king had condeſcenſion enough to write to the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg on the ſubject, as alſo to the magiſtrates of Lubec, that being the principal of the Hanſe towns, and to ſeveral princes and ſtates: well knowing at the ſame time, that it was only waſting a little ink and paper for the ſake of decorum; ſince from the beginning to the end he amuſed himſelf by ſtyling the landgrave *pacificator general of the holy Roman empire*, and calling his money, which he laid down at cards and dice not very willingly, by no other name than *l'argent d'appointement*; alluding thereby to his private communication with the houſe of Auſtria ‖.

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* *Spanheim's* Soldat Suedois, p. 370.

† *Voyez le Recueil des Traittez de confederation & d'alliance entre la courronne de France & les princes et etas etrangers depuis l'an* MDCLXXI. *juſques à preſent* MDCLXXII. *Sine loco.* 12°.

‡ This was contained in a ſecret article, ſigned ſix days afterwards.

‖ To underſtand the ſecret hiſtory of the landgrave's conduct better, who had lately married a young daughter of the elector of Saxony, we muſt look more nearly into the tranſactions of that age; and then we ſhall find, that the elector Palatine, about the time of the battle of Prague, had conveyed two ſignories to this prince by way of ſecuring them to his own uſe: but when Frederic grew unfortunate, the landgrave claimed them as his own proper poſſeſſions, and upon this, Mansfelt invaded his country, and detained him a priſoner; but procuring his liberty in a few days, and perceiving the houſe of Auſtria to be all-powerful, he obtained a grant from the em-

An event of a more ſerious nature now preſented itſelf; for his majeſty was informed from authority worth liſtening to, that half a dozen jeſuits at Augſburg had bound themſelves by ſolemn oaths and execrations to aſſaſſinate him: and what confirmed men in belief of this horrid conſpiracy was, that a Flemiſh prieſt had been found near his bed-chamber, late in the evening, with a poiniard in his boſom. Guſtavus replied only to the remonſtrances and repreſentations of his friends, by aſſuring them, *That a king, circumſtanced and employed as he was, muſt not lock himſelf up in a box:——that wicked men could not always effect what they wiſhed to perform:——that Providence was more to be relied upon than regiments of guards:——that God knew how far and how long he ſhould be pleaſed to employ him, and in the event would raiſe up others more able and more active than himſelf; for the Supreme Being*, continued he, *would never make his work depend on one breath, or one perſon**. This was the ſubſtance of all his anſwers upon ſimilar occaſions; ſo that when his miniſters and generals preſſed him one day in particular to look more watchfully round him, and place proper guards about his perſon, he replied abruptly, and ſomewhat peeviſhly, *that they took great pains to teach him to diſtruſt in God*†.

Guſtavus in his private hours of reflection, was not thoroughly pleaſed with Richelieu's duplicity in reference to the late treaty agreed upon between France and Bavaria; and perceiving plainly that the cardinal, and the cardinal's director, father Joſeph, had formed a ſcheme of reducing him to a piece of French mechaniſm, ſignified to Louis XIII. that he deſired a *private conference* with him concerning matters of the moſt extraordinary importance, and of courſe diſpatched Horn to Metz upon that errand.—Louis, naturally timid, and endued with very moderate parts, trembled at the thoughts of managing an important conference with a king, who talked ſeveral languages with uncommon energy and propriety, and whoſe ſuperior genius rendered him abſolutely a maſter both in the field and cabinet. Upon this the marquis de Brezé, now returned for freſh inſtructions, as he had not been able to effect any general pacification to the advantage of France, was diſpatched a ſecond time ambaſſador to Mentz with a pompous equipage, attended by numbers of the young French nobility. Guſtavus entertained

peror, not only of theſe two diſtricts, but of ſeveral lands in Veteravia, which belonged to the counts of Solms, Iſenberg and Lovenſtein, who all ſerved under Frederic. Secretary *Fowler's* Life of Sir G. Duglaſs, fol. 223.

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 374, &c. † *Le Vaſſor*, tom. vii. 102.

entertained him and his attendants moſt magnificently. Excuſes then for declining the interview propoſed were made in abundance, and all grounded upon the French king's infirm and delicate ſtate of health: But, Sire, ſaid the marquis, approach but a little towards Lorrain, and cardinal Richelieu ſhall meet you at the place appointed. *Monſieur l'ambaſſadeur,* replied his majeſty, with a tone of deciſion, *all kings are equal: my predeceſſors have never given place to the kings of France. If your maſter thinks fit to diſpatch the* CARDINAL *half way, I will ſend ſome of* MY PEOPLE *to treat with him**. Nevertheleſs, it was the French maxim at that time to talk to Guſtavus in a very high ſtyle, which, conſidering his ſpirit and temper, ſhewed want of addreſs and common good ſenſe in that political nation: for de Charnacé, the other ambaſſador, on ſome like occaſion, namely, on demanding the armiſtice†, gave him one day, in order to check the rapidity of his conqueſts towards Alſatia, a full detail of the immenſe number, as the world then computed, of his maſter's troops. "*Sir,*" ſaid Guſtavus, "*I own your king has abundance of ſoldiers; but indulge me only in one day's march before him, and I will give him the meeting at Paris; and ſave him the trouble of conducting an army by long journeys into Germany*‡. It was then objected, that his majeſty had violated his engagements with France in croſſing the Rhine, a point of great uneaſineſs to the French nation beyond all diſpute: to which he replied likewiſe with an air of coldneſs, *That the moſt Chriſtian king had given him an equal diſguſt in delaying to pay the Swediſh ſtipend. A French army and mine,* continued he, *can never compoſe the diſorders of Germany. Leave then to me the correction in the empire of all that is amiſs; and if the king your maſter be in good earneſt, let him turn his arms againſt Spain, and make a diverſion in favour of the general cauſe*§. Upon this the cardinal and the capuchin ‖ began to conſider Guſtavus not only as the greateſt conqueror in the world, but as a perſon ſuperior to all common efforts of political artifice; and their king on his part fearing a ſecond interview might be propoſed, retired from Metz to Paris with the precipitation of a monarch who had been defeated in battle. Yet willing to effect ſomething of the low kind, rather than miſcarry totally, and concluding little expedients, the baffled ſtateſman's momentary cordials, to be better than nothings; De Brezé at length, being diſ-

* *Le Vaſſor,* tom. vii. 102.
† *Swediſh Intelligencer,* part ii. 61.
‡ *Le Vaſſor,* tom. vii. p. 103. *Swediſh Intelligencer,* part ii. 61, 62.
§ *Idem. ibid.* part ii. 61, 62. ‖ Father Joſeph.

appointed

appointed in his grand ſcheme of an univerſal peace, or at leaſt, a general truce, contrived in the laſt reſource, conjointly with the ſeveral miniſters of the princes of the league, to extort from the king a ſort of *armiſtice* * for fourteen days, which Guſtavus granted, partly to avoid being teaſed, and partly with a view of exhibiting to the public ſome manifeſt proof of his pacific inclinations: in both which points he juſtified his good temper and benevolence at the expence of his victories. *For Pappenheim either knew not of the truce, or never regarded it; the infanta Iſabella found an opportunity to march her troops to the aſſiſtance of the league; the duke of Bavaria gained time to circumvent Guſtavus and Louis too, by driving a freſh concluſive bargain at Vienna; and France found means, during this interval, to give new laws to Lorrain, and adopt the elector of Triers under her own protection;*—— A long catalogue of advantages all gained in a FORTNIGHT from the king's generoſity and magnificence of temper! advantages fruitful of dark and miſchievous events; contrived by artifice, executed with inſincerity, and extorted from a brave and benevolent prince, who regarded duplicity ſo much the leſs, as he had parts and ſpirit to make his enemies repay him for ſuch ungenerous conduct with a double proportion of intereſt! Nevertheleſs, a ſtateſman or general, bleſſed with but one half of Guſtavus's abilities, muſt have been deſtroyed by ſuch a combination of falſehood, as well as total violation of all public good faith.

In order to bring about this mighty project of an armiſtice, De Charnacé received inſtructions to leave Munich, and act in concert at Mentz with De Brezé: but ſome few days before he quitted the former place, he made an attempt (being then as falſe to Bavaria as he proved the next fortnight to Sweden) to perſuade Maximilian, that he, of all princes, ought to permit Guſtavus to extend his conqueſts as far as poſſible; ſince, in caſe the houſe of Auſtria ſhould be ruined, the Imperial diadem would be tranſferred of courſe from the family of Vienna to that of Bavaria. He then played the rhetorician upon Walſtein's (the elector's mortal enemy) being raiſed to the ſupreme command; but Maximilian was too old a politician to allow himſelf to be over-reached by French eloquence; nor could he bear the thoughts of relinquiſhing that delicious acquiſition the Upper Palatinate. He therefore kept firm at all hazards to the Imperial cauſe, as did alſo his brother, the elector of Cologn.

* For the original of this treaty ſee the APPENDIX, Art. XXV. As likewiſe the ſubſcription of the French ambaſſadors, ibid. Art. XXVI. *Firſt Edition*, 4°.

No.

No ſooner had De Charnacé arrived at Mentz, but he began to ruffle the king's temper with thoſe unaccountable ſallies of vivacity which ſeem natural to Frenchmen, and to ſay truth, this miniſter was inveſted with a double portion of them; ſince at the very time he was to ſolicit a favour, and that of no common nature, he could not help throwing out ſome lively invectives on the preſumption of the Swedes for taking the liberty to croſs the Rhine. The king, who had been tired above meaſure with theſe inſolent impertinencies, and felt himſelf exaſperated to the quick at France's aſſuming the perpetual pre-eminence, gave him to underſtand very conciſely once for all *, *That if his Chriſtian majeſty was offended, he could not help it; and that whoever forced him back, muſt take the pains to effect that work ſword in hand.——That he was geographer enough to know his way to Paris as well as Vienna, and that his ſoldiers would reliſh Champaign and Burgundy, as well as Rheniſh or Moſelle. Therefore, for theſe reaſons, he humbly conceived a king of France would not affect to imitate that power, who alone can ſay,* HITHERTO SHALT THOU GO, AND NO FURTHER. He well knew France to be not ſo formidable as ſhe then affected to appear. Her army at moſt amounted to little more than 50,000 ſoldiers: nor did the revenues exceed forty-five millions of livres. Commerce was regarded with a careleſs eye, and the police greatly neglected.

The two French ambaſſadors, being thus humbled into a ſort of real or pretended modeſty, implored the king at all events to grant an *armiſtice for a ſingle fortnight*, which Guſtavus allowed with great reluctance, much againſt his own *private judgment*, merely to prevent importunity. *For, ſir*, ſaid he to De Brezé, *the princes of the league are inſincere. I have made them offers more than once of living with them on a friendly footing, provided only, that they contributed a moderate ſum towards the ſubſiſtence of my ſoldiers; but inſtead of accepting theſe terms upon principles of honour and honeſty, they have created both delays and obſtructions, which fully convince me, that they want only to amuſe me and gain time. Witneſs the deliberations and reſolutions lately taken at Landſhut and Ingoldſtadt: whence it appears, that the biſhop of Wurtzburg and the Bavarian miniſters talked one thing at Metz, and that their conſtituents perform quite another thing in Germany. Read theſe letters, ſir, and then ſuppoſe yourſelf to be better inſtructed.*

What the ſubſtance of theſe intercepted letters was, appears not from Le Vaſſor, whom I am copying, but *one* †,

* *Monro's* Expedition, part ii. 100. † *Chemnitz*, tom. i. p. 228.

if

if I remember right, was addreſſed from the duke of Bavaria to Pappenheim, wherein he charged him to undertake *immediately* the reduction of Weſtphalia, incloſing a bill of credit on Cologn for £.9000. which ſum he engaged to ſee repaid at Augſburg. Nevertheleſs, before the ceſſation of arms could be obtained, Guſtavus propoſed, once more, the plan of a *neutrality*, as it was then called; or rather a ſhort ſyſtem of preliminaries, all tending to a general pacification *; which he charged the ambaſſadors and miniſters to tranſmit to their reſpective courts for confirmation, inaſmuch as he and France had agreed concerning them. Of theſe we have already given the reader *two* different tranſcripts, and referred him to a *third*, in the preamble of which there is one paſſage worth notice; namely, that this armiſtice was granted purely out of regard to the earneſt interceſſions of the moſt Chriſtian king †.

As to the armiſtice itſelf, I have ſeen only two tranſlations of it, the one in Engliſh, and the other in French, both made public the year that it was ſigned; to the former of which I have referred my reader in the *Appendix*; and with reſpect to the plans of pacification mentioned by me, I conclude upon reviewing the matter, that they were only ſubſequent explanations of the king's meaning, diſpatched by him to the parties concerned, or to the Swediſh miniſters reſiding with them. Be that as it will, theſe are all ſignal proofs of his majeſty's ſincerity and good faith, which will appear ſtill in a ſtronger light, if we conſider the inſtructions conveyed by him on the occaſion to Guſtavus Horn, and, as it ſeems to me highly probable, to all his generals; namely, that the *armiſtice* was granted out of pure indulgence to the court of France; and that a poſitive anſwer to the propoſals of pacification was to be returned in the ſpace of a fortnight from the princes therein intereſted. It was agreed, that Pappenheim ſhould evacuate Weſtphalia, and the archbiſhopric of Magdeburg; and that the troops belonging to the elector of Bavaria and the catholic league ſhould be withdrawn likewiſe from Bohemia: all acts of hoſtility being ſuppoſed to ceaſe on either ſide, and power reſerved to retaliate injuries with injuries: yet nevertheleſs under this reſtriction, that blockades and ſieges already begun ſhould proceed in the ſame manner as if no ceſſation of arms had been agreed on ‡.

As

* See pag. 72, 73. † *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 62.

‡ Letter to Guſtavus Horn, dated at Hoëchſt. The author of the Merc. Franc. ſays Mentz. See APPENDIX, Art. XXVII. January 10, 1631-2.

That

As this letter to Horn bears date from Hoëchſt, Jan. 10, it is probable the king had ratified the agreement the day before, or that very morning at Mentz, and was advanced thus far on his road, in order to meet the queen at Hanau, whom he found there, to his higheſt ſatisfaction, the ſelf-ſame evening. Her majeſty made her public entrance in a manner not void of magnificence, being accompanied by the young princeſs of Brandenburg, her ſiſter, and eſcorted by numbers of noblemen, and 1200 horſe, commanded by old Ruthven. The king received her at the entrance of count Hanau's palace. Never meeting, after a long ſeparation of twenty months, was more affectionate and tender; for they knew well each other's merit*. Eleanora flew to him with a tranſport of joy that is not to be deſcribed, and throwing her arms round his waiſt, *Now, ſir,* ſaid ſhe, *the Great Guſtavus is* AT LENGTH TAKEN PRISONER! Which † particular ſort of expreſſion was ſo much applauded by the public, and paſſed ſo frequently from mouth to mouth, till acquiring freſh variations in travelling from Germany to England, it was at length reported by the London news-writer, that the king of Sweden was literally and *bonâ fide* an Imperial priſoner: which, it is probable, gave no great diſſatisfaction to the Engliſh miniſtry. The king made his conſort a preſent of jewels to a very conſiderable value.

This heroine had left the pleaſures of Stockholm, in order to ſhare the fatigues of war with her huſband, and brought with her no contemptible ſupply of ſoldiers ‡, artillery, and money. Nor was ſhe in the leaſt diſmayed at an extraordinary accident, which befell her in the firſt minutes of her embarkation; for one of her principal ſhips, ſurnamed the VASA, by way of diſtinction, ſunk directly to the bottom about half a league from ſhore, merely through ſome fault in its conſtruction: ſince the ſea in that place had no rocks, nor was there wind enough to ruffle its ſurface §.

During this momentary repoſe at Hanau, advice came that Pappenheim paid no regard to the ceſſation of arms: upon

That very evening, being Tueſday, the king met the queen at Hanau. *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 68.

* Fu incontrata (la regina) & raccolta da i popoli e dalle militie con applauſo, & pompa veramente regale, ma ſi caramente dal re ſuo conſorte, che ne ſtupirono i circoſtanti, in vedendo da petto di tanta fortezza uſcir coſi traborchevoli le tenerezze, e luſinghe de i più ſuiſcerati amanti. *P. Pomo.* libr. ii. 57.

† *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. 68.

‡ Of theſe, 4000 were deſtined to join the marquis of Hamilton, and the reſidue, 4000 more, were conducted by Oxenſtiern to reinforce the king.

§ *Scheffери* Memorab. Suec. Gent. 8°. p. 20.

upon which the king, being determined to chaſtiſe him, ordered ſeveral regiments to file off from Francfort, and advanced in perſon immediately as far as Guelenhauſen, twenty-four miles in his way to Weſtphalia. The queen would not deſert him, but hearing there that the danger he apprehended was blown over, returned to Francfort. In violation of the truce, the Spaniards had croſſed the Moſelle, and the infanta's troops were in full march towards the Palatinate; the duke of Bavaria made preparations for renewing the war with double diligence; the elector of Triers behaved with duplicity; and the duke of Neuburg allowed Tilly to take poſſeſſion of his metropolis. Thus, whilſt they all effected miſchief, in greater or leſſer degrees, the king, like an honeſt and punctual ſoldier, gained nothing but an inactive interval for the refreſhment of his army.

During this interim, the elector of Bavaria not only refitted his ſhattered troops, but found his opportunity of extorting higher advantages from the Auſtrian neceſſities, inaſmuch as the emperor had long balanced between reſtoring Walſtein, or breaking with Maximilian. At length he and his miniſtry, upon mature deliberation, thought proper to leave the firſt difficulty to work its own way, and pay an exorbitant price for the aſſiſtance of the laſt named prince: which retardment of glory, though only ideal, redoubled Walſtein's hatred againſt Bavaria.

The elector, perceiving France could not influence Guſtavus in greater matters, and diſcovering likewiſe the violent inclination of that prince to reſtore the Palatine to his hereditary dominions, diſpatched Donnerſberg, his chancellor, to Vienna; and bidding adieu to the interpoſition of France, at once, gave him authority to make the beſt market he could with the Imperial miniſtry, who received him with open arms *.

Donnerſberg proteſted, that though his maſter might want means, yet that he never wanted good intentions to the houſe of Auſtria, ſince he had refuſed the kingſhip of the Romans, which Richelieu offered him†; but that Sweden had almoſt overturned his ſyſtem, by that terrible ſhock, the defeat of Leipſic; and that the Infanta had beſought him to take no adventurous ſtep, till the catholic princes had recovered themſelves from their terror. He frankly owned, that the clandeſtine elevation of Wal-

* *Galeazzo Gualdo*, part i. l. 3.

† *Bernard*, Hiſt. de Louis XIII. lib. xv. fol. Par. 1646.

ſtein;

ſtein *; his inveſtiture with ſo much power; and repoſing ſuch undue confidence in a ſubject, had a little diſconcerted him in the articles of friendſhip and fidelity; and the more, as *that* general had been removed at his inſtances and ſolicitations.—Nevertheleſs, he privately hoped, that the emperor had been forced into theſe meaſures by pure neceſſity, and that Walſtein would never preſume, when he opened the campaign, to march into Bavaria, or canton his troops in that electorate. Of courſe, as the poſſeſſion of the Palatinates began now to appear precarious, he thought it conſiſtent with the emperor's prudence and equity, to *tranſfer* the Upper Auſtria † to him proviſionally, not only as an indemnification for his paſt expences, but as a ſort of equivalent for the Palatinates, which Guſtavus was determined to wreſt out of his hands. Upon theſe terms he made his Imperial majeſty an offer of all his ſervices, having previouſly raiſed the ban, and arrier-ban of Bavaria for that very purpoſe; fortified and guarded the banks of the Lech and Danube; and placed good garriſons in all the fortreſſes and cities on that ſide of his country ‡.

Theſe propoſals were a cordial of comfort to the Imperial miniſtry; yet the aſſignation of Upper Auſtria, by way of pledge or mortgage, was a ſort of nauſeous drop mixed with the compoſition, which rendered it to a certain degree unpalatable.

Their anſwer was, that the emperor would content his old ally not only in this inſtance, but in realizing alſo ſome promiſes of the ſame nature, which he had made before. That Walſtein in effect forced his own way; that the neceſſity of the conjuncture was his only patron, ſince no other man could collect an army at ſo ſhort a notice, and when the emergency of affairs was ſo very critical. However, care had been taken, that all competitions and jealouſies ſhould be removed; and that the elector of Bavaria ſhould receive neither affront, neglect, or injury from him. Walſtein hearing what part Maximilian had acted with regard to him, grew ſo enraged, that he made no ſecret of his future intentions.

* He does not name him in the memorial, but mentions only the elevation of a certain perſon.

† There are reaſons to ſuſpect it was rather that part of Upper Auſtria called Ober Ens, or *ſupra Aniſum*, which had been mortgaged to the duke at the beginning of the Bohemian wars, and reſumed upon the ceſſion made him of the Higher Palatinate.

‡ *Fred. Spanheim*, p. 380.

During the continuance of this truce, France, who always caſt a languiſhing eye on the weſtern banks of the Rhine, laid the ground-plot of a new machination againſt Sweden, by drawing the elector of Triers more immediately under her protection; and diſpatched the count de Brullon expreſsly into Germany upon that errand: of which we ſhall ſpeak more diſtinctly, when we come to the actual ſigning of the treaty. As Guſtavus was of a temper equally prudent and inflammable, of courſe ſhe entered into this act of patronage with wonderful ſlowneſs and timidity; for Richelieu knew the interpoſition to be of a very delicate caſt, ſince if he had ſoured, or ruffled Guſtavus too abruptly, he foreſaw, that the Spaniſh party would have extracted great advantage from ſuch an inadvertency, and kindled up a miſunderſtanding betwixt the two crowns. It ſufficed therefore for the preſent, that the elector publiſhed a memorial * concerning the ceſſation of hoſtilities during the truce, which the Spaniſh troops deſpiſed, and the members of his own chapter rejected.

Richelieu then changed his attack, and tampered ingeniouſly with the city of Straſburg, a ſort of game that was played afterwards with more ſucceſs in regard to Briſac; ſparing no pains to induce the magiſtrates to place themſelves under the protection of France. An old burgo-maſter, who, from principles of good ſenſe, and a true zeal for the welfare of the public, found himſelf more inclinable to embrace the patronage of Sweden, checked the French emiſſaries in their propoſals, and begged his fellow-magiſtrates to call to mind a caſe like their own with reference to the three cities of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. This remonſtrance confounded the whole project; and for theſe reaſons, Guſtavus, thoroughly affected with the preference theſe Straſburgers ſhewed him, always oppoſed a deaf ear to Richelieu, when he beſought him to give his parole of honour, not to enter Alſatia. The truth is, the French miniſter ſtood in awe of Guſtavus, and wiſely diſſembled a diſguſt which he had not courage either to explain or vindicate.

About the ſame time, Gonſalvo de Cordoua, who commanded the Spaniſh army in the Palatinate, was ſent ambaſſador to Paris, to make remonſtrances againſt the protection which Lewis XIII. afforded the proteſtants, whereby the catholic cauſe was greatly injured. But Richelieu reſumed the old tone, and told him, that the preſent war was

* The original letter, dated from Hermanſtein (Ehrenbreitſtein) Jan. 14, 1631-2, is preſerved in the *Swediſh Intelligencer*. Part ii. 69.

political,

political, and not religious: of courſe all perſons were left at full liberty to embrace that party which moſt favoured their private inclinations, or conduced moſt to their intereſts. Upon this, Gonſalvo returned thoroughly diſſatisfied, and refuſed a preſent the king offered him, of a ſword richly garniſhed with diamonds *.

We obſerved before, that the troops under this general's command had violated the terms upon which the armiſtice was founded; for Iſabella's 10,000 Walloons had reached the Lower Palatinate by long marches from the Low Countries, having croſſed the Moſelle during the continuance of the truce, and then the combined Spaniſh army ventured to paſs the Rhine near Spires, which the Rhingrave oppoſed very valiantly. That brave officer met little ſhort of a defeat, by diſregarding the repeated advices given him of the enemy's approach; and if captain Hume, at the head of four troops of horſe, had not reſiſted the united efforts of the whole Spaniſh army for half an hour, matters had taken a turn exceedingly untoward. This confirms a doctrine, that can be never too much inculcated into military men, that an undue degree of courage, when it borders upon a neglect of danger, is as fatal to the ſervice as downright cowardice.

Enraged at ſuch notorious breaches of compact, not only here, but on the ſide of Pappenheim, Maximilian, the elec-

* A ridiculous circumſtance once happened to this commander, who had been lieutenant-general to Spinola, and governor of Milan. In the campaign of 1621, it was his intention to poſſeſs a little walled village in the Palatinate, called Ogerſheim; and of courſe he diſpatched an officer, at the head of a body of troops, upon that errand. On the firſt alarm, nine-tenths of the inhabitants removed to Manheim, except about twenty inſignificant people, and a poor ſhepherd, who, beſides being a brave fellow, was a man of humour. The ſhepherd in good time faſtened the gates, let down the draw-bridge, and made a wonderful ſhew of reſiſtance. A trumpeter accoſted the town in form; upon which the few inhabitants, that remained, made their eſcape through a poſtern gate, and left only the ſhepherd and his ſhepherdeſs big with child. This unaccountable peaſant, in the ſtyle of repreſentative of the garriſon, gave audience from the walls to the military herald, and made his bargain of capitulation inch by inch; contracting at the ſame time for the preſervation of eſtate, and the free exerciſe of the proteſtant religion. Let the reader judge what ſurprize the Spaniards felt, when they entered the village; yet the droll preſerved the muſcles of his countenance inflexible, and ſome weeks afterwards, when his wife laid in, deſired the great Gonſalva to be *ſponſor*, which honour the pompous Caſtilian, for the jeſt's ſake, could not decline, and on the contrary ſent her ſome very handſome preſents.—This account, ſays an hiſtorian of veracity, *(F. Spanheim. Mem. d'Elector Palat.)* might appear to poſterity to border a little on the *romantic*, if its notoriety had not been a circumſtance indiſputable at the time it happened.

tors of Triers and Cologn, the duke of Neuburg, and France itſelf, as will appear immediately, his majeſty returned poſthaſte to Francfort, and having firſt diſpatched Monro with a body of infantry, for the Rhingrave had only horſe, placed himſelf at the head of a ſmall army, in order to give battle to theſe faithleſs invaders. The terror of the name of Guſtavus ſoon compelled them to repaſs both the Rhine and Moſelle; nor did they think themſelves in ſafety till they had reached the duchy of Luxemburg.

At length, namely, on the twenty-fourth of January, the armiſtice expired, and many attempts were made by Richelieu to protract it eight days longer: but Guſtavus, who had been thoroughly mortified and diſguſted, though he juſtly foreſaw and predicted all its ill conſequences, replied peremptorily, *he had made that ſacrifice to France, and was too good a politician to venture upon a ſecond experiment of the ſame nature.* Upon this, De Charnacé, De Brezé, and St. Etienne, learned to act a more decent and more cautious part; and when they teaſed and beſought the king to entertain a moment's patience, he not only gave them a poſitive refuſal, but told them moreover, that nothing ſhould ever induce him to give up Mentz, Bamberg, and Wurtzburg. *I muſt keep the whip in my own hands,* continued he, *in order to regulate and chaſtiſe the duplicity of your good eccleſiaſtical friends and allies**.

The truth was, the French for ſome months paſt had grown very uneaſy at Guſtavus's victories, and being conſcious of a private treaty with the elector of Bavaria, propoſed not only a *neutrality*, but an *armiſtice*, and the *continuation* of the armiſtice, by way of feeling his Swediſh majeſty's pulſe, and retarding the rapidity of his conqueſts. At the ſame time, they paved the way to a ſeparate agreement with the elector of Triers, and aſſembled a conſiderable body of troops near Metz, under pretence of ſuppreſſing an inſurrection formed by the duke of Orleans, giving out in the interim, by their private emiſſaries, that this force was intended to preſcribe laws to the conqueſts of the Swedes. To retard matters more, care was taken to pay the ſubſidy very ſlowly, and imperfectly: and what confirms the truth of theſe aſſertions yet further, is, that the French court could not conceal its joy, when the news arrived of Guſtavus's death.

The war was now revived with double ſpirit on the part of Sweden, and plans for new operations were diſpatched to

* *Le Vaſſor*, tom. vii. 104.

Banier,

Banier, who oppoſed Pappenheim in Weſtphalia; to Horn, who faced Tilly in the dioceſe of Bamberg; to Arnheim and Thurn, who acted againſt Don Baltazar and Tieffenbach in Bohemia and Moravia; alſo to the dukes of Mechlenburg and Lunenberg, Todt, Ruthven, duke William of Weimar, and others, who all commanded ſeparate armies. As to the marquis of Hamilton, he was then at Francfort in company with Vane the Engliſh ambaſſador.

About this time, it is the cuſtom of Engliſh hiſtorians to repreſent Guſtavus as dictating in a very high tone, and acting in the character of a perſon elated with ſucceſs. Any one may eaſily ſee, that he had real reaſons to alter his ſtyle, without incurring the imputation of vain-glory and haughtineſs; for he plainly diſcovered that Charles, in ſpite of all the proſperity that attended the Swediſh arms, had a diffidence, or a diſinclination to engage himſelf in any treaty that breathed ſpirit and magnanimity. Upon his unhappy coolneſs Guſtavus touched gently, but feelingly, in his letter which gave an account of the battle of Leipſic.

Part of Vane's inſtructions were not quite palatable to his Swediſh majeſty, for he had orders to reconcile him with the king of Denmark, upon ſome conditions that were not compatible with the temper of a man ſo jealous of his honour, as the former was known to be. It is true, Vane had a commiſſion likewiſe to enter into cloſer connexions with Sweden; but either this commiſſion was clogged with private reſtrictions, or the ambaſſador wanted parts and courage to ſeize the proffered opportunity. He was commanded likewiſe to conſult Hamilton previouſly to all difficulties and emergencies, which was giving an inſight and power to an inferior general, which did not agree with Guſtavus's doctrine of ſubordination. Vane paid his firſt viſit to that prince at Francfort *, where Guſtavus told him without ceremony, as Vane's commiſſion related chiefly to the reſtitution of the Palatinate, that he could give no diſtinct anſwer upon the ſubject, till a league was previouſly concluded betwixt him and the elector Palatine, which was to be the baſis of a ſubſequent alliance between Charles and himſelf; to which Vane, who declared he was inveſted with full powers, ſignified an inclination to aſſent. To that point Guſtavus replied, that as he was tender of promiſing one iota more than he could perform, it would be highly neceſſary to bring France into the ſyſtem: nevertheleſs, without depending up-

* We have proved elſewhere, from Vane's own papers, that this meeting was firſt at Wurtzburg.

on ſucceſs in that particular, he would at all events diſcharge the duties of a man of honour, and reſerve to himſelf the glory of executing ſomething beyond what he promiſed. Nor was this a piece of ſtate artifice, or political parade, as time afterwards fully diſcovered *. Hereupon, ſays Mr. Guthrie, who, bating ſome few trifling inaccuracies, has given us the beſt account of this tranſaction, Guſtavus added, That Charles had been too ſlow in ſending him, Vane, and that if he had ſent him *before he had concluded the treaty with France, he would have been at liberty to have fallen upon Bavaria* †. The ambaſſador anſwered, I make uſe of the words of his own diſpatch with Charles, "For our coming too late there, was no fault to be juſtly imputed to us; for had his majeſty of Sweden demanded reaſonable conditions, the alliance had been concluded: but leagues and buſineſs of ſo great importance could not but have ſlow motions; yet he beſought his majeſty of Swedeland, to give him leave to commemorate the proceedings of his maſter towards him, ſince his majeſty's coming into Germany, viz. That he had permitted him to make as many levies of his ſubjects as he had deſired; that he had ſince ſent the marquis of Hamilton to him with a royal aſſiſtance, and ſo opportunely, as it could not be denied, but that the marquis landed his army at a ſeaſonable time, to the amuſement of the emperor and the encouragement of the confederate proteſtant princes, as it appeared by the effects that followed thereupon, by the ſpeedy uniting of their arms under his command. And that though his Swediſh majeſty, next under God, was the only immediate inſtrument to whom the glory of this great revolution was to be attributed; yet it could not be denied, but that the ſubjects of Great Britain had done him great and remarkable ſervice both

* In confirmation of this aſſertion, of which many proofs are produced diſperſedly in the courſe of our hiſtory, I ſhall ſubjoin one authority more on the faith of MSS. extracted from a letter of Mr. John Dinely, at the Hague, to Sir Thomas Roe, bearing date Feb. 24, 1632-3, "The chancellor (of "Sweden) your friend, hath aſſured her majeſty, (the queen of Bohemia) "that his glorious maſter had never other meaning but to reſtore it (the "Palatinate); no more hath he;" namely Oxenſtiern, who faithfully endeavoured to fill up the outlines of the plan which Guſtavus left him.

† Here muſt be ſome miſtake, for no new treaty had been made with France ſince that of Bernwalt, Jan. 13, 1630-1; ſo that the king could only mean, that during the exiſtence of the truce, and upon ſuppoſition it tended to a general pacification, he was not at liberty to attack Bavaria, which enjoyed the Upper Palatinate; nor could Guſtavus be ſuppoſed to allude to the treaty France had concluded with Bavaria, May 8, 1631, ſince the moment the truce expired, he turned his arms againſt the elector.

in

in theſe and his former wars; and that theſe were neither to be concealed nor forgotten, nor the real aſſiſtance now ſent unto him."

His majeſty of Sweden acknowledged, that the king of Great Britain had proceeded with him as a friend; that he was a wiſe and virtuous prince; that none could wiſh more proſperity to his perſon and affairs than he did; and that he would do his beſt to aſſiſt him, in the buſineſs of the Palatinate; but he would then have him follow his advice; that he had too long depended upon the Spaniſh treaty, which was a fault, and had been greatly prejudicial; and that nothing was to be expected from them but words. The ambaſſador replied, If that were a fault, it behoved him to be wary in his negotiation, not to make an alliance, that might be diſadvantageous to his maſter, either in honour or judgment; and that whatſoever ſhould be the event, he doubted not but that God would bleſs both his councils and his actions. His majeſty of Sweden replied, That for the preſent he could not ſtipulate to make war with the elector of Bavaria, though he intended not to let him eſcape; for that it could not but be of great advantage, if he could ſecure the catholics, which he was in a fair way to effect; for, according to his articles delivered to *Charnaſſy* *, the electors of Triers and Cologn had accepted the neutrality. The ambaſſador aſked, Whether his majeſty had received any act of their own? He ſaid no; but the marquis of *Preſſay* † had aſſured him thereof; that he had not yet heard of Bavaria, neither could he yet ſay any thing thereunto, until either Charnaſſy or Horn, whom he had ſent into France, were returned.

His majeſty of Sweden then ſaid, He would make him two propoſitions; which were, he would either oblige himſelf to reſtore to the king of Bohemia what the Spaniard held, and treat with France and Bavaria for the reſtitution of what he poſſeſſes; which if he would not reſtore, he would then undertake a war with him: ſo the king would enter into an alliance with him againſt the Spaniards, if he ſhould attack him in any of his dominions.

Guſtavus at the ſame time added, That in order to do things effectually, he expected Charles to furniſh twelve thouſand men, his contingency of troops, and twenty-five thouſand pounds a month in money to maintain them.

* De Charnacé. † De Brezé.

Thoſe were very high demands, and Vane was appointed to treat further with Horn, *the chancellor of Sweden* *. But when the conferences opened, the Swediſh miniſter made the following high demands:

1. That the Palſgrave ſhould hold his country as a donative of the king of Sweden.

2. That he ſhould make no martial levies without the Swedes' conſent.

3. That during this war he ſhould furniſh the Swedes with ſo many thouſand men upon his own pay.

4. That two of his chiefeſt towns ſhould ſtand cautionaries for the performing of covenants.

5. That he ſhould make no league nor article with any other prince without the Swedes' conſent.

Thoſe propoſals were thought by Vane to be abſurd, and as haughty as the terms, that had been propoſed to the king of Bohemia by the emperor himſelf. Hamilton, who was preſent at all the conferences, had made him ſenſible of the reluctance which Guſtavus had to ſuffer the Britiſh auxiliaries to march into the Palatinate, or into any of the territories that were well-affectioned to the king of Bohemia. Charles and the king of Bohemia were ſenſible of the ſame thing, and from the haughty manner in which Guſtavus treated, they more than ſuſpected that he intended to make himſelf maſter of Germany, or at leaſt to give law to all the princes of the empire. But to bring matters to an iſſue, Vane propoſed, that Hamilton ſhould have the complement of Swediſh ſoldiers that had been firſt ſtipulated him; that they ſhould be paid with Engliſh money, and augmented with a new body of troops from Great Britain, ſo as to make a ſtrong army, which Hamilton was to lead into the Palatinate. Had Guſtavus really meant as diſintereſtedly for the king of Bohemia as he profeſſed, he would have embraced this propoſal; but, inſtead of that, he treated it with diſdain, and ordered the negotiation to be broken off.

Thus far Mr. Guthrie: but as to the latter part of his aſſertions, care has been taken to obviate them elſewhere. Indeed his Britannic majeſty miſtook his intereſts in entering into any negotiations about the Palatinate with the houſe of Auſtria; for in the firſt place, the court of Vienna had no intentions ever to come to an accommodation; and in the

* Horn was a Swediſh general, and Oxenſtiern chancellor of Sweden; but as Horn made the treaty of Bernwalt, and was ſent afterwards ambaſſador to Metz, he is miſtaken for a civil officer.

ſecond

ſecond place, the hereditary dominions of the elector had been doled out in ſo many parcels, that it was hardly poſſible to repoſſeſs them by an act of reſumption, and then reſtore them to their antient owner. The tree was felled; the elector of Bavaria had ſeized the timber part, and every other catholic neighbour faggoted up as much of the branches as he could ranſack together, for his own uſe. So that the emperor, eſpecially as Guſtavus was now powerful in Germany, could not poſſibly *redemand* with decency *what* he had *given*, or *recall*, with any appearance of juſtice, what he had *ſold*. Therefore, ſays Spanheim *, who wrote from his heart upon this ſubject, and to whom I am indebted for the idea of the picture I am now drawing, the court of London judged extremely ill, in hoping to wreſt the Palatinate from ſo many intereſted perſons by remonſtrances or embaſſies; "A ſuit of armour made of parchment records will not keep off the ſtroke of a muſquet ball."

On the other hand, the catholic princes pretended only, in a ſort of ironical way, to have their alternative of eighty years in the church poſſeſſions: and the Imperial miniſtry ſuggeſted, in imitation of what was once ſaid to Metellus, that the voice of law could not be heard amongſt the claſhing of arms, and that there was no antidote againſt the will of a Cæſar.

I have ſeen ſome other accounts, which inform us, that Vane preſſed Guſtavus ſomewhat abruptly and indelicately on the ſubject of the reſtitution of the Palatinate, telling him, that he had given his royal promiſe to complete that event; which aſſertion Vane proved oddly enough: "For, Sire," ſaid he, "you declared poſitively, on your firſt entrance into Germany, that you would reinſtate all the op preſſed and injured proteſtant princes; of whom the elector Palatine is firſt, not only in dignity, but in misfortunes." This logic of Vane was built upon the interpretation of a *manifeſto* only; and a *manifeſto*, in general, is a ſort of rhetorical noſegay, which kings now and then, for variety ſake, preſent the public with, having at the ſame time *other* deſigns in view, in order to amuſe their fellow-creatures, or miſlead or lull them into inattention: for this anthology in politics is the

*——Lucus & ara Dianæ,*
*Et properantis aquæ per amœnos ambitus agros.*

Nevertheleſs, Guſtavus had no duplicity upon this occaſion; and as he both loved and pitied the unfortunate prince in

* *Mem. d'Electr. Palat.* p. 302.

queſtion,

queſtion, allowed Vane's concluſion to be honeſtly, though not logically deducible; and promiſed to effect the reſtitution of the Palatinate, upon condition his Britannic majeſty would maintain an army in Germany, of 8000 foot and 3000 horſe; to which the ambaſſador replied, very indiſcreetly, That his maſter did not chuſe to make a purchaſe at a higher price than the thing was worth.

Guſtavus ſtill maintained a ſecret affection for the unfortunate elector, and ſolicited the French king to act with him in reſtoring to his dominions an oppreſſed and proſcribed prince, whoſe anceſtors had ſupported Henry IV. againſt the enemies of the houſe of Bourbon: propoſing likewiſe, at the ſame time, *that* notable expedient of augmenting the *number* of the electoral college; which maſterly ſtroke of politics was thought ſo neceſſary, as to be carried afterwards into execution at the congreſs of Munſter. Louis durſt not preſume to advance a ſingle ſtep, being diſmayed by the effects of *the* clandeſtine treaty which his miniſter had thought fit to conclude with the duke of Bavaria. Things being thus circumſtanced, Guſtavus took Frederic upon his own hands, and made his friends a promiſe of reinſtating him, upon condition he indulged his Lutheran ſubjects in the free exerciſe of their religion, and conſidered himſelf as attached and obliged *only* to the crown of Sweden: giving him however to underſtand, at the ſame time, that an affair of this ſort required dexterity and management in him, Guſtavus; and that his promiſe depended eventually upon a variety of circumſtances; ſo that the terms it was conceived in were only general and indefinite; however, his majeſty was ſincerely in earneſt, and that was ſufficient.

As Sclavata, the king of Bohemia's miniſter, had long before this time reached Holland, and informed his maſter, that Guſtavus expected to ſee him with great impatience, Frederic, having returned thanks to the ſtates in full council, and requeſted the continuance of their generous protection to his wife and children, undertook his journey to Francfort forthwith, accompanied by the ſtates-general to the gates of the Hague, by the prince of Orange as far as Weſel; and by lord Craven on to Francfort. The Dutch government, at parting, made him a preſent ſuitable to his high rank, and the nature of his expedition. An eſcort of 2500 horſe and foot convoyed him to the territories of Heſſe Caſſel, and the landgrave's troops conducted him to Francfort, where he arrived February the tenth, with a retinue of forty coaches, ſome were ſent by Guſtavus in order to do him honour, and ſeventy domeſtics on horſeback. He ſaluted the king and queen

next

next morning at Hoëchſt, the unfortunate place where Tilly defeated Chriſtian duke of Brunſwic, and returned with them to Francfort the ſame day, where Guſtavus gave him a magnificent entertainment; oftentimes allowing him *precedency* *, under pretence that he was both a *king* and *elector* †; and he and his conſort always addreſſed their diſcourſe to him with the appellation of *your majeſty*; a reſpect the young landgrave of Darmſtadt once omitting, whoſe father had been no good neighbour to Frederic, the king of Sweden rebuked him with no ſmall degree of aſperity ‡.—Notwithſtanding all theſe affectionate offices, he ſtill took care to touch upon the ſubject we have lately mentioned, and obtained a promiſe from Frederic, whoſe mind was ſtrongly prepoſſeſſed in favour of Calviniſm, to grant free exerciſe of religion in the Palatinate to all ſuch as made profeſſion of the opinions of Luther. Yet the joy of this prince, who ſeemed to be born only to prove unfortunate, was ſoon diminiſhed by an accident, or as ſome ſuppoſe a piece of villany; for the caſtle of Heidelberg §, his former place of reſidence, and the antient ſeat of his predeceſſors, was ſuddenly damaged by a violent fire, and the fine front thereof entirely deſtroyed. The Spaniſh garriſon ſeemed pleaſed with the misfortune, and ſtood with folded arms contemplating its ruin. This circumſtance was ſo much the more afflicting to the elector Palatine, as he had ſpent vaſt ſums upon it, which any one will ſoon acknowledge, when he knows the rock on which the building is erected. He perfected likewiſe, with immenſe expence, the fortifications of Manheim, begun by his father, Frederic IV.

Guſtavus had been vigilant enough the preceding year, to diſpatch the chevalier Rache firſt to Venice, where he ſucceeded well ‖; next to Genoa; and then to the thirteen cantons of Switzerland, concerning which embaſſy we have ſpoken at large elſewhere. The emperor ſet himſelf earneſtly to traverſe this negotiation, and wrote to the reſpective ſovereignties of each ſtate, making them proteſtations and promiſes in abundance. He cauſed the archduke Leopold to write another letter, in ſubſtance the ſame with his own,

* *Mercure François* en l'an 1631, p. 163.

† *Bertius* de Bellis Germanicis. ‡ *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 76.

§ During the war of the ſucceſſion, in 1693, this ſtructure was entirely deſtroyed, and the town ruined. The very tombs of the electors were not ſpared; of all which and preceding devaſtations, melancholy marks ſtill remain. The country round it is a terreſtrial paradiſe.

‖ *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, fol. tom. i. 176.

and

and full of politeneſs and civility *; and then deputed Arnoldin, counſellor of ſtate, and firſt ſecretary, *à ſecretis*, to Walſtein; who ſent him directly into Poland, in order to levy the little army of Coſſacks formerly mentioned. The Polanders trembled to think of oppoſing Guſtavus a ſecond time; and though they favoured the Imperial cauſe greatly in their private inclinations as catholics, yet the requeſt was paſſed by without notice. Some few noblemen made a levy of a company or two clandeſtinely, and nothing more. Iſolani ſucceeded better in raiſing 8000 freſh Croatians; a ſet of troops Guſtavus hated mortally, on account of the ravages and cruelties committed by them; and as they ſpared nothing, he uſually allowed them no quarter, and received none from them. The emperor then finiſhed the holidays by confiſcating the duchies of Jagernſdorf and Troppau, and beſtowing them on the prince of Lichtenſtein †.

It was now determined, that Pappenheim ſhould act at the head of a flying army of 18,000 men ‡; and to forward this project, the elector of Bavaria ſent him £. 15,000. As that prince had now made his final political deciſion with reſpect to France, De Charnacé and St. Etienne retired from Munich, each deſirous to ſee his maſter firſt; each diſſatisfied with his negotiation, and well prepared to accuſe his coadjutor. In ſhort, theſe gentlemen of *pacification* were ſo enraged with each other, that a challenge paſſed between them.

In the next place, the deputies of the elector of Cologn made freſh propoſals of accommodation; but Oxenſtiern received them with an air of roughneſs, and propoſed conditions to them, that were not to be digeſted. Nevertheleſs, De Pau, ambaſſador from the ſtates-general, met with a favourable audience from the king, who diſpatched Oxenſtiern immediately to the Hague to facilitate matters, and diſpoſe them to ripen into ſome perfection.

New miſunderſtandings broke forth on the ſide of Poland, with reference to the truce concluded in 1629, between that kingdom and Sweden; upon which the king appointed Ruſſel, one of his privy-counſellors, his ambaſſador, and gave him a letter both to Sigiſmond, and the ſtates of the realm, who received this miniſter very coldly, till at

* *Mercure Suiſſe* de Fred. Spanheim, p. 21.

† This is confirmed by the author of the *Memoirs* of the Houſe of Brandenburg.

‡ *Saggi d'Hiſtoria del Pietro Pomo.* lib. ii. p. 55. quarto.

length

length the matter was amicably compoſed by the interpoſition of the Engliſh ambaſſador *. This gave his majeſty great eaſe, for he leſs feared the interpoſition of any power than that of Poland; and to convince the public that he omitted no negotiation, of probable ſucceſs, even at the greateſt diſtance, he diſpatched an agent to George Ragotzki, prince of Tranſylvania, in order to create a freſh irruption into Hungary †; than which no proceeding, *ad hominem*, could be more juſtifiable, as the emperor, two years before, had ſent Arnheim with an army into Poland to aſſiſt Sigiſmond againſt the Swedes.

Though the campaign of the year 1631 had laſted, on the ſide of Guſtavus particularly, till Chriſtmas, yet the troops had hardly common breathing-ſpace allowed them to recover their fatigues, if we except the ſhort fortnight's interval of ceſſation from hoſtilities. The king actually took the field in February, and Walſtein on his ſide began to make appearance of doing the ſame; for having collected all his officers together, he found his regiments fully complete, and ready to march. The emperor ſent eighty very large cannon from the arſenal at Vienna, and ſeventeen more large pieces were conveyed to him from Breſlau and Lignitz.—Couriers paſſed and repaſſed every moment between Bohemia and Auſtria; and Walſtein, who loved to rhodomontade, dropped inſinuations to make people believe, that they brought him money. The military ſatiriſts, who have a dry laconic ſort of wit peculiar to themſelves, ſaid, That they rather moved too nimbly and too frequently for men employed in that capacity ‡.

Commiſſions were now iſſued for levying freſh troops in behalf of Sweden; and Chriſtian, the third ſon of Charles, count

* *Hiſtorical Authentic Relation* in Low Dutch, fol. tom. ii. p. 2—7, &c.

† *Ibid.* p. 27.

‡ Others report the *bon mot* thus, "Qu'il ne falloit pas s'ebahir, s'ils "alloyent viſte, parceque leur charge n'eſtoit pas grande." *Mercure François*, tom. xviii. p. 125. *Soldat Suedois*, p. 351. *N. B.* At and near this period there is one thing very remarkable; that the famous *Mercure François* and the *Soldat Suedois* both uſe the ſelfſame words to the amount of a conſiderable number of pages. Now each work, in the parts relative to the preſent period, made its appearance the ſame year, 1633; yet there are reaſons to conclude, that the *Soldat Suedois* is the inconteſtable original, as it was compoſed by Frederic Spanheim, then profeſſor of theology at Geneva, one of the beſt hiſtorians of that age, at the requeſt of the Swediſh ambaſſador to the Swiſs cantons, whom I ſuppoſe to be the chevalier de Rache, a perſon of great parts and addreſs; who knew the interior of Guſtavus's affairs almoſt as well as Oxenſtiern himſelf. This circumſtance reflects no great honour on that *oracle of French hiſtory*, the *Mercure*; which, when compared with the German, Engliſh, Italian, and Scottiſh relations, appears to

count Palatine of Birkenfeld, being newly created general of horſe, had orders to form an army in the marquiſate of Baden, and the diſtrict round Straſburg, in which town Frederic, margrave of Baden-Dourlach, was attempting to bring a negotiation with the inhabitants to concluſion. A treaty was then ſigned with the deputies of the adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg, whom the king reproved with ſome little aſperity, for renouncing the *concluſions* at Leipſic on the firſt approach of the Imperialiſts. Orders were then given to raiſe a ſecond body of troops in Suabia, where Oſſa commanded on the emperor's ſide, and extend the Swediſh influence to the ſource of the Danube; which put the Switzers into no ſmall conſternation, though the duke de Rohan, and the chevalier de Rache, at length explained away and pacified their fears.

By the middle of February his majeſty opened the campaign with the ſiege of Creutznach in the Palatinate, a ſmall town defended with one of the ſtrongeſt caſtles, in point of ſituation, that was to be found in Germany. The peaſants had ſo great an affection for the king's ſervice, that they levelled the roads of their own accord for the approach of his army, and procured him conſtant intelligence. The garriſon conſiſted of 600 veteran Germans, Walloons, and Burgundians. The fortifications roſe one above another in ſuch a manner, on the lower ſide, that Guſtavus called them, being greatly ſurprized when he contemplated, them, *the devil's works**; and one half-moon in particular he named *the devil's head.* For theſe reaſons he made his approach on the other ſide, having ſent to Mentz for ſome new arguments to perſuade the garriſon to liſten to reaſon, and lodged lieutenant-colonel Douglas all night near the walls, at the head of 300 Scots, who had performed ſo well at the ſtorming of Oppenheim.

Guſtavus took a ſurvey of the caſtle, but approached ſo near, that his brave generals, out of pure reſpect, gave him the

to be ſuperficial, defective, and erroneous in numberleſs inſtances. Of courſe it has been our care to ſelect ſparingly from it, except when it is ſupported with collateral confirmations; and we heartily wiſh, that father Bougéant in his elegant hiſtory, as to ſtyle and method, had made it the *companion* of his reſearches, but not the *guide.* Yet in juſtice we muſt acknowledge, that the judicious Le Barre took great precautions; for he examined more than twenty times, THREE books, with his own eyes, and whatever he relates may be depended on with ſafety; whereas Bougéant, in the military, and commonly hiſtorical parts, conſulted only the *Mercure, Lotichius,* and *Puffendorf. Two* of theſe works were not the *beſt,* and the third is extremely *partial, verboſe, and frivolous.*

* *Swediſh Intelligencer,* part ii. p. 77.

the honour of precedency. An huge ſtone hurled from the wall fell little ſhort of putting an end to his curioſity; and a perſon, who ſtood next to him, was ſhot through the brain with a muſquet ball *. Soon afterwards, being diſſatisfied with what he could diſcover, and the more ſo, as he was naturally ſhort-ſighted, he went out privately, and calling to him a ſerjeant, whom he knew perfectly well, as he did half the men that ſerved under him, *Fellow ſoldier*, ſaid he, *clamber up, and take a juſt view of yonder work; here are forty pieces of gold to make you happy afterwards* †.

The ſerjeant performed his buſineſs, and returned unhurt; yet Guſtavus could not reſt contented with his account, but mounting the ſteep of the hill, extended himſelf flat on the ground, to take a view of the fortifications, and made the ſoldier lie by him. Even then he could not command the works as he deſired; ſo diſmiſſing the ſerjeant, he clambered ſtill higher alone; then returning to his army, declared, with a voice of cheerfulneſs, *Now will I be maſter of yonder caſtle by five o'clock to-morrow evening.*

Next morning was ſprung a mine, which opened a ſmall but very ſteep entrance, full of looſe rocks, and difficult of aſcent. A general ſtorm was ordered, and colonel Winckle was to command. The Engliſh volunteers compoſed the van; and lord Craven, who was then very young, lieutenant-colonel Talbot, and Mr. Maſham, marched at the head. As the difficulties of aſcending were almoſt inſurmountable, the aſſailants were repulſed in their firſt attempt, which put Guſtavus into a tranſport of rage; yet at the ſame time he took particular notice of lord Craven's gallant behaviour, and, with a ſmile, patted him on the ſhoulder, and bid him return to the attack, which he did, at the head of all the troops. The conteſt laſted two hours, and was very ſharp and obſtinate, for the beſieged behaved with incredible reſolution. At length a German officer, though the Burgundians and Walloons oppoſed him ſtrenuouſly in what he was going to do, mentioned aloud the words *quarter* and *ſurrender*; and Craven, who was the very foremoſt man, ſeized this incident with a lucky preſence of mind, and giving him his hand thereupon, the firing ceaſed. It muſt be remarked, for the honour of the Swediſh diſcipline, that though the

* *Galeazzo Gualdo* confounds this ſtory, and the king's anſwer thereupon, with a ſimilar accident which happened at the ſiege of Mentz. Libr. iii. p. 81.

† Many particulars relating to this ſiege were tranſmitted from Germany by Sir Jacob Aſtley, who afterwards defended Reading againſt the parliament forces.

town

town was taken by ſtorm, the ſoldiers never once broke their order, or preſumed to open the door of a ſingle inhabitant; which when the townſmen ſaw, they recovered immediately from their terror; beſought the officers and private men to enter their houſes and refreſh themſelves; and poured forth acclamations of joy upon being reſtored to their lawful maſter, the elector Palatine. Guſtavus being piqued at the ſlaughter which the obſtinate defence of this town had cauſed amongſt his men, for it had reſiſted him a whole fortnight, he obliged the garriſon to march out *without* their colours, and not to ſerve againſt him for ſix months on the *eaſtern* ſide of the Moſelle. *If*, ſaid he, *you find me on the weſtern banks*, whither by the way he propoſed to march, *do your worſt, and ſpare me not* *. The loſs in the king's little army, for he conducted only a ſmall detachment, was by no means inconſiderable as to private men: but the death of colonel Halle chagrined him much †, having loſt his brother or kinſman, an excellent commander, in the battle of Leipſic. Not one of the Engliſh officers eſcaped without wounds: lord Craven received the puſh of a pike in his thigh; ſir Francis Vane, brother to the earl of Weſtmoreland, was ſhot in the hip-bone; Maſham was hurt by a large ſtone and a firebrand; and Talbot was killed, ſtanding next man to lord Craven. Colonel Alexander Ramſay, an officer become grey in the Swediſh ſervice, was appointed governor; but not being able to execute the charge, for he lay ill at Wurtzburg of the wounds he received there, his majeſty gave, *pro tempore*, this important poſt to Ramſay's lieutenant-colonel, George Douglas ‡, concerning whoſe conduct, with reference to his maſter, ſomething will be ſaid hereafter. The garriſon, however, as a teſtimony of their bravery, were permitted to depart with their arms. A thouſand loads of corn, and five hundred hogſheads of Rheniſh wine, were found in the caſtle. During this ſiege the king ſent for one of his colonels in a great hurry; the officer returned his duty to his ſovereign, and ſaid he would wait on him the moment his barber had finiſhed. On his arrival, Guſtavus told him, with a little tincture of acrimony, *That he would make an excellent cavalier to conduct a campaign againſt the ladies: whilſt you ſhave, Sir*, ſaid he, *with good fortune, I can take a town* §.

* *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 82.

† *Heylmanni* Leo Arctoüs, p. 47.

‡ This account reconciles the ſeeming contradictions between the Swediſh Intelligencer and Fowler's Life of Douglas, fol. Lond. 1656. p. 216.

§ *Galeazzo Gualdo*, p. 82, libr. ii.

About this time, or rather a few days before, the important town of Ulm conſented to receive a Swediſh garriſon of 1200 men; and ſir Patrick Ruthven, the eldeſt Scottiſh colonel in rank and ſervice *, was appointed governor, and by uncommon vigilance, ſuppreſſed two conſpiracies in their infancy. He was a favourite with his maſter, for different reaſons. He always behaved gallantly in the field; and when the king wanted to regale miniſters and officers of the adverſe party, in order to extract ſecrets from them in their cheerful hours, he made Ruthven field-marſhal of the bottles and glaſſes, as he could drink immeaſurably, and preſerve his underſtanding to the laſt †.

The king next commanded his troops to inveſt Baccharah, but when the trumpeter ſummoned Paul Bredangle, the Spaniſh governor, to ſurrender, he made him a preſent of a dollar, and a bottle of that excellent wine for which the place is ſo famous, returning him many thanks for the honour that was done him. Yet in the event, having loſt the town by ſtorm, he was obliged to capitulate for the caſtle, and duke Bernard allowed him his ſword and horſe. As to the men, they all embraced the Swediſh party, excepting

* His majeſty never liked any general turned of ſixty; and when ſir Patrick Ruthven arrived towards that age, he made him governor of Ulm, by way of a reputable ſinecure.

† I have a very gallant letter by me from this officer to the earl of Northumberland, who had traduced the reputation of a young gentlewoman, whom Ruthven eſteemed, and libelled the whole Scottiſh kingdom in ſome poetical invective; but as upon a nearer examination I find this letter to have appeared in print, it may ſuffice to extract the following paſſages:

"It is probable your lordſhip dares do *any* thing, but *that* which is *good* and juſt.—Think not to bear down theſe matters by greatneſs, or denial; —nor flatter yourſelf to paſs inviſible in your courſes, like another Gyges. —It was never known before, that to refuſe Northumberland's unlawful luſt was a crime for a gentlewoman.—As for me and my countrymen, know, my lord, that ſuch *blows* as come in *rhyme*, are too weak either to reach or harm us.—Sorry I am, that the north muſt now ſee how long it hath been miſtaken in Northumberland's ſpirit; and yet who would not commend your wiſdom in chuſing ſuch a ſafe courſe, to wrong a *woman*, and a *priſoner*: the *one* of which *cannot* and the *other* by nature and quality of the place *may* not, right his own wrong? Wherefore, ſetting aſide the moſt honourable order of the garter, and proteſting whatſoever is here ſaid is no ways intended to the nobility and gentry of England in general; —I do only in regard of *your* perſon affirm, that whatſoever in theſe *infamous* verſes is contained, is *utterly falſe and untrue*; and that yourſelf hath dealt moſt *diſhonourably*, *unworthily*, and *baſely*; and this I will *ever* maintain. If theſe words ſound harſhly in your lordſhip's ears, blame yourſelf.—Forgetting yourſelf, you have taught others how to *diſhonour* you; and remember, that though *nobility* maketh *difference* of perſons, yet *injury* acknowledgeth *none*. Patrick Ruthven." [*MS. in the Aſhmole collection.*]

only one company *. The king then publiſhed a programma †, in order to procure free tranſportation of goods to the Eaſter-fair held at Francfort, and excuſed the merchants from paying duties in thoſe territories that were occupied by his own troops, taking care, at the ſame time, to ſecure all public roads within the limits of his conqueſts from civil inſpectors and military robbers; and, laſtly, to protect Franconia both from France and the eccleſiaſtical electors, he planned out and fortified a city according to his own principles, on the confluence of the Rhine and the Maine, which he called Guſtavuſburg; but the common ſoldiers always named it *The Prieſt's Scourge*; becauſe it gave laws to the three eccleſiaſtical electors, and the neighbouring prelates ‡.

This campaign, one of the greateſt perhaps the world has ever ſeen, all circumſtances rightly and duly conſidered, was opened with immenſe preparations, as times then ſtood, on either ſide; for Guſtavus and his allies produced 100,000 foot and 40,000 horſe, and the Imperialiſts and princes of the catholic league were prepared to bring into the field a greater number of forces.

Walſtein, perhaps from unwillingneſs, was not yet ready to act, but Tilly had aſſembled his army at Nordlingen, and thence diſpatched two detachments, one into Suabia, and one into Bohemia. Impatient to be revenged of the diſgrace received at Leipſic, he determined to fall upon Horn, who lay encamped at Bamberg; the biſhop of which place attended the catholic army, and made no ceremony of cloathing himſelf in armour like a common cavalier.

The Swediſh general had taken this town by compoſition juſt a month before, and lodged a ſufficient force therein, had his ſoldiers not indulged too much in the pleaſures of a rich and plentiful city. The inhabitants formed a conſpiracy, which was debated afterwards with great ſecrecy in the town-hall, and the ſubſtance of their reſolutions communicated to the garriſons of Forcheim and Cronach, who conveyed privately ſome bands of armed men to the aſſiſtance of the Bambergers. At the point of time agreed, one general inſurrection broke out all in an inſtant; but Horn, who laid encamped not far from the walls, hearing the exploſion of muſquets and other noiſes, ruſhed immediately into the city at the head of a regiment or two,

* *Lotichius*; tom. i. 1010. *Heylmanni* Leo Arctoüs, p. 48.

† *Lotichius*; ibid. 1016. ‡ *Galeazzo Gualdo*, libr. ii. 78.

and

and ſoon terrified the conſpirators into obedience. This brave and good man, who copied his maſter in every virtue, had ſuch an abſolute dominion over his paſſions, even in the tranſports of ſudden reſentment and indignation, that he commanded his troops, who in their fury had killed nearly twenty inhabitants, to grant full and unconditional quarter to all the citizens; and as the people of better condition had retired to the public market-place in a body, he gave them all their lives, though moſt of them were then in arms, without terms, and without heſitation. Nor did he allow his ſoldiers, if we except the college of the Jeſuits, which made him no propoſals, to plunder a ſingle church or monaſtery, though the clergy had been particularly active in this conſpiracy. This may be conſidered as more extraordinary, ſince he knew the king diſliked the biſhop of Bamberg more than any prelate in the whole German empire; but judging well, as was his cuſtom, and coolly in all things, he concluded, that abſtinence from bloodſhed, and a moderate contribution, by way of compenſation for paſt offences, were proceedings much more conducive to his maſter's ſervice, as well as his honour, than any reſentments or retaliation could poſſibly be; and therefore, with great dexterity of good ſenſe, he affected rather to fix the foundations of the crime on the intemperance and negligence of the Swediſh garriſon, which tempted the inhabitants into a rebellion*.

Tilly approached Bamberg at the head of 16,000 men: Horn had only 10,000 or 12,000. The former, by a ſort of concealed march, advanced near the Swedes before they were apprized of his motions; nevertheleſs, Horn on the firſt notice made the round of the trenches, for his army laid partly in the town, and partly in the fields near it. The intrenchments he had begun to throw up were of vaſt extent, for Bamberg, not being ſurrounded with walls, is called the largeſt village in Germany. He then ordered Bauditzen's regiment to be drawn up as a corps de reſerve in one part of the city; but the lieutenant-colonel, miſunderſtanding the orders that were ſent him, marched directly into the fields, and fell into an ambuſcade. The retreat of this regiment gave the alarm to that of count Solmes, and as the latter was compoſed of new raiſed men, they ſoon gave way before 2000 Imperialiſts, who charged them under the command of Cratz and Farenbach, at the head of the old regiment of Cronenberg's cavalry. Horn had now no reſource,

* *Bertius* de Bellis German, p. 154, &c.

except to retire and ſecure the bridge; but Farenbach's diviſion preſſed ſo hard upon his heels, that they entered the head of the bridge pell-mell with Horn's people; and if Horn had not valiantly repulſed them in the ſuburbs, with ſuch few ſcattered troops as he could collect together, the day had been loſt; for the old regiments, in whom he placed his only confidence, had not yet formed themſelves in the town, and, fortunately for him, the groſs of the catholic army had a march of half a mile ſtill to perform. Tilly, who had experience enough not to let ſlip ſo favourable an opportunity, diſpatched, in a ſort of gallop, the flower of his cavalry to ſecure the bridge; but Horn had contrived in the ſpace of twenty minutes to blow up a part of it, and barricado the remainder; ſo that the reſidue of the day was employed in a continued diſcharge of muſquetry. However, towards evening the Imperialiſts brought two pieces of cannon to act againſt the temporary fortifications raiſed by the Swedes, which determined Horn to retire, after he had embarked his baggage, artillery, and ammunition on the river Maine. Himſelf, at the head of Bauditzen's regiment of horſe, ſecured the rear, and croſſing the Maine at Eltman, he broke that bridge behind him, as alſo another, which he paſſed at Halſtadt. He then wrote the king a very ſenſible letter *, informing him, how he had declared previouſly in a council of war, that a naked town of ſuch vaſt extent was no ways defenſible: and that he had been diſappointed of the reinforcement which duke William of Weimar had engaged to bring him, on which he repoſed his greateſt confidence. He then gave an ample narrative of the whole tranſaction, which, bating the ſuppreſſion of a ſlight circumſtance or two that made againſt him, correſponds exactly with all my other accounts, and of courſe due regard has been paid to it. The king, who conſidered a well managed retreat to be a better proof of military genius on ſome occaſions, than even a victory, ſat down highly contented with the prudence and dexterity of his lieutenant-general.

This ſlight diſgrace, which Guſtavus uſed to call a mere *caçade*, was the firſt the Swediſh army had undergone ſince its entrance into Germany. This misfortune may be attributed to various cauſes, ſuch as miſunderſtanding the general's meſſage, the cowardice as well as negligence of Solmes's regiment, for, not being uſed to labour, they had omitted to fortify their ſtation with any entrenchments;

* Dated from Gelterſheim, March 7, 1631-2.

whereas,

whereas, on the contrary, the other ſoldiers in the Swediſh ſervice were accuſtomed to be their own pioneers; and Horn, though otherwiſe an excellent officer, and remarkably cautious, ſeems in this inſtance partly blameable, as he neglected to furniſh himſelf with better intelligence. Yet, many excuſes may be offered in his extenuation. The commanders in thoſe days had the diſpoſal of no money for ſecret ſervices, and the genius and turn of war dealt more in ſurprizes and ambuſcade than it has ſince.—The Swedes loſt about 600 men in the engagement and retreat, and about 500 were taken priſoners. Count Solmes received a muſquet ball in his foot, and died of the fever it occaſioned ſome weeks afterwards.

Tilly entered Bamberg the next morning, and diſpatched the cavalry of Breda's and d'Eſpagui's regiments, and the whole corps of Croatians, after the fugitives. They deſtroyed and picked up a conſiderable number of ſtragglers on the road; but Horn contended hard for every diſputable inch of ground, and made them ſenſible more than once, that he was only marching, not flying from Tilly.

The elector of Bavaria, than whom nobody judged better in their own affairs, had private reaſons to be mortified even at this ſucceſs of his general, for he feared leſt an attack of ſo briſk a nature might exaſperate Guſtavus, and induce him to croſs the Danube, and pay a viſit to Munich, by way of retaliation. Horn, impatient of revenging himſelf, had the dexterity to procure intelligence, that a large body of Imperialiſts were ſecure in their quarters, at half a league from Bamberg. Marching therefore, by night, at the head of his cavalry, and conducted by a peaſant through a large wood, he almoſt ruined the two horſe regiments of Plancard and young Merodé, which latter officer was glad to make his eſcape with nothing on but his drawers. Four companies avoided the ill fate of their comrades, being ordered out an hour before to eſcort a convoy. The Croatians diſlodged on the firſt attack; nevertheleſs, one part of them threw themſelves into a churchyard which was walled round, and as Horn had no muſqueteers with him, he found it impoſſible to force them. Tilly now moved forwards with all his army, in order to bring matters to a general battle; but Horn diſpoſed his troops in ſuch a manner, that the wary Walloon did not think proper to engage him*.

His

* This great man, whom Guſtavus uſed to call *his right arm*, kept alive the glory of Sweden till after the peace of Munſter. His very enemies admired

His majeſty, impatient of the ſlight diſgrace which had thus befallen his lieutenant-general, grew impatient to give Tilly

admired him, for his extraordinary clemency to the perfidious town of Bamberg, and for his tenderneſs and humanity to the Romiſh clergy; inſomuch that the writers of that party give him the character of *merciful, quamvis hæreticæ ſuperſtitionis cultor.* He was an exact diſciplinarian, and kept up the ſtricteſt religion amongſt his troops.

At the ſiege of Biberach near Ulm, 1634, he had been extremely ill uſed by the governor, who had held out till reſiſtance was a ſort of madneſs. All things being prepared for a general ſtorm, the fury of which it was imagined nothing could reſiſt, a trumpeter made an offer of capitulating; but Horn enraged beyond meaſure declared peremptorily, he would ſacrifice the commander and his garriſon to their obſtinacy. In that inſtant a crowd of young women of condition iſſued out of the town; one ſeized his ſtirrup, the others fell down on their knees, weeping and filling the air with their lamentations. Horn ſoon diſcovered ſigns of emotion, and, changing in a moment the ſeverity of his countenance into a look of graciouſneſs, mildly deſired, that one would be pleaſed to repreſent the requeſts of the whole body. Upon this a young lady, bolder than the reſt, took the legation upon her, and told him in that broken interrupted eloquence, which nature inſpires upon theſe occaſions, That they aſked for the preſervation of their honour, and the lives of their innocent relations. His anſwer was to this effect: "I lay my indignation, my reſentments, my injuries, and revenge, at your feet. Tell that blockhead and brute of a governor, colonel Straſholt, I reſpect your tears, as much as I deſpiſe his ſword. Let him ſend a trumpeter to me, and receive conditions. Heaven knows, I thankfully embrace the opportunity of ſaving the lives of the innocent, inſtead of maſſacreing a herd of barbarian ſoldiers" [*Bertius* de Bellis Germanicis, p. 558, &c.]—Nevertheleſs, he diſarmed the garriſon, and would not allow it to march out with any one mark of military honour.

Benedictions were poured upon him in abundance, and it is probable the fair ſex made this effort upon his reſolution, as it was well known he had married Oxenſtiern's daughter, one of the moſt beautiful and virtuous women in Sweden, and that he and his wife had been a pattern of conjugal conſtancy and affection. He left this excellent creature, and two children, all whom died of the plague, in the year 1631, and, what is more remarkable, held her in his arms for ſeveral hours till the very moment ſhe expired. He then tranſported her body to Sweden in a ſilver coffin, and, though a young man, never forgot her ſo far as to venture upon ſecond nuptials. [*Monro's Exped.* Part ii. 29.]

He puſhed the Swediſh arms as far as the town of Conſtance, the ſiege of which did him great honour; but never ſhewed himſelf a greater man, than at the council of war preceding the fatal battle of Nordlingen, 1634; and though the duke of Weimar, in a tranſport of youthful rage, dropped ſome inſinuations, which proved he did not then diſtinguiſh between calmneſs and courage in a brother general, yet Horn neither gave him an unkind look, nor a ſevere anſwer, but ſubmitted patiently to the opinions of the younger and more impetuous officers, behaved like a lion in the day of action, led his men on to fifteen ſeveral attacks, in order to poſſeſs three half moons in the enemy's intrenchments, ſtaid upon the field almoſt the laſt man, and in co-operation with Cratz effected the orderly retreat of the Swediſh army, which otherwiſe muſt have been maſſacred without redemption. This generous conduct pierced duke Bernard to the very ſoul: for, after the battle was over, he tore his hair and beat his breaſt, like a perſon diſtracted:

Tilly the deciſive blow; not but that a diverſion of ſuch a nature was at this time diſagreeable to him: for having embarked his artillery on the Rhine, he had fixed his thoughts upon beſieging Cologn, a place at that time meanly fortified and thinly garriſoned, but abounding in wealth; inaſmuch as the whole nobility and gentry round had there depoſited all their riches and valuable moveables *. The king was piqued likewiſe at the elector's † conduct, who had tried all colluſions with him in a treaty lately propoſed between them ‡: which indeed was not unlikely to happen; for

I, ſaid he, am the ignorant ſoldier, and Horn is the wiſe man.—Where is the brave and experienced camp-maſter general?—Alas, he is a priſoner, he is a priſoner!—and fortune has cruelly reſerved me, to be walking about the world in full liberty.

The Imperialiſts carried Horn directly to the king of Hungary's tent, where the cardinal infant then was. He politely made an offer to kneel and kiſs their hands; they both raiſed him, and told him they would accept the mark of his eſteem, if he would perform the compliment ſtanding. The king ſaid he could not but congratulate himſelf upon overcoming, by any accident, the braveſt and beſt man in the Swediſh ſervice: to which the general modeſtly replied, That fortune had been kind to him in the midſt of her ſeverity, by conſigning him to ſuch generous hands. He then retired to a tent appropriated for him, where the principal Imperial commanders paid him a viſit of ceremony. Yet, in ſpite of theſe civilities, the houſe of Auſtria knew his merit too well to releaſe him on a ſudden, but kept him priſoner upon parole *for eight years only*. He was at length exchanged againſt John de Wert, whom the French had taken. Horn went directly to Paris, to return thanks to the king, who treated him moſt magnificently, and made him a preſent of a ſword ſet with diamonds, valued at 2000l.

A genius like Horn could not live idle during a long impriſonment, for he compoſed in his ſolitude a *Treatiſe on the Duties of a complete and perfect General.* [Schefferi Memorab. Sueciæ Gentis, p. 49.] I had once hopes of procuring a tranſcript of this MS. which, whenever it chances to be publiſhed, if the MS. mentioned to me proves the ſame, for it was only ſaid by a German profeſſor, that it was written by one of Guſtavus's principal generals, may prove the moſt ſcientific book in the art of war.

Had Oxenſtiern liſtened to the advice of this commander, who flew to him at Frankfort on the occaſion, it is probable the Swedes had not loſt the alliance of the elector of Saxony; for that prince could not bear, that the duke de Weimar, deſcended from the right Saxon line, which Charles V. had diſplaced, ſhould be a general in chief, and preſcribe laws to him.

I ſhall obſerve, laſtly, that it was always Horn's cuſtom to mark the *countenance* of his men before an engagement, thoſe near him with his naked eye, and thoſe more remote by the help of a pocket-glaſs; and if he diſcovered any marks of irreſolution in their looks, he always marched them up briſkly againſt the enemy; alledging as a reaſon, that this manœuvre gave a flow to their ſpirits, and infuſed into them a certain idea of ſuperiority; a practice the late earl of Peterborough always copied in his Spaniſh campaigns, as he himſelf aſſured me, and from the ſame motive.

* *Brachelii* Hiſt. noſtr. temporum, 277.

† Ferdinand; biſhop of Paderborn.

‡ The plan of it is ſtill preſerved. It conſiſted of eleven articles; in ſome of which great care is taken of the proteſtant intereſts.

for that prelate, beſides being ſtrongly attached to his brother the duke of Bavaria, poſſeſſed with him the arts of diſſimulation, ſagacity, and intrigue, in a high degree. Of courſe, he had negotiated more or leſs with Guſtavus ever ſince he advanced into Franconia; yet at the ſame time contrived the embaſſy which the biſhop of Wurtzburg undertook to execute in France. No man was more zealous in promoting the *edict of reſtitution*, yet after the battle of Leipſic it was cuſtomary for him to ſay, "How inconſiſtent is *that* Imperial decree, which purpoſes to recover cloiſters at the expence of biſhopricks!" In a word, he was the firſt man who diſcovered Pappenheim's genius, and that alone ſhows his diſcernment.

Guſtavus now, contrary to his original intentions, was obliged to ſpare him. In ſpite therefore of wintry torrents and miry roads, he marched from Francfort to Aſchaffenberg, and at length joined Horn at Gelderſheim, where the combined armies amounted to 30,000 effective ſoldiers. Expecting, ſtill, freſh reinforcements from the ſeveral bodies of men that acted under Banier and others, he made a viſit to Wurtzburg, in company with the elector Palatine, and returned, next morning, to Kitzingen *, where he had eſtabliſhed the general rendezvous of all his troops, cantoned in that neighbourhood.

Tilly, alarmed at theſe indications of a ſharp campaign, appriſed, likewiſe, that Walſtein was determined to *ſacrifice* him; and that his maſter, the elector of Bavaria, was much diſſatisfied with his late enterpriſe, made the beſt retreat he could through the Palatinate, draining all the garriſons as he paſſed along, in order to cover the frontiers of Bavaria with the whole force he could poſſibly collect. Guſtavus, on the other hand, apprehenſive that Walſtein might be obliged, contrary to his inclination and intentions, to form a junction with Tilly's army, determined to incapacitate the latter as ſoon as poſſible; and the rather, becauſe Tilly began to diſtruſt his men and his own fortune. This ſlight misfortune, which had befallen Horn, compelled the king not only to make a forced march, and ſuccour his general, but induced him likewiſe, by imperceptible degrees, to make an irruption into Bavaria ſomewhat ſooner than he firſt intended, and broke the project he had formed of beſieging Cologn, inveſting Heidelberg

* The biſhop of Wurtzburg, five years before, ſeized this town and ſignory, during the minority of the margrave of Anſpach; and that prelate and his ſucceſſors have had the dexterity to retain them ever ſince.

and

and purging the Lower Palatinate of all the Spaniſh forces. It remained, therefore, only for him to give the command of the army, which was to act on the Upper Rhine, to Chriſtian count Palatine of Birkenfelt, and duke Bernard of Saxe Weimar; but theſe two officers greatly injured the common cauſe by their miſunderſtandings and jealouſies; inſomuch that Oxenſtiern, ſupreme director in thoſe parts, poſitively declared it was more expedient to entruſt great military employs to men of moderate rank and parentage; ſince princes and perſons of very noble extraction, overlooking reproof, and conſidering themſelves as a ſort of beings placed beyond the reach of ſoldierlike enquiries, executed juſt ſo much of the orders given them, as ſuited their own humours and intereſts.

Maximilian, perceiving the tempeſt to direct its courſe againſt Bavaria, once had a mind to diſpatch his orders to Tilly, and command him to retire into Bohemia or Auſtria, which conſequently would draw the war after him into the hereditary dominions. This would certainly have proved his beſt policy; for Walſtein, upon reſuming the command, muſt then have acted vigorouſly and in earneſt. But the elector wanted courage, or quickneſs of determination, though far from being deficient in either reſpect, to make this *maſterly diverſion*, conſcious of being himſelf the firebrand that had kindled up this dreadful blaze of war, and fearing to diſmantle his own frontiers, and leave them naked to the revenge of the proteſtants, who conſidered him as the prime cauſe of their miſeries. Ferdinand too, who had reaſon to be diſpleaſed with Bavarian duplicity, was perhaps not ſorry to ſee Walſtein lie by, and have the power to give his troops a moment's refreſhment: and Walſtein, on the other hand, was not diſſatisfied to behold the two men he mortally hated, hard preſſed by a victorious monarch. He therefore poſitively refuſed to join Tilly, under pretext, that his army was not yet in condition to take the field, and alledging, by way of excuſe, that Guſtavus would haraſs out and conſume the Imperial forces, whoſe duty it was to conteſt the paſſage of ſo many diſputable rivers as protect Bavaria on that ſide:——and indeed few countries in Europe are better fortified with running waters, than the electorate is in thoſe parts through which Guſtavus was obliged to make his irruption.

Thus his majeſty purſued Tilly ſtep by ſtep, and ſucceeded him more times than once in the ſame bed, at the diſtance only of four and twenty hours. The city of Nurenberg, which had been always generouſly true to the proteſtant cauſe,

cauſe, received him with open arms *; entertained him ſumptuouſly; and preſented him with a pair of ſilver globes of a conſiderable ſize, which taught him to carry on the war, not ſo much in a geographical ſenſe, for there the king wanted no lights, as in a military one, for their inſides were filled with new-coined ducats; and as the Germans always love the *alluſive* and *emblematical*, the concealed meaning of the preſent was, that the terreſtrial globe implied conqueſt on earth, and the celeſtial one a crown of glory hereafter in heaven: a conception not unworthy of the very beſt Italian poets.

As the Imperialiſts had it in their power to have taken Nurenberg by ſtorm or ſiege, it was thought a great omiſſion in them to leave a town of ſuch wealth and conſequence open and defenceleſs to the king of Sweden. The truth of the caſe ſtood thus: Walſtein was too far off, and wanted beſides to embroil matters in that part of the empire; and the elector and Tilly were ſo alarmed that they could not ſpare a ſingle man from the defence of Bavaria.

Wilſburg caſtle was directly in his majeſty's way. It was ſo ſituated, had he been fortunate enough to have conquered it, as to have been highly ſerviceable not only to the Swedes, but to all the proteſtant powers in the circle of Franconia. For theſe reaſons, the elector, ſome weeks before, had commanded Tilly to ſecure this ſtrong paſs and fortreſs, which he eaſily effected by terrifying the lawful owner, the margravine of Anſpach, and her children, who maintained it only with a few ſoldiers and their own domeſtics. The king, in the moſt cautious and beſt-guarded terms, demanded this place in behalf of its natural and legal poſſeſſor; and aſſured the governor, he might hope for the moſt punctual good uſage that could be imagined, with regard to his father's lands and caſtle, which laid juſt by. No arguments could prevail on a young military enthuſiaſt of the name of Pappenheim, and only ſon to that general †. He very reſpectfully

* *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation* in Low Dutch, tom. ii. p. 59.

† Though moſt hiſtorians call this young man Pappenheim's ſon, yet they have not been aware of a certain chronological difficulty. Pappenheim's firſt wife, Ludomilla, counteſs of Colorath, brought him only one child, named Wolf-gang Adam, and he was born in 1618. By his ſecond wife, Anna Elizabetha, counteſs of Oetingen, he had no offspring. Therefore, by this account, the young man here mentioned could be little more than thirteen years old: which makes me ſuſpect, that the perſon in queſtion was a nephew of the general. That there lurks ſome concealed miſtake, is plain, becauſe other hiſtorians call him young Tilly, whereas that commander was never married.

Pappenheim's

reſpectfully ſent his majeſty word, *That the ruins of Wilſburg-caſtle ſhould be his monument.* Guſtavus believed him on his father's account, and for the firſt time took the anſwer of a governor of a town in part of payment.

Banier, during this delay of two days, inveſted Neuburg, the reſidence of the duke who bears that title; but having ſummoned the commander, and received a poſitive refuſal, he marched away without loſs of time. Guſtavus made himſelf very merry with the conduct of his general, and aſked him, *if he thought to take a city by a paltry epiſtle*?* Nevertheleſs, the town was ſoon afterwards evacuated voluntarily by Tilly's troops. His majeſty had reaſon to be afflicted, for he was not really angry, at Banier's diſappointment. He in truth, was not ſtrong enough to beſiege Neuburg in form, nor was there time to ſpare, becauſe the poſſeſſion of it, at that juncture, would have given free entrance into Bavaria, and ſaved the paſſage of the Lech.

As the ſharpneſs of this winter, which happened to be uncommonly ſevere, gave no check to the operations of war, ſo of courſe it put no ſtop to the briſkneſs of negotiating and intriguing. Cardinal Paſinan, to whom Walſtein was nearly related by marriage, croſſed the Alps to make a ſecond effort in Italy, charged with an abundance of invectives, and prepared to harangue on the ſtupendous progreſſes of our proteſtant hero, who, to uſe the orator's own words, was determined to extirpate the whole catholic religion; tear up the very foundation of the ſacred ſee; and invade Italy itſelf in the character of another Attila. It was ſuggeſted likewiſe, that the king of Spain had neglected Italy, the Low Countries, and both the Indies, in order to ſupport the catholic religion; ſo that its ſubverſion, in caſe ſuch an unfortunate event ſhould ever take place, muſt be attributed only to the lukewarmneſs and inattention of Chriſt's vicegerent†. Under this ambaſſador extraordinary, acted, likewiſe, as reſident ambaſſador, and not *pro tempore*, the duke de Savelli; diſpatched by the emperor on the ſame errand, and now fulfilling Guſtavus's prediction, that

Pappenheim's ſon, in the year 1647, was ſhot through the arm and heart in a duel, by general Goltz, whom he challenged at Colloredo's table, for ſpeaking diſreſpectfully of his friend, ſerjeant-major-general Sperreüter. Coloredo placed guards at the town-gates, to prevent any ill conſequence, for no duel could be fought in a camp, or where the commander in chief reſided, but the combatants conveyed themſelves down the ramparts, and ſent their horſes privately into the fields. Chriſtopher count Walſtein, and colonel Schevaliſki, were their ſeconds. *Waſſenbergii Florus* Germ. p. 800.

* *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. 140. † *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 243.

that he would become the ſlaſhed doublet better than the cuiraſs. With both theſe the Spaniſh miniſter concurred vigorouſly; and Borgia, who, if I miſtake not, was then cardinal-ſecretary, gave them all the aſſiſtance in his power; for the court of Madrid had lately purchaſed his friendſhip by beſtowing on him the archbiſhopric of Seville, a ſlight retaining fee, which amounted to ſomething more than £.30,000, a year. Eleven Spaniſh and Italian cardinals attended the Auſtrian ambaſſadors to the Vatican on the day of audience, but the Pope would not allow them to be preſent. After a full diſcuſſion of arguments on either ſide, it appeared, that the opinions of the conclave were divided; which enraged the Spaniſh faction to ſuch a degree, that Paſman took the liberty to give vent to his paſſions in an oration equally furious and unguarded. The Pope, who was ſecretly inclinable to the oppoſite ſide of the queſtion, felt himſelf hurt to hear his conduct ſo ſeverely ſcrutinized in public aſſembly by a cardinal; and told Paſman in reply, that the emperor fairly merited all the difficulties that had befallen him, having waſted both his treaſures and his troops by carrying an unjuſt war into Italy: otherwiſe, he might have chaſtiſed Guſtavus at his own leiſure, and upon his own terms. That ſtories of Alarics and Attilas might ſerve very well to embelliſh a romance; and as for the irruptions of Goths and Vandals, without going back to Procopius and other antient hiſtorians, he could ſuggeſt an inſtance of more recent date to the houſe of Auſtria, that happened only in the preceding century; during the fury of which, all Italy was deſolated, and Rome itſelf ſacked and plundered. He obſerved likewiſe, that the proceſſions of Charles V. in Spain, where liberty was the pretext, whilſt the knife was held to his throat, had added ſolemn mockery to determined injuſtice; and convinced mankind, that ambition paſſed precipitately over all bounds; and that the barbarians of the north were not the only enemies of Chriſt's church *, . . . . That for his own part, he knew his duty, and took care to perform it; and for theſe reaſons did not greatly reliſh any invectives againſt his conduct and government; and added laſtly, which appears to be a very extraordinary effort of indignation, That the *proteſtant Viſigoth*, to carry on Paſman's alluſion, ſhewed leſs ſpirit of perſecution than the *catholic Cæſar*, ſince the wars of Guſtavus affected neither the conſciences of men,

* *Fr. Spanheim, Soldat Sued.* 342.

nor

nor the altars of the Supreme Being; and that fewer outrages, and acts of rapine and cruelty, had been committed ſince the battle of Leipſic, than had been perpetrated in Italy, at and after the ſiege of Mantua. Thence recurring to his own conduct, he remarked briefly, That to traduce his adminiſtration was eaſy; to arraign, and convict it, extremely difficult.

The holy father having thus diſburthened his mind, by giving vent to his private opinions, frankly made an offer of ſome pecuniary aſſiſtance to the emperor, though much inferior to what the court of Vienna expected. However he excuſed himſelf by ſetting forth the enormous expences in which the Mantuan war had involved him; and this being too true, the Imperial party made no attempts to invalidate his aſſertion. Nevertheleſs, for decency's ſake, he thought fit to make up the deficiency of money by ſpiritual bounty, and of courſe appointed an univerſal jubilee, made a proceſſion in perſon to the churches of St. Peter, and St. John de Lateran, and publiſhed a brief, wherein he exhorted all catholic princes to extirpate hereſy, and unite in the bond of friendſhip againſt the common enemy. The Imperial deputies declared roundly, that this ſort of paper-credit would neither wage war, nor pay the ſoldiery *.

Antony baron de Rabata, governor of Gradiſca, counſellor and chamberlain to the emperor, had been diſpatched to the princes and republics of Italy on the ſame errand, and under the patronage of Vienna and Madrid: but the Doge and ſenate of Venice gave him fine ſpeeches inſtead of ſubſidies, alledging, as the Pope had urged before, that the Mantuan war had entirely diſcompoſed the ſtate of their finances; ſo that the two goddeſſes of the Megarenſians, which then preſided in the Venetian government, namely, *Poverty* and *Impoſſibility*, reſtrained them abſolutely from imparting any ſupplies to his Imperial majeſty. The latent truth was, the republic had entered into a good underſtanding with Guſtavus ſome months before †. The common-wealths of Genoa and Lucca held the ſame language: nevertheleſs, the grand duke of Tuſcany, allured with the hopes of being created king of Etruria ‡, made a promiſe of actual aſſiſtances, proportionate to his circumſtances, though perhaps not adequate to the neceſſities of his friends; and the duke of Modena engaged likewiſe to ſend ſome troops,

* *Fr. Spanheim, Soldat Sued.* 344.

† *Chemnitii* Bellum Sueco Germanicum, tom. i. 244.

‡ *Idem.* Ibid.

or

or conduct them himſelf. When Rabata made his entrance into Mantua, the populace roſe with an intention to murder him. The duke compoſed the tumult with great moderation, and pointing in dumb ſhow to the ruins occaſioned by the laſt ſiege, gave the ambaſſador to underſtand that all he could hope was to retreat in ſafety.

Meanwhile Guſtavus, as Tilly had retired from the Upper Palatinate into Bavaria, and broken down all the bridges on the Danube, from Rayne to Neuburg, except only that of Donawert, over which he paſſed his army, foreſeeing wiſely, that a young enthuſiaſt, like Pappenheim, might create ſome untoward check in the progreſs of his affairs, reſolved at once to leave Wilſburg-caſtle to the chance of accidents *, and inveſt Donawert with all poſſible expedition, as Tilly was then labouring to erect a formidable fortification on a little hill near the town. So that if by an extraordinary effort he had not prevented this work from advancing to any tolerable degree of perfection, it is probable, in caſe of receiving a repulſe, he muſt have marched ſeventy miles to Ulm, no road being paſſable for the main army, at that ſeaſon, but by way of Nordlingen, in order to have croſſed the Danube at the place firſt mentioned. Donawert therefore was of great conſequence to the king, not barely in point of proximity, but as the paſſage has ever been conſidered the key of admiſſion into that part of Suabia which leads to Bavaria, acroſs the Lech. Of courſe, having reviewed his army, and received duke William of Weimar's reinforcement, he advanced thirty miles, from Wilſburg to Donawert, in a day and a half, and contrived to take the town and cloiſter of Kayſerſheim, a rich abbey of Ciſtertians, as he paſſed along.

Rodolphus duke of Saxe Lauenberg, the ſame who had reſcued Tilly at the battle of Leipſic, commanded the garriſon, then in Donawert, conſiſting of 1200 regular foot, a body of trained-bands, and ſome companies of Cronenberg's dragoons. His majeſty having made himſelf maſter of an important outwork, to the north-eaſt, from whence the defendants retired into the town by means of a concealed *gallery*, diſpatched a trumpeter to ſummon the governor to capitulate. He returned only this ſhort anſwer, That the king, better than any perſon living, knew the duty of a ſet of men, who had nothing to rely on but honour and the

* The king left a garriſon at Weiſſenberg, which ſtands about a mile from Wilſburg, under the command of colonel Sperreüter, to prevent young Pappenheim's incurſions.

point

point of the ſword: and that he had no tribute to pay his majeſty, except in gunpowder *. Upon this, both parties performed their reſpective buſineſs with great earneſtneſs. The garriſon made a very furious ſally, and one company of Cronenberg's men penetrated half through the Swediſh lines. In repulſing this ſally, the commanding officer, a Scotſman, behaved ill; but Guſtavus pardoned him at the interceſſion of his countrymen, having firſt degraded him. The battery, conſiſting of twenty huge pieces of cannon, which the king raiſed on the north-eaſt ſide, only ſheered the bridge ſideways, without performing ſuch execution as was firſt expected; two circumſtances which induced him, at Hepburn's ſuggeſtion, to conſider the ſituation of the town with more attention. Obſerving to the weſtward an angle of ground formed by the influx of the Wernitz into the Danube, which angle commanded the bridge that croſſed the latter river, and leads to Bavaria, for Donawert ſtands on the northern bank; he, without delay, gave Hepburn orders to march his own brigade five miles up the Wernitz, where was the bridge of Haſfort, and then deſcending along the oppoſite ſhore, to poſt his men in the angle of confluence after ſuch a manner, as to command the Danube-bridge by his field-pieces, and even his muſquetry; which poſition made it difficult for the beſieged either to eſcape or receive ſuccours. Hepburn, who took with him lord Craven, Maſham, and all the Engliſh volunteers, conducted his men, in ſilence, to the place appointed, and lodged them a little after midnight along the garden-walls, ditches, and hedges, flanking the paſſage acroſs the river. The governor, perceiving himſelf inveſted on every ſide, grew inwardly diſcontented, and wiſhed to capitulate; Tilly at that time not being able to raiſe the ſiege. However, as he was not ſatisfied with the thoughts of ſurrendering upon diſhonorable terms, he conceived a ſudden reſolution, as the breach to the north-eaſt was now rendered aſſaultable, to paſs the bridge on the king's ſide at break of day the next morning, in deſpite of all the Swediſh muſquetry and artillery. This deſign however got wind, for the Swedes overheard a hurry in the town, and the loading of baggage-waggons about midnight. The duke, it is true, paſſed the bridge, but ſaved only a handful of men, for the fire that he ſuſtained was very ſevere. The reſidue of the gar-

* *Swed. Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 135—138. *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 254.

riſon,

riſon, having firſt made an unſucceſsful ſally at the Wernitz-gate, attempted to croſs the bridge on Hepburn's ſide, who gave them alſo a ſoldierlike reception. Nevertheleſs, they cleared their paſſage at all events, and contrived to break the bridge behind them in an imperfect manner, and barricadoed the town-gate with numberleſs loads of dung, the removal of which coſt the Swedes ſo much time, that the rear of the garriſon ſecured their eſcape, loſing however upon the whole not leſs than 500 men. Meanwhile the king ſtormed the town walls and Leathern-tower [*Lederthor*] ſword in hand; and as many baggage-waggons ſtood laden in the ſtreets, it was with great difficulty he could reſtrain his ſoldiers from pillaging them, and the whole city; which, according to the uſage of war, was looked upon in the right of fair plunder. The king then ſecured the north banks of the Danube as far as Ulm.

Thus the town of Donawert was beſieged and taken in forty-eight hours, though ſtrongly garriſoned, and ſituated on a ſteep hill; and the loſs was conſidered the more ominous, as it happened to fall into the hands of the Swedes on the elector of Bavaria's birthday. This city, once Imperial, had been placed under the ban of the empire in 1606, and at length regained its civil and religious liberties, by the means of the great proteſtant deliverer, Guſtavus. Solmes's regiment of infantry, which had behaved ſo ill in the late action at Bamberg, was placed there by way of garriſon; for the king did not chuſe to truſt that body of troops in the day of battle. He then returned Hepburn public thanks, for ſuggeſting the idea of croſſing the Wernitz, and for executing his plan with ſuch judgment and valour.

No ſooner was the town of Donawert taken, but the king ordered this officer to throw up a ſtrong half-moon, and intrench his brigade at the foot of the bridge, next Bavaria; and then diſpatched the Bohemian baron Cochtitzki, at the head of ſome choſen cavalry and dragoons, to purſue the fugitives. His majeſty repoſed himſelf at Donawert four days, partly to prepare matters for the great incident now approaching, and partly to reſtore and new fortify this important paſſage, as a ſafe and ſecure key of retreat, in caſe of diſappointments or diſaſters. Yet the bulk of the army was not idle; for ſuch as did not act the part of engineers, pioneers, and mechanics, made incurſions into Swabia, where many towns of conſequence, ſome of which belonged to the emperor, were all taken ſword in hand; as Guntzburg, the capital of the Burgau, the rich abbey of Elchingen, Gundelfingen,

ſingen, Lauingen, Hochſtadt*, Dillingen, where the biſhop of Augſburg uſually reſides, and Kirchberg; beſides a ſtrong caſtle on the banks of the Lech, called, if I miſtake not, Obernſdorf, belonging to the rich family of the Fuggers. In this enterpriſe Hepburn commanded; and though the place was well ſupplied and ſtrongly fortified, yet the garriſon was ſeized with a ſudden panic, and moſtly periſhed in attempting to eſcape.

During this interval of repoſe, as matters now began to wear a very ſerious aſpect, a trumpeter was ſent blindfolded to the king, with orders to ſolicit letters of ſafe-conduct for the French ambaſſador then reſiding at Munich. At firſt Guſtavus gave him a poſitive refuſal; but knowing his own firmneſs, and determined not to ſuffer his generoſity to be abuſed a ſecond time, he at length conſented. This ambaſſador was named St. Etienne. Nature had given him a plentiful portion of national vivacity; and it is probable, likewiſe, he preſumed too much upon being nearly related to father Joſeph, who held a correſpondence with Guſtavus and Oxenſtiern. One day he had the confidence to tell the king, that if he did not ſpare the catholic princes, his moſt Chriſtian majeſty would be obliged to march an army into Germany, in order to ſupport them; ſince they had all expreſſed an earneſt deſire to ſhelter themſelves under the protection of France. *Agreed*, replied Guſtavus, thoroughly exaſperated; *nevertheleſs, the king, your maſter, may ſpare himſelf the trouble of a long journey into Germany: let him only expreſs a deſire to make a campaign againſt me, and I will treat him with a battle under the walls of his own metropolis.*

France and her miniſtry ſtill perſiſted to interfere under one pretext or other; and therefore ſome few days after theſe conferences †, a treaty ‡ was propoſed between Louis XIII. and the elector of Triers, by virtue of which the former engaged, not only to aſſiſt the ſaid elector againſt all his enemies, but oblige the Swedes to evacuate the electorate of Triers and biſhopric of Spires, which belonged likewiſe to this prelate. In order thoroughly to underſtand an affair ſo intricate, it may not be amiſs to remind the reader, that France had long languiſhed

* There are many towns of this name in Germany; but here the duke of Marlborough and prince Eugene gained a complete victory over the French and Bavarians, Aug. 13, 1704.

† April 9, 1632, at Ehrenbreitſtein, otherwiſe Hermanſtein.

‡ See the APPENDIX, Art. XXVIII. *Firſt Edition*, 4°.

to receive this electorate under her patronage, and for this purpose had dispatched the count de Brullon to Triers, just to sow the seeds of those future incidents, which La Saludie* was now commanded to bring to maturity.

Indeed the elector, out of fervent zeal for the interests of the catholic league, had reduced himself into a very precarious as well as dangerous situation; for the Spaniards possessed Coblentz, and most of the strong places in his dominions; and though Gustavus, at the intercession of France, during the negotiation of the truce, had generously restored to him the important fortress of Ehrenbreitstein, yet that monarch, now, enraged to the heart at the barbarous murder of a young count Solmes, cut to pieces, together with his followers, by a party of electoral troops, made no scruple to declare, in the transports of his resentment, that he would dislodge the elector in person from his castle, then supposed to be impregnable. Dismayed and astonished at these menaces, the elector remained some days in a state of irresolution; when at length the French minister revived his spirits, by advising him to address a letter to Gustavus, wherein, far from discovering signs of fear, or demeaning himself by abject humiliations, it was his interest to throw out some indirect, but intelligible insinuations, with reference to the interposition and protection of a certain power behind the scene †. What reception these representations found with Gustavus, and what sort of answer he returned to them, has been already mentioned. It may be enough to observe, that the king's reply was of such a nature, as threw the elector into the greatest perplexities, and obliged him to offer Richelieu a piece of blank paper, with authority to write upon it what conditions he pleased. How far the cardinal either presumed, or intended to go, cannot well be ascertained; for that he dreaded Gustavus is a circumstance known beyond contradiction; nevertheless, he thought he had an opening to effect somewhat, and conceived an hope of availing himself more or less from the elector's terrors. This expectation was purely chimerical; for France, during the life of Gustavus, never once overreached, or extorted any advantage from him, except by importuning his good nature and his generosity; which, considering Richelieu's abilities, is saying as much as needs be said in behalf of our hero.

Thus, all that resulted from a connexion so extremely hazardous and delicate, was only this, that the elector pub-

* Louis de Brianson de la Saludie, maitre de camp et plenipotentiaire, &c.

† Hist. de *le Vassor*, tom. vii. 148.

lished

liſhed a manifeſto to juſtify his conduct for placing himſelf under the protection of France: and indeed one may ſee the ſtyle of Verſailles branch itſelf out like ſo many political veins through the whole ſurface of the compoſition. The cardinal, beſides obtaining that the caſtle of Ehrenbreitſtein ſhould be put into the hands of a French garriſon, had ſtill ſome views behind a counter-ſcene, which he hoped to unfold one time or other; for he knew Guſtavus not to be *immortal*, and then expected, if he ſurvived him, to take the cards into his own hands. Though this foundation may ſeem at firſt to be merely chance-work; yet it was laid deeply underground and out of ſight. France, from the event which reſulted from this, has ever had the ſame ſort of expectancies in view. In the preſent caſe, and from ſuch a ſeemingly narrow ground-plot, it has raiſed the ſuperſtructure of Alſace, Lorrain, &c.

Having ſo often mentioned the two electors of Cologn and Triers, it may ſeem ſurprizing, that ſuch little notice has hitherto been taken of the third eccleſiaſtical elector, the archbiſhop of Mentz. The truth was, the king had diſarmed this prelate by taking poſſeſſion of moſt of his territories; ſo that it no where appears that France conſidered him as an object worthy to be inveigled or cajoled; nor did ſhe ſolicit his aſſiſtance in the great plan relating to a neutrality.

It is probable too, that Richelieu looked upon him, not only as an enthuſiaſt and bigot, but as a devoted friend to the courts of Vienna and Munich; and thus much is certain, that the elector, finding himſelf in ſuch ill plight after the loſs of his capital, wiſhed extremely to behold a general pacification, and of his own free motive requeſted the emperor to permit him to lay ſome plan of that nature before Guſtavus *, who returned him ſuch conditions, as we have formerly mentioned in the two rough draughts, that were tranſmitted to the peruſal of all the catholic potentates then concerned.

By the taking of Donawert, and ſecuring a free paſſage over the Danube, Tilly ſoon perceived his Swediſh majeſty's real intentions againſt Bavaria; and therefore, with all poſſible expedition, broke down a ſecond bridge, then in his power, which croſſed that river between Neuburg and Rayne, and deſtroyed likewiſe a third bridge which leads over the Lech, at a ſmall diſtance from the latter town. On the poſſeſſion of this important entrance into Bavaria, the king

* *Vittorio Siri*, Memoire recondite, tom. vii. page 457, 458.

had ſet his mind, from the very inſtant he croſſed the Danube at Donawert, and diſpatched the flower of his dragoons and commanded muſqueteers to take a poſition there, for he had eſcaped the perilous undertaking of forcing his paſſage acroſs the Lech. Tilly knew too well the extraordinary conſequence of this inlet to Munich, and, as he had the power in his hands, prevented the enterpriſe on the part of the king, to whom this conſolation remained, that he had not loſt a ſingle moment in attempting to make good what he had projected *. Tilly then cantoned his troops in leſſer and greater diviſions, all along the Bavarian ſide, between the Lech and the Aach, from Rayne to Augſburg, both which places he garriſoned, and extended himſelf in good order on the banks oppoſite the Swedes for the ſpace of ſixteen miles. Foreſeeing principally where his majeſty would make the grand attempt, he erected ſome huge batteries, and intrenched the larger part of his choſen and veteran ſoldiery.

His majeſty's firſt attempt was to repair the bridge, that had been freſh broken down near Rayne; but this undertaking, through the intervention of ſome unforeſeen difficulties, was rejected almoſt in the ſame moment it was conceived. Thence bending his courſe towards Augſburg, he employed many hours, attended only by a friend or two, in contemplating the approaches to the river, and the circumſtances of landing, and making a lodgment, as well as forming an attack on the ſide oppoſite to him; finding at length, to his own mortification, as well as Tilly's honour, that the old general had erected his batteries, and intrenched his men preciſely over-againſt that ſegment of a circle, in the midle part of whoſe arch it was reſolved to throw over a bridge. Here a new obſtruction appeared; for the king foreſaw, at firſt glance, from the torrent-like rapidity of the ſtream, and height and inequality of its banks, that his own portable bridges could be made uſe of with no great proſpect of ſucceſs. Nevertheleſs, for the ſatisfaction of his army, he made one experiment, which verified his conjectures with too much truth. Having therefore intrenched his men under the protection of a ſtrong parapet along the bank, and fixed his more general encampment behind them near Northeim, he erected three batteries, conſiſting of ſeventy-two huge pieces of cannon †, one in the center of the

* *Burgi* Mars Sueco Germ. 171. 24°. Leod. 1633.

† *Santæ Cruz* remarks, with admiration, that Guſtavus paſſed the Lech by generalſhip; for having, ſays he, erected a battery of ſeventy,

the ſegment, and the two others at the extremities of the arch; which latter poſition gave him great advantages over his adverſaries; for their artillery could be raiſed only on a ſtraight line, and that of the Swedes half-flanked them, and raked them ſideways, when the grand engagement came on. Thus, during an uninterrupted cannonade of four days duration, the king brought his new ſcheme to tolerable perfection. At a little village called Obernſdorf, ſituated in a concealed and ſheltered valley at the diſtance of about half a mile from the place intended to be croſſed, he employed all his artificers to build a fabric, on a principle of his own invention, adapted to the nature of the river; and as the caſe was urgent, as well as important, found himſelf compelled to pull down all the gentlemen's houſes, farms, and villages round him, in order to procure an addition of uſeful and ſolid timber. Meanwhile at the hazard of his life, for the fire of artillery and muſquetry never ceaſed on Tilly's ſide, he employed himſelf every hour, in examining the banks, ſlopes, and winding of the ſtream: and ſpared neither money nor preferments, to gain intelligence of the variation of depth in that part of the channel where he intended to paſs.

There are few rivers of the ſame ſize, whoſe paſſage appears ſo difficult as that of the Lech. I ſpeak this from ocular obſervation. It takes its riſe in the country of the Griſons, and, at the time of year when the king croſſed it, partakes more of the nature of a torrent than of the river, for it is ſwollen with melted ſnow-waters from its very ſource. It meaſures forty yards acroſs at the point, between Rayne and Thierhaupten, where the bridge was erected, and the bank on the Swediſh ſide was about eleven feet higher than the bank oppoſite; where for a ſmall ſpace the ground was tolerably firm, and then declined gently into a moraſs knee-deep in ſlime and water, on the right-hand hardly paſſable, and guarded on the left, where the ſoil roſe a little, with thick beds of oſiers. This moraſs being once cleared, nor was the paſſage long, the land mounted with an eaſy aſcent to Tilly's intrenchments.

But the conſtruction and fixing of the bridge appeared more difficult to his majeſty than the fighting part. He greatly diſliked the inequality of the banks in reſpect of height, which

[ſeventy-two] large pieces of cannon over againſt the main body of the Imperialiſts, and thundered upon them ſeveral hours, he croſſed the river at a place unexpected, and intrenched himſelf before he could be obſerved. *Reflexions Militaires & Politiques, traduites del' Eſpagnol de M. le Marq. de Santa Cruz de Marzenado*, tom. ii. 238.

which rendered a bridge of boats or pontons highly inconvenient, if not entirely uſeleſs: and he likewiſe knew, that the bed of the river was a ſort of cone inverted: which intelligence he procured by various artifices, one in particular extremely curious; nevertheleſs, I ſhall decline relating it, having ſome doubts concerning the authenticity of the narrative *.

Being now informed, in ſome degree, of the depth and ſhape of the channel, he contrived, in the next place, a ſet of treſſels of various heights, and with unequal feet; their form in general, as here repreſented.



Theſe were firmly ſecured to ſtrong piles, driven deep into the bottom of the river. The planks then were ſpread over the whole, and well faſtened.

To lay this bridge in ſight of an intrenched army of equal force, and better ſupplied with large artillery, was a ſecond difficulty ſtill remaining, which demanded, at one and the ſame time, feints and illuſions of all ſorts, precautions, and activity, as well as prudence and intrepidity.

Of courſe the king poſted 1000 commanded muſqueteers behind a parapet of mould and turf on each ſide of the intended bridge, who, to prevent Tilly's people from approaching to procure intelligence of what was contriving, maintained an uninterrupted fire day and night. He then opened two large batteries at convenient diſtance from the point where he propoſed to croſs the river, and from theſe furiouſly thundered on the Bavarian camp without intermiſſion. Nor was his artillery idle in other places; it was only contracted in its extent, and divided into ſmaller parcels.

Meanwhile, to augment the confuſion and perplex the eye-ſight, he ordered little fires to be kindled in pits near the batteries, which were conſtantly fed with ſmoky combuſtibles of pitch and green wood.

Tilly ſuſpected ſomething, but knew not what; nor did he ceaſe to flatter himſelf, at intervals, in caſe the erection of a bridge was ſuppoſed to be practicable, that the king would

* It is to be ſeen in the *Memoirs of a Cavalier*, 8vo. Printed at Leeds, in Yorkſhire, about the year 1740.

hardly preſume to croſs a river; clear a moraſs; and aſcend a hill; under the eyes of an intrenched army of equal force, and ſupported with a train of artillery as conſiderable as his own, or more ſo.

To form a better judgment of the catholic general's ſituation, it may be convenient to obſerve, that the ground on Tilly's ſide, bating a ſmall ſwampy tract of ſoil, roſe by degrees to a moderate hill, covered here and there with ſhrubs and large thorn trees; and about midway between the foot of the hill and Tilly's main body were intrenched two conſiderable corps of infantry in a line parallel to the royal camp. Behind them crept a little rivulet in form of a bow, the bent part towards the Swedes, within which the artillery was planted. Its effects were felt on the oppoſite ſide of the Lech. After that ſucceeded a wood, which ſkirted up to a conſiderable height; in the front of which, the ſhrubby part being cleared in certain ſpaces, and the timber-trees felled, and interlaced by way of defence in front and flank, were poſted ſix bodies of choſen infantry, amounting to about 8000 men. The reſidue of the foot was diſpoſed judiciouſly here and there; and the horſe, on a more remote line, formed two wings at a diſtance on either ſide, in like manner as the Swediſh cavalry was diſpoſed, each of theſe parties being removed out of the reach of cannon-ſhot.

The king had ſome miſgivings with reference to the enterpriſe he had determined to undertake*; and therefore, which was a ſort of practice he rarely dealt in, convened all his generals to a council of war, in order to collect their ſeveral opinions. Horn, moſt ready to execute, as well as moſt cautious to reſolve, of any commander in the Swediſh ſervice, made ſtrong remonſtrances againſt attempting to paſs the Lech; and the major part of the ſuperior officers concurred with him: for he urged the difficulties both of the banks and bed of the river, and repreſented the force and quantity of Tilly's battering artillery. He remarked, in the next place, that a repulſe or defeat would raiſe the drooping ſpirits of the Bavarians, and bring Walſtein on the back of the Swedes, in a country full of rivers, where it was next to impoſſible, at one paſs or other, to decline a battle; and therefore propoſed, with all due deference and ſubmiſſion, to ſecure and fortify the frontier towns, both in the Upper Palatinate and Bohemia, till that period ſhamefully neglected by the elector of Saxony.——By

* *Vittorio Siri*; Memoire recondite, tom. vii. p. 459—461. *Le Vaſſor*, tom. vii. 163, 164.

theſe means it would not lie in Walſtein's power to force the king's troops into a deciſive engagement. He remarked further, that the Imperial generaliſſimo, whoſe immenſe preparations, not yet advanced to a ſtate of maturity, were, in the end, likely to become extremely formidable, ought to be cruſhed firſt.—— Wherefore upon the whole, it appeared beſt to him, to march directly into Moravia, and deſtroy the preſent and future hopes of the houſe of Auſtria all at once *.

Whoever underſtands the characters of men, and ſtate of hiſtory at this period, will be inclined, probably, to think with me, that the drift of theſe reaſonings ſeems to proceed upon the ſame principle, which Oxenſtiern, Horn's father-in-law, urged to Guſtavus, when he entered Franconia inſtead of Bohemia.

The king loved Horn, whoſe great talents he honoured, as well as his integrity, and heard him patiently; but at length replied, with a good deal of fire, *That the enterpriſe was leſs difficult than appeared at firſt ſight: and that the very beſt veteran troops that ever exiſted, had always ſome miſgivings after a total overthrow. Fortune*, ſaid he, *is the guardian-angel to men of heroical reſolution;—and Donawert is a ſure retreat in caſe of diſaſter.——Nor let it ever be ſaid, that Guſtavus declined any enemy, who* fled *before him;——ſince a delay, precaution or digreſſion of that nature would be inſtructing, and enabling an old and experienced general to reinforce and re-eſtabliſh an army, ill provided for, at the preſent juncture, and extremely weakened. Walſtein likewiſe is removed from us at a great diſtance, and has many leſſons ſtill to infuſe into his ſoldiers.——In a word, let us croſs this barrier, miſtakenly ſuppoſed to be impaſſable. Behold*, the expected land of plenty lies open to us! *A land, which has carefully been nurtured in peace and wealth for twelve continued years, whilſt the whole Germanic empire has been more than once ravaged and devoured from one end to the other* †.

Thus the king gave his opinion, or rather part of his opinion, as a man of ſpirit, without entering into the diſcuſſions of a philoſopher. Indeed it is probable he ſaw the thing in lights which Horn did not; or embraced his own ſcheme from a high perſuaſion of ſucceſs; and the rather, as the undertaking was compendious, enterpriſing, and full of glory; it being a maxim with him, as well as Pappenheim, *That it was poſſible to execute many achievements in war, merely becauſe the generality of mankind ſuppoſed them impracticable.*

* *Le Vaſſor*, tom. vii. p. 163.

† *Bertius* de Bellis German. p. 324. *Siri* Mem. Rec. tom. vii. 459.

Putting

Putting theſe conſiderations out of the queſtion, whoever has had opportunities to obſerve the rapidity of this river at the time of the *vernal equinox**, as was my fortune, and takes notice of the ſteepneſs and inequality of its banks; the irregularity of the channel-depth; the expoſure of the bridge in front and flanks; the intrenchments and batteries on the oppoſite ſide; the continued ſlope of ground riſing immediately from the Bavarian bank to the foreſt trees that crowned the whole; not to mention a moraſs knee-deep in ooze and water, muſt, I think, confeſs, that this was the moſt *daring*, as well as *brighteſt* action in the military life of Guſtavus, and ſuch as has never yet been ſurpaſſed by any general, antient or modern.

And now, Thurſday morning, April the 5th, whilſt the balls of the ſide-batteries, which ſtood at the extremities of a bow, for ſuch figure the Lech there formed, met in an angle, and tore every thing to pieces at 150 yards diſtance, the king, under favour of a ſmoke and fire inexpreſſible, paſſed over, after frequent attempts, in two boats which he had procured, ſome choſen engineers, pioneers, and ſoldiers, who made a lodgment; and, what was of ſtill greater conſequence, threw up ſeveral mounds of earth; one to protect the mouth of the bridge from the direct fire of Tilly's ordnance, and two ſide parapets to guard its flanks from ſuch batteries as he might occaſionally erect upon a change of circumſtances. To encourage theſe firſt undertakers, he made each man a preſent of about thirty ſhillings Engliſh.

Previous matters being thus adjuſted, all hands united to fix the bridge, and when the morning began to grow tolerably bright, Tilly beheld this aſtoniſhing attempt, but at the ſame time knew not how to counterwork it. To diſlodge theſe new comers appeared impoſſible, on account of the unmerciful fire of the Swediſh batteries; and it was foreſeen too, that ſuch an undertaking muſt have brought on, by degrees, one general carnage. It remained therefore only for him to raiſe two batteries againſt the ſides of the bridge: and here appeared a new inconveniency; for not to mention the parapets, which the Swedes had caſt up, the bank on the Bavarian ſide, though inferior in height to that on the Swediſh, yet at the ſame time roſe higher than the moraſs beneath it, and obſtructed the aim of the gunners, as well as the paſſage of their balls.

* This river, at the vernal equinox, without the falling of great rains, is ſwoln very much by the melting of ſnow on the Alps; but if rains happen to fall, which was the caſe in April 1632, its waters then riſe in a great degree.

On

On theſe accounts Tilly choſe rather to undertake the defenſive part, and having given orders to erect an half-moon in front, commanded his pioneers to deepen and widen the lines of his intrenchments, and employed all other hands he could ſpare, in hewing down a breaſt-work of large trees, interlacing them one with another, and ſharpening the branches near the trunk into a ſort of *chevaux de friſe*. So that when the king heard the noiſe of the ſaws and axes, he directed all his gunners to give them in the wood one general ſalutation from the whole train of artillery by way of morning-compliment.

In the ſpace of a few hours the machinery of the bridge was fixed, the ſurface planked and roughened, and the ſides guarded: which happened to be effected the more ſpeedily, as the king's Finlanders could all exerciſe the buſineſs of carpenters, as in their native country each man was his own mechanic.

It was the king's firſt care to relieve the pioneers and ſoldiers acroſs the river; and then the colonels Wrangel * and Gaſſion had the honour to paſs the bridge at the head of ſuch a body of troops as was ſuppoſed to be neceſſary. Part of them filled the new intrenchment, and the reſt, being all *commanded* muſqueteers, lined the oſier bed on the left hand, where they performed wonders in the heat of the conflict. When Guſtavus contemplated the bridge, and ground on either ſide, he declared in a whiſper to ſome of the generals, that ſtood near him, *That he would compound for a victory at the expence of one thouſand excellent ſoldiers* †.

Yet though he felt for his brave aſſociates, he diſcovered no diſmay with reſpect to himſelf; but, on the contrary, continued on the foot of the bridge for *ſix* and *thirty* hours, without intermiſſion. Meanwhile Tilly erected two new batteries near the banks of the river, in order to enfilade the flanks of the bridge; but though the theory was good, the executive part proved ineffectual.

During this interval, his majeſty conveyed one half of his army, cavalry as well as infantry, acroſs the Lech, though many good officers, friends as well as enemies, had publicly declared, that the enterpriſe was not feaſible, at the head of a fewer body of troops than one hundred thouſand ‡. Upon this, Tilly commanded the flower of his forces to give

* Charles Guſtavus Wrangel afterwards commanded the Swediſh army which entered Bavaria, Anno 1646, in conjunction with Turenne.

† *Swediſh Intelligencer* ſays 2000, part ii. 147.

‡ *Heylmanni Leo Arctous.*

the






A. *Imperial Infantry the rest concealed in the Wood*
B. *Cavalry*
C. *Breast work & Batteries*
D. *Entrench'd Infantry where Tilly was shot*
E. *A Rivulet*
F. *Tillys Batteries against the Bridge*

*Neele Sculp. Strand.*

the Swedes battle before they could form, and no leſs a perſon than Aldringer undertook the employment. Part likewiſe of the dragoons that ſerved under Aldringer received orders from the generaliſſimo to paſs between the oſier bed and the king's cavalry, with full directions to poſſeſs the mouth of the bridge at all hazards, and preclude reinforcements one way, and the power of retreating another.

When Aldringer, then general of the artillery, deſcended the hill, he found the Swediſh diſcipline to be ſuch, that the troops could form by the beat of a drum. He hoped likewiſe, that their ardour might have puſhed them on to have given him the meeting half way. There, however, the king impoſed his negative, expecting wonders from the two new raiſed batteries, which were erected not only as a feint to conceal the conſtruction of the bridge, but with the expreſs view to cut through and through the Bavarians obliquely, whenever the great conflict ſhould begin.

Aldringer conducted the attack without diſmay: but the fire, eſpecially from the two batteries, was ſo fierce and uninterrupted, that it was impoſſible for the diſpute to hold long. Some of the cavalry made a deſperate effort to ſeize the bridge, according to inſtructions; but attempting to file between the groſs of the Swediſh forces and the bed of oſiers, which Tilly ſuppoſed to have been a vacant ſpace left open by inadvertency, they received ſuch continued volleys from the muſqueteers concealed therein, that, in ſpite of all their endeavours, they were broken immediately. His majeſty was not literally in this action; his prudence kept the aſcendancy over his vivacity; and therefore with great coolneſs he planted himſelf at the foot of the bridge, on the Bavarian ſide, partly to give the troops their inſtructions with preciſion, as they paſſed over; and partly to take care, that not a ſingle Swede, who had already croſſed the river, ſhould attempt to retreat.

Aldringer ſtill preſſed on, the ſecond time, with a reſolution, bordering upon downright raſhneſs; but a cannon-ball grazed upon his temples, and he was removed ſenſeleſs off the field of battle. This ſtroke was the more fatal, as it ever afterwards diſcompoſed the beſt head-piece, for memorials and invectives, then in the empire*.

Now came the great Tilly's inevitable hour. He perceived, that no man could replace Aldringer except himſelf, and deſcending from the wood with a freſh body of his old

* *Le Blanc*: Hiſt. de Baviére, tom. iv. p. 374. 12°. A Par. 1680.

Burgun-

Burgundians, renewed the attack, in a manner well becoming his laſt efforts; for whenever a regiment gave way, he ſeized the colours, and advanced towards the enemy *; nor could the troops deſert an aged general, who had been victorious in thirty-ſix pitched battles and ſignal engagements, and who carried the marks of more than fifty campaigns in his own perſon. In a leſs ſpace than twenty minutes, he received a ſtroke on the knee from a falconet ſhot †, which weighed about three pounds; and ſwooning away ſeveral times, from the agony of the fracture, as well as contuſion, was removed out of the battle to Ingolſtadt, in the elector's own coach. To augment the general conſternation, two conſiderable parties of Finland horſe, impatient to ſee their brethren engaged on the oppoſite banks, plunged into the river like men poſſeſſed, and croſſed it by ſwimming; upon which event, joined to the former, and the rather, as evening began to approach, the Bavarian forces broke away imperceptibly, and the Swedes having gained and ſecured their paſſage, remained in their own ſtation, without advancing, by order of the king; who contented himſelf, at the cloſe of the evening, to march over the bridge, at the head of his own regiment of guards, and paſs the night on the Bavarian ſide.

All this time his electoral highneſs continued over-cautiouſly in the wood, at ſome diſtance from the ſharpneſs of the fire. Though generaliſſimo of the troops, he durſt not take the command upon him, but poſted away to Ingolſtadt ſomewhat unbecomingly, and left good part of the troops, eſpecially cavalry that laid remote, and who knew nothing of their general's misfortune, to ſhift for themſelves. It brings to mind a parallel paſſage in hiſtory: When Juſtinian was wounded, and obliged to be carried from the walls of Conſtantinople, the emperor retired, and the whole garriſon loſt its courage. Yet this did not happen at the battle of Lutzen, where every Swediſh colonel was in part a general, and one half of the common ſoldiers deſerved to be colonels; and all of whom fought more furiouſly, merely becauſe their king was dead.

* *Burgi* Mars Sueco Germ. p. 175.

† *Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illuſtri.* 4°. 372.—*Bougeant*, and the author of the Annals of the Empire, whom I will not ſuppoſe to be M. de V. give him this wound in the retreat, whereas the Swedes never purſued him. [Tom. i. p. 287.] Bougeant ſays likewiſe, that Guſtavus employed *three* days in conſtructing and erecting the bridge, inſtead of *two*; ſince by the diary it appears, that he began it April 3, and croſſed it on the 5th, early in the morning.

Thus

Thus ended the battle of the Lech, though the king as yet knew nothing of Tilly's misfortune. With regard to this tranſaction, it may be remarked, that the armies on either ſide were nearly equal, as were the trains likewiſe of battering artillery; for the king had ſeventy-two large pieces of cannon, and Tilly ſeventy: but, in point of management, the Swediſh engineers were greatly ſuperior; and it was in this reſpect that Torſtenſon, then general of the ordnance, gained that great reputation, which he maintained afterwards in every other branch of military knowledge. So that the more clear-ſighted in the art of war aſcribe this victory to three co-operating cauſes; *one*, the reſult of good ſenſe, and *two*, the product of invention and genius. Under the former head, they conſider the extraordinary *celerity* wherewith the king performed his buſineſs; and under the latter, his ſuperior abilities in point of *gunnery*, and the *conſtruction* of a bridge made preciſely for the river Lech, and no other. Nor was it uncommon at that time for learned men to obſerve, that the paſſage of the Lech was far ſuperior to that of the Granic; and that Guſtavus's architecture in the channel of the river was more difficult to execute than that of Julius Cæſar acroſs the Rhine; inaſmuch as the one, even after the diſcovery of cannon, effected in two days, what the other could hardly perform in the ſpace of ten; and certain it is, that the intervention of artillery, to ſay the leaſt of it, may be demonſtrated to counterbalance that difference of breadth, which is to be found in the two rivers, the Lech and the Rhine.

The action laſted about ſix hours, but was much ſharper than that at Leipſic. What numbers the king loſt has never appeared, yet from the nature of circumſtances he could not ſuffer ſo much as the army of the league; becauſe, as Tilly intrenched himſelf behind a large number of foreſt trees, he loſt many men in one uninterrupted cannonade of ſix and thirty hours duration, merely from the flying ſhivers and ſplinters of the timber. All that we know is, that a count Merodé, and ſeveral brave officers were killed and wounded; and one thouſand Bavarians left dead on the ſpot.

Upon the whole, from all that appears at this diſtance, Tilly would have done better, provided ſuch conduct had not diſheartened his followers, to have left the bridge and paſſage free to his Swediſh majeſty, without conteſting them*: for, had he ſpared himſelf his deſcent from the

* *Monro's Exped.* ii. p. 120.

eminence,

eminence, enlarged and deepened his lines, interlacing them well with the foreſt-trees that ſtood before him, (there being no paſſage for the king to file along by the banks of the river, without running an extreme riſk in flank) and fixed his batteries ſo, as to have played only on the Swedes, when they drew near his intrenchments, where it was not practicable to tranſport their heavy artillery, or bring it to act; it is more than probable, that Guſtavus muſt have ſuffered greatly, or been obliged to have croſſed the river in ſome ſecond place. In the part where the Swedes muſt thereby have been conſtrained to attack, they could only have advanced with two regiments in front, while Tilly had room to oppoſe them with juſt three times a ſuperior number. This, it is thought, was Tilly's private and reſerved opinion: but as the junior officers had conceived a notion, that his perſonal courage declined with his riper days, and half expired on the arrival of old age, than which nothing could be more falſe, he was forced to affect, both now and at Leipſic, a certain gallantry and ſprightlineſs of valour, not quite reconcileable to his more mature judgment. Conſidering the petulant fervour, and ſarcaſtic inſinuations from the younger part of military people, it might not be ill-judged for all commanders in chief to leave the field of action, when they have once reached their grand climacteric; for the old courſer will make an effort right or wrong when the *ſpur* of honour is applied to his *flank*, and his abilities, ſprightlineſs, and activity are called in queſtion.

To return from the preſent digreſſion. When the king ſaw the difficulties I have juſt deſcribed, he frankly told his generals, who crowded round him, *That he conſidered the paſſage of the Lech as a better day's ſervice than the performance at Leipſic**; and when cardinal Paſman, the Imperial ambaſſador extraordinary, at Rome, heard the news, he ſaid coolly, "The curtain has dropped and the play is over:" which, whether it related to the downfal of popery, or the houſe of Auſtria, at this diſtance, cannot be ſpecified.

The king, as we obſerved before, reſted all night at the foot of the bridge, and next morning, there were reaſons to think that the enemy had diſlodged; but before any certainty in that particular could be procured, Hepburn received inſtructions to conduct the remaining part of the infantry over the bridge, in order to introduce a ſecond and more obſtinate engagement; during which interim one Forbes, a Scots captain, at the head of thirty muſqueteers,

* *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 147.

was

was ſent to examine the poſition of the Bavarians. He found two horſe ſentries at the edge of the wood, and no more. Being ſent to the king, and interrogated by him, they poſitively declared, that they never heard a ſingle ſyllable concerning the departure of their companions. A part of the royal army purſued the fugitives to the walls of Rayne, and ſtormed the town ſword in hand. Here it was firſt learnt, that Tilly was wounded deſperately, if not mortally.

This victory of the Lech alarmed one half of Europe, and aſtoniſhed the other. France, who had rejoiced to ſee the houſe of Auſtria humbled to a certain degree, began now to conceive freſh uneaſineſs, both from fear and jealouſy; ſo much that Louis XIII. told Soranzo the Venetian ambaſſador, upon receiving an account of the paſſage of the Lech, That the powers intereſted in deſiring to ſee a *partial reduction* of the houſe of Auſtria had hitherto conſcientiouſly offered up their moſt ſincere wiſhes for the proſperity of the Swediſh arms; but then, continued he, no human being could ever conceive, that matters ſhould have advanced with ſuch amazing rapidity, and to ſuch extraordinary lengths. Inform, therefore, the ſenate, that means muſt be deviſed, whereby to check this impetuous Viſigoth in the career of his victories, which may prove, in the concluſion, as fatal to us as to the emperor and the elector of Bavaria. If this be true with reſpect to France, the houſe of Auſtria had ſtill ſtronger reaſons to take the alarm; for ſhe depended on one ſingle man, and that was Walſtein; and the duke of Bavaria, who, when the war was removed from his frontiers, had deſpiſed or deceived every power with whom he negotiated, began now to feel the ſharpeſt diſquietudes, upon three ſeveral accounts. He had neglected to oppoſe his whole force againſt the king's croſſing the Lech, for a part of his army was ſtationed near Ratiſbon: he apprehended the death of his admired general every moment; and beheld Guſtavus penetrating, by full marches, into the very vital parts of his dominions. England fell into the *national folly* of leaving the continent to take care of itſelf; ſo that the conduct of an Elizabeth, and the maxims of Burleigh, Cecil, and Walſingham, paſſed for the reveries of politicians, who had not conſidered their mother-country as an iſland. The elector of Saxony diſliked the proſperity of Sweden from the very beginning. The king of Denmark entertained certain ſelf-intereſted views, which ſhall be ſpecified forthwith. The ſtates-general traverſed Guſtavus in the late negotiation with

with the town of Cologn; and the prince of Orange, under various pretences, kept an army of obſervation on the frontiers of their dominions.

Guſtavus beheld all theſe jealouſies, counter-operations, and pretended friendſhips, with a countenance undiſmayed, and without making any remonſtrances or recriminations. He one day did remark, in great confidence, to a friend, whom he truſted, *That he now perceived he had puſhed his conqueſts* too *far, and given umbrage, as well as diſquietude, to certain potentates. It may be difficult,* continued he, *to preſerve the acquiſitions I have made to the ſouthwards; ſo that of courſe the more prudential part will be to confine myſelf within the northern regions of Germany, and erect a kingdom, if that be poſſible, of which the Baltic ſhall form the centre.* This account we owe to that impenetrable, as well as all-penetrating ſtateſman the abbé Siri*, who affects to have aſſiſted at every conference in the character of a political ubiquitarian; but for my own part, from a cool examination of future facts, I have ſome miſtruſt with regard to the authenticity of the preſent anecdote, ſince the king, far from retrieving the ſuppoſed miſtake, marched on to Ingolſtadt, and then to Munich, with the very words recent upon his lips. Nor was this any new idea wherewith to ſurprize his majeſty's underſtanding; as appears from the anſwer he gave to Oxenſtiern, as long before as the preceding Chriſtmas.

France ſeems firſt to have diſcovered the hook of Guſtavus approaching her lips, and pretending only to nibble, and play round it, without ſwallowing, hoped to ſee its point blunted, if not diſarmed, by ſome accident or other.

To co-operate with theſe views, ſhe threw Bavaria in his way, as a rugged rock concealed under water; and that attempt not ſucceeding, placed the elector of Triers there as a ſort of entangling weed: which latter effort ſerved to create ſome ſlight embarraſſment; for a perplexing treaty was ſigned at Ehrenbreitſtein, four days after the paſſage of the Lech †, whereby ſhe engaged to ſupport the ſaid prelate againſt all opponents, and oblige the Swedes, which was ſtill more, to evacuate the electorate, as well as the dioceſe of Spires.

In leſs than a fortnight from this period, the king had likewiſe ſome further miſgivings with reference to the conduct of Chriſtian king of Denmark, whom the Imperial and

* *Vittorio Siri*; Memoire recondite, tom. vii. p. 464, &c. and p. 546.
† April 9, 1632. APPENDIX, Art. XXVIII.

Spaniſh

Spaniſh miniſtry tried to allure into their intereſts by all ſorts of temptations. The Infanta, in ſome degree, almoſt over-reached and enſnared that politic prince: for under pretence of making him the compliment of propoſing conditions to Guſtavus with regard to a general peace, ſhe in effect made him a perſon intereſted, in caſe his Swediſh majeſty ſhould not liſten to an accommodation; for ſhe left the plan of reconciliation partly, if not entirely, to his management. Guſtavus had ſagacity enough to deſire earneſtly to avert this blow, but for prudent reaſons, not caring to ſend a miniſter in form on that errand, gave private inſtructions to one of his generals *, in whom he could confide, who was going by chance into Holſtein to raiſe recruits, to make his court to King Chriſtian, and endeavour to penetrate into his intentions; commanding him to give his Daniſh majeſty, in an indirect way, to underſtand, that by ſpeedily engaging in this proteſtant war, he might ſecure to his children the poſſeſſion of thoſe biſhoprics which the emperor had uſurped by virtue of the peace at Lubec. Chriſtian felt the force of this argument, but at the ſame time could not diſſipate the terrors which the ſevere uſage of the houſe of Auſtria, joined with his own misfortunes in the late war, had infuſed into him. Nevertheleſs, he diſpatched two ſenators to Guſtavus, with inſtructions to aſſure him, That he was deeply penetrated with a juſt ſenſe of this proteſtant enterpriſe; but that the oath he had taken at the *pacification* of Lubec, had unfortunately tied his hands,——That he participated, with Guſtavus, in all his conqueſts; and would never impede their progreſs in any ſhape;—but at the ſame time preſumed, gently, to remind him, that, as the ſucceſs of war is often periodical, even under the direction of the ableſt commander, it would highly become ſo juſt and generous a prince to give a ſolid and glorious peace to Germany: to effect which, he was ready to make a tender of his beſt ſervices, by way of mediator or arbitrator. To this propoſal Guſtavus replied, *That his preſent paſſion and ultimate object was to procure peace to the diſtreſſed and proſcribed proteſtants, which in truth could only be effected by a new and ſtrict union between all the princes and ſtates profeſſing the reformed religion. Our enemies,* obſerved he, *are inſincere; and ſeek only to create advantageous delays. Intercourſes, arbitrations, and negotiations, will produce nothing but remorſe and diſappointment. The houſe of Auſtria muſt be reduced to ſuch a point, as not to be able to interfere a ſecond time.*

* Bauditzen.

*If therefore the king your maſter will labour ſincerely to bring about this union among the proteſtants, and join me in the proſecution of ſo good a work, whereby each party ſhall become mutual guaranty for the protection of the whole;——If he will only thus think once with me, I will anſwer with my life that we impoſe ſilence on the houſe of Auſtria* *.

Chriſtian liked the doctrine, but begged to be excuſed from putting it in practice: nevertheleſs, from that day ſecretly wiſhed proſperity to the arms of Sweden; and dexterouſly extricated himſelf by little and little from the ſnare which the artful Iſabella had ſpread under his feet.

Guſtavus having ſecured the town of Rayne, and diſpatched Horn to purſue Tilly, ſhaped his courſe directly to Augſburg, making himſelf maſter of the town and cloiſters of Thierhaupten, and likewiſe of Friedberg as he paſſed along. In this march he refuſed to liſten to any propoſals of neutrality on the part of the duke of Neuburg, being diſſatisfied with that prince's former duplicity. *Sir*, ſaid he to the deputy, *Your maſter's acts have been contradictory; not contented to deceive me, he has had the diſingenuouſneſs to promiſe much, and perform nothing; whilſt, on the contrary, he has allowed paſſage and free retreat to the enemy's army, ſupplied them with artillery from his own arſenal, and fired on the trumpeter who approached his capital in amicable form, in order to deliver a letter from me to him. But Providence has now indulged me with the means of preſcribing thoſe terms, which formerly I ventured only to recommend. In a word, Sir, you are like your maſter, and your maſter is like you: for you are both diſſemblers, to ſay no worſe of you* †.

It is not difficult to conceive the aſtoniſhment of the duke's deputy, who continued motionleſs for ſome time like a perſon thunderſtruck. He at length withdrew, and then recovering his preſence of mind, renewed his applications by the interpoſition of prince Auguſtus, who was younger brother to his maſter, and a ſort of favourite with Guſtavus. The king's anſwer was very ſhort; *Give the duke of Neuburg to underſtand, that his future actions muſt prove the commentary upon his doctrines: and in the meanwhile, by way of a preliminary, let him diſpatch to my army two hundred thouſand loaves, and three hundred tons of beer* ‡. About this time the Bavarians quitted Neuburg as indefenſible, having firſt removed their artillery, and broken down one arch of the bridge for fear of purſuit; and upon this the Swediſh colonel

* Vide *Chemnitz*, tom. i. p. 264, &c.

† Ibid. 258. *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. 151, 152.

‡ *Soldat Suedois*, 485, &c.

Land-

Landſperg was ordered to take poſſeſſion of it, repair the bridge, and then defend the city like a man of honour.

Thus, in three days, the king reached from the paſſage of the Lech to the town of Augſburg, coaſting along the Bavarian banks of the river with the main of his army; but conveying his heavy artillery on the Suabian ſide; for it was thought by all intelligent perſons, that the new bridge could not ſupport the weight of horſes, carriages, and ordnance.

The rich and magnificent city of Augſburg lies ten miles to the ſouth-weſt of Donawert. It is ſituated in Suabia, and has two bridges acroſs the Lech. Its famous *confeſſion* will render it illuſtrious throughout all ages of the Chriſtian church; and it is probable the king, in the idea, that *the law firſt proceeded from Sion*, conſidered it as the Jeruſalem of his German Paleſtine; ſparing no pains, and omitting no attempts to make himſelf maſter of this reſpectable ſanctuary; and the father, as the Auguſtin profeſſion had been totally interdicted therein; the whole body of Lutherans diſarmed; and the proteſtant magiſtrates replaced by freſh ones of the catholic perſuaſion. Colonel Breda at that time commanded the garriſon, which had been increaſed by different reinforcements to the amount of 4500 men. Still there was great reaſon to fear an inſurrection from the numerous proteſtants within the walls.

When the royal army had advanced to Lechauſen, a ſmall town within two miles of Augſburg, the Imperial governor broke down the bridge; but the Swedes erected two others, the former above and the latter below the city. Guſtavus then brought forward his approaches on either ſide of the river, whilſt Torſtenſon gave new proofs of his uncommon ſkill in the management of his artillery. The king, grieved to ſee the havock he intended to make amongſt the fine edifices, diſpatched a letter to the magiſtrates, requeſting them to diſmiſs the garriſon, and preſerve ſo magnificent a city from the deſtruction of a furious cannonade. The anſwer returned him was alike polite and amicable; ſince it was there remarked, that the troops, which poſſeſſed the town, had been obtruded on them, and that if the Swedes had firſt preſented themſelves, they ſhould have been received with preference.—That to bid the Imperialiſts depart, amounted in effect to nothing; of courſe it appeared to them moſt expedient for his majeſty to introduce ſome negotiation with the commander of the garriſon.

Upon this, Horn, as it is ſuppoſed with his maſter's privity, wrote a very friendly letter to Breda the governor; and

having repreſented the imprudence, and other unavoidable ill conſequences, of an unprofitable reſiſtance, propoſed himſelf as an amicable mediator between his Swediſh majeſty and the garriſon. Breda, foreſeeing no relief, as Tilly was dying, and Aldringer diſabled, at length capitulated. Five hundred of his ſoldiers took ſervice under the king, and the reſt were conveyed to Landſberg. Count Holloch, a Palatine nobleman, was appointed governor, at the head of 3000 cavalry and infantry; and young Oxenſtiern, out of reſpect to his father the *chancellor*, was declared commander of the militia.

In the capitulation, the king gave Breda to underſtand, that at Augſburg no exceptions muſt be propoſed in regard to popery; and then at the requeſt of the inhabitants, who beſought him to honour them with a viſit, made a triumphal entrance, attended by all the princes, generals, and foreign ambaſſadors then in his camp, but eſcorted only by a few choſen troops, in order to prevent confuſion and plunder; ſo that the reſidue of the army was not allowed to paſs the barrier of the city gates.

In this town, the birth-place, if one may ſo ſpeak, of the evangelical religion *, his majeſty thought it incumbent on him to behave with all poſſible humility, ſweetneſs, and moderation; yet, at the ſame time, without injuring or diſcrediting the Roman catholics in any reſpect, reſtored the Auguſtan confeſſion to its original luſtre, which greatly piqued the elector of Saxony, who conſidered himſelf as firſt proteſtant prince in Germany †, and conſigned the whole government of the town into the hands of the Lutherans and the *reformed* ‡. On his entering the city gate, he diſmounted and walked directly to St. Agnes church, where the Lutheran ſervice was performed with great decency; the 103d Pſalm ſung, accompanied by a peal of organs; and Fabricius, the king's own chaplain, delivered a ſermon on the following text, Pſalm xii. verſe 5, 6. *Now for the comfortleſs troubles ſake of the needy, and becauſe of the deep ſighing*

* The *confeſſion* was preſented here to Charles V. in the year 1530, and is commonly called the *Augſburg* or *Auguſtine* confeſſion: to which we may add the *Pacificatorium* concluded here in 1555. The town does not depend in any ſhape upon the biſhop, though he has a palace therein. The reigning differences between the papiſts and proteſtants were greatly harmonized at the peace of Munſter; for by a partition-ſettlement the employs of government were equally divided, as well as the votes in public council; where twenty-two magiſtrates are of the Romiſh perſuaſion, and a like number of the evangelical and reformed.

† *Heylmanni* Leo Arctoüs, 4°. p. 55.

‡ *Hiſtorical* or *Authentic Relation* in Low Dutch, tom. ii. p. 64—66.

*of the poor, I will up, ſaith the Lord, and will help every one from him that ſwelleth againſt him, and will ſet him at reſt.* From the church, the proceſſion advanced, on horſeback, to a large ſquare, called the Wine-market, where he commanded the inhabitants, which was thought to be a very extraordinary ſtep, not only at Vienna and Munich, but at Dreſden, Paris, Copenhagen, Whitehall, and the Hague, to take the oaths* of allegiance and fidelity to the crown of Sweden, without mention of its allies and aſſociates †: confirming afterwards the charter of the citizens to them, without inſerting or expunging any thing. Here, amongſt, the acknowledgments from the magiſtrates and civilities on the part of the king, one of that venerable body took the liberty to tell him, "That the Swediſh troops appeared "to him irreſiſtible." The king, foraſmuch as the compliment ſeemed to carry no immediate connexion with the converſation preceding, requeſted him to explain the reaſons whereon he grounded that opinion: *Is it,* ſaid he, *on account of the number, or the valour, or the good fortune of my ſoldiers?* "No, Sire," replied the magiſtrate, "but," pointing to a company of guards drawn up before the apartment where his majeſty was to dine ‡, "Who could have imagined, that a ſet of men ſo decent and well behaved in times of capitulation, could have been thoſe very perſons, whom we have ſeen ſo reſolute and intrepid in the field of action §?"

During two days reſidence here, an uncommon adventure happened to Gaſſion. A rich citizen with whom he lodged, was ſo much affected with his courteſy and politeneſs, that he made him an offer of a beautiful daughter in marriage with a very conſiderable dowry. His majeſty, midſt all the cares and tumults of war, allowed not ſuch a trifling circumſtance to eſcape his notice, and gave the young Frenchman ſeveral hints, to make him conſent: but Gaſſion was too much of a military enthuſiaſt to embrace the propoſal; and it is probable Guſtavus liked him never the worſe for making a ſacrifice of love to glory; ſince not many days

* *Hiſtoire Politique du Siècle*, 4°. Lond. 1757.

† The expreſs oath is to be ſeen in the *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 158.

‡ In the palace of Fugger. This family, originally of Auſburg, is perhaps the moſt conſiderable that ever was raiſed by merchandize. The emperor, Maximilian I. ennobled it, and made the Fuggers counts, who immediately purchaſed large eſtates between Augſburg and Ulm. Not many years ago, there were fifteen counts of this family, who all poſſeſſed diſtinct ſignories.

§ *Hiſt. du maréchal Gaſſion*, [par Mich. le Pure.] tom. i. p. 63.

afterwards he offered him any command in his own guards, ſaying aloud in German to the officers round him, *That Gaſſion's corps ſhould be ſurnamed the pillow regiment, becauſe when that was near him, he could ſleep in ſecurity* *.

His majeſty having now derived great advantages from the ſubmiſſion of the Augſburgers, performed an action worthy of himſelf on leaving their city; for, conſidering the merit, as well as long ſervices, of old Ruthven, who defended Ulm, the royal magazine, as well as intended place of retreat in caſe of accidents, he gave him a grant of the earldom of Kirchberg, ſuppoſed worth at leaſt eighteen hundred pounds a year, clear of contribution to the ſervice of the war †, and belonged, if I miſtake not, to a count Fugger, who was governor of the town, but acted ſubordinately to Breda, when that officer threw himſelf into it by Tilly's orders, ſome days before the king arrived. The king, retracing the footſteps of his former march, advanced to Aicha ‡, where he was met by duke Albert of Bavaria, ſecond brother of the elector, who begged a neutrality for himſelf, his family, and eſtate, under pretence, that he had never concerned himſelf in the preſent wars. No diſcuſſion was made of the truth of theſe allegations, for the contrary was well underſtood to be true: but the anſwer returned was neither ill applied nor void of ſpirit; namely, *that Louiſa Juliana, the dowager electreſs Palatine, and Elizabeth, then lawful queen of Bohemia, and her children, had not interfered in the affairs of the Palatinate; yet their poſſeſſions had been confiſcated, and they compelled, under the diſgrace of a proſcription, to beg a ſubſiſtence in foreign countries* §. Upon this duke Albert retired to Saltſburg, and joined the electreſs of Bavaria, who had withdrawn herſelf thither.

It was hoped by the Imperialiſts, that Augſburg would hurt the Swediſh troops as much as Capua injured the army of Hannibal; but the king wiſely obviated theſe inconveniences, by ſtaying there only two days, and encamping his ſoldiers without the walls. He had moreover two great enterpriſes to execute, on returning from Augſburg ‖, having his eyes fixed not only upon Ingolſtadt, but on Ratiſbon; both which ſchemes he propoſed to effect by breaking down one of the two bridges acroſs the Danube. Tilly had

* *Hiſt. du maréchal Gaſſion*, [par Mich. le Pure.] tom. i. p. 63.

† *Monro*, Expedition, ii. p. 120.

‡ Some authors and map makers call this place Waho. It muſt not be confounded with Aichſtadt.

§ *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part. ii. p. 159.

‖ *Brachelii* Hiſt. noſtr. temp. p. 289.

parts enough to foreſee what ſo great a genius in the art of war would attempt to execute, and intreated the elector, almoſt with his dying breath, to ſpare no precautions with reſpect to the preſervation of Ratiſbon and Ingolſtadt*. And thus the king's project, however well conceived, was rendered abortive.

Far from being diſmayed with ſuch diſappointment, his majeſty directed his whole thoughts againſt Ingolſtadt ſingly. This town, then conſidered one of the ſtrongeſt places in the empire, was of courſe eſteemed the principal bulwark of Bavaria, and had formerly, during the reign of Charles V. rendered fruitleſs all the efforts of the Smalcaldic party. It lies half way between Donawert and Ratiſbon, and young Tilly†, whom the old man recommended to be governor, had three large choſen regiments under his command. It was one of thoſe fortifications, which the warriors ſurname *la pucelle*, and maintained that character in reſpect to *ſieges*, for Farenbach only betrayed it afterwards, till the Auſtrians took it by capitulation in the year 1742.

This town belongs to the elector, though it does not ſtand on the Bavarian ſide of the Danube. It was protected on that quarter where the Swedes approached it by two or three winding rivulets, whoſe bridges, by ſome accident had been neglected to be broken down, as likewiſe by a very troubleſome moraſs. One large bridge croſſes the Danube, and another paſſes athwart the town. At the foot of the former, called, if my accounts miſlead me not, the *gallows bridge*, were two outworks, extremely well fortified, and hardly poſſible to be taken by ſtorm; ſo that it is probable the king expected ſome aſſiſtance from a treacherous part of the garriſon, and the rather, as the ſeeds of Farenbach's and Cratz's conſpiracy were then ſuppoſed to be ſown, though at that time nothing diſcovered itſelf to the advantage of the Swedes. Nevertheleſs, the king made his troops approach nearer the walls, on firſt inveſting the town, than in all probability he would have done, if he had not expected ſomething of this kind. What is ſtill more, the elector of Bavaria laid encamped with all his troops on the oppoſite banks of the Danube, ſo that each army could diſcover the other's motions without the help of a glaſs.

* *Bertius* de Bellis German.

† Many hiſtorians, as Le Vaſſor, de Serres, &c. call this young man Tilly's ſon, but that general lived and died unmarried; and it was remarked of him, as well by enemies as friends, that he never indulged in any illicit amour. He was probably his nephew. What became of him after this period, no where appears.

The lines being now finiſhed, and the batteries erected, a ſudden and alarming accident befel the king. As he was riding about on his favourite palfrey to make obſervations, and the ſhortneſs of his eyeſight always carried him too near the danger, a cannon ball well aimed, and weighing at leaſt fourteen pounds, ſtruck the mare full in the flank, ſo near the king's leg, that the fleſh was ruffled, and overturned her more times than one. The ſame ball, in the rapidity of its paſſage, knocked down Gaſſion, who ſtood nearly on a line juſt before his maſter, without touching him. It was the opinion of all the by-ſtanders, that the king was cruſhed with the fury of the ſtroke, for he lay covered in dirt and blood, and rolled over twice or thrice after he received the blow. Gaſſion, half recovering his ſenſes, ran to him, but one of the king's equerries had raiſed him from his trance. *How*, ſaid the king, *was it poſſible for the enemy to hit me? I conceived myſelf to be out of danger.* In an inſtant all his generals crowded round him, and conjured him earneſtly to retire; but he mounted a freſh ſteed, and kept the field.

By this eſcape, his majeſty had the good fortune ſtill to verify his old obſervation, that no king had ever been killed by a cannon ball; yet this deſtiny was reſerved afterwards for one of his ſucceſſors*.

I have read ſomewhere, but cannot at preſent recollect in what author, a different account of this accident; namely, that there was an old culverin in Ingolſtadt of immeaſurable length, which rarely miſſed its object at a great diſtance, and had performed wonders againſt the proteſtants in the Smalcaldic wars. Now it is ſuppoſed by this relator, that the king received his ſtroke from this very piece of ordnance; which might be done eaſier, as he rode a little white† mare, that rendered his perſon more diſtinguiſhable.

In the evening, when he returned to his tent, all his generals, aſſembled in a body, beſought him, in the moſt earneſt terms, to take more care of a life ſo valuable. As he

* Charles XII.

† It is ſurprizing to me that hiſtorians ſhould differ ſo much about the colour of this mare. One ſays ſhe was milk white, another avers her to be dark grey, and a third variegates her with white and black ſpots like a tyger; whereas the ſaid animal was dug up and ſtuffed juſt after the accident, and preſerved in the arſenal of Ingolſtadt, for the edification of all travellers, memoir writers, and hiſtoriographers. For my own part, I never ſaw her; and muſt leave this important doubt in the ſame ſtate that I find it. But be the matter as it will, it was certainly ill judged in the king, to ride a creature of ſo particular a colour.

had

had often received repreſentations upon this ſubject, he returned them an anſwer, which I ſuppoſe to have been in ſome reſpect premeditated; and for that reaſon inſert it, having recited, in the courſe of my hiſtory, ſo many replies which aroſe caſually from the incidents before him. The anſwer was to this effect, *That the cannon ball which had approached him ſo nearly, not to mention various accidents of a ſimilar, though leſs dangerous nature, and thirteen wounds he had received beſides, admoniſhed him plainly of his mortality; and that he had no more title to plead exemption from death, than the meaneſt ſoldier that ſerved under him; ſince neither crowns nor victories could ſecure any human being from this general law of nature. That he had no part to take, except reſigning himſelf to God's providence; and nothing to bequeath his comrades in war, but a firm aſſurance, that the juſtice of the cauſe wherein they were engaged, had other aſſiſtance in ſtore, beſides the precarious exiſtence of* ONE GUSTAVUS*. *Indeed,* added he, *there is a circumſtance, that afflicts me greatly: ſome have given a ſiniſter interpretation to all my actions, and others have attempted to tarniſh my reputation, by baſely inſinuating, that the only objects of his Swediſh majeſty are freſh acquiſitions of wealth and power. But the Supreme Being knows, in that reſpect, the ſincerity of my ſoul; and my hope is, that he will inſpire me with grace to confound the envy and calumny of the public.—The ſums advanced by me, the debts diſcharged by me, my paſt conduct and future intentions, may, in the long run, convince the moſt perverſe and blind, that the only object of my expedition was the re-eſtabliſhment of Germanic liberty* †.

Either Tilly made an inexpreſſible fire from the redoubts next the bridge, or the day gave appearances of proving unlucky; for ſoon after the king's diſaſter, another cannon ball carried off half the head of Chriſtopher, the young margrave of Baden Dourlach, as he was diſcourſing with ſome officers in his tent. The whole body of Swediſh generals was rendered inconſolable by this misfortune, for his courage was of the cleareſt and moſt diſtinguiſhed ſort. His aged father's ‡ anſwer, upon receiving the news a few minutes after the accident happened, has ſomething in it

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 498. *Merc. Franc.* en l'an 1632, p. 229.

† Hiſt. de Louis XIII. par *le Vaſſor*. Tom. vii. 175, 176.

‡ In 1622, this brave old man fought the battle of Wimpfen, againſt Tilly and Gonſalvo di Cordova, being lieutenant general to the Princes of the union. He then ſerved his Daniſh majeſty, and being obliged to leave his troops in 1626, made his eſcape in a ſmall boat. Afterwards he lived, with variety of fortune, the life of an exile, having been proſcribed by the emperor.

highly

highly worthy to be remembered; *I am a father,* faid he to thoſe who came to condole with him, *but am a Chriſtian likewiſe.—My ſon belonged to God, by a prior right than he belonged to me. Happily, he died like a prince, and like a ſoldier.—Complaints are only to be made about thoſe children who live with infamy, and die like cowards. I have loved nothing, but with a firm reſolution to reſign it up on demand, except it be my conſcience, and my liberty.—As the firſt ſtroke of cannon proved favourable to the only ſupport of the proteſtant cauſe, I have reaſon to digeſt the ill effects of the ſecond, and, upon extended views, rather rejoice than lament, at the concluſion of this extraordinary day* *. When the king conſidered both the old man, and the young man, it is reported, that he ſhed tears on the occaſion †.

At almoſt the ſame inſtant that the prince was killed, the unfortunate Tilly expired in Ingolſtadt: and as the ſon and father, for reaſons needleſs to be recited, hated that general, and were reciprocally hated by him, his majeſty could not help remarking, *how fatal one place and minute had proved to two ſuch inveterate enemies* ‡. The king likewiſe had no perſonal affection to Tilly, diſliking him much on account of the cruelties he exerciſed at Magdeburg, and never truly forgetting, that in one of his applications to him, he had ſtyled him *cavalier* inſtead of king. Yet on this occaſion, juſtice and nature gained the aſcendant over diſguſt and pique; *Alas!* ſaid he, *the* HONOURABLE *old Tilly is now no more* §.

No ſoldier ever died in greater torture. The elector of Bavaria ſate conſtantly by his bedſide, and it is reported, that Tilly ſpoke to him in the following manner: "Your highneſs may remember, that in the middle and advanced ſtages of life, I have had enough of reputation, and glory in abundance. Oh, that inſtead of ſurviving my fame, I had expired in the great day of Leipſic! It had been for your advantage and my honour—Two things I muſt leave on your highneſs's mind, by way of dying advice; never break your alliance with the emperor; and make Cratz commander of your army. That officer has courage to ſerve you, fidelity to content you, and parts to aſſiſt you. He will conduct your troops with reputation, and, as he knows Walſtein, will traverſe his deſigns. Neceſ-

* *Mercure Francois* en l'an 1632, p. 230. *Hiſt. or Auth. Relat.* fol. tom. iii. 67.

† *Heylmanni* Leo Arctoüs, p. 56. ‡ *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 161.

§ *Monro's* Second Expedition, p. 118. *Adelzreiter* Ann. Bav. part iii. p. 257.

ſity

ſity requires you ſhould act the diſſembler, and ſubmit to the extravagancies of that inſolent man: for, except you can allure him to join you with the Imperial army, Guſtavus will enter Bavaria; and when he will relinquiſh it, heaven only knows.—Not being conſcious I have ever uſed your highneſs ill in the command of your armies, I ſhall aſk no forgiveneſs; contented and thankful to die, as you honour me with your attention in my laſt moments, of which very few now remain upon my hands.—Let me beſeech you, therefore, out of pure compaſſion to leave me; and as I have an account to render for human failings, tranſgreſſions, and errors, permit me, after having juſtified myſelf in your opinion, to make my peace with God*." He then kiſſed the hand of the elector, who retired in tears.

Thus died John Tchzerclas, count de Tilly, of whom we have ſpoken ſo much, not only through the courſe of the wars, but in a diſtinct note, that it may ſuffice to obſerve, he had paſſed through every ſtage of military life, from a foot ſoldier to the poſt of generaliſſimo. It is noticed by ſome that he blamed Pappenheim in his laſt moments†; and it is remarked by all writers, that he never indulged himſelf in wine or women. Yet, beyond all contradiction, he was over zealous, or, in other words, too great a bigot, in his own religion: and the cruelties exerciſed at Magdeburg, conſidering the temperate and virtuous life he led, ſeem to me an indelible blot upon his character. So that one is at little loſs to aſſign a motive for *what* no reaſonable being can produce a juſtification! *The court of Walſtein*, as the language then ran, received the news of his death with viſible marks of ſatisfaction. He was born of Walloon parents, and not very nobly deſcended: but created count by the emperor, with the title of *illuſtriſſimo*. He bequeathed the rich diamond ring, which the infanta Iſabella gave him, to the holy Virgin of Oetingen, and left £. 10,000. to the veteran bands that had ſerved under him, eſpecially the four regiments of infantry, which had made ſuch great efforts in the wood after the battle of Leipſic was loſt. Thus this illuſtrious chieftain experienced his own prophecy concerning war, which he had uttered formerly at Ratiſbon.

His majeſty employed eight days in beleaguering and attacking Ingolſtadt, which, in reſpect to ſieges, may be conſidered as the ſharpeſt ſervice during the whole courſe of

* *Bertius* de bellis Germanicis. † *Heylmanni* Leo Arctoüs, 4°. p. 54.

the

the thirty years wars. Though wounded in making the firſt diſpoſitions for poſſeſſing two redoubts ſword in hand, yet nothing abated the keenneſs of his valour, notwithſtanding the defendants had the command of reinforcements in abundance; for the elector of Bavaria lay with his army under the town walls on the other ſide of the Danube; ſo that the king was obliged to leave a body of troops all night, for fear of a ſally, which he had reaſon to expect, drawn up in order of battle, within reach not only of the enemies great guns, but of their muſquetry. Never ſoldiers ſupported a cool ſlaughter with more patience, or in better order; though the valiant Monro confeſſes, in the honeſty of his heart, That it was the longeſt night, for an eighteenth of April, that he ever ſaw *; and, what was more diſagreeable, the Swedes thought it mere waſte of powder and ball to fire a gun. Monro loſt twelve men in one company by a ſingle cannon ſhot; and more than three hundred brave fellows were left dead upon the ground, where they had ſtood a few moments before.

Next evening a thouſand *commanded* muſqueteers were ordered to attack the principal of the two redoubts ſword in hand; his majeſty attending the enterpriſe in perſon. The Swedes, having made incredible efforts, cleared the ditch, and entered the half-moon: but as young Tilly wanted no ſupply of hands, for by means of the bridge he could have marched not only the garriſon, but the whole Bavarian army againſt the aſſailants, his majeſty found himſelf obliged, in common prudence, to ſound a retreat. All, perhaps, that could be wanted by him, was to gain the redoubts and deſtroy the bridge, for then the electoral forces had not power to enter their own country; but this, for reaſons aſſigned, appeared to be an undertaking too difficult, as well as too dangerous. Therefore, all on a ſudden he raiſed the ſiege, for which great ſtroke of ſelf-denial, the continuator of Foreſti applauds him with rapture; leaving Banier to conduct the rear of his army, which repulſed the purſuing garriſon with great coolneſs and judgment. Nothing now remained for the inhabitants, but to dig up the king's palfrey, which had been concealed in the earth near his tent; and having carefully ſtuffed, depoſited it in their arſenal. Upon the whole, the citizens of Ingolſtadt were more polite to a four-footed beaſt, than the people of Breda were to the *boat*, by which their town was ſurpriz-ed; for the latter having dragged it round the ſtreets, and

* *Expedit.* ii. p. 120.

ſcourged

ſcourged it ſeverely, hung it up in their ſtadthouſe as a public trophy.

It was during this ſiege, which I could not obſerve without breaking in upon my narrative, that the elector of Bavaria made a freſh attempt towards a reconciliation, greatly alarmed with the apprehenſions of loſing Ingolſtadt, and fearing to draw the war into the bowels of his own country. This artful prince had *three* views in the preſent negotiation. He wanted to create delays; ſeize ſome fortunate incident, which might caſually preſent itſelf; or ſow the ſeeds of miſunderſtanding between the kings of France and Sweden; but Guſtavus pierced through the thin veil of artifice at a ſingle glance. Under the influence however of Munich-politics, St. Etienne made a viſit to the royal camp; where the king, for certain reaſons, choſe to receive his propoſals in the preſence of his Bohemian majeſty, and ſeveral princes and generals. There the French miniſter told him, with an air of confidence,—That the elector, who had the ſtrongeſt inclination imaginable towards a peace, had diſapproved of Tilly's enterpriſe with reſpect to Bamberg, and employed himſelf that very inſtant in deviſing expedients, whereby to pave the way for the king's admiſſion into Bavaria:—but Guſtavus interrupted him point-blank in this preamble, and, told him, *totidem verbis, That he was not a perſon to be amuſed and miſled by mere ſounds. Sir,* ſaid he, *the king your maſter may have excellent intentions; and if ſo, they bear no conformity to the language you make uſe of. But as to the elector of Bavaria, he ſeeks only to create delays and interruptions; he is a ſort of prince, who keeps in his wardrobe a ſet of upper garments of various hues; and changes them according to his intereſts; wearing black one day, white a ſecond day, and mixed colours a third;—but always concealing the Burgundian croſs next his heart. If it be his ſincere deſire to be well received in our court, let him produce himſelf in one form without change; let him open the gates of Ingolſtadt, diſband his army, refund his extortions, reſtore the Palatinate, reform what is paſt, and give good ſecurity for all which is to come* *.

St. Etienne ſtood aſtoniſhed, to find the king as clear-ſighted and determined in the cabinet as in the field of action; and whilſt he ranſacked his brain to deviſe ſome anſwer, either ſolid or plauſible, Guſtavus reſumed the diſcourſe, adding, *That he had intercepted a letter, of very recent date, wherein the emperor had promiſed to ſend Walſtein into Bavaria at the head of* 50,000 *men. With all my heart,* continued he; *the*

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 503. *Hiſt. or Auth. Relat.* tom. ii. 66.

*elector*

*elector will have ſignal opportunities to ſhew his hoſpitality, and abundance of gueſts to entertain, friends as well as enemies, who want not for good appetites, and quick digeſtion. For my own part, I intend to prove an expenſive viſitant* *.

As the French negotiator had erred before in point of decorum, he now made a ſecond falſe ſtep through pure inadvertency; for he obliquely inſinuated, That his moſt Chriſtian majeſty had a formidable army not far removed from the empire, and might, in all probability, greatly diſreliſh the rejection of propoſals from the duke of Bavaria. This was touching the king's temper in the only vulnerable part: his eyes aſſumed a fierceneſs in an inſtant, and he accoſted St. Etienne, as one who did not merit to be conſidered as a private gentleman: *Say no more*, continued he, *I pardon* thy *ignorance*: thou *knoweſt neither thy maſter nor me. When* thou *makeſt ſuch advances, bring me an authority ſigned by the king's own hand*; *and when* thou *acteſt for an unfortunate prince, like the elector of Bavaria, behave* thyſelf *with humility. The* familiar *freedoms of* thy *nation are ſometimes* overlooked, *and ſometimes* deſpiſed; *but in the preſent caſe, they are* INSUPPORTABLE. *Know, that I am* OFFENDED *and* VICTORIOUS †.

By this time the elector of Bavaria had made an irruption into the Upper Palatinate, in order to cauſe a diverſion in favour of his own dominions, and impede the enemy from marching on, directly, to Munich. Guſtavus well conſidered this movement, and entered the heart of Bavaria notwithſtanding; foreſeeing wiſely, that if he followed the duke, who ſhaped his courſe towards Bohemia, Walſtein and he might then be obliged to unite their forces by expreſs injunctions from the Court of Vienna, and that the two combined armies might overpower him by dint of numbers. He therefore adhered inflexibly to his firſt idea, knowing that he ſhould thereby force the elector back; and foreſeeing too that Walſtein, from a principle of private animoſity, would not digreſs to a point ſo far removed from him, as the capital of the electorate.

Leaving Ingolſtadt, therefore, he marched to Gyſenfelt, where the whole army paid the honours of ſepulture to the young margrave, making two diſcharges of all their muſquetry and artillery. Next day he conducted his troops to Moſberg, a long ſtretch of twenty miles; and thence detached Horn and Hepburn, at the head of 8000 horſe and foot, to beſiege Landſhut, a ſmall beautiful town, ſituated on

* *Le Vaſſor*, tom. vii. p. 169. † *Ibid.*

the

the conflux of the Iſer and Ampter, and uſually ſtyled the *pupil* of Bavaria's eye. When theſe officers arrived, their proſpect of ſucceſs appeared unpromiſing; for 1300 Bavarian dragoons threw themſelves unexpectedly into the place, having made a march that day of ſix and thirty miles; but when they beheld a large column of Swediſh infantry advance, they changed countenance, croſſed the Iſer, and broke down the bridge. Next morning, Horn ſent a meſſenger into the town, firſt by way of ſpy, and ſecondly, with the power of performing the part of a negotiator with the inhabitants; but the fellow found all the houſes locked and barricadoed, nor could he procure the ſight of any human being, even through a caſement. Upon this, Horn commanded all his troops to advance, and raiſed a ſharp contribution of £. 15,000. by his maſter's orders; for this place had undertaken to levy and maintain ſix troops of horſe at its own expence during the whole courſe of the wars. Hence it was, that the ſum demanded was paid with cheerfulneſs, and a reconciling fee of £. 300. * was advanced gratuitouſly to the general.

Next morning his majeſty arrived. When the citizens preſented him the town keys upon their knees, he ſaid to them, *Riſe, it is your duty to worſhip God, and not me* †. He then made a viſit to the palace, or as ſome call it, the caſtle, which he ſurveyed with great pleaſure and attention, as it had been conſidered, at leaſt by the Germans, in the light of a maſterpiece in Italian architecture. Being ſuddenly ſeized with a ſort of fainting fit, he was obliged to repoſe himſelf on a bench in the ſtreets for ſome time. He then mounted his horſe in order to leave the town; but on his arrival at the Jewiſh-gate, found himſelf obliged to take ſhelter there; for a tempeſt of thunder and lightning aroſe, which, for violence cannot well be deſcribed. That being over, he ſaid to Horn, *Go back, and free the inhabitants from their incertitude* ‡; for as yet he had given them no aſſurances of pardon.

His majeſty then returned to Moſberg, and advancing thence to Freyſingen, laid the city and dioceſe under contribution, haſtening onwards with great diſpatch to Munich, upon receiving intelligence, which proved not afterwards true, that Walſtein began to move towards the Upper Palatinate; and chooſing therefore to ſecure the capital of

* One account ſays 3000l. but the additional cypher appears to me a typographical error.

† *Heylmanni* Leo Arctoüs, 4°. p. 58. ‡ *Ibid.* 58, 59.

Bavaria

Bavaria before any other notable diverſion could be effected elſewhere. Here St. Etienne again interfered, and requeſted leave to negotiate a good capitulation with the inhabitants of Munich, but waſted ſo much time in frivolous propoſals and delays, that the king ſuſpected him and marched on. Alarmed a little at ſuch compendious and vigorous proceedings, St. Etienne intreated his majeſty to ſtifle the reſentments of himſelf and army, and not lay the town in ruins: to which was anſwered with an air of frankneſs, *That if the magiſtracy ſubmitted readily and with a good grace, care ſhould be taken, that no man ſhould ſuffer with reſpect to life, liberty, or religion.* The French miniſter ſoon conveyed this intelligence to the inhabitants, who, correſpondently to his majeſty's gracious propoſition, paid their court to him on the road; but in imitation of their maſter, endeavoured to amuſe him with long and artful preliminaries, which had the fate to be rejected almoſt as ſoon as propoſed. At length it was agreed to make him an offer of £.36,000. by way of exempting the town from plunder: but the king inſiſted upon receiving one third more; in which demand it was thought prudent to acquieſce. He next day entered the town at the head of three regiments only, accompanied by the king of Bohemia and ſeveral other great perſonages. The two kings took up their reſidence in the electoral palace. The garriſon received very generous uſage; for though the Swediſh horſe occupied all the paſſes throughout the country, yet it was allowed to retire in ſafety, without the ceremony of a capitulation.

Munich is a large and beautiful city, ſurrounded with vaſt plains, extremely fertile, and as finely watered as any in Europe. Maximilian, the then elector, had erected there a magnificent palace, adorned with pictures, painted by the greateſt Flemiſh and Italian maſters. Guſtavus did not remove a ſingle piece, which is more than can be ſaid of ſome ſucceeding conquerors. Charles I. of England, as we obſerved before, had an inclination to perform, what a great general practiſed afterwards*; but the ſtrictneſs of Guſtavus's morals, in conjunction with the nobleneſs of his temper, would not allow ſuch ſort of plunder, though ſanctified with the excuſes of *con guſto et con l'amore*. There was indeed a chimney-piece of rich marble, which ſtruck the king's fancy; inſomuch, that he declared, between *jeſt* and *earneſt*, that he had a ſort of inclination to tranſport it to Stockholm. It did not, however, anſwer my expectations, when I had

* *Geographie Univerſelle*, tom. v. 192.

an

had an opportunity to examine it, which made me conclude, that our hero's excellence conſiſted more in *military* than *civil* architecture. He was likewiſe greatly pleaſed with the good taſte and modeſty of the monument erected to the memory of William V. which, inſtead of being decorated with plump weeping angels, ſcythes, hour-glaſſes, ſhanks, and ſkulls, conſiſted only of a well-proportioned tomb, ſurmounted with a crucifix.

As to plate, jewels, and other valuable moveables, the Swedes found none in the palace; every thing portable and precious, paintings excepted, being removed to Saltzburg; to which city the elector and electreſs had retired with duke Albert their brother. Thus the *family*, that had diſturbed the peace of Germany for twelve years, proſcribed the perſons, or confiſcated the poſſeſſions, of half the proteſtant princes, and made almoſt every village the ſeat of devaſtation, at the expence of the lives of more than a million of people, was now obliged to leave its own abode, and labouring under a neceſſity, almoſt as diſagreeable as lying beneath the ban of the empire, compelled to ſeek food and refuge in another prince's territories like wanderers and exiles.

When Guſtavus entered the town, many of his principal officers perſuaded him to plunder this palace, as it belonged to the grand fomentor of all diſturbances, and commit it to the flames. His anſwer was, *My good friends, let us not imitate our anceſtors of confuſion, the Goths and Vandals, who, by deſtroying every thing that belonged to the fine arts, have delivered down to poſterity their barbarity and want of taſte, as a ſort of proverb and bye-word of contempt.** Whatever ſome authors may aſſert to the contrary, it appears, from the leaſt diſputable authorities, that the elector Palatine diſcovered a very manly and Chriſtian ſpirit; for though his Bavarian kinſman had plundered and depopulated all his dominions, ſtormed Heidelberg, ranſacked the palace, and tranſported the famous library to Rome; he diſcovered no joy upon contemplating this reverſe of fortune, nor touched a ſingle cabinet, bronze, or picture; and at dinner Guſtavus told him, with a view undoubtedly to his future re-eſtabliſhment, *that he might ſoon expect to eat at Heidelberg, as he could now make a repaſt at Munich.*

As the king entered this city without bloodſhed, he made a preſent of about five ſhillings Engliſh to all the ſoldiers then in his army; and as the inhabitants received him with

* *Le Vaſſor*; Hiſt. de Louis XIII. tom. vii. p. 177.

a cheerful countenance, forgave them that *third* part of the contribution which he had lately demanded. No civilities were ſpared by him of the ingratiating kind: he ſhook one man by the hand, called a ſecond by his name, and ordered a third to put on his hat; and with a view to familiarize himſelf to the eyeſight of the populace, it was his cuſtom to marſhal his ſoldiers every morning with the aſſiduity of a ſimple colonel; nor was it unuſual with him to diſmount various times in one review, take a muſquet from the hands of the loweſt probationer, and teach him the ſeveral poſtures and motions. Here he ſhewed the Bavarians, by way of unuſual ſpectacle, the art of firing in *platoons*, which we have obſerved elſewhere to be his own invention, as alſo another method he had of giving fire upon a new principle in *ambuſcades*.

On the feſtival of Holy-Thurſday, his majeſty ordered, for the firſt time at Munich, the proteſtant ſervice to be performed in the caſtle, as likewiſe a ſermon to be preached on account of his late proſperous enterpriſe, and made choice of the ſinging Pſalms *himſelf*. In the afternoon he went to ſee the popiſh manner of celebrating the aſcenſion. Thence, attended by two companions, he paid a viſit to the Jeſuits college, where the rector pronounced a very magnificent piece of oratory, to which the king replied extempore, in a manner leſs turgid, and more laconic; and as he had been witneſs, that day, to the celebration of maſs, took occaſion therefrom to enter into a ſyllogiſtical diſcuſſion of tranſubſtantiation and communion *ſub unâ*; which diſpute, ſay ſome, concluded with more good manners than real utility.

Others again maintain, that he took Gaſſion, and another officer with him, purely to entertain the major part of the Jeſuits in diſcourſe, and made a digreſſion from the theological parts of the converſation, till at length the reverend fathers gave him ſome intimations *with reference to the train of artillery* which the elector had cauſed to be concealed. On neither point is it in my power to pronounce with certainty. All we know is, he behaved with great friendſhip to the Romiſh eccleſiaſtics in general, and, amongſt others, treated the Capuchins with viſible marks of diſtinction: which was ſuppoſed to be done out of compliment to father Joſeph, who kept a private correſpondence with him and the other proteſtant princes. It is moreover thoroughly well known, that he *allowed* maſs to be publicly celebrated during his whole reſidence in this city; and when a zealous Capuchin exhorted him to embrace the religion of Rome, he heard

him

him with patience, and by his countenance appeared to be in no degree offended, making allowances for the probable goodneſs of his intentions. He then diſtributed money to the populace, and ordered alms to be given to the ſick and indigent. Yet all this humanity, intermixed with politeneſs, could not ſecure to him what he greatly wiſhed to poſſeſs; namely, ſome ſecreted manuſcripts that had been unjuſtly taken from the library at Heidelberg.

Now it was that the Daniſh ambaſſador, whom we have lately mentioned, made a ſecond offer of his maſter's ſervices, in the character of a mediator, between Guſtavus and the emperor: but the former ſaw through the artifice, having reaſon to doubt his northern neighbour's ſincerity, and obſerving, at the firſt glance, that ſuch a propoſal ſerved only to gain time, roundly told him, that he could take no ſtep of ſuch extraordinary conſequence, without conſulting and procuring the aſſent of thoſe powers who had called him from the depths of the north into Germany.

St. Etienne took this opportunity to renew his ſolicitations in behalf of Bavaria; but the king continued immoveable upon that ſubject, and gave him no anſwers but what conſiſted of ſharp invectives, conceived in general and indiſtinct terms.

It was matter of ſurprize with his majeſty to find the arſenal of Munich entirely diſmantled of cannon, which, ſome months before, it was well known to be the beſt ſupplied of any in Germany. It is true he found the carriages, but the artillery was all diſmounted. At length, having received ſome private intelligence concerning the matter, he ſet himſelf, the next day, according to his own phraſe, to *unbury the dead*; and breaking up the pavement, where no marks of concealment were viſible, diſcovered in large vaults beneath, one hundred and forty pieces of field and battering ordnance, twelve of which were very fine ones, of uncommon ſhape and workmanſhip, which the elector uſed to ſtyle, if the profaneneſs of the expreſſion may be pardoned, the *twelve apoſtles*. Three other pieces were found, ſo very large, that it was not poſſible to remove them to any conſiderable diſtance; and on many of them were to be ſeen the arms of Brunſwick, Denmark, and the Palatinate; and in the undermoſt of them all, ſurnamed *die ſau* *, was diſcovered a cartridge more powerful in war than can-

* In Engliſh, the female wild ſwine, an emblem of fury. The torrent of that ravaging river the *Savus* ſignifies *die ſau*, and is ſo called by the natives.

nons themſelves, for it contained 15,000 Hungarian ducats. Abundance of regimentals, were likewiſe found; wherewith the king cloathed a conſiderable part of his army. He now made a ſhort excurſion from Munich, in order to chaſtiſe the Bavarian peaſants, who had maſſacred his ſoldiers, and mangled and tortured them in the moſt cruel manner. It muſt not be diſſembled that the licentiouſneſs of the Swedes had adminiſtered no ſmall provocation, much to their maſter's diſpleaſure; for the beſt diſciplined troops are apt to grow inſolent and barbarous, when it is their fortune to overrun a rich country, without oppoſition.

Whilſt the king was employed in checking the inſurrection of the peaſants, Cratz, in his abſence, attacked Munich without ſucceſs *. He then made a detachment of 2000 infantry and Cronenberg's regiment of horſe, and rendered himſelf maſter of Weiſſemburg, were, through ſome miſapprehenſion, ſuppoſed to be intentional, the articles of capitulation were violated by the Bavarians, and 800 Swediſh infantry, and 200 horſe put to the ſword. The king wrote a ſharp letter, to the elector, on the conduct of his general, threatening retaliation at Munich; but it was only a threat, for he never performed it; and demanded Cratz in perſon to be delivered up to his juſtice.

Fluſhed with this ſlight ſucceſs at Weiſſemburg, the elector of Bavaria returned from Saltzburg to Ratiſbon †, and prevailed on the magiſtrates, as well as Salis the governor, to admit ſome companies of infantry by way of garriſon, who, under pretence of being reviewed, marched out of town on Sunday morning during the time of divine ſervice, diſcharging a certain number of muſquet-ſhots as a ſort of ſignal.

* *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, tom. ii. p. 72.

† A moſt agreeable city, with a magnificent bridge acroſs the Danube, which in the Gothic taſte may be pronounced to be an extremely fine one. The diet of the empire has been uſually held here, having received no interruption from 1662 to 1742: when Charles VII. being choſen emperor, and making war againſt the houſe of Auſtria, convened the diet, at Francfort upon the Maine, which, on the election of Francis I. was referred to Ratiſbon.

Few places can be more inſtructive to a traveller, who goes abroad to improve his mind, rather than his eyes or ears. There he may have acceſs to men of underſtanding, deputed not only from every ſtate and principality in Germany, but from courts of great conſequence beyond the limits of the empire: and thus within a circle of inconſiderable circumference he may learn from the beſt inſtructors the maxims, policy, forms of government, military force, commerce, &c. of various nations, eſpecially the northern.

Upon

Upon this Cratz*, who was a ſort of generaliſſimo in Tilly's room, and who was concealed hard by, ruſhed into the city at

* John Philip, count de Scharpfenſtein. I cannot paſs by this ſtrange phenomenon of a warrior without ſubjoining a note, whoſe hiſtory extends beyond the death of the king of Sweden: and indeed Cratz's life was a ſeries of bravery, misfortune, and ill-management. He was an officer of long ſervice, and gave the favourable turn to the battle of Prague in 1620, [*Ephemeris Expedit. in Bohem.* p. 99.] for which reaſon he was created a count by the emperor. It was his maxim never to quit the field of action; and thus it was his unhappineſs to be taken priſoner at the battle of Leipſic. It was not in the elector of Bavaria's power to make him generaliſſimo over the *army of the league*, conformably to Tilly's dying advice; for upon that promotion Walſtein threatened to abandon him to the reſentments of the Swedes without remorſe. Upon this Cratz retired, but his maſter conjured him to return; made him governor of Ingoldſtadt; and promiſed him the poſt of captain general in three months. Walſtein and he had quarrelled, originally, many years before this period, about a lady. When Cratz came back to his duty, he gave the former a piece of intelligence relating to the enemy, formed upon his own ocular obſervation. Walſtein called an aid de camp, and bid him mount on horſeback, and ſee if the circumſtances were truly related; upon which Cratz challenged him without ceremony, and told him he would make his ſword ſpeak plainer than his tongue.

The duke de Weimar, or, as ſome ſay Guſtavus Horn*, thought this a ſufficient reaſon to tempt the Bavarian commander into the Swediſh ſervice, and upon an exchange of priſoners ſent an officer of parts to try his virtue, diſguiſed in the habit of a trumpeter. This negotiator ſoon found an opportunity of looking, as if he had ſomething to impart in private. Cratz complied, and having heard his propoſal unconcernedly, aſked him with a ſmile, *if the duke would make him biſhop of Aichſtadt?* Nothing more paſſed, the officer took the inuendo, and retired.

Some days afterwards, having waited a little for fear of ſuſpicion, the ſame perſon returned in the ſame dreſs, making Cratz an offer of the poſt of camp-maſter-general in the Swediſh army. In return Cratz agreed to give duke Bernard an opportunity, by night, of ſeizing Ingoldſtadt, the key of admiſſion into Bavaria, for Guſtavus's ſucceſſors had not the vanity of aſpiring to croſs the Lech a ſecond time, and to this purpoſe diſpatched the better part of his garriſon on ſome chimerical errand, giving out likewiſe, that a body of Aldringer's men had orders to replace theſe ſoldiers at Ingoldſtadt; for the Swedes were to come at midnight, and perſonate this little army. But as ſtratagems and diſappointments are not uncommon in the military profeſſion, duke Bernard and his detachment miſſed their way, and arrived under the walls a few minutes after day-break. Cratz boldly pronounced this body of troops to be Aldringer's regiments, and ordered the town-gates to be opened; but an officer diſcovered the Swediſh colours, which the troops had brought with them, propoſing to enter Ingoldſtadt in the night, and perceiving a trumpeter in the firſt rank, whom Cratz had diſpatched that night to Aldringer upon other buſineſs, and whom the Swedes had taken priſoner, and made uſe of as a guide, he immediately comprehended ſomething, and gave the alarm of treachery. Upon this the Swedes returned thoroughly diſappointed, and the governor apprehended it was high time to ſhift the ſcene. Walſtein ſoon diſcovered this perfidy,

* *Galeazzo Gualdo,*

at the head of 2000 foot, and 500 cavalry; and, what was ſtill more imprudent, allowed his ſoldiers to commit moſt outrageous

and diſpatched a courier to adverti ſe the elector to arreſt Cratz, and ordered Aldringer likewiſe to ſeize him, if by chance he paſſed through Ratiſbon. Cratz, who told the officers of his garriſon he was going to Vienna in order to lay his commiſſion at the emperor's feet, reached Ratiſbon juſt before the ſecond mentioned expreſs arrived, and had paid a viſit to Aldringer, if an officer had not informed him, that that general had devoted the evening to a banquet of feſtivity, and for certain reaſons would be better pleaſed not to be interrupted. At that inſtant Cratz's ſteward informed him, by letter, that five companies of infantry had taken up their quarters upon his eſtate, which tempted him to mount his horſe immediately, in order to diſpoſſeſs them; but an expreſs from a friend at Ratiſbon overtook him on the road, and told him Aldringer had ſeized his equipage and baggage, and diſpatched fifty cavaliers to bring him back dead or alive. Uncertain what to do, he puſhed on for Poland, through the northern parts of Bohemia, thoſe parts being leſs crowded with Walſtein's ſoldiers. In the proſecution of this journey he met an Imperial commander, and they both knew each other very well, returning from making enquiries after him by Walſtein's orders. The officer applied immediately to a Poliſh noblemen to lend him ſome vaſſals in order to purſue and take the offender; but the Polander told him, It did not become *a prince like himſelf* to act the part of a ſbirro or a conſtable. Cratz then reached Cracow, but to his great mortification the king was abſent. He then ſent an explanation of his conduct to Vienna, and made propoſals of reconcilement; but Walſtein was all-powerful in the cabinet there, and no anſwer was vouchſafed him. After many wanderings from place to place, he at length found his way to the Swediſh army, and conformed to the Lutheran religion; joining duke Bernard the night before the fatal battle of Nordlingen; which gave that prince ſo much joy, that he embraced him, and thanked him in the preſence of all his officers. Nevertheleſs, he joined with Horn in the council of war, and pronounced the diſpoſitions of the enſuing day to be raſh and hazardous.

In that tranſaction he repelled the Imperialiſts in their very firſt fortunate impreſſion, and killed Aldobrandini, grand prior of Malta, with his own hand, and to his infinite regret; for he was the neareſt and deareſt to him of all his friends; but in the hurry of the action he did not recollect him. Duke Bernard ſtaid on the field as long as he could, without incurring the ſuſpicion of being thought a madman, and at length conſented, with tears in his eyes, to a retreat; and as Cratz had fought all day with 1600 Swedes againſt 4000 Imperialiſts, he implored him by an aid de camp to conſult his ſafety, and retire immediately. His anſwer was, that he would ſecure the retreat of the army, and have the honour to follow him by and by. There he fought on till not a ſingle ſoldier was left at his elbow, and mixing with the enemy's troops, walked up and down the field, being unhorſed long before, with his ſword and piſtols in his hand, intermixing with a few inferior officers and ſoldiers, their language and his being the ſame. At length he was left almoſt alone, and one Fontana, a Croatian captain, contemplating him for ſome moments, for he was a fine figure, and a perſon unknown to him, whiſpered him in the ear, with an oath, that he would make an excellent priſoner. This man had certain reaſons to ſuſpect ſomething; for whilſt all the troops a few minutes before had expreſſed a tranſport of joy for the victory, Cratz appeared remarkably grave and thoughtful. Cratz, who ſuppoſed Fontana by his air to be a French officer, told him

outrageous diſorders. The elector then joined the garriſon with all his forces, and gave directions for new fortifications in various parts. As Ratiſbon has always been conſidered in the Germanic ſyſtem a ſort of ſacred *Peculiar*, many people looked upon this enterpriſe as a very bold and hazardous one. The court of Vienna was ſtartled at it, and the magiſtracy preferred a complaint, of the violation of ſyſtematical rights, to the emperor, who, as he feared to irritate the elector at this juncture, requeſted him, by means of the moſt lively repreſentations, to behave himſelf with great caution and lenity upon the occaſion.

During this interval, Oſſa, the Imperial commiſſary, newly created general, who had the ſuperintendency of affairs in Alſatia, Tyrol, and the circle of Suabia, beſieged Biberach with an army of 7000 men, compoſed out of the archduke's old corps, the Lorrain troops, and thoſe that had ſerved againſt Mantua. His majeſty ſoon determined to raiſe the ſiege, and diſpatching 8000 men to that effect, overtook them, himſelf, near the river Iſer, having thrown a bridge over it, and appointed, before his departure, the valiant Hepburn to be governor of Munich. Oſſa, on the king's approach, retired to Lindau and the lake of Conſtance. He loſt many troops before the town, and, to his particular mortification, was

him inſtantly, in that language, he would give him 5000l. to contrive his eſcape, and a colonel's commiſſion in the enemy's army. The Croatian took him at his word, and demanded his piſtols and ſword by way of military ſubmiſſion. Cratz delivered the former, but inſiſted that a gentleman ſhould never reſign his ſword; which punctilio of delicacy in all probability coſt him his head. For as they moved along, in order to recover the rear of the Swediſh army, a thought ſtruck Fontana, that his own colonel had been killed by a priſoner, who had promiſed him a large recompence. Upon this he ſhaped his way to the Imperial camp, and meeting a flying party of Swedes, who knew their general, and made an attempt to reſcue him, he cried out aloud for help, and a ſquadron of Lorrainers who recollected Cratz at firſt ſight, flew to his aſſiſtance. His friends thought fit to deſert him upon this freſh onſet, and thus he became an eaſy priſoner: for the horſe Fontana had given him was ſo fatigued that it could hardly move.

Being carried to the duke of Lorrain's tent, that prince told him peeviſhly and haſtily enough, that he would teach ſuch commanders as him how to traduce a duke of Lorrain to the French king. To which Cratz anſwered, That his highneſs laboured under ſome miſtake; for ſince he did not own the accuſation, it was plain he had not deſerved it, it being his cuſtom to ſay more to men's faces than in their abſence.

The king of Hungary had the curioſity to make him a viſit incognito, and ordered his ſword, which the duke of Lorrain had taken from him, to be reſtored. Bernard of Saxe Weimar offered the payment of any ſum to diſcharge his ranſom, or propoſed to exchange the biſhop of Wurtzburg againſt him, a prelate and prince of far greater conſequence than the priſoner But the court of Vienna, or rather Walſtein, continued inflexible, and brought him to death, as he juſtly merited, on a public ſcaffold.

was repulsed chiefly by the women, who not only exhorted their husbands to behave courageously, but carried ammunition from place to place, and threw down fragments of stone from the walls on the assailants.

By this time the resentments of Walstein, who had rank before the elector of Bavaria in the military commission, began to exasperate, as well as endanger affairs overmuch; for the court of Vienna did not care to see that prince humbled to the dust, and yet dreaded the consequences of an irruption from Gustavus in the central parts of the hereditary dominions. At length the generalissimo, who affected to be without a master and above direction, found himself obliged, through common decency, though with infinite reluctance, to take the field in the beginning of April, and leaving the elector and Tilly, which latter was then living, to become a prey to the conqueror, employed himself upon more easy operations against the Saxons; namely, the reduction of Bohemia. The elector of Saxony, flushed with the success gained at the battle of Leipsic, had on foot a fine army with respect to numbers, and external show: but that prince was both indolent and insincere; and Arnheim was always prepared to negotiate with Walstein, upon condition he could distress the Swedes, whom he hated;——extract some advantage for his master, and, above all, make a good separate bargain for himself;——So that never was a conquest deserted with more baseness, and less regard to appearances than that of Bohemia was. Nevertheless, Walstein, who was an adept in artifice and dissimulation, felt the elector's pulse first, by way of negotiating, and made him considerable offers: yet they were not great enough to counterbalance the danger of quitting Gustavus; and perhaps the Saxon ministers, who were no way deficient in point of cunning, concluded likewise, that the emperor had not power enough at that time to make good his promises. Supposing both, or either to be the case, Walstein in part carried the point he aimed at, which was to render the Saxons *suspected* by the Swedes. Some historians assign other reasons, which appear to me not quite demonstrative; as that Walstein made these advances out of gratitude, because the elector had spared his fine palace at Prague, and moreover had been alarmed a little by Battista Seni, his astrologer, who predicted in that month the culmination of a planet very unpropitious and adverse to his fortunes. Without entering into these matters, the treaty, at that time, vanished into nothing, though colonel Spar, by Walstein's orders, had gained over most of the Saxon officers by proposing such rewards as always came

from Walſtein; who, little diſmayed with this diſappointment, repaired to Pilſen, and reviewed his army. He had, by his bounty and dexterity, collected together all the diſbanded veteran troops, that had ever ſerved under the Imperial enſigns, and took care to draw to himſelf each commander of note, who had declined the ſervice out of ill humour againſt the court of Vienna, or from attachment or perſonal friendſhip to himſelf. Neither did he omit to ſolicit any officer of note, of which ſort there were then many, whoſe ſwords and conſciences were always ready for ſale. Though he puniſhed with more than Roman rigour, yet he rewarded with more than Roman profuſion; and for this reaſon, men who knew they had military merit, delighted to ſerve under him. Nor was the court of Vienna idle in her co-operations. Orders were given to ſupply the army with every neceſſary that could be imagined. The provinces were all requeſted to make generous contributions, and upwards of £. 30,000. were ſent to Aldringer to ſet in motion the troops which he commanded in Suabia. At the ſame time a conſiderable reinforcement was expected from Poland, as the diet had been convened at Warſaw the month before, and as the emperor had formerly ſent 10,000 men, under Arnheim, to the aſſiſtance of the Poles, in conſequence of a treaty of alliance concluded in 1621: but Sigiſmond, who died ſoon afterwards, had an inſurmountable averſion to engage himſelf in any farther military conteſts with Guſtavus, and pleaded, by way of excuſe, the intractable nature of his form of government, and the apprehenſions he had of new diſturbances from the ſide of Tartary and Moſcovy. It is true this prince loved the houſe of Auſtria cordially and unfeignedly, but the States maintained a ſort of underſtanding with Guſtavus. To content the king for their undutifulneſs they made a very decent proviſion for a couple of his ſons, at the expence of two conſiderable biſhoprics.

At Pilſen, Walſtein received a deputation from the ſenate of Nurenberg. The gentlemen, who compoſed it, repreſented to him, that the honours and civilities paid the king of Sweden were things of indiſpenſable neceſſity at that time, and in that conjuncture of affairs. Walſtein knew their errand before they ſpoke, and, with an air of politeneſs and indifference, put their memorial into his pocket without reading it. Nevertheleſs, he entertained them ſplendidly, and ordered an eſcort of troops to conduct them home.

He then, at the head of 40,000 men, inveſted Prague, which was defended by 2000 regular Saxons, and about 5000 militia. The garriſon made good ſhew of reſiſtance, at firſt, and

and after a conſiderable breach was opened, repulſed the enemy in two ſeveral attacks, which enraged Walſtein to ſuch a degree, that, having commanded his infantry to make a third attempt, he ordered two regiments of horſe to puſh them on with drawn ſwords, and by theſe means compelled them to mount the breach.

Thus was Leſſer Prague taken. The garriſon retired to the caſtle, where they and the reſt of the Saxon troops agreed to ſurrender at the expence of their artillery, ammunition, and colours, reſerving nothing except their ſwords, and ſeventy baggage waggons, which were granted them. Upon this the emperor ſent Walſtein a patent creating him duke of Great Glogau in Sileſia.

About this time it was that the elector of Bavaria, who found himſelf on the brink of a precipice, determined to make a bold adventure, once for all, freely and openly, without reſerving to himſelf the poſſibility of playing an after game either with France or with Guſtavus. Of courſe he conſigned his life and fortunes to the emperor's protection, hoping perhaps by ſuch an implicit act of generoſity to procure compaſſion; and publiſhed a manifeſto *, which may be conſidered as no mean effort in politics, wherein having taken care not once to mention Walſtein, whom he hated, or the king of Sweden, whom he dreaded, and touching gently on his *thrice-dear* couſin the elector Palatine, whoſe patrimony had been devoured by him, he paints in the warmeſt colouring his indiſpenſable allegiance to the emperor, as well as his obligations of gratitude, and ſuppoſes none could ſuſpect him of concluding a ſeparate bargain with a great weſtern monarch, with whom he had ſigned and ratified the eighth of May 1631, but ſuch as were either profeſſed enemies to his proſperity, or detractors from his virtue. He then pays France, in the ſame breath, no ſmall tribute of adulation, but inſinuates, in the words of the prophet, alluding to that crying ſin of co-operating with heretics, *That thou*, meaning France, *ſtoodeſt that day on the other ſide; in the day, that the ſtrangers carried away captive our forces, and foreigners entered into our gates, and caſt lots upon Jeruſalem; even thou waſt as one of them* †.

There

* *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part ii. p. 182, & ſeqq.

† *Obadiah*, ver. 11. The curious in hiſtory may peruſe an example, equally ſtrong, of this prince's uncommon talents for diſſimulation and artifice, by conſulting a letter from him to the elector Palatine in the month of September 1620, ſome few weeks preceding the battle of Prague. [*Expedit. in utramque*

There is a certain circumſtance, very peculiar, in this manifeſto: for though it mentions abundance of facts, yet they are ſo cautiouſly collected, and alledged in ſuch general terms, that it is not poſſible to aſcertain the chronology of this extraordinary compoſition; ſince all we know is, that it was diſperſed here and there in various courts, about the ſpring of the year 1632.

As it is not my intention to deſcribe the war in full detail, with exception only of thoſe parts where Guſtavus was preſent, it may ſuffice to obſerve, in regard to Walſtein, that in ſix weeks after his acceptance of the dictatorſhip, and juſt as long before the death of Tilly, he had good ſenſe and foreſight enough to diſpatch Don Baltazar di Maradas *, at the head of 8000 men, into Bohemia, with a view to diſtreſs and haraſs the Saxons. The vigilant Spaniard, though in truth a better courtier than a general, for he had three or four civil employments, equally lucrative and honourable, *his armis illa quoque tutus in aula*; made a ſhift however to take Satz, the capital of a circle, by ſome called Zadeck; and having utterly ruined Bindhauf's regiment, which compoſed the garriſon, gave the firſt check to the cauſe of the proteſtants. Indeed the elector of Saxony's conduct was quite inexplicable in an honourable ſenſe, for, beſides ſome omiſſions, already mentioned, not wholly reconcileable to a ſincere alliance, he had left Bohemia, not many weeks after the reduction of Prague, at a time when he was victorious without oppoſition, and carried Arnheim his general with him, under pretence that no one elſe was capable of negotiating with Oxenſtiern at the diet of Torgau, which was held in February 1631, and to which the emperor diſpatched a deputy, who propoſed ſome indiſtinct advantages. The Swediſh chancellor ſoon cut the matter ſhort, by telling him roundly, whether with ſincerity or otherwiſe one cannot ſay, that the king, his maſter, and his proteſtant allies, expected firſt, by way of preliminary, to ſee the expences of two campaigns refunded to them.

What ſtill rendered matters more ſuſpicious, was, that previous to this, the elector of Saxony, in his own perſon, received

*utramque Auſtriam & Bohemiam Ephemeris.* 4to. Monachii. 1621, p. 50. 54.] Lib. rariſſ.

* To this commander a pretended Low-Country captain alludes, in one of Dryden's plays;

*Brave man at arms! but weak to Baltazar.*

Alluſions are made to him likewiſe in ſome of Johnſon's latter comedies.

received propoſals from a duke of Saxe Lauenberg*, who had reconciled himſelf to the catholic religion, and acted the part of an Imperial agent. Nor was it leſs extraordinary, that a prince, uninterrupted in his conqueſts, ſhould relinquiſh a country, at leaſt in effect, three better parts whereof he had entirely ſubdued, at a time when hardly any oppoſition could be made againſt him; and when his own troops, not to mention the addition of count Thurn's army, amounted, in caſe he had choſen to collect them, to 10,000 cavalry, and 27,000 infantry. I am ſenſible, it is true, that this number may appear to many readers overcharged; but then the Saxons muſt make themſelves reſponſible to poſterity for the miſtake, ſince the liſts ſtood thus, according to the accounts which they themſelves publiſhed. Dewbatel likewiſe laid in Luſatia at the elector's elbow, and with his own Swedes, Germans, and Hamilton's Engliſh, had expelled Goëtz and Tieffenbach out of that province; and beſides this, the elector of Brandenburg had 8000 men, all prepared to unite with Dewbatel, which junction was afterwards effected.

Nor muſt we here paſs by another piece of equivocal conduct in the elector of Saxony; for though, on the reduction of Prague, moſt of the late proſcribed and exiled proteſtants returned home, after a baniſhment and proſcription of twelve years, yet they found their new friends ſo very vigilant and clear-ſighted in the article of levying contributions, that the difference appeared to them only *nominal*, between an *evangelic* or *popiſh* government: ſo, of courſe, the greater part withdrew themſelves as voluntary exiles, to the very places which they had lately quitted.

Before we permit the king to leave Munich entirely, it may be highly neceſſary, to lay open a very extraordinary converſation betwixt him and the Engliſh ambaſſador, which has perplexed and puzzled me more than any ſingle incident through the whole progreſs of my work; and the rather, ſince, though I have ſtrong reaſons to conjecture that his majeſty's conduct might be juſtified, if any accounts could be obtained beſides this of Vane, who hated Guſtavus, and had neither parts nor inclination to ſerve the cauſe, yet the misfortune is, that no profeſſed hiſtorian, on the ſubject of this period, mentions a ſingle circumſtance relative to the preſent affair. Notwithſtanding all which, the love of truth, joined with a diſapprobation of partiality, forces me to lay the tranſaction before the eyes of the public, and leave it to

* Henry Julius.

work

work its own way upon the reader's mind. It had been eaſy for me to have paſſed by the whole ſtory, as being the firſt producer thereof, after it had ſlept without notice for the ſpace of one hundred and twenty-five years: but it is not my principle to ſerve even an hero under ſuch conditions. All men have, more or leſs, ſome failings of human nature; nor do I pretend to engage in drawing a faultleſs character*: yet, by a mere chance, it may lie in my power to throw ſome little light upon Vane's account, and extenuate, if not entirely exculpate, his majeſty. In the firſt place, therefore, I ſhall preſent the reader with Vane's letter, or memorial, tranſmitted by him to the court of Whitehall. It is drawn up in French: and that ſeems to me an affectation; for the French language then, and now, is better known in Germany than the Engliſh, in caſe his pacquet had been intercepted. The letter tranſlated, runs as follows:

Lieutenant colonel Douglas †, being thrown into a common priſon by his majeſty's orders, for making a journey to Munich without his maſter's permiſſion, it was my fortune the next morning, the ſixteenth inſtant ‡, the king being then upon the point of leaving the ſaid city, as I was going to take my leave of the king of Bohemia, to meet his Swediſh majeſty, by mere accident, in the great ſaloon, when it appeared to me neither impertinent nor unſeaſonable to ſolicit him in favour of the ſaid Douglas, and make an attempt to procure his liberty; remonſtrating in his behalf, that though he had taken this ſtep without his majeſty's concurrence or conſent, yet that, nevertheleſs, he had obtained permiſſion and leave to go, from the Swediſh chancellor. Upon which the king, kindling into ſome warmth, *ſwore he would take care to ſee the chancellor hanged.* As his majeſty went down ſtairs, in order to ſtep into his coach, I renewed my applications, and beſought him, once more, to receive Douglas into favour: upon which, turning ſhort, he replied with vehemence, *By heaven! if you ſpeak one ſyllable more on that ſubject, I will order the man to be hanged before your eyes:* to which my reply was, *that I hoped his majeſty would never commit ſuch a ſort of action. And why ſo?* anſwered

* One or two voluminous German compilers aſſert, that Guſtavus had a natural ſon, ſuppoſed to be born about two years before he eſpouſed the princeſs of Brandenburg: but I have never yet received light enough to ſay any thing in ſupport of the allegation.

† This officer, afterwards Sir George Douglas, betook himſelf to a civil employment.

‡ May, 1632.

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the king, *By heavens! if your maſter was preſent, I would do the ſame; and if the man, who has affronted me in this manner, were held in the arms of his Britannic majeſty, I would tear him thence, although obliged to go to England for that purpoſe, and commence a war of an hundred years duration: but ſure I am, the king of England will never ſupport a ſubject in a cauſe where I am affronted.* To which my anſwer was, *Your majeſty may ſay, at Munich, whatever you pleaſe, but will never perſiſt in ſuch an opinion after mature reflection.* Upon which he replied, *Do not tempt me into a paſſion. Sire,* ſaid I, *you cannot be offended, when an ambaſſador of Britain interferes for one of his maſter's ſubjects. Well then,* rejoined the king, *I at length releaſe him upon your parole only, but will not be affronted a ſecond time*.* To which my anſwer was, *Sire, it never appeared to me in the light of an affront, to interpoſe in behalf of a cavalier, who had ſerved your majeſty with ſo much fidelity. Yes,* replied the king, *to ſeek to quit my ſervice, after I had releaſed him, was not only an affront, but a contravention of my military edicts†. Sire,* added I, *I acknowledge the favour, which your majeſty have formerly granted to my ſolicitations; and it will ſtill be a freſh act of clemency, if you condeſcend to pardon him, even after a ſecond tranſgreſſion.* To which the king added once more, *Do not provoke me into a paſſion. Adieu, Sire,* replied I; and being on the point of departing from him, *By heavens!* cried the king, *the fellow is a raſcal, and I do not chuſe to be ſerved by ſuch ſort of animals. May it pleaſe your majeſty,* anſwered I, *I have always underſtood, that the ſubjects of the king, my maſter, have rendered you the moſt excellent and faithful ſervices. Yes,* ſaid the king, *I acknowledge the people of your nation have ſerved me well, and far better than any others; but this dog, concerning whom we are talking, has affronted me, and I am reſolved to chaſtiſe him.* It was my purpoſe then to have reſumed the converſation, but the king cut me ſhort, by ſaying, *Sir, I requeſt you not to take exception at what has lately dropped from my lips; it was the effect of a warm and haſty temper. I am at preſent entirely cool, and beſeech you to pardon me‡.*

It is now high time to make ſome obſervations on this extraordinary dialogue, concerning which I ſhall briefly premiſe, though the remark has been made by me, more times

* The king meant Douglas, but Vane artfully enough takes it upon himſelf.

† By this it appears that Sir Henry Vane had interceded formerly for Douglas, on ſome other offence, and obtained his pardon.

‡ *Sir Henry Vane's* letters in the Paper-Office.

than

than one, that Guſtavus's frailty was an undue warmth of temper, which, at the ſame time, manifeſted the goodneſs of his heart; for the people, that ſerved under him, did not diſlike an harſh expreſſion, inaſmuch as his anger was momentary only, and the amends he made thoſe, whom he had chagrined, more than repaid them for the tranſitory uneaſineſs of a ſlight mortification. Perhaps one cannot defend him better, upon this occaſion, than by inſerting the very words of his own apology to his generals, at a council of war: *I am thought by many of you*, ſaid he, *to ſpeak haſtily and angrily on certain conjunctures; but, alas! conſider, my fellow ſoldiers, what a weight lies upon my mind. I am to perform all, and be preſent every where; and when the human thoughts are on the ſtretch, obſtacles and interruptions of the grand purſuit make men peeviſh. You muſt bear with my infirmities, in the ſame manner as I ſubmit to your's: one general has a tendency to avarice, another has a paſſion for wine, a third wiſhes to wage war with the barbarity of a Croatian; yet, without going further than admoniſhing and adviſing you, I have diſcarded no man, but, on the contrary, have kept you all about my perſon, and, more or leſs, eſteemed you all* *.

Thus far with regard to the ſudden guſts of a great and high ſpirit, like that of Guſtavus. As to Vane's narrative, much may be remarked; it is certain he diſliked the king, neither had the king a favourable opinion either of his abilities, or of his intentions. It appears, by the notes on his memorial, and from what ſhall be remarked before we leave the ſubject, that he ſets forth juſt ſo much as ſerves to gratify his own ſpleen, namely, that Douglas came to Munich by Oxenſtiern's conſtrained conſent, without the king's permiſſion. From the face of his own recital, it appears highly ſuſpicious, that a paſſion, ſo fierce and violent, as he deſcribes the king's to be, muſt have been kindled and exaſperated by ſomething more offenſive, and more provoking, than Sir Henry chooſes to diſcloſe; for Guſtavus alludes to ingratitude, having pardoned Douglas once before, at the ambaſſador's interceſſion, as likewiſe to diſobedience, perſonal affront, and a thought conceived of paſſing into the enemy's ſervice.

It appears, in the next place, that Vane was anſwerable, in a great degree, for that very anger, in the repreſentation of which he labours afterwards to traduce the king's character: for his ſolicitation was of the teaſing kind; and when he had gained his point, he ſtill wanted *more laſt words*. He caught at thoſe circumſtances where he knew the king's temper was

* See *Soldat Suedois*, p. 865, &c.

inflam-

inflammable, and dwelt upon them: and when he received a rough anſwer, laid the foundation of producing a ſecond, that was ſtill more ſo. His ſincerity likewiſe is much to be doubted. He knew Guſtavus better than to ſuppoſe him in earneſt about hanging Douglas; yet makes a reply with the gravity of a ſchool-divine, or a caſuiſt; and when the king ſpeaks of Douglas's ſecond affront, paſſes that by, and ſuppoſes the affront to proceed from himſelf. Nor ſtands he quite clear in point of politeneſs, and common good manners; for when Guſtavus felt the infirmity of paſſion coming upon him, as Vane ſtill adminiſtered freſh fuel to it, and beſought him twice to drop the converſation, and not puſh matters to greater extremities; yet he ſtill perſiſts, even after he had obtained the object of his wiſhes. Under this claſs of incivility I rank likewiſe, the telling a paſſionate perſon, that he threatens more than he ever could expect to make good upon mature reflection. Whoever underſtands the human mind, knows, that ſuch a reflection carries its own poignancy along with it; and it was highly rude and indecent to aſſure the king, that he might perform at Munich what he durſt not preſume to do in England.

It appears alſo that Vane was either reſolved to exaſperate Guſtavus, or ill underſtood the better half of his political trade, which conſiſts in ſeizing the *moments of addreſs*; ſince by the *diary* of the king's actions, it appears, that he was *then* ſtepping into his coach, in a great hurry, in order to raiſe the ſiege of Biberach, and give Offa battle. Now on ſuch an occaſion, it may well be ſuppoſed that his majeſty's ſpirits were all on a flame, and his mind wholly occupied on a ſubject, where interruption only, without impropriety, teaſing, or ill manners, would naturally produce ſome haſty and unguarded anſwers.

Nevertheleſs, after various difficulties on this head, it may be poſſible, at laſt, to obtain ſome knowledge of the groundwork of his Swediſh majeſty's reſentments, and that from a perſon no leſs inſtructed than Fowler*, ſecretary to Douglas, afterwards created a baronet, who, in conſequence of this broil, exchanged the laurel for the olive, and went from England to Poland in the character of ambaſſador extraordinary, with inſtructions to act the part of a mediator at the treaty of Stumbſdorf, in Pruſſia, 1635. As

* *Hiſtory of the Troubles of Suethland, and Poland*, &c. Relation of the treaty of pacification, between Poland and Suethen, concluded at Stumbſdorf in 1635. Brief commemoration of the life and death of Sir Geo. Douglas, knight, lord ambaſſador extraordinary from England, fol. Lond. 1656, inſcribed to the lord protector.

Fowler

Fowler loved and honoured his maſter, Douglas, extremely, it is highly natural to expect no great partiality on the Swediſh ſide; yet enough is ſaid, whereby one may be enabled to ſay ſome little matter in behalf of Guſtavus; however, upon the whole, I fairly acknowledge that both parties were to blame, and perhaps equally.

Once for all, therefore, we will make an abſtract of the author's narrative *.

Douglas tranſported a company of Scottiſh infantry into Sweden, in the year 1623; and was afterwards advanced to be lieutenant-colonel in Sir James † Ramſey's regiment of foot; and as that officer happened to receive a diſagreeable wound, as we have mentioned before in its proper place, he commanded the corps at the ſiege of Wurtzburg-caſtle, if my relation *fail* not ‡; and at the taking of Creützach, he, by the king's commands, repreſſed the inſolence of the ſoldiery in ſo ſatisfactory a manner, that his majeſty deſtined him to be the *governor* of that moſt important place.

Before this commiſſion could be ſigned, a reverſe of fortune changed the commander of a town into a priſoner; for, on account of ſome ſtrange expreſſions in a memorial or letter to the king his maſter, who was naturally warm, and very jealous, in points of honour, orders were ſent from Guſtavus to confine him; but Guſtavus, on reconſidering the whole affair more coolly, forthwith commanded him to be ſet at liberty, and directed that his commiſſion of governor ſhould be delivered to him.

"And here it may be thought," ſays Fowler, "that our lieutenant-colonel had cauſe to reſt contented, having received ample ſatisfaction, by a preferment ſo honourable §:" but Douglas was not to be reconciled; proteſting he had received an affront, which he would bear from *no hand whatſoever*; and therefore, when Oxenſtiern tendered him the commiſſion, he demanded a paſs for Munich, in order to debate the matter with his ſovereign. This, the chancellor told him, he could not, and dared not grant; but upon over-perſuaſions, as he perſonally loved the man, he at length, reluctantly, granted him a ſhort furlough, that he might, if he pleaſed, attend the king, and demand his diſcharge.

* *Fowler*'s Hiſtory, 216—219.

† Some ſay Alexander Ramſey.

‡ Here Fowler ſuſpects a miſtake: we will ſubjoin, that he ought to have ſaid Marienberg-caſtle.

§ Such it certainly was, for the king run the riſk of his life in taking this fortreſs, which he conſidered as the ſtrongeſt place he had ever beſieged.

What made Douglas the keener was, the hope of ſheltering himſelf under the wing of Vane, the Britiſh ambaſſador then going to Munich; who never in his heart loved Guſtavus, and therefore, it is probable, encouraged this officer to embroil the miſunderſtanding afreſh. By all accounts from hiſtory, Douglas, though a man of worth and honour, and an excellent ſoldier, was as haughty, though not very high in command, and to the full as paſſionate as Guſtavus. This greatly exaſperated the king, who thought the ambaſſador and ſoldier had both conſpired to give him the bravado in the name of the Britiſh nation.

Nor did Douglas uſe any addreſs or management upon this occaſion; but, inſtead of employing his friends to ſeize the *mollia tempora* of applying to Guſtavus, preſented himſelf abruptly before him in a public tennis-court, where the kings of Sweden and Bohemia were amuſing themſelves.

This want of reſpectful duty and common good breeding ſoon ſtruck a mind like the king's, naturally warm on receiving affronts: *Sir*, ſaid he, *why are not you at your poſt of command? Sire*, replied Douglas, *I have none. Commit him to priſon then*, rejoined the king, and ſpoke no more *.

This ſpirited act of authority, which the ambaſſador thought fit to look upon as an inſult on the prince he ſerved, and the whole Britiſh nation, made both him and the king alike peeviſh and equally paſſionate.

Thus have we given a ſlight recapitulation of all that Fowler ſays in behalf of his patron, which ſeems, according to the beſt of our judgment, to incline the turn of the ſcale in favour of the northern monarch. Fowler declares, too, that he knew all the dialogue which paſſed between the king and the ambaſſador, and yet, for certain reaſons, thought convenient to ſuppreſs it. For my own part, I have ventured to tell the ſtory from authentic papers, and hope, as it was my buſineſs to conceal no one conſiderable fact in hiſtory, that I have thereby done no injury to the memory of Douglas or the *manes* of Guſtavus, who, to ſhew his humanity, and forgiving temper, after a ſhort recollection, releaſed Douglas a ſecond

* It was certainly Douglas's duty to have aſked his diſmiſſal by letter or memorial, ſtaying on his poſt till a proper ſubſtitute could be found to replace him, and not have left ſo important a charge in the midſt of war, and the royal army ſo far removed from him. By all military laws, he was diſobedient: nor could he ſay to the king, he had *no employ*, till he had firſt petitioned to be diſcharged, and had ſeen his ſucceſſor in poſſeſſion. For, if the commander of a town, upon any diſguſt, not repreſented, is at full liberty to leave his charge, what prince, or general, can be ſafe with ſuch a ſervant, or who can be ſecure from treachery, or deſertion?

time.

time. The former part Vane himſelf acknowledges, in a ſubſequent letter * to ſecretary Coke, dated from Augſburg, nine days after the firſt-mentioned diſpatch: "The king of Sweden," ſays he, "three or four days after this embroilment †, ſent my lord Spenſe to my lodging, profeſſing to be exceeding ſorry for the diſcourſe he had held, eſpecially wherein it touched the king my maſter, which, if it were poſſible, he would redeem at the deareſt rate. That he was his majeſty's brother, and ſervant, whoſe friendſhip he valued more than any others, having none but him, on whom he could rely: that though his ſatisfaction had been public, as well as his offence, yet, not content therewith, he would have written to his majeſty, by an expreſs, to excuſe the heat of his paſſion; but either he muſt have accuſed himſelf, or caſt the burthen upon me, as if my ſolicitations had provoked him to that paſſion; which he, willing to avoid, deſired me to make a favourable report to his majeſty."

But to return to the affairs of Germany. Within a few days after this altercation with Douglas, an embarraſſment appeared of a very different nature; for Guſtavus's old rival in war, Sigiſmond, king of Poland, died of an apoplexy ‡, after a wearifome and turbulent reign of forty-five years. On this event the Poles were divided in their affections, between Uladiſlaüs, the elder ſon of Sigiſmond, and Caſimir; and during the interregnum, prince Radzivil §, who loved Guſtavus, and had made him a viſit in the late king's decline, for Sigiſmond had many warnings of his approaching fate, received orders from the ſenate to command the army then prepared to act againſt the Moſcovites. Some very ſenſible hiſtorians, and Le Vaſſor ‖, amongſt the reſt, ſeem diſpoſed to think, that Guſtavus had an eye to this kingdom in his own perſon, which they ground on no other proof than that Radzivil held a correſpondence with him, and that he diſpatched ambaſſadors into Poland, to watch the motions of the future election. But his Swediſh majeſty, at that time, had building enough to erect, without enlarging his plan, and

* *Letters* of Sir Henry Vane in the Paper-office.

† His majeſty could not make the acknowledgment ſooner, for he was abſent, in order to raiſe the ſiege of Biberach.

‡ April 29, 1632: and Uladiſlaüs was elected, if I miſtake not, the October following. See more of this negotiation below.

§ He had been mortified, becauſe Sapieha, palatine of Vilna, had been preferred to him, as ſupreme commander in Lithuania. *Kobierziſki* Hiſt. Vladiſl. p. 920.

‖ Tom. vii. 179, &c.

that greatly too; nor was he a prince to amuſe himſelf, at ſuch a conjuncture, with a proſpect ſo remote in point of diſtance, and ſo chimerical in its own nature, if one rightly conſiders the perverſeneſs, as well as changeable diſpoſitions, of the Polanders. Had he not engaged in this German expedition, true it is, he had pretenſions to urge, and a head and hand capable to ſupport them; but at preſent it appears to me that he laboured only to form a party in the diet, ſufficiently ſtrong to prolong the *truce*, which would otherwiſe end in three years, between him and the Polanders; a circumſtance of great conſequence to a warrior, who had his hands full, and wanted no collateral buſineſs. All other ſteps taken by him ſeem conformable to this firſt idea: and if he preferred Caſimir to Uladiſlaüs, it was becauſe the former ſeemed leſs attached to the court of Madrid, as well as that of Vienna.

We have related before, that Cratz made himſelf maſter of Weiſſemburg, whilſt the king marched from Munich, where, amongſt other things, as we ought to have obſerved, he ſeized 8000 new regimentals, in order to give battle to Oſſa, who had inveſted Biberach; and to cruſh the inſurrection of the Bavarian peaſants: but the former, having loſt the beſt part of his artillery, retreated towards Lindau, and the lake of Conſtance; and the latter ſubmitted without reſiſtance. Upon this occaſion, it was obſerved of Guſtavus, that his enemies could never project an undertaking, which he did not counterwork by deviſing a remedy the firſt moment he attained the knowledge of their intentions. So that, it is difficult for us which to admire moſt, the inventive powers of his genius, or the celerity wherewith he executed any deſign, immediately after he had conceived it *; it being a maxim with him, that the grand ſcience of war conſiſted in ſeizing incidents, or keeping always in a ſtate of preparation, though the particular ſtroke may be unforeſeen. He then committed the army to duke Bernard's care, who purſued Oſſa almoſt to the feet of the Alps, and cut to pieces one of his fineſt regiments, that of Annibal count Hohen-Ems, though the commander had thrown himſelf into a walled village. Eight enſigns were loſt, but the count and 400 ſoldiers, that ſurvived, were ſent priſoners to Ulm.

Meanwhile the king, attended by a few followers, flew to Augſburg, and taking with him, from thence and the country adjacent, a ſtrong detachment, conceived great hopes of

* *Monro*'s Second Expedition.



relieving

relieving Weiſſemberg, a place of great importance to him, as it ſecured the retreat from Augſburg to Nuremberg; but the Bavarian general had performed his buſineſs before it was poſſible for the Swediſh army to arrive, and, dreading the approach of Guſtavus, evacuated the town almoſt as ſoon as he poſſeſſed it; which may be conſidered no ſmall omiſſion.

It was during the prelude, in Bohemia, towards a more ſerious and general campaign, but what period we cannot preciſely ſay, that a party of Imperial troops took priſoner, after a ſharp rencounter, Torſtenſon, who was then known to be the beſt officer of artillery in Europe, and uſeful to the king, his maſter, beyond expreſſion. But ſuch ſingular good fortune ſerved only to ſupply Walſtein with freſh opportunities of exerting that generoſity, and magnificence, which were peculiar to him; for he paid Torſtenſon's ranſom to the Croatians out of his own purſe, and reſtored him to Guſtavus without delay *.

Walſtein then finiſhed the reduction of Bohemia, by inveſting Egra, where ſomething happened equally heroical and extraordinary with regard to himſelf: for the magiſtrates knowing there was a young lady in the town whom he paſſionately admired, arreſted her without ceremony or previous notice, and ordered her, upon pain of death, to command the general to deſiſt from his enterpriſe. This woman, caſt by nature in no common mould, made a ſemblance of complying with great frankneſs, and ſealing up the following billet, addreſſed him thus; *Regard not my life; I am prepared to die, upon condition your Excellency can obtain true glory and ſerve your maſter with fidelity and ſucceſs* †. But the females of that age aſpired to vie with the men in acts of fortitude. Banier's wife ‡, following her huſband, in his expedition into Saxony, was brought to bed of a male child in her coach; which reſembles an accident of the ſame ſort, which happened to Agrippina, the wife of Germanicus §; and at the battle of Rhinfeld, in particular, ſeveral ladies ſtaid in the field during the warmeſt part of the action; nor did they retreat when the troops of their huſbands, who were Imperialiſts, were cut to pieces. So that ſome were killed, ſome robbed, and the remaining few eſcaped with difficulty ‖.

By this time Walſtein began to edge round towards the

* *Riccius* de Bell. Germ. 4°. 412.
† *Memoires d'Electrice Palatine*, 4°. 197.
‡ The counteſs of Lovenſtein.
§ *Memoires d'Electrice Palatine*, 4°. 196.
‖ *Ibid.* 198.

eaſtern ſide of the Upper Palatinate, on whoſe ſouthernmoſt ſkirts lay the elector of Bavaria with all his forces. It now behoved Guſtavus to make an exertion of thoſe great talents which Providence had beſtowed on him; for he had a conqueſt to ſecure behind him of ſeven or eight hundred miles in length, and half the breadth; and two armies to confront, the one equal to his own, and the other doubly ſuperior. Far from being puzzled or diſmayed, he maintained a preſence of mind that aſtoniſhed even his own generals; and without calling in a ſingle army to his aſſiſtance, he had no leſs than *five* ſmall ones in the parts adjacent, he rather adviſed them to purſue their ſeparate buſineſs; and inſtead of thinning them by detachments, augmented them from his own corps. With the compoſed coolneſs, therefore, of a man victorious, he even ſent away many commanders, whom he wanted much, if that can be ſuppoſed; for he detached Horn towards the Upper Palatinate, and permitted duke Bernard, whom indeed his brother William replaced in a ſhort ſpace, to purſue Oſſa, and left Hepburn commander in chief at Munich, and over the whole duchy of Bavaria; whilſt Oxenſtiern, Banier, and duke Julius the adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg*, and ſir Patrick Ruthven, all commanded ſeparate bodies, in or near the circles of Suabia and Franconia. He then made a treaty of accommodation with the city of Straſburg, through whoſe territory Haracour had lately marched a detachment of Lorrainers to the aſſiſtance of Oſſa and Montecuculi the elder, a circumſtance not extremely agreeable to the king's ſyſtem; and therefore, for theſe reaſons, he ſpared no pains to bring the Straſburgers into terms of friendſhip; and the rather, becauſe he thereby ſecured his chancellor † from a like occurrence in his government of Mentz, and in the protection of the Lower Palatinate, which department was alſo aſſigned to him. He had an apprehenſion too, that a reinforcement of Spaniſh troops might paſs the Valteline from the Milaneſe, and unite themſelves with Oſſa; and on this account he wrote a letter with his own hand to the cantons of Switzerland, who had lately aſſembled at Lucerne, and were now adjourning to Baden. Its tenour ran to this effect; and as I have an old tranſlation now before me, I ſhall content myſelf with correcting a few inaccuracies of language, and faults of connection, here and there:

* The king had ſome ſuſpicions of this prince, and having confirmed the alliance with him, reſolved to ſtation an army near him, to enforce the obſervation of articles, that had been agreed upon, *de novo*.

† Oxenſtiern.

" Gentlemen,

" Gentlemen,

" Being informed that the king of Spain attempts, by all poſſible methods, to perſuade you to grant free paſſage to his troops, out of Italy, into the parts of Germany now near me, in oppoſition to the progreſs and proſperity of my arms, and to the advancement of his own pernicious and unjuſt deſigns, as well as the ſupport and aſſiſtance of my enemies, and their proceedings; I have thought good to exhort and admoniſh you, in the moſt affectionate terms, to recollect within yourſelves, that the republic of Switzerland has ever, hitherto, flouriſhed in high reputation, and glorioufly maintained its liberties againſt all encroachers and invaders whomſoever, in oppoſition principally to the two houſes of Burgundy and Auſtria, each of which has made frequent attempts to diveſt you of thoſe invaluable bleſſings; particularly that liberty which exceeds all other ſorts of liberty, namely, the *free exerciſe of conſcience*; not to mention various efforts tending to the deſtruction of your civil rights and freedom.

" Therefore, gentlemen, let me beſeech you to remember *that* good underſtanding which I have always maintained with your commonwealth; and for theſe reaſons, permit me to adviſe you to ſtand vigilantly upon your guard from henceforward, perſevering firm and conſtant within the bounds of an exact neutrality, conformably to that good faith ſtill ſubſiſting between us; neither commanding nor allowing paſſage to the enemy, nor granting him aſſiſtance or favour under any ſhape. Otherwiſe, I ſhall find myſelf obliged to begin firſt, and declare hoſtilities againſt you; and then, in caſe an event ſo diſaſtrous ſhould take place, you yourſelves would draw down the war upon your own heads, and all the ruin, deſolation, and calamity, that uſually attend it. But I have conceived much better hopes of you, *my friends*; and, for my own part, hereby aſſure you all in general, and each in particular, of my beſt love and affection towards you.*

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS."

This letter was accompanied by a couple of Scotch colonels, with inſtructions to ſolicit leave for levying two regiments of Switzers.

The anſwer † returned to the king's letter was very polite and cautious, containing a fair aſſertion, that no demand had

* See more of this negotiation, and letter, in the *Hiſt. or Auth. Relation* in High Dutch, fol. tom. ii. p. 55.

† *Mercure François*, tom. xviii. p. 359.

been made, hitherto, on the ſubject in queſtion, by the court of Madrid: nor ſhould a repreſentation of that nature be liſtened to whenever it might happen to be preſented. That the neutrality, ſo generouſly propoſed, was embraced at the ſame time with the utmoſt thankfulneſs, upon ſuppoſition, that it interfered not with any prior obligations: and laſtly, it was acknowledged, that as the progreſs of the Swediſh army ſeemed to approach the Alps, it was hoped the Cantons ſhould enjoy their proportionable ſhare of royal favour; and ſuffer no diminution of rights and revenues in ſuch of their poſſeſſions as laid in adjacent provinces, then made, or thereafter to be made, the ſeat of war.

His majeſty, by this time, being returned to Augſburg, and having conquered in two years, or brought over to his intereſt, nearly three hundred cities, fortreſſes, and walled towns, collected together his own little army, which conſiſted of about eighteen or twenty thouſand men, and marched to Donawert. He then took the two epiſcopal cities of Aichſtadt and Dillingen, as likewiſe Pappenheim-caſtle, which lies eight miles to the weſt of Aichſtadt, removing the beſt ordnance in all three places to his grand magazine at Augſburg. By the ſeventh of June he arrived in his old encampment at Furt, near Nurenberg, where duke Bernard, who had purſued the Imperialiſts to the lake of Conſtance, joined him. What his intentions then were ſoon appeared to the public, by the anſwer he made the magiſtrates, who requeſted him to honour their city with a viſit; *Gentlemen*, ſaid he, *I ſhall not deny myſelf the pleaſure; but at preſent I had much rather ſee Walſtein than Nurenberg**. The truth was, the king intended to have paſſed through the Upper Palatinate, where Horn then was, and given Walſtein battle, before the elector of Bavaria could have joined him; but the country was ſo ravaged and waſted, partly by war, and partly by expreſs order from the Imperial general, that the enterpriſe was laid aſide, becauſe it was thought impoſſible to ſucceed. The king, who had actually began his march towards the Walſteiners, returned to his antient lines, and intrenched himſelf according to the great abilities he poſſeſſed in that then unknown branch of the military ſcience. His ſubſiſting himſelf in this hazardous ſituation, for the ſpace of *ſixty-one days*, and his reſiſtance of the efforts of 60,000 men, with only 20,000, not to mention that he had the confidence, upon receiving ſome ſmall reinforcements, to attack his adverſary ſword in hand, though intrenched up to the

* *Swed. Intel.* part ii. 181.

eyes,

eyes, and protected with barricades of trees and battering artillery, beyond number, *will be always esteemed*, by *such* generals as are masters of the finer parts of their business, *the highest pitch of ability which the human mind can attain in the profession of arms.*

Indeed this conduct of his majesty appears nothing near so wonderful in *our* days, as it certainly was in the *last* century, forasmuch as the practice has been *copied*, more or less, by all experienced commanders ever since: yet the exertion of the idea, in its masterly manner of execution, is first due to the GREAT GUSTAVUS. The thing, it must be allowed, ever has been and will be a real and equal truth in all ages; but then the person, who makes the experiment, must be like the man, whom I have lately mentioned. When a genius, such as Gustavus, has once adjusted certain previous circumstances, he may safely face a *treble* number of troops for a long duration. Like the great master of mechanics, who used to say, that if certain postulata could be granted him, he would undertake to move the world with a single thread: Δὸς πᾶ στῶ, καὶ τὸν κοσμὸν κινήσω.

In these encampments against forces sometimes *doubly* and sometimes *trebly* superior, as was the case partly at Werben, and more particularly here, it is impossible for me, either to analyse the king's abilities, or explain the various principles upon which he proceeded. It may suffice to remark, that in military fortifications, of all sorts, he had then no equal, and particularly in the management of his artillery. It was he who first fortified the weaker parts of his camp with *those* sort of redoubts, the carrying of which resembles storming so many separate towns sword in hand.

Under this article I shall just mention a slight circumstance, having touched upon the point in other parts of my history more than once. In the former part of the last century, cannons were made much longer than they are at present; concerning which something was said in the siege of Ingoldstadt, with reference to the piece of artillery from which a shot struck the king's horse; till at length it was conjectured by some, that a cannon, formed two feet and a half shorter than even those in common use, might convince mankind that a ball moves with greater force through a less space than a larger. This Gustavus proved by repeated experiments, in the year 1624, when an iron ball, of forty-eight pounds weight, was found to go farther, from a new short cannon, than another ball of ninety-six pounds weight out of a larger piece; whereas, in other respects, it is certain, the larger the bore and ball, the greater the range.

By

By this time the duke of Bavaria invaded the Upper Palatinate with all his forces, and whilſt he reduced Amberg, the principal city of the country, diſpatched a part of his army to inveſt Sultzbach, which belonged to prince Palatine Auguſtus, whom we have often mentioned. This place, after ſome reſiſtance, capitulated; but Schomberg, who commanded the detachment, violated every article of the agreement; for he enlarged the garriſon contrary to the terms ſtipulated, deſpoiled the citizens, plundered the prince's caſtle, and raiſed one thouſand pounds by way of contribution. This ſcene of perfidy ſharpened Guſtavus's reſentments, and determined him, as we obſerved before, to enter the ſaid Palatinate, and give the Elector battle before he could form his junction with Walſtein: but the country was ſo waſted and ruined, that it was impoſſible to ſubſiſt a ſecond army therein, and the Imperial generaliſſimo, who longed to ſee the duke deſtroyed, and yet found himſelf obliged to preſerve appearances, had commanded a body of 3600 cavalry to advance to the aſſiſtance of the Bavarians.

Elevated with his late ſucceſſes in Bohemia, he diſpatched colonel Spar to the elector of Saxony, with freſh propoſals of accommodation, and as things now began to take a leſs favourable turn with regard to himſelf, he condeſcended to caſt his eyes upon them. How great was his aſtoniſhment, when he perceived that Walſtein raiſed his tone to an immeaſurable height, and declared, that the loſſes the elector had ſuſtained at Leipſic, when Tilly plundered it, were more than counterbalanced by the repriſals made by the Saxons on the town of Prague: that to reinſtate himſelf into the Imperial favour, he ſhould advance two months pay to the army, freely and ſpeedily reſign the *bona eccleſiaſtica* he had impropriated, and join in the common cauſe of driving Guſtavus out of the empire: and then, by way of acknowledgement for all theſe compliances and advances, the Bohemians were to enjoy the free exerciſe of the evangelical religion.

In truth, Walſtein, beneath theſe appearances, determined to make the example of Saxony a terror to all Germany, and therefore named conceſſions impoſſible to be granted, unleſs with extreme diſhonour. He beſides had a great number of penſioners in the electoral army, the titular prime-miniſter was one, though Arnheim indeed was every thing, and always expected ſome advantage either from mutiny or deſertion. Some letters too had been diſcovered, even before this period, between him and the general, which gave the

Swedes no ſmall ſuſpicions *. But matters were not yet ripe for defection on the Saxon ſide.

It was therefore Walſtein's deſign to intercept the retreat of Arnheim's army in the noted paſs and defile between Auſſig and Leütmeritz. To this purpoſe he approached his enemies, as near as he could, without alarming them, and ordered ſome troops, under pretence of taking in an inconſiderable town or two, to file off privately towards Saxony. He then made new and not diſadvantageous propoſals to Arnheim; and ſent an officer of great experience, whoſe perſon was unknown to the Saxons, to deliver the conditions to him, being diſguiſed in the habit of a trumpeter. Thus he learned the poſture and ſituation of the enemy's camp. It was unlucky for Walſtein, that Arnheim had been formerly his pupil, his confident, and his favourite. The ſcholar ſoon penetrated into the deſigns of the maſter, but profoundly diſſembled all ſort of ſuſpicion, and affected to be ignorant of the march of any troops whoſe buſineſs it was to intercept him: and wrote back by the trumpeter, that he had authority and orders to treat, and was ready to do ſo at a minute's warning, and then diſpatched couriers every hour with freſh expreſſes, growing every hour more compliable. That night he paſſed his cannon and army over the bridge at Leütmeritz, which he broke down immediately after him, having previouſly detached a choſen body of troops to ſecure Auſſig, and conſequently both ſides of the Elbe: and by preventing the Walſteiners in this ſingle circumſtance, entirely ruined all their ſcheme. At Pirna he croſſed the Elbe on a bridge of boats, and intrenched himſelf ſtrongly, waiting for his maſter and Banier, who had promiſed to reinforce him with 10,000 men. Though this retreat depended more on political than military genius, and though it cannot be compared in all points with that of Banier in the year 1637, and many others during the courſe of the thirty years war; yet it muſt be acknowledged a very fine one, and may be conſidered as the maſterpiece of Arnheim's performances in the capacity of a general. Thus in half a campaign the emperor recovered Bohemia with the ſame eaſe that he loſt it in a preceding one.

During this interval, Pappenheim, general of the catholic league in Lower Saxony, had ſeveral rencounters of various kinds and ſucceſſes againſt the Swedes, availing himſelf of the miſunderſtanding that ſubſiſted amongſt their commanders. The magiſtrates of Hildeſhein ſent him a meſſage of

* *Chemnitzius* de Bello Sueco-Germanico, tom. i.

accommodation,

accommodation, to which he returned for anſwer, that he would make them a viſit very ſoon, and ſave them the trouble and expence of a formal deputation; notwithſtanding which, he never had the power to keep his word. Amongſt others, the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel ſet himſelf to oppoſe his conqueſts, and met with ſeveral diſagreeable checks here and there. About this time an event broke out, which had like to have done the Swediſh cauſe conſiderable miſchief. Some Daniſh ſoldiers had been cut to pieces in the town of Friedberg by the troops of the archbiſhop of Bremen, who was an ally of the crown of Sweden. The courts of Vienna and Bruſſells took care to aggrandize this breach of faith to the utmoſt: and Pappenheim dexterouſly laid hold of an expedient, which went very near to detach the Daniſh king from the Swediſh, and throw the former into the arms of the emperor: for poſſeſſing many towns in the dioceſe of Bremen, where the prince of Denmark was coadjutor, and finding it expenſive, and perhaps hardly poſſible to keep them, he offered to ſell them at a moderate price to his Daniſh majeſty, thereby hoping to produce a miſunderſtanding between Sweden, Denmark, and Bremen. When the ſtates of the ſecond of theſe countries were convened to take the propoſal into conſideration, the prudence of the ſage and moderate ſoon got the better of a few impetuous and turbulent ſpirits, who had given heedleſsly into the ſnare. Thus the miſconduct at Friedberg being entirely placed to the archbiſhop's account, an embaſſy was ſent to Guſtavus in order to reconcile theſe reciprocal grievances, and place matters, for the future, on a more ſolid and amicable footing. In a word, there was ſomething peculiarly gallant and heroical in the demeanor of all his Swediſh majeſty's enemies during the invaſion which he made into Germany; for no arts, intrigues or promiſes could ever induce Denmark, Poland or Moſcovy to diſtreſs or perplex him. Or ſuppoſing this not to be the caſe, and that they took no ſecret pleaſure to ſee the houſe of Auſtria reduced to a ſtate of humiliation, then it is plain they dreaded leſt Guſtavus ſhould conclude a ſudden peace with the emperor, and deſtroy them without the poſſibility of being ſuccoured or ſupported by the latter.

The Swediſh general Todt inveſted Staden; but Pappenheim gave him battle, and compelled him to raiſe the ſiege by throwing into the town three regiments, who croſſed the river Schwinga upon portable bridges. Nevertheleſs, it muſt be acknowledged, that the Swedes retreated in good order; and as the Bavarian colonel Boninghauſen, a principal com-

mander under Pappenheim, was diſpatched after them with a large body of cavalry to haraſs the rear, they prepared an ambuſcade for him, and cut to pieces two thirds of his detachment. Animated with this lucky change of fortune, Todt returned to his poſt, and there had the honour, in his turn, to blockade Pappenheim, who, according to his cuſtom, made a furious ſally, and carried his troops through the Swediſh army; which he effected the more eaſily, as Todt and the duke of Lunenberg hated each other, and performed nothing in concert. The former was therefore recalled to the king, and replaced by Bauditzen.

As Pappenheim's preſence was looked upon to be highly neceſſary in other places, and as it was thought impoſſible to maintain his conqueſts in the archbiſhopric of Bremen, he reſtored the keys of Staden to the magiſtrates, and having exhorted them to continue their allegiance to the houſe of Auſtria, recommended his ſick and wounded ſoldiers to their humanity and protection. By this voluntary ceſſion the Swedes became maſters of the Elbe on either ſide, from Hamburg to the Baltic.

He then paſſed into the territory of Brunſwic and the biſhopric of Verden, and extracted no ſmall advantages from the new miſunderſtandings that aroſe between the duke of Lunenberg and the archbiſhop of Bremen; and having made a general deſtruction of forage and proviſions in the country round him, left part of his troops under the command of count Gronsfield, and advanced with others into the territory of Heſſe-Caſſel; and then commanded, as it were, the ſtates aſſembled at Zell to enter into no meaſures prejudicial to the Imperial intereſts, ſince that would oblige him to march over the ruins he had already made. The ſtates of Lower Saxony perceiving, plainly, he was on the wing of departure, conferred the ſupreme command on the duke of Lunenberg, and conſtituted Bauditzen lieutenant-general under him. It was thought by ſome, that Pappenheim meditated this retreat in order to conſult his friends, and attempt to ſucceed Tilly in the employment of generaliſſimo to the princes of the league: but that appears improbable; for, beſides a diſlike to be near Walſtein, he loved no ſuperior, eſpecially one of ſo interfering a temper as the elector of Bavaria; and therefore preferred a ſeparate command in a ſtation leſs diſtinguiſhed.

When he diſlodged from Lower Saxony, the Swediſh generals reviewed their army, which amounted to 9000 foot, 5000 horſe, and 700 dragoons. During his abſence they repoſſeſſed ſo many places, that he found himſelf obliged

to

to return to Brunſwic, and ordered Gronsfield to join him. He then made Bauditzen an offer of ſelling Nienberg to him for £.9000.; but the latter ſent him word, that he hoped to poſſeſs the place as a ſoldier, and not as a merchant. The landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel defeated four regiments under Boninghauſen, and took that officer priſoner.

Thus was almoſt every town in Lower Saxony, Weſtphalia, and Heſſe, taken and retaken half a dozen times in the ſpace of a year, at the expence and to the affliction of the poor inhabitants, and with little advantage to the contending parties; for, in thoſe parts, they who conquered in the field ſoon became maſters of the rivers and the towns.

War was carried on with like ſucceſs, and upon the ſame principles, in the circle of the Rhine, where William margrave of Baden-Baden, Oſſa, Montecuculi, and Haracour with his Lorrainers, ſupported the part of the emperor; whilſt Oxenſtiern and the Rhingrave, with one ſmall army, and the dukes of Birkenfelt and Weimar with another, ſuſtained the cauſe of Sweden. To the relief of the former parties the count of Embden made a very dexterous march at the head of 8000 Spaniards through the biſhopric of Liege, and croſſed the Moſelle about the middle of April with little or no moleſtation, though the inhabitants mortally hated the nation which his troops belonged to, and that for reaſons of the freſheſt date. Oxenſtiern formed a reſolution to intercept one half of his army in its progreſs; and for that purpoſe diſpatched the Rhingrave at the head of the very choſen party of his cavalry, who lodged that night at a village called Nieder-Ulm. Of this, Luca Cagro, commiſſary general of the Spaniſh forces, procured intelligence, and diſlodged at midnight with 1200 horſe to give the Rhingrave a *camiſado*; for in that age all attacks in the *dark* were ſo called, and had no *other* name: but the latter being appriſed, by his ſpies, of the Spaniards' intentions, poſted himſelf in an advantageous paſs mid-way, and gave them ſo rough a reception, that they ſoon betook themſelves to flight, and overturned 1000 horſemen, who had advanced out of the lines to ſupport their retreat. The Swedes took eight colours, and purſued the enemy ſo far, till the cannon of the camp compelled them to retire. To reſtore matters a little after this ſignal affront, Don Philip De Sylva joined the count with 3000 infantry, and ten pieces of artillery; in conſequence whereof the town of Spires * was beſieged and

* The Imperial chamber here, which we have mentioned more than once in the courſe of our hiſtory, was removed to Wetzlar in 1693.

taken

taken by capitulation; for which Horneck the governor was immediately arreſted by Oxenſtiern's order, and condemned to death by a court-martial; nevertheleſs, his majeſty was pleaſed to pardon him, at the queen's interceſſion. The Spaniſh general extorted, by way of compoſition out of the poor inhabitants, £.10,000. which he refuſed to apply to the emperor's uſe; and diſcovered a coffin in the houſe of the knights of the Teutonic order, where Horneck had ſecreted the greateſt part of his wealth.

This unfortunate panic which ſeized Horneck, made Oxenſtiern extremely vigilant in ſtrengthening the fortifications of Mentz and Wormes; and at the ſame time care was taken to reinforce the garriſon of Manheim. The chancellor * then erected two bridges acroſs the Rhine and the Maine; and when the French ambaſſador complained to him, that the governor of Mentz had ordered all the eccleſiaſtics to retire, upon the approach of the Spaniards, he immediately cancelled the ſaid governor's decree, and aſſured the ambaſſador, that what had been done was contrary to his maſter's intentions, and his own orders.

Some days afterwards her Swediſh majeſty ſignified an inclination of taking up her reſidence at Mentz; upon which the grave ſtateſman Oxenſtiern, with the politeneſs and gallantry of a young courtier, accompanied by all the nobility and princes that ſerved in his army, paid his attendance to her at Coſtheim, on the other ſide of the Rhine, at the head of the flower of his cavalry; and on the oppoſite bank of the river ranged two bodies of infantry, each conſiſting of 4000 men, who made the queen and court-ladies an unaccuſtomed compliment in one general diſcharge of their fire-arms. Her majeſty, attended by her own guards, entered the city with a train of twenty coaches, and lodged in the archiepiſcopal palace.

About this time the margrave of Baden-Baden received orders from Vienna to demand the town of Spires in the emperor's name; but count Embden told him, that every ſubject was to ſerve his reſpective ſovereign; and that he could not order the garriſon to diſlodge, till proper inſtructions arrived from the court of Bruſſells. Nevertheleſs, he began now to find himſelf greatly ſtraitened in the neighbourhood of Spires, and Oxenſtiern preſſed and perplexed him more and more, having ſurprized a courier with ſome of his diſpatches, by which he became informed of the enemy's wants and diſtreſſes. It is true the Infanta Iſabella took all poſſible care of this general's ſafety, and don Gonſalvo di Cordova

* Oxenſtiern.

received

received commands to march to his ſupport with 8000 freſh troops; but the vigilance of the Swediſh chancellor was ſo great, that it was difficult to form this junction, and of courſe Cordova advanced to Triers, and then deſiſted.

Embden was much diſconcerted at this diſappointment; and having left a garriſon of 1000 men in Spires, filled the magazines of Frankendale, and furniſhed it with a defence of 1500 infantry, and 250 horſe, owed his ſafety to a feigned march, and a well-managed retreat. To effect this, he ordered his troops to aſcend the Rhine, and join Oſſa; but at midnight turned his courſe ſhort, and made all imaginable expedition to Triers. Oxenſtiern, whoſe army was now enlarged, watched his motions with 18,000 effective men, but Embden haſtened with ſuch extraordinary diligence, that it was next to impoſſible to overtake him. Nevertheleſs the chancellor continued to purſue him with the bulk of his army, and diſpatched the Rhingrave, with all the cavalry, to embarraſs his retreat, and force him to halt, if that could be, and ſo draw him into a general action. In the valley of Steinbach the Rhingrave at length came up with and obliged him to turn round and defend his rear, which he did with great firmneſs, but cautiouſly avoided a full and deciſive engagement, refuſing to ſeize little advantages, and ſkirmiſhing only, till the artillery and baggage had gained a place of ſafety. Cordova joined him at Triers, and Merodé, at the head of ſome Imperial troops, increaſed their numbers.

As the elector of Triers had made a ſeparate treaty * with Loüis XIII. and as France had engaged to become the guaranty of his dominions, for we have made it manifeſt that ſhe always loved to have a finger in German affairs, ſo now, as that prelate, who had loſt Coblentz, Philipſburg †, and all his ſtrong places, except Ehrenbreitſtein or Hermanſtein, found himſelf ſurrounded, tormented, and devoured on every ſide, it was thought neceſſary to march 24,000 men to his aſſiſtance, under the command of the marſhals D'Effiat and La Force. The Imperialiſts were chagrined above meaſure, nor was Guſtavus thoroughly pleaſed, when the elector reſigned fort Hermanſtein or Ehrenbreitſtein to the French; which indeed that prince was not greatly inclined to do, but the two generals told him, that in proportion as he became ſafe, he became forgetful likewiſe, and that they expected realities from him, as well as promiſes. This

* It was ſigned at Ehrenbreitſtein, April 9, 1632, APPENDIX, No. XXVIII.

† This town belonged to Philip Chriſtopher, elector of Triers, as biſhop of Spires.

fort

fort had the good fortune to command the Rhine, and was rendered next to impregnable by ſituation and art. As to Coblentz, the elector appeared very willing to reſign it into the hands of the French. It is a town of no ſmall importance, as it ſtands on the conflux of the Rhine and Moſelle in ſuch a manner, that nothing but the firſt-mentioned river ſeparated the ſubjects of Triers from the Spaniards. Nevertheleſs, the latter contrived to throw a ſufficient garriſon into it, which piqued the two marſhals of France not a little, for few nations hate one another more *cordially* than the French and Spaniards. Guſtavus ſoon made his allies happy in this reſpect, for he diſpatchd Horn from Mentz, with an army of 14,000 freſh troops, in order to diſperſe the Imperialiſts; chaſtiſe the chapter of Triers; and repoſſeſs Trarbach and Coblentz: which latter place, by a convention between the two kings, was delivered up to the French, and the inhabitants reimburſed the Swedes for the charges of the expedition as well as the ſiege.

Horn afterwards made himſelf maſter of Graffenberg and Trarbach, a ſtrong fort on the Moſelle, about thirty miles from Triers, both which places were garriſoned by Spaniſh ſoldiers. He then entered Spires, for the Caſtilian governor diſlodged at his firſt approach; and laſtly, poſſeſſed Straſburg, which had long fluctuated between the then contending powers, and at length made a formal declaration in favour of Sweden.

Meanwhile the elector of Triers had not power to conſign his own metropolis into the hands of France, for the chapter, which was in the Imperialiſts intereſts, and more zealous catholics than their biſhop, had rebelled againſt him, and ventured, titularly at leaſt, to degrade him; inſomuch that a count Iſenberg who ſerved the emperor, had taken care to ſecure the city for his maſter. The elector then ſent a trumpeter to his own commander at Philipſburg, but this man's loyalty had received a taint from his Spaniſh neighbours at Frankendale, and all the anſwer he returned his ſovereign was, that he acknowledged no authority but what came from Vienna, nor could afford him any other admiſſion than ſuch as could be procured by the point of the ſword: and, to manifeſt the ſincerity of his intentions yet further, he burnt all the houſes that ſtood near the fortifications, and having manned his walls, placed his artillery in a poſture of diſputing the event.

The two marſhals not caring to waſte time on an officer of ſo ſingular an humour, advanced with their troops into the duchy of Deuxponts, and paid their compliments to the

duke, who received them in a manner, almoſt peculiar to himſelf. This prince had uncommon talents of wiſdom, politeneſs, dexterity, and perſuaſion. During a civil war of twelve years continuance, he had *aided* none, and *offended* none: and though the ſeveral marches of Imperial, Lorrain, and French troops had produced ſome inconveniences to his ſubjects, yet every general, upon the firſt converſation with him, found himſelf ſo ſtruck with his eloquence and addreſs, that far from burthening the inhabitants, he ſought to eaſe them. La Force was ſoon recalled, upon advice, that *Monſieur* had entered France. D'Effiat croſſed the mountains of Vogheſi * with all his cannon, and raiſed contributions from Straſburg, not in money, for that Guſtavus might have oppoſed, but in neceſſaries for the ſupport of his army. He had inſtructions from the cardinal to behave politely and humanely to all people, and of courſe always aſked for quarters even in neutral, or friendly countries. Having advanced to Lutzelſtein, he there died of a camp fever. Upon this event, the maréchal D'Etrée received the brevet of command in chief, which the viſcount Arpajou, general, *pro tempore*, reſigned to him.

It was D'Effiat's purpoſe to have croſſed the Rhine at Germerſheim or Spires, and beſiege Philipſburg; but De Charnacé, the French ambaſſador to Guſtavus, told him, that, beſides the difficulty of the attempt, his Swediſh majeſty, who already poſſeſſed the greater part of the biſhopric of Spires, would never allow the French to fix their footſteps in that dioceſe. The reſolution was conſequently formed to lay ſiege to Triers.

During this period the contending generals were not inactive in the circle of Suabia and the territories adjoining, where Oſſa, Furſtenburg † and Montecuculi acted againſt Banier, duke William of Weimar, Schavaliſki, Ruthven, and the adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg, concerning whom we have ſpoken already. Nor was the circle of Franconia leſs quiet; for the duke of Saxe-Coburg, and the margrave of Culmbach, commanded the Imperial party, and the colonels Haſtver and Muffel conducted the Swediſh. To deſcribe

* This chain of mountains, which Claudian, if I remember right, expreſsly mentions, takes its riſe near Daun in the Sungau, and ſtretches on to the duchy of Deux-ponts, and a part of the Lower Palatinate. From the Vogheſi mountains the Maeſe, Moſelle, Marne, and Saon take their riſe.

† This was not the perſon who commanded the main body at the battle of Leipſic.

the

the various rencounters, conflicts, and little battles, that happened here, and in the ſeveral departments above-mentioned, would ſwell my account to ſuch a ſize, that though it might aſtoniſh my readers, yet it would bear too hard upon their patience at the ſame time. It may ſuffice therefore to conclude this ſketch of the war in parts ſeparate and remote from Guſtavus, with obſerving only, that if he had not recalled duke Bernard to Nurenberg, on the expectation of Walſtein and Maximilian's junction, it is probable, *that* ſpirited and fiery young warrior would have carried the Swediſh arms through the Tyroleſe, and driven the archduke from his own capital.

It appears, by this time, that the ſtream of the war ran entirely againſt the emperor; yet nothing embarraſſed or afflicted him ſo much as the forlorn condition to which he ſaw the elector of Bavaria reduced. He not only pitied this unfortunate prince, but knew him to be *capable* of deſerting the cauſe; and feared alſo, leſt Guſtavus ſhould puſh the war into Upper Auſtria. Couriers upon the heels of couriers were diſpatched to Walſtein day and night, to diſſuade him from invading Saxony, which was then his intention, and implore him to carry his aſſiſtance into Bavaria. At length the ſplenetic general complied, merely becauſe it was indecent and dangerous to refuſe any longer. In all probability, what moſtly determined him was, that ſome of his perſonal enemies, or ſome who wiſhed well to the houſe of Auſtria, had ſpread a report, that he feared to confront the king of Sweden. The ſureſt way to animate or exaſperate the heroes of the ſword, is to throw out ſuſpicions on their conduct, or their courage; for then reaſon, philoſophy, and even preſence of mind, the moſt ſhining of all their qualifications, are obliged to give way. It was under theſe *circumſtances* that Tilly loſt the battle of Leipſic; and the valiant Hepburn, favourite of Guſtavus, reſigned his commiſſion, and refuſed to be reconciled to his maſter, who *condeſcended to aſk the continuance of his friendſhip*. In a word, a thorough enthuſiaſtical warrior can ſupport moſt things but an impeachment of his military character; and from my knowledge of hiſtory, ſuch as it is, it appears probable to me, that more generals in proportion have died of chagrin, and a broken heart, than poets, and enamoratos. In the wars we are now ſpeaking of, the amiable duke of Feria paid his life a ſacrifice to the perverſeneſs of Aldringer; for Aldringer, it is well known, was ordered by Walſtein to contradict that general in every point which he had at heart; and Spinola, whitened with the ſervice of forty campaigns, whom fortune

courted many years after ſhe is accuſtomed to deſert others, retired at laſt to a little niche in the terreſtrial ſyſtem hardly known *, crying out, *m' hanno levato l'honore, m' hanno levato l'honore*; and graſping in his hand, on his death-bed, his catholic majeſty's letter, which authorized him to act according to the very manner in which he had acted †.

But to reſume my narrative: Walſtein having reduced Egra, Elnbogen, and Leütmeritz, left Don Baltazar near the laſt place, and Holk in the neighbourhood of the ſecond, with two ſeparate armies, and then joined the elector of Bavaria at Luditz, near Egra. Perceiving therefore it was now high time to draw Guſtavus towards the Baltic, he judged it proper to advance towards the centre of the Swediſh conqueſts, and made more than a ſemblance of poſſeſſing Nurenberg, a town, whoſe intereſts his majeſty had greatly at heart, for the ſake of the inhabitants and himſelf. No man could be more eager to form this junction than the elector; inſomuch that he mounted his muſqueteers behind his horſemen, to perform the march with greater expedition. Nor could the king impede the union of the two armies; for his ſcheme of entering the Upper Palatinate, and poſting himſelf between them, proved impracticable on the firſt attempt; and of courſe the paſs of Rhinſberg laid free and open to the admiſſion of the Bavarians ‡. Still it was neceſſary to poſſeſs Nurenberg, even at the expence of making a long circuit in marching; for if that town, ſincerely attached to the king from inclination as well as religion, had been preoccupied by the enemy, it was highly probable, that the armies in Suabia, under duke William of Weimar, Banier, and Ruthven, had been intercepted, and cut to pieces, in their advance to ſupport their maſter. By this poſition, likewiſe, Guſtavus ſecured to himſelf the dioceſe of Wurtzburg, and was open to receive the ſeparate corps under Oxenſtiern, and others, then ſtationed in the circle of Franconia, and the Lower Rhine. As Walſtein was now advancing, and the ſervice threatened to become extremely warm, the king, like a ſenſible and prudent prince, took care to diſcharge the arrears of his officers and ſoldiers.

When the Imperial general left Egra, he brought up the rear of his army himſelf, count Galas conducted the main body, and Aldringer led the van. As he croſſed a wood, a muſquet-ball paſſed through his coach, and miſſed both him and Tertſki, his brother-in-law, very narrowly. Whether

* The fort of Scrivia. † Galeazzo Gualdo. Vita di Mazarini.

‡ Monro, Second Expedition, 129.

this

this was done by accident, or deſign, cannot well be aſcertained; however Walſtein, for political reaſons, reſolved to take it in a ſerious acceptation. When he and Maximilian met, though each of them were maſters of the moſt profound diſſimulation, yet their perſonal reſentments ran ſo high, that neither one nor the other had the power of concealment: but the elector had the mortification to be obliged to make his firſt advances. The number of the two combined armies amounted to 60,000 effective men, and upwards; though Walſtein, who loved to rhodomontade like a true Auſtrian, gave out a liſt, on approaching Nurenberg, of 59,000 infantry, and 24,600 cavalry, beſides Croatians*. At all events this was the largeſt army, that had appeared in Europe ſince the days of Charlemagne: but it was a maxim with its leader, *Que la fortune favoriſe toujours les gros eſcadrons:* Nor did he ſpare any pains, by falſe reports, fictitious declarations, and pretended movements, to draw the king off from Nurenberg; but the latter knew his buſineſs, and remained immovable, at the head of 18,000 or 20,000 men, at moſt, it being a maxim likewiſe with him, in his turn, *That a great general, with a ſmall army, can hardly ever be obliged to fight.* Upon this account he had, for ſome days, formed a reſolution to encamp near Nurenberg, and on that ſpot juſtify his theory, and exhibit to the world one of the moſt ſhining efforts in the art of war that has or can be found in hiſtory. Being, to a certain degree, in an hoſtile country, he had three great difficulties to contend with; namely, how to ſupport his army; how to prevent an enemy, of ſtrength trebly ſuperior, from forcing his lines; and how direct the reinforcements, that were to join him, to advance their marches in ſuch a manner as not to be intercepted and cut to pieces. As to the *firſt*, he had penetration enough to ſee that the Nurenbergers loved him; and that the town had ſufficient proviſions, as well as bills of exchange, to ſupport his army, till he ſhould have ſtrength to march abroad and confront his enemies in open field: beſides, being inferior in numbers, it was not in his power to ſubſiſt his camp by convoys and remote magazines. As to the *ſecond*, he diſplayed the full perfection of one of thoſe talents he particularly prided himſelf upon; for never ground was better choſen, and, if the times be conſidered, no camp

* In other words, the liſt ran to this effect; 197 companies of foot, at 300 men in each company; and 246 troops of horſe, beſides ſome irregulars, at 200 in each troop. The Bavarian army included, conſiſting of 58 foot-companies, and 124 troops of horſe.

had ever been fortified in ſuch a manner, and upon ſuch principles of art. Nor had outworks, and redoubts, of three miles circumference only, ever been protected with 300 pieces of artillery. And laſtly, as to the *third point*, there alone laid all his diffidence; for though Horn, Banier, duke Bernard, and others, were each of them, as it were, a ſecond Guſtavus, yet he felt the ſharpeſt anxieties, when he reflected, that theſe generals might miſcarry in their attempts to join him, and then his ruin was next to inevitable.

The town of Nurenberg had behaved more generouſly towards the king, than any one free Imperial city in the empire; for it had declared in his favour, as long ſince as the November preceding. His majeſty was not of a temper to ſee himſelf outdone in acts of ſhining and more diſtinguiſhed friendſhip.

Here, round the ſuburbs of the town, he fixed his camp; and as Walſtein was ſuppoſed to be in full march to attack it before it was completed, than which the king expected nothing with greater degree of probability, one half of the army performed the duty of pioneers, day by day alternately, aſſiſted by a conſiderable number of peaſants, as well as citizens; to whom the king allotted a portion of work diſtinct from the Swedes, in order to excite emulation between the two parties: Walſtein ſaw the plan, and dreaded to aſſault the work, even in its infancy. Eight diſtinct forts were erected, one particularly ſurnamed the royal, all guarded with abundance of cannon, not to mention batteries, baſtions, half-moons, and every other ſort of fortification. The ditch of circumvallation was in all places twelve feet wide, and eight deep; and in critical ſituations, its width was eighteen feet, and its depth twelve. Advantage likewiſe was taken of the river Pegnitz, and of all troubleſome and irregular ground. The whole camp, not comprehending ſpace allowed for irregular angles, and outlines of defence, intrenchments, and redoubts, of various ſhapes, all conformable to the genius of the ſpot of earth, contained, as nearly as I can calculate, and the account came from Hepburn, about 219 clear ſquare acres: and thus the king, by this grand maſterpiece of contracting his boundaries, reſerved to himſelf the full power of bringing more hands to act than Walſtein could overcome. Perſons of leſs abilities would have wanted proportionably greater ſpace to move in. The common demands for food and forage muſt have ſpread the troops at greater diſtances, as appears, evidently, to have been Walſtein's caſe; and the providing magazines, and eſcorting them to the head-quarters, muſt

have ſeparated the army too much, and weakened it by daily ſkirmiſhes, however fortunate and ſucceſsful. The king, taking previous care to ſee Nurenberg excellently provided, made it, at one and the ſame time, his granary, his ſtable, and his ſhambles, for the ſpace of eight weeks and five days: and one thing is very remarkable, that though the town fed the royal army, which afterwards increaſed, and maintained at leaſt 20,000 mouths beſides, for many gentry and peaſants flocked into it; yet corn, at laſt, roſe to a price not much higher than it then ſold for in London.

The mind is loſt in aſtoniſhment, when it conſiders the wonderful foreſight made uſe of on this extraordinary occaſion. Indeed it may be aſked, how the king, with ſo ſmall an army, could furniſh and protect his camp with ſuch a number of cannon as 300 pieces? But the queſtion ſolves itſelf, when we reflect, that part of the artillery along the ramparts was at his diſpoſal, and that the arſenal of Nurenberg, both then and now, was as well furniſhed as moſt in the empire. Here one may ſubjoin another remark, namely, that when I make his majeſty's troops amount to the number of 20,000 men, the garriſon of the place, a ſort of city militia, is ſuppoſed to be comprehended in the calculation. This body of troops conſiſted of twenty-four companies, and carried for arms, on their enſigns, the twenty-four letters of the alphabet.

Notwithſtanding all theſe conveniences, though it muſt be acknowledged one half of them was created by dint of parts and genius, it has been thought by many*, and not without ſome appearance of reaſon, that the king fixed on Nurenberg more from a principle of generoſity and gratitude than from any local advantages: for had he, ſay they, withdrawn firſt to Mentz, and then returned and encamped beneath the walls of Bamberg, he might have eaten out the territories of a prelate, who had uſed him baſely, and joined his own armies, a point then of the higheſt conſequence to him, with one third part of the danger and difficulty. Still ſetting apart the obligations of gratitude, and ties of reciprocal affection, Nurenberg ſeems to me, upon all accounts, to be the preferable place; it had both proviſions and money in great abundance; it had a diſtrict round it, of about ſixteen Engliſh miles ſquare, all ſubject to the king's good pleaſure; it was connected with a conſiderable number of free towns, and little proteſtant adjoining ſtates; and had abundance of artillery, which the king wanted above all

* Le Vaſſor, &c.

things: whereas at Bamberg, the diocefe had been devoured, in turns, by each contending party; the ordnance would have been removed, or rendered ufelefs; magazines within the town there were none; and the inhabitants were all zealous Romanifts, and profeffed enemies. As to the arrival of the Swedifh armies, the king had planned that meafure with cool reflection, and had great reafon to hope he fhould effect that junction under the walls of Nurenberg, and within fight of Walftein.

As a proof of this, in his worft fituation, he difpatched a perfon he valued * to the elector of Saxony, exhorting him to behave like a man of fpirit, and fhew no fymptoms of defpondency; *Tell him,* faid he, *whatever appearance things may carry, I will make him a vifit foon, attended by my valiant and faithful army.* His majefty had ftill a further view in this embaffy; for he charged his negotiator with a fecret commiffion, and that was, to pacify an unaccountable jealoufy and averfion, which fubfifted, on the Saxon fide, againft the king of Bohemia. He then informed the French king very compofedly by letter, *That he was not diftreffed to fuch a degree as the enemy fet forth; but, on the contrary, had troops fufficient to oppofe againft him; and that the bravery of his foldiers was never to be extinguifhed, except by death. We perform our exercifes,* continued he, *every day in the field of Mars, and will give Walftein to underftand what, and how much, can be performed by men who fight the caufe of public liberty, and defend princes and nations who groan under tyranny and perfecution* †. He had prefence of mind, at the fame juncture, to difpatch an ambaffador to Ragotfki, prince of Tranfylvania, under pretence of accommodating fome differences between him and the fair Catharina of Brandenburg, relict of the late Gabriel Bethlem; but in reality, to induce him to attack the emperor in his Hungarian dominions. From Tranfylvania, the minifter had orders to haften to Conftantinople, in order to learn the fentiments of the divan, in reference to the Ger-

* Auguftus, count Palatine of the Rhine, who paffed on from Dreſden to Berlin, and finifhed a fecond negotiation there; but returning to join his maſter at Nurenberg, died at Weinfheim in Franconia. He was a young man, from whom the king had great expectations, both as a foldier and a politician.

† Le Vaffor, tom. vii. 345. Whatever the king might write, yet Richelieu was ſo terrified with his majeſty's ſituation, that, fearing Walſtein might totally deſtroy him, and of courſe render the courts of Vienna and Madrid too powerful for that of Verſailles, he immediately made propoſals of an accommodation with the duke of Orleans.

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manic wars: but in the latter place he obtained nothing, except fair words and an obliging reception.

By this time the Imperial general arrived, and having viewed the king's intrenchments, determined at once, contrary to his intentions on the road, not to aſſault, but attempt to ſtarve him: and, upon this principle, he pronounced, vain-glorioufly enough, that Europe ſhould ſee, in a few weeks, who was maſter of Germany, whether Guſtavus or himſelf. In truth, this extraordinary perſonage, putting fear out of the queſtion, did not chooſe to bring his dictatorſhip to ſo ſhort a concluſion; upon which the elector of Bavaria, who diſliked both his phlegm and his vanity, preſſed him earneſtly to force the Swediſh lines ſword in hand; "Sir," ſaid Walſtein, aſſuming an air of coldneſs, "begin the attack with your whole army, and I will ſupport you with all my forces."

Meanwhile Walſtein contemplated the new intrenchments, made by Guſtavus, with the ſame attention as a geometrician could be ſuppoſed to ſtudy a freſh work of Euclid, juſt recovered from obſcurity; being reſolved to force it, if the attempt was practicable, confiding greatly in the ſuperiority of his numbers: but, upon examining the fortifications erected, and precautions taken, he changed his reſolution, for he was thoroughly aſtoniſhed; having chanced to forget, that a few troops judicioufly poſted, and intrenched up to the eyes, were at leaſt a match for whole Imperial legions, who were to act in a ſtate of expoſure above ground. He then coolly traced out a camp, almoſt within ſight of, yet three miles diſtant from the king. Its defence was very ſlight and inſubſtantial, conſiſting only of a ſmall ditch, protected in various parts by interlaced foreſt-trees, baggage-waggons, and gabions. He then cauſed his troops to lodge in eight different diviſions, and covered ſuch an extent of ground, that the whole appeared more like a populous country than like a camp.

As to ſubſiſting an army, there indeed laid his chief excellence; for in the management of his artillery, of which he had enough, he was no great genius, and had few good hands; nor was he, as an honeſt Briton ſaid bluntly of him, *in any degree a notable ſpade-man* *. But in reſpect to proviſions and forage, he ſhewed himſelf a purveyor of the firſt claſs. Amongſt other things, his ſtore-bread was admirable. In hard times this makes half the ſtanding diet of a ſoldier, and anſwers all purpoſes very well, when nothing

* *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part iii. p. 9.

better

better can be obtained. As he had troops to ſpare in great abundance, it was his intention to check the Swedes in all little excurſions for the ſupport of their camp; and this he partly effected, having daily more men at leiſure, than the king could bring to act upon the moſt trying emergency.

The country behind him, and on each ſide, was all open to his devotion, and proviſions and ammunition were conveyed to him even from Vienna and Munich; the firſt by water-carriage, as near as Ratiſbon. He poſſeſſed all the towns and paſſes in the circle of territories which ſurrounded him, except only beyond that little ſegment which the king occupied. He then ſtationed two large bodies of troops in the dioceſe of Bamberg and the Upper Palatinate, and cauſed his Croatians, like beaſts of prey, to ſcour the whole country night and day, in a line croſs-wiſe from Munich to Bamberg; a tract of excurſion, which meaſures at leaſt one hundred miles.

Having ſlightly ſketched out the ground-plot of a camp, he drew up ſeventeen regiments at the head of his intended lines, by way of bravado, a practice extremely common in thoſe days, being a fine *pons aſinorum* for thoſe hot-brained fighting warriors, who miſtake animal vivacity for true courage. The king humoured Walſtein in this ſort of interlude, though determined in his own mind not to hazard an engagement at that juncture, and drew out his cavalry in line of battle, juſt under the enemy's noſe; for he well knew, that a ſmall river divided the two armies, and ſerved both for a barrier and an excuſe. This river, called the Pegnitz, having traverſed Nurenberg from eaſt to weſt, paſſed between the two camps, and ſupplied both armies: but as the weather was extremely dry, and the ſeaſon of the Dog-ſtar began to approach, the Swedes and Imperialiſts ſuffered much from the ſcantineſs and corruption of the water, ſo that petechial fevers multiplied exceedingly *.

It ſoon became manifeſt to all men, that Guſtavus's conduct not only puzzled Walſtein, but created ſerious apprehenſions in the mind of that general; for it made a viſible change in his way of thinking and ſpeaking. He altered that deciſive tone which he had formerly uſed in matters of war. From being confident, he became diſtruſtful; and what was once haughtineſs and obſtinacy, began now to ſoften itſelf into ſomething, which carried the appearance of

* Brachelii. Hiſt. noſtror. Temp. p. 282.

deference

deference and docility. He found himſelf neceſſitated to make his military motions ſtep by ſtep, having to do with one who was capable of ruining him from the *inattention* of a ſingle moment. So that his *greateſt chance* conſiſted in the hope of compelling the king to liſten to ſome neceſſary accommodation, occaſioned partly by hunger, and partly by the interception of his re-inforcements. Perhaps he had ſome hopes too of corrupting the fidelity of the town of Nurenberg; but that was an airy and childiſh expectation. Therefore as one ſingle ſtroke, if the compariſon may be allowed, oftentimes determines the character of a general, as much as a painter; he ſaw with grief, that though Guſtavus had had ſeemingly *no* choice, yet he had choſen for his encampment *one of the beſt* places he could have found in all Germany. No town but Nurenberg could ſupport him; and in any *other* ſpot, Walſtein might have ſtarved him in a fortnight's ſpace, or hunted him, like a fugitive, from one extremity of the empire to another.

It was matter of aſtoniſhment to all mankind, that two armies, on whoſe conduct the fate of Germany depended, ſhould lie gazing on each other for eight weeks, without ſtriking more than one ſingle blow, if we except, and that indeed was unavoidable, the little onſets, ambuſcades, and ſkirmiſhes betwixt *partiſans*, who roamed here and there to procure forage, and intercept convoys: yet in all the time above-mentioned, it is not certain that a muſquet-ball was exchanged in earneſt, or one conſiderable alarm given by either party from the two encampments. The truth of the whole was this: Walſtein durſt not *attack*, and the king, for prudent reaſons, *declined* engaging; yet ſuch was the vivacity of his high ſpirit, that he declared himſelf, more than once, to be quite out of temper with the *ſhyneſs* of Walſtein, who, though he well knew the weakneſs of the Swedes, yet likewiſe knew their valour and diſcipline; and of courſe, as Gaſſion tells us *, reſolved to make it "*the campaign of ſtarving.*" And hence it was he declared ſo confidently, that the myſtery of re-eſtabliſhing his maſter's affairs did not conſiſt in giving frequent battles; that his predeceſſors had played *this* game many years, without obtaining the object of their wiſhes: Therefore, ſaid he, I ſhall take the liberty to wage war upon different principles.

This plan was not unworthy of a great general, and Walſtein had parts to comprehend the idea in its full extent; yet it is plain he proceeded upon ſelfiſh and ambi-

* *Memoires*, tom. i. p. 68.

tious

tious motives alſo. His grand object was to *protract* the war; he ſerved his Imperial maſter ſparingly and grudgingly; and had no deſire to remove hoſtilities from the threſhold of the Bavarian territories, whoſe elector he conſidered as the principal cauſe of his late diſgrace.

The king diſpatched couriers to the ſeveral generals he intended ſhould join him, and ſubjoined to each letter a plan and ſketch of their reſpective marches, drawn out by his own hand. He then amuſed himſelf, at intervals from more immediate buſineſs, with reviewing his troops every day, and ſeeing ſome ideas in exerciſe realized, which his inventive genius had lately brought to light. As the trial of ſkill conſiſted in ſtarving with good grace, he reſolved to fight the firſt moment he could increaſe his handful of men to a moderate number, knowing preciſely how long, and in what manner to ward the blow, or when to return it; and in the interim employed all his thoughts how to procure a mouthful of bread, when Walſtein had none. Indeed, the effects of this foreſight and economy ſoon made their appearance; for by this time, he reduced that magnificent perſon, who affected a table ſpread with princely profuſion, to ſix diſhes at dinner, for himſelf and officers, and two bottles of wine, both which reductions he was obliged afterwards to diminiſh yet further. The king, with his ſmall body of troops, haraſſed his convoys, and deſtroyed his magazines; not to mention, that Walſtein's ſupplies came by land-carriage from Ratiſbon, having no navigable ſtream to befriend him. As to the Rednitz, which ran through his camp, notwithſtanding it came from the country of his firm ally the biſhop of Bamberg, yet it was too narrow, and too ſhallow, to admit boats of any ſize; and, to increaſe this inconvenience, the ſtream was againſt him. Guſtavus, upon the whole, was the beſt purveyor; though indeed it is hard to comprehend, how an inland town like Nurenberg, could be ſupplied in the manner it was; for neither meat, nor ammunition, nor bread, were wanting; and the quantity of oats was beyond deſcription. Amongſt other things, the city furniſhed his army each day with 8000 loaves. Thus, though Walſtein took care to poſt his troops on every road that led to Nurenberg, and by the ſame methods that he deprived his enemy, ſupplied himſelf, being maſter of all the paſſes, and having a communication open with Forcheim, where the Germans gravely tell you Pontius Pilate was born *, as likewiſe with Wurtzburg,

* The verſes on the occaſion are *ſo claſſical*, both in *ſtyle* and *quantity*, that one cannot abſtain from citing them:

*Forchemii*

burg, Cronach, and all Bavaria; yet the king lived better than he; not that he could diſpute every inch of ſuperiority with him, being four degrees inferior to him in reſpect of cavalry *, but by procuring better intelligence, and watching the critical moments of advantage and ſurprize.

Guſtavus, notwithſtanding his great parts and foreſight, felt ſome miſgivings in his own breaſt, in reference to the dangers that attended his little armies, which were now in full march towards him from various quarters. Far from diſcovering the leaſt external ſymptoms of diſmay, he aſked the ſeparate opinion of every general, and condeſcending even to ſend for Gaſſion †, then not arrived to the rank of a lieutenant-colonel, explained to him the critical and perilous ſituation of his army with familiarity and confidence; expreſſing no kind of *diffidence* with reſpect to his own conduct, but manifeſting *ſome* apprehenſions with regard to the fate of his reinforcements. Hence it appears, that the braveſt of men, and ſuch Guſtavus truly was, can be alarmed, though not dejected, with danger. Such preſentiments make the great general what he is, upon ſuppoſition that they do not diſturb his preſence of mind, or, in other words, the free exertion of the powers of his underſtanding.

Meanwhile Guſtavus depended as much upon the want of good agreement between Walſtein and Maximilian, as Hannibal ever expected advantage from the miſunderſtandings that ſubſiſted betwixt the Roman conſuls and the generals under them. The Bavarian elector, being a perſon equally well ſkilled in penetration and diſſembling, ſoon found, that oppoſition, far from humbling Walſtein, only ſerved to inflame and exaſperate him; and ſubmitting therefore with the beſt grace he could, he had the mortification to ſee his new and well-beloved acquiſition, the Upper Palatinate, laid waſte and devoured by his own allies. Walſtein went ſo far, as to refine upon the paſſions of reſentment and malice; for, perceiving that his rival hated Guſtavus with a mortal hatred, he affected a thouſand politeneſſes and civilities towards him, and ſpoke of him in the ſtyle of ſomething *more* than human. One circumſtance, about this period, ſeems highly probable and generous in Guſtavus; for when he ſent a route of the roads, planned by

*Forchemii natus eſt Pontius ille Pilatus,*
*Teutoniæ gentis, crucifixor Omnipotentis.*

* See *Le Blanc.* Hiſt. de Baviere, tom. iv. p. 393.

† *Vie du maréchal Gaſſion*, par Michael Le Pure, tom. i. p. 69.

by himſelf, with uncommon judgment, to every commander who was to march to his aſſiſtance; *Gentlemen*, added he, in the concluſion of his letters, *your king, and military protector, can only direct his abſent diſciples in general terms: incidents will ariſe, which no human foreſight can predetermine:* ſeize the moments; ſnatch the proffered opportunities, which take birth and flight in one inſtant. *I reſign into your hands* full diſcretionary *power*; *uſe it in a manner worthy both of me and yourſelves**.

We have kept ſilence for ſome time, with reſpect to the ſituation of affairs between Guſtavus and Charles I. but an incident preſented itſelf at this period, almoſt to a day, and we ſhall juſt touch upon it in our progreſs. Vane, piqued as the *offending* party uſually is, with the late converſation betwixt him and Guſtavus, had withdrawn himſelf, by way of reſentment, from Munich to Ulm, and renewed his ſolicitations about the reſtitution of the Lower Palatinate, moſt of which the Swedes had then conquered. This ſtep he had taken according to his old cuſtom, or, in other words, with impropriety and teaſing; and what inclines us the more to form this conjecture, is, that the king of Bohemia neither co-operated with, nor imparted his deſigns to him, as Vane himſelf confeſſes.

The ſtreſs of the difficulty laid here. Guſtavus had a full deſign to *conquer* and *reſtore* the Lower Palatinate, but as he knew the Spaniards, then very powerful at ſea, might interrupt his commerce, a point, if he had had leiſure, very near and dear to him, and perhaps ſend a fleet to give laws to the Baltic, he made it a preliminary *ſine quâ non*, that England ſhould declare a *naval* war againſt Spain; than which, as with great judgment he foreſaw, nothing could be eaſier to her, or more agreeable to the bent of the nation, if the king had wiſhed, in earneſt, to ſee his brother reinſtated. Charles hung like a dead weight upon this topic, and refuſed to comply.

To the preſent part of the queſtion Vane ſays nothing; but an extract from his letter †, with reference to the preceding paragraph, may be worth tranſcribing:

"The king of Sweden, within theſe few days, hath plainly told the king of Bohemia, that he would neither conclude with him, nor myſelf, until he had ſpoken with the elector of Saxe."

* Vide *Chemnitz*, tom. i. p. 311.

† Dated from Ulm, June 23, 1632. *MS. Paper Office.*

"This

" This I have certain information of, though not from the king of Bohemia. Whereupon I thought fit to write him the incloſed letter. * * * Thus you ſee the hard game I have to play; and which is ſo much the more difficult, in regard of the great intelligence there is between the king of Sweden and ſome of his majeſty's ſubjects, by intercourſe of letters out of England into the army. But this is a tender point, and tenderly to be dealt in; and therefore no notice to be taken of it at preſent. What iſſue the preſent conjuncture may produce is not to be foreſeen; but I conceive it worthy of his majeſty's great wiſdom, and the ſtate's, ſeriouſly and timely to take into their conſideration the true balancing the eſtates of Chriſtendom, for they are now upon a criſis."

He then adds, that the king of Sweden, " though he had raiſed himſelf by contributions and otherwiſe, yet did not pay his troops a farthing, but ſuffered them to plunder *; and if he ſhall be obliged to retreat, and pay them no better, they may poſſibly diſband of themſelves†: therefore he (Sir Henry) hopes, that he ſhall have orders to put the king to a point, for what he holds in the Lower Palatinate, and to return to England."

As to occaſional rencounters in the field, for nothing paſſed between the main armies, never troops were kept in better breath than the Swedes and Imperialiſts: but this ſort of war *in detail*, or *la petite guerre*, as the French call it, merits not to be recorded, as it decides nothing, excepting here and there in a particular inſtance, which ſhall be juſt mentioned in my way. Yet one thing highly deſerves to be tranſmitted to poſterity. The king, in frequent conflicts with the Croatians, a ſet of beings he mortally hated, as way-layers, robbers, and murderers, deviſed a new practice in the military art, for mixing dragoons, who then carried a ſhorter muſquet, and not carbines, with his own light cavalry, either ſerving on foot, as occaſion required, or doing great miſchief on horſeback, as their pieces diſcharged a heavier ball.

* For the confutation of this unchriſtian and infamous report, in every branch, which Vane had dwelt upon in other letters, and we have replied to occaſionally *in loco*, compare particularly the pages 276—277, 278, &c.

† This is a ſuſpicion highly tinctured with malice: for, in the whole courſe of the king's wars, I find no deſertion, which, beſides other things, proves incidentally that his pay was punctual. Vane remembered well the old rule, *Calumniari fortiter, ut aliquid remaneat.*

Amongſt

Amongſt theſe leſſer actions of a ſignificant caſt, the valiant colonel Dewbatel, at the head of his own regiment, ſupported by ſome few of Sperreüter's * men, having defeated a party of Croatians, fell in unawares with 6000 Walſteiners; upon which event, he led his ſoldiers on four or five times to the charge, and made incredible efforts to cut his way through the enemy, till at length, having loſt one half of his little army, he found himſelf unhorſed in the engagement, and conducted priſoner to the Imperial general. His majeſty having received intelligence of this rude and unexpected ſhock, poſted away full trot, with a ſelect body of cavalry, in order to diſengage his brave commander, but unfortunately found the field of battle covered with the dead bodies of his ſoldiers, and nothing elſe; for the Imperialiſts very wiſely retired the very moment after they had performed their buſineſs.

Walſtein received Dewbatel with uncommon marks of eſteem, and commanded Peroni, ſteward of his houſehold, immediately to diſcharge his ranſom, which in thoſe days, for an officer of that rank, ran ſometimes to the amount of *one thouſand pounds*. More reaſons perhaps than *one* induced him to perform this act of politeneſs. He knew the man to be a favourite with Guſtavus, and hoped probably, by ſuch an inſtance of generoſity, which indeed agreed with Walſtein's natural temper, to open an honeſt warrior's heart, and extract ſome uſeful intelligence from him. Therefore from theſe motives, and under pretence of admiring Sperreüter's turn of mind and diſpoſition, he created occaſions of holding ſeveral private converſations, which ran chiefly upon encomiums with regard to Guſtavus, and on the earneſt deſire he had to give peace to Germany, and produce a reconciliation between the emperor and his majeſty of Sweden.

Not many days afterwards, ſome Swediſh partiſans, with Gaſſion amongſt them, had the good fortune to ſeize Darmitz, an officer of Walſtein, in whom that general placed a peculiar confidence, who was haſtening without a ſufficient guard from one quarter to another. Him his majeſty examined ſtrictly, *upon oath*, ſuch was his uſual cuſtom with priſoners of condition, and finding that Walſtein intended to remove to his camp the next day a large magazine from Freyſtadt, which contained all that could be amaſſed in Bavaria,

* What this officer's real name was, I know not; for the king one day in Poland, returning over the field of battle, ſaw a ſoldier pierced through with a pike, and the inſtrument remaining in his body, without diſcovering any ſymptoms of pain or uneaſineſs; which ſtruck his majeſty ſo much, that he ſurnamed him on the ſpot Sperreüter, *or knight of the ſpear*.

the

the Higher Palatinate, and the biſhoprics of Ratiſbon and Aichſtadt, he conceived an idea of intercepting or deſtroying the convoy, and put the execution thereof into Dewbatel's hands, who by this time was returned from the Imperial army *. This officer, impatient to juſtify his majeſty's choice, left him towards the cloſe of the evening, having received his private orders, and mounted on horſeback, at the head of three regiments of cavalry, his own dragoons being one, which the king allowed him to ſelect from all the army. Gaſſion had a private order from his majeſty ſome minutes before, and had the honour to aſſiſt in this expedition with his own ſhattered regiment, conſiſting only of 300 horſe. They arrived at Freyſtadt, a ſmall town near Neumarck, about ſixteen miles from Nurenberg, about two hours after midnight; ſecured the corps de guard unperceived, and fixed three petards to the town-gate, the laſt of which ſucceeded. Dewbatel ſhaped his entrance one way, and Gaſſion the other; ſo that in two hours the whole garriſon, being oppreſſed on either ſide, was either killed or diſarmed. Then the Swedes had leiſure to load 200 waggons with military ſtores, and burnt more than 1000 loads of corn and hay; after which they began their retreat compoſedly and in good order, driving with them an incredible number of cattle. Who could have imagined, that the Swedes, with ſo ſmall an army, would have undertaken an enterprise, which befitted the perſons only, who had a ſuperiority of forces? Meanwhile the king, who knew what Walſtein would do on this occaſion, almoſt as well as Walſtein himſelf, advanced with a body of 2000 cavalry, to ſecure the retreat of his men. Eventually, as he concluded, the Imperial general took the alarm in an inſtant, and diſpatched Spar, ſerjeant-major di battaglia, with his own regiment of muſqueteers, and ſome other infantry, eight ſelect troops of Gonzaga's and Coloredo's horſe, and twenty ſquadrons of Croatians, to make an example of theſe adventurers. But as his majeſty accidentally fell in with Spar, without ſeeing his own troops, or being ſeen by them, they retired without any moleſtation, and knew nothing of all that happened, till the fortune of the day had been decided. Spar, the Imperial general, who outnumbered the king doubly, for his majeſty thought by joining his own troops to preſerve an equality in numbers, felt himſelf animated with the glory of fighting a battle in minature with the great Guſtavus; and, of courſe,

* *Hiſt. or Auth. Relation*, in Low Dutch, fol. tom. ii. 81. 82.

gave him so desperate a charge, that colonel Reiss was shot through the body; and a gentleman of the bedchamber, and Cratzenstein, one of the pages, were both killed at their master's side. As Reiss led the commanded musqueteers, the king was obliged to dismount, and conduct them himself, persevering with incredible patience, knowing well that his men would never desert him. At length the Croatians began gradually to disappear, by little and little. The regular horse behaved well in part; but two Imperial regiments * performed wonders, for, having gained the covert of a small wood, they fought on till they had not a single charge of powder remaining; and then, by mutual consent, filed off among the trees, but the ground behind perplexed them in their escape. Gonzaga's horse ran away, for which Walstein convened him before a court martial, though he had the honour to be cousin to the empress, and though it appeared, on his trial, that he kept the field after every man of his regiment had deserted it. This rough encounter happened in the neighbourhood of a village, called Burgtham, about three miles from Altdorf †. The king, during the conflict, was so pleased with the behaviour of Leslie and Gordon, who were afterwards concerned in Walstein's death, that he declared publicly, if he took them prisoners, he would discharge them without delay, and pay their ransom himself. This he did; but some obstructions deferred the execution of his promise for the space of five weeks. When the confusion of the action was partly over, some Swedes saw a horse, richly caparisoned, fastened to a thorn-tree, and asking an Imperial horse-boy ‡ if he knew the owner, received for answer, that it was his general's; and amidst some osiers and rushes just by, for the ground there was very marshy, and the cavalry could not clear it, at length Spar was discovered, who, making some resistance, received two very rude strokes from the club end of a musquet, and soon lost the massy gold chain which hung round his neck. This officer was somewhat unfortunate, for he had paid one ransom the preceding year; and what perplexed him afterwards in his examination, and gave the king some advantage over him, was, that he had passed his parole not to serve against the Swedes for a certain duration of time. When brought to his majesty, in the field of action, the king only said, laughing heartily, *Ah!*

* These regiments were Irish and Scotch.

† *Invasions of Germany, cum Fig.* 12°. p. 76. Lond. 1638.

‡ These horse-boys, in both the services, were probationists for the cavalry.

*monsieur*

*monſieur Spar, I ſee you love me ſo dearly, that you cannot poſſibly refrain long from my company* *.

Beſides thoſe already mentioned, Tertzki likewiſe, Walſtein's brother in law, was taken priſoner. The enemy loſt 800 choſen men on this occaſion; but only two pair of colours, having taken care to tear the others into pieces. His majeſty rewarded the common ſoldiers, who brought him theſe colours, very generouſly, gratified many officers, and complimented all, ſpoke to ſeveral inferior men by name, and applauded them highly. At night he returned Dewbatel public thanks before the principal commanders of his army; and thought the advantage ſo conſiderable, as to ſend for his chaplain, and order mention to be made thereof in the devotions of next day.

Gaſſion, with his comrades, reached the camp before his majeſty arrived; upon which, with fifteen choſen horſemen, he remounted immediately, and went in ſearch of his maſter, whom he found returning. The king embraced him with a ſmile, and aſked his intentions: "Sire," ſaid he, in military Latin, for he then could not talk German, "you once promiſed me the honour of dying near you, and I haſtened now to take my chance." *Frenchman*, replied Guſtavus, for that was the appellation he always gave him, *take my word, I will engage in no battle, but you ſhall ſhare in the blows given and received on either ſide.*

As Spar had violated his *parole* of honour, given at Francfort upon the Oder, of not ſerving againſt Guſtavus and his allies for a certain period of time, he proved a priſoner that might be depended upon, as he was expoſed to the rigor of the then eſtabliſhed military practice. Being twice examined by the king in perſon, upon oath, he anſwered, on the faith of a Chriſtian, that he knew nothing of Walſtein's deſigns, as that general made no participators in his ſecrets: but the commonly received opinion, with which his own coincided, was, that he aimed only to compel him by hunger into a treaty. The king inſiſted no farther, and was perhaps the only prince or general, as the cuſtom then run, that would have pardoned Spar in ſuch a ſituation as that officer ſtood.

In this partiſan war, a ſort of piracy and murder, offenſive to a generous ſpirit, and particularly as it rarely determined any thing, his majeſty began to diſcover great uneaſineſs; for many of the beſt generals, including the common ſoldiers almoſt to a man, began to grow cruel and

* *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part iii. p. 22.

rapacious. This hurt the king's mind both as a Chriſtian and a warrior; for it was a maxim with him, that avarice was illiberal in a military man, and that barbarity uſually implied cowardice. Beſides, he plainly foreſaw, that want of *morals* would ſoon create want of *diſcipline*; and that *then* his once invincible army would be reduced to the level of the common ſtandard. Nay, he remarked, that even Walſtein in the preſent campaign preſerved a ſubordination and regularity which were quite the reverſe of that licentiouſneſs with which he had formerly indulged his troops. Sending therefore for every commander to his tent from the lieutenant-colonels to the lieutenant-general, the latter being the ſecond poſt then in all armies, and aſſuming, which is very difficult, an air of affliction and firmneſs at the ſame time, he delivered his ſentiments in the following words:

*Gentlemen,*

*You partly belong to thoſe numbers who have ſhewn themſelves unfaithful and diſloyal to their own country *, having endeavoured to procure and complete its ruin to the utmoſt of your power. You, my generals, and all you my inferior officers, I have ever eſteemed as brave cavaliers, and make this confeſſion now to your honour; teſtifying at the ſame time, that, upon all occaſions of ſervice offered, and more particularly in the hour of battle, you have given me ſuch demonſtrations of your valour, as have entirely ſatisfied my moſt ardent wiſhes. But when I reflect on the ravages, extortions, and cruelties lately committed †, and believe me, my friends, the ſeeing you all before me enlivens my memory with the ſtrongeſt recollection, and that you, perſons of rank, birth, education, and competent incomes, have been guilty yourſelves of thoſe very inſults, and companions of thoſe who neither obſerve diſcipline, nor ſee it obſerved;——I own my mind is ſtruck with aſtoniſhment and horror. Turn your eyes inward upon your own conſciences; and I aſk no more. Is it not a caſe afflicting and deplorable; is it not a ſight odious to the Supreme Being; that one Chriſtian, even of the ſame profeſſion in religion, ſhould deſpoil another? That brethren ſhould render brethren miſerable, and friends deſtroy friends? Demons themſelves, as far as can be conjectured, have more juſtice and leſs barbarity!*

*How often has anguiſh cut me to the heart, when the voice of fame reports, on numberleſs occaſions, that the Swediſh ſoldiers*

* Meaning Germany; for the German officers and ſoldiers were neither ſo moral nor ſo well diſciplined as the Swediſh.

† In Bavaria; where uninterrupted ſucceſſes firſt rendered them inſolent.

*are*

*are more cruel and more licentious than the Imperialists! But here lies a mistake. All my troops are denominated Swedes, but the offence springs from the native Germans: and had I known the cast and complexion of the nation in the same manner as I now stand informed; and that you, Germans born, had no more natural affection for your mother-country than has since appeared, rendering it no better services, and discovering no greater fidelity towards it; believe me, on the honour of a soldier, I would never have saddled a horse in your behalf; much less hazarded my life, kingdoms, and reputation, as also the persons of those brave and faithful men, who accompanied me hither, for you.*

*No——since I now perceive, that you are animated with a rage for the destruction of your country, it would have been my choice and judgment both to have left you precisely in the state I found you; that is, in other words, plunged and buried in the depths of slavery as well mental as corporeal.*

*Let your own consciences bear testimony, that it is not my usual custom to deny any of you a request that is reasonable; and the Supreme Being knows moreover, that I never intended more than, by the co-operation of divine assistance, to restore every man to his own, and his own to every man; and for the acquisitions proposed to be made in Franconia and Bavaria, it was my fixed intention to distribute them impartially to the nobility and gentry of the German nation, and leave no man's good services unrewarded. But this diabolical practice of ravaging and destroying lays a dead weight, I must confess, on my best purposes, and checks the vigour of my christian resolutions. But answer me, fellow soldiers! have you not the spirit and dignity of sentiment to reflect a little, what kind of idea posterity will form concerning you in future histories? Remember, likewise, I conjure you, what perplexities you are creating to your honour and consciences, and what visitations and punishments you are now drawing down, not only on your own persons, but on your country and successors, by these outrageous acts of oppression and inhumanity! Oh! that you could once reflect what an account you have to settle at the great tribunal! Happy, thrice happy had been my condition, if I had still remained in my own kingdoms, and not travelled so far to behold such enormities as I have beheld!*

*You will say, perhaps, that you want money, and yet it is evident to all mankind, that I pay you and the whole army punctually, to the full extent of my power: but by your depredations, extortions and ravages, you bring the honour of my credit in question, and deprive me of the very means to support my forces. And whence, I demand a second time, proceeds it, that you are not satisfied? What share have I received, in any*

*inſtance, from all your plunder?——Juſt nothing. Here therefore I proteſt, in the preſence of the Supreme Being, for what I ſay is religiouſly true, that in all this war I have not enriched myſelf to the amount of* ſix German dollars*. *Nay, I can make it appear to demonſtration, if any doubting perſon amongſt you deſires to be ſatisfied under this article, that I have drawn from my own patrimonial treaſures, ſince I have left Stockholm, at two and thirty ſeveral remittances, the full and complete ſum of three hundred and ſixty thouſand pounds; all which I have expended for your advantage, and for the re-eſtabliſhment of ſuch princes as are united with me in the ſame truth of religion. This, it is true,——for there may be ſome tincture of vanity in the recital, I ought perhaps to have kept in the dark: but one thing there is, which I can never allow to be buried in oblivion, and that is, the loſs ſo many brave and excellent officers, whoſe virtues indeed ſurpaſs all eſtimate. Here gratitude and human nature muſt break forth: for I valued ſuch perſons beyond all my riches.——And to proceed ſtill farther, what have you, gentlemen, from the firſt to the meaneſt, ever contributed towards the expences of the war?*

*Henceforth therefore I* requeſt *and* COMMAND *you to deſpoil no man of his goods or poſſeſſions. As you have ſpirit and intrepidity, leave the marks of them on the breaſts of your enemies; but ſtain not the honour of a warrior by committing outrages on the unarmed and the innocent.*

BE CONTENT WITH YOUR WAGES †, *as a ſoldier ought; and ſubſiſt not by pilfering and plunder, like banditti and Croatians! Otherwiſe, you, from the higheſt to the loweſt, will be always* infamous; *and I, with ſuch aſſiſtants, ſhall never become* victorious †.

Thus ſpoke the king; and the ſpeech which is here produced, almoſt verbatim, carries its own marks of authenticity with it, being of ſuch a caſt, that few hiſtorians will have the *vanity* to ſay they were able to *invent* it. The effect was, it ſoon melted the rugged audience into tears, and produced afterwards a thorough reformation. Nor was a ſyllable offered by way of juſtification or excuſe. Nevertheleſs, his majeſty purſued the blow with a general proclamation, to which it was annexed by way of penalty, that thenceforwards he would pardon no man, of what rank ſoever, either of

* About one guinea Engliſh. In the original he pointed, it is ſaid, to the boots he had then on: *I have not gained*, obſerved he, *this ſingle pair of boots, which I now wear.* See *Schefferi* Memorab. 149.

† *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part iii. p. 24, 25, 26. See alſo *Chemnitz*, tom. i. p. 317: and, *The Hiſtorical, but Authentic Relation*, fol. Low Dutch, tom. ii. p. 80, &c.

birth.

birth or military ſtation, in caſe he appeared to be a delinquent. *And if*, added he to ſome German officers, *you dare pretend to* deſert *or* mutiny, *I have enough left of my faithful and valiant Swedes to cut you all to pieces even in Walſtein's preſence: for having* reaſon *and* Chriſtianity *on my ſide*, I WILL BE OBEYED. He then cauſed a lieutenant to be hanged, whoſe ill ſtars led him to be the firſt offender; and when a poor peaſant complained of a common ſoldier, who had ſtolen the ſupport of his family, a ſingle cow, he ſeized the fellow with his own hands, and calling for the regimental executioner, commanded him that inſtant to perform his office: *Friend*, ſaid he to the criminal, *every ſoldier is my child: yet it is better for thee to die, than that the wrath of God ſhould deſcend, on account of this tranſgreſſion, upon me, and thee, and the whole army aſſembled round us* *.

Walſtein ſtill continued his politeneſs and deference towards Guſtavus, and reſtoring to him a captain Reiſchel, after having entertained him at his own table, and diſcharged his ranſom to the Croatians, beſought that officer to aſſure his majeſty, That he conſidered him as the *firſt general* in the world, and ſhould die contented, if he could only have the honour of concluding a peace between him and the emperor. His majeſty received this meſſage at table with a ſmile, and anſwered, *That Walſtein, it muſt be confeſſed, was a perſon of magnificence*; *and as he was always ready to do him juſtice, ſo he was too honeſt a man to wiſh his death, eſpecially till he could once have the pleaſure of giving him a good ſhake by the collar in open field* †.

By this time maladies began to be extremely rife in either army: for the water of the Pegnitz, which ſupplied them both, grew ſcanty and diſturbed, and the putrefaction of dead horſes was ſuch, that petechial fevers raged to a degree ſcarcely credible. His majeſty ſuffered moſt from want of green forage, and was maſter only of a ſtrip of meadow-ground for that purpoſe. It was now reported not only at Vienna, but throughout all Europe, that Guſtavus had humbly ſued for peace. True it is, the *pacificator-general* of the empire ‡ made a tender of his ſervices; the Daniſh ambaſſador renewed his late attack, and interpoſed a little; Chriſtian-William, late adminiſtrator of Magdeburg, and

* Chemnitzius de Bello Sueco-Germanico, tom. i. 316.

† *Mercure Franç.* à l'an. 1632, p. 388.

‡ So the king always ſtyled, in a ludicrous manner, the landgrave of Heſſe-Darmſtadt, who was ſuppoſed to be a ſecret penſioner to the emperor.

couſin to the queen of Sweden, had private permiſſion, being before a priſoner, to leave Vienna, in order to ſound the king's diſpoſitions; and Spar propoſed to make terms with Walſtein from his own free will; but his majeſty continued ſhy, and deſired to be excuſed from hearing the *bare mention* of any ſingle preliminary. As a proof of the ſincerity of his declarations in this reſpect, he wrote to Oxenſtiern, commanding him to join him; *but*, ſaid he, *conceive not your maſter in* ſuch *a ſituation, as to ſuppoſe yourſelf obliged to run ſuch bold and hazardous riſks, as men uſually do in affairs of deſperation. Proceed coolly and ſolidly; let no apprehenſions hurry you from the free exertion of your underſtanding.* I can look the enemy in the face for a longer continuance.

It may be worth while now to conſider this great maſterſtroke in the art of war, the conduct of Guſtavus; who remained, begirt with numbers trebly ſuperior to his own forces, from the beginning of June till the 21ſt of Auguſt; for *that day* his ſeveral armies reached him. Their firſt conjunction with themſelves was tedious and difficult, and their combined march, in order to join their ſovereign, was long, intricate, and dangerous. The chancellor Oxenſtiern then laid in the electorates of Mentz, Triers, and Cologn, where he had upon his hands the Spaniſh troops, whom Horn held in play with a ſmall army during his abſence. He had a junction likewiſe to form with the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, who was to ſteer his courſe through Pappenheim's troops; but fortunately for him, that vigilant general was then making his *romantic* and *heroic* journey to the relief of Maſtricht. When it was that the king wrote firſt to Oxenſtiern with directions to advance, I once knew, but the memorandum is miſlaid; nevertheleſs, it was, if I miſtake not, about the middle of June; but the chancellor could not poſſibly move till the 11th of July.

Duke William of Weimar, his younger brother Bernard being recalled to Nurenberg, was then near the lake of Conſtance, ſo that Milan firſt, and all Italy afterwards, began to tremble. This perhaps is only a figurative manner of expreſſion in the author I am now peruſing *, and took its riſe, probably, from the zeal of the honeſt Finlanders, who being no great geographers, aſked the peaſants about Lindaw, *how many days march it might be from thence to Rome?*

This general, about the time that Walſtein *beſieged* the king, for that indeed is the moſt proper expreſſion which can be uſed on the occaſion, this general, I ſay, received orders

* *Loccenii* Hiſt. rerum Suecicarum, p. 596.

to haſten in perſon from the foot of the Alps almoſt to the Baltic; namely, to the duchy of Magdeburg, and the biſhopric of Halberſtadt; in order to glean up the Engliſh and Scottiſh remains of Hamilton's army, now reduced to two regiments, the firſt commanded by Ballandine, and the latter by Alexander Hamilton. Our vigilant and induſtrious countrymen ſaved their future general a part of his labour; for, venturing forwards of themſelves with generous reſolution, they reached Halle in Saxony, where they found the blue and green brigades, four companies of Mitzval's infantry, and two regiments of cavalry. Thence paſſing through Lutzen and Zeitz, they found their commander, who had with him few forces, except his own guards, that attended him from Suabia; and then croſſing the foreſt of Thuringia, reached Franconia, where five Saxon regiments joined them, of which two were horſe. At length they fell in with the chancellor Oxenſtiern at Wurtzburg about the tenth of Auguſt.

The general, Banier, who led the *third* army, was then near Augſburg, where he commanded againſt Cratz, late Bavarian velt-marechal under Tilly *. On receiving his inſtructions he croſſed the Danube, nor durſt his enemy purſue him; and gliding by the weſtern ſide of his maſter's camp, ſo far was the king from wanting his aſſiſtance, advanced to Weinsheim in the margraviate of Anſpach, with a view to facilitate the approach of Oxenſtiern and duke William of Weimar. But how vaſt was his ſurprize, and how greatly did he admire the king's judgment and intrepidity, when he found his brother Bernard poſted there with a ſtrong detachment from the royal camp! Hence it is plain, that Guſtavus with his handful of men deſpiſed all the efforts of Walſtein; and felt no pain but how to enable his combined armies to reach him with ſafety; blending and conſolidating them together in one point from the greateſt diſtances; overlooking the loſs of days and weeks, with reſpect to his own diſtreſſes, and expoſing himſelf to all ſorts of dangers, upon condition only, that he could once make them ſtrong enough to look Walſtein in the face, in caſe he marched from his lines to intercept their approach; which he knew to be both poſſible and

* It may be worth while to remark here once for all, that the poſt of velt-maréchal was beneath that of the lieutenant-general; which the French hiſtorians are ignorant of in their accounts of theſe wars: for they talk of a velt-maréchal as commander in chief; whereas it appears from hiſtory, that Francis Albert, duke of Saxe-Lauenberg, after the king's death, was appointed velt-maréchal of the Saxon army under lieutenant-general Arnheim.

practicable;

practicable:——provided the Imperial general had ſpirit enough to undertake the enterpriſe.

The Swediſh troops being thus ſurprizingly aſſembled together, advanced ſlowly and cautiouſly, for ſuch were their directions, to Hertzog-Aurach, which, as it was a walled town protected with a ſtrong caſtle, the king took, in ſpite of Walſtein, for their conveniency, a few days before. From this place they proceeded gently to Bruck, which lies ten miles to the north of Nurenberg, where the river Aurach falls into the Pegnitz: and on the weſtern ſide, the town and caſtle ſtanding to the eaſtward, which ſhews what an excellent defence the king's prudence ſecured for them, they fortified and encamped themſelves for three days. There Guſtavus made them a viſit, and led them triumphantly to his camp under Walſtein's noſe. They amounted to 26,000 hardy veterans, who deſired nothing more than to come to blows. His majeſty acknowledged their zeal and diligence, their affection and fidelity, with a tranſport of joy; and ſoon availing himſelf of their ſpirit and ardour, determined to bring this *gazing* and *ſtarving* conteſt to a ſhort concluſion.

Walſtein's countenance began to change at this junction; and as he had not ventured to attack the Swediſh reinforcements in their approach, people thence formed preſages favourable to the proteſtant cauſe. The king burnt with impatience to talk to the Imperial general in a higher ſtyle. When he had troops to act, it was never his humour to allow them to ſit with their arms folded; and he, whoſe eyes penetrated into, and whoſe ears were open to every thing, had chanced to maintain a correſpondence with a couple of futlers in the Imperial army; but one of them, happening to be detected in ſtealing Cronenberg's ſervice of plate, confeſſed the treaſon, and impeached his accomplice. They were both broken on the wheel the ſame day; and thus the king's correſpondence was entirely ruined.

The king having ſet apart a day of public thankſgiving for the arrival of his armies, and borrowed money of the Nurenbergers at ſix *per cent.* in order to advance a month's pay to his forces, balanced immediately in his own mind, whether he might not have recourſe to forcible means, inaſmuch as artifice had failed him, and his information been deſtroyed at the very ſource. At length he formed the heroical reſolution, to which an unlucky circumſtance afterwards contributed, of beſieging and attacking Walſtein in his own lines, determined either to enter his camp, or compel him to diſlodge.

lodge. *This* general, as well as the elector of Bavaria, aſtoniſhed at the ſight of ſuch extraordinary preparations, ſent expreſs upon expreſs to Pappenheim, beſeeching him to aſſiſt in reſcuing them from their dangerous ſituation: but that commander, who loved neither of them, and who made the ſacrifice of his plain-dealing to no man, affecting independency, and having his own particular ambition and humours, made them no return but ceremonious excuſes, and well-ſtudied delays; for he conſidered himſelf as the only antagoniſt worthy to oppoſe Guſtavus, in the character of generaliſſimo of the Imperial armies. The reaſon he was ſo ardently ſought for appears to be as follows. Walſtein, apprehenſive of ſtarving, had ſent Holk, into Miſnia, with ten thouſand men; ſo that he only exceeded the Swedes by fourteen thouſand, and ſuch troops as he could draft from outpoſts and neighbouring garriſons; which might make about half an equivalent for thoſe he had detached.

His majeſty, with little ceremony, thundered upon Walſtein from three vaſt batteries of cannon; and that general, who, by this time, had learned to copy Guſtavus in expecting great things from the force of artillery, erected batteries in all convenient places, and gave his officers charge, under pain of his higheſt diſpleaſure, which with him was but another phraſe for diſgrace, degradation, or death, never to be tranſported by any heat of paſſion, or any ſeeming fitneſs of opportunity, into an engagement, more than barely defenſive and repulſive. As this attack was undertaken, diſcontinued, and reſumed for ſeveral days, it ſo happened, that whenever the king's troops advanced too near, or expoſed their flanks, the Walſteiners treated them very roughly, but always contented themſelves with the firſt advantage, and never once gave a momentary opening, which Guſtavus watched for, and ſtrove to entice them too, whereby things might be drawn on to a general action; ſo implicitly was Walſtein obeyed. Indeed, never was a commander better calculated to break the ſpirit of that dangerous ſort of officers, who do great miſchief merely by poſſeſſing animal courage, without coolneſs and conduct. In one of theſe engagements Banier received a muſquet-ſhot in his arm, juſt above the elbow-joint, which remaining there, gave him inexpreſſible torment.

The king then diſmantling his batteries, employed two days in paſſing the greater part of his forces over the Rednitz, at a ſmall diſtance above the town of Furt; in croſſing which little river, William Harvey, only ſon of the earl of Briſtol,

Briſtol, was unfortunately drowned. He was a young man endowed with every amiable quality, and ſerved, that day, with the curioſity of a ſtranger, being then returning home from a tour of three years duration over France, Italy, and Germany.

In making this movement, the king propoſed to diſlodge Walſtein from a part of his encampment; for by ſeizing a certain eminence, he had then full power, which he wanted before, to bring three newly-erected batteries to perform their duty. The Imperial general foreſeeing the conſequence, retired to the old caſtle of Altenberg, which name implied an high ſituation, and there intrenched himſelf anew. The foreſt of Altenberg ſpread itſelf round him; the aſcent of the hill was ſteep and craggy. He immured himſelf behind a three-fold barrier of trees, each riſing in a ſemi-circle one above the other; and in ſhort poſſeſſed a lodgment hardly poſſible to be taken, provided the defendants acquitted themſelves like men of honour.

It is thought, that Aldringer, who was a perſon of ſharp and ready parts, induced the king, by an artifice, to aſſail a poſt, which upon cool examination, if the king had been left to himſelf, he would certainly have declined. For at nine o'clock, juſt after finiſhing morning prayers, which were longer than uſual, as the day was a feſtival *, a valet de chambre of Aldringer, who had himſelf been a valet de chambre, and riſing by his dexterity and courage knew how to chooſe an enterpriſing genius, was brought priſoner into the king's preſence. This adventurer, who threw himſelf purpoſely into the way of the Swedes, told his majeſty, with an air of confident firmneſs, that the Imperial commander was then actually decamping, in order to comply with the remonſtrances of his troops, who declared they were ready to die as ſoldiers ought, but did not chooſe to periſh by famine. The king from his eminence ſoon diſcovered the enemy in great motion, and ordering his men to advance, learned at length this fatal truth, that they were only haſtening to ſeize a poſt †, which, if Aldringer's ſervant had not miſled his judgment, he had ſurely taken poſſeſſion of before Walſtein could do ſo. Piqued therefore to ſee himſelf overreached by a ſuborned diſſembler, concerning whoſe future fate or puniſhment we know nothing, he ſaw the deſperate nature of the undertaking, yet reſolved to proceed; ſtung to the

* St. Bartholomew, Auguſt 24.

† An old fortreſs called, The Burgſtal.

heart

heart with the phlegm of Walſtein and the artifice of Aldringer. Thus when the paſſions are thoroughly diſturbed, there appear to be certain moments in war, where the parts of a finite being are hardly ſufficient; ſince ſomething of human infirmity will ever adhere to the moſt perfect man.

The king, forming his reſolution in an inſtant, and ordering the dragoons and part of his cavalry to diſmount, advanced ſword in hand at the head of the van-guard of the left wing*, having ordered each poſt to be relieved every two hours; but the main attack againſt the ruinous caſtle of Altenberg was ſupported wholly by commanded muſqueteers, all drafted from the ſeveral brigades, who left their colours below the mountain with their companions †. There was an arched projection on one ſide of the hill over-hung with trees; and in this hollow the king lodged his body of reſerve. Many other deſperate attacks were made, and one particularly on the poſts where Aldringer and Caraffa were lodged, and where Walſtein, Galas, and Aldringer ſtood during the courſe of the engagement. The firſt diſappointment ſeemed rather to ſharpen than blunt his majeſty's courage; for all the batteries being now mounted, he thundered upon the enemy continually, with more than two hundred pieces of cannon, to which Walſtein replied with unwearied diligence. The king, though ever fixed in one place, formed the diſpoſition of each attack, and diſpatched his orders accordingly; and the whole combined operation proceeded only upon one principle, which was, to poſſeſs the ſummit of the mountain; a taſk rendered difficult by nature, and more ſo by the intervention of art, and the obſtinate reſiſtance of the imperial troops; for Walſtein's army was a piece of machinery, which he forced to act almoſt as long as he pleaſed. On the contrary, Guſtavus's men loved and adored him on a principle of honour, and fought death out of free choice and pure magnanimity. Yet the height of the mountain was

* The curious may like to know, how the poſts of honour were diſtributed on this important day's ſervice. Duke William of Weimar was lieutenant-general; and his buſineſs was to take the command in caſe of accident: his brother Bernard conducted the cavalry, and general Strief, an old Manfelder, ſerved under him. Some ſubſtitute acted for Banier as commander of the infantry, and Torſtenſon directed the artillery. Hence it appears, that Oxenſtiern had riſen to no great employment as a ſoldier; nor had the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, both then preſent, any diſtinguiſhed command. Guſtavus never made compliments of rank or ſeniority in a battle.

† Theſe aſſailants were all ſubdivided into little bodies, conſiſting of 500 men; and an experienced colonel, for the king had ſometimes five in a brigade, a lieutenant-colonel, and other proper officers, were aſſigned to each body.

unattainable,

unattainable, though not a ſingle Swede behaved amiſs. The reader may form ſome idea of its ſtrength from the following circumſtance: word was brought Walſtein by an aid de camp, that *the king had mounted the hill.* He anſwered haſtily, with a mixture of profaneneſs and ſurprize, for he was extravagant in his language, beyond all imagination, *That he would not believe there was a Supreme Being in heaven, if that caſtle could poſſibly be taken from him**. Now, if a man reflects coolly on this monſtrous expreſſion, which nothing but the fidelity of an hiſtorian would have allowed me to repeat, I think it is pretty plain it aroſe more from being diſconcerted than from impiety. I mention it partly to ſhew, that Walſtein wanted preſence of mind upon great emergencies; and being firmly perſuaded, that the place was not to be conquered by human means, broke out into a profuſion of downright nonſenſe as well as profaneneſs.

Now began the ſharpeſt ſervice that had been ſeen during the courſe of the thirty years wars: ſo that the old officers, on either ſide, all agreed, that the battles of Prague and Leipſic were but a ſort of holiday reviews, when compared with the bloody ſervice of this day. The Swedes were expoſed and naked from head to foot. The Walſteiners, on the contrary, laid buried in their intrenchments, not to mention parapets of felled oaks diſpoſed in treble and fourfold rows, inſomuch that it was impoſſible for the Swediſh cavalry to act, or even ſuſtain their infantry. The conflict laſted ten hours without intermiſſion, which probably never happened in the ſame degree of violence, either before that time, or ſince; and the fire of the cannon and muſquetry was ſo fierce and unremitted, that the whole mountain appeared to be in a flame†, as if the king purpoſed to perform ſomething eminent in the way of artillery near Nurenberg, where, according to moſt accounts, the invention of cannon made its firſt appearance. Walſtein wanted no advantage that he could wiſh; and though ſix thouſand men filled the principal poſt, yet he had the power to replace them from his camp every half hour; and beſides, within the walls of the caſtle, he had opportunity to lodge one thouſand ſoldiers, who, out of the reach of cannon-ball, ſtood

* *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part. iii. p. 50.

† By the account of the military ſtore-keepers, the king fired that day almoſt 200,000 cannon-ſhots. *Chemnitz.* vol. i. 313. This ſeems a miſtake, for each piece of ordnance muſt have been diſcharged nearly 1000 times.

prepared

prepared to ruſh forth upon the leaſt emergency. Many Swediſh regiments returned ſix, ſeven, and eight times to the attack, for the king never left the front line, ſince it was a ſervice of ſo deſperate a nature, that a commander in chief was obliged to put himſelf upon a worſe footing than the meaneſt ſoldier that ſerved under him. In a word, it was thought, both parties engaged, we ſpeak of infantry and dragoons, almoſt to a man, ſome in one place and ſome in another; for the deſperate raſhneſs of the Swedes, and the obſtinacy of the Imperialiſts, were not to be paralleled.

Amongſt the ſeveral attempts upon Walſtein's camp, duke Bernard's attack appeared upon trial to be more practicable than that of the king; and when the report was communicated to his majeſty by an aid de camp, colonel Hepburn was diſpatched immediately to ſurvey the ground; and bringing word, that the account was juſt, the king flew thither and examined the ſituation himſelf. *Sir*, ſaid he to Hepburn, *you have made a true and faithful report; yet I muſt not aim at making my principal impreſſion here. It demands at leaſt my whole body of infantry, and then the artillery and cavalry are left naked to the mercy of the enemy, who may chuſe where to make his capital effort, or aſſault me, if he pleaſe, in two places at once.* This account has been delivered down by Hepburn himſelf, a perſon who at that juncture bore his maſter ſome *ill will*; and confutes a rumour, then current over the empire; namely, that Guſtavus might have carried his point, and diſlodged Walſtein, if he could have departed from his obſtinacy, and, following duke Bernard's advice, reſigned an ill choſen poſt in exchange for a ſecond, that was better ſituated. So far was this aſſertion from being true, that on the contrary, all the generals teſtified their approbation of the king's ſedateneſs of judgment, as well as quickneſs of deciſion.

Having mentioned ſomething relative to Hepburn, it may be worth obſerving here, that one or two ſharp expreſſions had paſſed between him and the king a few days before, upon which the former angrily and haughtily declared, that he would never more unſheath his ſword in the Swediſh quarrel *. Therefore, in the preſent action, he attended the king as a ſimple ſpectator. When duke Bernard's impor-

* Part of this account is taken from *P. Bougéant's Hiſtoire des guerres, &c. qui precedérent la paix de Weſtfalie*, and it is the only paſſage wherein I have derived the leaſt aſſiſtance from him: for though his work is a clear piece of proſe, well methodized, yet his materials are few and meagre, nor are his *three* original authors, whom he copies, judiciouſly choſen.

tant

tant information arrived, the king turned round and exclaimed with ſome eagerneſs, Where is any able officer to haſten away and ſurvey the ground*? But the confuſion and ſlaughter being ſo great, that none could be found, for each commander had full employment in his reſpective poſt, the brave Scottiſh warrior made a tender of his beſt ſervices; *Go*, ſaid the king, *I am much obliged to you.* Having returned to Guſtavus, and made his report, and accompanied him a ſecond time to the ſpot of ground in queſtion, he returned his ſword into the ſcabbard, ſaying, Now, Sire, I ſhall never draw it more in your behalf. His late maſter made no anſwer at that time, either becauſe his affairs were in ſuch a ſituation, that he had not a moment to ſpare; or more probably, becauſe he thought the uſage ſo harſh and abrupt, that he rather diſdained to make a ſuitable reply to it, and therefore conſidered ſilence as the anſwer which carried with it moſt expreſſion, and the greateſt degree of dignity.

His majeſty, as the afternoon began now to decline, perceived plainly that nothing could enſue that day but fruitleſs attempts and inevitable ſlaughter; and therefore leaving, for the honour of his troops, the muſqueteers, employed in attacking the hill, to maintain their ground, commanded the groſs of the army to form on the plain below. Before theſe orders could be completely executed, a large part of Walſtein's cuiraſſiers iſſued out of their lines, and fell with all the fury and inſolence of conquerors on a body of Swediſh infantry, conducted by Torſtenſon, who, with muſqueteers and pikemen, faced a four-fold number of aſſailants with incredible firmneſs; till at length, half overpowered by numbers, he ſaved the remains of his men, keeping ſtill next the enemy, at the expence of his liberty, which he ſoon regained in exchange againſt Spar. Meanwhile Cronenberg†, with his own regiment of 1500 horſe, ſurnamed the *Invincible*, flew like lightning upon Stalhauſe‡, who commanded 200 Finland cavalry; but the latter had the courage and fortune to repel the Imperialiſts, and purſued them, till the cannon of Altenberg caſtle ſtopped him from advancing farther.

* Others ſay, that colonel Erpach, being mortally wounded, Hepburn, at the king's requeſt, ſupplied his place, and maintained the poſt.

† It was Cronenberg who carried off Tilly at the battle of Leipſic.

‡ This colonel, a Finlander by birth, roſe purely on account of his merit, being originally a footman to Sir Patrick Ruthven. He was remarkable for ſpeaking excellent Engliſh.

And

*Night*, the moſt expeditious as well as moſt effectual of all truce-makers, introduced a breathing ſpace at leaſt, after a day's work of moſt deſperate ſervice. The honour of the action remained equally diſtributed between either party. The Imperialiſts kept their intrenchments, and the Swedes ſlept all night in plain ground, juſt in the front of the enemies lines; ſo that nothing ſaved the former, as they themſelves confeſſed, but the great advantage of ſituation. Thus ended the obſtinate conflict at Altenberg, which, in the ſenſe of ſome, was a ſort of victory, for Guſtavus miſſed his aim, and Walſtein maintained his ground: ſo that, according to the example of Marcellus, and the other Romans who repelled Hannibal to the gates of Nola, he and his generals all concluded that they had obtained ſome very ſignal advantage; and flattered themſelves with the expectation of future victories, having once beheld the day, when they had *ceaſed to be beaten* by a conqueror equally formidable with the great Carthaginian.

In addition to the misfortunes of the Swedes, there fell moſt violent rains, which laſted till morning, ſo that the king ſate till daybreak in his coach, and his domeſtics laid round a *nominal* fire, for it was hardly poſſible to make it burn.

Walſtein, who did not mount on horſeback till news was brought him that Guſtavus had ſtormed the caſtle of Altenberg, had his horſe killed under him by a muſquet-ball; and, by another ſhot, the king loſt part of the ſole of his boot, next the toe; and a domeſtic was killed at his elbow by a cannon-ball. Duke Bernard, that day, gave ſpecimens of conduct and courage, which no ways miſbecame the ſucceſſor of Guſtavus. He gained an eminence that was almoſt upon a level with the old caſtle, and by the king's orders erected a battery thereon; but, in the interim, the Imperialiſts retired to a ſecond diſtance, and having intrenched themſelves afreſh, clogged the new aſcent with the fall of ſo many trees, that it was impoſſible for the troops to get up without expoſing their whole body to inevitable deſtruction.

Though hiſtorians make the loſſes to be nearly equal on either ſide, that is to ſay, about one thouſand killed, and fifteen hundred wounded, in each army, yet ſure it is, that the Swedes muſt have ſuffered moſt conſiderably, as appears from the very nature of the deſcription. Among the latter, fell general Boetius, count Erpach; Crailſham, a Britiſh officer of repute *, and many others; and the Imperialiſts loſt Maria de Caraffa, a young nobleman of great hopes,

* *Invaſions of Germany*, Lond. 1638, 12°.

Chiefa, and Fugger, all colonels. The latter died, bravely, in the opinion of fome, though not in the character of a man of honour; for being examined by the Swedes, in his laft moments, and the king, if I miftake not, ftood by, he called for a bumper of wine, and faid, "Gentlemen, it is now no time to diffemble; my general, in his turn, will affault you;" and having thus drank, he expired immediately. As to what the Imperialifts fuffered, we know nothing that is very certain; but the lift of the wounded, on the Swedifh fide, was very great; for as many officers, higher and lower, were difabled for a feafon, as were thought fufficient to conduct 6000 men.

Next morning, his majefty, after having paffed a wet, cold, and tedious night, reflecting, all the time, with great compaffion on the fate of the *commanded* mufqueteers, who lay directly under Altenberg caftle; and afking his domeftics anxioufly, at break of day, if any officer of the field was near him, received for anfwer, that none but Hepburn was there, who, as we obferved before, came there only out of curiofity. Him the king requefted earneftly, notwithftanding Hepburn's *late* behaviour, to make a vifit to the poor foldiers above-mentioned, and remark likewife if any place could be difcovered, from whence the ordnance might be brought to act againft the old caftle. He then defired him to call, in his return, upon duke Bernard, and command his troops whilft the general came to receive freth inftructions. I think, all thefe circumftances, combined with others that have been mentioned, may ferve to fhew, that though the king was warm and hafty, yet, when the tranfport of his refentment was over, he fubfided always into the friendly and condefcending character; and afked favours, very often, on purpofe to give an opening to reconciliation. When Hepburn returned, he made report to his majefty, that the mufqueteers were almoft buried in dirt and water, but that he had difcovered a fpot of ground, whence, if the earth was raifed a little, four pieces of battering artillery might be brought to bear againft Altenberg fortrefs, at the diftance only of fifty paces: *I had rather*, faid the king with great emotion, *you had found me a place at ten times that diftance; I cannot bear the thoughts of feeing my men torn to pieces a fecond time* *. Therefore, having held a fhort confultation, to which duke Bernard had been lately fummoned, in his own coach, he gave orders for a general retreat; which was performed with fuch regularity and firmnefs, that Walftein

* *Monro*; Second Expedition.

durft

durſt not uncouple one ſingle band of Croatians to haraſs his rear. Indeed, part of the ſtreſs of the difficulty turned upon bringing off the *commanded* muſqueteers with reputation and ſafety, for they laid more advanced towards the enemy, than any other Swediſh troops: and his majeſty felt ſo much uneaſineſs in this particular, that though duke William of Weimar had undertaken to ſee the buſineſs performed, and had ſent Monro, then the firſt time acting as colonel, which made his general deſtin him to ſome diſtinguiſhing ſervice, to conduct the retreat, at the head of 500 picked muſqueteers; yet Guſtavus, ſtill impatient concerning the event, reſolved to ſee with his own eyes how that officer and his ſoldiers acquitted themſelves; and overtaking Monro, whom he obſerved to be wounded, having received, the day before, a muſquet-ſhot in his ſide, had the generoſity and humanity to bid him return to his tent, leſt his health might be endangered. Taking the partizan courteouſly out of his hand, the king performed the duty of a ſimple colonel himſelf, and brought his men back with ſuch compoſure and reſolution, that the enemy, far from preſſing on his heels, durſt not diſcharge a ſingle muſquet. It is true, many may think this office, humane and compaſſionate as it was in itſelf, beneath the dignity of a crowned head; but it was the king's *humour*, as Tilly ſaid on a leſs important occaſion concerning himſelf, and *that* muſt ſuffice for a general anſwer; for it was a maxim with his majeſty, and perhaps the only dangerous one which he ever adopted, *That no duty, compatible with the honour of a ſimple colonel, miſbecame the greateſt commander.**

Whoever ſhall conſider the whole of the tranſaction at Altenberg diſpaſſionately and ſenſibly, will perhaps admire Guſtavus more, in this inſtance of diſappointment, than in many of his ſhining and moſt proſperous victories. Miſled by falſe intelligence, and warped a little in his judgment by the warmth of his temper, and an impatient ſenſibility of diſgrace, it is certain he took the ſtep too *precipitately*; and thus much ſome of his generals modeſtly ſuggeſted: but then in what manner did he retrieve an error, ill conſequences of which in another commander had been unavoidable?—He ſeized his opportunities, and ſhifted and reſumed his hold, with ſuch acumen of judgment, inducing the army, by his own example, to act with a reſolution not to be paralleled; that though the chances againſt him were at

* *Character of Guſtavus Adolphus*, Lond. 4°. 1633.

leaſt as *three* to *one*, yet he brought the amount of loſs, on either ſide, to be nearly equal; formed his retreat, the next day, with ſuch boldneſs and gallantry, as gave his enemies the option of a ſecond battle; and then intrenched himſelf afreſh under their beards, where he remained unmoleſted, from the twenty-fifth of Auguſt till the eighth of September. —All *military* engagements, of *equivocal* ſucceſs, are beſt judged of by their *conſequences*; but this action was attended by no conſequences, either good, bad, or indifferent. It occaſioned no ſingle variation in the king's future motions; nor did it influence his intended decampment, which took place a fortnight afterwards.

The king, after this bold but unavailing attempt, changed his plan undiſmayed; and removing to ſome little diſtance from his laſt lines, ſketched out a new camp, ſtill nearer to Walſtein's than the former; for a cannon-ball could do execution, from one to the other, at its greateſt range. Matters being now reduced, for a time, to a ſtate of pauſe and quiet, the Engliſh ambaſſador made a farther attempt, without being furniſhed with a freſh degree of power, and of courſe received a repulſe more ſtrongly worded than the laſt had been. For this, we have his own authority againſt himſelf, his maſter, and the miniſtry*. "The king of Sweden *complained*," ſaid he, "that he had been *amuſed and led on with ſubtilty and fineſſe* by the ambaſſador, and ſaid publicly, *That this was a* RIGHT ENGLISH TREATY, for they uſed to be *eternally in treaty*, but *never concluded*."

What piqued the king, was the preſeverance and ſhuffling of the Engliſh court. He wanted an *offenſive* treaty of *definite* duration, but could not gain it; he requeſted a *naval* war againſt Spain, but could not procure it: and knowing Charles's mutable and timorous temper, reſolved to chain the Proteus, or elſe leave him at full liberty. He had conceived, likewiſe, a diſapprobation of Vane's errand, from the firſt moment he ſaw his inſtructions at Mentz, under the great ſeal of England; which inſtructions were never altered afterwards in any material circumſtance; and the tenor of them ran invariably, that the ambaſſador ſhould engage in no league, but ſuch as was purely of a *defenſive* nature. Whence it appears to demonſtration, that the reconqueſt and reſtitution of the Palatinates, points wherein the honour and religion of England ought deeply to have been concerned, were never thought of ſincerely, conſiſtently,

* Letter, dated Aug. . . . . 1632, MS. *Paper-Office*.

or

or in good earneſt. This both the elector and electreſs Palatine knew, and deſpiſed their profeſſing and proteſting brother accordingly. Sorry I am, that ſuch truths as theſe ſhould paſs from my pen, at ſo great a diſtance of time. I know the reverence that is due to the aſhes of a crowned perſon, and touch them with a cautious and unwilling hand: for, as a man of private virtue, and an encourager of the fine arts, I reſpect and venerate the memory of Charles I. and make ſome allowances for the untoward circumſtances of the period of time into which Providence was pleaſed to throw him.

To return to the negotiations before us, concerning which ſome farther information may be given by producing an extract from a third letter of Vane* to ſecretary Coke, which ſeems to me to precede the laſt cited in order of time; but the date of the day being either omitted in the original, or overlooked by the perſon who had the goodneſs to tranſmit the copy to me, I can only ſay, that they both came from Nurenberg, or the king's camp, in the ſame month, namely, Auguſt 1632. "Having been in treaty, in conformity to your laſt directions, with the king of Sweden, we not agreeing *de genere fœderis*, nor upon the *indefiniteneſs* of the time,——he preſſing a league defenſive, *(offenſive)* and *time certain*; I, going according to my inſtructions, from which your honour knoweth I am not to depart; on the nineteenth of the preſent, after four hours conſultation, with ſome of his council, on this affair, he ſent his ſecretary Camerarius † to me, with this declaration, that he had ſo long been in agitation between himſelf and me, that he gave his majeſty many thanks for the honour he had done him, in ſending his ambaſſador *to offer him* an alliance; and gave me thanks for the pains I had taken therein. The concluſion was, *That he would not accept of the auxiliary treaty, nor of the condition propoſed by me; and for the indefiniteneſs of the time, it was againſt all form of proceeding in alliances. That he ſhould write to his majeſty, to give him thanks for the continuance of his good offices towards him.*"

It appears, upon the whole, that Guſtavus, well knowing his Britannic majeſty's timidity, inſiſted upon a public declaration of a *naval war* againſt Spain; and being well ap-

* MS.

† A politician of great abilities, as appears from ſome letters I have ſeen. He had formerly ſerved the elector Palatine in England. I have been informed he wrote the famous *Apology*, publiſhed in Latin, 4°. 1624.

prized of Charles's irresolute temper, demanded a *time specified* for the duration of the alliance; paying little regard, either to British subsidies, or the transportation of British forces, having well digested in his mind, what had formerly been done, in that respect, for the elector Palatine; and more lately, with reference to himself. Therefore not being able to possess Charles wholly, he disdained to compound for the tythes of his friendship, the payment of which he foresaw to be precarious; and thus the matter ended, honourably to the penetration and magnanimity of Gustavus.

Walstein and he laid gazing at one another in a second state of inaction, if we except only rencounters, surprizes, and intercepting of convoys. Gustavus, for want of more important employment near Eubach, cut to pieces a regiment of Croatians, a set of warriors he mortally hated, being of somebody's opinion in that age, I forget now who the person was, that defined a Croatian *to be a sort of Christian, who did not acknowledge the eighth commandment*: and then remarking that Walstein derived all his provisions either from Bavaria, or the Upper Palatinate, which latter road lay through the town of Neumarck, placed Sperreüter on the Bavarian side, with 5000 men, near the pass of Wilsburg and Weissenburg; and lodged 3000 chosen horse on the Neumarck side, from whence an Imperial convoy was expected hourly, and missed little of seizing the generalissimo himself, who, being advertised of the Swedish designs, ventured in person to secure the arrival of his troops. A page belonging to him was taken prisoner, and reported that his master escaped by stealing through the labyrinths of a thick wood. Still I have some doubts concerning the fact; for Walstein rarely placed himself in the way of danger; which, whether it proceeded from prudence, or timidity, some extolling him for such practices, and some depreciating him, cannot well be ascertained.

During this interval a body of Croatians, which had placed themselves in ambuscade to intercept a party of Swedes, stumbled by mere chance on a party of gownsmen that belonged to the university of Altdorf, and made them all prisoners of war, without any respect to the *jus publicum*, or the *German Muses*. Thus the professors Agricola, Nesler, and Bruno, had the misfortune to lose all they possessed, except their learning. A detachment from the king's army made reprisals on the town and rich monastery of Castel, about thirteen miles to the east of Altdorf, where they found two Jesuits, one of whom, attempting to escape through a window, missed

miſſed his footing on the ladder, and broke his neck; but the other, being carefully ſecured, ſerved in exchange againſt the Literati.

The king grew impatient to ſee moments of importance waſted upon depredations and ſkirmiſhes, that determined nothing. He therefore, once for all, formed the reſolution of poſting Horn, now returned from the electorate of Mentz*, and Banier, † then recovered from his late wound, at the head of two ſmall armies, near the town of Lichtenau, a ſtrong fort in the burgraviate of Nurenberg, not far diſtant from Anſpach: thereby propoſing to make this

* Others ſay duke Bernard of Saxe Weimar; which, upon recollection, appears to be moſt probable.

† We will here, once for all, ſay ſomething of this excellent officer, who, when he was between a child and a youth, fell from a window four or five ſtories high, without groaning or ſhedding a tear. Guſtavus hearing of it pronounced him born for great events, and made him a ſoldier. He was deſcended from one of the beſt families in Sweden, and reſembled his maſter extremely in perſon, with which the king was not diſpleaſed. It was computed he had killed eighty thouſand men, in the ſeveral pitched battles where he had commanded, and taken ſix hundred colours. As a ſoldier, his retreat from Bohemia may be looked upon as a maſterpiece; for in this branch of ſcience, he excelled all officers before or ſince. As a politician, his reconcilement of the proteſtants, after the battle of Nurenberg and the peace of Prague, to the Swediſh intereſts, may be looked upon as an act of prudence and firmneſs worthy of Oxenſtiern himſelf. His letters to the maréchal Guebriant, and others, ſhew him to be very great and very determined. Nevertheleſs, there was ſomething of levity in his ſecond marriage. He buried his wife, who was a counteſs of Lovenſtein, whilſt he laboured under the chronical illneſs which occaſioned his death. No huſband appeared more inconſolable; but in his return from the funeral, chancing to meet the margravine of Dourlach on the road, he was ſo aſtoniſhed with her charms, that he made application to, and married her in a few days.

In his laſt teſtament, he bequeathed Torſtenſon, then in Sweden, to the army as his ſucceſſor; and requeſted his conſort, in the ſtrongeſt terms, never to allow his body to be unbowelled and embalmed, 1640-1.

He had received an excellent education, which made the king call him one of his *learned* generals. Before he fought and gained the battle of Witſtoc, 1635, he baniſhed every known coward from the Swediſh army, and gave the deſponding and timorous full permiſſion to quit the ſervice. *Continuat. Lower Auſtr.* fol. 41.

One ſlight circumſtance more ſhall be mentioned. His retreat, environed by the enemy and the Elbe, at Torgau, at a time when all Germany gave him over for loſt, and by which he preſerved a very fine army with little or no loſs, has ever been conſidered as a maſterly performance in the military art, and an *emblematical* print was publiſhed, whence came the well-known expreſſion of *cul de ſac.* [*Memorab. Suec. Gent.* 46.] The emblem took its riſe from Banier's own words on the occaſion: "The Imperialiſts," ſaid he, "incloſed me in a bag, and though they tied the mouth of it with great ſtrength and diligence, yet they forgot to darn up a trifling hole, which was at the bottom."

body of troops ſuperior in force to all flying parties; and alluring Walſtein, at the ſame time, to march out with his whole army in order to diſlodge them; when the king expected a fair opportunity to give him battle upon equal ground. As things thus ſtood, no military ſcheme ever appeared better concerted, for he left his adverſary but *three* choices, without any ſubterfuge or ſuccedaneum, namely, *fighting*, *ſtarving*, or *decamping*; ſince an army poſted at Lichtenau had the power of cutting off the channel of intercourſe with Bavaria and Suabia. An unforeſeen accident, however, deſtroyed all this ſublime plan in one moment, and gave his majeſty the keeneſt mortification.

Scheverlin, a patrician of Nurenberg, defended this fortreſs of Lichtenau, which the king, who always propoſed to make his uſe of it, though not for the purpoſes now related, took care to ſee well provided in every reſpect. The governor, till then, was a man of character, and had behaved reputably, when Walſtein's troops beſieged him ſome weeks before. Now, his fortreſs being inveſted a ſecond time, as Walſtein either knew the importance of the place, or gained ſome intelligence of the king's deſigns, he made a ſacrifice of his honour and good fame all at once, and entered into a capitulation without any one urgent neceſſity. Some ſuppoſe him to be corrupted, but that no where appears; it was an act of mere timidity, and deſpondency; for as the Swedes had faced the Imperialiſts ſo long without beating them, he became firmly perſuaded, that Walſtein would deſtroy Guſtavus; and ſuch indeed was the opinion of the public, from the beginning of their trial of ſkill to the concluſion. Thus the king underſtood the crime; and ordered the magiſtrates of Nurenberg to ſecure his perſon, and prepare his proceſs. However, as the man did not belong to him, and as his puniſhment became no example to his own troops, he deſpiſed all reſentment againſt a baſe ſpirit, and gave himſelf no concern, whether he was condemned, or acquitted. Thus was a plan of extraordinary conſequence deſtroyed by the miſbehaviour of a ſingle perſon, whom no one doubted; and what doubly ſharpened the king's affliction was, he had a further view in poſſeſſing Lichtenau. It was a ſtrong poſt, capable of ſecuring his decampment, concerning which he now began to think in good earneſt; and was equally neceſſary to him, in caſe Walſtein ſhould defeat him. He had now his whole ſyſtem to reform anew, and paſſed two or three days in meditation, walking to and fro, by himſelf, in his tent or the fields, as was his uſual cuſtom upon ſuch occaſions.

At length, conſidering the condition of his army, he determined not to puſh a punctilio of honour into an act of cruelty; and as Walſtein, who had no compaſſion, was reſolved to ſee which army ſhould *ſtarve* laſt, the king, for the ſake of his brave followers, took the *apparent diſgrace*, though indeed it was an example of ſolid glory, to diſlodge firſt, his grand ſcheme being now deſtroyed, with regard to Lichtenau. This ſhews us how inventive the parts of a great commander ought to be, and how abundant likewiſe in reſources; ſince otherwiſe the fruits of a whole campaign may be blaſted at once, by the miſconduct or baſeneſs of an officer to all appearance inconſiderable. Indeed it was high time for the one or other party to decamp, ſince *perſeverance* was nothing better than *deliberate murder*. The king, though warm and haſty, was naturally inclined to be compaſſionate; nor could he bear to ſee brave men periſh piecemeal like felons in a priſon. The ſeaſon of the Dog-days had been uncommonly hot; the waters of the Pegnitz were foul and corrupted; the ſtench of the dead horſes, there being hardly room to bury them, was inſupportably noiſome, and *petechial* or camp fevers of the purple kind, raged to a degree of peſtilence. Walſtein had more room, yet ſuffered more; for his numbers were greater, and his management leſs circumſpect.

His majeſty being now on the wing of departure, and the grand trial of ſkill ſuppoſed to be concluded, the marquis of Hamilton, who by this time had neither men nor command, took his final leave, at Neuſtadt upon the Aiſch, where he was diſmiſſed by the king with diſtinguiſhing marks of eſteem and affection *, and all the Britiſh officers had leave to attend him a half day's journey. The *inflexible* Hepburn took this opportunity of quitting the Swediſh enſigns, propoſing,

* Beſides what appears to us from Vane's papers, Chemnitz, the king's hiſtoriographer, who wrote upon excellent materials, gives us a ſhort but ſenſible account of all that paſſed, with reſpect to the Britiſh ambaſſador and Britiſh general. Venius primum cum campiductore Hornio Herbipolim, mox cum regni cancellario Moguntiæ, regis juſſu, inchoata re, ſed neutrubi conſummata, ad regem Monachium Bavariæ ſe contulerat, & conventum ſane illic de pleriſque: nec obſcura de *indeciſis*, (promiſſa utrinque moderatione) ſpes apparebat, concluſionem fœderis ea propter haud dilatum iri. Reſumpta igitur ad Noribergam tela. Sed a Britannico legato conditiones propoſitæ omnino novæ, & faciem rei mutantes: adjectis nonnullorum articulorum appendiculis; è quibus nil ſerio agi, nec fœderis quæri perfectionem rex ſuſpicabatur. Marchioni ergo Hamiltonio delectum habendorum in Magnam Britanniam, ut diximus, eunti, *latentes hujus proceſſus cauſas indagare, regem Magnæ Britanniæ, ſemotis arbitris, de eo edocere, aliorumve non proba conſilia illic turbare*, una in mandatis datum. *Tom.* i. p. 316.

as

as it is thought, to make a tender of his ſervices to France, but had the misfortune, in that kingdom, to be killed in a duel *. The king loved him, and confided in him more than in any colonel that acted under him; and ſome days before their diſagreement, appointed him commander of half the infantry in the camp of Nurenberg: but his *juſt* and *noble* ſpirit had not the power of making greater condeſcenſions than thoſe we have formerly repeated.

The Auſtrians made unwearied applications for aſſiſtance to the diet at Warſaw; but the Polanders had a king to chuſe; and perceiving, likewiſe, that affairs took a more ſerious turn in the empire, had not much inclination to embark in a ſyſtem of difficulties, which appeared to be of no ſhort duration. Beſides, *national conteſts* in Poland, like *rebellions* at Naples, are a ſort of political holiday; the inhabitants rejoice in them, as much as ever the Spaniards took delight in the *Juego des toros & cannas*; nay, the very ladies are all cabinet-counſellors and politicians; and the huſband frequently recites to the ſenate the lecture he has firſt received in his wife's dreſſing-room †. At this very juncture too, as well as at moſt others, each man thought of advancing his own intereſts, and gratifying his own reſentments, and beſtowed only a few empty wiſhes on the emperor and his cauſe: and as to a ſupply of forces, it was alledged, that all they could collect were hardly ſufficient to maintain the public peace at home, as they were upon the eve of a great event, the election of a ſovereign.

Paſſing by every circumſtance of this litigious cabal ‡, except ſuch as relate immediately to my preſent ſubject, it was debated in the diet, under the third head of enquiry, whether the treaty projected with Sweden, ſhould be confirmed and cloſed; and the nobility, almoſt to a man, were for the affirmative. Guſtavus, amongſt all the tumults of war, had a watchful eye to theſe tranſactions, not chuſing however to engage in them over-deeply, and diſpatched a gentleman, veſted with full powers, to make the Poles an offer of ſecuring their kingdom from the Moſcovites and Tartars, and to procure

* This officer had excellent parts, but was no great maſter of modern languages. As he often went from Guſtavus to Richelieu, the latter uſed to ſay, when he was in a cheerful humour, "I long to have ſome accounts from the king of Sweden, as alſo to ſee colonel Hepburn, and hear him talk about his *himeras*." From whence the writer of Richelieu's Life concludes, that he pronounced *chimeras* in that manner.

† *Memoirs communicated.*

‡ *Le Soldat Suédois* de Fr. Spanheim, 711—717.

a good

a good underſtanding betwixt the government of Poland and the neighbouring ſtates.

Fame reports Guſtavus to have inſinuated, that deputies on his part, for the future, had pretenſions to demand free entrance, and vote in this aſſembly, by virtue of the territories he held in Pruſſia and elſewhere, feudatory to the crown of Poland. But the ſenators were full as cautious as the king was enterpriſing: they made him proteſtations and excuſes in abundance; but referred the grand deciſion to the eventual circumſtances of things.

The elector of Brandenburg's requeſt was attended to with more alacrity; but the ſenators eluded the article of allowing him a deliberative vote in elections, alledging, that ſuch a conceſſion was inconſiſtent with their oaths, and the allegiance which they owed their country; yet beſought him to employ his beſt offices with Guſtavus, in order to bring about a more laſting and more effectual accommodation; beſeeching him likewiſe to name a place where the reſpective deputies ſhould meet, and, to ſhew their ſincerity, recommending ſome town in Pruſſia, or the neighbouring provinces, for that purpoſe.

Secretary Arnoldin and count Morſpurg took care of the Imperial affairs at this diet; but perceiving the Swediſh party to be overpowerful, they paſſed on to Moſcovy, by their maſter's orders, to conclude ſome ſort of treaty with the great duke. Meanwhile Guſtavus gave a final audience to the ambaſſadors of Ruſſia and Tartary, who made him an offer of breaking into Poland, Sileſia, or Hungary. The king received their propoſals with courteſy and thankfulneſs, but waved the acceptance of their ſervices; partly becauſe he found ſufficient already on his hands, and partly becauſe he deteſted a war that muſt be carried on with barbarian ferocity.

At or near this period, as far as may be conjectured, his majeſty received a deputation from the peaſants of Upper Auſtria, who had ſpirit, for the ſake of the evangelical religion, to form a revolt under the emperor's eye, and complain in unpoliſhed, but animated expreſſions, of the violations committed on their fortunes and conſciences *. Theſe uneaſineſſes had blazed forth in the very beginning of the thirty years wars, and though the fire ſeemed extinguiſhed to outward appearances, yet the embers were perceived to glow at bottom. Upon the preſent occaſion they acted with ſo much ſecrecy and judgment, that the court of Vienna

* *Soldat Suedois*, 723—730.

only

only ſuſpected, and not groundleſsly, that ſome clandeſtine intelligence had been carried on betwixt them and the Swedes. Oppreſſions, confiſcations, decimations, and tortures, ſeemed to harden theſe reſolute proteſtants. This civil contagion made its firſt appearance at or near Mühl*, and overſpread the Higher Auſtria with great rapidity. The emperor no ways liked a diſtemper that approached ſo near his vital parts: he found alſo, that his revenues diminiſhed, and the paſſage of the Danube was intercepted between him and Walſtein.

Theſe revolters, ſome ſay, made an army of 18,000 men, and being rendered wiſe by the experience of paſt errors, ſeized moſt of the frontier towns by way of ſecurity, in order to facilitate their retreat in the hour of need; and by making themſelves maſters of the river on either ſide, they allowed none to paſs or repaſs but friends and allies, and iſſued out their protections like commanders in form. It was greatly feared, leſt the infection ſhould ſpread through the other parts of the hereditary dominions, and as a proof of this, the court thought fit to proceed upon moderate terms. Count Kevenhüller, the great hiſtorian, if I miſtake not, was diſpatched to treat with them, attended by ſeveral barons, proteſtant as well as catholic, and his orders were to proceed with great temper and equanimity. Nevertheleſs, with a view to be prepared for all events, it was reſolved to raiſe a body of recruits, and Tieffenbach, now recalled from Sileſia, coaſted up the ſide of the Danube with ſome regular forces, expecting the iſſue of the negotiation. Colonel John de Wert, a warrior of the moſt ſingular character that is to be found in the ſeventeenth century, attended him with his irregular cavalry.

Kevenhüller diſcharged his commiſſion with the utmoſt exactneſs; but the *inſurgents* placed no confidence in rhetorical promiſes. They had advanced too far to look back on eventual reſources, and had no ſecurity but in the change of their maſters; and though they were plain country perſons, yet they had ſenſe enough to foreſee, that one cannon ball would tear to pieces all Imperial patents and letters of amneſty †. For theſe reaſons, they firſt pillaged the

* I ſuſpect, that my relator, F. Spanheim, miſleads me here: there is no town called Mühl, in Upper Auſtria; but the diſtrict of Mühl, is well known. If any place of that name be alluded to, it muſt be Mühldorf, a ſtrong caſtle near the Danube.

† *Soldat Suedois*, 727.

monaſtery

monaſtery of Lambach, and ſeized the paſſage of the river Traun; by which means they kept a correſpondence open with the proteſtants about Cremſmünſter, famous for its rich monaſtery of Benedictins, and were very near ſeizing two brothers of the grand duke of Tuſcany, who were making a tour to Walſtein's camp. On the approach of Tieffenbach and John de Wert, they broke off the negotiation in an inſtant, and perceiving they wanted both military directors, and a foreign protection, ſent deputies to Guſtavus, beſeeching him to remember, that he entered Germany in defence of the civil and religious liberties of the oppreſſed and perſecuted. The king received theſe *rural* ambaſſadors with great courteſy, making them handſome preſents, and giving them ample aſſurances of protection and aſſiſtance. He likewiſe, as it is aſſerted by many, ſent ſeveral officers to them, diſguiſed like peaſants, with orders to direct their warlike operations upon better principles.

During the interval of the inaction which preceded the two decampments, we will leave the two ſuperior commanders for a few minutes, and take a ſlight ſketch of the other parts of the empire, where the war was carried on with all imaginable keenneſs and obſtinacy. So great were the terrors conceived with reſpect to Guſtavus, that Strozzi, Piccolomini, Annibal, and Loüis Gonzaga, were all employed to protect the weſtern frontiers of Auſtria. The court of Vienna laboured alſo under ſome uneaſineſs on the eaſtern ſide; for Ragotzki, the ſucceſſor of Gabriel Bethlem, formed pretty much the ſame pretenſions, and expected the ſame gratifications from the emperor. He had actually requeſted permiſſion from the *Porte* to commence hoſtilities, and the Turks had ſent him, by way of approbation, a ſcymitar, a ſtandard, and a quantity of arms: but what gave greater umbrage to the Imperialiſts was, that Guſtavus had diſpatched the Sieur Straſburg with a private commiſſion to this prince of Tranſylvania, with orders to proceed to the Ottoman court, and carry on a ſecond intrigue there. David Salomon, Ragotzki's lieutenant-general, collected ſome troops, and his maſter demanded from the houſe of Auſtria to receive his inveſtiture in form. It was reported alſo, that the prince of Moldavia and the Pacha of Buda had orders to ſupport the Tranſylvanians; yet matters kept quiet in that quarter.

As to Saxony, Holk had entered Miſnia by the 30th of Auguſt, and committed outrages that can hardly be credited. It is true, he left his generaliſſimo near Nurenberg as long before

before as the 20th of July; but his inſtructions were to intercept, as he paſſed along, the army of duke William of Weimar, who then marched to the king's aſſiſtance: but in this attempt he did not ſucceed, being deficient either in abilities or good fortune. During this irruption the elector and Arnheim were making conqueſts elſewhere, otherwiſe Holk might have been repulſed with eaſe; for the Saxon army amounted to ſeven and twenty thouſand fine troops to all appearance, and Holk pretended to no more than half of that number. But Arnheim had a violent inclination to reduce Sileſia, contrary to Guſtavus's opinion, where Dewbatel conducted the Swedes, who were all freſh men, new raiſed, and colonel Burgſdorf* led the Brandenburgers in the abſence of their elector, who had made a journey into Pruſſia, in order to exert ſome influence in the diet then held at Warſaw. In this excurſion he had a great eſcape, for during his abode in the caſtle of Neuenhoven, his bedchamber began to ſink ſo ſuddenly, that he had but juſt time to ſeize the iron bars of the window, and ſupport himſelf there by main force till people came to his aſſiſtance.

As this expedition into Sileſia was of too extenſive as well as too graſping a nature, ſo ſome circumſtances conſpired to render it diſagreeable likewiſe; for Arnheim and Dewbatel† had two never-failing topics of contention, the one concern-

* This officer had been ſent to the camp of Nurenberg, that his maſter might know to what purpoſe Guſtavus deſtined the Brandenburg troops. The king oppoſed this junction with the Saxons in Sileſia to the utmoſt of his eloquence, though the thing was done before his advice could be put in practice, and beſought the electoral troops, as he foreſaw an invaſion from Walſtein's or Pappenheim's army, to continue in their quarters till he, or Oxenſtiern arrived. *But*, ſaid he, *if in the interim it is the fate of the elector of Saxony to be attacked at home, leave him not with his throat expoſed to the enemy's knife.* *Chemnitz.* tom. i. p. 316.

† As I have expreſſed, in a former note, ſome doubts concerning this officer's real name, for hiſtorians had then given him no leſs then five: ſo Chemnitz in his relation of this expedition, p. 319, helps to embarraſs me ſtill more, for he calls him *Mac Duwallius*, or, in plain Scotch, Mac Dougal. Yet this may be a miſtake, for Monro, who often mentions him, muſt have known him to be a countryman. This man roſe purely by merit, being five years before only a ſerjeant in the blue regiment. But the taking of Hanau advanced him in a month's time from the poſt of lieutenant-colonel to the colonelſhip over one regiment of cavalry, and another of infantry. He proved at laſt a fatal, though uncommon inſtance, that bravery and ingratitude may go together. To conclude this note, I find a colonel Mac Dougal landed with Guſtavus, but meet with him no where afterwards under that name, except on this occaſion. Yet as other hiſtorians aſſign the preſent tranſaction in Sileſia to Dewbatel, I acknowledge my difficulty to be inexplicable.

ing

ing ſuperiority of command, and the other about the diviſion of their conqueſts. The former, according to cuſtom, performed but little; for he always made war give place to his private politics, and changed of a ſudden from the ambitious to the moderate: but the latter gave good content to the king his maſter, and more eſpecially in the following inſtance.

The inhabitants of Great Glogau, though their duchy and town were reputed unalienable, had been obliged to take their oaths of fealty to Walſtein, newly created their maſter; but the Swedes ſoon freed them from theſe obligations, and general Goëtz, not being able to eſcape with his garriſon, found himſelf obliged to ſurrender on diſadvantageous terms.

Arnheim's preſence became now neceſſary in Saxony, which gave Dewbatel greater means of extending his conqueſts. As the Imperial army laid encamped under the walls of Steinau, he contrived to ſeize a fort, which commanded the bridge leading into the town, and ſeized a quantity of boats, laden to the amount of eighteen hundred pounds. He then cannonaded both town and trenches, and attacking the enemies lines ſword in hand, killed two thouſand men, forced four thouſand into the city, and purſued the reſt to a conſiderable diſtance. Prince Ulric of Denmark made this campaign with the Swedes and Saxons in the capacity of a volunteer.

Next day the Imperial commanders halted *, and having rallied their troops near Breſlau, intrenched themſelves, to the number of 20,000 men, in an advantageous poſt, protected by woods and marſhes, and approachable only by one entrance. There Dewbatel penetrated at the head of 6000 choſen infantry and dragoons, and forced them, after an obſtinate reſiſtance of two hours, to throw themſelves into a foreſt, through which they retreated. The Oder now parted the two armies, and by its depth and breadth ſaved the Imperial troops, who by this time had ſuffered exceedingly. Dewbatel made all poſſible efforts to repair the bridge, but as the enemy's ſafety depended upon counterworking him in this intention, he at length found himſelf compelled to deſiſt, and croſſing the river at a favourable fording place, under the direction of ſome fiſhermen, inveſted Lignitz †, whoſe duke,

* Don Baltazar di Marradas, Goëtz, Dhona and Illo.

† The dukes of Lignitz, in 1537, entered into a treaty of fraternity with Joachim II. elector of Brandenburg, which they ratified by oath: but the ſtates of Bohemia complained to Ferdinand I. that this compact aimed directly

duke, by a timely ſurrender, ſaved his capital and country from ruin, and declared himſelf a good Swede. Then turning ſhort, he ſummoned Breſlau, where the townſmen ſoon formed a mutiny in favour of the proteſtant armies, ſo that general Dhona, who had thrown himſelf into that city, eſcaped with great difficulty, to his own caſtle of Wartenberg.

Holk availed himſelf of the abſence of Arnheim, who trifled away much good time before he returned from Sileſia. There muſt always have been great unſteadineſs, and ſome duplicity in the conduct both of this general and his maſter, as has been pointed out in various places. It may be worth while to give my reader a faithful ſketch of the elector of Saxony. It is drawn up in ſuch a manner as to carry the marks of originality with it. "The duke of Saxony," ſays Feuquiéres, ambaſſador of France, in a letter to his own court, "is a warm and bigotted Lutheran, diſdainful, haughty, extravagant in drinking, hated and deſpiſed not only by his ſubjects, but by his own children, whom he treats as priſoners; a paſſionate admirer of pleaſure or inactivity; incapable of great affairs, dependant on the king of Denmark, a concealed enemy to the crown of Sweden, partly for its interference in Germany, and partly on account of its pretenſions to Magdeburg and Halberdſtadt; jealous of the houſe of Weimar, and extremely attached to the prerogatives and dignity of the empire. When *that* is concerned, all foreign powers are ſuſpected by him; and it is his private inclination, as well as opinion, that a true German may diſpenſe himſelf from tranſmitting any ſyſtematical intelligence to ſuch, as live not within the limits of the ſyſtem. His original prepoſſeſſion to the houſe

directly at the rights of the crown of Bohemia, to which the duchies of Lignitz, Brieg, and Wolau, ought to devolve upon the extinction of the families then poſſeſſing them. This emperor therefore declared, in 1546, that the confraternity of 1537 was null and void in ſuch wiſe, as if it had never exiſted; ſo that the dukes of Lignitz were obliged to retract it, and promiſe, that the three duchies ſhould fall to the kingdom of Bohemia in caſe their own family became extinct. The elector of Brandenburg entered his proteſt againſt the Imperial deciſion, and the duke of Lignitz dying without a capable ſucceſſor, in the year 1675, Frederic William, ſurnamed The Great, then elector of Brandenburg, preſented himſelf as heir; but the emperor took poſſeſſion of the territories, and George William could not obſtruct him.

The like happened not long after the death of Charles VI. in 1740. His preſent majeſty of Pruſſia revived his rights upon theſe duchies, and rendered himſelf maſter of them by force of arms.

houſe of Auſtria always ſubſiſts: nevertheleſs, it appears expedient to him to manage that family with dexterity upon principles of advantage; firſt, becauſe it is his opinion, that the proximity of ſituation renders him more neceſſary to the emperor than to any other prince; and ſecondly, as he is jealous beyond conception of the Palatine, Brandenburg and Weimar families. The pre-eminence of the *firſt* was inſupportable to him. The aggrandizement of the *ſecond* gave him umbrage; and the pretenſions of the *third*, from *which* the electorate had been forcibly wreſted, filled his mind with ſuſpicious apprehenſions. The general Arnheim, and one of his miniſters, govern him abſolutely; which he believes not, as he reſerves to himſelf the power of ſnarling and bluſtering wherever he pleaſes. The landgrave of Heſſe Darmſtadt, who married his daughter, and Francis Albert, duke of Saxe-Lauenberg*, ſtill preſerve great credit with him. At their inſtigation he always maintains a ſecret correſpondence with the emperor and Walſtein†."

Holk, from whoſe irruption into Saxony we have made a ſmall digreſſion, in order to give the finiſhing touches to the elector's character, poured firſt into Vogtland with all the impetuoſity of a raging torrent, imagining, like a true Barbarian, that a country could never be *thoroughly conquered*, till it was *utterly deſtroyed*‡. Having reduced many villages, as well as the fair town of Olſnitz, to aſhes, without aſſigning any reaſon, he took Zwicka‖ by *compoſition*, and blockaded Plauen. He then ſtripped the electoral palace, called Auguſta, of all its rich and magnificent furniture, and having reduced Chemnitz by a regular ſiege, puſhed on to the gates of Dreſden, where one circumſtance helped to rouſe the

* Suppoſed by ſome to have killed Guſtavus treacherouſly and diſhonourably in the battle of Lutzen; or rather to have conſpired againſt his life, by giving ſome ſecret ſignal to the Imperialiſts during the heat of the action. It is true that this circumſtance of maintaining intelligence with the emperor and Walſtein ſeems to be of an untoward and ſuſpicious nature, and appears to bear hard againſt him.

† If I miſtake not, there is a ſecond, juſt delineation of this prince in *Daniel Eremita's* beautiful book of Travels. Vide etiam *Conſiderat. Cauſarum Belli Boemici.* 4°, part ii. p. 98.

‡ *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part iii. p. 92.

‖ An elegant little town, called in Latin Cygnea, romantically ſituated at the foot of mount Schneeberg, or the ſnowy mountain, on the banks of the Mulda. It ſtands in Miſnia, but the church-yard lies in Vogtland; whence ariſes the common ſaying in the neighbourhood, that an inhabitant of Zwicka is a Miſnian in his life time, and a Vogtlander after his death.

elector a little: for in a random ſkirmiſh ſome papers were found on one of Holk's quarter-maſters, which ſhewed the Imperialiſts kept a fair countenance, and made liberal promiſes to the court of Dreſden, but concealed very malignant intentions beneath the diſguiſe.

Nor were the French idle at another extremity of the empire; for the maréchal d'Eſtrées and count la Suze beſieged Triers with an army of 24,000 men, and reduced to epiſcopal obedience the town and chapter, which ſome time before had admitted a Spaniſh garriſon, and colonel Iſenburg as governor, in behalf of the emperor. This commander not caring to immure himſelf in a place where no honour was to be gained, appointed eight hundred men to defend the town, and when the French approached it in good earneſt, made an attempt to ſupply his want of proviſions by means of a large convoy. The troops which conducted it, namely, twelve hundred infantry and three hundred horſe, had private orders to continue in Triers, and reinforce the garriſon.

The maréchal ſecretly informed of this project, gave inſtructions to count la Suze and Arpajou to intercept the enemy. Having forded the Moſelle, their advanced guard, which conſiſted only of twenty men, commanded by a lieutenant, ſoon came to blows with ſome ſquadrons of Imperial horſe, but four companies of infantry, one of which was cardinal Richelieu's, ſupported them immediately. Theſe ſkirmiſhings naturally drew on a general engagement, and at length Iſenburg was obliged to retire. In conſequence of this diſappointment, the town was taken forthwith, and the electorate cleared of Spaniſh garriſons. Many ſtrong places were conſigned to their lawful maſter, but the French kept ſome by way of *depoſita*, till proper inſtructions arrived from Paris, with reference to their diſpoſal.

At the ſame time Henry, prince of Orange, beſieged Maeſtricht with ſo much vigour, that the Infanta had great apprehenſions of loſing this maſter-key to ſeveral provinces, notwithſtanding ſhe repoſed the higheſt confidence in the bravery of the marquis de Leda, who, though deputy-governor, had then the ſupreme command. As the Spaniſh army had been ſenſibly weakened by the revolt of Berg and Egmond, the Infanta, by way of a laſt reſource, caſt a wiſtful eye towards Pappenheim, as one of the moſt valorous and enterpriſing generals then in Europe; and, to tempt him more, offered him great pecuniary recompences *, and the order of The

* About 16000l. ſterling.

Golden

Golden Fleece. As this *enterpriſe, march,* and *attack,* have been ſeldom paralleled in military hiſtory, I ſhall venture to ſpeak of them more circumſtantially and diffuſedly than has hitherto been done.

There is reaſon to think, that money and honour had no great weight with Pappenheim; but the nature, difficulty, and danger of the attempt delighted him. He fancied he ſaw a path opening to glory, by purſuing which he might at length advance himſelf beyond Tilly and Walſtein in point of reputation, and make pretenſions to rival even the great Guſtavus. Therefore, without heſitating a moment, he accepted the propoſal; he, who before had neglected the commands of Walſtein, turned a deaf ear to the requeſts of the elector of Bavaria, and had evaded the very orders he received from his maſter the emperor concerning his march to Nurenberg. Nor does it appear, that any previous application was made by the Infanta to the court of Vienna, ſince indeed there was hardly time or opportunity to effect it; but the great generals in thoſe days acted principally from their own diſcretion, and *that* made them perform ſuch wonders as they then performed; whereas, on the contrary, as ſomebody has ſaid aptly enough, *A prime miniſter, with a map in a cloſet, is almoſt more than a match for any commander's good fortune. There,* ſaid a ſtateſman to Turenne, laying his hand on a map, *you may croſs the river. Yes, Sir,* replied the general, *but your finger is not a bridge.*

Pappenheim was then near Hanover. He had a long and difficult march to make, partly through hoſtile, and partly through neutral and uncertain countries, all long ago devoured by war. He had the drought and heats of ſummer to ſtruggle againſt, and was obliged likewiſe to throw a paſſage for himſelf over the Weſer, the Rhine, and the Meuſe. Having therefore firſt taken care to place good garriſons in all thoſe towns that had been reduced to his devotion, and leaving Gronsfeld with a part of his army to preſerve the circles of Lower Saxony and Weſtphalia in their obedience, he began his journey when Bauditzen and Lunenberg, who acted againſt him, leaſt expected it; and forcing the Imperial towns of Dortmund and Eſſen, raiſed, from thence, ſufficient contributions to defray the expences of himſelf and his followers for ſome days. As to the convent near the latter town, whether he compelled the princeſs abbeſs and her fair votaries to ſubſcribe to his undertaking, or whether they contributed their contingent out of pure catholic zeal and gallantry to ſo brave a man, is to me uncertain. He then

croſſed the Rhine with great ſpirit, and though the ſtates of Holland both adviſed and threatened the elector of Cologn not to allow him a paſſage through his territories, a treaty of neutrality then ſubſiſting on his part*, yet that prince, ever ſecretly favouring the cauſe of his own religion, returned them only proteſtations inſtead of realities, and connived at Pappenheim's admiſſion into his capital at the head of 500 dragoons; reſigning, in ſecret to him, the forts of Stein and Himmelſtein, which gave him a paſſage croſs the Rhine. From Cologn the general of the league † drew refreſhments and ſubſiſtence for his whole army, which amounted to 12,000 foot and 3000 horſe; every man of whom was in high ſpirits, and poſſeſſed with the ſame enthuſiaſm that animated the maſter. The refugee biſhops of Mentz, Wurtzburg, and Oſnaburg, all flocked to him as their great deliverer, and loaded him with their benedictions. They had ſuch confidence in his conduct, that they concluded firſt on the preſervation of Maeſtricht, and next on their own reſtoration, as points certain and incontrovertible.

Pappenheim then, after a march, which, for rapidity, can hardly be paralleled, paſſed through the city of Aix-la-Chapelle, and coaſting along the Meuſe, made himſelf maſter of Sittart, where he threw a bridge over the river, and protected its head with a ſtrong fort. He then purpoſed to erect a ſecond fort between Maeſtricht and Liege, in order to give laws to one, that the prince of Orange had raiſed, and allow the Spaniſh army, having cut off ſuch proviſions as came to the Dutch camp, full power and opportunity to join him: which junction, by the way, the two generals of the Spaniards, Don Gonſalvo di Cordova, and the marquis de Santa Croce, never intended to realize. The enemy however rendered all theſe fine projects abortive, having ſecured to themſelves the ſpot of ground in queſtion, and diſpoſed troops in ſuch a manner, that the Imperial pioneers durſt not venture to break the ground.

It was death to the old Caſtilian pride, to ſee an hero called, as it were by magic art, from the depths of Germany, and advancing like an enthuſiaſt into the Low Countries, fully determined to fight the battles, and vindicate the glory of the Spaniſh nation. As he teſtified ſuch an appetite for dan-

* He had alſo paſſed his word of honour to Oxenſtiern, to continue truly neutral between the Swedes and Imperialiſts for two months. *Chemnitz.* Tom. i. p. 300.

† Pappenheim.

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ger, it was reſolved to give him a plentiful ſurfeit: and therefore, with a degree of inſolence not to be paralleled, theſe two ſolemn and punctilious grandees poſtponed their maſter's honour to their own perſonal gratification; declaring coldly, with an air of irony, "That their catholic maſter had expended only four hundred thouſand patagons to pave the foſſes of Maeſtricht with reiters and lanſquenets*."

Pappenheim ſaw the ſnare that was ſpread for him, when it was too late; nor had he ever conceived, that ſuch malice and envy could poſſeſs the hearts of men who made profeſſion of arms. He long knew the vigilance and bravery of the prince of Orange, but now perceived, with ſurprize, but not with diſmay, that the Spaniards were ſeriouſly reſolved to leave their deliverer and his army to periſh. No hiſtory affords a ſimilar example in all its circumſtances! But as he had entailed a debt of demand upon his glory, he ſtill determined, if poſſible, to force the enemies lines, and raiſe the ſiege. At leaſt he was reſolved to *do ſomething*, in order to ſhew there was no caſe, wherein he had not the *ability of performing* ſomething. Though this general was as wary as he was intrepid, yet in caſes of extreme dangers it was always his maxim to *proceed forward*. He firſt attempted to ſeize a bridge that belonged to the Hollanders; but that deſign miſcarrying, he placed his troops on the ſide of the Wyck near Stirum's quarters, determined to break through them ſword in hand, if the ſituation of ground, or the common fortune of chances, produced him any opening that could be thought advantageous. The prince of Orange ſoon comprehended the preciſe points on which he relied, and reinforced that part of his camp with a ſtrong body of dragoons, commanded by the duke of Boüillon. Pappenheim conſidered his firſt deſign again, and having well examined the enemies trenches, determined to attack them the day following, the 7th of Auguſt; making a ſhort oration to his officers and ſoldiers, the nature and drift of which every reader may comprehend, who knows the man. As he ſaw the affair would be obſtinate and bloody, beyond example, he thought it needleſs to attempt any thing by way of ſurprize, in order to gain a momentary advantage, which would determine nothing. Therefore, early in the morning, having battered the Hollanders with all his artillery, he drew up his army in full array, ordering the drums to beat and the trumpets to ſound, with the gallantry of a fair opponent. One

* Two old words for German cavalry and infantry.

hundred choſen ſoldiers, armed with ſwords, and carbines ſlung behind them, carrying in their hands faſcines and ladders, attended by ſeveral companies of pioneers, compoſed the forlorn hope; two regiments of veteran infantry formed the point. The reſt of the foot flanked, ſupported, and ſucceeded theſe two regiments. Two wings of horſe, ſlowly advancing, cloſed the ſides, and a third body encircled all the infantry behind, partly to ſuſtain, and partly to preſs them on, and prevent them from retreating. No general ever made a finer diſpoſition than Pappenheim did on that day; and it was remarked by all men, that no army ever advanced with more ſilence, and greater compoſure.

When the Imperial troops approached the trenches, the fire of the Dutch artillery and concealed muſquetry was ſuch, as moſt ſoldiers might pronounce to be inſupportable. Yet Pappenheim's two regiments, ſupported by the infantry, and protected by the cavalry, performed the ſervice they intended to execute; he himſelf fighting on foot within a pace or two of the foremoſt man, inſomuch that the defendants were obliged to abandon an important outwork to him. When the prince of Orange flew to this place, attended by all his volunteers, and the flower of this army, the diſpute re-commenced with redoubled obſtinacy, and as the Dutch cannon, charged with cartridges, at little more than the diſtance of muſquet-ſhot, were brought to bear on Pappenheim's flanks, it was impoſſible for him to continue where he was, without making a ſacrifice of all his army. Coolly therefore, all of a ſudden, he left the trenches, choked with dead bodies and ſtreaming with blood, and ordered his trumpets to ſound a retreat, which was effected with ſo much temper and conduct, that not a ſingle Hollander paſſed the lines to purſue him.

Returning to his encampment, which was about 500 yards from the enemies' works, he comforted and complimented all his ſoldiers, and having allowed them a ſhort repaſt for mere refreſhment, as it was now about eleven o'clock in the forenoon, he led forth his brave Walloons to a ſecond engagement; and to puſh matters yet farther, inaſmuch as he had ſufficiently experienced the bravery of his infantry, and ſaw plainly, that they neither wanted to be puſhed on, nor had any inclinations to quit the field, he commanded not only the dragoons, but all the cavalry, to ſerve on foot. This was more practicable in thoſe days, as the horſemen's boots were not ſo ſtubborn and unwieldy, as we find them ſince. Notwithſtanding *four* hours deſperate ſervice in the morning,

morning, the Imperial troops performed this ſubſequent duty to admiration: ſome with ſpades filled up the trenches, ſome threw in barrels of earth, gabions, and rolling *mantelets*; others aſcended by ſcaling ladders; ſo that, in a word, the conflict laſted from *one* in the afternoon till *ſeven* in the evening, without a moment's intermiſſion. This we pronounce the more extraordinary, as Pappenheim, with 15,000 men, aſſaulted an army which conſiſted of 24,000 ſoldiers, intrenched in the ſtrongeſt manner then known, and protected with artillery of the heavieſt ſize, and in ſuch quantities as can ſcarcely be enumerated. The prince of Orange oppoſed the general in perſon, and there the fury of the action is not to be deſcribed. Meanwhile the latter, fearing no troops could ſupport ſo deſperate a ſervice, ordered ſome gibbets to be erected, *in terrorem*, near his camp; and, to prevent his followers, in another ſenſe, from retiring, gave them an example rarely to be paralleled; for ſerving ſometimes on foot, and riding ſometimes from poſt to poſt, as the afternoon's attack was made in two places at once, he always, by preference, took care to plant himſelf, and that for ten entire hours, in the moſt dangerous ſituations. All this time, if poſterity can be induced to believe what follows*, the Spaniſh generals, at the head of 26,000 men, kept cloſe to their intrenchments, though within the range of a cannon-ball; never once detaching a ſingle ſoldier to his aſſiſtance, notwithſtanding perhaps a regiment or two only might have turned the fortunes of the day. Nor had they the complaiſance to order a drum to beat, or make a falſe attack, which hazarded nothing. It is true, the marquis de Leda had ſpirit enough to undertake a ſally, and, as in the heat of the action the garriſon marched out undiſcovered, ſome ſmall havock was cauſed in the Engliſh quarter; but the aſſailants were ſoon handled with ſo much roughneſs, that it was thought convenient to retire to the town. At length Pappenheim, after eight or ten deſperate attacks, not to mention the various charges, to which he led his men in the morning, found himſelf compelled to ſound a retreat, pitying the brave and faithful Germans, and pouring forth the ſharpeſt and moſt bitter invectives againſt the malevolent and inſolent Spaniards. In this afternoon's ſervice alone he left 2000 of his beſt ſoldiers dead on the ſpot. Many of his officers were

* Multi exiſtumabant dejici tum Hollandos obſidione ea potuiſſe, ſi idem animus Hiſpano duci fuiſſet. Qui ſuos intra caſtra quiete continens, ne quidem eo induci potuit, ut commotis tympanis, aut ſubitario ſaltem tumultu, agreſſionem ſimularet. *Bracci Hiſt. noſtr. temporum*, p. 286.

killed or maimed. Lintelo, his favourite lieutenant-colonel, fell amongſt the foremoſt; Comargo received a muſquet-ball in the ſhoulder, and Palant in the leg. A third ſtruck Pappenheim; and a ball from a *falconet* carried away the pommel of his ſaddle, and ruffled the ſkin of his belly: but this was nothing to a man who bore, at that time, on his face and body, the ſcars and gaſhes of more than ninety wounds; and hence acquired the ſurname of BALAFRE*. Nine hundred diſabled ſoldiers were ſent to the neighbouring hoſpitals, and more particularly to that of Aix la Chapelle. Prince Henry thought it unſafe to purſue him a ſingle ſtep; ſo that he returned unmoleſted into Weſtphalia, where, in an abſence of ſix weeks, he allowed the Swediſh generals to perform all that laid in their power; being, as was ſaid on him with great juſtice on the occaſion, *Omnibus par, ſingulis ſuperior.* Santa Croce, and Don Gonſalvo, two of the Spaniſh generals, hurt him leſs by their treachery and malice, than by the ſolemn ceremony of returning him their compliments of thanks, after the attempt was over: nor did they ſtop here, but declared publicly, with a mixture of gravity and irony, that the renowned Pappenheim was not a man of *puncto*, having paſſed his word to raiſe the ſiege or periſh in the undertaking, when in truth he had performed neither. Yet

* As this general's temperament was an equal mixture of the *prudent* and *courageous*, moſt hiſtorians imagine him to be a man advanced in years, and ſpeak of him in the ſtyle of an old, wary, and long-experienced commander. Much experienced he really was; for in the twenty-fourth year of his age he performed wonders at the battle of Prague. The many ſcars, likewiſe, and contuſions, which he carried in his perſon, confirmed writers more and more in their opinion;—though, in truth, at the period we are now ſpeaking, he was juſt advancing into his eight and thirtieth year, being of the ſame age with Guſtavus, whom he affected to reſemble in all things; in a ſimilitude of nativity and horoſcope; in the manner of adjuſting his hair; in riding a white palfrey, &c. &c. and, what was ſtill more difficult, in good morals and piety. He was very nobly deſcended; ſerved his firſt campaigns in the Valteline, and performed wonders at the ſiege of Chiavenna. The chamber wherein he expired is ſtill ſhewn at Leipſic with great reſpect; it is a ſmall apartment in the caſtle of Pleiſſenberg. It is reported of him, though moſt hiſtorians ſeem to me to take that for ſerious, which appears to others mere matter of pleaſantry, that he always maintained in converſation with his friends, that, conformably to a prediction found in the archives of his family, a certain Pappenheim *balafré*, mounted on a white ſteed, ſhould kill, hand to hand, in field of battle, a great monarch, who came out of the north. Had this been ſpoken in ſincere good-earneſt, the temper of Guſtavus was ſuch he would certainly have deſpiſed him, as a vain-glorious boaſter, and a credulous enthuſiaſt: whereas, on the contrary, he always ſhewed him acts of politeneſs, and honoured him extremely, not only for his perſonal intrepidity, but for his inventive genius in marches, attacks, and ſtratagems.

others,

others, equally ill intentioned towards him, acknowledged, that he had abundantly diſengaged both his honour and and promiſe, being anſwerable only for his own conduct and that of his troops, and not for the eventual termination of the enterpriſe. In a word, the *march*, the *action*, and the *retreat*, may be conſidered as the fineſt performances in the military art*.

By this time the elector of Cologn began to be terrified at his own imprudent violation of the late neutrality; and diſpatched a miniſter to the Hague, in order to explain his conduct with regard to Pappenheim, and protect his dominions from the reſentments of the Dutch; offering to recall ſome few regiments, then ſerving under the Spaniards. But the Hollanders, ſays an hiſtorian†, who knew well what they were about, had a *local* memory of the depredations committed in the late irruption, by means of his connivance, and returned him no anſwer that appeared ſufficient to compoſe his uneaſineſs.

During Pappenheim's abſence, the Swediſh generals, Bauditzen and Lunenberg, made conſiderable acquiſitions in the circles of Weſtphalia and Lower Saxony; for Gronsfeld had neither forces nor abilities ſufficient to oppoſe them. They firſt beſieged Duderſtadt ‡, a place of no ſmall importance to their late conqueſts, which Pappenheim had ſtrengthened with good baſtions, and committed to the care of 1200 infantry, and 400 dragoons; ſo that the ſucceſs, at firſt ſight, appeared to be doubtful on the Swediſh ſide; but the beſieged, who had loſt all ſpirit when their generaliſſimo was abſent, ſoon began to mutiny for want of pay, which compelled the governor to make an offer of capitulating; but it was his misfortune to procure no better terms, than ſuch as are uſually granted upon ſurrendering at diſcretion: for the duke, and Bauditzen, knew the condition of the garriſon by their ſpies. Abundance of artillery and military ſtores were found in the place; the Imperial troops enrolled themſelves into the Swediſh ſervice, and the fortifications were razed to the ground.

Bauditzen next made himſelf maſter of Eimbeck §; for colonel Holtz, the commander, ſoon ſurrendered, having loſt

* *Life of Henry Prince of Orange*, in Low Dutch, fol. cum fig. ex Officina C. Dankaërtz.

† *Frederic Spanheim.* ‡ It ſtands in the electorate of Mentz.

§ This town is the capital of the principality of Grubenhagen, in the Hanoverian dominions. It is famous for good beer, which gave Martin Luther great ſatisfaction at the diet of Wormes. There are hiſtorians who tell

loſt the flower of his garriſon in an unfortunate ſally. Taking this city deſtroyed the levy of ſix new regiments, which Pappenheim had ordered to be raiſed in his abſence; as moſt of the recruits, following the laws of arms, and fortune of the country, took pay from the Swedes. The garriſon of Wolfenbuttle ſtill maintained its ground, and breathed nothing but ravage and plunder through the diſtrict round it. Upon this, the duke of Lunenberg*, from particular as well as general motives, obliged himſelf to blockade it. The town was an inveterate thorn, ſtill growing among the Swediſh laurels, being the only remaining place in that duchy which obſtructed the proſperity of the king's arms. Though all poſſible means were employed to ſtraiten the garriſon, and though the courſe was diverted of the river Ocker, which paſſes through the city and ſupplies its mills, the governor ſtill made ſo reſolute and obſtinate a reſiſtance, that Pappenheim returned from Maeſtricht time enough to relieve him. Gronsfeld, Pappenheim's vicegerent, was very deſirous to throw troops into the town, but Bauditzen took him off from that deſign, by making a diverſion in Weſtphalia: where, advancing firſt into the dioceſe of Paderborn, he took Warburg by capitulation, formerly an Imperial and Hanſe-town, reduced Volkmarſen to aſhes, and inveſted the capital, at the head of 7000 foot, 4000 horſe, and 1000 dragoons; but colonel Weſtphali, who had conveyed himſelf into the city with 1500 men, made ſo many gallant ſallies, ambitious to acquit himſelf like a man of honour, and obtain the good opinion of the general he ſerved, that this attempt of the Swedes was rendered ineffectual; for Pap-

tell us, that Eric duke of Brunſwic, a bigoted catholic, and furious perſecutor of the proteſtants, owed his converſion, twenty years afterwards, to the lucky incident of having preſented a flaggon of this liquor to Luther, when he was heated in a long diſputation. Upon which the reformer is reported to ſay, that as duke Eric had remembered him on that day, God would alſo remember duke Eric in his laſt hours.

* The houſe of Brunſwic-Lunenberg was erected into a duchy in 1235. It afterwards ſpread itſelf into four branches, Zell, Brunſwic, Calemberg, and Grubenhagen.

The ſame diviſion of the country ſtill ſubſiſts; and hence it is, that this ducal houſe has four votes in the diet of the college of princes.

In 1682, the branch of the dukes of Hanover was raiſed to the electoral dignity, and enjoys, in this country, Zell, Calemberg, and Grubenhagen; and the firſt named branch poſſeſſes the principality of Wolfenbuttle.

The library of this place merits notice, being ſuppoſed to contain 116,000 printed volumes, and 2000 MSS. not to mention 100 other MSS. relating purely to public acts, negotiations, treaties, &c. one of the greateſt hiſtorical treaſures now in the world.

Pappenheim not only raiſed the ſiege, but puſhed on to Hildeſheim, which he maſtered, and then forced the Swediſh troops to croſs the Elbe. Nothing more happened in the parts adjacent, except that the peaſants made an inſurrection in the abbacy of Fulda, in oppoſition to the Heſſian officers, who commanded there: but the landgrave ſoon attacked, and conſtrained them to obedience.

During this period, the Imperial generals, Oſſa, Montecuculi, and William margrave of Baden-Baden, were not inactive in Alſatia, having an army of 20,000 men under their command, excluſive of three regiments, then conducted by colonel Metternich, which had been raiſed in the county of Mark, and duchy of Juliers, where Metternich was a man of quality and a native. Theſe troops having croſſed part of Lorrain, were juſt upon the point of arriving in Upper Alſatia, in order to aſſiſt the town of Coblentz; but that attempt not ſucceeding, they united themſelves to the army above mentioned.

The Auſtrian commanders ſent a trumpeter to the town of Straſburg, and demanded quarters and magazines for their troops in the ſignories that belonged unto it. This requeſt the magiſtrates peremptorily denied; but the Imperialiſts conſidered the meſſage and the refuſal as mere matters of form. They then made an irruption, by way of revenge, into the territories of the margrave of Baden-Dourlach, a prince they mortally hated, and extorted all the money that could poſſibly be ſqueezed from the poor inhabitants. Afterwards they took Bretten, or Bretheim, the birth place of Philip Melancthon, a town dependant on the Lower Palatinate, and having forced the garriſon to enliſt amongſt their troops, carried away nine of the principal inhabitants as hoſtages.

Theſe enterpriſes alarmed the adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg, eſpecially as the Imperial army began to direct its courſe towards his dominions. Amaſſing therefore a body of 8000 men, and overreaching Montecuculi by a feigned march, he paſſed by that general, and threw ſome troops into the large town of Knitlingin, as much renowned for the birth of Fauſtus the printer, as Bretten had been for that of Melancthon. The inhabitants being moſtly inclined to the Auſtrian party, Montecuculi conveyed a regiment in at one of the gates, cut 400 Wirtembergers to pieces, and ſet fire to the town at the four oppoſite corners. Metternich, then governor of Heidelberg, being kept in ſpirits by having a conſiderable army to ſupport him, made a draught from his own

own garriſon, as well as from thoſe of Frankendale and Oppenheim, and laid ſiege to Wiſloch, a little city in the Lower Palatinate, famous for the battle between Tilly and Mansfeld, in the year 1622. The inhabitants had been reinforced by ſeveral troops of dragoons, and one troop of horſe, and ſoon convinced him that they were not to be terrified at a ſlight ſiege. Piqued with this diſappointment, Metternich found means to fall on colonel Straſburger, near Heidelberg, and deſtroyed him and his ſmall eſcort. He then took care to ſee his body embalmed, and made a compliment of it, very politely, to the governor of Mentz, requeſting the perſons of ſeveral living officers by way of exchange for the dead; and remarking in his letter, that as ſpices were dear, and ſurgeons rare, he expected ſome acknowledgment in money beſides.

Horn, enraged at theſe proceedings, flew immediately to the ſupport of Alſatia, and the adjacent countries; and having made ſelect detachments from the garriſons of the Lower Palatinate, and the electorate of Mentz, joined the Rhingrave Otho Lewis; and coaſting along the Neccar, paſſed his cavalry over the Rhine at the laſt mentioned city, and his infantry at Wormes. Arrived at Manheim without oppoſition, he there encamped, partly to obſerve the countenance of the enemy, and partly to wait the arrival of the adminiſtrator with his little army; but being informed by a courier, that ſome of Montecuculi's troops had filed off to ſupport Metternich in the affair of Wiſloch, which was preſſed almoſt to the laſt extremity, he made ſuch extraordinary marches, an effort in thoſe days not uncommon, that in the firſt place he raiſed the ſiege, and in the ſecond place miſſed little of ſurprizing the beſiegers in their retreat to Heidelberg.

Some of Horn's partiſans, who patrolled the country, ſeized an inferior officer, eſcorted by ſix horſemen, who had been diſpatched from Metternich to Oſſa and Montecuculi, with inſtructions to ſolicit a reinforcement, in order to carry on the ſiege. It was this man's misfortune to fall into the hands of the Swedes on his return; when being ſeverely and cloſely examined, he confeſſed at length, that a body of the enemy's cavalry had received orders to ſuccour Metternich the next day. Horn thus learning their route, diſpoſed an ambuſcade accordingly; for the Imperial generals had only blind and perplexed reports, with reference to the approach of the Swediſh army. Of courſe the colonels Montbaillon and Vitzdum were employed on this buſineſs, with a choſen

detachment, and approached Wiſloch in great ſecurity, neither examining the country, nor ſuſpecting an attack. Horn once had a deſign to let them paſs till they had advanced between his cavalry and his infantry, for then their ruin had been inevitable; but perceiving they ſhaped their courſe, by chance, too much on one ſide, and fearing by thoſe means they might eſcape, he ordered the Rhingrave to fall on them in the rear, at the head of a few troops of horſe. Montbaillon faced about without diſmay, and being ſeconded by Haracour's cuiraſſiers, and the reſt of his cavalry, gave the Rhingrave a very rough reception; but Horn ordered other ſquadrons to advance, and charged the enemy on all ſides. Upon this, the Imperial commander, who ſaw the effects of an ill-grounded ſecurity, too late, provided for his ſafety by the moſt prudential method that then occurred to him, which was, in other words, a precipitate retreat: but the Swediſh dragoons purſuing briſkly, brought him from his horſe with a carbine-ball, and took him priſoner, as alſo the chevalier de Treilly, his lieutenant-colonel. In a word, one way or other, this body of troops was almoſt entirely ruined.

As many ſoldiers after a defeat are the moſt expeditious couriers in the world; ſo of courſe Montecuculi and Oſſa were ſoon informed of this diſaſter; and making an expeditious march to Oppenheim, paſſed the Rhine there, and poſted themſelves in a ſituation leſs expoſed than that they formerly occupied. The Swediſh general purſued them without ſucceſs; if we except the picking up a few ſick and wounded men, from whom he learnt that the enemy had formed a deſign on Spires, which report was confirmed by the number of boats he ſaw collected together. This determined him to aſcend the coaſt of the Rhine, and paſs into Alſatia, by way of repriſal; and the rather, as the town of Straſburg ſtood much in need of his aſſiſtance; for the enemy's forces had ravaged its little territory, more like an hoſt of Tartars than a body of well-diſciplined ſoldiers. During this interim, the Imperial generals aſſembled their troops near Hagenau, and drafted every garriſon that was capable to afford them a ſmall reinforcement; being reſolved to ſupport Schelſtadt, Colmar, Benfelden, and Briſac, and finiſh the conteſt with Horn by a general engagement.

Horn demanded a paſſage over Straſburg bridge*, a favour which was granted him, after a ſhort conſultation; and then, to ſhew his confidence in the inhabitants, and avoid creating ſuſpicions, he and the Rhingrave, for the generals in thoſe

* *Hiſt. or Authent. Relat.* in Low Dutch, fol. tom. ii. p. 91.

days

days gained money, and loved pomp, made their entrance in ſix coaches, drawn by ſix horſes each; but attended only by two troops of cavalry, one of which was Horn's own company of cuiraſſier-guards. The magiſtracy received them with all poſſible honour; and the rather, as his Swediſh majeſty always maintained a miniſter in the town by way of reſident. Next morning, Horn, at the head of the better part of his cavalry, paſſed the bridge, and being attended by one or two regiments of infantry, formed the blockade of Benfelden, whilſt the bulk of the army, reinforced by a body of Wirtembergers, laid ſiege to Stolhofen*, whoſe governor at length hung out a white flag of capitulation, and demanded a conference. Hoſtages being reciprocally exchanged, the Swediſh troops approached the gates, relying on the good faith of the agreement, when, on a ſudden, a general diſcharge of artillery and muſquetry made an inconceivable ſlaughter. Schevaliſki, a Bohemian colonel of great repute, and a favourite of the king, had his horſe ſhot under him; and ſeveral officers of conſequence were maimed and diſabled. Enraged at ſuch perfidy, the Swediſh commander recalled his hoſtages, and ſent the governor word, to do his worſt, and die ſword in hand; for quarter ſhould be neither given nor taken. The cries of the women and children on the walls, and their ſupplicating poſtures, ſoon melted the heart even of this inhabitant of the north; who, for the honour of the maſter he ſerved, ſent the commander word, he would receive him and the garriſon priſoners, but under *no* reſtrictions; which propoſal, all circumſtances duly conſidered, carried with it no appearance of harſhneſs; but on the contrary, ſoon found a ſubmiſſive and thankful compliance on the part of the Imperialiſts.

During theſe tranſactions, Montecuculi and Oſſa kept themſelves inactive under the walls of Philipſburg; in marching to which place they loſt a conſiderable part of their army, merely from the apprehenſions that they might be overtaken by Horn†; who, finding it impoſſible to tread on their heels, determined to ſecure the better parts on the eaſtern ſide of the Rhine, and then exert his utmoſt efforts towards the reduction of Alſatia; well foreſeeing, that if he could

* A ſtrong fortreſs in Suabia, protected by moraſſes. The French army diſmantled and razed it in the year 1689.

† Hoſtis majore adhuc celeritate uſus, dieſque & noctes, nulla intermiſſa quiete, iter continuans, *nec jactura ulla militum*, qui nimio labore fracti inter viam magno numero remanebant, *(deſerti potius*, quam deſertores ſignorum;) &c. &c. *Chem.* tom. i. 330.

render

render himſelf maſter either of Benfelden, Schelſtadt, or Colmar, he ſhould of courſe give laws to the river Ila, which runs through and commands the country. In order therefore to pave his ground with greater ſecurity, he reduced Upper Ehenheim to obedience, and the fortreſs of Ortenburg, before which place a ball paſſed through the body of one of his officers, and wounded Horn in the ſide. He then made himſelf maſter of Offenbourg; and thus, by one uninterrupted ſeries of valorous, prudent, and ſucceſsful actions, diſplayed all the abilities of a diſciple, who brought no diſgrace to the ſchool of Guſtavus; ſince at one and the ſame time he opened to his countrymen the rich valley of Kitzingen, and the county of Hanau; and found means to reſtore the Upper Margraviate of Baden-Dourlach to its ancient and lawful owner, after an excluſion of more than ten years duration.

There is a certain point, in all judicious and well-conducted campaigns, firſt in *intention*, as the ſchoolmen affect to ſpeak, and laſt in *execution*, namely, the giving the totality a proſperous caſt at the concluſion of the year; ſo Horn never once let his eye ſwerve from this primary and ultimate object of military operations, and determined, from the beginning to the end, to cloſe the ſcene of a year's campaign with the reduction of the town of Benfelden: which acquiſition, for good reaſons already aſſigned, transferred to his maſter the means of ſubduing Alſatia, and opened to him a new field of conqueſt on the weſtern banks of the Rhine; which was intended by Horn as a *collateral* check to France, and a *direct diminution* of the Auſtrian power at the ſame time. As to the former, hiſtory affords proofs abundant; and with reſpect to the latter, certain it is, that ſome days afterwards, Leopold*, archduke of Inſpruch, the emperor's brother, died of chagrin and a broken heart; for he could not bear to ſee his territories ruined, and moſt of his future expectations deſtroyed.

At length Horn inveſted Benfelden, a place of ſmall extent, and of courſe more eaſily defended. It was rendered ſtrong by art and nature; for the marſhes round it were next to impaſſable, and the fortifications had been newly erected, according to the beſt principles that were then known. It was ſurrounded by three deep foſſes, two of which were filled with water. The garriſon conſiſted of one thouſand men, and part of the artillery, of which there was great abundance on the walls, carried balls of forty-eight pounds weight. Oſſa,

* He was forty-ſix years old, and left Ferdinand Charles, his eldeſt ſon, for ſucceſſor.

and

and the margrave of Baden-Baden, then general of the Imperial forces on the Upper Rhine, made ſeveral attempts to raiſe the ſiege, which, as it was an enterpriſe attended with extraordinary difficulty, continued without intermiſſion from September till November. At length the courſe of the river Ila, which ſupplied the town ditches, being diverted, a fair and honourable capitulation was propoſed by the governor, and accepted with complacence on the part of the Swedes. Towns of leſs importance ſubmitted of courſe. Schelſtadt ſuſtained ſome ſharp attacks, and at length ſurrendered. So that the circles of Suabia and the Upper Rhine were cleared of their enemies; and *two parts* of Alſatia entirely reduced to obedience, in the ſpace of four months. Thus ſtood matters when the king fought the battle of Lutzen: ſo that, in a word, Horn's digreſſive campaign may be conſidered a *maſterpiece in the art of war*.

Having thus given a general idea of the ſtate of the king's ſeveral armies in various parts, we may remark, that two other bodies of troops, by no means inconſiderable, paſſed the campaign in a ſtyle of waging war then little known, and which Guſtavus did not greatly affect to practiſe, namely, in the character of *armies of obſervation*; for Ruthven, by merely ſhowing his forces, had maintained, in obedience, the whole diſtrict that laid round Ulm; and Wrangel, under whom Sir George Fleetwood ſerved with his Engliſh regiment, did little more in Pomerania than watch the countenance of the Polanders. In a word, the Swediſh troops prevailed every where, except in thoſe places where Pappenheim commanded. There, upon the whole, they rather loſt than gained, yet paſſed the whole ſummer without ſuffering one ſingle defeat.

As Walſtein continued reſerved and cautious, and had determined within himſelf not to run the riſk of a general engagement; his majeſty, for various reaſons, which have formerly been ſpecified, put in practice a reſolution he had long conceived, and that was, to *diſlodge firſt*. Thus making a ſacrifice of military vanity to ſolid good ſenſe, he had but one affliction remaining upon his mind, and that was, his deſertion of the faithful and affectionate town of Nurenberg; for Walſtein had given the public to underſtand, that his intention was to ſack this commercial and opulent city on the king's departure, partly to terrify the allies of Sweden, and partly to make the emperor amends for the great expences of the preſent campaign. Kniphauſen ſoon perceived this *ſtruggle of honour* in his maſter's breaſt, and told him

him frankly, that on the peril of ſuffering ignominiouſly on a ſcaffold, he would undertake to defend Nurenberg with 4000 men, againſt all the attempts of the Imperial forces. Guſtavus knew the man, and reliſhed the propoſal; and having convened the patricians in one body, explained the whole matter to them with great delicacy and preciſion: *Gentlemen*, ſaid he, *this officer has defended a village, protected only by a ſingle wall, againſt all the efforts of Tilly.* No ſooner were theſe words pronounced, than the Nurenbergers acquieſced with great complacency, and agreeing to maintain the Swediſh garriſon at their own expence, and unite with them their own troops commanded by Schlammerſdorf, who had formerly diſtinguiſhed himſelf in the Palatine ſervice, conſented that the king ſhould likewiſe leſſen a part of his firſt intrenchments, and demoliſh the reſt. All this could not content a perſon of ſuch punctual good faith and tender honour as Guſtavus was: he therefore firſt aſſured them, by a ſeries of the cleareſt arguments, that Walſtein would not undertake the ſiege of a town like Nurenberg on the approach of winter; declaring likewiſe, that if the Imperial general ſhould have the ſpirit and reſolution to beſiege them, he would march in perſon to their relief at all hazards; *and moreover*, added he, *I will leave Oxenſtiern with you, as a royal pledge of my ſincere intentions.* Here the chancellor hung up his votive armour, and never afterwards appeared in the field clad in iron. The king then celebrated the anniverſary of the battle of Leipſic, and diſlodged the next morning, September the eighth.

As he had a great paſſion for *military gallantry*, when *conſiſtent* with prudence, he abhorred the thoughts of decamping by ſtealth and artifice, but on the contrary drew up his whole army in fair array; and having lain under Walſtein's eye, for four continued hours, at length purſued his courſe compoſedly and ſlowly. The Imperial commander, far from diſturbing his paſſage, called in all his advanced guards and out ſentries, inſomuch that a ſingle ball was not diſcharged on either ſide. Next evening the Swediſh army reached Newſtadt on the Aiſch *, a ſmall town in the margraviate of Anſpach, about twenty miles to the north-weſt of Nurenberg. Here the king reſted his troops one entire day, and then turned fourteen miles ſouthwards to the city of Winſheim. Meanwhile he borrowed a large ſum from the merchants of Francfort, taking the liberty to pawn ſome

* There is another Newſtadt in the ſame circle of Franconia, ſtanding upon the river Stray, near Koënigſhofen.

demeſnes belonging to the Teutonic order, at and near the town of Mergentheim; and gave a freſh audience to the Moſcovite and Tartarian ambaſſadors*, who made propoſals, as it is conjectured, to ſecure to him the kingdom of Poland; whoſe inteſtine diviſions, occaſioned by the late death of Sigiſmond, ſeemed to give fair openings for no inconſiderable interpoſition. But our hero wanted no *ſuccedaneum* of employment, and advanced only juſt ſo far as gratitude allowed him.

Walſtein had great apprehenſions that Guſtavus would overreach him by a feigned march, and for theſe reaſons ventured not to *unearth*, as a German hiſtorian expreſſes it, till his ſpies brought him certain aſſurances that his majeſty had decamped in good earneſt. Though conjectures may be formed, it ſeems difficult to aſcertain what numbers of men this general loſt without fighting, eſpecially by dyſenteries and ſcarlet fevers; for the Auſtrian army then, and almoſt a century afterwards, had only a few medicaments, and here and there a ſurgeon of very moderate abilities; it being in thoſe days, and in part of ours, a ſort of maxim with the Imperialiſts, that it coſts more to *cure* a ſoldier, than *levy* a recruit. Nor was the ravage leſs deſtructive amongſt the cavalry, where, as a ſenſible author obſerves, conſiſted both their ſtrength and pride: for it is computed they loſt 14,000 horſes during the time they remained in camp.

Walſtein had no *real* intentions to beſiege Nurenberg, ſince he knew the king, when once at liberty to range the empire, might ſoon remount his cavalry, and compel him to diſlodge. For the ſame reaſons he judged it impoſſible to continue longer in his old lines, for his enemy, being maſter of the country round, had full power to reduce him by hunger. There was an inſurrection likewiſe in one of the Auſtrias; ſo that, having well weighed all circumſtances in his own breaſt, he decamped, as ſome ſay, with ſuch extraordinary caution, that he began his march at the cloſe of the evening; keeping the river Rednitz between him and the king, who lay to the weſtward, and leaving behind him, for want of draught-horſes, as moſt people imagined, innumerable quantities of ſtores and baggage, and a great number of ſick and wounded ſoldiers; whilſt the Croatians, in the courſe of their march, laid the farm-houſes and villages all in aſhes.

At Winſheim the king firſt ſuſpected that Walſtein and

* *Hiſt. or Auth. Relat.* Low Dutch, tom. ii. 162.

the

the elector of Bavaria propoſed, for both their armies ſtill continued to be united, to point their courſe to the banks of the Maine: and as he was particularly jealous of any attempt on his late conqueſts in Franconia, a part of the empire he had deſtined, in his own mind, to ſome particular uſes, into which I have not inſight enough to deſignate, a thought ſtruck him how to divide the fury of this combined ſtorm; and turning ſhort all of a ſudden, gave duke Bernard half his army *, wherewith to diſpute the paſſage of the Maine againſt Walſtein; and then purſued his old and well-known track into Bavaria. He concluded, ſafely enough, that the elector muſt haſten to the ſupport of his own capital and country; and ſagaciouſly foreſaw, that if the Imperial general ſhould paſs by the Weimarian troops without attacking them, and point his courſe towards Saxony, a circumſtance which merited his utmoſt attention, yet ſtill he reſerved to himſelf the power of placing his army between the Bavarian and Auſtrian forces. Neither was it probable to imagine, that the elector would preſume to cope ſingly with one, whom he and Walſtein, with their united abilities, had declined to fight. In caſe he had an inclination to engage the Imperial general hand to hand, it then was not difficult to recal duke Bernard out of Franconia into Miſnia, and command ſome detachments to join him from the ſeveral corps that acted under Bauditzen and Lunenberg in the circle of Lower Saxony, and under Banier and the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel in parts adjacent.

Theſe, and other conſiderations of a ſimilar nature, determined Guſtavus to march half his army into Bavaria, taking with him about ſeven regiments of cavalry, and as many of infantry; and placing himſelf, as he choſe to be preſent every where, and obſerve all things with his own eyes, at the head of three hundred of Steinboch's dragoons, in preference to

* At that time the king and duke de Weimar had about 24,000 men between them. Walſtein's corps might amount to 18,000, and it may be aſcertained, that the duke of Bavaria's conſiſted of 13,000; ſo that the combined armies loſt in nine weeks encampment, by ſickneſs, deſertion, hunger, and a little fighting, ſomething more than 15,000 ſoldiers, being 60,000 ſtrong when they firſt intrenched themſelves; and this, with allowance for a body of 8000 ſent with Holk into Miſnia, and 4000 diſpatched to his aſſiſtance under Galas, not including two regiments commanded into Auſtria to repreſs the inſurrection of the peaſants; ſuppoſing too, which is not very probable, that no reinforcements had been conveyed to the head-quarters of the Imperial and Bavarian armies:—That conceſſion granted, Walſtein's loſſes were ſtill greater.

his own guards; as being a body of troops leſs encumbered with weight than the common cavalry, for they wore no armour, and had lighter horſes. They could alſo diſmount on proper occaſions, and ſerve on foot.

It was partly by the over-perſuaſion of Oxenſtiern *, that Guſtavus undertook this expedition into Bavaria and Upper Auſtria; for the ſtateſman alledged, upon the preſent occaſion, that his Imperial majeſty valued one hereditary province more than all the other dominions in Germany. The king, afterwards, had reaſons to conſider this meaſure as neither a very prudent nor a very injudicious one, but rather of a mixed and uncertain nature; for Walſtein continued inflexible in the reſolution of not purſuing him, and afforded the elector of Bavaria, at parting, no further aſſiſtance, than permitting Aldringer to attend him with his own regiment, and that of Coloredo.

No ſooner had Guſtavus begun to march at the head of this diminutive army, but the chancellor recalled him by an expreſs from Nurenberg; informing him, that Galas had inveſted Lauf with a party of 2000 infantry and four pieces of cannon. It was a town of more conſequence than ſtrength; and of courſe the king flew to its aſſiſtance with 2000 horſe, and 1500 *commanded* muſqueteers; but on his approach to Nurenberg, the chancellor and Kniphauſen met him, and gave him information, that Galas had carried his point, and advanced towards Vogtland and Miſnia. Upon receiving this intelligence, the king juſt refreſhed his troops one hour in Nurenberg, and leaving freſh occaſional directions with Oxenſtiern and the commander, haſtened with all poſſible expedition to Anſpach, and thence to Dunkelſpiel, where, on the ſixth day after his abſence, he overtook his army in its march to Donawert. By next evening he advanced twenty miles, and reached Nordlingen, where Tilly had the year before eſtabliſhed his winter quarters. Here he was joined by 5000 Switzers, ſuch were the effects of the chevalier de Rache's embaſſy to the proteſtant cantons, which body of troops colonel Wormbrandt had ſafely conducted from the foot of the Alps to Schaffhauſen, and then along the banks of the Danube, in deſpite of Oſſa, who commanded thrice the number of Imperial forces in the circle of Suabia. The king was ſo excellent a geographer, that though he gave his commanders occaſional liberties, in caſe of unforeſeen events, yet in all marches of length

* *Puffendorf* de Rebus Suecicis, fol. p. 79.

and

and conſequence, he ſent them a route ſketched out on paper, aſſigning the journey of each day, and the place of ſtation every night or evening. Perhaps one inducement to Guſtavus for marching into Bavaria, which hitherto has been paſſed by without notice, was to preſerve, in caſe he could not by ſuch a ſtep ſeparate the elector from Walſtein, this valuable body of infantry from being intercepted by the Imperial armies; for Montecuculi, who then commanded the remnant of the electoral troops in Bavaria, with which two reinforcements were joined, partly Tuſcan and partly Imperial, might, with great eaſe, have united himſelf with Offa, and hindered Ruthven and the adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg from facilitating the advance of the Switzers. Guſtavus had an eye to all events, and gave the ſame proportionate attention to ſmall occurrences, as well as greater ones.

Montecuculi therefore, not daring to advance one ſingle ſtep beyond his new diſtrict *, thought proper to give his majeſty ſome trouble, famous as he was for paſſing rivers, in croſſing the Lech a ſecond time; and of courſe dexterouſly enough inveſted Rayn †; which gave the king no great uneaſineſs, for the town was excellently, though not ſufficiently fortified, ſince colonel Mitzval, who commanded, had neglected to caſt up ſome works, which his maſter had ordered when he left Bavaria. Mitzval had victuals, artillery, and ammunition in abundance, and likewiſe his own complete regiment of infantry, and five troops of horſe under his directions; ſo that the king ſuppoſed he might have repulſed the Imperialiſts till his arrival, even without expoſing himſelf to ſerious fighting. The apprehenſive panics, however, to which commanders are ſometimes liable, ſurpaſs all conjectures upon the ſubject. This unfortunate man had riſen to command by the force of a military character hitherto untainted, in caſe we make one ſingle exception; for he indulged immoderately in the pleaſures of the table. He had performed ſome actions of a ſhining and more diſtinguiſhed nature. He was an officer of long ſtanding, having ſerved in Poland, and commanded a regiment when the king landed in Germany; and now, all at once, to evince the fatal truth, that courage itſelf may be *periodical*, ſurrendered this important place, without alledging one circumſtance in his

* Hitherto he had commanded in Suabia, Alſatia, and the parts adjacent, with this exception, that he ſerved one half in 1630 and 1631, partly in Pomerania, and partly in Sileſia, &c.

† *Hiſtorical or Authentic Relation*, in Low Dutch, fol. tom. ii. p. 163.

defence, except that an enſign had threatened him with the mutiny of the garriſon; and that his officers in a council of war had agreed with him in opinion. Guſtavus replied coolly and juſtly: *A man of ſervice ſhould have puniſhed the enſign, and* that *Mitzval never attempted.* What ſtill rendered the caſe more exaſperating, was, the king had written this commander a letter, with his own hand, beſeeching him to have ſome regard to his reputation for a few days, inaſmuch as he was in full march to relieve him from the hands of the enemy. Great therefore was Guſtavus's aſtoniſhment, when, at the head of an army that breathed nothing but glory, he received the news of Mitzval's ignominious and mean-ſpirited capitulation: which afflicted him ſo much the more, as Rayn was the only convenient paſſage acroſs the Lech; and an Imperial garriſon lodged therein, might intercept all communication between his good allies, the great commercial towns of Augſburg and Nurenberg *. It was the characteriſtic of Guſtavus, whenever he was fruſtrated in *one* attempt, always to find out ſome *ſecond* expedient. He therefore bethought himſelf in an inſtant, that there was hard by a little bridge over the Lech, at the foot of a fortified caſtle called Obernſdorf, which belonged to the rich family of the Fuggers. Thither he flew with all imaginable expedition, and there found 150 men in garriſon, and 250 Croatians in full employment to deſtroy the bridge, which they took care to effect before the king arived; yet not ſoon enough to ſecure their retreat to Rayn: for Guſtavus purſued them in perſon at the head of Steinboch's dragoons, and having deſtroyed them all, returned and took the caſtle by ſtorm, obtaining ſeven enſigns in the conflict. He then ſet himſelf to repair the bridge, and paſſed the river without oppoſition. Whether it was that Montecuculi, bearing in memory Tilly's late misfortune, feared to diſpute the paſſage of the Lech a ſecond time, or whether he received orders to ſecure the cities of Ingoldſtadt and Ratiſbon, and form a junction with the elector, who was then marching into Bavaria, is more than I can take upon me to aſſert with any warrantable degree of confidence.

The king, ſheltered under the obſcurity of a miſty morning, approached Rayn before the governor knew he had croſſed the Lech, and projected his attack againſt *that* very place, which Mitzval had neglected to fortify. Panic terrors were now become hereditary to the governors of this unfortunate

* *Bertius* de Bellis Germanicis, 4°. p. 412.

city,

city, ſo that the Imperial commander, having taken the infection from his Swediſh predeceſſor, conſented to capitulate upon terms equally unſoldierlike and ignominious; for though eight days were allotted by Guſtavus for completing the ſiege, yet the governor ſurrendered in leſs ſpace than four and twenty hours. Nor could his majeſty yet digeſt the diſgrace which Mitzval's late conduct had thrown on the reputation of his arms, and of courſe conſented only, that the cavalry of the garriſon ſhould depart without horſes and accoutrements, and the infantry be deprived of their pikes and muſquets; yet, as he had an innate averſion to mortify men of ſervice overmuch, he allowed both parties to march out with their ſwords. Thence diverging to Landſberg on the Lech, he made the garriſon, conſiſting of 600 muſqueteers, all priſoners of war, not permitting them to retire, as he ſtill continued to be mortified with the diſreputation Mitzval had caſt on his troops, with any marks of military honour except peeled oſier wands, which he allowed them to bear in their hands *.

From Rayn the king advanced to Neuburg, in purſuit of Montecuculi, who retired towards Ratiſbon along the banks of the Danube. At Neuburg he ordered Mitzval to be beheaded in the preſence of all the army, and commanded the lieutenant-colonel, and eight captains belonging to his regiment, to ſtand upon the ſcaffold during the execution. This period of time † was unfortunate not only to Mitzval but to his brother, who was likewiſe a colonel: for the very day before the preſent Mitzval ſuffered, his brother had the misfortune to be beaten in the principality of Wolfenbuttle, where he loſt great part of his regiment, as well as his reputation and his liberty. During the whole of this ſharp ſervice in Germany, where battles were frequent, and rencounters happened almoſt every day, and where attacks and defences of towns may be ſuppoſed innumerable, only *two colonels* on the Swediſh ſide, namely Mitzval and Horneck, were condemned to an inglorious exit on a public ſcaffold. The latter was pardoned at the queen's interceſſion. Her majeſty likewiſe, from the natural tenderneſs of her ſex, pleaded ſtrongly in behalf of Mitzval, and preſſed inceſſantly for ſome commutation of puniſhment; but Guſtavus repreſented to her, that compaſſion in the preſent inſtance would entirely ruin the diſcipline of the ſervice. It was his intention likewiſe to have ſtruck off the lieutenant-colonel's and

* *Puffendorf* de Reb. Suec. p. 79.
† *Chemnitz.* tom. i. p. 335.

captains' heads; but the perſuaſive Eleonora procured their pardon.

It was now determined, in earneſt, to attempt Ingoldſtadt a ſecond time *, and for this purpoſe Guſtavus made all preparations becoming the moſt able and ready commander; for he tranſported down the Danube abundance of artillery from Augſburg and Donawert; ſome ſay to the amount of fifty pieces of the largeſt ſize, and by the ſame channel ſupplied his army with great quantities of proviſions and forage. To effect this enterpriſe ſtill more ſucceſsfully, it was his intention to viſit Augſburg in perſon; but an expreſs from Oxenſtiern, giving information that Walſtein had fallen into Vogtland and Miſnia, in order to deſtroy, at one blow, the elector of Saxony, a prince of very fluctuating diſpoſitions, and who did not greatly affect the Swediſh cauſe †, obliged the king to change his plan of operations againſt Bavaria: the rather, as John George, the elector, had beſought him, by two urgent letters, to march directly to his aſſiſtance ‡; and indeed there were reaſons to take care of ſuch an uncertain ally. Leaving therefore 12,000 men, of whom the new-raiſed Switzers made a part, under the command of Chriſtian prince Palatine of Birkenfeld to oppoſe the elector of Bavaria in that duchy, till ſuch time as Banier ſhould be recovered from the wound he lately received; and having taken excellent care of the towns of Augſburg, Rayn, and Donawert, he marched with the reſidue of his army to Nurenberg, intending to penetrate the vaſt Thuringian foreſt, and keep an eye of attention towards his Saxon friend.

In one word, the conduct of this elector began to grow more and more myſterious every hour; for not many weeks before, the king had offered him the aſſiſtance of ſome Swe-

* *Hiſt. Auth. Relat.* tom. i. 335. *Merian Theatr. Eur.* part. ii. 746.

† This prince verified to a tittle the prediction of Paul Grebner the aſtrologer, which was publiſhed many years before the period in queſtion. "Tempore illo (nempe poſt Bohemiæ tumultus & ſtrepitus bellicoſos magna cum defectione, &c.) *Cæſar Electoris Saxoniæ*, naſo Hiſpanica, fraudulenta, doloſa, blanda, inſidioſa imponit *conſpicilla*, & quorum naturam tandem ipſe pernoſcit, proprioque edocetur experimento, quod hæc Auſtriaca conſpicilla, poppyſmata, & phalerata verba, ſceleratæ & proditoriæ ſint practicês; quibus ſi ultra fidem habere duceret, ſeipſum, conjugem, natos & univerſos Chriſtianiſſime—confœderatos in pernicioſum præcipitaret exitium."

In a following paragraph he likewiſe adds theſe remarkable words; "Sueeus feliciſſimo ſucceſſu *claſſe*, & *ſuo populo* terra marique in hoſtem utetur." ["This book," ſays the author of the *New Star in the North*, Lond. 4°. 1632. "was preſented by Grebner to queen Elizabeth. The original copy whereof, written by Grebner himſelf, was placed by Dr. Nevil in the library of Trinity-college, Cambridge, whereof he was maſter."]

‡ *Chemnitz.* de Bello Sueco German, tom. i. fol. 335.

diſh

diſh regiments, which he excuſed himſelf accepting, under pretence of economy *. It appeared alſo, that Arnheim had made the expedition into Sileſia purely to embarraſs his electoral maſter: nor was Guſtavus conſulted in that undertaking. Thus Miſnia and Vogtland were left defenceleſs. Arnheim declared too, that he would not act under Banier, or in conjunction with him, but, on the contrary, would reſign his commiſſion. Beſides this, Arnheim, during the ſummer and autumnal campaign, had acquitted himſelf inſincerely towards the intereſts of Sweden. He behaved reſervedly and inſolently to Dubalt, who commanded the royal forces; making a thouſand delays, in poſſeſſing Breſlau, till he waſted an entire month, and gave the Imperialiſts leiſure to collect their army. He aſſigned the Swedes no quarters but the duchy of Lignitz, already exhauſted by war, and the *prefecture* of Drachenberg; inſomuch that Walſtein was heard to declare, that the Auſtrian cauſe was ſafe in Sileſia ſo long as Arnheim commanded there. He indeed received his maſter's orders, if they were real, to return into Miſnia, but put them into his pocket without regarding them †, and received a gratuity from the emperor, which ſurpaſſes all belief; for hiſtorians make it amount to £. 120,000. ſterling‡, as likewiſe the promiſe of being elevated to the dignity of a prince ‖, which made him overlook the kind intentions of Guſtavus, who propoſed only to create him a count. What exaſperated matters ſtill more, a letter from Arnheim to Spar, Walſtein's favourite negotiator, was ſhewn the king, concluding with theſe remarkable words: "My deareſt colonel, I beſeech you in God's name, to convey me no more letters like your laſt; for if you continue a practice of this nature, you will bring the perſon of an honeſt man, and his very life and reputation, into queſtion: moderate, therefore, your ſtyle, in ſuch a manner, that I may have the power to communicate what you write to my electoral maſter §."

Spar, who was a ſubject of Sweden, being over-heated one night with wine, offered the peruſal of this letter to the Bohemian colonel Hoffkirch; in conſequence whereof the count de Solmes either procured the original, or delivered

* See the whole tranſaction at large in *Chemnitius*, tom. i. p. 362—369, &c.

† Some ſay he diſobeyed him by dint of his influence, in a council of war. True it is, he went to Dreſden to excuſe himſelf, but took care to be attended by 2000 ſoldiers of his own ſelecting.

‡ *Chemnitius* de Bellis Sueco Germ. tom. i. 366.

‖ *Puffendorf* de Rebus Suecicis, fol. p. 80, &c.

§ *Lotichius*, tom. ii, fol. in annum 1632.

a copy

a copy to John George, who convened a cabinet-council, and ſummoned Arnheim to appear; but the accuſed had the gift of natural eloquence, ſufficient to confound a whole legion of jus-publiciſts; and thus the affair ended without conſequences. Meanwhile Dubalt, who partook more of the ſoldier than of the politician, was long blinded by this moſt artful man; but Guſtavus ſoon perceived his general to be deluded, and to avoid creating future jealouſies, diſpatched young Cochtitſchi, a Sileſian born, and a nobleman of great property, with full powers to rectify theſe great diſorders; ſending him in the quality of *legatus ad exercitum* to eaſe Dubalt from all except the military concerns.

Cochtitſchi, previouſly enlightened by his royal preceptor, ſaw, with a ſingle glance, through Arnheim's intentions, and gave him an inſight into his ideas concerning him, which indeed was needleſs, at the firſt conference. He then informed Guſtavus, that this commander would bear no equal in the confederate army, and that therefore it was neceſſary to cauſe him to be removed, or ſend as many Swedes as were able to preſcribe laws to him. Time, the grand expounder of all doubts, ſoon verified this excellent advice, which Guſtavus knew, but had not then the power to realize: for Arnheim afterwards took care to abſent himſelf from the battle of Lutzen, and when news arrived of Guſtavus's death, extorted Breſlau from the Swedes by main force, and told them all pretenſions expired at the death of their maſter. Then marching away from Dubalt, he left him to the mercy of the Imperial forces, who made him a priſoner*: but Walſtein pitied a brave man, ſo ſhamefully betrayed, and diſmiſſed him from his captivity without a ranſom, as likewiſe the old count Thurn, whoſe blood the court of Vienna longed to ſee ſpilt on a public ſcaffold.

Rendered cautious therefore by the inſincerity of Arnheim, and the irreſolute diſpoſition of John George his electoral maſter, Guſtavus judged it indiſpenſably neceſſary to confirm that fluctuating prince, by a perſonal appearance at the head of an army; and ſo much the rather, as he liked not Pappenheim's return, of which he now received undoubted aſſurances, from Maeſtricht. Fearing, moreover, that matters might take an unproſperous turn in the circle of Weſtphalia, and both the Saxonys; and preſaging likewiſe, that his conqueſts in Upper Germany could not be deemed truly tenable, if things proceeded unpropitiouſly in the Lower; he changed, all at once his reſolution of fixing Oxenſtiern in one of the

* *Puffendorff* de Reb. Suec.

Saxon

Saxon circles, and chose to establish him at Nurenberg, as his representative in the southern regions of the empire. It is the custom of *great* geniuses to *decide in a moment*, and *not unfortunately*. Of course Gustavus left Christian count Palatine to command in and round Bavaria, till Banier should be recovered from his late wound; and flew towards Misnia, as we shall relate hereafter.

We will now reflect, for a few moments, on the count de Pappenheim, who by this time, for we have before mentioned his extraordinary march to Maestricht, felt a strong desire to repass the Rhine, and regain his old quarters in Westphalia and Lower Saxony*. Many things conspired to prompt him to carry this idea into execution. He had no great confidence in his neighbours the Dutch; and though his troops were actually encamped in the territories of another state, yet he could not absolutely depend on their geographical fidelity; no, not though Reubens had published a plan of the siege of Maestricht, and an exact ichnography of the country round it. He had likewise no great opinion of the fortune, conduct, or honour of the Spanish generals, and doubted lest Bauditzen might be tempted to copy the very march he lately made, and, uniting himself with the Dutch troops, augment his dangers in a double proportion. Of course he rejected all the fresh offers which Isabella proposed him, and that for two reasons; partly because she had never verified her late promises, and partly because the Swedish generals had made great progress in the departments of Lower Saxony and Westphalia during his absence.

Decamping therefore in the night, and setting fire to his huts rather than tents, he shaped his course towards the Rhine, and gained the river Röer. Next day he approached Juliers, and, to his misfortune be it mentioned, found himself obliged to indulge his soldiers in all sorts of ravage and plunder; not from any principle of cruelty, or avaricious and mercenary disposition in his nature, for he was alike disinterested and brave, but merely because he had *no* money, either to subsist his soldiers, or discharge their arrears. He received many expresses on the road from Walstein and the duke of Bavaria, both then encamped near Nurenberg, which he repaid only with courtesies and excuses; alledging, that his troops were famished and harassed, whilst the Swedes, whom he had formerly coped with, remained fresh and vigorous: that the French army, in particular, obstructed his passage over the Moselle, and the emperor's affairs, in the

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 71, &c.

north-west

north-weſt of Germany, were all ſinking into ruin by reaſon of his abſence: nevertheleſs, if hereafter any great extremity ſhould preſent itſelf, he would engage to force his way through the circles of Saxony. The man's temper was known, and his delays and excuſes ſeen through, but there was no remedy; it being his determined reſolution to receive as few laws as poſſible from the generaliſſimo or the elector.

Diſpatching therefore count Merodé, before him, with a conſiderable detachment, he croſſed the Rhine, and entered Weſtphalia at Kayſerſwerd *; diſlodged Bauditzen from the ſiege of Paderborn; compelled him to croſs the Weſer, and advance towards Hoëchſt; in order to join the duke of Lunenberg, who at that moment inveſted the city of Wolfenbuttle. He then refreſhed his men ſome days in the neighbourhood of Eſſen, and afterwards devoured the dioceſe of Paderborn †, under pretence of protecting it from the Swedes; for in theſe days, the *protector* and *plunderer*, in the Imperial armies, often differed in name only. Pappenheim, in himſelf, was a man of order, generoſity, and humanity; but his ſoldiers at this time were inſatiable, and, as he had no money, and feared a mutiny, he durſt not chaſtiſe them.

As the nobleſt minds are always moſt inclinable to forgive neglects and injuries, Pappenheim ſoon forgot the *golden fleece*, and the *pecuniary remuneration*, both promiſed him by the infanta Iſabella, and ſtill continued ſincere and unſhaken in her cauſe, inaſmuch as it was connected with the ſervice and proſperity of his Imperial ſovereign. For theſe reaſons therefore, and partly from an ambition to convince the public that he could conduct the pen as well as the ſword, he privately compoſed a memorial, which he took care to convey to the prince of Orange; ſetting forth, that as Rheinberg ‡, and Orſoy, had been comittted to his protection as places belonging to the empire, he beſought him, "to diſtinguiſh between towns that wore the livery of Caſtile, and towns that owed homage to the Auſtrian eagle ‖;" proteſting, at the ſame time, that the Hollanders ſhould have no cauſe of complaint, with reſpect to the two places in queſtion, ſince

* Kayſerſwerd *Cæſaris Verda*, in the dioceſe of Cologn, a well known paſſage acroſs the Rhine. It was, in Pappenheim's days, protected by a fortreſs of conſequence, but the allies diſmantled and raſed the fortifications, during the *war of the ſucceſſion*.

† This biſhopric contains about eighty miles ſquare. The canons are obliged to have ſtudied at ſome univerſity in France or Italy.

‡ Then an important fortreſs on the Rhine, about ſixty miles from Cologn. It was demoliſhed by the allies in the war of the ſucceſſion.

‖ *Soldat Suedois*, 766, &c.

they

they ſhould continue diſintereſtedly neutral, in all preſent and future differences, between the United Provinces and the Infanta. But the Dutch, without the help of political glaſſes, ſoon ſaw through Pappenheim's artifice. Even the punctilious Spaniſh honour was not ſuppoſed conſcientious enough to deliver back its uſurpations on the empire out of pure gallantry, and without compulſion; and the *depoſitary*, or third perſon who held the ſtakes, was concluded to be a truſtee of ambiguous faith, and as little to be relied upon as the former occupier: ſo that it was natural to infer, that neither the governors nor the garriſons would be changed, and no ſecurity would remain, but the promiſe of a perſon who had not power to make good his promiſe. However, the prince returned an anſwer extremely polite and full of reſpect, to Pappenheim, profeſſing the great regard he had to any propoſals that came from him, and engaging to deliberate effectually on the ſubject, and not ſuperficially; obſerving indeed, by way of concluſion, that he expected information from effects, as well as words; and hoped, by way of preliminary, to ſee the two places purged of Spaniſh garriſons, the fortifications diſmantled, and no protection left but the town-walls.

The elector of Cologn had ſent a miniſter to the Hague, to explain and amplify his excuſes, with regard to the permiſſion or connivance of Pappenheim's march through his territories. The ſtates-general made no improper reply, by forming two demands; namely, that he would furniſh them with the ſame ſupplies and contributions that he had beſtowed before on the Imperial commander, and reimburſe the damages, that had been occaſioned by Pappenheim's irruption; but the prelate found this calculation amount too high, and petitioned and remonſtrated to no purpoſe.

Nor was the duke of Neuburg more ſucceſsful in demanding the reſtitution of Juliers from the Infanta on the approach of the Hollanders; though this requeſt was, in its own nature, highly juſtifiable; and the rather, as it was a maxim of the Spaniſh court, at that time, to make a preſent of thoſe places which it could not keep.

Now Pappenheim, having refreſhed and reinforced his army, advanced farther into Lower Saxony, fully determined to attack Bauditzen. The latter being inferior in point of numbers threw his troops into Hoëchſt; but before he could amaſs proviſions, and complete his outworks and fortifications, he found himſelf ſurrounded all of a ſudden; for the rapidity of the Imperial general's march had outſtripped the calculations of the Swediſh commander: and the former being greatly

greatly ſuperior in cavalry, ordered Gronsfelt to paſs the Weſer, whilſt himſelf and Merodé continued on the weſtern ſide. Bauditzen perceiving the courſe of the river to be diverted, the town-walls being thereby rendered uſeleſs, and not caring to be immured and ſtarved, formed a ſudden reſolution to retreat, though the town was actually inveſted, and the batteries fixed againſt it. He firſt, by concealed methods, diſpatched his cannon and baggage towards Munden, and forthwith all his army. Pappenheim, by the ſilence of the town artillery, ſoon perceived the enemy's deſign; and as he foreſaw what road it was their intereſt to purſue, expedited the flower of his cavalry at their heels: but the ſtealth of one hour's advance, other things being ſuppoſed equal, often decides the fortune of a retreat; for Bauditzen had given ſuch excellent orders, that nothing happened but a few ſlight ſkirmiſhes, till the body of his little army reached a poſt of ſafety. He obtained three colours and loſt two; ſo that upon the whole, the retreat had merit. This leaving the country open, compelled the duke of Lunenberg to raiſe the ſiege of Wolfenbuttle; and the rather, as Gronsfelt had the dexterity to throw a body of troops and ſome proviſions into the town. Nor was the duke's retreat ſo fortunate as that of his comrade; for he loſt two pieces of cannon, four colours, and ſeven hundred men: nevertheleſs, this loſs was fortunately ſupplied by a reinforcement of two regiments, under the command of the duke of Saxe Lauenberg. Lohauſen, who, I believe, commanded the Brunſwic troops, returned to the diſtrict of Wolfenbuttle with a few regiments, and repoſſeſſed his antient quarters, for reaſons to me intirely unknown. What ſucceſs could be expected from blockading a town, that had been revictualled ſome days before, and reinforced by a garriſon half equal to the number of the beſiegers; their deliverer at the ſame time within call, and almoſt within ſight? Lohauſen ſoon diſlodged, and gave Gronsfelt an opportunity to demand an exorbitant contribution from the town of Hanover; but the inhabitants wiſely employed that money to invite colonel Herden's regiment, and two companies of the duke of Brunſwick's men, to undertake their defence, which they effected ſucceſsfully.

The good people of Hildeſheim, who had ſcared themſelves out of their ſenſes with omens and preſages, not to mention rivers ſtreaming with blood, and armies embattled in the air, now ſaw Pappenheim approaching in all the terrors of real danger. The Swedes ſhewed them no compaſſion, having made late offers of placing them

beyond the reach of danger: but repentance for the rejection of this propoſal, and a ſlight breach in the town walls, immediately frightened the beſieged into a capitulation. Pappenheim thruſt 2000 men into the town, to preſerve, as he alledged, good order; obliging the inhabitants to maintain them; and exacted £.10,000. by way of contribution. Finding alſo interpoſitions of this ſort much more agreeable to his ſoldiers than the affair of Maeſtricht, he puſhed on to Mulhauſen, the largeſt town in Thuringia, except Erfurt; and as the place was of vaſt extent, and poorly fortified, he had only to appear and take poſſeſſion, demanding and receiving the ſame ſum which had been exacted at Hildeſheim: nor was it in the power of the Swediſh generals to ſtop this impetuous career of the Imperial commander. No reſource remained for them, but to ſpread one part of their ſeveral armies along the banks of the Elbe, and ſhelter the reſidue under the cannon of Magdeburg*; permitting their opponent to advance towards Miſnia, where Walſtein, on the king's approach, expected him with earneſtneſs.

Four weeks had now elapſed ſince Guſtavus and Walſtein had each purſued a ſeparate expedition; for whilſt the former made his irruption into Bavaria, the latter pointed his courſe into Franconia, and then towards the electorate of Saxony; which was ſomething more extraordinary, as their marches were almoſt as diametrically oppoſite as the ſouthern regions are to the northern.

It has already been mentioned in what manner Walſtein and the elector of Bavaria diſlodged from Nurenberg. Being arrived at Forcheim in the biſhopric of Bamberg, whence Walſtein detached two regiments into Upper Auſtria, in order to extinguiſh the laſt remains of rebellion, they repoſed their troops for a fortnight in good quarters, and there firſt received intelligence, that Guſtavus had diſpatched duke Bernard to obſerve their motions with half the army, and conducted the other moiety into the dukedom of Bavaria. This news ſtartled the elector not a little, inſomuch that he beſought the Imperial general to join his forces, and puſh this enterpriſing monarch to the very foot of the Alps; nor was the court of Vienna much diſſatisfied with a requeſt of this nature, as the peaſants of Upper Auſtria had preſumed to revolt under the very eye of the emperor.

Yet no remonſtrances nor repreſentations could make the leaſt impreſſion on Walſtein's inflexibility. True it is, he paid the elector the external honour of attending him twenty-

* *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 341.

ſix

fix miles in his return homewards, and at Bamberg they parted with all the exquiſite politeneſs of veteran diſſemblers. Walſtein appeared the leaſt ſupple of the two, and preſerved more coldneſs and reſerve than the old Bavarian; who, at, and after this ſeparation, threw out indirect hints, that ſome ſecret underſtanding was carried on, by the means of Dewbatel, between Walſtein and Guſtavus *, which ſeems to me to be nothing more than an angry miſapprehenſion. Be that as it may, he with more juſtice complained that he ſerved in conjunction with a commander, who gave him no lights into any thing; and that he had expended, likewiſe, more than £.150,000. ſterling, to very little advantage, ſince the day he firſt united his forces with the Imperial army †.

Walſtein's firſt idea ſeems to have been the reduction of Franconia; and to this end he turned his attention, as the king conjectured, on the important town of Sweinfurt, ſituated upon the northern banks of the Mayne, about twenty-five miles to the weſt of Bamberg. Charles Harte, the Swediſh governor, took care to reinforce himſelf from the garriſon of Koënigſhofen; and at that very inſtant, the vigilant Dewbatel, by duke Bernard's orders, threw himſelf into the town, at the head of his own regiment, which conſiſted of thirteen troops of dragoons. Meanwhile duke Bernard approached with his whole army to ſuccour the beſieged; and of courſe Walſtein either entirely changed his original plan, or varied it occaſionally into a ſecond form, being determined at once to deſtroy the two electoral houſes of Saxony and Brandenburg.

Therefore, to gratify his malice againſt the family laſt mentioned, he diſcharged his reſentments on the margrave of Bareüth, who was likewiſe margrave of Culmbach, and uncle to the then young marquis of Anſpach. The capital of Bareüth was ſoon laid under a ſevere contribution; but that of Culmbach, being better fortified, made a laudable reſiſtance; ſo that the Imperial general advanced to Coburg, whoſe duke was related to the Erneſtine branch of the houſe of Saxony, and uncle to the dukes of Saxe Weimar, which latter had furniſhed *ſeven* brothers, who all bore arms againſt the houſe of Auſtria. The town of Coburg ſoon became a ſacrifice to Walſtein's indignation, for the duke had appeared in armour in behalf of the Swedes, as likewiſe the rich palace and treaſury; and great quantities of merchandize, from

* *Riccius* de Bellis Germanicis, 4o. 411.

† *Idem* ibid.

Augſburg

Augſburg and Nurenberg, which were then on the road to Leipſic fair. The caſtle*, which ſtands on an advantageous eminence, was not to be reduced on ſuch eaſy terms; for Dewbatel had thrown himſelf into it, at the head of his well-known regiment of dragoons. Walſtein wiſhed impatiently to make this gallant officer his priſoner a ſecond time, and Dewbatel laboured as much to avoid the repetition of ſo ſenſible a mortification. It may ſuffice to ſay, that a breach was made by the third of October; but Dewbatel had gallantry enough, at the time the walls were actually ſtormed in the defenceleſs part, and the ſervice became as obſtinate as moſt that had appeared during the courſe of the thirty years wars, to take the aſſailants in flank, at the head of his dragoons, which threw the 500 Imperialiſts, who formed the point, into total confuſion. Walſtein's colonel, who led the attack, was killed in the foſſe; as likewiſe a young nobleman of Walſtein's name and kindred. Duke Bernard had advanced from Schweinfurt to Hilperhauſen, fifteen miles to the north of Coburg, having defeated forty troops of Iſolani's† Croatians, and ſeized ten colours and a part of their baggage‡, with full intentions to raiſe the ſiege; partly from his unwearied zeal for his maſter's ſervice, and partly, as ſome conjecture, with a collateral view to his own well-being and proſperity; inaſmuch as the dukedom devolved to him on the deceaſe of his uncles, of which the then reigning duke was one, who were both aged, and had no children. However, the glorious efforts of Dewbatel and Bernard freed their maſter from abundance of uneaſineſs; for one part of Walſtein's plan was totally defeated, his intention being to have rendered himſelf conqueror of this caſtle, whereby he would have ſecured the roads in one of the moſt wild and rocky parts of Germany; and then have penetrated through the

* Here Martin Luther lodged ſome months, in 1530, and the chamber is ſtill ſhewn. No one can enter this fortreſs without expreſs permiſſion from the prince. In it is a vault ſo extremely ſecret, that all things of value are ſafely concealed there in times of war: and in the caſtle are preſerved abundance of documents, &c. in MSS. relating to *the Hiſtory of the Reformation, which merit to be examined by the beſt church hiſtorians. Mem. communicated.*

† Iſolani, created a count by the emperor: his Chriſtian name was *Lodovica*; and as the French hiſtorians talk much of one Lodovico, general of the Croatians at this period, it is worth noting, that Iſolani and Lodovico are the ſame man. But the Croatians and Carniolians, in reſemblance of the Italians, whoſe language and forms of expreſſion they are fond to imitate, uſually deſignate a perſon by the *Chriſtian name*. This ſurpriſing hero was remarkable for being beardleſs. He died at Vienna, 1640-1.

‡ *Riccius* de Bellis Germ. p. 411.

bleak and inhoſpitable Thuringian foreſt, and formed his junction with Pappenheim. Dewbatel deſtroyed one branch of this ſcheme, and the poſition of the duke's army diſappointed the other. Of ſuch amazing conſequence in a campaign is the vigilance of an officer or two, who have parts to comprehend their duty, and ſpirit enough to carry their projects into execution! Walſtein's ſcheme was enterprifing and extenſive, like all his other conceptions: for had he gained the caſtle of Coburg, and croſſed the Duringerwalt without moleſtation; he had then, beſides the junction of his troops with Pappenheim, a point he ardently wiſhed for, deſtroyed the rich territories of a family which he mortally hated, namely, the once electoral houſe of Saxe-Weimar. Then purpoſing to have wintered in Miſnia, his intentions were to have ſecured the banks of the Elbe, which would greatly have impeded the king's retreat; to have devoured all the wealth and proviſions in the two electorates of Saxony and Brandenburg, which had enjoyed a long repoſe from the late devaſtations of war; and thus, at the firſt opening of ſpring, having totally humbled theſe two powers; to have ſpread half his army over the adjacent parts of Luſatia and Sileſia; and reconquer, with the other half, his own duchy of Mechlenburg, to which his natural ambition conſtantly inclined him. Thus it was his firm opinion he ſhould encircle Guſtavus in a wide-ſpread net, and force him, as he conceived it difficult for that prince ever to reach the coaſt of the Baltic, either to engage in a raſh and deſperate battle, or capitulate upon diſgraceful and inglorious terms.

Chagrined to the heart at this diſappointment, for 500 men were loſt in three days before Coburg, the preſervation of which city ſaved Thuringia and the county of Henneberg to the king's advantage, Walſtein at length, after ſome mortification, pieced out and extended the remaining parts of his plan, as well as circumſtances could then allow him. Doubtleſs he expected great things from his firſt ſcheme in its full extent; ſince he conceived it worth while to command Pappenheim for that purpoſe to relinquiſh all his conqueſts in ſo vaſt a tract as the circles of Weſtphalia and Saxony: and what more afflicted him at the preſent juncture was, that Pappenheim, on account of the diſappointment at Coburg, might now find great difficulties in penetrating into Upper Saxony, in order to join the Imperial army in the marquiſate of Miſnia. As that general was formed, by nature, for undertaking perilous and extraordinary marches, Walſtein preſerved ſome glimmerings of hope, that he would effect a junction by ſome inventive ſtratagem or other; though at that

that time it was hard to preſcribe the meaſures, whereby ſuch an enterpriſe was to be brought about.

From Coburg therefore, full of diſappointment, he turned ſhort to the right, and advancing to Cronach, in the dioceſe of Bamberg, entered Vogtland; where, adding to the cruelties of Holk and Galas, who had already ravaged all that country, he waged war, if an irruption on an unarmed multitude may be named a war, more like a man poſſeſſed by the furies, than in the character of a civilized being. At length he encamped at Weida, on the banks of the Elſter, about forty-eight miles to the ſouth of Leipſic.

We will now caſt a look upon Guſtavus. Had that prince ſurvived the November enſuing, he intended to have made a ſecond winter campaign; for the advantages accruing from the laſt exceeded his hopes*; and it was hoped moreover, that ſo ſevere a ſeaſon might not preſent itſelf again in a great number of years. Hard and continued froſts open a new theatre of war; marches are conducted over tracts of ground, deemed otherwiſe to be impaſſable; and approaches are made to fortified towns, acroſs moraſſes and waters, which, at the common ſeaſons of fighting, are known to be inacceſſible: ſo that the officers, who dealt in ſurpriſe and enterpriſe, had on theſe occaſions a new department to engage in.

That the troops in Bavaria might be inſpired to act with uncommon reſolution for the ſervice, his majeſty gave the prince of Birkenfelt draughts on Augſburg and Nurenberg, and commanded him, with earneſtneſs, to pay the ſoldiers punctually and honourably; expreſſing much concern to leave Monro's brigade behind him, which by this time was greatly ſhattered, and quite unable to march to Saxony; for it had fought near the king's perſon almoſt from the firſt weeks after he landed †; and recommending the colonel, particularly, and Moſtyn, the lieutenant-colonel, to the protection of the general, he bade adieu to each regiment, and haſtened onwards to Donawert. He there took leave of Banier, Birkenfelt and Ruthven, with great tenderneſs, ate a

* *Paganino Gaudentio*, Singolarità, &c. 214. *Supplement de Foreſti.* It was a conſtant ſaying with the king, that he could perform greater exploits in winter than ſummer. *Arma Suec.* 78.

† This regiment of infantry, uſually keeping company with the main army, appears, from a diary kept by the colonel, to have marched two thouſand one hundred and ſixty miles in a year and three quarters; and if expeditions, parties, ſtorming of towns by night, &c. be likewiſe included, with which the practice of the age then abounded, it is probable the number of ſteps taken by the corps here mentioned, might amount to a calculation which runs higher by near a third.

ſhort dinner with the queen, who met him there, and propoſed, like a true heroine, to conclude the campaign in Saxony, and ſhare the glory of defeating Walſtein. That night they ſlept at Nordlingen, from whence the king poſted to Nurenberg with ſome choſen cavalry, and beſought the queen to do him the honour of conducting the brigades of foot, firſt to Dunkelſpiel, and then to Rotenburg on the Tauber.

When Guſtavus approached Nurenberg, Oxenſtiern met him on the road, and informed him that Kniphauſen with a part of the garriſon had inveſted Lauff. The king conſequently went forwards to favour the enterpriſe of his general, but meeting Kniphauſen, who returned ſucceſsful, learned from him, that colonel Munich had appeared under the walls of Lauff, to ſuccour the beſieged, at the head of 1000 horſe, and 300 dragoons; whereas the king had only 700 horſe, and 300 dragoons, which then attended him*: but, without drafting a ſingle man from the Nurenberg detachment, he ſaid to Kniphauſen, with an air of cheerfulneſs, *March you back to your charge*; *I cannot return till I have performed ſomething.* Near two villages, called Schleucten and Felden†, he cut to pieces 300 of Munich's Croatian cavalry, and returned with ſeveral priſoners and two colours to Nurenberg; having thus freed that loyal and affectionate city from a ſort of blockade.

Leaving the town therefore, as no enemy was near it, to the protection of its own forces, he commanded Kniphauſen to follow him with three Swediſh regiments, that compoſed the garriſon, which, in conjunction with the other three regiments, not yet arrived at Nurenberg from Bavaria, made a body of 6000 men complete. The cavalry amounted to 2500, including thoſe that attended the king; at the head of which latter party he left Nurenberg, October the 17th, in order to join duke Bernard, and expel the Walſteiners out of Saxony, giving directions to the better half of his diminutive collection to purſue him by briſk marches, in the beſt manner it could contrive to advance.

This young hero, duke Bernard, had been diſpatched, a month before, with an army of 12,000 men, to watch the motions of the Imperial general, and likewiſe ſecure the banks of the Mayne; protect the whole circle of Franconia; and direct his attention particularly to the preſervation of the town of Sweinfurt. The moſt aged and experienced com-

* *Chemnit.* de Bello Sueco-Germ. tom. i. 335.

† *Chemnitz* ſays Alenfelt and Schupfen.

mander

mander never diſcharged a duty better; for allowing his troops no reſt, he preſented himſelf in every place, as occaſion demanded; preſerved from inſults the important cities of Sweinfurt and Wurtzburg, into the former of which places he threw Dewbatel with his regiment of dragoons, and executed a ſecond enterpriſe of the ſame nature, when Walſtein removed, and inveſted Coburg caſtle; compelling him, by vigilance and perſeverance, to carry the ſeat of war into Upper Saxony.

By this time, the great advances made by Guſtavus renewed in men's minds more and more the prediction of Tycho Brahé, juſt tranſiently touched upon in the former part of our work; where it was ſpecified, on the appearance of a new ſtar in Caſſiopéa, anno 1572, "that a northern prince was expected to ariſe, who ſhould greatly advance the intereſts of the more pure religion; and that the preciſe culmination of this aſtral influence ſhould be perceived by the generality of mankind in the year 1632, or thereabouts *." At the ſame time, the king being now advanced to the zenith of his glory, the ſpeculative and curious perſons of the age began to pay freſh regard to Frederic Braunborn's predictions, who had foretold the death of Antichriſt in the year 1636, in an explanation of the Old and New Teſtament, which book he publiſhed at leaſt eighteen years before. The unfortunate death of our hero ſoon put an end to theſe airy conjectures.

Guſtavus marched in fourteen days from Bavaria to the northern parts of Thuringia, including likewiſe three days which he ſpent at Nurenberg. What detained him there more eſpecially was his perceiving the princes and ſtates, his allies, to grow remiſs in ſubſcribing to the war, and in conveying their contingent of troops to him. He conſequently formed an idea, and gave Oxenſtiern full powers to convene at Ulm the principal perſonages of Upper Germany, in the four circles of Suabia, Franconia, and the two Rhines. The plan of this *confederation* was bold, extenſive, magnificent, and worthy its great inventor, who died before it could be brought beyond its infancy; yet upon *this ichnography*, Oxenſtiern, the enſuing year, eſtabliſhed the *Convention* of *Heilbrun*, which has been conſidered by all hiſtorians as the moſt diſtinguiſhed action of his political life. Guſtavus, that he might mature his conceptions better, commanded the chancellor to attend him in his march to Erfurt in Thuringia, diſcourſing with him on the ſubject during the whole journey,

* *De Stella nova*, Anno 1572. Excuſ. Uranoburgi. Dan. A. MD. C. X. p. 805. *Heylmanni* Leo Arctoüs, p. 12.

and inculcating and repeating his directions, as they occurred occaſionally to him. It was his majeſty's firſt ſcheme, had he continued in Bavaria, to have made this miniſter *Director-general* of Upper and Lower Saxony: but matters being now totally changed in that reſpect, he commanded him to return to Nurenberg with all poſſible expedition, and put the other new ideas into actual operation. It muſt not here be forgotten, that the king, before he left the laſt-named town, perceiving the Engliſh and Scottiſh regiments to be extremely thinned, combined them all into one brigade, informing the leaders and ſoldiers, that henceforwards they ſhould always act near his perſon; aſſuring the former, that as this ſelect body of troops happened by the preſent reformation to be trebly officered, he ſhould prefer the ſupernumerary commanders into other regiments, in proportion as vacancies happened. There is reaſon to think, that this brigade was one of the fineſt bodies of troops that ever appeared in the military world. Now it was, according to the beſt conjectures which can be made, that Guſtavus, in order to encourage and reward his allies in Germany, made a ſecond full examination of his grand *ſcheme of commerce to the Eaſt and Weſt Indies*, firſt publiſhed by him in the year 1626, or 1627; for my accounts vary in point of chronology. The former part may be peruſed at leiſure in the *Appendix*; as alſo the ſubſequent additional articles, extended to all his faithful aſſiſtants and friends then in the empire.

At Arnſtadt the king joined duke Bernard, where they reſted ſix days, till the royal army arrived from Nurenberg. Here Oxenſtiern took his perpetual farewel of his reſpected ſovereign, and making an excurſion by way of Francfort and the Lower Palatinate, being entruſted with the laſt letter his maſter ever wrote to the unfortunate elector Palatine; he then completed his journey by returning to his directorial office, at and round Nurenberg. Indeed no plenipotentiary character was ever greater than what the generoſity of Guſtavus beſtowed on his chancellor; for he had a commiſſion *unlimited* to four circles, being conſtituted *ſupreme arbiter of peace and war.* He was authorized to preſide, *without controul*, over all generals and military expeditions; to ratify all truces, conventions, and treaties, pro *re nata*; being pronounced *firſt in all things*, to make uſe of the very words in his commiſſion, both as VIR TOGATUS, ET SAGATUS; receiving in charge particularly to keep a ſtrict eye to the true intereſts of the proteſtant religion. To all which the king annexed this *extraordinary* confirmation: *Quicquid hac ratione in ſui (ſcil. regis) emolumentum vi ſuſceptorum mandatorum*

*torum gereret, disponeret, ordinaret, ratum à se, perinde ac si ipse gessisset, disposuisset, ordinasset, habitum iri* *.

Had not Gustavus used amazing expedition from Bavaria into the depths of the Thuringian forest as far as Arnstadt, the vigilant and enterprising Pappenheim had certainly perplexed him in two important points, namely, the possession of the cities of Erfurt and Naumburg †; which might have obstructed his majesty's entrance into Saxony, and facilitated the junction of the Imperial armies, which the king laboured to render difficult, as far as was in his power, and, if possible, to counterwork. Duke Bernard, in obedience to the instructions of his master, put a check to the former attempt; but as to the event of the latter, it was almost humanly impossible to out strip, in a long march Pappenheim, who, not daring to invest Erfurt whilst the king lay in Thuringia, cast only a languishing eye towards that important city, having crossed the Unstrut, and approached as near it as Butstadt, a distance only of twelve miles. Then changing his plan all at once, he shaped his course through the little district of Freyburg; and, passing the Sala with the rapidity of a flash of lightning, never allowed duke Bernard, who was close on his heels, with a large body of cavalry, to overtake him.

It being now the anniversary of St. Simon and St. Jude, the king marched his two armies from Arnstadt to Erfurt, a day's journey of twenty miles; and considering such a slight effort as a kind of holiday, reviewed his troops, all drawn up in fine order, before they entered the town. Whilst he was so employing himself, he received a deputation from the magistracy, requesting him to honour their city with his royal presence; to which he returned an indistinct, but very affectionate answer; insomuch that one of the deputies afterwards acknowledged that it forced tears from his eyes. At night his majesty made his entrance privately; and first, so peculiar was his humanity to any general that was wounded or indisposed, paid a visit to duke William of Weimar; from whom hastening to the queen's lodgings, her majesty, attended by her train of ladies, politely received him on foot in the square of the market before her apartments; upon which Gustavus, dismounting at a distance, led her up stairs into her own chamber, and after a short, but tender interview, retired to military business; foreseeing plainly, that the fate of Germany was now approaching towards its grand crisis. They supped together early in the evening, and in half an hour the king

* *Chemnit.* de Bello Sueco-Germanico, tom. i. 345.
† *Nani* Historia, L. ix. *Puffendorf* de Reb. Suec. p. 80.

withdrew a ſecond time, for he had letters to write of great importance to ſeveral princes, and particular expreſſes to diſpatch to all the troops that could poſſibly reach him in ten days or a fortnight. In a word, he had the great event, which afterwards made its appearance upon the glorious but unfortunate plains of Lützen, full in his imagination.

During the few hours Guſtavus ſtaid at Erfurt, he received agreeable diſpatches from all parts, if we except the fruitleſs and injudicious march of the duke of Lunenberg, who attempted to join him, but never had abilities to effect that junction. His majeſty heard, particularly, that the prince of Birkenfelt had retaken Landſberg, and driven the duke of Bavaria into Munich, with conſiderable loſs: that Banier had raiſed the ſiege of Rayn, and quaſhed a deſperate enterpriſe of the enemy againſt Augſburg, the king's magazine of arms and military ſtores: that part of the Swediſh and Wirtemberg troops had gathered laurels on the very banks of the lake of Conſtance: that Dubalt had cleared Sileſia, and Horn had reduced Alſatia almoſt miraculouſly; and that the Tranſylvanian general had cauſed a diverſion, by invading Hungary.

At break of day the king roſe, and taking a ſlight breakfaſt with his beloved Eleonora, gave audience to the magiſtrates of the city, and then concluded an earneſt and pathetic ſpeech, with a few ſhort ſentences, to this effect: *You know, gentlemen, that uncertainty and ſublunary affairs are ſynonymous terms, and that war, particularly, the viſitation of heaven for human depravity, is* precarious above all things: *it is poſſible that ſomething unfortunate may* ſoon *arrive to this my perſon, and if ſuch be the will of the Supreme Being, transfer to my* dear Conſort *that affection and obligation which you owe to me. On theſe conditions, I pray Providence to proſper you**. Then turning round to Eleonora, he could pronounce no more than juſt to ſay, GOD BLESS YOU! and thus, abruptly, leaving the whole aſſembly diſſolved in tears he mounted his horſe, and vaniſhed immediately in order to overtake his army, which by this time was in full march towards Saxony.

In two days and a half his majeſty, by eaſy journeys of twelve miles a day, reached Naumburg; and hearing on the road that Holk, now created deputy velt-maréchal to Walſtein, in order to make room for the velt-maréchal Pappenheim, had ſent troops into the town to demand the arrears of the laſt year's contribution due to Tilly, diſpached co-

* *Swediſh Intelligencer*, part iii. p. 72.

lonel

lonel Brandſtein, at the head of a body of muſqueteers, with ſtrict orders to diſlodge the Imperialiſts. This officer requeſted admiſſion at the Othmar-gate by break of day, and on the ſentinel's beſeeching that time might be allowed him to inform the magiſtracy of his demands, burſt the port-cullis to pieces with a petard, and entered the city ſword in hand.

Next day, at noon, the royal army croſſed the bridge over the Sala. Part entered Naumburg, and the reſidue, though the winter began now to appear with a threatening aſpect *, found themſelves obliged to take quarters in the high roads that lead to Zeitz and Leipſic. It was here his majeſty had commanded George duke of Lunenberg to join him with the little army which he commanded in Lower Saxony. His inſtructions were, either to force a paſſage through the enemies' quarters, by the road of Halle, or ſhape his courſe to the right, through the town of Eyſfelt, and then purſue much the ſame route which Pappenheim had taken. That general choſe rather to follow his own imaginations, than the king's directions; and having left his infantry at Magdeburg, which was a great omiſſion, and ſingularly affected the day's ſervice at Lützen, took the liberty to conduct his cavalry only acroſs the Elbe to Wittemberg, where he received orders to join the king at all hazards; but had not courage or dexterity enough to penetrate the enemies' forces. Hence aroſe *one* remarkable inconveniency; for the count de Pappenheim joined Walſtein, but the duke of Lunenberg never more beheld Guſtavus †!

Whilſt we have thus purſued the king's progreſs from Bavaria to Saxony, by which extraordinary march he outſtripped even Walſtein's ideas of activity, and ſaved Erfurt and Naumburg ‡, a point of infinite importance to him, miſſing little, at the ſame time, of exceeding Pappenheim in vigilance, we will, for a moment, take a glance over the conduct of Walſtein, whom we left encamped at Weida in Vogtland ſomething more than a fortnight before the preſent period.

This commander, having diſpatched Galas into Bohemia to aſſiſt Don Baltazar againſt Dubalt and Arnheim, commanded Holk to return from his depredations and ravages, and point his courſe towards the town of Leipſic, which both armies beſieged in form, and rendered themſelves maſters of in three days. For this ſtep the Imperial generaliſſimo is greatly admired by the Continuator of Foreſti, who applauds all *bold* ſtrokes, juſt upon the *eve* of ſome deciſive battle.

* It was now Nov. 1.

† *Puffend.* de Rebus Suec. p. 80. ‡ *Nani* Hiſt. l. 9.

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The THREE INSTANCES he ſelects particularly on the occaſion, are, the paſſage of the Lech by Guſtavus; the ſiege of Magdeburg by Tilly; and the poſſeſſion of Leipſic by Walſtein's orders. Be that as it will, one thing is remarkable, that the commandant, who ſurrendered the caſtle this time, was the ſelf ſame man who gave it up to Tilly the preceding campaign. If his name be worth preſerving, he was called Vopelius. This may ſerve to ſhew, that the elector of Saxony was neither over delicate, nor over ſolicitous, in the choice of his officers. In a word, he cared little, which of the two contending powers obtained the ſuperiority.

Nor was Walſtein inactive during the ſiege of Leipſic town and fortreſs: for in that interim he took poſſeſſion of Weiſſenfels, Merſburg, Naumburg, and Halle, the caſtle of the latter alone excepted, where ſome veteran Swedes remained, who ſtaid there on account of the wounds they received laſt year, in the battle of Leipſic.

The ſame general was not void of attention in another particular; for he had once formed a deſign of poſſeſſing Torgau-bridge by force, by which he propoſed to himſelf the choice of various and diſtinct advantages; ſuch as the more eaſy reduction of Saxony, if that undertaking beſt pleaſed him. By being maſter of the bridge he propoſed alſo to create new difficulties, in caſe the elector and Guſtavus intended to unite their forces, than which nothing appeared more probable. He had the power likewiſe, by this ſtroke of ſurprize, to enter Lower Luſatia, and the *Marches* of Brandenburg, and of courſe decline a battle, if he thought proper. But the elector of Saxony, who, juſt at *that* time, ſquared every motion by the directions of the king, from whom he received daily expreſſes, had rendered this paſſage ſuperior to inſults of the impetuous and momentary kind; nor did Walſtein ever realize this ideal experiment; for having marched his whole force to Eülenberg, half way between Leipſic and Torgau, he there received an expreſs from Pappenheim, with information that he was upon the wing to join him. On the receipt of this acceptable news, for it is thought Walſtein would have ſhunned Guſtavus in the abſence of his velt-maréchal, he turned back to Leipſic by the road he came, and formed the junction at Merſburg.

Here Pappenheim, who had the power of over-perſuading all men in military matters, for his bold ſtrong ſenſe had the appearance of irreſiſtibility, ſoon induced Walſtein, though in general the moſt reſerved, ſullen, and untractable commander of that age, to change his operations all at once, and embrace a project, which indeed had once occurred to him ſlightly,

ſlightly, as before mentioned, and that was, to croſs the Sala without delay, and occupy the principal towns and paſſes of Thuringia, particularly Weimar and Erfurt; foraſmuch as in the whole country duke Bernand had only one ſmall army, and his brother William, who was then ſick, could produce no greater ſtrength than 5000 ſoldiers, wherewith to garriſon the two cities laſt mentioned. As to the arrival of Guſtavus with an army from Bavaria, *that incident was foreſeen by no man* *.

Whilſt theſe matters continued in profound agitation, *news arrived that the king of Sweden was on the banks of the Sala.* The alarm indeed was premature; for the report took its riſe from the approach of duke Bernard's cavalry, whom the king had diſpatched to intercept the rear-guard of Pappenheim's army. But in two days his majeſty's arrival at Naumburg and his approach into Saxony were manifeſt beyond contradiction. Walſtein immediately ſummoned all his troops to join him under pain of death, directed his courſe from Leipſic to Lützen and Randſtadt †, and there ſpread himſelf along the ſides of the great high road which leads into the heart of Saxony. He then ſent courier after courier, but without ſucceſs, to recal Galas, who by that time was advanced with 12,000 men into Bohemia. Walſtein then procured from Leipſic a contribution of more than £.8000 demanded from the inhabitants about a week before: which firſt precaution appeared to him in no degree unneceſſary, though at that time he did not ſincerely believe that Guſtavus, at the head of 18,000 men, would have the confidence to attack a body of troops amounting to 40,000, who had their choice of ground to intrench themſelves, and no contemptible train of heavy artillery. This prepoſſeſſion led him afterwards into a *ſlight* miſtake, and that was, The detachment of Pappenheim to take poſſeſſion of the town of Halle. Concluding, at leaſt during the preſent criſis, that the whole winter would be ſpent inactively in quarters of cantonment, he thought the acquiſition of that town and the diſtrict round it a ſafe and deſirable enlargement of elbow-room; giving him, in truth, a

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 823.

† In this village, properly called Upper-Randſtadt, is ſhewn a ſmall paſſable houſe, where the duke of Marlborough made his applications to Charles XII. who reſided therein a whole ſummer: and here the peace of Randſtadt was formed and concluded, in the year 1707. This little manſion the author viſited in 1748, in company with his ever-reſpected pupils, Mr. ELIOT, and Mr. STANHOPE; and that excellent hiſtorian M. MASCOU.

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ſort of elliptical range along the banks of the Sala, from the city laſt mentioned to the towns of Zeitz and Altenberg *.

Next morning the Imperial generaliſſimo advanced to Weiſſenfels, when the colonels Suevis † and Bredarxo ‡ who had been ſent to Naumburg, to bring, into the military cheſt, the arrears of a contribution due to Tilly, returned with no ſmall degree of precipitation, and declared the Swediſh army to be in full march againſt the Imperialiſts. This was little leſs than a thunder-ſtroke to Walſtein, whoſe preſence of mind began now to fail him. He had once an inclination to leave the road open to Leipſic and Dreſden, and reſerve to himſelf the power of attacking the king's rear, and giving him battle, when he ſaw occaſion. He then, which is not uncommon when the calmneſs of the underſtanding begins to be ruffled, went directly into an oppoſite project, and conceived an idea of attacking the king's lines ſword in hand; for by this time he heard that a camp was to be ſtrongly fortified near the walls of Naumburg, a miſrepreſentation eaſy to be accounted for, ſince it was Guſtavus's cuſtom to intrench his army every night, when near the enemy. In the next place it was Walſtein's determination to take the ſtraight road from Weiſſenfels to Naumburg, a diſtance of twelve miles, or ſomething leſs; but the paſſage was too narrow and too miry to be undertaken with ſafety. He then ſent the quarter-maſter-general Julio Deodati to examine the way, which leads thro' Zeitz; for it was Walſtein's cuſtom, which proceeded more from haughtineſs than the gout, which he alleged, as occaſion ſerved, for a general excuſe, to examine *no* ground with his own eyes. On the ſame principle, and not from *that* which influenced Guſtavus, he diſdained convening a council of war; yet on this emergency had the condeſcenſion to requeſt Pappenheim to collect the private opinion of all the generals and colonels, who declared unanimouſly againſt attempting to force the Swediſh lines.

A new thought now occurred to him, the true cauſe and motive whereof has eſcaped the notice of all hiſtorians without exception, nay even of the *Spaniſh relator*, who was himſelf a diſtinguiſhed officer in the Imperial ſervice; and that was, *the diſpatching Pappenheim to take poſſeſſion of the town and caſtle of Halle, which commanded the great road*; and this appeared to be his favourite ſcheme. All writers of good ſenſe

* *Spaniſh relation by an Imperial officer*, printed at Liſbon, 1633.

† ‡ The Spaniſh relator ſeems to be miſtaken in theſe officers' names. The firſt, I think, ſhould be Salis, and the ſecond, I am ſure, ought to be Breda.

appear to be puzzled * why Walſtein ſhould detach Pappenheim, in whom himſelf and the army placed the greateſt confidence, at the very moment when that commander's preſence was *moſtly* wanted; for the Swediſh forces lay then but a few miles removed from the Imperialiſts. The real reaſon for this *movement* appears to me to be preciſely thus. Walſtein, in his cooler hours of reflection, and at ſuch periods when reaſon gets the better of falſe fears, ſeemed, in part, convinced, that Guſtavus would not embark in an enterpriſe, where the diſproportion againſt him then laid, as that of forty oppoſed to eighteen. Beſides, as no general was more dexterous in procuring intelligence than Walſtein, it is probable his correſpondents informed him, that the king, which was really the caſe, had no intentions to engage, till the Saxon and Lunenberg army could both join their forces with his; and therefore the Imperial general concluded, he had breathing ſpace enough to diſpatch Pappenheim, whom he could recal in twenty hours, to ſecure the city and fortreſs of Halle; which, in truth, commanded the only *great* and *practicable* road at that time of the year convenient for his private purpoſes. What theſe purpoſes might be, ſhall be explained directly. Walſtein did not greatly like the deciſion of an engagement hand to hand with a commander like Guſtavus; and though he thought that prince would ſcarcely venture to give him battle, during Pappenheim's abſence of three days, which by the way he hoped to conceal till the ſtroke was completed, yet he foreſaw but too plainly, that the Swediſh monarch would force him into a general action the very inſtant he had formed his *junction* with the elector of Saxony and the duke of Lunenberg. For theſe reaſons, which centered entirely in his own breaſt, he choſe to avoid a deciſive engagement, if that were poſſible; and having ſecured the great road he privately wiſhed for, propoſed to himſelf, in caſe of emergency, to give Guſtavus free paſſage to Leipſic and Dreſden, and commanding his whole army to file off to Halle in an inſtant, transfer, by this unexpected movement, the ſeat of war towards the coaſts of the Baltic, a point he ardently wiſhed for, inaſmuch as it had taken full poſſeſſion of his mind from the very moment he diſlodged at Nurenberg. From this ſingle *falſe ſtep* of detaching Pappenheim, which took its riſe from diffidence and timidity, he loſt his reputation at once, as a great commander, and gave birth to that very battle which he laboured hitherto to divert or decline.

* At generaliſſimus, *neſcio qua mente*, Pappenheimium ut Hallas expugnaret, miſit. *Waſſenbergii Florus German.* p. 317.

Guſtavus,

Guſtavus, on Thurſday, November the firſt, arrived at Naumburg, and thence diſpatched meſſengers after meſſengers, with a plan of the junction he intended to form with the elector of Saxony and duke of Lunenberg, who both then laid at Torgau, making between them a ſmall compact army, conſiſting of 4000 cavalry and 4000 infantry; though ſome hiſtorians ſuppoſe their number to be nearly double. The king's idea of uniting theſe forces to his own conſiſted in this: that the elector of Saxony ſhould advance fourteen miles on the weſtern ſide * of the Mulda, to the town of Eülenberg; and that himſelf, during this interim, ſhould march to Pegau, on the river Elſter, fourteen miles to the ſouth of Leipſic, and thence to Grimma, ſituated on the Mulda, eighteen miles to the eaſt of Pegau, and fourteen to the ſouth of Eülenberg, and that the conjunction ſhould be formed at the place before mentioned, namely, Grimma. Whoever knows Saxony, and comprehends the diſpoſition and cantonment of Walſtein's army, will, at firſt ſight, allow the preſent ſcheme to be *finely concerted.*

This ſelfſame day the king ſurveyed his encampments at Naumburg, and made a ſlight excurſion round the country, to examine the aſpect and poſition of the enemy; but the afternoon proved not ſo fortunate to ſome Engliſh adventurers, on the ſame errand, who falling into an ambuſh of Croatians, two out of three were taken priſoners †, and conducted that night to Weiſſenfels, where Walſtein had then intrenched himſelf. He diſpatched Pappenheim forthwith to examine them ſtrictly, concerning the king's ſtrength, and his military deſigns. Walſtein then commanded them to be confined in the rear of his army, where they were ſpectators of the battle of Lützen.

At Naumburg the king dropped ſome expreſſions to Fabricius his chaplain, which moſt hiſtorians have conſidered as prophetic; for in converſation he diſcovered great uneaſineſs, to behold himſelf, in ſome ſenſe, *deified* as it were by the generality of mankind: *I fear, doctor,* ſaid he, *ſome impending misfortune, either to my own perſon, or the proſperity of the Swediſh forces: I am received every where with* undue *joy, and* undeſerved *honours*; *the people rely too much on the*

* I ſhould apprehend it ought to be on the eaſtern ſide of the Mulda; but not having examined the ground, which has been carefully performed in moſt other important ſcenes of action, I chooſe to conform to the authorities before me.

† Namely, lieutenant-colonel Tyrwhit, and captain Fielding, who communicated their accounts of Walſtein's behaviour during the battle, to their friends in England; and from whence part, which follows, has been copied.

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*probabilities of* ſecond *cauſes: their ſuppoſed ſecurity is a* deception *to them: they miſtake the* true object of human addreſſes *: *I take no delight in this ſort of incenſe*;——— *let the event be as it pleaſes God* †!

In addition to what has been ſaid, many ſuppoſe the king, about this period, to have entertained certain miſgivings concerning his death. Without having recourſe to ſuch ſuperſtitious preſages, ſure it is, the braveſt of men may have their intervals of tenderneſs and ſenſibility; and this, without ſuppoſing it to be conſtitutional, may be occaſioned by the indiſpoſition of a ſingle fibre; though, for my own part, I think compaſſion and ſedate reflection were always intermingled in the character of Guſtavus. They ground their opinion upon part of a letter, diſpatched to the Chancellor Oxenſtiern, which I ſhall venture to publiſh, as it does ſome honour to human nature; for never perſon acted with greater aptitude and preſence of mind, than his majeſty did ſome days afterwards, on the plains of Lützen. Let the reader peruſe the extract, and refrain from ſympathiſing, if he can.

* * * * * * *Though the cauſe I am embarked in is juſt and good, yet the event of war,* propter delicta humana, *muſt be deemed uncertain. Uncertain likewiſe is the duration of mortal life; therefore I beſeech and require you, in the name of our bleſſed Redeemer, to preſerve your fortitude of ſpirit, though things may not proceed in exact conformity to my wiſhes.——Remember likewiſe how I ſhould comfort myſelf in regard to you, if by divine permiſſion I might live till* THAT *period,* WHEN *you ſhould have occaſion for my aſſiſtance under any ſhape. Conſider me as a man, the guardian of a kingdom, who has ſtruggled with difficulties for* TWENTY YEARS, *and paſſed through them* WITH REPUTATION, *by the protection and mercy of God; namely, as a man, who loved and honoured his country and faithful ſubjects; as a man, who neglected* life, riches, *and* happy days, *for the preſervation and glory of thoſe he belonged to; expecting no remuneration, except to be pronounced* the perſon, *who fulfilled the duties of that ſtation which Providence aſſigned him.———Thoſe, who ſurvive me, for I with others muſt expect the ſtroke of mortality, are, on* MY *account, and for many* OTHER *reaſons, real objects of your commiſeration:* They are of the tender and defenceleſs Sex:—A helpleſs Mother, who wants a guide, and an innocent Daughter ‡, who requires a protector!—Natural affec-

* *Hiſtorical and Authentic Relation,* in Low Dutch, tom. ii. p. 175.
† *Swediſh Intelligencer,* part iii. 74. *Memorab. Suec. Gentis,* p. 144.
‡ The princeſs Chriſtina was then eight years of age.

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tion forces theſe lines from the hand of a Son and a Parent! ——*But I muſt reſume myſelf*; *and recommend them, together with my ſoul and body, to the protection of the Supreme Being, expecting better things on earth than my preſent melancholy now preſages*; *and eternal life, peace, and happineſs hereafter in heaven, which may God beſtow on you, at his own appointed time and hour!**

GUSTAVUS.

The next day after the conference with Fabricius, his majeſty examined, in perſon, all the approaches and paſſes about Naumburg, having as yet formed no reſolution to give Walſtein battle †; but propoſing rather to examine the great roads that were between his camp and that of the Imperialiſts; paſſages which he found upon inſpection to be very deep and difficult. But the ſubject of this expedition being purely occaſional and incidental, his grand and principal intention was, and therefore he commanded abroad ſeveral ſtrong parties of cavalry, to engage his troops in ſome ſharp ſkirmiſhes, in order to obtain from priſoners more certain intelligence of Walſtein's ſituation, and examine carefully, during this confuſion, the true nature of the road that led to Pegau, with a view to effect his junction more dexterouſly with the elector of Saxony and duke of Lunenberg.

The following morning, being Sunday, a Saxon peaſant came running to the king with a letter in his hand, which Coloredo had engaged him to carry to an Imperial officer then quartered al Querfurt. This letter appears to have been written the Saturday evening. Its purport was, that he, the officer, ſhould march to Halle, and join Pappenheim the next morning ‡, at which time his Excellency,

* *Loccenii* Hiſt. Suec. 4°. p. 605, 606.

† *Puffendorff* de Rebus Suecicis, p. 80.

‡ Le Barre, uſually judicious, and on moſt occaſions the beſt inſtructed hiſtorian I know, ſuppoſes Pappenheim to have received orders from Walſtein, after the reduction of Halle, to advance to Cologn: which extraordinary digreſſion ſeems in no wiſe to ſquare with the then preſſing and urgent neceſſities of the Imperial generaliſſimo. This difficulty is better ſolved by the plain narration of a party in war, than by the refined ſpeculations of an hiſtorian in the cloſet. In a word, the caſe ſtood thus. At the preſent period, a ſtrong report prevailed [*Spaniſh Relation, printed at Liſbon*, 1633] that count Henry Vander-Berg, at the head of an army of Hollanders, was in full march to inveſt Cologn, whoſe elector was a faithful friend to the Imperial intereſts. Upon this the Auſtrian party *ſuppoſed*, that Pappenheim, having rendered himſelf maſter of Halle, would advance thence to the banks of the Weſer, and having joined the reſidue of his own army under Gronsfelt, make ſome attempts to raiſe the ſiege; and that Walſtein perhaps might be induced to follow him, in hopes to draw Guſtavus ſtill farther from the heart of the empire. Such were men's ideas for a few days; but the alarm was falſe, and ſoon vaniſhed into air. *Spaniſh Relation ut ſupra.*

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the generaliſſimo, had determined to remove his camp from Weiſſenfels to Lützen. Both theſe circumſtances gave Guſtavus uncommon joy; for he was never known to *diſlike* the abſence of Pappenheim: and the removal of Walſtein from Weiſſenfels in no ſenſe diſpleaſed him, as that town laid directly in the way of the intended expedition, whereby he propoſed to unite his forces to thoſe of Saxony; and Lützen is about nine miles from the high road which leads to Pegau.

Upon receiving the two articles of intelligence above mentioned, the king, who had always a ſecret appetite for fighting, convened duke Bernard and Kniphauſen to his own apartment, having no great opinion of tumultuous councils of war for many reaſons. He there expounded to theſe two commanders the particular circumſtances of Walſtein's ſituation, and deſired their opinions candidly and generouſly without reſerve. The former, as is congenial to the temper of youthful warriors, took flame immediately, and declared for action. The latter, brave as the youngeſt combatant in the army, but matured by reflection, and chaſtiſed by experience, pronounced uniformly and ſteadily, at the firſt glance, that an engagement at the preſent juncture was no way reconcileable to the true ſcience of war: For, ſaid he, no commander is obliged to encounter an enemy greatly ſuperior to him in ſtrength, except compelled by ſome preſſing and unavoidable neceſſity. War is an affair of demonſtration; and not an unpremeditated effuſion of animal ſpirits. His majeſty is neither circumſcribed in place, nor deficient in proviſions, forage, nor military ſtores.—The king ſubmitted with complacency to good ſenſe wherever he found it; though it is poſſible the firſt emotions of his heart inclined him to undertake an action that carried with it ſuch a ſhining appearance both of glory and difficulty; yet making no remonſtrance, aſſured both his generals poſitively, with an air of calmneſs, that he would decline the engagement, and march to join the elector of Saxony the enſuing morning *.

Leaving therefore the bulk of his baggage, and a ſufficient garriſon in the town of Naumburg, he ordered his drums and trumpets to ſummon the army into motion at one hour after midnight; for he always diſdained *ſtealing* a march, except occaſions were *preſſing* and *hazardous*; and, it is probable,

* Spanheim and Chemnitz ſuppoſe the king to have advanced directly from Naumburg to Lützen, without any intention to join the Saxons. [*Soldat Suedois*, 824, 825. *Bellum Sueco Germ.* tom. i. 347.] The ſuppoſition throws ſome reflection on his majeſty's military prudence, though nothing of that kind was originally intended by the hiſtorians.

though he declined oppoſing Kniphauſen's arguments, that he did not privately diſlike an attack from Walſtein, in caſe that general ſhould think fit to impede his journey; for the ground he well knew was one wide plain, which gave the enemy no particular advantage. Four hours before it was daylight, the whole army* was under march; and being now arrived half way to Pegau, and repoſing itſelf for the ſake of a momentary refreſhment, having by this time, it being now ten in the morning, advanced nine miles, ſome gentry of the country and peaſants came haſtening towards the king with full and poſitive aſſurances, which report was likewiſe confirmed by ſtraggling priſoners taken here and there, that the Imperial army, then on a line to the north-weſt, looſely and thinly diſperſed in various villages, had received no alarm, nor the leaſt intelligence of his majeſty's motions. This idea, adding thereto the abſence of Pappenheim, took poſſeſſion of the king's mind all at once: he thought it

* TABLE of REFERENCE to the Battle of LUTZEN.

SWEDISH FORM OF BATTLE.

I. LINE.

1. Finlanders, Stalhaus.
2. Muſqueteers.
3. Weſtergothians.
4. Muſqueteers.
5. Ingermanians.
6. Muſqueteers.
7. Uplanders.
8. Muſqueteers.
9. Oſtrogoths.
10. Muſqueteers.
11. Smolanders.
12. *Firſt brigade, Harte.*
13. *Pretorian brigade, guards, yellow; count Weiſſenberg.*
14. *Blue brigade, gilards; Wincle.*
15. *Green brigade; Wildeſſein.*
16. Duke Bernard's regiment.
17. Muſqueteers.
18. Duke Bernard's ſecond regiment.
19. Muſqueteers.
20. Carberg.
21. Muſqueteers.
22. Livonians; Wrangel.
23. Muſqueteers.
24. Tiſenhauſen.
25. Muſqueteers.
26. Courville.

II. LINE.

27. Steichnitz; French.
28. Muſqueteers.
29. Steinboch's dragoons.
30. Muſqueteers.
31. Brandſtein.
32. Muſqueteers.
33. Lowenſtein.
34. Muſqueteers.
35. Prince of Anhalt.
36. Muſqueteers.
37. Hofkirch; Saxon.
38. *Brigade, Mitzval.*
39. *Brigade; Thurn.*
40. *Brigade; Kniphauſen.*
41. *Brigade, Boſen; Saxon.*
42. Uſſar.
43. Muſqueteers.
44. Dalwick: Heſſian.
45. Muſqueteers.
46. Beckerman.
47. Muſqueteers.
48. Bulach.
49. Muſqueteers.
50. Goldſtein.
51. Muſqueteers.
52. William of Weimar.

RESERVE I.

53. Henderſon: Scottiſh infantry.

RESERVE II.

54. Ohem: Palatine cavalry.

not

not difficult to cut the ſeveral Imperial quarters to pieces one by one, before it was poſſible for Walſtein to collect any conſiderable maſs of forces together. Calling therefore all his generals round him in an inſtant, he, who had never yet declared his ſentiments upon this occaſion concerning fighting, propoſed the enterpriſe without heſitation, and the propoſal was received with the moſt lively demonſtrations of applauſe and joy.——He then aſked the country gentlemen, how many miles it might be to Lützen? They replied, *There, Sire, there it lies, directly under your eye.* But here aroſe a fatal miſtake. For the country being, with a ſlight exception, one uniform level, and the buildings of the church and caſtle high in themſelves, and ſtanding likewiſe on a ſort of eminence, the town of Lützen appeared to be one half nearer the Swedes than it really was; or, in other words, to be removed five miles from the army, inſtead of eight miles and ſomething more. Here it muſt be obſerved further, that as the ground was an immenſe tract of corn-lands, freſh ploughed to receive the grain, the paſſage proved to be miry and difficult beyond deſcription. The error of diſtance was not obſerved, and the difficulty of marching ſeemed to be unforeſeen; circumſtances which in the high and ſudden ardor of generals and ſoldiers might be eaſily overlooked. At a ſingle inſtant the whole army made its evolutions, and bent its courſe towards Lützen. Never were troops known to advance with ſuch amazing alacrity; but the ground clung to the mid-leg like clay, and when they came within two miles of the deſired object, there was a moraſſy ſwamp to paſs, formed by a creeping half-ſtagnated rivulet, over which lay a paltry bridge, where only two perſons could croſs a-breaſt. In and near a nameleſs village *, on the oppoſite ſide, was lodged a regiment of cuiraſſiers and another of Croatians, who, far from diſputing the paſs, took the alarm, and formed themſelves on a little eminence beyond the water. It was now ſunſet by the time the whole Swediſh army had cleared the paſs, and diſengaged itſelf from this unexpected incumbrance; and, to the ſenſible mortification and diſappointment of the whole army, the Swedes had only daylight ſufficient to diſlodge the two regiments from the poſt they had poſſeſſed. This was effected by a very ſharp and ſpirited attack, the ſucceſs of which the king facilitated greatly, by fixing ſome field-pieces on another little eminence, which bore hard on the enemies flank. In the heat of this rencounter one ſtandard was taken, which all men conſidered, conform-

* I have ſince learned that this village was called Rippach.

ably to the genius of that age, a well promising and prosperous omen; for thereon was painted the Austrian eagle displayed, and the goddess Fortune; with the following inscription underneath, *Fortuna & aquila Romana* *. Some Swedes considered this a very promising omen †: but the generality rested the event upon other hopes

——— *Romano milite dignus,*
ENSIS *adest* augur ———

Still it was remarked, that his majesty discovered no great signs of satisfaction, when this trophy was presented to him; not that he wanted dexterity to encourage any idea which inspired his troops with vivacity and confidence, but in truth he was *chagrined* to the heart at the *deception* of distance we have lately mentioned, and perceived now, that, for the first time in his military life, he was *obliged to give battle*; not absolutely *against* his judgment, but in a *certain manner*, that did not *quite* please him. Nevertheless, as it was this prince's peculiar character to have greater possession of himself, in proportion as distress and difficulty encreased upon him, he soon assumed that composed air of confidence usually worn by men who rely upon some resource of firmness and genius, at the very period that their friends suppose their danger next to inevitable.

About this time, it is certain, some one of Gustavus's generals, not improbably Kniphausen, advised him still to meditate a retreat, and repass the rivulet, which the mist next morning gave him full opportunity to do. It was urged likewise, that the royal army wanted rest and provisions; and that it bordered on temerity to assail a double number of forces, protected by batteries, and secured by intrenchments. The *die* was cast, and the king replied with a tone of decision, *That he could not bear to see Walstein under his beard without making some animadversions upon him; and that no disinclination, on his part, had ever hindered him from bringing the contest to a fair trial. I long*, said he, *to unearth him once from his subterraneous hiding-places, and behold with my own eyes how he can acquit himself in a champaign country* ‡. Now the king having crossed the pass, found himself under an in-

* The particularity of this ensign was not so great, as the Swedish army seemed disposed to interpret it; for most of the Croatians bore the Austrian eagle on the front-side of their standards, and on the opposite side were the emblem and motto. I have seen the same eagle engraved on the officers partizans of that age.

† *Soldat Suedois*, 825. ‡ *Idem*, p. 827, 828.

dispensable

diſpenſable obligation to engage the enemy; for had he attempted to return the next morning, at leaſt according to his own ideas, he might have run the riſk of incurring a total defeat, or ſacrificing, at leaſt, the very flower of his army. He determined therefore, without heſitation, to begin the action two entire hours before daylight; for Walſtein's quarters were remotely diſperſed, and Pappenheim, who had taken with him twelve regiments of the league, could not be ſuppoſed to return in leſs ſpace than eighteen hours.——Walſtein appeared thunderſtruck at this unexpected viſit from Guſtavus. He diſpatched an officer immediately to Pappenheim, with orders to relinquiſh his undertaking, however proſperous it might be; and inſtructions were conveyed to the chieftains in their ſeveral quarters, to repair forthwith to the general rendezvous on the plains of Lützen. Thus the greater part of the Imperial army began its march before midnight; and ſome, more remotely quartered, did not reach their generaliſſimo till the enſuing morning *.

Walſtein, having diſpatched his orders to recal Pappenheim, and collect his forces, and recovering, by degrees, his wonted preſence of mind, began at length to reflect ſeriouſly on the nature of the ground, occupied by himſelf, or poſſeſſed by Guſtavus. To underſtand both circumſtances better, it muſt be remarked by the reader, that a large highway, from Lützen to Leipſic, biſects the plain in a line that extends from weſt to eaſt, but ſlants gently to the eaſtward; on the ſouthern ſide of which laid the Swedes, and the Imperialiſts on the northern. A great part of this road was then ornamented on each ſide with middle-aged willow-trees, and, as the ſoil was moiſt, deep, and rich, a conſiderable trench had been cut on either hand, to prevent travellers from making ſide-excurſions along the corn-fields †. The tract of land which Guſtavus covered was plain and uniform; but on Walſtein's right, near the town of Lützen, was a gently-riſing eminence, where ſome windmills were erected ‡. Here, about nine at night, he fixed two large batteries of heavy

* *Chemnitz.* tom. i. 373.

† Two ditches, one on each ſide, ran parallel with the road. *Chemnitz.* tom. i. 73.). That next the king was rendered deepeſt by Walſtein, and continues ſo to this hour.

‡ It is remarkable, that there was no material variation in the fields of Lützen from the year 1632 to the year 1748, when the author examined them, and compared the preſent ichnography of the ground with the drafts publiſhed immediately after the battle, by Lotichius, Merian, Gabler, Sandrart, Danchaertz, &c. &c. That very day a cuiraſſier's ſpur was ploughed up, of enormous ſize; it is in my poſſeſſion; and the head of a pike, or partizan, very curiouſly engraved, and now in the poſſeſſion of Edward Eliot, Eſq. of Port Eliot in Cornwall.

artillery, and ſecured them, in front and flank, with an intrenchment. The lower line played directly on the left wing of the Swedes; and the uppermoſt threw its balls obliquely through the center of the right wing. He then protected his own main body with the field ordnance; and as it was well foreſeen where the king affected to appear, he placed there, namely, againſt the right wing of the Swedes, a fourth battery, compoſed of the heavieſt and moſt deſtructive artillery. Guſtavus, who valued the advantages of artillery as much as he, and underſtood its management far better, had only with him ſome few cannons of a moderate ſize, and a reaſonable number of common field-pieces, two, I think, at the head of each regiment, ſuch as are uſually tranſported with armies in marches of expedition. At ten in the evening Walſtein ordered his pioneers and ſoldiers to deepen and widen the ditches on the road-ſide, till they had brought them to the due height of a parapet: and at this work they laboured inceſſantly till the battle began next morning *.

The royal army carried nothing with it, except ſuch few things as were indiſpenſably neceſſary. The king himſelf was not proprietor of a field equipage; but paſſed the whole night in his coach, accompanied by Kniphauſen, and duke Bernard: and as the ſoldiers had taken ſome ſlight entertainment before noon, and propoſed to refreſh themſelves better the ſame evening at Torgau, where diſpoſitions had been made for their reception, it is not probable they got much to eat that night, on the plains of Lützen. Monro aſſures us †, they ſtood to their arms in perfect array; for which the reaſons will appear ſelf-evident, in the enſuing paragraph.

His majeſty paſſed the night, partly in diſcourſe with his generals, and partly in profound contemplation. On one point he fixed his mind, as it were intuitively; and that was, to give the enemy battle two hours before break of day, well foreſeeing, that their forces could then never be truly formed; that a great part of the troops could not reach the ſtation appointed; and that the paſſage of the ditches could not be made ſo difficult, as it might be rendered in a few ſucceeding hours. Every circumſtance, if we except there was no diſmay in the caſe, proved unfavourable to Guſtavus. The night appeared to be ſeveral degrees darker than uſual; and a miſt prevailed in the ſkies, which, at intervals in the enſuing day, rendered the air ſo obſcure, that it was hardly poſſible to diſcern an object clearly at the diſtance of two pikes length.

* *Hiſt.* or *Auth. Relat.* tom. ii. 172. Low Dutch, fol.
† *Part* ii. 163.

At

At the moment the dawn of morning firſt began to appear, he found it impoſſible to perform any exploit in the martial way *; and therefore, ſending for Fabricius his chaplain, commanded him to celebrate divine ſervice, and ordered prayers to be read at the head of each regiment, ſo far as the reſpective clergymen could be found in ſuch a ſudden and unforeſeen expedition. The king was then aſked to take ſome refreſhment, but declined it. He was requeſted likewiſe to clothe himſelf in ſteel, according to the cuſtom of that age; but his anſwer was, *The Lord is my armour.* Some indeed ſay, he had lately received a contuſion † in one of his ſhoulders, from a muſquet-ball, which rendered the leaſt preſſure of his cuiraſs an inſupportable pain to him. He only changed his yeſterday's clothes, and wore a new plain cloth coat, and an elk-ſkin buff waiſtcoat, which fell afterwards into Holk's hands, and is ſtill preſerved at Vienna. About eight in the morning the ſun began to diſpel the fogs, and gave the promiſe of a bright and calm day; when, lo! a new and unforeſeen difficulty preſented itſelf! For in the ſtraight line, on which the Swediſh left wing propoſed to advance, was a deep ditch, too difficult for the troops to croſs; ſo that the king was obliged to make his whole army edge to the right, and then occupy the ſpace, between the *Fluſgraben*, for ſo the Germans call a wet ditch cut to drain lands ‡, and Walſtein's army; leaving his ammunition-waggons, his coach, and the few conveniencies that belonged to the army, in the village of Churſitz, as will appear more diſtinctly by the plan. This movement coſt ſome trouble, and employed no ſmall ſpace of time. At length, towards the hour of nine in the morning, his majeſty, riding with an air of briſkneſs up and down the lines, and ordering two hymns ‖ to be ſung publickly, addreſſed himſelf to his Swediſh ſoldiers. *My companions, and friends, ſhew the public this day what you really are. Acquit yourſelves like men of ſervice; obſerve your orders, and behave valiantly, for your own ſakes as well as mine. If you do this, you will find the benediction of heaven on the points of your ſwords—honour, and the recompence of valour. But, on the contrary, if you think of flight, and ſelf-*

* *Memoires communicated.* *Merian*, Theatr. Europ. 746.

† I have given this circumſtance a place in my text, not from authority of De Prade, whoſe good faith I have never once depended on, but becauſe Spanheim, (*Soldat Sued.* 828.) and the *Swediſh Intelligencer*, both ſupport the aſſertion. (Part iii. 128.) All I know is, it in no way appears where the king received this contuſion; and, if I miſtake not, he wore no armour at the battle of Leipſic.

‡ Others ſay, *Flot Grachten*, i. e. ditches to float wood.

‖ Taken from the 46th and 67th pſalms.

*preſervation, then your infamy is certain, as well as my diſgrace and your deſtruction——And I here proteſt to you, on the veracity of a king, that not an* atom of your bones ſhall ever return into Sweden*. Thence haſtening to the German regiments, which formed, chiefly, the ſecond line, he ſpoke to them briefly thus, lowering a little the tone of authority: *Friends, officers, and ſoldiers, let me conjure you to act a valiant part this enſuing day.——You ſhall fight, not only* under *me, but* with *me.——My* own blood *ſhall point you the track whereby to follow me.——Keep religiouſly within your ranks, and ſecond your leader with reſolution.——If you do this, victory is ours, and all its advantages, which you and your poſterity will not fail to enjoy.——But if you once give ground, from that moment your lives and liberties become a ſacrifice to the enemy* †.

On the concluſion of theſe two ſhort harangues, one univerſal ſhout of acclamation paſſed from regiment to regiment, throughout the army.

The king's field-diſpoſition ‡ proceeded upon the ſame principles, but ſomewhat enlarged and improved, as had been laſt year exhibited at Leipſic. Here we muſt obſerve with pleaſure, that Puffendorff, and the authors of the Swediſh Intelligencer, and Low Dutch Relation, agree almoſt to a tittle in every word concerning this arrangement. The whole army was formed upon two lines; but the troops appear to me to be *not ſo good* as thoſe produced laſt year at Leipſic; ſo conſuming is the *wear* and *tear* of war, even on the proſperous and victorious ſide. Many regiments were diſcordant maſſes, compoſed from broken ones; that of Lowenſtein, in particular, had been ſo lately raiſed, as not to be proprietor of a ſingle ſtandard; and the principal generals, ſuch as Horn, Banier, Banditzen, and Dubalt, were all abſent. His majeſty, according to cuſtom, took upon himſelf the conduct of the right wing, where were diſpoſed ſix regiments of native Swedes, ſupported by five intermingled bodies of muſqueteers. The left-wing was committed to duke Bernard's care, and conſiſted of the like number of cavalry, and intermixed infantry. The centre was compoſed of the four invincible brigades, or columns, namely, the

* *Soldat Suedois*, p. 829. *Merc. Franc. Swediſh Intell.* part iii.

† I have preferred theſe ſpeeches to thoſe recorded by Chemnitius, which, in imitation of the practice of the ancient hiſtorians, ſeem to favour more of the library than of the field. Beſides, the *Soldat Suedois*, the *Mercure François*, and the *Intelligencer*, all came out at the ſame period, in Switzerland, France, and England; and each author relates, nearly word for word, the very paſſages that I have preſerved.

‡ *Chemnitz.* de Bello Sueco-Germanico, p. 372.

pretorian,

pretorian, or yellow guards, the firſt brigade, the white*, and the blue; ſupported by Henderſon's reſerve of Scottiſh infantry, and commanded by Nicholas Brahé, count of Weiſſenburg.

The ſecond line conſiſted of the ſame numbers with the firſt, in reſpect both to regiments and brigades, ranged preciſely on like principles, excepting that the reſerve conſiſted of cavalry inſtead of infantry. Bulach commanded the right wing, Kniphauſen led the main body, and Erneſt, prince of Anhalt, conducted the left wing. It was the king's cuſtom, at this period, to make his lines only four deep in cavalry, and ſix in infantry; whereas Walſtein, following the antient practice of the Low-Countries, advanced always ten deep, at the very leaſt. The watch word, on both ſides, was the ſame that had been uſed at Leipſic. The Swedes had twenty field-pieces, of a moderate ſize, diſpoſed here and there to the beſt advantage; and ſeveral portable cannons of the king's invention were ordered to advance in the front of each body of intermingled muſqueteers†.

It is difficult to give the reader a diſtinct account of the Imperial diſpoſitions in this day's ſervice; for ſo greatly was Guſtavus admired, in the character of a field-officer, that the generality of plans, which have fallen within my reach, bear an eye principally to the Swediſh form of battle. Of Walſtein's therefore we ſhall ſay the leſs, as we are unable to ſpecify, by name, what colonels commanded the reſpective regiments; and likewiſe, to pronounce, deciſively, which of the two Imperial ground-plots, here exhibited, was realized

* Some ſay the *green*.

† The chevalier de Folard muſt make a miſtake in the arrangement, and plan, which he forms of the king's forces; and I think ſo the rather, becauſe he errs in the ichnographical windings of the *Fluſgraben* and the poſition of the gallows: ſo that it appears probable to me, that he never beheld the plains of Lützen, nor rightly knew the number of the Swediſh forces. He allows to the eight columns, on the loweſt computation, many more men, than the king, at that time, could produce; or more than he employed in the brigade, or column, then practiſed by him. He errs, likewiſe, in diſpoſing ſixteen bodies of infantry behind the columns, when, in truth, the reſerves of Henderſon and Ohem made only one regiment of foot, and one of cavalry, marked in the plan 53, and 54. Thus Folard, by two augmentations, has magnified the royal army *one third* at leaſt beyond the truth: nevertheleſs, the diſpoſition of the two reſerves is neither incorrect, nor unnatural. It is probable, if his Swediſh majeſty had been maſter of 5000 ſupernumerary ſoldiers, he might have placed them as the chevalier has. But as we have the names, by us, of every diſtinct corps which ſerved that day under Guſtavus, and cannot produce troops ſufficient to enlarge the columns, and make good the imaginary battalions, we find ourſelves obliged to paſs theſe remarks on an author highly excellent in moſt other reſpects.

by

by the commander in chief: whether, for example, *that* we have admitted into the body of the copper-plate, which is Dankaertz's; or *that* ſubjoined, and incloſed within a line, which reſts upon the authority of the Swediſh Intelligencer; for both writers were faithful collectors, and publiſhed their drafts ſoon after the death of Guſtavus. In my own private opinion, it appeared beſt to give the preference to the *firſt*, as it is drawn up, to a certain degree, upon two lines; the only material variation being, that in the centre of the ſecond plan Piccolomini's regiment of cavalry is placed amidſt the infantry. We can however obſerve, with greater certainty, that Walſtein, in imitation of Guſtavus, condeſcended to mix ſome infantry amongſt his cavalry, behind the windmills: That the conduct of the left wing was committed to Holk, ſupreme commander there till the arrival of Pappenheim, who always made a point of oppoſing Guſtavus. The right wing was intruſted to Colorcdo, and Walſtein undertook the command of the main body; making his appearance during the whole engagement in a ſedan chair, which his friends attributed to the gout, and his enemies imputed to timidity, and diſſimulation of ſickneſs.

When the king ſaw the vaſt extent of the Imperial line of battle, he could not refrain from obſerving to his followers, that if Walſtein was ſupported in a manner equal to appearances, he could not produce leſs than 30,000 effective men; and, by the way, freſh regiments were then marching every moment to the Auſtrian army, and Pappenheim's corps was expected by noon: ſo that the Walſteiners in effect brought 40,000 men into the field, before the day's ſervice was concluded; and as the town of Lützen touched the extremity of the Imperial right wing, care was taken to ſet fire to the outlying houſes, and line the garden-walls with ſtrong bodies of muſqueteers, which did unſpeakable miſchief the next day, till duke Bernard at night cut 500 of them to pieces.

It is agreed likewiſe by moſt authors, that Walſtein drew up his army in two lines, or ſomething nearly reſembling thereto; and that the centre conſiſted of four ſquare maſſes of infantry, poſted on the angles of a larger ſquare.——That each of theſe bodies contained two Imperial regiments, amounting perhaps, for war had made its havock amongſt them, to 3000 men, or thereabouts;——the inner ſquare conſiſting of pikemen, and the outward of muſqueteers;—— the whole group intirely ſolid:——and foraſmuch as the angles of ſuch a figure are eaſily ſtruck off from the main body of that figure, each corner was ſtrengthened with a little lozenge made up of fifty muſqueteers, which, like a ſort of Satellites,

# PLAN of the BA





Satellites, attended the motions of theſe larger Jupiters. Thus, ſays Folard* very ſenſibly, a firſt whimſical error was corrected by the ſubſtitution of a ſecond ſtill more paradoxical.

His majeſty, the beſt officer of infantry the world had ever ſeen†, placed his confidence this day, as he did at Leipſic, on the doctrine of columns, one of the fineſt pieces of military machinery, ſay ſome writers, that human wit can deviſe for the ſervice of the field; ſince bodies of infantry thus drawn up, arranged, and ſupported, may be pronounced with

* *Traité de la Colonne.* p. lxiv.

† It may not be uninſtructive, under this article, to ſubjoin a few remarks relating to the field arrangements of the king, the morality and diſcipline of his troops, &c. made by a perſon of condition as early as in the month of November 1630, long before his more perfect amendments and regulations took place. The account, ſays an exact hiſtorian, ran thus;

*** Dicebat ſe *novem & pulcherrimam* in ipſius exercitu *formam aciei* obſervaſſe, quam hoc loco deſcribere nimis prolixum foret. Summa huc redit, eam *munitioni* ſimilem, quæ ab omni parte, qua hoſti acceſſus patet, eum deſtinatis ictibus petere queat: neque tantum machinas commode poſſe diſplodi, ſed etiam *quemque* ſclopetarium viritim jaculari, & hoſtem ferire: quod in *magno agmine quadrato* fieri nequeat, ubi duobus aut tribus ordinibus ſclopeta diſplodentibus reliqui ictus ſint inanes, adeo ut agmen illud ab irruente equitatu facile diſſolvi poſſit: *quod in acie Suecica fieri nequeat*; nam priuſquam hoſtilis equitatus ſe loco movere aut impetum facere poſſit, *ſclopetarios* ſub præſidio non tantum haſtatorum, ſed etiam equitum, tanquam *duorum propugnaculorum*, quæ ad latera habeant, tutos eſſe: adhæc multos gradus inter ſclopetarios eſſe ad receptum, ut priuſquam hoſtilis equitatus ad ultimum agmen pervenire & illud diſturbare poſſit, eum diſſipari neceſſe ſit. Cum igitur *coherentia* totius aciei, equitatus & peditatus, tormentorum majorum ac minorum, nec non ſclopetariorum maximi ſit momenti: ſe non videre, quomodo hujuſmodi acies, *niſi Deo ita volente, aut ſi prius quam inſtructa ſit, hoſtis eam ex improviſo invadat, fundi fugarique poſſit: in eo autem victoriam verti, ut ordines ſerventur, nec acies rumpatur.*

Regem in conflictu (quod experientia teſtatur) imperterritum, nec minus præſenti animo eſſe, quam ſi ſit in convivio: periculum omne, ubi opus ſit, contemnere: à metu, qui oculos excæcet, & animum dejiciat, prorſus liberum eſſe: milites autem ipſius ita *exercitatos*, ut licet ordines ipſorum turbentur, eos mox reſtituere, & in locum ſuum redire poſſint: quod eo facilius ſit, quia tertia fere pars exercitus *ex præfectis & ducibus conſtet*: quod ſit robur exercitus.

Denique ſummopere ſibi placuiſſe dicebat, *quod ſingulis diebus, præter exactam diſciplinam, preces certis horis per tota caſtra bis devote habeantur*, & Deus rogetur, ut ipſis victoriam largiatur, milite diligenter monito, *felices ſucceſſus à Deo proficiſci.* * * * * * * *

Cum igitur tam fortes atque animoſos ſe [Sueci milites] præbeant, Germanos & Scotos ipſorum exemplo excitari, ut mori malint quam aliquo dicto commiſſo honoris ſui jacturam facere, aut ab aliis in officio faciendo ſuperari. Regem autem ex hac æmulatione multum emolumenti capere: quam ita ſovere & moderari norit, *ne gens una alteram odio proſequatur, ſed unaquæque fidem & virtutem ſuam Regi probet.*

juſtice

juſtice to be *next* to invincible. What this column *preciſely was in detail*, even before or at the battle of Leipſic, could at this period never be known, if a minute drawing of lord Reay, one of his majeſty's favourite colonels, had not been preſerved, by mere good fortune. That the king, in the preſent engagement improved, or, through ſcarcity of forces, altered the plan delineated by lord Reay, is a circumſtance highly probable; but whether the Frenchman's drawing be ſtrictly true, either as to the configuration or arrangement of the brigade, ſhall be left to the deciſion of better judges*.

In addition to what has been formerly ſaid, it may be worth remarking, that the glory of this day's ſervice muſt be attributed ſolely to the COLUMN of Guſtavus, which, in truth, according to the opinion of ſeveral excellent judges, exceeds all field diſpoſitions, not only in fair campaign, but alſo in rough and contracted ground; ſo that ſome writers, without aſſuming the gift of prophecy, have ventured to predict, that poſterity one time or other will adopt this idea and ſupport it with earneſtneſs. Let us only therefore compare the column in queſtion with thoſe *two* military diſpoſitions which moſt reſemble it. It exceeds the old *Burgundian ſquare* of Walſtein, not only in ſimplicity, velocity, and diverſity of motion, but becauſe its angles are, ſtrictly ſpeaking, unaſſailable, giving the adverſary neither hold nor entrance in whatever form he propoſes to attack them. Again, this very quadrangular maſs of Walſtein, the moſt proper configuration extant, whereby to oppoſe the column of Guſtavus, except another column, conformable to that prince's

* Folard ſeems to have received his idea of the brigade from traditional accounts; for *that*, which is ſubſtituted by him, carries little or no reſemblance to lord Reay's actual delineation, nor to the alteration of it into *one half, or thereabouts*, [ſee Plan N° II. p. 21 of this vol.] as his majeſty, on certain occaſions, might be induced to practiſe; but *it* bears more than a ſmall ſimilitude to the king's diviſion of *one* brigade into *four*; each of which *fourths* was denominated a *battaglia*, [Plan N° III. and IV. ibid.] but ſure we are, that *theſe battaglias* could not be ſtrong enough for the central parts in the engagement at Lützen, and therefore Folard's ichnographical repreſentation muſt be defective.

It is probable the king uſed the *half brigade* in this day's ſervice, for we have certain proofs he *did ſo* in the battle of Leipſic, ſince Dankäertz aſſures us, that each corps conſiſted of 1200 men; and the half brigade, or more properly the *improved brigade* of the *ſecond* ſize N° II., contained, according to our computation, 1224 men. So that this brigade, N° II. was not properly *half* in *ſuch proportion* as the battaglia was a *fourth*; for the numbers ſtood thus:

| | |
|---|---|
| Original brigade | 2016 |
| Half, or reformed | 1224 |
| Battaglia | 504 |

arrangement,

arrangement, ſurpaſſes that refinement upon him, which the moderns have ſurnamed the *hollow ſquare*, whoſe corners are ſtill weaker than thoſe of the other, and its impreſſion or reſiſtance leſs violent. But the brigade or column of Guſtavus is ſolid upon all occaſions, and verſatile in every reſpect; its fire, without talking figuratively, may be termed perpetual, and it is capable of being diverſified upon every new occurrence *ad infinitum*. It can contract itſelf in danger, or dilate in the moment of ſucceſs with equal eaſe; and as in the diſparting of ſolid bodies, if one may draw a compariſon from more humble ſubjects, more wedges than one, of ſizes different, are ſuppoſed to be neceſſary; thus an individual column *pro re natâ*, in a ſingle inſtant, can divide itſelf into a couple of columns differing in no reſpects from the parent which gave them birth, except in the circumſtances of weight and magnitude.

It has been aſked by many, how this great tactical invention took its flight from the world *at once* after the death of Guſtavus? To which queſtion it may ſuffice to reply, that it expired by *ſwift degrees*, but not *inſtantaneouſly*. For the Swediſh general Kniphauſen fought and conquered upon the principle of columns at the battle of Oldendorp in 1633; and five campaigns afterwards, the victory of Wittenweyr, where duke Bernard commanded, and Turenne and Guébriant ſerved under him, was obtained by imitating the ſelf-ſame practice *.

About nine in the morning the king drew his ſword, and placed himſelf at the head of the right wing, attended by the duke of Saxe Lauenberg, Crailſham the grand maſter of his houſhold, a body of Engliſh and Scottiſh gentlemen, whom he had *reformed* at Schlenſing, and deſtined to be a ſort of aids-de-camp, and ſome few domeſtics and grooms. But as Walſtein's left wing extended further than the king's right wing, his majeſty, for fear of being attacked in flank, ordered three diviſions to advance from the line of cavalry, which was poſted behind him †, and when Kniphauſen miſſed theſe troops from their ſtation, and begged by meſſage to know what was become of them, the king returned him back word by the duke of Saxe Lauenberg, that after one charge, he ſhould find them at his ſervice in their old poſition.

* *Merian*, Theatr. Europæum. tom. ii.

† Namely N° 19. 21, 22. commanded by Bulach.

By

By this time the cannonade began to grow extremely violent; for Walſtein's artillery, though not great in quantity, was exceedingly heavy, and being well mounted on proper batteries, made uncommon ſlaughter amongſt the Swediſh ſoldiers. This ſharpened the king to bring on a general engagement as ſpeedily as poſſible, having nothing with him but field-pieces, and ſmall portable cannons. His whole army had to croſs the ditches, which were well lined with muſqueteers, and had been rendered, by Walſtein, five feet deep, which incommoded the cavalry eſpecially, and beyond meaſure; yet this important obſtacle was at length ſurmounted, and the commanded muſqueteers, in conjunction with a Swediſh brigade, cleared the whole high road, and then the battle began in all its forms. Nevertheleſs, the four Swediſh brigades of the firſt line, the fineſt body of infantry then in the world, found croſſing the ditches ſo extremely hazardous and perplexing, that their ardour abated a little, and they ſeemed to pauſe. His majeſty, who was poſted at ſome inconſiderable diſtance from the centre, not perceiving them to advance in ſuch proportion as the troops which he conducted, flew to them in an inſtant, and diſmounting, ſnatched a partizan from one of the officers, in order to lead them over the foſſe*. *If*, ſaid he, with a tone of ſeverity as he marched along, *after having paſſed ſo many rivers, ſcaled numberleſs fortreſſes, and fought various battles, your antient intrepidity has at once deſerted you, ſtand firm at leaſt ſome minutes longer, and have the curioſity to ſee your maſter* die—*in the manner he* ought, *and in the manner he* chuſes. Upon this the ſoldiers all cried out, *Stop, Sire, for heaven's ſake ſpare that invaluable life of your's*; *diſtruſt us not*; *the buſineſs ſhall be completed* †.

Guſtavus returning to the head of the right wing, ſoon ſet an example to his keeneſt ſoldiers; for making his horſe ſpring acroſs the ditch, his companions thought themſelves obliged to follow him cheerfully. Having caſt a glance

* *Continuat. Laur. Auſtriac.* fol. 32.

† *Theatr. Europ.* fol. 747, &c. He that deſcribes a battle without well conſidering the ground, and having a diſtinct plan before his eyes, both which advantages we have the good fortune to boaſt, will commit errors upon errors, *ad infinitum*. Du Prade ſays, the king made this ſpeech to the regiments of *La Tour* [Thurn] and *Chreſtoph*; but unfortunately for the French hiſtoriographer, Guſtavus never had ſuch a regiment as the latter in his ſervice. Riccio makes the reprimand addreſſed to the corps of Thurn and Anhalt (N° 28. 32.) Now theſe troops were placed in the rear of the centre and left wing, nor were they moved from their ſtation till ſome hours after the death of Guſtavus.

over

over the Imperial wing that oppoſed him, and perceiving there three ſingle maſſes of Imperial cuiraſſiers, clad in iron, and Iſolani's Croatian cavalry, which terminated the firſt line, he called to him colonel Stalhaus, an officer of great repute, though he had been originally only a foot-man: *Stalhaus,* ſaid he, *charge me thoſe black fellows ſoundly, for they are the men that will undo us*: as to the Croatians, I mind them not.* Others, with leſs authority, diverſify the expreſſions: *they are the men,* IT IS PROPHESIED, *will undo us.* Stalhaus executed the royal orders with great alacrity; but the irregular cavalry, according to cuſtom, changed their ſtation, and attacked the baggage-waggons, putting all at firſt into ſuch confuſion, that the king's own coach ran away in the univerſal diſorder. Thus Bulach, whoſe three diviſions Guſtavus had commanded from Kniphauſen's ſecond line, was obliged to attend theſe deſultory combatants, and afforded no other aſſiſtance to the firſt and grand impreſſion, which his maſter undertook to make. Soon after, namely, about eleven a clock in the morning, the king received the ſtroke of death; and immediately a miſt aroſe which, though the day promiſed to be brighter than uſually appears in the month of November, obſcured the ſky on a ſudden to ſuch a degree, that the ſoldiers could hardly diſcover their companions at twenty feet diſtance. We will paſs over the unpleaſing event of his majeſty's death for a few moments, and purſue the various changes and circumſtances of the battle, which was gained upon the king's principles of *arrangement,* and *field-diſpoſition,* although the great Guſtavus was then no more!

As the duke of Saxe Lauenberg immediately left the field, and conveyed himſelf to Weiſſenfels, ſuppoſing, as his friends gave out, that the day was loſt irrecoverably; the firſt intelligence duke Bernard received of his maſter's death, was the diſcovery of his horſe, which being wounded in the ſhoulder, galloped up and down the line of battle. The duke immediately *whiſpered* this fatal news to Kniphauſen, and they both agreed in an inſtant, from *that* preſence of mind peculiar to great men, to ſpread a report, that the king of Sweden was taken *priſoner,* which ſoon produced the deſired effect; for the ſoldiers thenceforwards fought like

* Theſe were Marazini's cuiraſſiers, &c. which former boaſted the honour of having killed the king; yet it is probable that he fell by the hands of Piccolomini's cavalry, and therefore Walſtein made him that extraordinary preſent, which we have mentioned elſewhere.

enraged

enraged lions * in order to recover their leader's body; or, as Scheffer informs us † with ſtronger probability, every man had an ambition to expire the ſame day with his royal leader.

The miſt, which aroſe about the time the king fell, proved no way inconvenient to the right wing, where his majeſty commanded; for the Imperialiſts at that period had rather the advantage: but Stalhaus, to whom the command then devolved, made uſe of the incident, to reinſtate and new diſpoſe his forces, and making a freſh deſperate charge, recovered the royal body of his ſovereign maſter.

At this very period the Swediſh generals led on their troops to a ſecond conflict. Here it was, that the four central brigades, in front, performed wonders, as has been acknowledged even by the Imperialiſts themſelves; for they drove their enemies to the foot of the gallows, and almoſt totally ruined that large invincible maſs of troops that belonged to Piccolomini. Here it was too that the two regiments of elder Bruner and young Walſtein made a reſiſtance ſo very obſtinate and unparalleled, that the Imperial generaliſſimo, when he retreated into Bohemia, adopted the reſidue of them for his own guards round the palace of Prague, and clothed, paid, and fed them at his own expence.

The Swedes moreover took ſeveral ſtandards ‡, and ſeized a battery conſiſting of ſeven large pieces of cannon, that was planted before this body of troops; which in truth was effected the more eaſily, as Walſtein's powder-waggons in that quarter had by ſome accident taken fire a few minutes before. This ſharp conteſt laſted near an hour, and, to render matters ſtill more diſagreeable to the Imperial commander, a body of 1000 German cavalry conceived a panic terror, without any aſſignable reaſon, and conſulted their ſafety in ſuch a manner, as never more to return during that day's ſervice. All they ſaid was, for an Engliſh officer, then a priſoner, was hurried away with them in the tumult; *We know the king of Sweden very well; he always ſhines towards the end of a battle.*

Now, after a ſhort intermiſſion, the count de Pappenheim arrived, and ſo highly was that officer eſteemed by all parties, that notwithſtanding the confuſion and tumult of the late engagement, a report paſſed from mouth to mouth

* *Loccen.* Hiſt. Suec. lib. viii. 604. *Pietro Pomo*; Guerre di Germ. 4°. 228.

† *Memorab. Suec. Gent.* 181.

‡ *Merc. Franç.* tom. xviii. 735.

through

through either army, that Pappenheim was come at the head of his cavalry, and invincible infantry. This rumour was not ſtrictly true, for when Walſtein's meſſage found him at Halle, his foot-ſoldiers had diſperſed round that town and Merſburg in queſt of plunder; ſo that he had time only to march his cuiraſſiers and dragoons*, which amounted, it is probable, to about 6 or 7000 combatants. He had a poſt preſerved for him, which he always affected, and that was the wing oppoſite Guſtavus. Of this he took the command in an inſtant; but whilſt he was making ſome diſpoſitions at the head of the line, he received a ſtroke from a falcon-ſhot. Nevertheleſs, as ſoon as the ball had reached him, the wound being given in his thigh, upon recovering his ſenſes, he ſpoke cheerfully to his men, though he well knew he had received a blow from the hand of death. A coach conveyed him out of the battle, and his chaplain, whom he had ſent for, attended him. As he paſſed through the ranks, he called a particular officer to him: *Sir*, ſaid he, *tell Walſtein*, giving him no title of highneſs, excellency, general, &c. *that* WHAT *I have received is enough for my purpoſe*; *but tell him too, that I have preſerved the* catholic religion, *and made the emperor a* FREE MAN †: for he knew at that time Guſtavus was dead. He then faced death with the ſame tranquillity in his bed, as he had done on innumerable occaſions in the field of battle: for this brave and prudent commander, as if he had determined to rival Guſtavus in every thing, was one of the moſt moral and religious perſons in the Imperial army ‡. He was born the ſame year with Guſtavus, and exceeded him in age only ſix months and a few days. It is remarkable, that he had triumphed over his enemies in *forty-four battles and rencounters*, but lived not to receive the order of the Golden Fleece, which had been promiſed him the preceding autumn §. The chamber in which he expired is ſtill ſhewn at Leipſic with great reſpect ‖. It is a little mean apartment in the caſtle of Pleiſſenberg.

Yet the name of Pappenheim, his having received the wound being generally unknown, was ſufficient to revive

* *Helvici* Hiſt. lib. xxi. p. 231.

† *Riccius* de Bello Germ. 437.

‡ *Idem*, 438.

§ *Relat. Eſpagnole de la Bataille de Litzen.* Printed at Liſbon 1633. 4°.

‖ Di queſta morte, frà le morti riputata feliciſſima da ſoldati, finì la vita nel fiore dell' eta, et delle ſue glorie Goffredo di Pappenheim, ornato delle più excelle dote, ch' illuſtraſſero giamai capitano di fama; in vita dopò Guſtavo Re di Suecia, primo guerrier de ſuoi tempi; e nella morte, ſtimata ſolo, dal ſentimento commune de gl' huomini, condegna à bilanciare la perdita d'un tanto Re. [*Pietro Pomo*; *Guerre di Germ.* Liber iv. 126.]

the ardor of the Imperial combatants; nor were the ſuccours he brought, as his troops were the beſt ſeaſoned of all that ſerved under the enſigns of the league, conſidered by any man as a contemptible reinforcement.

Now began a third engagement of two hours duration; for new life was infuſed into the Imperial army upon the return of Pappenheim's forces. On that general's leaving the field, Holk reſumed the command of the left wing, in like manner as Stalhaus replaced Guſtavus. They engaged each other with various fortune, but the combat was attended with no one deciſive event.

Meanwhile Piccolomini, Tertzky, and others, led on to the charge the Imperial centre, conſiſting of four great ſquare maſſes of infantry, each conſiſting of 3000 men, or thereabouts, and flanked by two regiments of cuiraſſiers, all which troops ſeconded their leaders with extreme reſolution. Here Piccolomini was twice or thrice ſhot, yet never left the ſcene of action. The wreck fell extremely heavy on the four Swediſh brigades that confronted them*, the flower and glory of the royal army; ſo that excepting the right-hand brigade, commanded by Charles Harte, which the Smoland cavalry protected, and the left-hand brigade, which received ſhelter from duke Bernard's horſe, the two middlemoſt had five perſons out of ſix killed or diſabled †. It was remarked that this veteran body of infantry, when the men were killed, lay ſtretched out almoſt as regularly, as if the ſurvivors had placed the corpſes in battle array.

This laſt deſperate ſtruggle ſeemed to portend no good to the Swediſh cauſe; for the battery before taken was now regained, and eight ſtandards loſt, one of which belonged to the king's own company of royal guards. Kniphauſen, who commanded the rear of the centre, an officer of unparalleled coolneſs and foreſight, ſoon reinſtated affairs, by diſpatching to the relief of his aſſociates the two regiments of Thurn and Mitzval ‡, and four conſiderable bodies of horſe; namely, the prince of Anhalt's, Lowenſtein's, Brandſtein's, and Steinboch's §, which latter, conſiſting of dragoons, was a favourite corps in the eſtimation of their late maſter. This judicious reinforcement ſoon reſtored the fortunes of the day; ſo that the Swedes retook the battery, and another on its left hand, which contained four pieces of large artillery.

* N° 8, 9, 10, 11.

† The blue brigade (Winkle's) had ſerved under Charles IX. the king's father. *Relat. Eſpagnole.*

‡ N° 38, 39. This Mitzval was a brother to the colonel whom Guſtavus beheaded in Bavaria.

§ N° 35, 23, 31, 29.

Duke

Duke Bernard in the left wing had a piece of ſervice to engage in that was equally deſperate; for the enormous battery of all, near the windmills, laid full in his front; and the road and ditch being nearer the enemy, rendered all approaches more difficult to him than the reſt of the army. He had once conceived an idea of ſetting fire to Lützen, which Walſtein had partly effected the ſame morning, and attacking the Croatians at the extremity of the Imperial wing, in their flank; but for certain good reaſons, as the enemy could have lined the town-walls with freſh ſupplies of muſqueteers, he forebore to put the idea into execution. Nevertheleſs, in the ſpace of two hours he led his troops on to the charge twelve ſeveral times, whilſt Coloredo, who commanded againſt him, being protected by a numerous train of artillery, which it was prudent in him upon no advantage to remove himſelf from, allowed the young and valiant hero, already wounded in the right arm, to waſte his ſtrength againſt ſuch extraordinary difficulties in what proportions he pleaſed; and in one of theſe attacks thundered againſt the duke with ſuch violence, that the prince thought it not an unſoldier-like action to ſhelter himſelf for a few moments under the miller's houſe marked L. Meanwhile Kniphauſen kept the rear-line compoſed and in excellent order, diſpatching his little aſſiſtance to all places where they could be looked upon as needful. By this time the miſt cleared off, and as all parties ſeemed deſirous to know the fate of their companions, a kind of pauſe or breathing-ſpace enſued, ſeemingly as it were, by the tacit deſire of the combatants.

Upon this duke Bernard galloped up and down the lines of battle, in order to contemplate the countenance and ſituation of his fellow-ſoldiers. He ſoon perceived the greater part of the army exceedingly ſhattered, but rejoiced at the ſame time to perceive that Kniphauſen had preſerved the rear of the centre and the reſerve in excellent order. They agreed in a moment to renew the combat. At the ſame time Walſtein, taking advantage of the ſky then clearing, diſpatched Piccolomini and Tertzky to obſerve the Swedes, who brought him back word, that they were new-forming themſelves, and returning to a fourth engagement. It was in this onſet, that the royal army brought ten of their own field-pieces to act againſt the windmill battery; and the eleven cannons which they had taken from the Imperialiſts; for the ſtreſs of the action by univerſal conſent was now near the town of Lützen, whoſe adjacent walls being lined with muſqueteers, ſorely galled the advancing Swedes. Here Walſtein received a ſlight ſtroke from a muſquet-ball that had ſpent its force; and duke Bernard and Coloredo engaged

till evening with a fury and obſtinacy that can hardly be deſcribed; pauſing from and reſuming the combat like fatigued duellers. The fortune of the day began now to incline manifeſtly to the Swediſh ſide, which acknowledged its ſucceſs to be partly due to the *intermingled* muſqueteers *; but the fog, not unfavourably for the Imperialiſts, obſcured the ſkies a ſecond time, ſo that duke Bernard could not help crying out, *Gracious God! had it not been for this darkneſs, I had completed the affair!*

Now a rumour ran through either army with the rapidity of lightning, that Pappenheim's infantry was at length arrived; which, though the report proved afterwards falſe, might have diſmayed any troops, except the Swediſh ones. The attack was ſtill continued with great violence near the windmills. At length duke Bernard having rallied his cavalry, and being ſeconded by Kniphauſen with four freſh regiments of infantry, the Imperial army was reduced to the laſt extremity; and night put an end to the deſperate day's ſervice on the plains of Lützen.

Yet the Swedes, if we conſider the confuſion the miſts had created, were far from certain that the battle was concluded. Duke Bernard and Kniphauſen held a conſultation, whether they ſhould retire to Weiſſenfels or not; at length they determined heroically, upon ſuppoſition they found the attempt barely practicable, to preſerve the ſpot of ground they had gloriouſly maintained; for they were not abſolutely ſure they had gotten the victory. In this interval Walſtein ſounded a retreat, the meaning of which the Swedes happened not to comprehend: but an Imperial horſeman, who had orders to command Hoffkirk's regiment to follow the generaliſſimo to Leipſic, fell by chance upon colonel Ohem's regiment of cavalry, which made in the daytime the final reſerve of the army, and having kept free from action, was appointed the advanced guard at night. The cavalier being aſked whom he wanted, replied, naturally, Hoffkirk's regiment: Here it is, replied the ſentinel, and conducted him immediately to his own commander, colonel Ohem.——Then it was the Swediſh generals comprehended, for the firſt time, the great advantages they had obtained. The ſoldiers, without any refreſhment, ſlept all night on the hard ground; and a ſevere froſt, which came on before morning, happened to kill many of the wounded that might otherwiſe have ſurvived.

The battle laſted about nine hours. The Imperialiſts loſt 7000 men, and the Swedes between 2 and 3000. Many more might have been deſtroyed by the latter, but night

* *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 375.

prevented

prevented *all purſuit.* It is the purſuit, which gives us the *long liſt of dead and wounded* in a great victory; and therefore it may be worth while to remark here incidentally, that the Saxons, who fled from the plains of Leipſic, loſt *doubly* more men than the Swedes, who remained and fought valorouſly many hours afterwards till the cloſe of the evening.

Amongſt the killed on one ſide was the KING of SWEDEN, whom the Imperialiſts pronounced the braveſt enemy, and the beſt general in Chriſtendom *: as alſo the counts Nils and Weiſſenburg, colonel Gerſdorf, ſerjeant-major-general Uſlar, Erneſt prince of Anhalt, count Thurn, and colonel Wildeſſein.

Amongſt

* It may be worth while here to give mankind the idea, which the more bigoted papiſts, towards whom he ever comported himſelf with all imaginable courteſy and moderation, entertained of Guſtavus. True it is, he diſliked the Jeſuits, and uſually expreſſed himſelf with warmth on their intriguing, miſchievous interferences, and relaxed morality. They, on the other hand, as the miniſtry in England ſurnamed him the *dragoon-king*, always beſtowed on him the denomination of *genuine antichriſt*.

"Acie cecidit Guſtavus, inter noſtræ memoriæ duces facile primus, niſi "magis pugnax quam regem deceret.—Militaris diſciplinæ peritia, bellicaque "virtute nemo potuit cum eo componi. Erga etiam gregarios milites facilis "regium ſupercilium demiſit: quo fiebat, ut eſſet acceptiſſimus militum animis, quamvis eos a furtis & ſtupris pœnis durioribus coerceret.

"Exercitus ſuos ſeveriſſima diſciplina continuit: cultus ei corporis nihil a "vulgari abhorrens; veſtes nullo auro diſtinctæ, aut aureis amentis inſignes: "nihil in amictu pretioſum nitebat.——*In ſuæ ſuperſtitionis* IMPIETATE "PIISSIMUS; *ſummaque ei atque exacta ſuorum ſacrorum cura, cum eos ritus, "quibus a rudibus annis imbutus fuerat,* EXQUISITA *religione ſervaret.*

"Me ſane eorum miſeret, qui parentum erroribus eruditiuntur, & falſis hæreticorum placitis inſtituti, vanis religionibus, in quibus nati educatique "ſunt, tenaciſſime hæreant. Rex tamen nunquam catholicam religionem "contempſit, immo maximum honorem pluribus religioſorum hominum fa"miliis habuit: præcipue patrum Capuchinorum arctas rigidaſque vitæ ra"tiones obſtupuit; de quibus dicere conſueverat, eos patres eſſe validiſſimum "catholicæ veritatis argumentum."—

"Fuit aſſentationis infenſiſſimus hoſtis; nam et ſuos duces non ita pridem, "antequam acie caderet, acribus verbis accepit, quod *ſuæ virtuti felicitatique "victoriarum laudes, non Deo tribuerent*: et ſane ſi rerum geſtarum magnitudinem, expeditionumque fortunatos eventus atque exitus intuemur, nullus "Rex multis abhinc ſæculis eo felicior cenſeri poteſt: cum veluti fulmen totam Germaniæ latitudinem a Baltico mari uſque ad Carnicas rupes cuncta "belli terrore evertens exiguo tempore emenſus, centum & triginta urbes "aut bello domuerit, aut in fidem, & deditionem acceperit." *Riccius de Bellis German.* 4°. 433, 434.

——"Prodotto dalla natura per vivamente rappreſentar al mondo l' unica "e perfetta idea d' un gran prencipe; poſſedeva, quaſi moſtro delle militari "perfettioni, cumulatamente tutte le più eccelſe parti, che ſi ricchiedono ad "illuſtrare un gran capitano; la giuſtitia e la clemenza erano unite in lui con"tempra sì forte, che mai nell' attioni ſue ſi viddero ſcompagnate; ne vi fù "mai prencipe, ch' adun' iſteſſo tempo meglio di lui ſapeſſe farſi da ſudditi "amare e temere; parve mentr' egli viſſe, ſuenar ſe medeſima la fortuna,

Amongſt the ſlain on the other ſide may be reckoned the illuſtrious Pappenheim, the prince and abbot of Fulda*, count

" per riemper lui ſolo di trionfi, e di gloria, e naſcondendo à bell' arte i preggi
" propriii, voler, che ſolo al valore di lui s' attribuiſſero gl' eſiti dell' impreſe
" felici; in tutte le fattioni del commandare, e del combattere, eſemplare
" non meno à ſoldati che à capitani; epilogo in ſomma dell' arti tute del
" dominare, e nella pace e nella guerra; viſſe ne' ſuoi riti religioſo oſſervator
" delle più eſquiſite virtù morali; nè i buoni v' hebbero altro à deſiderare
" in lui, che un vero lume di fede. Il livore e l' invidia vi trovarono di più,
" da notare in lui una ſubita colera e un ardir ſoverchio: ma quella, corretta
" d'un immediata dolcezza, e affabilità naturale, conciliava in altrui più, che
" odio, ò timore, amore, e riverenza. Queſto diffetto ordinario dell' anime
" grandi, che non capendo nell' anguſtia d'un cuor humano, ſgorga, e pro-
" rompe nel deſiderabile della gloria, ſenz' avertire all' horribile, che lo
" minaccia; era à ciaſcheduno, che lo mirava riguardevole per la grand-
" dezza del corpo e vie più venerabile per la venuſtà della faccia, in cui mani-
" feſto ſcorgevaſi quel raggio di Maeſtà, che d'ordinario imprime Dio nella
" fronte di quelli, che coſtituiſce dominatori di qualche gran parte dell' uni-
" verſo." *Pietro Pomo, Guerre di Germania*, 4°. libr. iv. 128, 129.

—" Tal fine hebbe Guſtavo Secondo, Rè di Suecia, capitano e nel valore e
" nella peritia non inferiore a qualſivoglia de gli antichi. E non ha dubbio,
" che ſe la morte non gli rompeva sì preſto il corſo de' ſuoi vaſtiſſimi penſieri,
" gemerebbe hora la Germania, e gran parte del reſto dell' Europa ſotto
" giogo Straniero. Poiche oſſervantiſſimo della diſciplina militare, ſeppe in ſe
" ſteſſo & ne' ſuoi ſoldati, mantenerla ſempre viva. Non laſciava marcir nell'
" ozio la ſoldateſca: ma quando non v' era contraſto nemico, la teneva
" eſſercitata con moderate fatiche; et abbaſandoſi egli ſteſſo dalla regia con-
" dizione a quella del più baſſo uffiriale inſegnava a formar le ſquadre, a
" maneggiar l' armi, come sì ſcaricaſſe il moſchetto in piedi, come curvo,
" come a ſedere. Non comportò mai nelle guerre di tanti anni, che nel ſuo
" eſſercito sì trovaſſer donne di ſcandalo. E voleva ne' ſoldati la modeſtia, e
" l' affabilità con tutti, vietando affatto ogni inſolenza. Per dar' animo agli
" altri ſoleva metterſi a combattere alla teſta: & a chi lo pregava a porſi in
" luogo più ſicuro, rèſpondeva, *Ch' egli era ſolito non di ſpignere, ma di guidar'*
" *i ſoldati alla battaglia.* Onde non è maraviglia, ſe nel corſo continuo di tanti
" anni con nazioni ferociſſime, otteneſſe tante vittorie; e che nell' iſteſſa
" battaglia, dov' ei fu privo di vita, il ſuo eſſercito reſtaſſe vittorioſo.
" Aggiungaſi a tutto queſto, che non havendoſi eletto alcun' Idolo, al cui ca-
" priccio doveſſe ſacrificare e la propria riputazione, e'l ſangue, e le ſoſtanze
" de' ſudditi; ma riconoſcendo i meriti di tutti, e dipendendo da ſe ſteſſo;
" concilioſſi appreſſo i ſuoi una venerazione tranſcendente l' humana ca-
" pacità. E felice invero poteva riputarſi, s' el valore che da Dio gli era ſtato
" donato, fuſſe da lui ſtato impiegato, non in danno della religione cat-
" tolica. Ma venendo a mancare nelle ſue grandi impreſe la giuſtitia della
" cauſa, reſtan prive di quel premio che ſi deve alla pietà & religione."
*Ritratti & Elogii di Capitani Illuſtri*, 387, &c.

* John Bernard Schenk, prince and abbot, choſen March 12, 1623. Curioſity led him to the battle. A cannon-ball ſtruck him as he contemplated the action from one of the windmills. (*Le Barre, Hiſt. D'Allemagne, Theatr. Europ. tom.* ii. 749.) This prelate had a title to the ſame motto which his late neighbour the biſhop of Wurtzburg and Bamberg aſſumed in

count Bertholt Walſtein, ſerjeant-major-general Breüner, ſix colonels, and a prince of Ditrichſtein.

The Imperialiſts loſt only twenty-one pieces of artillery; for Walſtein, who little expected the king ſhould attack him, was not greatly provided; it being his firm opinion, till convinced by ocular proof to the contrary, that Guſtavus would not attempt to act deciſively before the Saxon and Lunenberg armies had formed their junction with him. So that this general, if I remember right, had but twenty-ſeven large cannons in all; though ſome writers add ten pieces more. Now ſuch a collection may be conſidered as a kind of defect in point of military precaution, foraſmuch as it was in his power to have procured a larger ſtore;——and under this article we may blame him likewiſe for the looſe and diſperſed cantonment of all his forces, many of whom marched the whole night, and were half fatigued when they faced their opponents the enſuing morning *. He is cenſured moreover for making his appearance in a ſedan-chair, and rarely, if ever, expoſing his perſon in ſuch trying emergencies as we have here recited. But Piccolomini made ample amends for the ſhyneſs of his generaliſſimo; for though he had three horſes killed under him, and received ten wounds, yet he ſtaid till the laſt man on the field of battle †. It may ſuffice to add, that Walſtein retreated precipitately without a purſuer from Leipſic to Prague, and there held a ſevere court-martial, which might be conſidered as a *forenſic* campaign. For moſt of his officers died gallantly; and a young colonel, whoſe ſcaffold was erected under our chieftain's window, began his ſpeech in the following manner: *Gentlemen, I preſent myſelf here to die; and upon what accaſion? For running away with my generaliſſimo.*——But Walſtein, who affected to be extravagant in all things, was alike extraordinary in rewards and in puniſhments; for he gave many of his officers gold chains, adorned with diamonds, to which a medal of himſelf was affixed, that amounted each to the value of £. 500.——He preſented Piccolomini with a large ſum, £.1600., as we have mentioned formerly ‡; and when

the beginning of the Bohemian wars 1618. Being obliged to furniſh to the Imperial army a large contingent, as duke of Franconia, he affixed this device to his ſtandards: *Una manu gladium, altera Breviarium*; nor would the ſelf-ſame lemma twenty-five years afterwards have proved remarkably improper for Bernard van Galen, biſhop of Münſter.

* *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 373.

† Octavio Piccolomini, deſcended from one of the beſt families in Sienna; created afterwards duke of Amalfi. The more curious may peruſe his life at large in a quarto, entitled, *Scelta di Azioni egregie da generali e da Soldati Italiani dall' anno 1600 ſino al 1700.* Venet. 1742. 4to.

‡ Pag. 85 of this vol.

when the king of Denmark reclaimed Holk, as his ſubject, under pain of confiſcating his little poſſeſſions, he gave him his choice of four Bohemian ſignories, which contained each of them ſixteen or eighteen dorps and villages.

Here it may be proper to ſay ſomething more diffuſe concerning the death of Guſtavus, who fought ſword in hand at the head of the Smoland cavalry, which cloſed the right flank of the centre, and, perhaps, in his ardour outſtripped the brigades which compoſed the main body, and whoſe buſineſs it was to advance upon the ſame line with himſelf. As his majeſty's eyeſight was not the moſt perfect, and foraſmuch as a miſt began gently to obſcure the ſky, it is moſt probable to imagine * that, attended only by his own followers and ſervants, and the ſquadron commanded by him, he had a violent deſire to examine the center of the Imperial army, towards which his own invincible *brigades* were now advancing, and on whoſe bravery and firmneſs he principally grounded the future ſucceſs of the day's ſervice. It is natural, I ſay, to conclude, that the king loſt his life in ſome attempt like this, being prompted on by a high ſpirit of impatience and curioſity; for moſt accounts agree, that he fell by the hands of Piccolomini's cuiraſſiers, whom ſome place in the firſt line of the Imperial left wing oppoſite the letter C, and others place it in the very central point behind letter B; but the confuſion and difficulties under each of thoſe articles are ſo perplexing and intricate, that I have ſometimes been induced to think, that Piccolomini was a colonel both of infantry and cavalry, and that two regiments derived their names from him; that ſort of honour and encouragement being not unfrequent in the Swediſh ſervice; where duke Bernard had a couple of regiments, a ſubſtitute-colonel being appointed; and ſo had Teüffel, Kniphauſen, Falkenberg, and others †.

Here therefore, that is, in the front of the troops firſt deſcribed, or, which is more probable, in the interval between them and the adjoining maſs of infantry, Guſtavus received a ball in his left arm ‡, which at firſt he either did not feel or diſregarded, ſtill keeping foremoſt, with great intrepidity; yet the ſoldiers perceived their leader to be wounded, long before he ſpoke to that effect, and expreſſed their affliction and conſternation: *Courage, my comrades,* replied he, *the affair is nothing: let us reſume our point, and return to*

* *Memoirs communicated. Theatr. Europ.* tom. ii. fol. 742. *Caraffa*, lib. iii. 402. 12°. *Colon. Agrip.* 1639.

† *Arma Suecica*, p. 73.

‡ Another account ſays, that he received two piſtol-ſhots. *Memoirs communicated.*

*the*

*the charge* *. One of the equerries cried out likewiſe, that his majeſty was wounded, for which the king reproved him harſhly †. At length perceiving his voice and ſtrength fail him, and fearing to diſmay his brave aſſociates, he whiſpered the duke of Saxe Lauenberg to this purport: *Couſin* ‡, *I perceive myſelf to be grievouſly wounded: convey me hence to ſome place of ſafety* §. In that inſtant, as the king's followers were preparing to retreat, an Imperial cavalier advanced, unobſerved, in this momentary confuſion of turning, and having cried out, *Long have I ſought thee* ‖, tranſpierced his majeſty with a piſtol-ball through the body; but he lived not to glory in this inhumanity; for the maſter of the horſe to the duke of Saxe Lauenberg ſhot him dead with the words recent on his lips. Upon this Piccolomini's cuiraſſiers gave the king's companions a moſt deſperate attack. His majeſty was for ſome moments ſupported on his ſaddle, but the horſe being at that very inſtant ſhot in the ſhoulder, made a deſperate plunge, and flung the rider to the earth. His few perſonal attendants ſtaid with him; but the troops that accompanied him were ſoon diſperſed. One of the gentlemen of the bedchamber, who was likewiſe on the ground, cried out aloud, in order to ſave his maſter's life, that *he* was the king of Sweden. Upon which an Imperial cuiraſſier, who had alighted to ſtrip the bodies, ran him through with his ſword: Guſtavus afterwards being aſked who he was, replied boldly, *I am the king of Sweden, and ſeal with my blood the proteſtant religion, and the liberties of Germany:* adding likewiſe, *Alas! my* POOR QUEEN! *Alas! my* POOR QUEEN! The Imperialiſts gave him five dreadful and inhuman wounds; and though one ſhot him through the head, he had ſtrength to pronounce, *My God! my God!* His body was ſtripped in an inſtant, the ſhirt excepted, for every enemy was deſirous to poſſeſs ſome ſpoil that belonged to him. His buff waiſtcoat was ſent to the arſenal at Vienna **,

* *Merc. Franc.* tom. xviii. p. 734.

† *Memoires de Santa Cruz*, tom. v. 3.

‡ This appellation was not purely an expreſſion of regal courteſy, for the wife of Guſtavus Vaſa, and grandmother of Guſtavus Adolphus, was a princeſs of Saxe Lauenberg; and our king's father's ſiſter married Magnus III. duke of Saxe Lauenberg, who was brother to the father of Francis Albert, concerning whom we are now ſpeaking. *Mem. communicat.*

§ *Santa Cruz*, ibid.

‖ We have at length diſcovered, that this perſon was one *Maurice Falkenberg*, a lieutenant of cavalry in Goëtz's regiment. He knew the king, having been lately his priſoner, and received many courteſies from him on account of his ſurname or kindred: for if the reader remembers, there was a baron *Falkenberg*, a German born, who bravely defended Magdeburg againſt Tilly. *Memoirs communicated. Vide Monumenta Paderbornenſia*, 216.

** *Parin. Relat. Hiſt.* p. 11.

but

but fell firſt into Piccolomini's hands*. A common ſoldier ſeized *that magical* ſword†, concerning which the German profeſſors have publiſhed more diſſertations than one; and Holk obtained by purchaſe the poſſeſſion of his ring and ſpurs. One Schneberg, a lieutenant in Goëtz's cavalry, ſeized his gold chain, which is ſtill preſerved in the Schneberg family; namely, at the time the *Monumenta Paderbornenſia* were made public‡.

Having mentioned this work, we muſt beg leave to remark tranſiently, that it was compoſed by Ferdinand de Furſtenberg biſhop of Paderborn; and as the preſent part is purely digreſſional, it may be wondered, why this perſon was ſo extremely anxious to make ſuch minute enquiries concerning the authors of the king's death. But his own words under this article ſhall ſolve the difficulty; for the good prelate had a mind that the natives of his dioceſe ſhould claim the honour of deſtroying *Antichriſt*; for ſuch the Papiſts ſtyled Guſtavus.

*Placuit hoc recens Paderbornenſium militum facinus, dum vetera monumenta percenſemus, hic ſubnectere.*——NE QUI ALII, UT POST VICTORIAM IGNAVI ETIAM GLORIANTUR, HANC SIBI LAUDEM PRÆCERPANT.

Nevertheleſs it may be worth while to remark here, that though Schneberg took the chain, yet from the period in queſtion to the preſent moment, we know nothing concerning a famous *Turquoiſe* enchaſed therein, and hanging at the bottom, of extraordinary ſize and beauty, and belonging from time immemorial to the crown of Sweden. *Cyanos*, ſays a moſt faithful and candid hiſtorian §, *quam aurea catenula appenſam collo geſtabat, ſingularis magnitudinis gemma, atque antiquum Sueciæ regum munus, nuſquam inventa eſt, quamvis rex omnino ſpoliatus in campo deinceps repertus ſit.* That this remarkable ſtone ſhould never make its appearance ſince in Europe, is a difficulty hard to be accounted for; ſince Schneberg might have ſhewn the *Turquoiſe* in the ſame manner he produced the *chain*.

Meanwhile, one Innocentio Bucela, *camerado*, as the language then ran, to colonel Piccolomini, informed his friend, that the king of Sweden, whom he well knew, was naked and dead hard by them. Piccolomini flew immediately to the place mentioned, accompanied only by ten cavaliers, and found Guſtavus in his laſt convulſive agonies.

* *Burgi* Mars Sueco Germ. p. 230. 12°.

† *Relat. Eſpagnole* de le Battaille de Lützen imprimée a Liſbon. 1633. 4°.

‡ Anno 1669. *In Heriſtallo Saxon.* p. 216. et ſeqq. See more in *Struve*, under the article of Ferdinand II. § 39.

§ *Burgi* Mars Sueco Germanicus, p. 230. It was of the true oriental ſort, which comes out of the *old rock* in the mountains of Piruſkua, about eighty miles from the town of Moſcheda. *Memoirs communicated.*

He

He propoſed that moment to have carried off the deceaſed, but Stalhaus charged with ſuch fury, that the Imperialiſts were obliged to relinquiſh their prize; and, what may be worth remarking, the king's two faithful grooms, though mortally wounded, had thrown themſelves over their maſter's body *.

Many have ſuppoſed Francis Albert, duke of Saxe-Lauenberg, concerning whom we have ſpoken amply in various places, in order to give ſome light into what hereafter may follow, to have had ſome hand in the king's death, not by open force and an act of murder, but by concealed indications agreed on betwixt him and the Imperial party.——It is not our cuſtom to diſturb the aſhes of an illuſtrious perſonage, merely becauſe he belonged to another nation, and has ſlept in tranquillity more than a century.——That there is a probability exiſting to this prince's diſfavour, muſt ever be allowed; but truly cogent and irreſiſtible proofs, I think, there are none. The reader ſhall peruſe candidly and impartially the whole that we know †.

This officer, who was four years younger than Guſtavus, had ſerved in Italy, as a colonel, under Aldringer and Galas, in the Mantuan war; and by the account, which Sirot gives of him in that campaign, was a perſon of a very high and impetuous temper. Upon ſome diſguſt, whether real or fictitious we will not take upon us to pronounce, he demanded his diſcharge from the court of Vienna, and made a tender of his ſervices to the king of Sweden. After the battle of Lützen, being looked upon with coldneſs by the royal army, he repaired firſt to the Saxon, and then a ſecond time to the Imperial ſtandards, and took a freſh commiſſion under Walſtein; paſſed between him and duke Bernard, in the *ſuppoſed conſpiracy* of the former; and was committed to priſon upon the aſſaſſination of the Auſtrian generaliſſimo. We find him afterwards one of the chamberlains extraordinary to the emperor. Being taken priſoner at the battle of Sweidnitz, for then he had been reſtored a ſecond time to favour, and declared commander in chief of that town and diſtrict, he was generouſly protected by Torſtenſon from the reſentment of the Swediſh ſoldiers, and died, partly by his wounds, and partly with vexation, in a few days after the engagement ‡.

Some ſay he bore a mortal hatred to the king of Sweden, inaſmuch as that prince had once given a blow to one of

* *Le Barre*; Hiſt. d'Allemagne. Theatr. Europ. tom. ii. 749.

† The author expected conſiderable helps from profeſſor *Menke*'s Diſſertation *de dubio Guſt. Adolphi mortis genere*; but on peruſing that piece, found himſelf to be greatly diſappointed.

‡ 1642.

his

his brothers, who made a viſit to Stockholm, about the period when Guſtavus firſt aſcended the throne. The narrative runs thus. At the houſe of a certain lady, whom *each* of theſe princes had an eſteem for, the king having loſt all the money he carried with him, deſired the miſtreſs of the manſion to lend him a part of her winnings: which ſhe declined, by ſaying, it was beneath the dignity of a monarch to borrow from a poor ſubject. In the courſe of the evening the duke of Saxe-Lauenberg loſt his money alſo, and then the lady of the houſe made him a tender of her purſe, without being ſolicited; adding, in terms of courteſy and politeneſs, "Sir, the king my maſter has money at hand, and in great abundance; but you are a ſtranger, far removed from home, and muſt of courſe depend on the chance of remittances." Upon this Guſtavus took fire, and making ſome ſharp expoſtulations, the duke interfering in behalf of his patroneſs, gave the blow we lately mentioned. This ſtory, it muſt be confeſſed, reads no ways amiſs, when delivered from the pen of an Italian noveliſt, or French memoir-writer: *ſi non e vera, e ben trovata*; but as we do not know preciſely that the prince in queſtion was ever in Sweden, not but that there is a probability a duke of Saxe-Lauenberg might have made a journey to Stockholm, on account of the conſanguinity that ſubſiſted between the regal and princely families*, we of courſe ſhall preſume to pronounce nothing confidently, except more ſolid accounts could be procured from Germany, in reference to an affair ſo long removed from knowledge, and which ſeems to me to have taken its firſt riſe on the ſouthern ſide of the Alps†, and not from Germany or Sweden.

The circumſtances, which plead ſtrongeſt againſt duke Francis Albert, are theſe. When he made a tender of his ſervices the preceding Auguſt to his majeſty near Nurenberg, Oxenſtiern conceived an untoward ſuſpicion of him, at the firſt glance‡. For as he had great intereſt with the elector of Saxony, it was thought Walſtein, whoſe creature he was, connived at his quitting the Imperial ſervice, in order to ſeduce the ſaid elector from the Swediſh intereſts. Of courſe, therefore, the Chancellor failed not to lay open all his apprehenſions to the king his maſter; but Guſtavus replied, *That a prince and pro-*

* Genealogia *Ritterſhuſii*, fol. Tubing. 1668. See alſo *Hübner*'s Genealogies in German. 4°.

† It is related at large, by *Riccio de Bellis German.* 4°. 434, &c. but he, though a bold, lively hiſtorian, and peculiarly fond of all anecdotes, ſcruples not to pronounce the preſent narrative, *anilem fabellam, mulierculorum deliramentum.*

‡ *Puffendorf* de Rebus Suecicis, fol. p. 83.

*teſtant*

*teſtant could neither be a villain nor an aſſaſſin.* On his firſt arrival, many military employs, of conſiderable honour, were offered him; but he declined them all, and choſe rather to ſerve near the king's perſon, in the capacity of a volunteer. It is remarkable, he wore a green ſcarf in the day's ſervice at Lützen, which was not cuſtomary amongſt the Swediſh officers. He received no wound, upon ſuppoſition he attempted to diſengage the king, though the maſter of the houſhold, the pages, and very grooms, that attended him, were all killed, if we except one, who lay wounded, ſtripped, and ſenſeleſs, and expired ſo ſoon after the engagement, that accounts from him can hardly be depended on with any tolerable degree of certainty. The duke often ſhewed the royal blood that had fallen on his cloaths. Indeed it does not make much againſt him, that the king received a piſtol-ſhot in the hinder part of one of his elbows; for in ſuch a confuſion his majeſty might naturally turn himſelf round more times than once. True it is, he conveyed himſelf out of the battle precipitately, and never acquainted duke Bernard and Kniphauſen, the king's ſucceſſors in command, of this direful and diſaſtrous event; but, on the contrary, fled to Weiſſenfels, about eight miles from the ſcene of action, and returned next morning to the Swediſh camp, when he heard the royal army had become victorious. He there found but a very cold and diſcourteous reception; for the univerſally-received opinion in Sweden, to the preſent moment, is, that Guſtavus fell by ſignal agreed upon, and treachery; and this is confirmed by the tradition of officers to their friends and relations, from the very day when the battle of Lützen was fought *.

To the beſt of my unbiaſſed judgment there appears one circumſtance in duke Francis's favour, namely, that his maſter of the horſe, who was a gentleman, killed the cavalier who ſhot Guſtavus; for had the prince been engaged in any connivance or conſpiracy, it is natural to think, that this perſon might have borne his ſhare therein. We can ſay no more, and the truth muſt be left to the great ſearcher of all ſecrets †.

Thus fell the King of Sweden; the news of whoſe death broke the heart of the unfortunate elector Palatine in about ſix days ‡; nor did the gratitude of the Saxons erect the

* *Memoirs communicated.*

† There is a defence of this prince, by the author of the Schaubühne der Welt; but I never had the good fortune to procure a copy of that work, which conſiſts of four volumes in folio, *cum fig.* Francfort 1699—1718. It was written, if I miſtake not, by Job Ludolphus.

‡ He died Nov. 19, at Francfort on the Mayne, and we muſt allow a certain ſpace for conveying the melancholy tidings to him. The princeſs Sophia, who married Erneſt Auguſtus, elector of Brunſwic Lunenberg, was his twelfth child.

ſlighteſt

ſlighteſt monument or cenotaph to the deliverer of their country. In a word, this illuſtrious potentate has no monument on the plains of Lützen, except this imperfect hiſtory can be called a *monument*; ſave only a few large and miſhapen ſtones, which the piety of the peaſants has piled together, in order to perpetuate his memory. He died, aged *thirty-ſeven years, ten months, and twenty-ſeven days*, having received thirteen wounds before the battle of Lützen was fought.—He finiſhed his courſe, ſays a ſpirited hiſtorian, as an hero ought to do, *with his ſword in his hand, the word of command betwixt his lips, and victory in expectance;* concluding all with this religious ejaculation, *My God! My God!*

Nor was this death non-conformable with his majeſty's conſtant practice; for his great amuſement, at leiſure hours, conſiſted in peruſing the Holy Scriptures. It was his cuſtom to retire much to his apartment, and keep the doors anxiouſly cloſed; conſidering the ſacred writings attentively, whilſt the army concluded he was delineating plans of ſieges and battles, or inditing letters to foreign potentates. Which puts me in mind of one circumſtance, at the camp of Werben; when the whole Imperial army was preparing to force his lines, Steinberg, a privy-councillor had ſome extraordinary intelligence to report to his maſter; and as he half opened the curtain of his tent gently, and perceived Guſtavus very intent on reading the Bible, he retired ſoftly, and as he hoped, unobſerved; but the king recalled him: *Steinberg*, ſaid he, *I find great conſolation in peruſing the word of God: princes themſelves muſt acknowledge, that the evil demon ſpreads the moſt artful ſnares for thoſe who fancy they lie under no obligation to render an account to their own conſciences, and their fellow-creatures* *.

Few couriers were better received than thoſe, who conveyed the account of the king's death, to declared enemies, or concealed ill-wiſhers: nor did the report greatly diſpleaſe the court of White-hall; where the miniſtry, as it uſually happens in caſes of timidity, had its degree of apprehenſions, for fear the event ſhould not be true; and, as I have learnt from good authority, impoſed ſilence on the news-writers, and intimated the ſame to the pulpit, in caſe any funeral encomium might proceed from that quarter. The ungrateful Richelieu looked upon Guſtavus's death as a ſort of triumph. The emperor was more modeſt, contenting himſelf only with the exploſion of a few rockets: but the Spaniards exhibited a mock-tragedy, which conſiſted of twenty-four acts, and took up twelve nights in its repreſentation, entitled, The Death

* *Heylmanni* Leo Arct. 76, 77.

of

of the King of Sweden: and, as an author of great authority * declares, kindled up ſo many bonfires on the occaſion, that the court interpoſed, leſt fuel ſhould become too ſcarce the approaching winter. In a word, of all the catholic princes, the pope alone lamented the death of Guſtavus. On the other hand, funeral ſermons were preached in honour of him throughout all the proteſtant churches in Germany; and, what was very extraordinary, almoſt every preacher, without a poſſibility of knowing the intentions of other preachers, *drew a parallel between him and king Joſiah* †.

Having thus finiſhed the battle of Lützen, we may obſerve, that the Swedes, by a ſtrange antitheſis of fortune, obtained a *triumph*, but *loſt* their hero: the Imperialiſts relinquiſhed the field of battle too precipitately; yet, in truth, acquired a complete victory, for they *outlived* Guſtavus! Yet the effects of the king's operative ſpirit never intirely left the military body that had breathed and moved under his influence. The French repaſſed the Rhine upon Turenne's death; but the Swedes, after the deceaſe of their maſter, extended their victorious arms, not only over Lower Saxony, but to the very threſhold of the Alps. The principle of acting continued the ſame; the proportion only of the *vis vivida* was leſſened.——Nothing but a large fire could be capable of ſo prodigal remains.——In a few words, it may be remarked of Guſtavus, that he was equally great, living, dying, and even after death; fulfilling and completing the idea of a character, CUJUS GLORIÆ NEQUE PROFUIT QUISQUAM LAUDANDO, NEQUE VITUPERANDO QUISQUAM NOCUIT.

As Alexander conſigned to poſterity the Ptolemys, the Antigonus's, the Seleucus's, and the Antipaters, who, after his death, founded kingdoms in Egypt, Syria, Aſia Minor, and Macedonia: ſo Guſtavus, *from whoſe tomb*, ſays a ſpirited hiſtorian, *the laurels ſprung forth*, bequeathed to mankind the Saxe-Weimars, the Horns, the Baniers, the Torſtenſons, and Kniphauſens; who, if fair ſcope had been allowed them, would have given the finiſhing ſtroke to that *great* monarchy, whoſe very foundations their maſter had ſhaken the operations of nine-and-twenty months. Theſe valiant chieftains, formed in the ſchool of ſo excellent an inſtructor, gave ſigns neither of diſtreſs nor diſmay, when their allies partly proved inſincere to, and partly forſook them, at the concluſion of the peace of Prague, two years after Guſtavus's death. On the contrary, they retired ſtep by ſtep, gloomily, and unwil-

* *Vide Schaubühne ut ſupra.*

† *Chemnitz*, tom. i. 376. *Mem. d'Electrice Palatine*, 4°. 310.

lingly,

lingly, from the heart of the empire*; and kept the war alive, with unſpeakable obſtinacy, for the ſpace of ſixteen ſucceſſive years; and far from being ſqueezed into the Baltic ocean, as men formerly, and at that time, plainly propheſied, completed their eighteenth campaign, with making a fortunate camiſado on one of the towns of Prague.

In this circumſtance there is ſomething extremely *remarkable*; namely, that the amazing obſtinate and extenſive war which I have here in part deſcribed, after a duration of thirty years, ſhould conclude upon the *very ſpot of ground where it firſt began.*

Thus, with more labour than I can expect thanks, I have at length finiſhed the life of Guſtavus; a prince perhaps, with whom few heroes may be compared in the ſeveral diſtinguiſhing characters of *ſoldier, ſtateſman, father of his people*, and *ſincere Chriſtian*. Had it pleaſed God to have made a leſs infirm ſtate of health my portion, I might have been tempted, in a ſecond work, leſs circumſtantial and diffuſed, than matters of biography uſually require, to have carried on the *hiſtory of Germany down to the concluſion of the peace of Munſter*: the moſt important, as well as moſt deciſive era, that is to be found in the annals of Europe! But the magnitude of the undertaking partly diſmayed me; not to mention the expence and difficulty of conſulting, in perſon, the archives and libraries of various countries †. Numbers, it is certain, are to be found, amongſt my countrymen, who, in every reſpect, are infinitely better qualified for ſuch an undertaking than I can pretend to: and indeed it would be no inconſiderable ſatisfaction to me, to ſee our nation derive its knowledge of affairs on the continent from any hiſtorians, except the French; whoſe method, it muſt be acknowledged, is well conceived, and their ſtyle uſually ſuch as hardly allows the reader to be inattentive; but the writers themſelves are negligent and romantic, inſincere and partial.

* *Singolarità delle Guerre di Germania*, 4°. 183. Venet.

† The author has by him, already finiſhed in one volume, quarto, The *Hiſtory* of THE THIRTY YEARS WARS, from the breaking out of the troubles in Bohemia, in 1618, till the death of Guſtavus, 1632; ſo that only ſixteen years remain to be completed. [This has never, I believe, been publiſhed. Editor.]

ADVER-

# ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following uſeful SCHEME *and* DIARY of the War, &c. from the King's entering Germany till the battle of Lützen, compoſed for the better underſtanding the Three Great Campaigns of 1630, 1631, 1632, though the only one of the kind I ever remember to have ſeen, was begun in September, 1631, and carried on till November 6, 1632, by an Engliſh or Scottiſh officer, who ſerved under Guſtavus. I have ſupplied it by an addition of thirteen months, corrected the names of places, &c. and added the *third* and *fourth* columns throughout, in order to render the whole complete; making various additions likewiſe to the *firſt* and *ſecond* columns. Nothing can be more neceſſary in a Military Hiſtory.

(July 1630.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King'

| GUSTAVUS | TORQUATO DE CONTI |
|---|---|
| LANDED June 24. The intervening days, between that time and July, were employed in disembarking and reviewing his army, and examining the country. | |
| Publishes his manifesto. | Makes weak efforts against the king, with an army of equal numbers; the duchies of Pomerania and Mechlenburg being well garrisoned throughout. |
| 4. Reconnoitres the island of Usedom, with 4000 men. | |
| 5, 6. Gives audience to the deputies of the dukes of Pomerania and Mechlenburg, and the town of Stralsund. | |
| 7. Takes a fort at Wolgast. | Extorts Gartz and Griffenhagen from the duke of Pomerania. |
| 8. Advances to the cloister and pass of Pudegla. | |
| 9. Makes himself master of Swein. | |
| 10. Signs articles of confederation with the duke of Pomerania, who | Encamps half his army at Gartz, and half at Anclam. |
| 14. Writes to the emperor. | Retreats to Anclam, and forms a large camp. |
| 10—25. Remains in the islands of Usedom and Wollin. | |
| 23. Appoints a solemn fast. | |
| 26. Transports his army over the Frish-hof, and invests Stetin. | |
| — Takes it by stratagem. | |
| 27. Orders Banier to give a camisado to Dam. | |
| — Stargard and Camin taken. | |
| — Negotiates with the administrator of Magdeburg, who places himself under the protection of Sweden. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen.—(July 1630.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| The chancellor Oxenſtiern commands a ſeparate body in Poliſh Pruſſia, to watch the appearance of the Poles, and the king's new friends in thoſe parts; while Leſlie and Ruthven form a ſecond camp near Stralſund, caſting an eye of obſervation alternately towards the iſlands of Rugen and Uſedom, on the one ſide, and the duchy of Mechlenburg on the other. | Walſtein, then expecting his recal, lived privately at Memmingen, near Ratiſbon, to watch the motions of the diet, and avert the impending diſgrace. |
| | Tilly employed in reducing the landgravate of Heſſe, and ſecuring his own grants of poſſeſſions in Weſtphalia and Lower Saxony. |
| The adminiſtrator of Magdeburg ſent to oppoſe Tilly in that duchy. | Torquato de Conti had the care of Pomerania, and the duke Savelli of the duchy of Mechlenburg. |
| | 30,000 veteran Imperial troops are employed in the ſiege of Mantua, under the command of Colallo, Aldringer, and Galas. |
| Bauditzen and Hepburn act in Outer Pomerania with 8000 men. | |
| | The diet of Ratiſbon. |
| | 8000 men ſtationed at Deſſau-bridge, to prevent the king from marching to Magdeburg. |

(Auguſt 1630.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TORQUATO DE CONTI |
|---|---|
| 1—8. Commanded parties abroad. | |
| 6. Secures the paſs of Stolp. | |
| 9. Publiſhes a ſecond manifeſto. | |
| Fortifies Stetin, and fixes a camp there under Guſtavus Horn. | Remains inactive. |
| Offers Torquato battle. | |
| 15. Conceives ſome deſigns againſt Gartz and Grieffenhagen. Sends Horn to blockade Landſberg. | |
| Reſolves firſt to clear Pomerania and the duchy of Mechlenburg. | Quits his laſt camp, retires to Gartz, and thence to Stolp. |
| The plague rages at Stetin. | Marches at the head of 3000 men to throw ſuccours into the town of Wolgaſt, but is defeated. |
| Takes Wolgaſt town and caſtle. | |
| 20. Appoints a ſolemn faſt. | |
| Receives a reinforcement of 8000 men from Livonia. | |
| Fits up Wolgaſt caſtle for his queen. | |
| Prepares an invaſion of Mechlenburg, by taking the important paſſes of Tribeſes, Gripnitz, and Trepto. | |
| In this month fell into Aligheri's ambuſcade. | |
| Anſiruther, as ſome conjecture, pronounces his harangue at Vienna. | 31. Breaks up his camp at Stolp, and again intrenches near Anclam. |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(Auguſt 1630.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| Oxenſtiern commands in Pruſſia, near Brunſberg. | Walſtein remains inactive in Suabia, near Ratiſbon. |
| Leſlie and Rathven take preparatory meaſures to facilitate the king's irruption into Mechlenburg. | Tilly continues to attempt the reduction of Lower Saxony. |
| Chriſtian-William, adminiſtrator of Magdeburg, oppoſes Tilly. | The Duke de Savelli defends the duchy of Mechlenburg. |
| | Pappenheim blockades Magdeburg. |
| | 10. The Electors write to Guſtavus. |
| 15. The Swedes attempt to ſurprize Landſberg. | |
| 18. Marvellous eſcape of 700 Scots, who take Rugenwald by ſurprize. | 18. The Emperor writes to him. |
| | Tieffenbach and Goëtz conduct two ſeparate armies in Sileſia and Luſatia, and Balthazar di Marradas commands a third in Bohemia. |
| | The diet of Ratiſbon continues. |

(September 1630.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TORQUATO DE CONTI |
|---|---|
| 1. Friday, obſerves a ſolemn faſt. | 1. Aligheri, a deſerter from the Swedes, attacks the king's lines. |
| — Reviews his troops, and pays thoſe lately arrived. | 2. Makes another attempt. |
| Takes Griffenberg and Golnau. | |
| 6. Leaves Stetin, and prepares to invade Mechlenburg. | 4. Imperialiſts ruin Paſſevalk and Uckermund, and then leave them. |
| Sends aſſiſtance into Lower Saxony, which lands the 25th near Lubec, and joins Francis-Charles, Duke of Saxe-Lauenberg. | 7. Retake them, and commit great outrage. |
| 13. Writes to the Catholic electors. | |
| 14. Embarks with 12,000 men to reduce the duchy of Mechlenburg. | 14, or thereabouts. Loſe 1000 men near Gartz. |
| — Reaches Stralſund, and takes Bart and Damgarten. | |
| 17. Writes to Lewis XIII. and Richelieu. | Torquato obſerves the motions of Horn at Stetin. |
| — Appoints a ſolemn faſt. | |
| 26. Advances to Ribnitz and forms a camp there, having taken the town. | |
| 28. Diſſolves the allegiance of Wallſtein's new ſubjects by two proclamations. | |
| Detaches Banier to the frontiers of Mechlenburg, near Pomerania, and orders Bauditzen to inveſt Colbergen. | |
| Returns to Stralſund to indite proper letters to all his friends and enemies. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued*.—(September 1630.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| Oxenſtiern continues in his old ſituation near Brunſberg. | Aldringer, Galas, and Colalto recalled, with an army of 30,000 men, from Mantua. |
| The Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, Francis-Charles, and the Swediſh reinforcements act in Lower Saxony, and take Boitzenburg, Lauenberg, and Nyehauſen. | Colonel Reynacher oppoſes Saxe-Lauenberg. |
| 4. Bauditzen and Kniphauſen form the blockade of Colbergen. | Perpetual rencounters in the duchy of Magdeburg, between the Imperialiſts and adminiſtrator. |
| Bauditzen reinforces him, having taken Piritz. | Tilly ſtill continues in Lower Saxony, and on the frontiers of Heſſe. |
| Banier commands an army on the frontiers of Mechlenburg next to Pomerania. | The duke de Savelli command-Walſtein's troops in the duchy of Mechlenburg. |
| | Pappenheim takes Francis-Charles, duke of Saxe-Lauenberg, priſoner at Ratzburg-caſtle. |
| | — Reduces Allerſleben to capitulate. |

(October 1630.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TORQUATO DE CONTI |
| --- | --- |
| Beſieges Roſtoch, but converts the ſiege into a blockade. | Imperialiſts convey 4000 freſh troops into Roſtoch, with conſiderable loss. |
| — Clears the whole ſea-coaſt with his fleet. | |
| — Advances towards Wiſmar. | Torquato ſends Holk's and Butler's regiments to reinforce Savelli. |
| — Beats the duke de Savelli. | |
| [Here, ſome ſay, he firſt exhibits the brigade or column.] | |
| Writes to Charles I. the letter not extant. | A convoy of four regiments of Walſteiners defeated. |
| 11. Returns to Stralſund. | |
| Camerarius pronounces a ſpeech of the King's dictating at the Hague. | |
| Guſtavus remains at Stralſund.—Makes a ſhort digreſſion into Mechlenburg; returns again to Stralſund. | |
| 31. Writes to the emperor. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(October 1630.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| Bauditzen and Hepburn form an army of 8000 men near Rugenwald, in Back Pomerania: take Scheifelbein, and enter the Marche. | The duke de Savelli oppoſes Guſtavus in the duchy of Mechlenburg. |
| | 3. Col. Denhoff defeated near Stetin by the Imperialiſts. |
| 4. Kniphauſen carries on the blockade of Colbergen. | Offa and Montecuculi command in Suabia. |
| Oxenſtiern continues in the neighbourhood of Elbingen to watch the Poles. | Göetz and Tieffenbach in Silefia and Luſatia. |
| Banier ſucceeds the king in the duchy of Mechlenburg, as commander in chief.—Publiſhes an edict. | — Don Baltazar in Bohemia. |
| | — Pappenheim in LowerSaxony. |
| The adminiſtrator of Magdeburg acts in that duchy. | |
| The adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg in Suabia. | |

(November 1630.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TORQUATO DE CONTI |
| --- | --- |
| | Attempts fruitleſsly to throw a reinforcement into Colberg. |
| | — Detaches 10,000 men to raiſe the ſiege. |
| | 5. Imperial mandate publiſhed againſt Guſtavus. |
| 12. Sends Falkenberg to defend Magdeburg. | |
| — Marches as far as Griffenberg to join Horn, and fight the Imperialiſts. | |
| 20. Returns to Stetin, where he continues. | |

entering Germany till the battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(November 1630.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| | 3. The diet at Ratiſbon concludes. |
| 6 or 8. Monro takes Scheiffelbein. | |
| Kniphauſen turns the blockade of Colberg into a ſiege. | 9. The emperor publiſhes his edict concerning contributions and regulating the army. |
| Roſtoch ſtill blockaded by Todt. | |
| 13. The ſtrange battle of Colbergen between Kniphauſen and Montecuculi. | |
| A great fire at Colbergen. | |
| Stations of troops in diſtant provinces, as in laſt month. | —The ſame on the Imperial ſide, only that Montecuculi ſerved in Pruſſia. |
| 26. A dreadful tempeſt at Magdeburg. | |

(December 1630.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TORQUATO DE CONTI |
| --- | --- |
| 1. Continues at Stetin. | |
| Writes to the magiſtracy of Lubec. | |
| — Makes a ſhort excurſion into the duchy of Mecklenburg. | — Remains on the defenſive, beſeeching Tilly to ſend him ſupplies. |
| —Summons all his troops for ſome great expedition: reviews them, and pays off all arrears. | |
| 12. Finiſhes the fortifications of Stetin. | — Recalled. |
| | ANNIBAL COUNT DE SCHOMBERG commands. |
| | — Encamps under Gartz and Griffenhagen. |
| 23. Inveſts Griffenhagen. | |
| 24. Takes it by ſtorm. | |
| 27. Marches to beſiege Gartz. | The Imperialiſts fly to Cuſtrin, and thence to Francfort, burning the bridge over the Oder. Their whole army ſaved by the elector of Brandenburg giving it entrance into Cuſtrin. |
| 28. Takes fort Morwitz. | |
| 29. Gartz evacuated: And the Imperial army decamps. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(December 1630.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| A ſea-fight between the Swedes and the Imperialiſts.—15 large ſhips under Gabriel le Roy, and 9 Swediſh men of war.—Swedes victorious. | The Duke de Savelli oppoſes the Swedes in the duchy of Mechlenburg. |
| | The Imperialiſts ravage and deſtroy all Pomerania. |
| The elector of Brandenburg publiſhes a manifeſto againſt the cruelties and depopulations of the Imperialiſts. | Tilly writes to the adminiſtrator of Magdeburg. |

(January 1630-1.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | SCHOMBERG |
| --- | --- |
| Denied entrance into Cuſtrin; and thereby loſes the power of ſaving Magdeburg. | — By means of Cuſtrin, preſerves Spar's, young Walſtein's, Göetz's, and the old Saxon regiment. |
| — Takes Köeningſberg. | |
| 8. Advances to Lubus, within four miles of Francfort. | |
| — Takes Legnitz-caſtle and Piritz, and ſecures all, except Landſberg, between the Warta and the Oder. | |
| The winter extremely ſevere. | |
| 13. Treaty of Bernwalt ſigned between Sweden and France. | — Repreſents his bad ſituation to Tilly. |
| | TILLY. |
| The king publiſhes twenty-two new prayers. | |
| 18. Reviews his army, conſiſting of 16,000 men, at Dam. | |
| | 24. Advances to Francfort on the Oder. |
| 26. Poſts Horn at Köeningſberg to obſerve Tilly's motions. | |
| — Grants kind protection to the inhabitants of the New Marche. | |
| — Gives up all thoughts againſt Landſberg: and, taking the advantage of a ſevere froſt, enters Mechlenburg. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(January 1630-1.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| Horn's blockade of Landſberg goes on. | Don Baltazar commands in Bohemia: Göetz, and Tieffenbach, in Sileſia; Savelli, in the duchy of Mechlenburg; Oſſa, in Suabia and Alſatia; and Pappenheim, in Lower Saxony. |
| 8. Leſlie takes Löcknitz. | |
| 15. Horn, with a ſeparate army, obſerves Tilly near the frontiers of Sileſia. | Count de Schomberg made governor of Francfort. |
| | Colonel Hatzfield murdered. |
| — Recalled towards the end of the month, and poſted in the New Marche. | |

(February 1630-1.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| 4. Sets out at the head of 16,000 men, on a ſecond expedition into Mechlenburg. | |
| Takes New Brandenburg and Clemptno. | |
| — Propoſes terms to the inhabitants of the diſtrict round Stargard. | |
| Garriſon of Trepto diſlodged. | |
| 14. Damin beſieged. | Accuſes the duke de Savelli, governor of Damin. |
| Löitch taken. Kniphauſen's army joins the king. | Propoſes to ſtop the king's journey into Mechlenburg, but deſiſts. |
| The king detaches Banier to take Loczin. | |
| — Encamps his troops between that and Trepto. | |
| Malchin ſurprized. | |
| Fridland and Weſtrow taken. | |
| [Guſtavus in eight months renders himſelf maſter of eighty cities, caſtles, and fortreſſes in Pomerania and Mechlenburg.] | |
| Receives ſome ſuccours from Scotland; withdraws his garriſons from the iſle of Rugen; is reinforced by ſome of Oxenſtiern's army, and by the troops that inveſted Colberg. | — Advances from Francfort upon the Oder towards Mechlenburg. |
| | — Paſſes the king's lines, but dares not attack them. |
| — In expectation of Tilly, places Banier at Damin, Kniphauſen at New Brandenburg, Count Ortenberg at Trepto, Horn at Fridland, and himſelf at the paſs of Paſſevalk, to guard the Oder and Pomerania. | |
| — Encamps between New Angermond and Freyenwald. | Bernſtein makes an unſucceſsful camiſado on Templin. |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(February 1630-1.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| The rhingrave commands in Mechlenburg. | Pappenheim acts in Lower Saxony. |
| Oxenstiern in Prussia. | Other imperial armies stationed as before. |
| 8. Diet at Leipsic begins. | |
| All Back-Pomerania conquered. | |

(March 1630-1.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| 1. Articles ſigned with the Marquis of Hamilton. | — Puts the garriſon of Feldſberg to the ſword. |
| Guſtavus adds twenty new edicts, concerning plunder, extortion, &c. to his military code. | 9. Takes New Brandenburg by ſtorm, with an army of 22,000 men. |
| — Arreſts the garriſon of Colberg, by way of reprizal. | — His great cruelty. |
| | — Diſmantles it. |
| — Encamps between Trepto and Damin. | — Enters Fridland, and attempts Trepto in vain. |
| — Invents brigades in his camp at Schwet. Monro, part II. 25. | — Advances to Damin, and deſpairs of taking it. |
| | — Returns to Repnin. |
| 18. Croſſes the Warta to obſerve Landſberg. | — Fruitleſsly attempts to deſtroy the king's fine bridge acroſs the Oder. |
| — Conſtructs a famous bridge over the Oder at Schwet. | — Retires beyond Francfort on the Oder, whence he came; others alledge, he went back to Repnin. |
| Zednick taken. | |
| | — Orders a garriſon of 7000 men into Francfort. |
| 25. The king determines to beſiege Francfort. | — And 5000 into Landſberg. |
| 27. Croſſes the Oder, and continues his march. | — Draws the garriſons from Trewen-Brietzen and Munchenberg. |
| | — Fears to inveſt Damin. |
| | — Forms deſigns againſt Magdeburg. |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(March 1630-1.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| | Don Baltazar, Montecuculi, Goëtz and Tieffenbach, command in Bohemia and the annexed provinces. Offa in Suabia and Alfatia. |
| 2. Colbergen furrenders, after five months fiege, to Colonel Todt. | |
| 9. Horn retires to his maſter near Schwet. | |
| New Brandenburg is taken. | |
| The Swedes defeat a body of Croatians near Munchenberg. | Coloredo attempts, in vain, to burn the king's bridge at Schwet. |
| | Schomberg appointed to defend Francfort. |
| 18. Remonſtrance and concluſions ſent to the emperor from the diet of Leipſic. | Pappenheim employed in the duchy of Magdeburg. |
| 24.—And to the Catholic electors. | |
| A convention of the ſtates of Pomerania. | |
| 25. Horn ordered to watch the Imperialiſts on the ſide of Sileſia. | |

(April 1631.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| 1. Arrives at Lubus. | The Francfort garrifon, conſiſting of 7000 men, eſcape, part of them into Sileſia. |
| 2. Forms his approaches round Francfort. | |
| — Takes the town by ſtorm, and kills 3000 men.—Old Leſlie made governor. | |
| — Sends 4000 men towards Landſberg. | |
| 4. Guſtavus writes to the confederates at Leipſic; and the elector of Saxony appoints a thankſgiving. | |
| 5. Follows the Landſberg detachment with the groſs of his army. | |
| — Sends the rhingrave and Bauditzen into Sileſia. | |
| The town of Landſberg ſurrenders after eight days ſiege; and thus Pomerania and Mechlenburg are cleared, and a paſſage opened into Sileſia. | 12. Tilly inveſts Magdeburg in form. |
| 18. The garriſon marches away. The king returns to Francfort upon the Oder, negotiating, by means of couriers, about Spandau, which he obtains afterwards. | |
| The States-general ſubſcribe to Guſtavus about 5000l. per month. | 21. Takes a ſtrong fortreſs. |
| | — Alarmed needleſsly at Guſtavus's coming. |
| The king garriſons Francfort, Croſſen, and Landſberg. | 29. Farenbach, an Imperial colonel and engineer, performs wonders. |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(April 1631.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| The rhingrave and Bauditzen command in Silesia. Take Croffen the 16th. | The administrator of Wirtemberg, [Duke Julius] and the Protestants, form an union in Suabia, and levy troops. |
| 9. Treaty between France and the elector of Tryers. | |
| | Don Baltazar, Tieffenbach, Montecuculi, and Dhona act in Silesia, &c. against Bauditzen and the rhingrave. |
| 15. A detachment of Swedes beaten between Landsberg and Schieffelbein. | |
| 16. Palm Sunday. The diet of Leipsic breaks up. | |
| | 18. Landsberg evacuated. |
| | The Imperialists attempt Croffen in Silesia. |
| | The emperor publishes an edict for raising new taxes.—Excises meat. |

(May 1631.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| 1. Detaches from Furſtenwald, near Francfort, 10,000 infantry, and 80 troops of cavalry towards Berlin. | |
| — Sends count Ortenburg to demand Spandau and Cuſtrin. | |
| 2. Diſpatches Horn on the ſame errand. | |
| 3. Has an interview with the elector in Copnick-grove. | |
| — Obtains Spandau only for a month. | |
| — Enters Berlin. | |
| A treaty of confederation between France and Bavaria. | |
| The king goes to Potzdam. | |
| — Lies in his camp at or near Potzdam the remaining part of this month. | |
| 6. Solicits a confederacy with the elector of Saxony in vain. | |
| — Enters Berlin. | |
| 10. Hears that Magdeburg is taken. | 10. Takes Magdeburg by ſtorm; burns the city and deſtroys the inhabitants. |
| — Encamps at Potzdam to intercept Tilly's retreat. | — Breaks Deſſau-bridge too precipitately. |
| — Takes Old Brandenburg and Ratenau. | 13. Makes his public entrance into Magdeburg. |
| — Views the country near Magdeburg. | — Stays thereabouts many days. |
| — Retakes Werben and Borg near Jericho Monaſtery. | |
| 28. Eſcapes an ambuſh of Pappenheim. | — Removes from Magdeburg, and croſſes the foreſt of Hartz. |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(May 1631.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| Oxenſtiern commands in Pruſſia. | The Imperial commanders ſtationed as in the two preceding months. |
| Horn in Sileſia, reinforced by the King. | |
| 8. A treaty of confederation and alliance, for eight years, between France and Bavaria. | |
| | 14. An Imperial ban publiſhed againſt the Leipſic confederates. |
| | Pappenheim attempts to ſecure Havelberg. |

(June 1631.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| 1. Takes Guterboch, to ſecure he two bridges, over the Elbe, Deſſau and Wittemberg. | — At Alleſleben treats with the princes of the houſe of Saxony. |
| 5. Reinſtates the dukes of Mechlenburg. | — Has a deſign on Erfurt. |
| 8. Reſtores Spandau, with great reluctance. | |
| 11. Obtains it by a new treaty of alliance. | |
| — Receives four regiments from his army in Pruſſia, and ſome new levies from Brandenburg. | |
| — Sends Oxenſtiern a reinforcement of 4000 men. | |
| 12. Returns by water to Stetin. Gives audience to the Moſcovite ambaſſador the 15th. Propoſes to aſſiſt at the ſiege of Gripſwald. | 13. Advances to Weimar. |
| | 14. Croſſes the Unſtrut. |
| | 15. At Oldſleben. |
| — Publiſhes his apology concerning Magdeburg. | — Goes to Mulhauſen; has a deſign on the landgraviate of Heſſe Caſſel. |
| Anſtruther pronounces his harangue to the emperor. | — Sends Pappenheim to ſecure Havelberg; who afterwards raiſes contributions at Eiſleben. |
| | — Continues in theſe parts all the month. |
| | 28. Propoſes to march and attack Guſtavus, but is diſmayed by Pappenheim's and Mansfelt's ill ſucceſſes. |
| 29. Guſtavus returns from Stetin to Berlin. | |
| Bauditzen and Dewbatel ford the Elbe, with 4000 horſe and dragoons, and take Tangermond ſword in hand. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(June 1631.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| Horn commands the Swediſh army in Sileſia. | The Imperial generals in their laſt-mentioned poſts. |
| | The Imperialiſts attempt Croſſen in vain. |
| 16. Gripſwald capitulates to Todt, after a blockade and ſiege of eleven months. | |
| 17. Two dukes of Mechlenburg command in their duchies. | |

(July 1631.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| — Defeats Pappenheim near Magdeburg, and takes Stendal. | |
| | Pappenheim fends for Tilly. |
| 9. Banier takes Havelberg, fword in hand. | |
| The king encamps moſt judiciouſly at Werben. | Tilly, who had intended to make an irruption into Heſſe Caſſel, obliged to return. |
| 12. Concludes a treaty with the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel. | |
| 17. Gives Bernſtein a camiſado, and ruins four of Pappenheim's beſt regiments. | 17. Advances to Wolmerſtadt in the dioceſe of Magdeburg. |
| — Encamps at Werben. | |
| — Receives a viſit from the landgrave of Heſſe and duke Bernard, with a tender of their ſervices. | 19, 20. Reviews his army. |
| 21. Recals the garriſon of Tangermond. | 21. Arrives at Tangermond, forms a plot to fire the king's camp and powder-waggons. |
| — Diſcovers Tilly's plot, and turns it to advantage. | |
| 23, 24. Several ſkirmiſhes. | |
| 25. Guſtavus repulſes Tilly. | 25. Attacks the king's lines. |
| 26—30. Continues on the defenſive in his excellent camp at Werben. | 26—30. Remains quiet at ſome diſtance, about Mulhauſen. |
| — Writes a letter of thanks to the Magdeburgers. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(July 1631.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| | Furſtenberg, with 18,000 men, partly the Mantuan army, forces the adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg to renounce the Leipſic concluſions. |
| | 12. Fugger and Furſtenberg, with part of the Italian army, invade the landgraviate of Heſſe Caſſel. |
| 16. The marquis of Hamilton ſails from Yarmouth. | — Recalled to join Tilly. |
| 18. Duke Bernard acts in the landgraviate of Heſſe Caſſel. | Tieffenbach commands in Sileſia. |
| 31. The marquis of Hamilton lands at Wolgaſt, with 6000 Engliſh forces. | |

(Auguſt 1631.)—Scheme an. Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
| --- | --- |
| — Remains at Werben. | — In the neighbourhood of Werben. |
| | 10. Diſlodges, and moves towards Saxony. |
| 12. Signs a treaty with the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel. | |
| Queen of Sweden lands at Wolgaſt, with 8000 men. | |
| 15 The king ſends his forces on various deſtinations, and leaves Bauditzen with the ſtanding camp at Werben. | |
| — Propoſes to form two other camps, one at Ratenau, and another at Old Brandenburg. | 16. Joined by Furſtenberg, with 18,000 men, near Mansfelt. |
| | — Summons the elector of Saxony to enter into new engagements, and demands a paſſage over Wittemberg-bridge. |
| — Receives preſſing letters from the elector of Saxony. | 26. Takes Merſberg. |
| | — Pillages Naumburg and Zeitz. |
| 29. Advances with part of his army to Ratenau, whilſt the main body reaches Old Brandenburg. | 29. Summons Leipſic. |
| 30. Marches towards Saxony. | |
| 31. Arrives at Coſwick, where Arnheim confers with him. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(Auguſt 1631.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| 10, or thereabouts. The Engliſh joined by 4000 Swedes, newly landed. | |
| Horn commands in Sileſia, and Todt in the duchy of Mechlenburg. | |
| 20. The elector of Saxony reviews his army. | |
| The landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel acts in his own country. | 21. Pappenheim ravages Miſnia. |
| The elector of Saxony encamps at Torgau to defend the banks of the Elbe. His whole army amounts to 20,000 men. | |
| — Prevents Furſtenberg from paſſing the river. | |

(September 1631.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| 1. Forces the elector of Saxony, whom Arnheim repreſented, to ſign a treaty. | 1. Ravages the country about Leipſic. |
| 3. Allowed to paſs the Elbe at Wittemberg-bridge. | 3. Inveſts it with 40,000 men. |
| . Meets the Saxon army and ſome Brandenburg troops at Dieben. | |
| 5. Reviews the combined army. | 5. The town capitulates. |
| 6. Deliberates and halts on Tilly's taking Leipſic. | 6. Tilly invites the king to battle by letter. |
| 7. Marches and fights the battle of Leipſic. | 7. Defeated at Leipſic, and flies to Halle. |
| 8. Inveſts that city. | |
| 9. Purſues the Imperialiſts to Merſburg, and takes it. | 9. — To Aſcherſleben, and writes to Aldringer; and thence to Halberſtadt; 80 Engliſh miles. |
| — Diſpatches his army in ſeveral corps to purſue the enemy. | — Publiſhes monitorial letters to recal his diſperſed troops. |
| 11. Takes Halle and Merſburg. | |
| 13. Writes to Charles I. on the victory of Leipſic. | 13. Leaves Halberſtadt. |
| 14. Collects his forces. | |
| 16. Begins his journey, and marches along the Unſtrut. | |
| 17. Lies at Great Someren. | 17. Reaches Alvede, 15 miles. |
| 18. Takes Erfurt. | |
| — Settles the affairs of Thuringia. | 25. Arrives at Corvey, and croſſes the Weſer. Receives 5000 troops from Cologn. |
| — Sends for Oxenſtiern out of Pomerania. | |
| 26. Advances to Arnſtadt. | 26. Lies at Warburg. |
| | — Points his courſe between Waldec and Heſſe, and arrives near Fulda. |
| 27. Reaches Ilmenau; divides his forces. | |
| 28. Croſſes the Thuringian foreſt. | |
| 29. Lies at Schleüſſing. | |
| 30. Beſieges Köeningſhofen. | 30. Advances to Fritzlar in Heſſe Caſſel. |
| — Frightens the Imperial commiſſaries from Francfort on the Mayne. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(September 1631.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| 1. Elector of Saxony lies with 16,000 men near Torgau. | Gronsfelt and Boninghauſen act in Weſtphalia and Lower Saxony, againſt the duke of Lunenberg, archbiſhop of Bremen, and the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel's troops. |
| 2. The Engliſh troops arrive at Stetin. | |
| 3. The landgrave of Heſſe returns home from the king to carry on the war, taking duke Bernard with him. | |
| — Clears the abbacy of Hirſchfeild. | |
| | Aldringer and Fugger oppoſe the landgrave. |
| 12. The elector of Saxony inveſts Leipſic. | |
| 13. Receives its capitulation, and reduces Miſnia. | |
| Banier ſent to oppoſe Pappenheim in the dioceſe of Magdeburg. | |
| —Blockades Mansfelt in that town. | |
| The landgrave of Heſſe wages war fortunately in the dioceſe of Paderborn, and the abbacy of Fulda, &c. | |
| 15. The landgrave of Heſſe takes Fritzlar. | 15. Hover with their troops about Erfurt; retire. |
| | The duke of Lorrain marches to join Tilly. |
| | Tieffenbach and Goëtz threaten to invade Saxony. |
| | —Quit Luſatia for private reaſons. |
| 26. Bauditzen marches part of the king's royal army by another road through the Thuringian foreſt. | |
| 27. Horn, with another detachment, frightens the imperial armies from Eyſenach. | |
| — The elector of Saxony, in conjunction with Hamilton's forces, invades Luſatia. | 28. Aldringer near Eyſenach. |
| 29. Horn takes Gotha. | |
| 30. — Returns to the king. | 30. Some Croatians alarm Dreſden. |

(October 1631.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| 1. Takes Schweinfurt. | |
| 2. Makes his entrance. | 2. Removes from Fritzlar. |
| 3. Diſpatches circular letters to the biſhopric of Bamberg and parts adjacent. | 3. Ravages ſome towns in the landgraviate of Heſſe Caſſel. |
| 4. Forces the biſhop of Wurtzburg to make his eſcape. | 4. Joined by Aldringer. |
| — Inveſts Wurtzburg. | |
| 5. Makes himſelf maſter of it. | |
| 5—8. Beſieges Marienberg-caſtle, and takes it by ſtorm. | 6. Reviews his army at Fulda. |
| 8—14. Diſpatches his army in parties to make conqueſts in the dioceſes of Wurtzburg and Bamberg. | 10. Reaches Aſchaffenberg; confers with the duke of Lorrain. |
| 15. Wertheim taken. | — Sends Aldringer to join the Lorrainers. |
| The king gives a camiſado to three regiments of Tilly. | 16. Detaches 3000 men towards Wertheim, whom the king defeats. |
| 17—20. Viſits the troops at their various ſtations. | 17. Joined by the Lorrain army. |
| | 18. Advances towards the Higher Palatinate. |
| | 20. Lies about Darmſtadt. |
| 21. Commanded parties abroad, &c. which ſurpriſe Rotenberg, Biſchofsheim, and Mergentheim. | 21. Repulſed near Rotenberg. |
| | 22. Takes Babenhauſen. |
| | 23. Solicits the city of Francfort. |
| 26. Guſtavus publiſhes a ſecond manifeſto. | — Marches into the Bergſtraſs. |
| — Doubts whether he ſhall march to Nurenberg or Francfort on the Mayne. | |
| | 30. Advances again towards the Higher Palatinate, and continues thereabouts. |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(October 1631.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| The elector of Saxony hears Paradeiſſer's propoſals of accommodation with the emperor, at the interpoſition of Cadretta, the Spaniſh ambaſſador. | Goëtz ravages Lower Luſatia, and Tieffenbach the Upper, and conquer both provinces. |
| | — They retreat, by orders from Vienna. |
| Horn ſtays with the king all this month. | 4. The Lorrainers paſs the Rhine. |
| Leſlie and the Engliſh under Hamilton, act in Luſatia and Sileſia. | Grounſelt and Leſlie oppoſe the landgrave of Heſſe. |
| | The elector of Bavaria puts himſelf at the head of 20,000 men. |
| 7. Arnheim reduces Lower Luſatia. | |
| The landgrave of Heſſe takes Munden.—Enters the dioceſe of Paderborn.—Carries the war into Weſtphalia, and marches to join Guſtavus. | |
| 16. Roſtoch ſurrenders to General Todt. | |
| Banier beſieges Magdeburg; Hamilton and the Engliſh then with him. | |
| 18. Virmond beſieges Halberſtadt in vain; joins Mansfeldt at Magdeburg. | |
| 20. Arnheim reduces Upper Luſatia. | |
| 25. The elector and Arnheim enter Bohemia; take Tetchſin and Starahora, joined by old count Thurn. | Don Baltazar di Marradas commands againſt Arnheim, &c. |
| | 28. The recall of Walſtein agitated at Vienna. |
| | Mansfeldt commands in the dioceſes of Halberſtadt and Magdeburg. |
| | The Croatians attack Old Dreſden, but are repulſed. |

(November 1631.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| 1. Hanau taken by camiſado. | |
| | 2. Retires into Franconia, and ſtorms Mergentheim. — Propoſes to rejoin the Lorrainers. |
| 5, 6. The king paſſes backwards and forwards to Oxenfurt. — Ill of a fever. Leaves Horn in Franconia. | 5, 6. Forms a deſign of taking Oxenfurt ſword in hand, but without ſucceſs. |
| 7, 8. Advances towards Francfort. | 7, 8, 9. Reduces ſeveral towns in his way to Nurenberg. |
| 10—13. Takes Steinheim, Procelden, Miltenberg, &c. in his way. | 13. Orders Oſſa to take Rotenberg. |
| 14. Croſſes the Maine at Aſchaffenberg. | 14, 15. Makes himſelf maſter of Weinſheim, Guntzenhauſen, Weiſſenburg, and Wilſburg-caſtle. |
| 15. Enters Hanau. Obtains Ruſelheim from the landgrave of Heſſe Darmſtadt. | |
| 16. Lies at Offenbach. — Makes his public entry into Francfort. | 16. Ravages the margraviate of Anſpach. |
| | 17. Advances to Schwabach. |
| 19. Takes Hoëchſt. | 18. Inveſts Nurenberg. |
| 20. Returns to Francfort. Joined by the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel with 10,000 men. | |
| 22. Retires to Hoëchſt to perform his thankſgivings in private for taking Francfort. | |
| 23. Forms a league with the counts of Veteravia. | 23. Raiſes the ſiege. |
| 25—27. His actions near the Rhingau and Bingen. | 24, 25. Lies two nights at Rott, where his powder waggons blow up. 26. Puts his army into garriſon and winter-cantonment; one part in Bavaria, and one in the Higher Palatinate. |
| 29. The army returns to Francfort. | 28, &c. Goes to Donawert. |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(November 1631.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| 1. Arnheim ſummons Prague. | |
| 5, 6. Horn with a ſeparate army in the dioceſe of Wurtzburg, to obſerve Tilly.—Aldringer and the duke of Lorrain continue here the whole month.<br>The landgrave of Heſſe ſent with his own army of 10,000 men to interrupt the ſiege of Nurenberg. | |
| 8. The elector of Saxony makes his entrance into Prague. Count Thurn publiſhes a general protection in Guſtavus's name. | Don Baltazar, Tieffenbach, Galas, and Goëtz act againſt Arnheim and count Thurn. |
| 15. Banier ſent about this time, to take the command in the dioceſe of Magdeburg; with him Hamilton and the Engliſh act.—They inveſt Magdeburg for ſix weeks. | |
| | Oſſa joins Tilly, and goes with him towards Bavaria. |
| | The duke of Bavaria appointed generaliſſimo over the army of the league. |
| | — The Lorrainers forced to retire acroſs the Rhine. |
| 28. Arnheim and Thurn beat four imperial generals at the battle of Limburg. | |

(December 1631.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| 1. Marches in order to inveſt Heidelberg. | |
| 2, 3. Takes ſeveral towns in the Bergſtraſs. | 2. Meets the elector of Bavaria, having repoſed his army in winter-quarters. |
| 4. Beſieges Oppenheim fort, changing his deſign againſt Heidelberg. | 4. Takes Kitzingen. |
| 7. Paſſes the Rhine, and engages the Spaniards. | — Goes to Nordlingen, and there remains inactive. |
| 8. Oppenheim town and fort ſurrender. | — Appoints Cratz field-marſhal in the Upper Palatinate. |
| 9. The winter begins to be extremely ſevere. | |
| 10. The king beſieges Mentz. | |
| 13. Mentz capitulates. | 12. The elector of Bavaria ſummons a diet at Ingolſtadt. |
| 14. Guſtavus makes his public entrance, it being, as ſome ſay, his birthday. | — Sends an ambaſſador to the emperor, and another to the king of Sweden. |
| 16. A public thankſgiving. | |
| 18. The king ſurprizes Fridberg. | |
| 22—28. The Spaniards evacuate ſeveral towns in the Palatinate. | |
| The city of Spires ſides with the king, following the example of Worms. | |
| Guſtavus hears propoſals from the Bavarian miniſter. | |
| — Erects a column on paſſing the Rhine. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(December 1631.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| 3. Arnheim and Thurn take Egra; inveſt Budweis without ſucceſs. | |
| 4. Horn takes Kitzingen, | Aldringer takes the field to relieve Rotenberg, but too late; he retires to Augſburg. |
| 10. and Weinſheim; keeping the field all the month, and making advantage of Tilly's retiring into quarters. | |
| 12. Takes Gebſatel. | Pappenheim acts in Lower Saxony. |
| 13. Arnheim and the elector return to Dreſden, which diſpleaſes Guſtavus, who wanted them to keep the field. | 13. The Imperialiſts attempt Prague in vain. Walſtein accepts the generalſhip. Galas and Baltazar command in Bohemia. |
| 16. Horn takes Mergentheim; blockades and takes Rotenberg. | Boninghauſen and Mansfelt act in Mechlenburg, againſt the dukes, Banier, Todt, &c. |
| — Marches into Suabia. | |
| 20. Beſieges and takes Hailbrun. | |
| 21. The landgrave of Heſſe beſieges and takes Köeningſtein-caſtle; then retires with his army into his own territories. | |
| — Enters the abbacy of Fulda. | |
| 24. Magdeburg propoſes to capitulate. Banier and Hamilton diſagree about retreating. | The Spaniards forſake many towns in the Palatinate. |
| 26. The rhingrave commands on the Moſelle, and defeats the Spaniards in various rencounters, particularly near Frankendale. | |
| Horn returns into Franconia. | Pappenheim raiſes the ſiege of Magdeburg. |
| 30. Takes Guntzenhauſen. | |
| Col. Lohauſen, after a long ſiege, takes Doëmitz in Lower Saxony. | |
| The dukes of Mechlenburg clear their country. | |
| The Swedes take Mergentheim, i.e. Mariendal, Friedberg, Köeningſtein, Hailbrun, Germerſheim, Landau, and Bingen. | |

(January 1631-2.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| Manheim taken by ſurprize. | |
| 3, 4, 5. Heidelberg and Frankendale blockaded. | 3, &c. Goes to Donawert and Amberg, and forms a ſcheme of moleſting the elector of Saxony, by ſending the Imperialiſts 10,000 Bavarian recruits. |
| Guſtavus negotiates with England, France, Holland, the electors Palatine and of Cologn, and the duke of Neuberg. | |
| 10. An armiſtice concluded for 14 days; the king writes to Horn on the ſubject. | 10, 11. Returns to Nordlingen, to prevent Guſtavus entering Bavaria through the duchy of Wirtemberg. |
| 11. Advances in the interim to Gelenhauſen, to give battle to Pappenheim, who had violated the truce. | |
| The Spaniards diſregard the convention, and paſs the Moſelle. | 18. Sends ſome ordnance from Wilſburg-caſtle to Offa. |
| 19. The French ambaſſadors annex their ſubſcription to the armiſtice, or treaty of neutrality. | |
| 20. The king returns to Francfort with his queen. | — Detaches more troops into the Upper Palatinate. |
| 22. Sends the rhingrave againſt the Spaniards. | |
| 24. The armiſtice expires. | |
| The king diſpatches duke Bernard on a ſeparate command; he takes ſeveral towns about Mentz. | |
| 29. Protects the trade of Francfort by an edict. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(January 1631-2.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| 1. Horn continues near Weinſheim. | Aldringer keeps an eye to the city of Augſburg, and prepares to relieve Rotenberg. |
| 2, 3. Reviews his army. | |
| | 7. Pappenheim evacuates Magdeburg; and the marquis of Hamilton repoſſeſſes it. |
| 10. Obeys the truce, and viſits Iphoven and Nurenberg. | |
| — Joined by duke William of Saxe Weimar. | |
| | 12. Pappenheim quits Wolfenbuttle. |
| Wiſmar ſurrenders to Todt and the duke of Mechlenburg. | |
| — A battle between the garriſon and the Swedes. | 14. The elector of Triers publiſhes his manifeſto with regard to France. |
| The archbiſhop of Bremen appears with 8,000 men. | |
| 20. The rhingrave takes Kirchberg by aſſault, and defeats the Spaniards near Caſtel: Falls afterwards into an ambuſcade. | |
| 21. Horn returns to Sweinfurt. | |
| | 22. Walſtein publiſhes his placard to invite all deſerters and diſcontented old commanders. |
| | The elector of Bavaria joins Tilly. |
| 25. Prepares to poſſeſs Bamberg. | |
| | Cratz made field-marſhal under Tilly. |
| 29. Takes Hochſtadt. | Pappenheim retreats croſs the Weſer to Hamelen, purſued by the generals Todt, Lunenberg, William of Weimar, Banier, the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel, and the archbiſhop of Bremen. |
| Duke William of Saxe-Weimar joins Banier and Hamilton in the dioceſe of Magdeburg. | |

(February 1631-2.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| 1, &c. At Francfort. | |
| 4. Quits it to repel the Spaniards, who had violated the truce. | 2. Sends Cratz to ſuccour Forcheim. |
| 10. The king of Bohemia and Lord Craven arrive at Francfort. | 8—20. Employs himſelf in fortifying the banks of the Danube. |
| 11.—The marquis of Hamilton alſo. | |
| His majeſty goes to Hoëchſt, where the king of Bohemia finds him. | |
| — That prince regaled ſplendidly by Guſtavus, as likewiſe a vaſt number of foreign miniſters. | |
| Guſtavus ſends Oxenſtiern ambaſſador to Saxony; he does great ſervice at the diet of Torgau. | |
| 16.—Marches to Mentz in order to beſiege Creützнach. | |
| 18 Inveſts Creützнach. | |
| 22. Takes poſſeſſion. | 20. Goes into the Upper Palatinate. |
| 23. Returns to Francfort. | 23. Prepares himſelf to attack Horn. |
| 24, &c. Reduces the whole biſhopric of Mentz. | 24. Advances to Altdorf. |
| | 27. Enters Forcheim. |
| | 28. Advances to Bamberg. |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(February 1631-2.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| 1. Horn takes Bamberg—detained by rains and floods. | |
| Marquis of Hamilton sets out to wait on the king at Francfort. | Pappenheim cuts to pieces 1,500 new raised Swedish dragoons near Corvey. |
| Banier and duke William of Weimar take Goslar, Northeim, Göttingen, and Erichsberg-castle. | |
| | 13. Di Marradas recovers part of Bohemia. |
| 14. The landgrave of Hesse Cassel retakes Warberg. | |
| 20. Horn prepares to invest Forcheim. | |
| Duke Bernard conquers the whole electorate of Mentz. | |
| Palatine-Christian of Birkenfelt levies troops for the king. | |
| Count Hanau takes Drusenheim. | |
| Ulm accepts a Swedish garrison. | |
| 25. Banier and duke William of Weimar receive orders to march to the king on his entering Bavaria. | |
| — Todt supplies their places. | |
| 28. Horn prepares to receive Tilly. | The town of Cologne signs a neutrality with Gustavus. |
| — Duke William of Weimar sent to reinforce Horn, but did not arrive. | |

(March 1631-2.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| — Receives the account of Horn's defeat.<br>— Assembles his army, in order to be revenged on Tilly. | 1. Defeats Horn, and enters Bamberg.<br>— Continues about Hasfurt in the bishopric of Bamberg. |
| 4. Sets out from Francfort. | |
| 6. Advances to Aschaffenberg.<br>7. To Lohr, thirty miles, halts there.<br>9. To Warenfelt.<br>10. To Arnstein.<br>11. To Tettelbach.<br>12. To Kitzingen; dispatching Hepburn to Oxenfurt. | 12. Calls a council of war at Forcheim.<br>13. Reviews his troops, and marches into the Upper Palatinate.<br>15. Advances to Christian-Erlang.<br>16. To Neümarkt, where he continues some days. |
| 16. Marches to Weinsheim, his three armies being now united, and Dunkelspiel. | |
| 20. Encamps at Furt. | 20. Retreats towards the Danube. |
| 21. Visits Nurenberg.<br>— Has some rencounters with Tilly's army.<br>— Changes his design and march. | |
| 24. Advances to Oetingen and Pleinfelt.<br>— Passes young Pappenheim in Wilsburg-castle. | |
| 26. Takes Kayserheim town and cloister, and invests Donawert. | 26. Continues about Ingolstadt. |
| 27. Takes it by storm. | |
| 28. Also a castle of the Fuggers. | |
| 29. Sends the Palatine Augustus with an army into the duchy of Neuburg; he takes Höchstadt and Lawingen. | |
| 30. Banier makes an unsuccessful camisado on Neuburg. | 30. Retires into Bavaria. |
| 31. The king leaves Donawert. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(March 1631-2.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| 1. Horn retires from Bamberg, and makes a fine retreat, croſſing the Maine. | Walſtein declared generaliſſimo, enters Bohemia with 20,000 men, not including Di Marradas's army. |
| 2. Cuts two regiments of his purſuers to pieces in retreating to Mergentheim. | |
| Oxenſtiern left commander in chief in the electorate of Mentz, and the Palatinate. | |
| 5. Horn retires to Schweinfurt. | Pappenheim takes the field and croſſes the Weſer, to the eaſtern ſide. |
| 7. Writes to the king. | |
| | — Retakes Erichſberg and Eymbeck. |
| 11. Joins him. | — Marches through Hildeſheim and Lunenberg. |
| 15. Conducts the van-guard to Weinſheim.—Stays with his maſter. | |
| — Duke William of Weimar commands in Horn's abſence, in Thuringia, &c. | |
| — The elector of Saxony enters Bohemia, and boaſts that his troops amount to 37,900 men. | |
| Todt commands againſt Pappenheim. | |
| Some recruits land from England. They inveſt Boxtehude, and take it in three weeks. | |
| Sir Patrick Ruthven made governor of Ulm, and general in Suabia. | |
| General Todt diſplaced on Salvius's repreſentations. Leſlie ſucceeds him, and being wounded, Bauditzen is ordered to ſet out, and take the command.—Meanwhile Todt ſtill acts. | 31. Count Embden with 10,000 Spaniards croſſes the Moſelle. He is ſupported with another army under Gonſalvo di Cordova. |

(April 1632.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | TILLY |
|---|---|
| 1. Advances with his army to Northeim. | 1, 2. Lies encamped near Rayn. |
| 2. Joined there by Duke William of Saxe-Weimar's reinforcements. | |
| 3, 4. —Erects his batteries and bridge, in order to croſs the Lech. | 3, 4. Spreads his troops along the Lech. |
| 5. The battle of the Lech. | 5. Defeated, and carried off the field of battle, mortally wounded. |
| 6. The king advances into Bavaria. | |
| 7. Points his courſe to Augſburg. | 6, 7, 8, &c. The Elector of Bavaria takes the command, and flies towards Ingolſtadt. |
| 8. Encamps at Lechauſen. | |
| 9. Summons Augſburg. Treaty ſigned between France and the elector of Triers. | ELECTOR of BAVARIA. |
| 10. Guſtavus receives the capitulation of Augſburg. | |
| 11. Settles the government; reſtores the Lutheran religion. | |
| 14. Makes his public entrance. | |
| 15. Goes to Waho [Aicha] in his way to Ingolſtadt. | |
| 16. Inveſts that town. | |
| 17, 18, 19. Employed in the ſiege, and repulſes a vigorous ſally. | 18. Surprizes Ratiſbon. |
| 20. Overturned by a cannon-ball. | 20. Tilly dies at Ingolſtadt. |
| 22. Makes a journey to Neuburg. | |
| 24. Gives up the ſiege of Ingolſtadt. | |
| 25. Takes Moſberg. | |
| 29. Goes to Landſhut, which Horn and Hepburn beſieged. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(April 1632.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| | Walſtein advances towards the middle of Bohemia; ſuppoſed to command 50,000 men. |
| | — Croſſes the Elbe near Budin; advances to Schlani. Takes Budin and Prague. |
| 7. Oxenſtiern, duke Bernard, and the rhingrave, oppoſe the Spaniards with 15,000 men. | |
| Horn detached to purſue Tilly's army; rejoins his maſter at the ſiege of Augſburg. | |
| 13. Luca di Cagro, a Spaniſh general, intends a camiſado, and is defeated by the rhingrave. | 14. Don Philip de Sylva joins the Spaniards with 8,000 men. |
| 20. The queen of Sweden eſcorted by Oxenſtiern to the city of Mentz. | |
| 21. Col. Horneck ſurrenders Spires to the Spaniards. | |
| 23. Horn ſent from Ingolſtadt to penetrate again into Bavaria. | |
| 25. Returns. | |
| 27. He and Hepburn beſiege Landſhut. | Pappenheim raiſes the blockade at Stade, and ruins Leſlie's and Monro's regiments. |
| Todt orders the Engliſh to blockade Stade. | |

(May 1632.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | ELECTOR of BAVARIA |
|---|---|
| 4. Turns back to Moſberg. | |
| 5. Takes Freiſſingen. | |
| — Recals duke Bernard from the electorate of Mentz, and ſends Horn thither. | |
| 6. Advances towards Munich. | |
| 7. Makes his public entrance. | |
| 9. Reviews his army. | |
| — Leaves Hepburn governor of Munich. | |
| 16. Quarrels with Sir H. Vane. | |
| 20. Advances to Augſburg in order to give Oſſa battle. | 20. Cratz makes an irruption into Bavaria. |
| 25. Raiſes the ſiege of Biberach. | |
| 27. Returns to Augſburg. | 27. Takes Weiſſenberg. |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(May 1632.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| The rhingrave oppoſes Don Gonſalvo in the electorate of Triers. | Pappenheim attempts to force a paſſage through Todt's army, but miſcarries. |
| Bauditzen takes the command againſt Pappenheim. | — Goes to Wolfenbuttle. Negotiates about ſelling Stade to the king of Denmark. |
| 11. Horn arrives at Francfort, to replace duke Bernard. | — Enters the territories of Heſſe. |
| | 20. Oſſa beſieges Biberach. |
| | 21. Spaniſh generals forced to leave Spires. |
| | 23. Greatly preſſed by Oxenſtiern's army and the French. |
| | 25. Retreat with difficulty. |
| | 26. Walſtein over-reached by Arnheim in a march. Takes Egra. |

(June 1632.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | ELECTOR of BAVARIA |
|---|---|
| Leaves Bavaria, and marches to Munich. | — Enters the Upper Palatinate. |
| — Takes Aichſtadt, Dillingen, and Pappenheim-caſtle. | 5, 6. Takes Sultzbach and Amberg. |
| 7. Arrives at Furt. | |
| 8, 9. Reviews his army. | |
| 10. Makes a viſit to Nurenberg. | 10. Advances to join Walſtein, and receives from him a reinforcement of 16,000 men. |
| — Attempts to intercept the duke of Bavaria. | |
| 11. —Reaches Lauff. | |
| 12. —And Hirchſbruch. | |
| — Retakes Sultzbach. | 13, 14. Returns towards the king. |
| — Seizes the paſs of Hartmanſhoven. | WALSTEIN |
| — Retires to Nurenberg, on hearing Walſtein and the duke of Bavaria were in full march. | 14. Takes Prague, and offers Saxony a peace. |
| | 16. Having taken Leütmeritz, approaches Egra. |
| 19. Regains Nurenberg. | — Enters the Palatinate, in order to join the elector of Bavaria, who had ſurprized Ratiſbon. |
| — Encamps there. | |
| | 25. Joins the duke of Bavaria. |
| | 26. Both armies advance to Neümarkt. Walſtein leaves the diſtrict round Amberg. |
| | 27. Rencounter between his troops and Colonel Dewbatel. |
| | 28. Advances to Freyſtadt. |
| | 30. Arrives at Schwabach; and confronts the king. |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(June 1632.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| Duke Bernard left to purſue Offa, defeats Hannibal count Hohen Oems. | |
| Banier left with 8,000 men at Augſburg. | 6. Don Baltazar enters Luſatia. |
| Duke William of Weimar left with 12,000 men in Suabia. | |
| 10. Arnheim enters Luſatia to oppoſe Don Baltazar—ſaves Bautzen. | |
| The adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg obſerves Offa with 8,000 men. | |
| Horn detached towards the Upper Palatinate. | |
| | 14. Ellenbogen in Bohemia furrenders to Holk. |
| 17. The rhingrave beſieges Coblentz, and takes it the 21ſt. | |
| 21. Beſieges Trarbach, and takes it. | |
| [The French army in and near the electorate of Triers.] | |
| 25. The elector of Saxony and Arnheim return to Dreſden to liſten to a negotiation, which Guſtavus hinders. | |
| Dewbatel, with 10,000 Swedes and Brandenburghers, enters Sileſia. | |
| Arnheim returns with his army, having made a very fine and artful retreat. | 28. Pappenheim offers the Swedes battle. |

(July 1632)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | WALSTEIN |
|---|---|
| 4. Removes his camp to Furt. | 4. Intrenches at Furt. |
| 5—10. Common rencounters. | |
| 11. Oxenſtiern begins his march from the electorate of Mentz, to join his maſter. | Commanded parties abroad. Margraviate of Anſpach ravaged. |
| 20. The king takes a great convoy of Walſtein's. | 20. Walſtein ſends Holk with 10,000 men into Miſnia. |
| 27. Gains intelligence of the imperial magazines at Freyſtadt. | |
| 30. Dewbatel gives that town a camiſado, and deſtroys the magazines. | |
| The king defeats General Spar, and takes him priſoner. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(July 1632.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| 3. Horn takes Graffenberg, after ſix days ſiege. | |
| — And Berncaſtel, and Veldentz. | |
| | Pappenheim, preſſed by the duke of Bavaria to make a diverſion in Thuringia or Saxony, which he refuſes; and then marches to raiſe the ſiege of Maſtricht, July 4. |
| 12. Dewbatel ſeizes Great Glogau. | |
| Banier recovers Munich, and drives Cratz out of Bavaria. | |
| Duke Bernard clears the Lech from archduke Leopold's forces. | |
| 14. Bauditzen razes the fortifications of Duderſtadt, and afterwards takes Einbech. | |
| — The duke of Lunenberg beſieges Duderſtadt. | |
| — Takes it the 24th. | |
| 20. Oxenſtiern joins the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel; they advance into Franconia, with in all 10,000 men; wait at Wurtzburg for duke William of Weimar, who had been diſpatched to bring the Engliſh, and ſome Swediſh forces from Lower Saxony, and ſome Saxon regiments; in all about 8,000 men. | |
| 24. Duke Bernard and Banier receive orders, by an expreſs, to join their maſter. | |
| 25. Arnheim clears Luſatia; receives a reinforcement of 10,000 Swedes. | — Serves on the banks of the Weſer, about the end of the month. |
| Horn returns to Mentz. | — Gronsfeldt left to command in his room. |
| 30. The duke of Lunenberg blockades Wolfenbuttle. | |

(Auguſt 1632.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | WALSTEIN |
|---|---|
| 1. His oration to his generals on depredations, contributions, cruelty, &c. | The court of Vienna highly pleaſed with Walſtein's declining a deciſive engagement. That general wants to enter into ſome accommodation with Guſtavus. |
| 4, 5. Parties ſent abroad. | — Diſpleaſed with Felt-marſhal Cratz. |
| 8. The king pays his army. — Takes Hertzog-Aurach, to facilitate the junction of his troops. | — Sends parties abroad all the beginning of the month. |
| 17. His four little armies deſtined to join him, advance to Bruck. | |
| 18. The king meets and reviews them. | |
| 20. Repairs a bridge which Walſtein had broken down. | |
| 21. The junction formed: A public thankſgiving: Battle offered to Walſtein. His lines attempted. | 21. Renders his intrenchments extremely ſtrong. |
| 22. The attack continued. | |
| 24. The deſperate engagement about Altenberg-caſtle. | 24. Makes a very obſtinate reſiſtance. |
| 25. The king's fine retreat. | |
| 26. Forms a new camp cloſe to Walſtein. | 26. Sends parties abroad till the end of the month. |
| 29, 30. Commanded parties ſent abroad. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(Auguſt 1632.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| 1. Lunenberg and Bauditzen divide their armies.<br>Bauditzen, in Pappenheim's abſence, breaks into Weſtphalia. Surprizes Warburg and beſieges Paderborn the 12th: Raiſes the ſiege the 21ſt. | |
| 6. Horn routs the Imperialiſts near Straſburg. | |
| 9. Arnheim and the Swedes take Breſlau. | |
| 10, 11. Oxenſtiern's and duke William of Weimar's armies advance to join each other: junction formed the 13th.<br>Horn enters Straſburg. | |
| 11. —Advances into the Lower Palatinate. | |
| 13, 14. Duke Bernard's and Banier's armies unite with Oxenſtiern's and duke William of Weimar's between Kitzingen and Weinſheim, having marched through the biſhopric of Aichſtadt into Franconia. | 13. Holk makes an irruption into Vogtland, having taken Zwicka the 12th. |
| 15. Horn raiſes the ſiege of Wiſloch. | |
| 17. Cuts to pieces 1,000 imperial cavalry by means of an ambuſcade. Puſhes Montecuculi acroſs the Rhine.<br>The Combined Swediſh armies reach Hertzog Aurach. | 16, 17, &c.—Ravages Miſnia. |
| 18. Lie at Bruck.<br>— Arnheim and Dubalt gain the battle of Limburg. | |
| 21. The combined Swediſh armies all join their maſter.<br>Horn obtains Straſburg-bridge. | 21. Gronsfeldt forces Bauditzen to retire.<br>Pappenheim's great effort towards raiſing the ſiege of Maſtricht. |
| 22. — Enters Upper Alſatia. Leaves Dewbatel to beſiege Stolhoven. | 23.—Repaſſes the Rhine. |
| 26. Little Jacob joins Bauditzen with 3,000 cavalry. | Montecuculi leaves Alſatia to aſſiſt in Bavaria. |
| 30. Horn enters Suabia to aſſiſt the Wirtembergers, and takes Offenburg and Ortenberg-caſtle. | |

(September 1632.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | WALSTEIN |
|---|---|
| 1, 2, 3. Small rencounters. | 1—10. Sends abroad commanded parties. |
| 4. The king explains himſelf to the Nurenbergers about decamping. | |
| 7. A public annual commemoration for the victory at Leipſic. | |
| 8. The king diſlodges. | |
| 9. Lies at Neuſtadt. | |
| 13. Removes to Weinſheim. | 12. Diſlodges. |
| 14. Divides his army. | 14. Arrives at Forcheim. |
| 15. Returns with half towards Nurenberg, then marches into Bavaria. | |
| — Recalled to Nurenberg by a letter from Oxenſtiern. | |
| 21. Lies at Dunkelſpiel. | 21. Summons Culmbach. |
| 22. At Nordlingen; thence advances to relieve Rayn. | |
| | 24. Advances to Bamberg. |
| 25. Mitzval ſurrenders Rayn. | 25. Parts with the elector of Bavaria and his army. |
| 27. The king cuts to pieces 400 Croatians near the Lech. | Montecuculi takes Rayn, and attempts in vain to hinder the king from croſſing the Lech. |
| | 29. Walſtein takes Bareüth. |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued*.—(September 1632.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| Oxenſtiern ſtays at Nurenberg with General Bauditzen. | |
| 5. Horn returns to Straſburg. — He and Dewbatel command in Alſatia. | |
| 9. Horn beſieges Benfelden. | |
| | 13. Galas beſieges Lauff. |
| 15. Duke Bernard, with 12,000 men, ſent to obſerve Walſtein in Franconia on one ſide, and Pappenheim on the other. | 19. Pappenheim appears in the abbacy of Corvey in Weſtphalia. |
| | 20. Purſues Bauditzen 20 miles. |
| Duke William ſent to collect ſome Swedes and Engliſh which laid near Hanover. | — Montecuculi oppoſes the Swedes and Engliſh near Hanover. |
| Hamilton and Hepburn leave the King and ſet out for England. | |
| | — Gronsfeldt, Boninghauſen, and Mansfelt act all in Lower Saxony. |
| | Oſſa commands againſt Ruthven, &c. in Suabia. |
| 22. Bauditzen enters Heſſe. | 22. The two young dukes of Tuſcany go to ſerve in Walſtein's army. |
| Arnheim in Sileſia and Luſatia. | Marradas, Tieffenbach, and Goëtz act againſt Arnheim. |
| | Tieffenbach ſent into Auſtria to repreſs the inſurrection of the peaſants. |
| 24. The duke of Lunenberg forced by Gronsfelt to raiſe the ſiege of Wolfenbuttle. | 24. Galas ravages Vogtland and Miſnia. |
| | 25. Aldringer detached by Walſtein to aſſiſt the elector of Bavaria. |
| Ruthven and the adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg command in Suabia. | |
| — And the duke of Mechlenburg in Lower Saxony. | |

(October 1632.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, from the King's

| GUSTAVUS | WALSTEIN |
|---|---|
| 1, 2. Paſſes the Lech. | 1. Takes Coburg. |
| 3. Retakes Rayn. | 3. Repulſed at Coburg-caſtle. |
| — And Landſberg. | |
| 5. At Neuberg on the Danube beheads col. Mitzval. | 5. Advances into Vogtland. |
| 6, 7. Prepares to beſiege ſome towns in Bavaria, particularly Ingolſtadt. | |
| 8. Marches to Nordlingen. | 8, 9. Gains ſeveral towns in Vogtland. |
| | 10. Arrives at Plauen. |
| 12. Orders Kniphauſen to retake Lauff. | 11. Forms a camp at Weida. |
| 13, 14. Purſues and defeats col. Munich. | 13, 14. Advances towards Leipſic. |
| 15. Returns to Nurenberg, where he is recruited by 5,000 Switzers. | |
| 17. Advances towards his army. | 17. Sends ſome cavalry to make a bravado to it. |
| | 18. Summons it to capitulate. |
| 19. Arrives at Kitzingen, and meets his queen. | 19. Takes Weiſſenfels. |
| | 20, 21. Beſieges Leipſic. |
| 21. Joins duke Bernard at Schleüſſing, having marched from Bavaria into Thuringia in 14 days. | 22. Takes the town. |
| 23. Reaches Arnſtadt; ſtays there ſome days. | 23.—And the caſtle [Pleiſſenberg.] |
| — Incorporates the Engliſh and Scottiſh amongſt his other regiments. | 25, &c. Reduces other towns in Miſnia. |
| Oxenſtiern returns to Nurenberg. | |
| 28. The queen of Sweden arrives. | 28. Forms his junction with Pappenheim. |
| — The king reviews his troops at Erfurt. | |
| 29. Marches 13 miles beyond Erfurt. | |
| 30. Continues his march. | |

entering Germany till the Battle of Lützen—*continued.*—(October 1632.)

| SWEDISH ARMIES in other Parts, &c. | IMPERIAL ARMIES in other Parts, &c. |
|---|---|
| 1. Duke Bernard advances to raiſe the ſiege of Coburg. | 1. Galas takes Chemnitz. |
| | 2. Pappenheim ordered to join Walſtein; ſends Merodé againſt Bauditzen, and leaves Gronsfelt to obſerve the duke of Lunenberg. — Raiſes contributions from Mulhauſen. — Attempts Erfurt in vain; marches on to Walſtein. |
| | 3. Holk and Galas unite their armies in Miſnia. |
| | 4. —Take Freyberg. |
| Ruthven and the adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg act againſt Offa in the circle of Suabia. | 12. —And Wurtzen. |
| 28. Horn takes Benfelden, after a ſiege of near 8 weeks. | |

(November 1632.)—Scheme *and* Diary of the War, &c.

| GUSTAVUS | WALSTEIN |
|---|---|
| 1. Thurſday, arrives at Naumburg. | 1. Sends ſome cavalry to Leipſic, and removes to Weiſſenfels. |
| 2. Diſpleaſed at being deified by the people. | |
| 3. Intrenches himſelf, not propoſing to hazard a battle. | |
| 4. Intercepts Coloredo's letter. | 4. Detaches Pappenheim to Halle. |
| 5. Reconnoitres Walſtein's lines. | 5. Prepares for the battle. |
| — Reſolved to fight in Pappenheim's abſence. | |
| 6. Gains the victory at Lützen. | 6. Defeated and flies. |
| — Killed. | |
| N. B. When his Majeſty died he left ſix armies in the field, beſides his own; namely, Kniphauſen's in Lower Saxony, Dubalt's in Silefia, the Palatine of Birkenfelt's in Bavaria, Bauditzen's in the electorate of Cologn, Horn's in Alſatia, and Ruthven's in Suabia; not to mention four confederate armies, viz. the Saxons, Heſſians, the troops of Lunenberg, and Bremen. | |

# APPENDIX

TO THE

# HISTORY OF THE LIFE

OF

# GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

## I.

Oratio GUSTAVI ADOLPHI Helſingfordæ in comitiis habita, menſe Januarii, A.D. MDCXV. ætatis ſuæ XXI.*

ILLUSTRES, generoſi domini, nobiliſſimi, clariſſimi, prudentes ac honeſti. Ego quidem in præterito quadriennio, quo per omnipotentis providentiam huic regio imperio præfui, libenter & ſæpe quæſiviſſem occaſionem, quomodo poſſem aliquando de harum provinciarum conditione, & omnium veſtrûm ſtatu certi quid cognoſcere: ut in tempore, quod ad omnium veſtrûm ſalutem facit, ita ordinare ac diſponere poſſim: quò ſub meo imperio queatis (in quantum his incommodis temporibus fieri poteſt) ſervari per legum & legitimarum ſanctionum cuſtodiam; & ut ipſe (prout à Deo mihi commiſſa poteſtas hoc exigit) poſſim querelas veſtras & gravamina comperire, & poſtea illis remedia comparare; ſed quàm libenter hoc effectui dediſſem, & quantum mihi hoc cordi curæque fuerit; tamen ab hoc per multiplices difficultates, quas bellum ſecum traxit, ſemper præpeditus fui ad hoc uſque tempus & oblatam occaſionem. Hanc autem prætermittere nolui quo minus. Vos omnes ad me & hæc comitia vocarem: ut vobiſcum non ſolùm harum provinciarum negotia perpenderem, ſed etiam vobiſcum agerem de rebus quibuſdam, quæ pertinent ad commune regni & chariſſimæ patriæ noſtræ bonum & ſalutem. Itaque gratias vobis benevolas ago, quod tam promtè, quàm bonos & fideles ſubditos decet, hîc conveneritis. In memoriam vobis ſatis revocatis, quomodo Sigiſmundus rex Poloniæ eo tempore, quo ſecundum jus ſuum hæreditarium ad regiam dignitatem aſcenderat, hîc in dilectâ noſtrâ patriâ ſtatim ab initio, & poſtea continuè quoties occaſio hoc ipſi dictare videbatur, eò anniſus eſt, ut nos deducet à purâ & verâ apoſtolicâ doc-

* It was pronounced originally in Swediſh, and tranſlated verbatim by Loccenius. Hiſt. Suec. 4^to. 526.

trinâ;

trinâ; & occœcaret nos pontificiis erroribus ac tenebris, quò omnia ejus consilia & molitiones, tam accommodationis quadam specie, quàm insidiis & vi directæ erant. Hæ ut impedirentur, rex Carolus, dilectissimus & honoratissimus meus dominus pater laudatissimæ memoriæ, unà cum pluribus aliis rectè sentientibus christianis, Suecis, & patriæ verè amantibus viris, summopere studuit. Super istæc extranea cepit arma Sigismundus, eaque in regnum, patriam suam introduxit, & regni incolas ad civile bellum adversus seipsos concitavit & irritavit, & persecutus est beatæ memoriæ dominum parentem meum & illos, donec ipse & illi, necessitate coacti, defensionis arma contra Sigismundum capesserent, quibus ejus & asseclarum illius machinationes anno 1598, ad Lincopiam, divinæ gratiæ providentiâ, frangebantur & irritæ reddebantur, ejusque & asseclarum contra Deum & patriam perjurium puniebatur & vindicabatur. Inde quoque contra recens pactum ibi præstitum, patriam suam deseruit, omnem offensam & turbationem post se relinquens; per quæ non modò multi honesti viri, sed etiam totius regni status periclitari imò prorsus interire potuissent. Quamvis autem beatæ memoriæ dominus parens meus & regni ordines satis causæ habuissent regium imperium statim ab eo ad alium transferendi; tamen prius in diversis comitiis & conventibus ipsi & ipsius filio hoc obtulerunt. Sed ab ipso deinceps nihil aliud agitatum & susceptum est, quàm damnosum bellum adversus hoc regnum, per quod postea universi regni ordines permoti sunt ad abjudicandum & renunciandum ei jus suum hæreditarium ad hoc nostræ patriæ regimen & imperium; & de cætero mutarunt veterem unionem hæreditariam, atque in beatæ memoriæ dominum parentem meum transtulerunt; prout Norcopiensis & plures recessus, unà cum renunciationibus in publicum editis, ulterius continent ac ostendunt quas ut annihilaret Sigismundus rex, postmodò vi & astutiâ operam dedit. Ut autem eò melius reliquum suum propositum hoc modo persequi & promovere posset, exinde non solùm bello, sed etiam vanorum scriptorum copiâ hunc præsentem regni statum perturbatum ivit, velut quoque præterito tempore bello in Livoniâ, & diversis diplomatibus ac mandatis huc in regnum missis & disseminatis satis testatum fecit, in quibus non modò dominum patentem beatæ memoriæ & me, sed etiam omnes regni ordines famosis & falsò effictis scriptis, nostras & illorum actiones & facta laude digna conatur Sueciæ subditis totique mundo odiosa reddere. Ego me diversis temporibus ad amicam reconciliationem scripto obtuli: ut diuturnum illud & cruentum bellum aliquando deponeretur, atque provinciæ & regna salutarem pacem degustarent, & mala bellum concomitantia

mitantia tandem ceſſarent. Sed ille nihil aliud quàm probroſa verba reſcripſit, magis ad perturbationem, quàm conciliationem facientia. Ulterius contra inducias inter Sueciæ & Poloniæ delegatos præteritâ æſtate factas, mandata & libellos famoſos huc in Sueciam miſit, eo fine, ut per eos, vos à pacis obligatione (qua vos in ante dicto induciarum pacto parenti meo & mihi devinxiſtis) abduceret, & ſic diſcordiam, diffidium, atque, ſi fieri poſſet, inteſtinum bellum excitaret, à quibus periculoſis ejus conſiliis vos benevolè dehortor. Dat vobis dulcia & fallacia verba, dolet veſtras vices & ſtatum, quærit tamen ſub eo fuco vos in graves conditiones conjicere. Vociferatur de eo in ſuis diplomatibus, quod in bello cum vicinis veſtris & circumjacentibus regnis verſemini; ſed non addit, quod libenter vos à veſtro juramento ſeducere, atque ad inteſtinum bellum irritare velit. Artificiosè quoque diſſimulare & reticere poteſt, quis in cauſa fuerit, ut eum vicinis noſtris Ruſſis incideremus in hoc bellum. In ſumma hoc agit, ut quovis modo ſubditorum meorum animos à me abducere poſſit & alienare, atque ſic plus motuum creare. Quapropter vos gratiosè monitos volo, ut vobis ab hujuſmodi ſcriptis caveatis, & veſtros vicinos, conterraneos & parœcianos adhortemini, ne quis veſtrûm per ea circumveniatur. Ut verò eò melius & reipſa intelligatis Sigiſmundi artes, quibus ſemper uſus eſt, provincias & regna populatus eſt, multas turbas, bellum & ſanguinis effuſionem procuravit, conſtitui ſummatim coram vobis repetere, quomodo non ſolùm in animo habuerit per bellum in Ruſſiâ geſtum ſubigere noſtram patriam, ſed etiam quomodo præcipuâ in causâ (poſt delictorum pœnam) fuerit, ut implicaremur huic Ruſſico bello, & quâ ficta ſpecie deceperit Ruſſos; ut inde poſtea colligere poſſitis, quid intendat cum ſuis diplomatibus. Hoc ſatis notum eſt, quum rex Poloniæ, bello in Poloniam traducto, contra Sueciæ regnum nihil efficere poſſet, & ille cum ſuis & pontificii legati conſiliis & auxiliis, modum & viam parentem meum beatæ memoriæ & Sueciæ regnum occupandi ferme impoſſibilem deprehenderet, aliud excogitat medium, atque ſic conatur uno malleo duos ictus facere, ut dici ſolet. Polonis enim dabatur occaſio, ficto dolo Ruſſos ad inteſtinam perducendi diſcordiam; in qua ſibi non difficile fore arbitrabantur, ſive unum provehendi ad imperium, qui cum illis facturus eſſet, ſive totam Ruſſiam ſibi ſubjiciendi. Erat in Ruſſia anno 1605, Boritz Fœdorouvitz Gudenou, qui ex vili genere & ortu erat, & czaris Frederici affinis, ſuo tempore ſtabuli magiſtri officium gerens, quum verò factus eſſet czaris affinis, præponebat eum (quia ipſe parum cordatus erat) toti Ruſſiæ, quæ re ipſi anſa dabatur plebem in ſuam fidem & obſequium

obſequium adducendi, & quia videbat, czarem improlem eſſe, cogitabat de viâ magnum ducatum ſub ſe redigendi. Sed ipſi obſtaculo erat Johannis Baſilii, quondam czaris minimus natu filius, Frederici Ivanovitz frater, nomine Demetrius: eoque hunc clam occidi facit. Quum verò czar Fredericus Ivanovitz obiiſſet abſque hæredibus, plebs deſiderabat dictum Boritz, qui, pro vulgi arbitratu, non malè præfuerat imperio, defuncto czari ſuccedere. Alioqui ſibi in ſuâ adminiſtratoris dignitate quandam auctoritatem & exiſtimationem conciliarat; ita ut magnates, qui poſſent ratione conſanguinitatis eſſe proximi imperio, non auderent populo contradicere; ſed ipſi cogerentur, licet inviti, dictum Boritz eligere in czarem. Sed ille per decennium, quo Ruſſiam regebat, primatum invidiam & odium magis & magis in ſe derivabat. Quum ergo rex Poloniæ comperiſſet, iſtum in omnium Ruſſorum odio tandem eſſe, effingendum ſibi aliquid & tentandum eſſe cogitabat, quo ſeditio & inteſtinum diſſidium inter Ruſſiæ incolas cieri poſſet; nihil moratus, quod ante quinquennium pacem & amicitiam ad XX annos cum eodem Boritz feciſſet. Sed reperiebat fugitivum monachum gente Ruſſum, qui ex vili Otrapiorum genere ortus, nomine Griſka erat. Hunc monachum Sigiſmundus putabat eſſe idoneum, per quem conſilium ſuum effectui mandaret; quia aſtutus homo & magus erat. Idcircò evulgabatru morem, iſtum monachum eſſe Demetrium, Johannis Baſilii minimum natu filium, ſparſis in Ruſſia (ſecundum morem ejus hîc in regno præterita æſtate uſitatum) non paucis diplomatibus & literis ſub iſtius Demetrii nomine, prætendens, verum Demetrium non fuiſſe interfectum, ſed illos, qui in mandatis habebant, eum occidere, ſubduxiſſe eum & abdidiſſe in monaſterium, ubi in hunc diem educatus eſſet, & poſtea, quum ad maturam ætatem perveniſſet, ſe contuliſſe in Lithuaniam, ut Boritzii tyrannidem effugeret, ideo monebat eos, ut à Boritzio deſciſcerent ad illum, qui verus eorum dominus eſſet. Rex etiam monebat Woiwodam de Sandomiria, ut quaſi per ſeipſum, ei aliquot millium auxilium præſtaret, quod etiam fecit. Ita monachus iſte, ſubmentito Demetrii nomine, cum illo exercitu pergebat, & obſidebat aliquot Ruſſicas urbes; quæ ſe confeſtim à rege Poloniæ & commento ejus decipi patiebantur. Ruſſi, qui ſatis ſciebant dolum ſubeſſe initio quidem ei aliquantum reſiſtebant, ſic ut rex cogeretur monacho ſuo plus auxiliarium copiarum mittere. Tandem tamen tædio Boritziani imperii afficiebantur, ita ut majorum ac minorum gentium ſubditi ab eo deficerent, & in partes Demetrii paſſim tranſirent. Itaque poſtquam rex Demetrii ſui ſucceſſum cognovit, fœdus cum

eo inivit, & promisit ei imperium Muscoviticum, & nuptias Sandomirii principis filiæ. Ipsum contra obligatum iri ad introducendam pontificiam religionem in Russiam, & ad juvandum regem Poloniæ in occupatione regni Sueciæ, cum aliis hujusmodi. Proinde rex ei ingentem exercitum auxilio misit; quo nonnullos cogebat, nonnullos ex imprudentia putantes ipsum genuinum czaris filium esse, impellebat ad suas partes sequendum, quidam, ex invidia & odio Boritzii imperii, ei ultrò accedebant; donec Boritzius ex desperatione sibi ipsi mortem conscisceat. Boritzii filius ad aliquot hebdomadas post patrem suum administrabat imperium; sed ille quoque cum matre suâ veneno sublatus est. Itaque regis Sigismundi monachus ad Russicum imperium coronatur in urbe Muscovicâ. Hîc ex Boritzii casu sibi quivis cautelæ exemplum capiat, ac videat, quomodo DEUS plectat illos, qui per latrocinium & malas artes extollunt se in domini sui sedem ac thronum; etiamsi DEUS hoc ad tempus ferat; sera tamen & gravis pœna cum vindicta tandem supervenit. Hîc etiam vobis considerare & cernere integrum est, quid Sigismundus rex libellis aut scriptis suis emissitiis effecerit, & quomodo dictum Boritzium imperio & vitâ dejecerit, & monachum exaltarit, Russos perturbarit: unde postea omnes hi motus exorti sunt. Potestis insuper ex his judicare & colligere, quàm periculosum propositum hujusmodi scriptis, quæ indies huc mittit, adversus patriam nostram conceperit, à quo DEUS nos clementer custodiat. Quilibet sapiens vir etiam bene perpendere potest, in quanto discrimine Sueciæ regnum chara nostra patria versata sit, quando iste regis Poloniæ monachus imperium Russiæ tenebat: erant enim illi fœdere conjuncti; erant unius pontificiæ religionis; erant duorum potentium regnorum, nobis vicinorum, compotes, ita ut, nisi DEUS illorum consilia præveniisset & fregisset, impossibile coram humanis oculis fuisset, se contra illos defendere. Sed ut illud sacrum dictum habet: Decerne consilium, & fiat irritum; armate vos, & tamen fugam capite: quia DEUS nobiscum est; pro quo ipsi gloria sit. Quum enim iste Demetrius dicto modo à rege Poloniæ extolleretur ad imperium Russiæ, statim cogitabat de servando pacto suo, omnis generis præparationem ad bellum faciebat, quo secum animo constituerat adoriri Sueciæ regnum. Sed quum ei, secundum ante dicti fœderis tenorem, etiam illud pactum, servaretur, ut principis Sandomirii filia ei nuptui daretur, & videretur firmum fœdus inter Russiam & Poloniam coaliturum, atque in nos redundaturum, Deus aliam ingrediebatur viam. In ipsis enim nuptiarum diebus excitabat DEUS Russicum dominum, nomine Basilium Ivanovitz Suski, qui satis sciebat, hoc merè

fictum

fictum opus cum isto Demetrio esse. Ille fastidivit Polonicum istud imperium; proinde commovit populum, & ipsos quoque magnates, ut eorum favor in ipsum inclinaret, atque sic, occiso pseudo Demetrio cum suis Polonis, ab ipso pendentibus, hunc Basilium Ivanovitz eligunt sibi czarem. Hîc dictum fœdus jam cum suo Demetrio exspiraverat, hîc omnia cassa erant, pro quibus tamdiu laborarant, hîc etiam amicitia inter Polonos & Russos in merum odium, vindictæ cupiditatem, & apertum bellum conversa ac mutata erat. Sigismundi regis animo non parum ægrè erat, quod ejus consilium in Russia non felicius cessiffet; putabat tamen, hîc nondum quiescendum esse; idcircò cum ingenti exercitu à se armato ipse proficiscebatur in Russiam. Ut autem Russis, tunc vacillare incipientibus ulterius imponeret, iterum spargebat rumorem de Demetrio, quasi non occiso, sed elapso, & apud se in castris præsente. Sic Russi, pro barbaricâ suâ levitate, majore sui parte iterum deficiebant à czare suo & revertebantur ad partes Poloni, qua defectione Polonorum castra ita roborabantur, ut czarem & paucos illos, qui adhuc in fide ejus erant, in urbe Muscovia obsidione cingerent, & in tantas angustias redigerent, ut auxilium à patre meo p.m. petere cogerentur; quia verò dominus parens meus haud ignorabat, quanti periculi res futura esset, si rex Poloniæ Russiâ potiri deberet, regia ejus majestas suæ & patriæ securitatis causa, desiderio ejus deesse non poterat. Itaque eò mittebat exercitum suum, & czarem liberabat obsidione; & totam Russiam liberasset, si quorundam extraneorum proditio non interveniisset, prout multis vestrum notum esse potest, qui ipsi adfuerunt. Hæc peregrinorum defectio tantum effecit, ut rex Sigismundus Russiam occuparet, & filium suum, czarem fieri curaret, & Basilium monachum faceret. Per hanc occasionem regis Poloniæ molitiones, quas parens meus beatæ memoriæ, patriæ securitatis causa, non poterat non impedire, primùm incidimus in hæc Russica negotia, quæ postea anno 1613, per Russorum dolum malum eruperunt in hoc bellum. Non potest illud absque admiratione tam extraneorum, quàm incolarum abire, quomodo factum sit, ut nos tam subitò cum Russis, quibus nuper auxilium ferebamus, quique nostri amici erant, adeò cruentum bellum nacti simus. Ut ejus rei causam sciatis, & reipsâ videatis, eam ex merâ Russorum inconstantiâ & perfidiâ profectam esse, paucis coram vobis referam. Postquam beatæ memoriæ dominus parens meus, ut prius dictum est, ita propter regis Sigismundi molitiones permotus erat, ut succurreret Russis, pro qua re ipsi promissa erat Kexholmia ejusque ditio in remunerationem expensarum; quamtumvis autem czarem Russiæ liberasset ab obsidione ferme triennali

triennali Muſcoviæ urbis: non tamen poterat caſtelli Kexholmenſis compos fieri, niſi illud obſidere, & vi cogere deberet. Atque quum Kexholmia jam occupata eſſet, regia ejus majeſtas ſatis rationis habuiſſet ad diſpiciendum, quomodo de circumjacente terra ſibi ſtatim in rem ſuam conſulere potuiſſet; quia Ruſſi paulò ante Uladiſlaum regis Poloniæ filium, parentis mei inimicum, ſibi elegerant in czarem. Nihilominus tamen regia majeſtas in mandatis dederat ſuo mareſchallo, ut ſolummodò invigilaret horum finium defenſioni. Sed quum Ruſſos pœniteret, quod Polonis ſubjecti eſſent, qui crudeliter & violenter illis imperarent, recolligebant ſe ſuaſque copias, tam validas, ut urbem Muſcoviam & Polonos in eâ obſiderent. Quum tamen vererentur, ſe impares fore obſidioni perſequendæ, ex caſtris ad Muſcoviam ſcribunt Novogardiam, & cives iſtic jubent petere Campidominum ſibi auxilio. Qui quum ex ipſorum deſiderio adveniſſet, Ruſſorum conditio quotidie melior fiebat, partim ob Polonicorum militum ſeditionem, partim ob alias diſſenſiones inter Polonos natas, ita uti Ruſſi ſibi perſuaderent, ſe per ſeipſos hoc bene effecturos. Sed Novogardenſes hac occaſione circumventum ibant Campidominum, & blandis verbis cum tam diu detinebant, ut omnis ejus exercitus ad extremam famem redactus eſſet, ea re deinceps adductus eſt ad occupandam urbem Nougardenſem. Hoc facto, Ordines Novogardenſes, qui in arce erant, ineibant contractum cum Campidomino, nimirum quod vellent unum ex domini parentis mei filiis ſibi dominum & czarem eligere, quod etiam poſtea à proceribus in Muſcovia approbatum eſt, ſecundum hujus contractus vigorem poſtmodò omnes reliquæ domus occupabantur. Poſteaquam Ruſſi Polonos, qui in urbe Moſchâ erant, tamdiu fame torſerant, ut cogerentur arcem et urbem dedere; iſti *(Ruſſi)* adeò animis inflati ſunt, ut non ſolum obliviſcerentur promiſſi de Carolo Philippo principe fratre meo in czarem creando; ſed etiam omnium gentium juris. Non enim modò alium ſibi czarem eligebant; ſed quoque noſtros milites, qui Tiphini & Augdoæ erant, ex improviſo obruebant (ſecundum Nougardenſium proprium deſiderium, in illorum ſecuritatem qui in præſidiis locati erant) eoſque miſere trucidabant, quod adhuc tolerari potuiſſet, ſi amicæ tranſactioni ſe accommodare voluiſſent. Ad eos diverſæ literæ monitoriæ ſcribebantur, ut nobiſcum amicè agere vellent. Sed illi eas literas quaſi metu ſcriptas interpretabantur: ingentem enim exercitum ad Brunitz collocatum habebant. Ut autem illis oſtenderem, ſe ſibi ipſis imponere, per mea agmina ad Nougardam ſtantia excurſionem ad eorum caſtra Brunitzenſia fieri jubebam, obſidebam quo-

que Augdoam; & Deo favente ad Brunitziam ſedentes cædebantur, & Augdoa capiebatur. Ut autem mundus intelligeret, quantum mihi diſpliceret ſanguinis effuſio & cruentum bellum, deinde ex urbe Narvâ per Campidominum Aulæ & Campi Mareſcallum, ſenatum Ruſſicum ulterius admoneri faciebam, ut ad amicam compoſitionem animum applicare velint inſtruebam quoque Campi Mareſcallum Jeſperum Andreæ & Magnum Martini poteſtate cum illis volentibus tranſigendi, ſed illi probroſa & inania dicta regerebant. Interea tantum valui apud Magnæ Britanniæ Reges & Ordines Belgicæ, ut ſuos legatos ad hujus negotii compoſitionem mitterent. Illi quoque jam ad ipſius compoſitionis actum convenerunt, quomodo verò Deus illorum animos ad juſtitiam & pacem flectere poſſit, tempus docebit. Hunc in modum res proceſſit, & nos ad Ruſſicum bellum devenimus, quod mihi, per hoc triennium, impoſſibile fuit amovere ob hoſtis pertinaciam; quantæcunque etiam mihi curæ fuit. Spero tamen, Deum per media, quæ nunc dedit, omnia in bonum verſurum. Quum ergo ita ſit, quod rex Poloniæ omni conatu, diplomatibus & mendacibus ſcriptis, bello per Livoniam & Ruſſiam, ſuſcitato, hoc agit, uti dictum eſt, ut dilectam noſtram patriam in perniciem præcipitet, & pontificis ac Polonorum ſervitutis jugo ſubjiciat; ideo cauto opus eſt, ne ab illis vos ſeduci patiamini, velut Ruſſi fecerunt, ſed eorum exemplum vos circumſpectos faciat, conſiderantes, quot diverſa mala imperiorum mutationes ſecum trahant; præſertim quando ſit per inteſtinam diſcordiam. Proinde revocate vobis ſemper in memoriam varias obligationes, quibus dn. parenti meo beatæ memoriæ & mihi diverſis temporibus vos obſtrinxiſtis, additis ſcriptis & corporalibus gravibus juramentis. Ne quoque oblivioni tradatis immenſa pericula ac moleſtias, quas pater meus b. m. & ego multis modis, veſtræ ſalutis cauſa, paſſi ſumus & ſuſtinuimus. Intuemini porrò cauſas & ipſum fundamenum belli Ruſſici, quod non regiæ majeſtatis b. m. vel meâ culpâ ceptum & tamdiu continuatum eſt; ſed quod ducit originem ſuam veram ex ipſorum Ruſſorum perfidia & pervicaciâ. Vos itaque boni viri velitis perſeverare in illa fidelitate, quam hactenus in vobis comperi, ſic ego de cætero quoque, ut hactenus, veſtræ ſaluti ſummopere ſtudebo operamque dabo, ut vos reducam ad pacem, quietem & meliorem ſtatum; ad quod Deus omnipotens gratiam ſuam largiatur.

## II.

Copy of Mr. LILLY (the Aſtrologer's) Letter to the King of SWEDEN, upon his receiving an honorary Reward of a gold Medal.

[In the Aſhmolean Muſæum, MSS. N° 8365.]

[This letter was written about 1612, when Guſtavus was 18 years of age.]

Sir,

THAT munificent honorarium, ſent from your royal hand by our valiant countryman captain Owen Cox; he (accompanied with the right honourable Sir George Aſkew) delivered unto me the 5th of October laſt, (ſtylo vet.) which, with all humble thankfulneſs, I did receive.

But finding my weak labours have met with ſo great eſteem in your princely thoughts, even to invite a king, from the treaſure of his own virtue, and in the midſt of thoſe buſy engagements your majeſty has now on foot before Copenhagen, to caſt your no leſs gracious aſpect than high teſtimony of favour upon me, is a conſideration that would ſurpriſe me with the greateſt admiration, did not I perfectly ſee the meaſure of princes benefit holds more proportion with the largeneſs of their heart than merit of thoſe on whom beſtowed.

What brought me to honour your heroick name, and thence led on the engagement of my pen, in behalf of yourſelf and nation, was the large relations my only Engliſh Mecenas (the right honourable the lord Whitlock at his return from Sweden) gave me of thoſe princely endowments, your heroick virtues and generous inclinations: and now give me leave with humble reſolves to engage, that foraſmuch as your majeſty's favour, like a beam caſt from that king of planets, has out of your innate goodneſs, conveyed influence upon ſo obſcure and remote a perſon, your majeſty ſhall aſſuredly draw to yourſelf greater obligations than hitherto I could manifeſt; together with the reſolution of ſailing after your own ſhip, and under the fortune of your own trophy, through the moſt perilous ſeas and trial of all your concernment.

And while my being is continued on earth will I retain this ſignal of your kindneſs as my chiefeſt treaſure; intending moreover its future preſervation in ſome eminent and public place, and with ſuch an inſcription as ſhall ennoble your princely bounty, and record my humble gratitude to all poſterity.

That GOD, whose great name the reverse of your medal wears, dispose of all your designs; and may the guardian angel of Sweden happily carry on your sword with compleat and continual victory, and plant your trophies throughout the dominions of all your enemies; these are and shall be a part of the earnest and hearty votes of

Your Majesty's most humble
and most obliged servant,

A true copy, Jan. 8. 1759. W. LILLY.
Wm. Huddesford.

## III.

LE CAPITOLATIONI della compagnia dell' Indie Orientali e Occidentali, instituta dal rè GUSTAVO ADOLFO di Suetia per beneficio de suoi sudditi, fino dell' anno 1626*, che poi fù da lui pochi giorni innanzi la sua morte estesa anco alli sudditi de suoi confederati, e di tutta Alamagna, con ampliſſimi privilegi, e sono li seguenti †.

I. CHE fra dodici anni à venire nissuno soggetto al regno di Suetia trapassando lo stretto di Gibilterra con altro titolo, che della general compagnia negotiasse nell' Africa, nell' Asia, nell' America, nella Magallanica, ò ne' paesi Australi sotto pena della perdita delle navi, e di tutte le mercantie; & i padroni delle navi, i quali in simili paesi havessero traficato, fossero tenuti render conto de' loro negotii, e come trasgressori de gli ordini, e decreti regii, fossero puniti.

II. Che questa compagnia s'intendesse cominciata al prima di Maggio 1627, e durasse fino à dodici anni venturi; nel qual tempo à nissuno de' compagni fosse lecito ripigliare il danaro sborsato; nè introdurre à parte del negotio altre persone; se poi decorsi i dodici anni parerà alla compagnia prolongare il tempo del privilegio, egli concede questa proroga in quel modo, che più piacerà.

III. Che ciascun anno si saldassero i conti, a i quali potessero esser presenti tutti quelli, che di sua parte havessero posti nella compagnia mille scudi. Ogni sei anni si facesse un computo finale di tutti i conti; imperoche se'l guadagno, e l'utile (il che non voglia Dio) non corrisponda al danaro postovi, in guisa, che à gl'interessati non paia doversi continuar la compagnia, all'hora fosse disciolta.

* Loccenius says in 1627.

† Continuatione del Commentario delle Guerre successe in Alemagna, &c. Descritto dal Sign. Conte Bisaccioni. In Venet. 4°. 1634.

IV. Che

IV. Che ſi notificaſſe à tutti con publici editti, che ciaſcuno entrar poteſſe in queſta compagnia, dandoſi di tempo à gli habitatori del regno di Suetia ſino alle calende di Marzo, & a' foreſtieri ſino al primo di Maggio; di modo, che chi vorrà mettere il danaro nella compagnia debba pagarlo in quattro volte; cioè una parte nel termine preſcritto, e le altre tre parti in tre anni venturi.

V. Scorſo il tempo preſcritto ſi elegano i ſopraſtanti, i quali ſolo ſiano tanti di numero, quante centinara di migliara di ſcudi foſſero contati; ſe però tal'uno quale haveſſe contribuito cento mila ſcudi non voleſſe due ſopraſtanti, i quali però haver doveſſero il ſalario, come ſe foſſero un ſolo.

VI. I ſopraſtanti debbano eſſere eletti con i voti communi de' participanti, e chi non haveſſe contribuito mille ſcudi, non habbi voto nell' elettione; e niſſuno ſia eletto per ſopraſtante, il quale non habbia contribuito due mila ſcudi.

VII. I ſopraſtanti primieramente eletti durino nel loro officio per ſei anni; e paſſato queſto termine delle tre parti di loro, due foſſero di nuovo elette; e per la terza parte foſſero ſoſtituiti i principali de' participanti, il che coſì ſi oſſervaſſe ogni due anni, doppo i ſei anni decorſi, finche terminaſſe il tempo preſiſſo nel privilegio.

VIII. Che tutti, e qualunque ſi foſſe tanto del paeſe, come ſtranieri, che contribuito haveſſe nella compagnia 100 mila ſcudi, conſtituiſſero ſe gli pareva un ſopraſtante, & a queſto fine foſſero apparecchiate tutte le nationi con le ſcritture del contratto, acciò per mezo di quelle poſſano traſmettere il denaro nelle mani di coloro, ch' eſſi ſtimano fedeli, e buoni; E che claſcuno nella ſua partita ſcriveſſe à qual natione aggregar ſi voleſſe. Li foraſtieri, che riſolvendoſi habitare nel regno di Suetia contribuiranno 25 mila ſcudi nella compagnia, godano l'iſteſſe ragioni, che i terrazzani, e ſiano liberi daogni tributo, purche non eſercitino nelle città negotti civili, e ſia loro conceſſo per ogni volta, che gli piacerà, libero paſſo per partire.

IX. Li ſopraſtanti ſiano di autorità, e di potenza eguali, ſenza riguardo de gli officii, ò delle dignità, che per altro haver poteſſero. E datoli il giuramento promettano, di ſempre eſeguir fedelmente l'officio loro; ogni coſa accommodare; procurare il commodo della compagnia; evitare il danno, favorire giuſtamente, & egualmente tutti ſenza riguardo d'amicitia, di nobiltà, ò di dignità di chi ſi ſia; non perdonare ad alcuno, nè condeſcendere al piacer di altri; ma doppo l'haver à tempi debiti reſo i conti, & oſſervati i capitoli del preſente trattato, ſodisfare per quanto potranno

à rutti. Che non diſtribuiſcano nè mercantie, nè navi proprie, nè ricompraſſero da ſe, nè per mezo d'altri, ò direttamente, ò indirettamente dalla compagnia mercantia alcuna.

X. Che a' ſopraſtanti ſi aſſegnaſſero di ſalario mille ſcudi l'anno.

XI. Se li ſopraſtanti foſſero aſtretti a prò della compagnia far viaggio, per la loro ſpeſa, e fatica, oltre la paga delle vetture, haveſſero ſei marche Suezzeſi al giorno, che ſono di noſtra valuta lire undici, e ſoldi cinque.

XII. Che alli ſecretarii, cancellieri, & altri miniſtri ſi pagaſſero i ſtipendii dalla cancellaria della compagnia. Et i ſopraſtanti di ciascheduna camera rendeſſero i conti particolari de loro ſecretarii, e miniſtri.

XIII. Ma ſe per ſorte alcuno de ſopraſtanti ſi riduceſſe a ſtato tale in qual ſi ſia camera, che più non poteſſe aſſiſtere, & eſſer utile alla compagnia, ſi che perciò ne riſultaſſe danno alcuno; il danno toccaſſe alla camera, in cui egli ſi ritrova, overo a quelli, che lo deputarono ſopraſtante; e che ſi computaſſe il danno, ſempre col danaro contribuito da lui, alla compagnia, quale per ciò reſti ſempre obligato ad eſſa; il che anche s'intendeſſe de' compagni, e di quelli, ch'entraſſero a parte, i quali col ricomprare molte merci haveſſero ſatto qualche debito con la compagnia.

XIV. Che non ſi ſoſteneſſero, nè portaſſero in areſto i ſopraſtanti, nè i loro beni ſotto preteſto di render conti, nè de pagar debiti; ma tutte le pretenſioni, che vertiſſero contro di loro ſi riduceſſero al giudice ordinario.

XV. Che i danari, che ſi metteranno nella compagnia ſiano eſenti da ogni confiſcatione, nè in conto alcuno ſi poſſano applicar ad altri; anzi, che ſe avveniſſe, (il che Dio non permetta) che il rè di Suetia haveſſe riſſa, ò guerra con altri regi, prencipi, ò republiche; li ſudditi de' prencipi nemici, che haveſſero contribuita qualche ſomma di danari nella compagnia ſiano capaci di poter ripigliar la loro ſorte principale, e tutti gli frutti, emolumenti, e commodi, come gli ſteſſi ſudditi, e confederati col rè di Suetia, e non altrimente, che ſe co' prencipi loro non foſſe guerra ò diſcordia alcuna.

XVI. Che le città commode alla navigatione, e che eſercitano la mercantia ſe contribuirāno trecento mila ſcudi, conſtituiſcano camera, e le coſe neceſſarie per la rata di queſta ſomma.

XVII. Che foſſe libero anche alle città, e provincie di ridurre il denaro contribuito a queſto effetto in una ſomma, e determinar la camera, e le coſe neceſſarie; dichiarando però,

però, che le ſpeſe ſtraordinarie ridondino nelle città, che ne riportano il commodo, e non nella compagnia.

XVIII. Che la flotta delle navi ſi radunaſſe à Gottemburgh, e di conſerva da quel porto ſi partiſſero, e compito il viaggio di nuovo colà ſi riduceſſero: & ivi ſcaricaſſero le mercantie, e poi di novo rimandaſſero le navi, dove erano partite cariche, purche i venti, & il tempo lo permettano, e che non ſi temeſſe di qualche coſa ſiniſtra a danno della compagnia.

XIX. Se qualche camera reſtaſſe ſfornita di qualche ſorte di mercantia, le altre, quando ne ſiano richieſte, la provedino, e procurino, che ſimili mercantie peregrine, e foreſtiere, ſi ritrovino in tutti li luoghi.

XX. Che doppo l'elettione de' ſopraſtanti, e la deputatione della camera, in ciaſcheduna di eſſe ſi deputino eſpreſſi direttori, li quali ogni giorno faccino i conti, e con li ſopraſtanti deliberino, e determinino delle coſe neceſſarie; come del continuare, o non continuare la compagnia, della diſtributione delle mercantie portate, e di ſomiglianti coſe.

XXI. Che ſi concedeſſe alle camere autorità di permutare qualunque ſupraſtante da una camera all'altra; e che ogn'una di eſſe camere, debba tenere in Gottemburgh un'amminiſtratore; che le camere tra di loro in termine di due meſi doppo la partita delle navi mandino i conti l'una all'altra, acciò ſi poſſa ſaper la ſpeſa delle merci caricate, e de gli apparati delle navi, & ogni tre meſi rimettere la ſomma delle coſe vendute.

XXII. Che ogni volta, che parerà neceſſario s'inſtituiſca una dieta, & adunanza delle camere, accioche deliberar ſi poſſa ſopra la levata delle navi; quante, & in che modo debbano eſſer fornite; in che luoce, & a che prezzo ſmaltir ſi doveſſero le portate mercantie; rendere i conti, & altre coſe ſimili. Il che ne' primi anni oſſervar doveſſe la camera, che haverà contribuito più dell'altre; la quale perciò doverà haver la precedenza ſopra le altre; le altre camere poi haveranno la loro precedenza, e luoco ad imitatione di queſta.

XXIII. Che nella dieta compariſſero dodici ſopraſtanti a nome di tutte le camere, alli quali egli haverebbe aggionto il terzo decimo voto a ſuo nome, accioche con più commodità riſolvere ſi poſſa ſopra li maggiori affari; & a queſto effetto ciaſcheduna camera conſtituiſſe tante perſone, quante ſomme haveranno contribuito nella compagnia; per eſempio, ſe qualche camera haveſſe ..... la metà contribuiſſe ſei perſone, ſe la terza parte, quattro, ſe quattro parti, tré; e ſe la ſeſta parte, due; e tutto quello, che con queſto modo dalla maggior parte delli voti concluſo, e riſoluto reſtaſſe, foſſe da tutti gli altri accettato.

XXIV. Che tutte le mercantie, che foſſero nel regno di Suetia introdotte, o da quello eſtratte fuori, paghino di gabella quattro fiorini per cento, e queſto per una volta ſola, doppo la quale ne a' banchi, dogane, ò porte, ſe li poſſa far pagar altro. Donaſi anco facoltà alla compagnia, che dopo l'haver pagato li quattro per cento ſopradetti, poſſino traſportar le ſue merci per tutto il regno ſenza pagar altro datio, o gabella; purche le dette merci non ſi vendano a poco, a poco, con diſcommodo, e danno de' cittadini, e ſudditi del regno.

XXV. Che egli ricevuto haverebbe ſotto la ſua protettione la compagnia, e la conſervarebbe nel ſuo libero eſercitio della mercantia, & uſo della navigatione, e la difenderebbe contro tutti quelli, che tentaſſero di nuocerli, e ne' tumulti di guerra gli aiutarrebbe (richiedendo il biſogno) con la guardia ſua propria.

XXVI. Che in ſe ſteſſo pigliarebbe l'aſſunto di fabricare caſtelli, e fortezze in quei luochi, che ſaranno giudicati opportuni alla ſicurrezza de' trafichi, e de' mercanti ſteſſi, e di preſidiarli con armi, ſoldati, & artigliarie a proprie ſpeſe.

XXVII. Che le prede, e le coſe tolte a' corſari, & ad altri nemici s' impiegaſſero in utile della compagnia, & in difeſa del trafico; ſenza che egli, o il ſuo ammiraglio ſopra eſſe pretenda ragione alcuna; ma ſe l'acquiſto delle prede ſi faceſſe con l'opera de' ſoldati del rè, in tal caſo la preda ſi compartiſſe con egual portione.

XXVIII. Che egli non prenderebbe, nè ſi ſervirebbe di navi, artigliaria, danari, o mercantie, della compagnia, per ſervitio di alcuno di ſuoi, nè meno per uſo del regno, ſenza il volere, e'l libero conſenſo della compagnia.

XXIX. Che egli dà facoltà a quelli, che hanno parte nella compagnia di far contratti con i popoli habitanti fra i termini, e confini ſudetti, di far nuove confederationi con prencipi, e popoli foraſtieri a proprio nome, di fabricar città, caſtelli, e fortezze; di occupar luochi deſolati, e di farli habitabili, e di operare, e procurare per quanto poſſono l'utile, e commodo proprio, e della compagnia. Con queſto però, che non faccia violenza hoſtile contro gli habitatori di quei paeſi, e che nè anche ſi tenti coſa alcuna contro i ſudditi del rè di Spagna; nè che ſi pretenda, & eſerciti commercio alcuno ne' luochi a loro ſoggetti ſenza eſpreſſa loro licenza; ſotto la pena di già ſtabilita contra li traſgreſſori de ſuoi ordini, e contra li perturbatori della publica pace.

XXX. Se avveniſſe mai, che queſta compagnia ſotto ſpecie d'amicitia foſſe ingannata, o in qual ſi ſia altro modo mal trattata, e nell'uſo de' trafichi, ò per forza, o per fraude impedita,

impedita, o defraudata; all'hora gli cócedeua piena facoltà di rifarſi de' danni con qual ſi voglia modo, e mezo, che potranno; e di procedere contro coloro, che s'ingegnaſſero d'impedire li loco tranſichi, o di farli violenza, come contro corſari, nemici, aſſaſſini, e turbatori della publica quiete.

XXXI. E per maggiormente ſcoprire il deſiderio ſuo di ajutare, e promovere la compagnia, che egli vi contribuirà, e metterà a riſchio della fortuna, come gli altri, quatro cento mila talari Suezzeſi.

XXXII. Che oltre li quattro fiorini per cento da pagarſi in vece di datio, egli ſi prenderebbe il quinto dell'oro, argento, & altri minerali, che dalle cave de' metalli tranſportate foſſero; e la decima parte de' frutti di quei paeſi, in recompenſa de gli ajuti, privilegii, & eſentioni, che loro concedeva. Con queſte coſe però egli non comprende le mercantie, le quali foſſero dalla compagnia diſtratte; nè l'oro, e l'argento, o improntato, o nò, che dalla compagnia foſſe ſtato ricevuto in vece delle ſue merci; ma che tutto ciò laſciarebbe alla compagnia, & oltre di quanto ſi è detto non riſcuoterebbe coſa alcuna.

XXXIII. E perche Guglielmo Uſſelinz da Anverſa Brabantino ha ſpeſo gran tempo della ſua vita in ricercare i ſudetti porti, e per teſtimonianza de' ſtati della Fiandra, e di Mauritio prencipe di Oranges, egli ſia ſtato il principal inventore in Olanda della compagnia dell' India occidentale, e con li ſuoi ammaeſtramenti habbi molto coadiuvato, & havendo egli di già riſoluto di ſtarſene nella Suetia, habbia promeſſo di fedelmente manifeſtare quanto egli con tante ſue fatiche haveva penetrato; però in ricompenſa di ciò egli vuole, che la compagnia le paghi un fiorino per migliaro di quelle mercantie, che dalla compagnia ſaranno o portate, o levate, per tutto quel tempo, che ſi faranno i trafichi ne' luochi accennati nel privilegio.

XXXIV. E perche di già abondantemente la compagnia é ſtabilita, e ne' luoghi foraſtieri ſono traſmeſſe genti del paeſe; perciò s'inſtituiſca un conſeglio, il quale con gli officii, con l'autorità, e con le reſolutioni attenda all' amminiſtratione della giuſtitia, alla conſervatione delle buone leggi, & alla continuatione della guerra; acciò, che queſta impreſa con giuſtitia ſi cominici, con prudenza ſi proſeguiſca, e felicemente ſi forniſca.

Queſto conſeglio debba determinare ſopra il far ſoldati, deputar governatori, ſopraſtanti, e Giudici, ſopra l'edificar città, e caſtelli; accommodar le differenze, e riſſe, che naſcer poteſſero fra gli habitatori di quei paeſi, & i foraſtieri colà paſſati;

paſſati; e lo ſteſſo anco quando fra queſti, e li ſopraſtanti, o camere e confederati ſuccedeſſe qualche diſcordia.

Finalmente queſto conſeglio habbi da mantenere, & oſſervare tutte quelle coſe, le quali ſono proprie, e convenevoli ad un buon ſtato, e politia.

Perche li mercanti, che devono attendere alli loro trafichi, adobbamenti di navi, conti, & alle loro corriſpondenze (coſi eſſe le chiamano) non poſſono applicarſi a ſimili affari, perciò con l'erettione di queſto conſeglio reſtano ſgravati.

Queſto conſiglio doverá inſtituirſi de' principali de' participanti, quali devono eſſere eſenti da' negotii, & affari delle commiſſioni, de' nocchieri, & altre conſegnationi della compagnia, atteſo, che a queſte coſe doveranno attendere li ſopraſtanti, e dar informatione a loro conſiglieri, delle navi, e de gli aviſi, che poteſſero alla giornata ricevere, che in tutte l'occorenze ſi poſſa riſolvere di quelle, che far ſi debba.

In detto cóſeglio tutte le coſe ſi riſolvino có forme al parer de' piu.

Il numero de conſeglieri ſi debba preſcrivere conforme all'occorrenze, & al giudicio della compagnia.

XXXV. Se per ſorte qualche principe, communità, città, o campagnia contribuiſſe 500 mila ſcudi, in queſta compagnia, ſi deputi a ſuo nome un'agente con ogni plenipotenza, acciòche con lui trattar ſi poſſa delle coſe neceſſarie, che occorreranno.

XXXVI. Se alli participanti pareſſe eſpediente dimandare altre conditioni diverſe da queſte, le quali poteſtero eſſere di commodo, & utile alla compagnia, purche non repugnino a gli ordini del regno, ſalute della republica, & al beneficio della compagnia, gli ſiano liberalmente conceſſe.

Queſto privilegio il Re di Suetia poco avanti la battaglia fàtta a Lutzen, communicò a gli attenenti, & a' confederati della Germania, aggiungendovi queſti altri Capitoli.

I. CONCEDE ampia facoltà alli ſudditi delle provincie da lui ſoggiogate, & a tutti quelli, che ſeco ſi confedereranno, di conſtituire camere, & amminiſtrationi fuori del regno di Suetia ne' loro proprii diſtretti, & in qualunque luoco, che più loro piacerà. E ſe a chi ſarà ſuo attinente o amico (non confederato), che di già li foſſe ſtato conceſſo di entrare nella compagnia, piaceſſe di adornar le proprie camere, debbano di ciò dichiarasi avanti, perche ſua maeſtà non intende negar ſimil coſa, conforme però alle occorrenze, & al biſogno.

II. E perche

II. E perche nel primo articolo del privilegio ſi nominano alcune parti del mondo; non doverſi ciò coſi rigoroſamente intendere, che la compagnia foſſe aſtretta più in un luoco, che in un altro, ma che con queſte dichiarationi S. M. concedeva facoltà d'indrizzare la loro navigatione dovunque più li piaceſſe, e di eſercitare li loro trafichi in ogni parte, e di terra, e di mare, dove poſſano ſperare commodo, & utile maggiore.

III. Che l'entrar nella compagnia ſia conceſſo ad ogn'uno fino all'ultimo di Decembre 1633, paſſato il qual tempo non poſſino più entrarci. Nel detto tépo ciaſcuno, che entrerà ſia tenuto di pagar la quarta parte dello ſóma, che vorrà contribuire; e queſto acciò che la compagnia habbia il ſuo principio li 10 di Gennaro 1633, & indi durar debbi per lo ſpatio di dodici anni continui avenire. Nel reſto il ſecondo, e quarto articolo rimanghi nel ſuo vigore.

IV. Se poi qualcheduno di quelli, ch'entreranno nella compagnia voleſſe contribuir in una ſol volta tutta la ſomma, a queſti tali la compagnia ſufficientemente prometta, & a ſuo tempo attenda; che fornito il tempo preſcritto nel privilegio, li ſarà pagato la ſolita portione, e frutto delli ſuoi danari dal giorno, che li contò; non eſſendo di dovere, che alcuno tenghi morto il ſuo capitale, ſenza il dovuto utile, e frutto.

V. Oltre a tutte queſte coſe S. M. dichiarava, che il Talaro Suezzeſe, di cui ſpeſſo ſi è fatto mentione reſtaſſe ſempre nel ſuo valore, cioè di quattro Marche; ſei e mezza delle quali fanno uno ſcudo Imperiale, e che li conti nella compagnia ſempre ſi faceſſero a ragione di ſcudi Imperiali.

VI. Che le ragioni, e privilegii, li quali nel quinto, & ottavo articolo ſono conceſſi a quelli, che haveſſero contribuito cento mila Taleri Suezzeſi, ſi reſtringeſſero a cin quanta mila ſcudi Imperiali, e quelli, che ſono conceſſi nel ſeſto articolo a quelli, che contribuivano mille, e due mila Taleri Suezzeſi ſi limitaſſero a cinquecento, & a mille ſcudi Imperiali; & a quanto ſi è detto nel decimoterzo articolo a quelli, che contribuiſſero trecento mila Talari Suezzeſi, ſi reſtringa a 150 mila ſcudi Imperiali; e perche nell' articolo ottavo a quelli, che conferiranno 25 mila Taleri Suezzeſi, era conceſſo molti privilegii, come in eſſo capitolo appare, hora ſua maeſtà, li reſtringeva a 12 mila, e cinquecento ſcudi Imperiali; e di più (oltre le ragioni della civiltà, e l'immunita della gabella, che in eſſo capitolo ſi contengono) vi aggiungeva, che volendo eſſi eſercitare gli eſercitii della città, & altri trafichi lo poſſano fare, e gli ſia conceſſo.

VII. Che

VII. Che li sopraſtanti, quali ſoſſero in viaggio per gli affari della compagnia, ſenza haver riguardo a quanto fù detto nell'articolo undecimo, poſſano prendere dalle camere quanto farà loro di biſogno, conforme alla qualità de' luochi & occaſioni.

VIII. E benche nell' articolo decimo ottavo, fuſſe ſtata deſtinata per camera generale, e per la radunanza delle navi la cittlà di Goltemburgh ; con queſto però dichiara S. M. che ſe qualche natione, o città haveſſe la ſua camera non troppo lontana dal mare oceano, e perciò non li foſſe di commodo il mandare le ſue navi a Goltemburgh ; ſiano tenuti di ſignificarlo alle diete generali de'ſopraſtanti, e nominare il luoco dove potranno, o li ſarà commodo di unire le loro navi con l'altre.

IX. Se con l'aiuto del ſignor Iddio, e con l'induſtria, & opera de' Tedeſchi aveniſſe, che ſi ergeſſero più di dodici camere ; così anco ſi accreſceſſe il numero de' ſopraſtanti, li quali per vigor del vigeſimo terzo articolo, mandar ſi devono alle diete generali.

X. In oltre ſua maeſtà eſtende il vigeſimo quarto articolo del privilegio a tanto che la compagnia ſia eſſente dal pagare datii, e gabelle nel regno di Suetia per li primi quattro anni. Con queſto però, che niſſuno abuſi queſta gratia con fraudi, ſotto pena della perdita delle navi, e delle mercantie.

XI. Forniti, che ſiano li quattro anni ; ne gli altri avenire ſi paghino le gabelle conforme all'articolo vigeſimo quarto.

XII. Che le navi, e mercantie della compagnia, che capiteranno nelli porti, e città delli ſtati, prencipi, e participanti, che haveranno accettato il privilegio conceſſo da ſua maeſtà alla compagnia, ſiano tenute di pagar impoſitione delli quattro per cento impoſta ; a queſto modo però, li due terzi per ſua maeſtà, e l' altra terza parte ſia delli prencipi, ſtati, e participanti ſopradetti, proportionabilmente ſecondo la ſomma del danaro, che haveranno poſto nella compagnia. Non intendendo però di contravenire alle altre impoſitioni, e gabelle, che poteſſero havere ſopra le altre merci ; ma ſolo delle mercantie della compagnia.

XIII. Che li prencipi, città, e communità, le quali contribuito haveſſero alla compagnia 250 mila ſcudi Imperiali, oltre il reſidente conceſſoli nel trigeſimo quinto articolo, habbino anco un aſſeſſore del conſeglio ; il qual conſiglio doverà eſſer formato conforme nell'articolo trigeſimo quarto ſi è detto.

XIV. Che per maggior confermatione dell'amplificatione, e dichiaratione de' privilegii conceſſi alla compagnia, ſua

maeſtà eſtendeva la promeſſa fatta delli 400 mila Taleri Suezzeſi in 400 mila ſcudi Imperiali; per la qual ſomma di danaro egli non pretendeva maggior utile di quello foſſe toccato a gli altri pro rata.

Per chiara intelligenza di ogn'uno il Talero Suezzeſe, è di quattro marche, che di noſtra moneta ſono lire ſette, e meza. Il ſcudo Imperiale, è meza dobla.

## IV.

REGIMINIS SUECICI CONSTITUTIO: Quam Rex invictiſſimus GUSTAVUS SECUNDUS & magnus ultimæ voluntatis inſtar regno populiſque ſuis ſtatione hac mortali functus exhibendam voluit.

[SUPPOSED to be complete in the beginning of the year 1630, and containing thirty-five pages in quarto.——N. B. This invaluable MS. which contained the proviſional diſpoſition that was made of the government of Sweden, in caſe he ſhould be killed in the German wars, during the minority of the princeſs Chriſtina, who was then aged about four years and ſomething more, was for a conſiderable time in the author's poſſeſſion, as all his intimate friends well know; but unfortunately loſt, with ſeveral other papers of conſequence, in going by ſea from London to Cornwall in 1758.]

## V.

ARTICLES ſigned by GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS with JAMES marquis of HAMILTON.*

WE Guſtavus Adolphus by the grace of God king of the Swedes, Goths, and Vandals, great prince of Finland, duke of Eſthone and Carel, and lord of Ingria, &c. To all and ſundry whom it concerns, make it known and certain, that whereas the illuſtrious and our ſincerely beloved lord James marquis of Hamilton, maſter of the horſe to the moſt ſerene king of Great Britain, out of his zeal for the public good, and for acquiring eternal fame, hath reſolved to dedicate himſelf and the fortunes and forces of all he is concerned in, for reſtoring our oppreſſed friends in Germany, and for that end hath offered to us, by the illuſtrious and our ſincerely faithful co-

* Burnet's Memoirs of the Duke of Hamilton.

lonel,

lonel, Alexander Hamilton, his fidelity and ſervice, and that he will, on his own expence, gather a ſtrength of ſix thouſand men, and bring them over as ſoon as may be to any place we ſhall appoint, either againſt the Imperialiſts, or any other of our enemies, and maintain them on his own charge, and do us all faithful and vigorous ſervice with them, till this great affair be brought to a good iſſue, provided we ſhall authorize this his deſign with our protection, and give him the underwritten aſſiſtance; therefore, there being nothing dearer to us than to make all vigorous reſiſtance to the common enemies of liberty, and having in high eſtimation the brave undertakings of generous men, we not only would not reject, but have heartily embraced the nobleneſs of ſo good reſolutions: we have therefore admitted, like as by the vigour of theſe preſents we admit, the ſaid lord marquis into our ſervice, armies, and military connſels, on the following conditions:

Firſt, Whenever he ſhall ſignify to us that he is ready to bring over his forces, we ſhall aſſign him a place for his landing, either to come and join with our armies, or to make an impreſſion elſewhere, as we ſhall think fit.

Next, If we appoint him to land in any place from whence he ſhall not come ſtraight to us, we ſhall, for ſtrengthening his forces, ſend to the place we ſhall aſſign for his landing four thouſand foot out of our armies, whom we ſhall furniſh with all neceſſaries, and maintain on our charges a whole year.

Thirdly, Becauſe the ſaid marquis thinks two thouſand horſe are neceſſary for his foot, for whoſe levy and pay he promiſes all aſſiſtance; we ſhall therefore think of all ways and means for raiſing and maintaining theſe.

Fourthly, We not only give the ſaid illuſtrious marquis the abſolute command of this army in our abſence, but ſhall alſo join to him a counſellor with whom he may conſult in all things, that ſo his deliberations be more expedite and clear.

Fifthly, Whatever the illuſtrious lord marquis ſhall take from the enemy, the lands and territories ſhall belong to us, but the revenues and all the emoluments ſhall go to him, and to the relief of his army: yet ſo as theſe revenues ſhall be gathered decently and in order, without depredations or plunderings; ſince our deſign is not to oppreſs thoſe who have been already enough preſſed, but rather to deliver them from the oppreſſions of others, as much as by the divine aſſiſtance we can.

Sixthly, That the marquis may more effectually perform what he hath bravely reſolved, and may ſooner make thoſe warlike inſtruments of his own invention, on which he relies much

much in his expedition, we ſhall not only with the firſt occaſion furniſh him with a hundred ſhip-pounds of crude iron, but ſhall alſo aſſign hammers for working it according to his deſign; of which inſtruments he hath promiſed to leave a model with us, and we ſhall be careful that none of our ſervants ſhall make uſe of them before he hath firſt made trial of them himſelf.

Seventhly, We ſhall alſo furniſh him with three hundred and ſeventy ſhip-pounds of iron-ball for his guns, and two thouſand and five hundred pikes, and as many muſquets.

Eighthly, Whenever the marquis ſhall advertiſe us of his needing gunpowder, we ſhall aſſign him bills of exchange in Holland for buying ſeventy-two ſhip-pounds of gunpowder.

Ninthly, If any other kings or ſtates ſhall concur with us, all they contribute ſhall be at our diſpoſal; but if the marquis his neceſſities require further aſſiſtance, we ſhall not abandon him, but faithfully aſſiſt him, as much as our affair ſhall permit.

Tenthly, For all which the ſaid illuſtrious lord marquis with all his forces hath promiſed fidelity to us, and ſhall be bound to it as well as our men, and theſe who receive our pay, are, for which both he and all his captains ſhall be particularly engaged.

But becauſe there is to be a treaty betwixt our commiſſioners and the Imperialiſts at Dantzick, therefore if a peace ſhall be there concluded, ſo that we ſhall not need the ſervice of the marquis and his army, he hath obliged himſelf to pay for the foreſaid materials at their entire value.

All which things being thus concluded, and to be firmly obſerved by us, we have ſubſcribed theſe articles with our hand, and commanded our royal ſeal to be put to them. At our caſtle in Stockholm the laſt of May, Anno Dom. 1630.

Signed,

L. S. GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

## VI.

### ARTICLES ſigned by the marquis of HAMILTON with GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

WHEREAS there is a mutual compact agreed betwixt the moſt ſerene and mighty king of Sweden and me, for joining of our forces; that the articles be fully ratified, and leſt any thing afterwards fall in which may put a ſtop in our counſels,

counſels, or give matter for ſiniſtrous gloſſes, I therefore ſubſcribe for my part all the articles, adding only the following explication to ſome of them.

To the firſt, If the moſt ſerene king aſſign me a place for landing, I vow and promiſe by the grace of God to do it, betwixt and the day of the next June.

To the ſecond, If the moſt ſerene king of Sweden ſend me the agreed number of ſoldiers out of his own forces, at the place and time appointed, I underſtand that by furniſhing them with all neceſſaries, a full and entire pay without any deductions be laid down for a whole year, according to the eſtabliſhment of his majeſty with his own officers.

Beſides, If the moſt ſerene king cannot allow of ſo great a diminution of his forces, it will be neceſſary that he not only ſettle a fund, for ſuch a ſum as may levy, arm, and pay, as many ſoldiers, but there will be need of ſome more; for the odds will be vaſtly great betwixt his majeſty's trained ſoldiers, and a ſudden levy of raw novices.

To the third, Since the article of horſe is conceived in general terms on both ſides, nothing being certainly fixed on either, it will be expedient that your ſacred majeſty declare your mind in it plainly, how far you oblige yourſelf: and what ſhall be agreed for me, betwixt your majeſty and theſe to whom this affair is truſted by me, I bind myſelf to ratify.

To the fifth, Since the reaſons of my expedition to Germany are the ſame with your majeſty's, I have firmly reſolved to help and relieve the oppreſſed princes and ſtates of Germany, with the eaſe of all theſe burdens with which they are now preſſed, and therefore ſhall do every thing in order, and decently, as becomes moſt friendly auxiliaries; and if any thing be taken by me from the common enemy, I ſhall deſire nothing more than that the right of it be entirely and inviolably your majeſty's.

To the ninth, Since I have devoted my whole fortune with all my intereſts for promoting this our deſign, I promiſe, that whatever any ſhall contribute for it, ſhall all be laid out for this war, which I ſhall with my whole forces manage and carry on, till either it pleaſe God that you obtain a deſired peace, or that the liberty of Germany, which is now oppreſſed, be reſtored.

To the tenth, Since by this article your majeſty requires and expects fidelity from me and my army, I James marquis of Hamilton, by theſe preſents give my faith for myſelf and

and them, and bind both myſelf and them; and for the confirmation of this I do ſubſcribe this article with all the preceding, and put my ſeal to it, at London the 1ſt of March Anno Dom. 1631.

(L. S.) HAMILTON.

## VII.

## SPECIALES CAUSÆ BELLI SUECICI*.

QUANQUAM autem naſcens, & e Germaniæ malis valida cum tempore incrementa ſumens Auſtriacæ domûs potentia, extraneis regibus, principibus, rebus publicis, ſenſim hoc modo magis magiſque formidoloſa facta fuerit, maximè cum, intra imperii Romani fines jam ſe non amplius continens, vicinos quoque, miſſis in Italiam, Boruſſiam, Tranſiſulana diverſis exercitibus, laceſſere haud vereretur: Guſtavus tamen Adolphus, ſecundus ejus nominis & magnus, Sueciæ rex, imprimis ſuſpectam habuit, luculenter deprehenſo; quo magis Baltici maris littoribus illius vires appropinquarent, eò plures majoreſve adverſum ſe indies ſeri bellorum occaſiones.

Velut jam anno mileſimo, ſexcenteſimo, viceſimo ſexto, literæ quædam regis Sueciæ ad Tranſilvaniæ principem, nec ab hoſte, nec ad hoſtem miſſæ, a Cæſarianis reſeratæ, interceptæ, ac confictâ in regis invidiam verborum interpretatione, publicatæ fuerant: ipſo internuncio in carcerem compacto, ac durè & hoſtiliter habito. Quæ injuria, quo inopinatò magis regem a Cæſare, quem, nec verbo, nec facto, hucuſque læſerat, perculit, eò altiùs in pectus penetravit, ac deſcendit: maximè, cum verus literarum tenor nihil, in Cæſaris aut imperii Romani præjudicium tendens, loqueretur, ſed bellum, quod regi Sueciæ cum Polonis hac tempeſtate intercedebat, ſolummodò concerneret.

Porrò regi a fide dignis relatum: licet componendorum inter Sueciæ ac Poloniæ regna diſſidiorum ſæpe numerò ſpes affulgeret; commiſſariis utriuſque regni annuatim in eum finem congredientibus: pacis tamen hos oſores, per internuncios ac literas, ſedulò apud Polonos operam dediſſe, ne vulnus in cicatricem coiret, antequam in Germaniâ ſuum plene attigiſſet ſcopum; ſpe certâ Polonis datâ, Germaniæ

* Chemnitius de Bello Sueco-German. vol. i. p. 7, &c. The reader may peruſe a fuller copy of this manifeſto in the Merc. Franç. tom. xvi. p. 297—317.

electoribus, principibus, ordinibus sub jugum missis, sese igitur, omnibus viribus collatis, eò gnaviter incubituros; ut Sueciæ quoque regnum à Polonis penitus opprimeretur.

Et quo verbis facta statim responderent, Suecosque omnibus bellorum gerendorum mediis, quantum pote, nudatos, Polonorum armis, favore suo suffultis, debellandos exponerent, & omni militum, & rei bellicæ commercio, quod utrumque liberum Polonis, Suecorum tunc hostibus, reliquerat, regi Sueciæ in Germaniâ interdicere visum.

Clarius autem odium eorum in regem anno milesimo, sexcentesimo, vicesimo septimo emicabat; quando Adolphus, Holsatiæ dux, cum copiis haud contemnendis, Sigismundo tertio, Polonorum regi, subsidio ablegatus: idque eo potissimum tempore, quo, equitatu Polonico ad Dirschaviam dissipato, & toto exercitu in consternationem haud exiguam conjecto, periculum erat, ne ipsis castris Poloni pellerentur. Quapropter hoc præter opinionem & immerito suo, illatum vulnus, regi eò magis doluit, quo certior spes erat, hostilem exercitum, absque hoc foret, ad internecionem cæsum, atque ita hac vice debellatum iri. Nec verò, missione militum, nec alio prætextu colorabantur istæ suppetiæ: quin potius ipsius Cæsaris signa & imperii Romani aquilæ in hostili acie apertè fulserunt. Dux quoque Holsatiæ, post navatam Polonis strenuam aliquamdiu operam, è Borussia cum residuo milite in Pomeraniam regressus ibidem, non secus ac aliæ Cæsaris legiones, hiberna nactus est: ut vel inde, e Cæsaris stipendio numquam excessisse, appareret.

Interea Cæsareus miles regis Sueciæ subditos, qui, negotiorum suorum ac innoxiorum commerciorum causâ, in Germaniam appulerant, ubicunque, nanciscì contingeret, hostiliter tractare: ablatis vi mercibus, & navibus fisco addictis. Quod iidem, non aliò locorum se justius confugere rati, ad regem detulerunt: ejus opem, auxilium, patrocinium supplicibus ac querulis precibus implorantes.

Imprimis septentrionalibus regibus ac regnis maximè suspectum accidere: quod Cæsar ac rex Hispaniæ supradicto milesimo, sexcentesimo, vicesimo septimo, & sequenti anno, per Georgium Ludovicum, comitem Suartzburgensem, & Gabrielem de Roy, commissarios suos, Lubecam, aliasque urbes Hanseaticas, in partes suas traducere conati, illarum ope classem in mari Baltico comparare molirentur. Ut ut enim alius color rei quæsitus nil aliud, videlicet, intendi, quàm ipsarum civitatum commodum; hac etenim ratione, abrogatis, quæ exteri invexissent, monopoliis, navigationem & commercia civitatibus sarta, tecta conservatum, ac, inter alia, Hispanicarum mercium vectarum ad solos eorundem portus

portus aſtrictum iri: ſeptentrionalium tamen regnorum reges, re altius penetratâ, aliorsùm id interpretati, aliquid monſtri alere negotium exiſtimabant; nec modo in regalium ſuorum ſuper mare Balticum, cujus tutelam & protectionem, ex majorum inſtituto, ſibi aſſerunt, inſigne vergere præjudicium, ſed & ipſis in regnorum viſceribus oppugnandis, media ac occaſionem quæri.

Que ſuſpicio in rege Sueciæ validiora incrementa ſumſit, poſtquam, finito bello Danico, a claſſe & navibus armandis minimè ceſſatum: in ſe enim, reconciliato Daniæ rege, fabam hanc cudi, haud ſine causâ ominabatur. Præſertim, quia Cæſariani, ſpe de adjungendis ſibi civitatum Hanſeaticarum viribus evoluti, Gedanenſium & Polonorum, cum quibus regi Sueciæ apertum bellum, naves in conſortium aſciverant, illarumque ope mare Balticum, harum artium hactenùs inſolens, piratica infeſtum reddebant: in tantum; ut rex Sueciæ, regalium ſuorum, & ſecuritatis maritimæ, commerciorumve conſervandorum, claſſem & ipſe ſuam magnis incommodis atque impendiis adornare, illâque Cæſarianos occupatis portubus, præſertim Wiſmarienſi, incluſos tenere coactus fuerit.

Cum autem anno mileſimo, ſexcenteſimo, viceſimo octavo, Straleſundæ urbs a ſupremo Cæſareæ militiæ Imperatore, Fridlandio, præſidia, quæ imperabantur, admittere detrectans, arctiſſimo premeretur obſidio, ferroque ac flammâ extrema quæque perpeteretur, recepit illa quidem ab initio a Daniæ rege militem auxiliarum, quem ſpontaneo motu, defendendæ urbi, hic ſubmiſerat, & neceſſitate exigente, plus auxiliorum ab eodem conſequi poterat: ne tamen cum Cæſaris hoſtibus [quos inter tunc temporis Daniæ rex] conſpirare argueretur, mox ad Sueciæ regem, confugiens, ut addicti neutri parti principis, cujus benignitatem antehac luculentis rerum teſtimoniis experta fuerat, tutelæ ac patrocinio, ſequeſtro velut depoſuit exagitatam infeſtis hoſtium armis libertatem. Nec rex juſtiſſimis de cauſis, quas ipſimet Straleſundenſes per legatos ſuos deduxerant, recuſare ullatenùs potuit; quin civitati, non ipſius modò, ſed et publicæ, communiſque ſecuritatis gratiâ, miſſo non contemnendo militum ſubſidio, ſubveniret.

Salvâ tamen obedientiâ, Cæſari & duci Pomeraniæ, tanquam ſuperioribus, debitâ; nec ad Cæſaris, aut cujuſquam offenſionem, ſed ſolam civitatis, portuſque Straleſundenſis, & conſequenter, totius maris Baltici defenſionem, commerciorumve libertatem: ut ex fœdere, cum Straleſundenſibus initio, ſole meridiano clariùs apparet.

Inde militum tribunis, qui Straleſundenſibus ſuppetias miſſi, in mandatis datum: ne extra obſidium, & neceſſariæ atque legitimæ defenſionis cancellos, adverſus Cæſaris exercitum quicquam tentarent. Qui & ipſi, ab initio, Danis, quamdiu illic loci unâ commorati ſunt, in expugnatione oppidi Bart, aliiſve factionibus, nequequam ad capeſſenda contra Ceſarianos hoſtilia arma, inſtigantibus, regis ſui mandatum cauſati, intra hos terminos immoti ſteterunt.

Eodem penè tempore Cæſar duces Megapoleos omnibus ditionibus, quas ab imperio ipſi, eorumve majores, tot per annos, feudi nomine poſſederant, privârat; ducemque Fridlandiæ ſummum terrâ, mari militiæ ſuæ imperatorem, his inveſtitum erat. Quorum, & religionis, & ſanguinis nexu junctorum, ducum vicem rex, ipsâ Chriſtianâ caritate, arctâque neceſſitudine flagitante, jure miſeratus: præſertim cum, omni aliâ ferè ſpe deſtituti, in his anguſtiis ad regem, velut ſacram anchoram, confugerent.

## VIII.

### The Monthly Pay of a SWEDISH Regiment of Infantry, under GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

| Military Eſtabliſhment. | Per Month. Dollars. | English Money £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| To the colonel | 184 — | 32 | 4 | 0 |
| Lieutenant-colonel | 80 — | 14 | 0 | 0 |
| Serjeant-major | 61 — | 10 | 13 | 6 |
| Chief quarter-maſter | 30 — | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Captain | 61 — | 10 | 13 | 6 |
| Lieutenant | 30 — | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Enſign | 30 — | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Two ſerjeants, each | 9 — | 1 | 11 | 6 |
| The *Fuhrer**, *Furryer*†, *Muſter-writer*‡, and the *Ruſt-maſter* §, each | 7 — | 1 | 4 | 6 |
| Drummers and pipers, each | 4 — | 0 | 14 | 0 |
| 6 Corporals, each | 6 — | 1 | 1 | 0 |

* The *Furrer* attended the enſign, and took the colours when he was diſabled or killed.

† The *Furriers* were under quarter-maſters, and appeared in action armed with a halbert or partiſan.

‡ The *Muſter-ſchreiber*, as he is called in German, was clerk of the muſters.

§ The *Ruſt-maſter* ſaw that the ſoldiers kept their arms clean and bright.

15 *Rot-*

| Military Eſtabliſhment. | Per Month. Dollars. | Engliſh Money. £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15 *Rot-maſters**, each | 5 — | 0 | 17 | 6 |
| 21 Inferior *Rot-maſters*, each | 4 — | 0 | 14 | 0 |
| A common ſoldier | 3½ — | 0 | 12 | 3 |
| 18 *Paſſe volants* †, each | 3 — | 0 | 10 | 6 |

Civil Eſtabliſhment, &c. of the ſame Regiment.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 Chaplains, each | 18 — | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| 2 Examiners, or regiſters of the court-martial, each | 30 — | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| 4 Surgeons, each | 12 — | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| 4 Provoſt marſhals, each | 12 — | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| Clerk of the regiment | 30 — | 5 | 5 | 0 |
| Clerk of the council of war | 18 — | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| Serjeant of the council or court of war, | 18 — | 3 | 3 | 0 |
| 2 Bedels, each | 3 — | 0 | 10 | 6 |
| The executioner | 7 — | 1 | 4 | 6 |

And here it muſt be remarked, that if the ſervice required *Lehnung*, or advance money, it was his Swediſh majeſty's cuſtom (a certain ſum being due to his officers and ſoldiers at the expiration of each month) to divide the ſaid month into thirteen equal parts, and pay his troops a fixed portion of their ſtipend beforehand, upon the firſt, the eleventh, and one-and-twentieth day, amounting at the three ſeveral payments to the following proportion:

| | Per Month. Dollars. | Engliſh Money. £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Colonel | 69 — | 12 | 1 | 6 |
| Lieutenant-colonel | 32 — | 5 | 12 | 0 |
| Serjeant-major | 14 — | 2 | 9 | 0 |
| Chief quarter-maſter | 11 — | 1 | 18 | 6 |
| Captain | 14 — | 2 | 9 | 0 |
| Lieutenant | 11 — | 1 | 18 | 6 |
| Enſign | 11 — | 1 | 18 | 6 |
| 2 Serjeants, each | 5 — | 0 | 17 | 6 |

* The *Rot-maſters* took care of the ſeveral rots (each rot, or file, conſiſting of ſix men) which were committed to their charge. Twelve rots of muſqueteers and nine of pikemen, making a compleat company of 126 men, not including officers, paſſe-volants and ſervants.

† The *Paſſe-volants* were ſervants to the officers, and carried arms in the day of battle.

| | Per Month. Dollars. | English Money. £. | s. | d. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fuhrer, furrier, muſter-writer, and ruſt-maſter, each | 4 — | 0 | 14 | 0 |
| Drummers and pipers, each | 2 — | 0 | 7 | 0 |
| 6 Corporals, each | 3 — | 0 | 10 | 6 |
| 15 Rot-maſters, each | 2 — | 0 | 7 | 0 |
| 21 Inferior Rot-maſters, each | 1½ — | 0 | 5 | 3 |
| A common ſoldier | 1¼ — | 0 | 4 | 4½ |
| 18 Paſſe-volants | 1 — | 0 | 3 | 6 |

Civil Eſtabliſhment, &c. of the ſame Regiment.

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 Chaplains, each | 7 — | 1 | 4 | 6 |
| 2 Examiners, or regiſters of the court-martial, each | 11 — | 1 | 18 | 6 |
| 4 Surgeons, each | 7 — | 1 | 4 | 6 |
| 4 Provoſt-marſhals, each | 7 — | 1 | 4 | 6 |
| Clerk of the regiment | 11 — | 1 | 18 | 6 |
| Clerk of the council of war | 7 — | 1 | 4 | 6 |
| Serjeant of the council or court of war | 7 — | 1 | 4 | 6 |
| 2 Bedels, each | 1½ — | 0 | 5 | 3 |
| The executioner | 5 — | 0 | 17 | 6 |

## IX.

ARTICLES de Confederation accordez entre le Roy de SUEDE, & le Duc de POMERANIE, pour eux, leurs Succeſſeurs, Provinces & Subjets *, July 10th, 1630.

PREAMBLE reciproque entre Guſtave, & Bogiſlaüs, * * *

cipalement par une etroite confederation contractée entre nos predeceſſeurs d' heureuſe memoire, les roys de Suede & les ducs de Pomeranie, leurs provinces & eſtats, en la pacification faite entr' eux le jour de ſainct Luc l' an 1570, enſemble auſſi noſtre grand intereſt à caüſe de la mer Baltique, entant que les provinces de Pomeranie ſituée a la coſte de ladite mer ayans eſte occupées, ſervoyent de retraite aux ennemis, pour, (à noſtre grand prejudice) empeſcher la liberté du commerce, & infeſter nos royaumes & eſtats; ayans meſmes, pour pallier leurs violences, abusé de noſtre nom. Apres avoir auſſi conſideré que la confederation pour la neutralité (de l'entretenement de laquelle ledit ſeigneur duc, nous avoit requis) n'eſtoit aſſez ſolidement eſtablie, nous avons eſtimé (quoyque non requis devoir accourir au ſecours dudit ſeigneur duc & ſes eſtats, pour avec l'aſſiſtance divine les delivrer d'oppreſſion; & meſmes pour repouſſer de nos eſtats les cruelles hoſtilitez, & venger les machinations & injuſtes oppreſſions faites contre nous; eſtans à ces fins, par l'aide de Dieu arrivez avec *une aſſez puiſſante armée* en Pomeranie (apres avoir pris la principauté de Rughe [Rugen] y ayans occupé *ſans aucune reſiſtance* toutes les iſles, villes, ports, & forts, ſervans pour la defence & conſervation de la ville de Stetin, capitale de la province, ayans toutes les places eſté abandonnées par ceux qui les tenoient) *nous priſmes occaſion, contre l'opinion & l'eſperance du dit ſieur duc d'entreprendre & venir heureuſement à bout de reduire la dite ville de Stetin.*

D'autre part nous Bogiſlaüs, &c. &c. ayans conſideré (1.) q'eſtans deſtituez de tous ſecours, (2.) nous ſeuls n'euſſions peu reſiſter à ſi grandes forces, (3.) nos ſubjects ayans eſté pour la plus part deſarmez par les precedents pretendus defenſeurs (4.) eſtans meſmes deſpoüillez de tous leurs biens, & privez de tous vivres & moyens de defence, (5.) &, qui plus eſt, affoiblis & extenuez par une cruelle oppreſſion, durant trois ans, n'ont eu penſée ny courage de ſe delivrer, ny de reſiſter, pour n'empirer leur condition. (6.) Si bien que n'eſperans plus aucun ſecours: (apres tant de capitulations & promeſſes ſaintement jurées & toutefois enfreintes.) (7.) Survenant le louable & tres chreſtien ſecours de la ſacrée royale majeſté de Suede. (8.) Qui n'eſt point venu contre l'empereur ny l'empire, avec leſquells ſa majeſté n'a rien de faſcheux à deſmeler. (9.) Mais contre ceux qui contre tout droict & equité avoient occupé nos provinces, (10.) afin de les delivrer de violence, & les remettre en leur premier eſtat & liberté, & pour par meſme moyen aſſeurer ſa perſonne, & ſa couronne, & ce avec des proteſtations chriſtiennes & amiables, qui ont eſté ſuivies de leur effet, à l'eſgard de la ville de Stralſund, & de la duché de Rugen, occupé par ſa

majeſté. Nous avons eu pluſtoſt ſujet de louer & accepter, que de refuſer à noſtre tres grand prejudice, & de nos ſubjects, ſon ſecours & aſſiſtance.

Pour ce eſt il que nous Guſtavus, &c. et Bogiſlaüs, &c. avons enſemble convenus & accordez les ſuivants articles par nous d'un mutuel conſentement approuvé.

I. Nous avec nos eſtats, provinces & ſubjets reſpectivement, voulons et promettons ſincerement et de bonne foy, conſerver à l'avenir entre nous une ferme et conſtante amitié utile, et convenable à des bons voiſins, et ne faire ny ne permettre eſtre fait l'un à l'autre ouvertement ou couvertement, par qui, et en quelque maniere que ce ſoit, aucun hoſtilité ; ains nous defendre les uns les autres par armes, et par mutuel ſecours, contre toutes violences, invaſions, ravages, *contributions*, oppreſſions, et contraventions, ne nous point abandonner, beaucoup moins nous trahir, ou ſubjuger, mais plutoſt rechercher, et accroiſtre le profit et avantage, et deſtourner tout dommage l'un de l'autre : advancer de tout noſtre pouvoir le trafic et commerce de Suede en Pomeranie, et de Pomeranie en Suede ; faiſans pour ce, ceſſer toutes inhibitions et empeſchements. A l'effect dequoy, nous roy et duc ſuſdit, pour nous, nos ſucceſſeurs et eſtats, avons non ſeulement renouvellé ladite ancienne paction et accord, pour l'entretenement d'un bon voiſinage entre nous, nos royaumes, duchez principautez et leurs appurtenances, mais, auſſi l'avons par le preſent traicté de nouveau confirmé et corroboré, pour durer à jamais. Voulans en outre que la preſente confederation ſoit de dix ans en dix ans renouvellée et re-integrée.

II. Le dit accord s'entend eſtre renouvellé pour *la deffence* mutuelle contre la violence, non point pour *l'offence, (ſi non que pour l'entretenement des choſes convenües entre nous, il fuſt grandement requis)* auquel cas, chacun de nous ſera obligé de preſter l'un à l'autre, *juſqu'au dernier effort*, mutuel ayde et ſecours.

III. Au moyen de ce, le preſent traicté ne doit point eſtre reputé fait *contre la majeſté ſacrée de l'empereur ny de l'empire*, mais pluſtoſt pour le conſerver en ſon anciennne forme, liberté, religion, et paix religieuſe et ſeculiere contre les tumultuaires, et perturbateurs de la paix publique : *n'entendans point nous departir de l'obligation par laquelle nous Bogiſlaüs duc ſuſdit ſommes tenus à la ſacrée majeſté imperiale et à l'empire, et au cercle de la Saxe Superieure* ; ains au contraire, proteſtans de nous y conſerver ſelon noſtre devoir *(à la charge tout à fois qu' ils ne requerront de nous aucune choſe contrevenante au preſent traicté,)* et de demeurer avec nos duchez, eſtats, et ſubjets joints à l'empire, audit circle, et aux conſtitutions Imperiales ; ne voulans qua l'occaſion du preſent traicté

traicté l'eſtat de nos provinces ſoit changé ny que rien nous ſoit oſté ny diminué de noſtre ſouveraineté, ny quant aux droicts royaux, dignitez, juriſdictions, droicts domaniaux et territoriaux à nous appartenans, ny ſemblablement quant aux privileges, tant generaux que particuliers de la nobleſſe de Pomeranie, et des ſujets et eſtats; ny aux conceſſions, droicts, ſtatuts, loix fondementales, ny aucun autre droict particulier.

IV. Puis que cette union tend principalement à ce que nous duc ſuſdit puiſſions eſtre delivré de la cruelle oppreſſion, de laquelle noſtre conſtante & fidelle innocence, a eſté travaillée pour l'eſpece de trois ans, contre les lois ſacrées de l'empire & dudit cercle, & contre les claires & expreſſes conſtitutions de la paix publique, & meſmes contre les ſpeciales ſincerations, mandements & declarations de la ſacrée majeſté de l'empereur, & les provinces & pays de Pomeraine eſtre conſervez en leur ancien eſtat, ſans recevoir aucuns empeſchemens limites, ports & paſſages, & eſtre delivrez a l'advenir de tous dangers. Pour ces raiſons a eſté de part & d'autre unanimement convenu entre nous, de s'oppoſer par jonction de forces à toute autr qui en l'empire Romain contrarie, & peut en quelque façon que ce ſoit contravenir à la paix de la religion obtenüe avec tant de peine & de travaux.

V. Les villes, lieux & provinces de Pomeranie, par nous roy de Suede occupéz, ou que nous pourrons cy-apres occuper, ſeront par nous *remis entre les fidelles mains & au pouvoir dudit ſeigneur duc de Pomeranie avec toutes leurs appurtenances, droicts, regales, & juriſdictions, ſans nulle reſerve, ny tergiverſation, & ſans repetition de frais de la guerre: meſmes la ville de Stralſond luy ſera par nous rendüe, pourveu que, comme ledit ſeigneur duc ne doit rien aliener deſdites provinces de Pomeraine, principalement la principauté de Rugen*; auſſi il eſtabliſſe ès dites provinces *tels officiers*, qui en tout ce qui concernera la defence & conſervation deſdites provinces, ſe monſtrent de bonne volonté envers les *commiſſaires de Suede*: pourveu auſſi, que les *privileges de la ville de Stralſond ſoient maintenus en leur entier*, & que ſpecialement par deſſus touts l'alliance faite par la dite ville avec ſa dite majeſté ſoit conſervée inviolablement *, & que les griefs par eux pretendus ſoient promptement reparez, & equitablement jugéz.

VI. D'autant l'eveſché de Camin eſtant dans les provinces & eſtats de Pomeranie, & en conſequence de ce, devant jouir en ſon particulier de tout ce qui par le preſent traicté

* His Majeſty, in the year 1628, renewed a treaty (for former ones had ſubſiſted) betwixt Sweden and the town of Stralſund. It was to hold in force twenty years, and is preſerved by Lotichius, tom. i. 608.

a eſté

a eſté accordé, pour le bien general de la Pomeranie, a eſté particulierement convenu, que ſi contre les privileges, ſtatuts, & loix fondementales de l'eveſché & du chapitre, eſt attenté quelque choſe au fait d' election de l'eveſque ou du coadjeuteur, ou à quelque autre occaſion que ce ſoit, nous roy & duc ſuſnomméz l'empeſcherons conjointement de tout noſtre pouvoir, & maintiendrons la liberté du chapitre & du dioceſe, enſemble la libre election de l'eveſque, ſon eſtat, ſes droicts & ſes dignitez.

VII. *Nul de nous ſans le vouloir & conſentement de l'autre, ne pourra renoncer au preſent Traicté,* & beaucoup moins nous duc de Pomeranie ne pourrons, pour ce qui concerne la preſente defence de noſtre eſtat, faire aucun traicté, ny alliance, avec qui que ce ce ſoit que ſi ſa royale majeſté pour noſtre bien et de nos provinces, vouloit faire quelque traicté, l nous devra eſtre communiqué, duquel, ſi y voulons entrer et eſtre joints, ny nous, ny nos provinces ne pourrons en eſtre exclus.

VIII. Si quelque prince chreſtien ſe veut adjoindre à la preſente confederations, et s'y aſſocier à conditions raiſonnables, il luy ſera libre de la faire, moyennant que par la dite jonction les eſtats d'aucuns de nous n'en recoivent dommage, et n'empirent leur condition.

IX. Parceque qu'en cette confederation particuliere (permiſe de tout droict, entant qu'elle eſt pour la conſervation de la paix religieuſe et ſeculiere de Pomeranie) nulle mention n'a eſté faite des autres confederations et accords cy-devant faits pour la conſervation d' icelle; les dits accords ne pourront en rien prejudicier au preſent traicté, ny eſtre alleguéz contre iceluy. Et nous duc ſuſdit promettons de ne nous point allier par traicté avec qui que ce ſoit, ſans le ſpecial vouloir et conſentement de ſuſdit royale majeſté.

X. Si le dit ſeigneur duc, ſes provinces, et ſujets, à l'occaſion de la preſente confederation, effoient aſſaillis en guerre par qui que ce ſoit, en tel cas non ſeulement nous roy de Suede et nos royaumes et eſtats ſerons obligéz, et promettons d'entreprendre ſoigneuſement et fidellement la defence dudit ſeigneur duc, mais auſſi y attirerons les autres princes nos confederez, pour augmenter et fortifier le nombre et les moyens de la defence. Comme auſſi au reciproque, nous duc de Pomeranie, nos provinces et ſubjets ferons le meſme, au cas que ſa royale majeſté et ſes royaumes et eſtats fuſſent infeſtez par guerre, à cauſe du preſent traicté.

XI. Par la preſente confederation le privilege de naturalité s'entend eſtre reſpectivement accordè aux ſubjets du l'une et de l'autre parties, royaumes et eſtats de Suede et de la

la duché et eſtats de Pomeranie: et la nation Suedoiſe honorera, aydera et procurera le profit et advantage de la Pomeranoiſe, et la Pomeranoiſe de la Suedoiſe en temps de paix et de guerre; ſauf reſpectivement aux uns et aux autres, leurs droits, privileges, et immunitez particuliers.

XII. Pour la conſervation, facilité et advancement du commerce, la monnoye royale de Suede aura cours en Pomeranie, et celle de Pomeranie en Suede, et ſera exposée ſelon l'evaluation qui en aura eſté faite ſur les lieux.

XIII. Si ſurvient quelque different ou quelque meſintelligence entre ſa royale majeſté et ledit ſeigneur duc ou entre leurs ſujets, ou eſtats, elle ne ſe terminera point par l'epée et par guerre, ains en la facon preſente par la pacification de Stetin en l'année 1570, c'eſt à ſcavoir par perſonnages d'authorité, nommés par les parties, ou eſleus par ſort.

XIV. Finalement, nous roy de Suede nous ſommes expreſſement reſervéz, qu' au cas que ledit ſeigneur duc vient à deceder ſans deſcendans maſles, ſes heritiers, avant que l'electeur de Bradenburg (auquel comme au futur ſucceſſeur de l'eſtat, l'hommage a deja eſté fait) ait approuve et ratifié la preſente confederation, et avant que le dit ſucceſſeur ſoit venu en perſonne pour la liberation de ces provinces, ou au cas que cette ſucceſſion fuſt revoquée en doute, et rendue litigieuſe au dit ſeigneur electeur; nous roy de Suede, ou nos ſucceſſeurs de nos royaumes et couronne, retiendrons ces-dittes province en forme de ſequeſtre et de protection, juſques à ce que le droict ſucceſſif ait eſté pleinement eſclairci et eſtabli; et que par le ſucceſſeur les frais de la guerre nous ayent eſté entierement payez et rembourſéz (ſans toutefois en faire fouffrir aucune charge ny contribution aus dites provinces, eſtats et ſubjets de Pomeranie) et juſques à ce que la preſente confederation ait eſté par luy deüement ratifiée et confirmée.

Tout ce que deſſus s'entend avoir eſté accordé & promis de bonne foy & ſans fraude. Pour certitude & perpetuelle fermeté de quoy, nous roy de Suede, &c. pour nous, nos ſucceſſeurs, &c. & nous duc de Pomeranie, &c. pour nous, nos ſucceſſeurs, &c. avons la preſent noſtre convention & confederation approuvée & confirmée de nos ſeaux royal, & ducal, & realle, ſignée de nos mains, au vieil Stetin le 10 jour de Juillet, vieil ſtil, l'an 1630.

GUSTAVUS.
BOGISLAUS.

## X.

## LETTRE du duc de POMERANIE à l'Empereur.

TRES Haut, &c. *cum titulis majoribus*, * * *

& dont les preuves & teſmoignages ſe pourront ſuffiſament produire cy-apres. Voire on n'en eſt pas demeuré là, ains ils ont attaqué mon chaſteau & ma ville d'Uckarmond, qui eſt à un notable paſſage, chaſſé d'icelle ma garniſon contre l'accord exprez, & tout auſſi-toſt l'ont quittés laiſſer vuide. A Wollin ils ont pillé la maiſon de la princeſſe doüariere, ſoeur d'electeur de Saxe & taſché d'y mettre feu. De là eſt enſuivy que le roy de Suede prenant l'occaſion & ſon temps, (pendant que Torquato Conti mareſchal de camp pour voſtre majeſté imperiale avec la pluſpart de l'armée ſe jettoit contre la Pomeranie) eſt arrive le 20 Juillet à la faveur du vent (qui luy fit faire ſix lieus en deux heures) devant cette ville, que tout auſſi-toſt il inveſtit de telle viteſſe, & bloqua de touts coſtez, faiſans ſes approches de ſi prés, qu'il fut impoſſible de ſe mettre en defence, beaucoup moins recevoir ou attendre ſecours de l'armée de voſtre majeſté.

Que ſi là deſſus il plait à voſtre majeſté imperiale, ſelon ſa grande bonté & prudence, de laquelle elle eſt douée de Dieu, aux electeurs & princes de l'empire, voire à tout le monde, de bien conſiderer & juger comment, & par quels moyens je ſuis tombé en ce malheur : je ne crains point d'encourir de droict & equité autre jugement ny cenſure, ſi non que la ſincerité & conſtance de ma foy vrayement Allemande (en laquelle je ſuis demeuré ferme, nonobſtant toutes mauvaiſes procedures) à eſté mal recogneüe ; & que tout ces malheur ſe doit attribuer à cette nouvelle invention de loger des gens de guerre contre les ſtatuts de l'empire, & *exiger de ſi groſſes contributions* que la ruine totale du pays s'en eſt enſuivy, pour ne point toucher aux autres raiſons. Car par la grace de Dieu, je ſuis tout aſſeuré en ma conſcience, de n'en avoir jamais donné le moindre ſujet, ny par union ny par correſpondence, beaucoup moins par conſpiration ou aucune action ſuſpecte, ains pluſtoſt comme un vray & fidelle membre de l'empire Romaine, demeurant toujours ferme en termes d' integrité & innocence, pour deſtourner ces malheurs, perils & extremitez de mon pays, ay recherché juſques à preſent toutes voyes & moyens, & tant envers voſtre majeſté imperiale, que vers les college des electeurs, comme auſſi vers vos generaux, capitaines & tous autres, qui pouvoyent ſervir à la cauſe, envoyé des ambaſſades notables à voſtre majeſté & aux ſuſdits electeurs ; & de fraiche memoire, par l'advis des grands miniſtres d' eſtat de voſtre majeſté commandans icy, *une ambaſſade à la couronne de Suede.* Encore une à Dantzic ; meſmes encore une preſentement à voſtre majeſté imperiale ; ſi peut eſtre, par une ſinguliere & gracieuſe volonté de Dieu, il ſe pouvoit trouver remede & repos. Que ſi tout cela juſques à preſent

preſent ait rapporté peu de fruict, & que cette occaſion y ſoit ſurvenüe, ny moy, ny mes pays innocens n'en devons point patir. Ains tant plus & faudroit-il penſer aux moyens d'une ſalutaire paix & à deſtourner le mal. Auſſi ne veux-je perdre toute eſperance de paix & de remede, *veu que par le peu de diſcours que j'ay eu avec le roy de Suede je ne l'ai pas recogneu ſi animé, qu'il ſe porte pour ennemi de voſtre majeſté* ny de l'empire Romain ; *mais que ſon deſſein n'eſt que de conſerver la liberté du commerce de la couronn de Suede & les membres de 'empire ſes voiſins, de tout temps confederez en leur ancien eſtat,* les defendant contre toute violence injuſte que les gens de guerre ont entrepris d' y exercer ſous le nom & ſouvent contre l'intention & mandement de voſtre majeſté. C'eſt que la neceſſité urgente m'a fait declarer à voſtre majeſté & la ſupplier tres humblement de me faire ſentir les gracieux effects de ſa clemence & promeſſes imperiales, & renvoyer mes deputez, par leſquels je la ſupplie en toute humilité de me deſcharger de tant de difficultez, avec bonne depeſche. Cela non ſeulement tournera à la louange & gloire immortelle de voſtre majeſté, mais le tout-puiſſant la comblera encore de toute proſperité & benediction, & moy je ne ceſſeray par continuelle obeyſſance & devotion de ſervir voſtre majeſté & la ſereniſſime maiſon d'Autriche; recommandant tres affectueuſement voſtre majeſté en la protection du tout-puiſſant, à ce qu'il luy donne un regne heureux & plein de proſperité & moy en toute ſubjection avec mes pays aux bonnes graces de voſtre majeſté. Donné à Stetin ce 14 Juillet 1630.

De voſtre imperiale majeſté
le tres humble, tres obeyſſant,
& fidele prince de l'empire, & Feodal,
BOGISLAUS.

## XI.

LETTRE des electeurs catholiques à la lettre du roy de SUEDE.

NOUS Anſelme Caſimir par la grace de Dieu, archeveſque de Mayence, Philippes Chriſtophle archeveſque de Treves, Ferdinand archeveſque de Cologne, Maximiliam duc de l'une & l'autre Baviere, Jean Georges duc de Saxe, George Guillaume marquis de Brandebourg, archichancelier, grand eſcuyer, grand mareſchal, grand chambrier, & princes electeurs du ſainct empire Romain, par la Germanie, la Gaule le royaume d'Arles & Italie.

Roy

Roy ſereniſſime, noſtre tres amé couſin & allié, voſtre dignite royale nous à expoſé par ſes lettres du ſeptieſme Avril pluſieurs plaintes, auſquelles elle deſiroit remedié par noſtre entremiſſe, avant que la neceſſité la preſſaſt de ſe pourvoir des remedes qu'elle jugeroit eſtre plus convenables, leſquels pourroient cauſer de grands maux en l'empire: comme auſſi elle s'excuſoit, de ce qu'elle avoit ſecouru la ville imperiale de Stralſond. Toutes ces choſes ayans eſté conſiderées, nous n'eſtimons point, que de là puiſſe naiſtre aucun ſujet qui porte voſtre dignité royale à deſſeigner & mediter quelque mauvais deſſein contre l'empire Romain: que ſi ceux de Stralſond ſe fuſſent monſtrez d'avantage affectionnéz, plus parfaits que par paroles envers l'empereur, leur ſouverain ſeigneur, la voye pour gaigner ſa clemence imperiale, eut eſté expediente au remede plus prompt contre les dommages de la guerre: car il ne leur eſtoit pas convenable d'appeller à eux des ſecours eſtrangers, ny d'en donner aux eſtrangers, au prejudice de l'empire.

Que ſi voſtre dignité royale a eſté offensée, & ſi elle a receu quelques indignitez par les ennemis de la paix; c'eſt choſe que nous n'approuvons pas: & ſi en la ſuſcription de nos lettres il n'y avoit pas ce qu'elle deſiroit, cela n'a pas eſté fait d'aucune mauvaiſe volonté, ny avec deſſein de diminuer ſon honneur, mais bien ſelon le ſtil duquel nous uſons meſme envers les autres roys. Et pour ce qui concerne les armes imperiales conduites en Baſſe-Saxe, & par apres aux coſtes de la mer Baltique, qui ont eſté ſuivies de preparatifs de guerre: pour ces choſes nous ne croyons point que ſa majeſté imperiale ait jamais eſté provoquée contre la couronne de Suede, ny ordonné eſtre entrepris aucun acte d'hoſtilité ſur l'eſtat de voſtre dignité royale: mais que ſon conſeil a eſté, d'aller au devant de tous ſujets de trouble, que vouloient exciter ceux qui eſtoient plus portez à ayder les conſeils ennemis, qu'à embraſſer la bien veillance de ſa majeſté imperiale qui leur eſtoit offerte.

Et de ce qu'elle ſe faſche, que ſes voiſins & parents ont eſté privez de leurs ſeigneuries paternelles, pour ce qui concerne les principautez & fiefs dependans immediatement de l'empire: nous ſçavons que voſtre dignité royale deferera d'autant plus equitablement l'arbitrage de cette cauſe à ſa majeſté imperiale, comme ſeigneur direct des fiefs de l'empire, que plus elle recogniſtra que ſadite majeſté eſt portée à la clemence, & qu'elle eſt tres-prompte d'adminiſtrer la juſtice à ceux qui la demandent. Auſſi auparavant nous avons fait voir noſtre ſoin par nos lettres, de recommender à l'equité de ſadite majeſté imperiale, la cauſe des

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ducs de Meckelbourg ; & que pour les ſecours qui ont eſté envoyez au roy de Pologne en Pruſſe, nous ne croyons que cela ait rendu ſa majeſté imperiale ennemie de voſtre dignité royale, veu qu'il n'apport rien de la raiſon de ce fait : mais bien croyons nous qu'elle a en a eu des cauſes particulieres, pour leſquelles elle a jugé n'eſtre à propos de n'abandonner le party d'un roy, qui lui eſt parent & ſamy : & d'advantage, puis qu'à preſent les treſors ſont accordées de part & d'autre ; ſi voſtre dignité royale veut pretendre de là, ou de quelques autres cauſes, avoir eſté offensée, nous ne pouvons croire toutefois, que telles choſes puiſſent ou doivent eſtre ſujet de troubler l'empire par les armes, veu qu'il ne manquera pas d'autres voyes & remedes pacifiques pour compoſer les differents, & ſatisfaire à l'une & l'autre partie. Ce qui eſt cauſe que nous exhortons voſtre dignité royale de ne ſe laiſſer induire par les conſeils de qui que ce ſoit, de lever les armes contre l'empire, ny de vouloir faire juger les differents de ceux, qui juſques à preſent ont refuſé de rendre obeyſſance à ſa majeſté imperiale : & ne pouvons nous empeſcher de trouver eſtrange de voir maintenant, d'armées levée contres l'empire par voſtre dignité royale, & de ce qu'elle ne retire ſes troupes : veu que voicy le temps auquel on peut conſulter de plus grandes affaires avec noſtre empereur invincible, nous promettans de travailler à l'eſtabliſſement d'une bonne & ſolide paix en cette aſſemblée de Ratiſbonne. Et ſi elle fait autrement, chacun pourra voir qu'elle ne veut recevoir aucun conſeil important à ſa ſeureté ; mais que voſtre dignité royale veut entendre aux mauvais deſſeins de ſa majeſté imperiale. Reſte donc qu'en nous promettant de meilleurs ſuccez en toutes ces affaires, & nous confiant en l'aſſeurance de la paix, nous offrions nos offices mutuels à voſtre dignité royale, lui ſouhaittans que toutes choſes heureuſes luy ſoient concedées par Dieu tout puiſſant. Donné à Ratiſbonne le dixieſme jour d'Aouſt mil ſix cens trente. De voſtre dignité royale, les tres prompts amis & alliez.

## XII.

LETTRE du roy de SUEDE aux electeurs catholiques *.

GUSTAVE ADOLPHE. Reverendiſſimes, tres nobles & tres-illuſtres princes, nos tres chers amis & alliez. Nous avons receu les lettres de vos dilections du dixieſme Juillet, & dixieſme Aouſt à nous renduës depuis peu de jours, &

* Mercure François, tom. xvi. p. 338, &c.

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ayans conſideré la forme exterieure d'icelles, nous avons recogneu que maintenant avoient eſté corrigées les choſes contenuës aux lettres precedentes de vos dilections, concernantes noſtre titre de roy, ainſi qu'il eſtoit raiſonnable: & ayans ouvert les voſtres dernieres, il y a dequoy s'eſtonner, de ce que, contre la couſtume ordinaire, & le ſtil uſité aux lettres electorales addreſsées non ſeulement à nous, mais auſſi aux autres roys & princes ſujets à l'empire Romain, les noms de vos dilections ſont expriméz à vos lettres, comme ſi cela avoit eſté fait à deſſein de preferer les noms des autres à noſtre titre royal, & pour cauſer quelque prejudice à noſtre dignité & majeſté royale. Mais nous voulons croire que tout cela s'eſt fait par les ſecretaires, la plume deſquels a poſſible eſté ainſi conduite par quelques ennemis de la paix publique, afin que toute communication & commerce de lettres d'entre nous & vos dilections, ſoit à l'avenir rendu plus difficile, veu qu'ils cognoſſoient fort bien que nous ne voulons admettre ny permettre aucune choſe qui ſoit contraire à noſtre dignité royale: & pour meſme ſujet nous n'avons auſſi deu par aucune raiſon recevoir ny accepter les lettres que l'empereur nous à eſcrites depuis peu, en la ſubſcription deſquelles ſa majeſté nous appelle Uſeren Furſten (noſtre prince) en ſorte qu'il ſemble nous vouloir comprendre au nombre de ſes ſujets, & neantmoins nous ne tenons du benefice imperial la moindre poignée de terre; mais nous diſons que tout ce que noſtre empire embraſſe eſt tenu par nous de Dieu ſeul & de l'eſpée, ſa divine bonté par ſa clemence ayant favoriſé noſtre tres-juſte cauſe en toutes les guerres que nous avons faites juſques à preſent. Mais nous ne voulons point nous arreſter plus long-temps ſur ces choſes, veu principalement qu'il ſe ſçait aſſez, que par tels actes choſe aucune ne peut eſtre derogée d'avantage à noſtre majeſté royale, que de là il n'en puiſſe arriver autant à la dignité de vos dilections.

Et pour ce qui concerne ces choſes, nous avons eu pour agreable, de ce que vos dilections aſſurent n'avoir peu approuver les injures & indignitez à nous indignement & injuſtement faites par les communs perturbateurs du repos public: mais nous aurions bien plus agreable, ſi les remedes convenables à ces maux euſſent eſté appliquez en temps & ſaiſon; il ſemble que maintenant vos dilections s'eſlévent contre les choſes par nous commiſes, & excuſent aucunement & non entierement deſadvoüent tout ce qui s'eſt fait juſques à preſent par nos ennemis; veu qu'auparavant par nos lettres, nous avons ſuffiſamment exposé les raiſons qui nous contraignoient de donner ſecours à la ville de Stralſund & de procurer autant qu'en nous eſtoit poſſible le ſalut de cette ville voiſine, qui depuis pluſieurs ſiècles eſt conjointe par divers liens à nous & à

noſtre couronne, & d'aller promptement au devant du peril eminent, qui menaçoit nos eſtats & la mer Baltique. Et neantmoins nous n'avons enterpris aucune hoſtilité contre l'Empire Romain, ny attenté aucune choſe à ſon prejudice ; mais pluſtoſt nous nous ſommes perſuadéz qu'en cela nous remportions de grandes loüanges de l'Empire par nos merites, pour avoir empeſché que cette ville ne fuſt opprimée par les iniques perſecuteurs contre ſa meſme authorité imperiale, & l'ayant veu preſte à tomber és mains des ennemis de l'Empire Romain, nous avons comme embraſſé la meilleure voye pour ſa conſervation, l'avons maintenuë ſaine & entiere au meſme Empire : et eſtimons n'eſtre neceſſaire ny convenable de reciter icy toutes les particularitez de cette affaire, veu que nous pouvons facilement eſperer, que nul (au gouſt duquel nos premiers actes n'ont peu ſatisfaire) ne peſe derechef toutes choſes d'une balance eſgale : ſcavoir ſi la ville de Stralſund n'avoit pas aſſez de cauſes juſtes & preſſantes d'implorer un ſecours eſtranger contre une force non moins injuſte qu'extreme ; & ſcavoir ſi elle pouvoit trouver une voye meilleure & plus expediente, pour s'aller rendre à la clemence de ſa majeſté imperiale, comme à un autel d'un port de ſalut. Ceux meſme du deſtroit du ſond ſont tous preſts de faire voir cela devant tous les juges plus equitables du monde, & chacun pourra facilement recognoiſtre combien peu profitoient en ce temps la' les decrets de l' Empereur, non ſeulement pour delivrer cette ville innocente du danger d'eſtre ruinée, mais auſſi pour pouvoir tant ſoit peu refroidir & temperer cette haine mortelle & fureurs inhumaines, qui s'allumoient à la ruine extreme de cette place ; ſes ennemis poſans tout droict & raiſon à la violence des armes.

D'avantage vos dilections diſent qu'elles ne peuvent croire que l'empereur n'ait eſté provoqué à prendre les armes, & faire des preparatifs de guerre pour envoyer en Baſſe-Saxe, & qu'il avoit ordonné qu'apres que ſes armes ſeroient conduites és coſtes de la mer Baltique, elles ſe jetteroient en ſes eſtats & pays. Ce que nous euſſions creu auſſi tres-volontiers, ſi tant d'exemples funeſtes contraires, que nous avons veu de nos yeux, ne nous euſſent fait recognoiſtre, que pluſieurs en ce temps là, pour avoir adjouſté trop de foy à ces choſes, ont eſté chaſtiez par des peines tres ſeveres : & euſſions jugé eſtre choſe indigne de noſtre dignité & authorite royale, de donner quelquefois trop de creance en de choſes de ſi grande importance, qui regardent le ſalut de l'eſtat & des peuples que l'eternel a mis ſous noſtre puiſſance. Mais nous ne penſions pas qu'il fuſt trop tard de ſe plaindre de cela. Toutefois pour ce qui eſt de l'empereur, nous ne nous promettions pas rien de mal de ſon coſté, quoy que

que plusieurs ayent esté assez offensez par ses ministres: mais comme tels perturbateurs de la paix, n'estans par nous provoquez, n'ont pas laissé de nous faire mille indignitez, & d'adjouster injures sur injures (ainsi que vos dilections cognoistront par la deduction des dommages & offenses receus d'eux, que je leur aye depuis peu envoyée) & ainsi nul ne doit trouver estrange, si estans frappez de crainte & d'apprehension non vaine & inopinée, mais tres-juste, nous avons commencé d'avoir tels procedez plus que suspects. C'est pourquoy nous aseurans sur le droict tres-equitable de la defense, et que nous nous sommes resolus de defendre nostre dignité par d'autres voyes, & avons esté forcez à prendre en tels maux le remede plus salutaire pour en prevenir de plus grands, & pourvoir soigneusement, qu'eux qui sont faits à la navigation, n'entreprennent d'entrer en nos provinces qui leur sont voisines, & en celles de nos royaumes qui sont au delà de la mer, sans empescher que le domaine direct sur les choses qui dependent des fiefs de l'empire, ne soit conservé à l'empereur en l'empire Romain. Et toutesfois ce droict d'amitié, de voisinage & de consanguinité, ne se peut rompre, ny faire en sorte qu'il ne soit licite de se condouloir sur les adversitez des amis & voisins, & beaucoup plus des parents & alliez, & qu'il demeure encores à nous comme roy & prince d'avoir leur cause & raison pour recommendée, veu principalement que non tant en leur propre faute, mais bien que les sinistres desseins des ennemis estans sans defense, & ny ayans en leur cause aucun ordre de droict gardé qu'avoit accoustumé d'estre conservé en l'empire Romain, tant à convaincre qu'a condamner, ils se sont veus precipitez en une si grande calamité.

Vos dilections se persuadent aussi, que l'empereur a eu ces causes particulieres, pour quoy il n'a pas jugé estre à propos que les amis & parents du roy quittassent son party, & que pour cela secours avoyent esté envoyez au Polonis en Prusse, & que par ainsi ils n'estiment pas cela estre si grande chose, qu'il n'y ayt encores d'autres moyens pacifiques pour composer les affaires, & partant que l'empire ne devoit estre troublé par d'autres mouvements de guerre. Et nous au contraire, nous nous laissons facilement persuader, que ces causes impulsives & persuasives n'ont manqué à nos ennemis pour envoyer ces secours, ou bien que ces raisons là sont pour justifier les causes de cet affaire, ou bien pour improuver nos actions. Nous voulons que vos dilections jugeants l'amitié qui est entre l'empereur & le roy de Pologne, ne nous imposent pas la necessité de ne pouvoir souffrir telles invasions & actes d'hostilité: & n'y a sorte de droict qui decide, qu'il ne nous soit loisible de defendre nostre dignité contre tels violateurs, qui ont

exercé toutes sortes d'hostilitez au tré grand prejudice de nos estats, & d'en poursuivre la vengeance par le juste droict de la loy talion ; & qu'il vaut mieux les aller chercher finalement de hors, & aux costes estrangeres, qu'en la maison & aux entrailles de nostre royaume. Ce qui ne se peut faire, qu'avec une perpetuelle solicitude & agitation : pour ce que nostre droit, ny les treves faites entre nous & le royaume de Pologne, ne peuvent se rompre ny diminuer. Et quoy que toutes ces choses soient ainsi, les dernieres pourtant ne doivent pas estre premierement entreprises. Car vos dilections se souviendront, combien de fois nous nous sommes travaillez, pour oster toute discorde par composition amiable : mais si les choses que nous avions si bien meditées, ont manqué au succez desiré, cela ne nous doit estre imputé, mais bien à leur iniquité, subterfuge & malice, qui ont indignement rejetté, & se sont en partie moquez des moyens par nous proposez. C'est pourquoy les remedes lenitifs ne profitant de rien, il ne se faut scandaliser, si nous nous sommes resolus aux remedes corrosifs & severes. Et pour ce que vos dilections par leurs lettres n'ont couché aucunes paroles des remedes qui se devoient esperer, afin que par vostre authorité & interposition il fust pourveu à faire cesser ces justes plaintes, ce n'est pas avec injure que nous les recherchons. Car quelle autre chose se pouvoit-il recueillir de là sinon une option ou une necessité qui nous restoit, de pourvoir au salut de leurs estats, & du nostre par une autre voye ?

Neantmoins nous voulons bien repeter icy ce que nous avons souventefois protesté, que nous ne voulons estre ennemis de l'empereur Romain, ny de vos dilections, ny des autres ordres & membres de l'empire, qui ne nous ont offensez, ny les provoquer à l'advenir ; mais seulement de demander par nos armes, que l'ambition, fureur & licence particuliere d'aucuns qui sont accoutumez de pescher en eau trouble, soient reprimées, afin qu'elles ne croissent outre mesure ; & que la seureté de nous & de nos voisins soit certaine. Ce que faisans, nous ne troublerons l'empire Romain, ny ne voulons assister ceux qui refusent l'obeyssance deuë à l'empereur & à l'empire, ny offenser aucun de ses estats, mais plutost poursuivre les perturbateurs du repos public, & conserver les nobles membres de l'empire de ruine & de ravages, & de venger les injures par eux faites. Finalement vos dilections nous exhortent de retirer & emmener nos armées, ce que nous jugeons devoir faire, sinon lors que nous serons asseurez de la satisfaction des injures à nous injustement faites, & qu'il apparoisse de la seureté, tant de nous que de nos voisins. Que si avant l'année courante les autres qui ont esté plusieurs fois admonestez, se fussent monstrez

prompts

empts à rappeller leurs troupes ennemies de la Pruſſe, nous n'euſſions maintenant amené nos armées en ces coſtes. Toutefois ſi quelques conditions de paix, juſtes, equitables, & aſſeurées, ſont miſes ſur le tapis, & que nous recognoiſſions que la choſe ſe faſſe par l'autre partie: tant s'en faut que nous nous monſtrions contraries au traictés de la paix, que nous confeſſons ingenuëment que le but principal de nos armes n'eſt que la paix juſte & aſſeurée. C'eſt pourquoy nous faiſons de congratulations à l'empire Chreſtien, & à vos dilections, de ce que nous apprenons qu'elles elevent leur eſperance à une ſolide paix, & qu'elles ſemblent promettre, que la vertu, le ſoin & l'affection de voſtre illuſtre college inclinent à la paix commune de la Chreſtienté: & comme nous nous promettons toute ſorte de biens & amitié de vos dilections; auſſi nous trouveront elles tous-jours diſpoſez & preparez à la paix. Donné à Stralſond le 13 Septembre 1630. De vos dilections bon amy & parent Guſtave Adolphe roy de Suede.

Le meſme roy de Suede ayant veu les lettres que l'empereur luy eſcrivit au mois d'ouſt, cy-deſſus inſerées, & par icelles comme ſa majeſté imperiale s'eſtonnoit de ce qu'il eſtoit entré és terres de l'empire, le blaſmant de cette entrepriſe voulut ſe juſtifier par ce qui ſuit.

## XIII.

### LETTRE de l'EMPEREUR au ROY de SUEDE.*

NOUS Ferdinand par la grace de Dieu, empereur des Romains, &c. Au ſereniſſime prince Guſtave Adolphe, roy de Suede, des Goths & Vandales, &c. noſtre amitié, dilection, & ſalut. Sereniſſime prince & tres cher amy, il nous a eſté rapporté de divers lieux, dignes de foy, que voſtre dilection a dreſſé n'agueres une puiſſante armée de cavalerie & infanterie, dont elle a inopinément fait entrer une partie, apres avoir paſſé la mer, dans les iſles de l'empire Romain, & en terre ferme au duché de Pomeranie, s'y eſtant emparée, non ſeulement de quelques places, villes, & chaſteaux d'importance: mais a auſſi outre cela commencé d'uſurper les gabelles & peages (qui en vertu de droict royal, n'appartiennent qu'à nos) & eſt encores en volunté de nous aſſaillir par toute ſorte d'hoſtilité, & d'empieter d'avantage ſur les pays

* Mercure François, tom. xvi. p. 334, &c.

dudit empire. Nous n'avons point ſouvenance, que depuis que nous ſouſtenons cette grande charge d'empereur il ſoit arrivé entre nous aucun contraire ou ſiniſtre accident, ou que nous ou l'empire ayons donné occaſion de trouble ou diſſenſion, moins d'une ſi ouverte hoſtilité. Et pourtant il nous ſemble fort eſtrange, que voſtre dignité a entrepris de jetter contre nous & l'empire, les fondemens d'une guerre, poſſible tres facheuſe à l'une & à l'autre des parties, & ce pour quelque different particulier, touchant la ville de Stralſond, duquel voſtre dignité n'a deu concevoir aucun ombrage de danger ou prejudice. Car tout cela s'eſt paſſé dans noſtre terriore, & de l'empire, & concerne les droicts, & privileges d'iceluy, eſquels voſtre dignité n'a non plus de droict de nous faire la loy, qu'avec raiſon elle ſe trouveroit offencée, qu'en ſemblables debats l'on entrepriſt, de la maiſtriſer en ſon royaume de Suede. Et ce d'autant plus, qu' à noſtre opinion ledit different pouroit facilement eſtre compoſé & aſſoupy, ſous des conditions equitables, ſans venir à aucune hoſtilité ou effuſion de ſang, par l'entremiſe du roy de Dannemarc, qui n'a fait aucune difficulté de s'en charger, auſſi promptement qu'on le luy avoit propoſé & conſeillé, ſi voſtre dignité s'y fuſt portée de meſme zele & affection que nous, & qu'elle euſt au temps prefix & aſſigné envoyé ſes miniſtres avec inſtruction ſuffiſante. Mais comment que ce ſoit, il eſtoit plus que raiſonnable par le droict des gens, que voſtre dignité (ſuppoſé, qu'elle euſt creu d'eſtre aſſez bien fondée de nous attaquer par armes & de rompre toute amitié) nous euſt prealablement denoncé la guerre par un deffi public & legitime, avant qu'envahir l'empire ſi injuſtement, aſſeurant voſtre dignité, que nos preparatifs de guerre prez la mer Baltique, & ailleurs, n'ont point eſté faits pour l'offencer, ny cy devant, ny à preſent: ains qu'au contraire nous avons eu le deſir, de continuer entre nous les effets de bon voiſinage & toute amitié mutuelle, comme nous avons encore cette meſme affection, pourveu que voſtre dignité par ſes procedures contraires ne nous donne plus de ſujet de nous porter à d'autres reſolutions, & qu'elle faſſe ceſſer cette guerre non neceſſaire. C'eſt pourquoy nous l'exhortons amiablement, de ne s'ingerer plus avant és affaires de l'empire & que (ne luy ayans donné nulle occaſion) elle n'offence ny nous, ny les membres dudit empire, ains qu'elle retire ſon armée, au pluſtoſt des iſles & terres d'iceluy par elle occupées: Qu'elle n'empeſche plus par ſes navires, la navigation & le commerce maritime, & qu'elle ne nous incommode point, ſoit par mer, ſoit par terre, en la perception des droicts de l'empire. Que ſi au contraire (ce que nous n'eſtimons pas) il

arrive,

arrive, que voſtre dignité en meſpriſant noſtre preſente declaration imperiale, & confidente aſſurance de noſtre amitié, perſiſte en cette hoſtilité, & s'opiniaſtre à retinir les places par elles priſes, par ruſe de guerre, ou par force: nous, avec l'ayde & conſeil des electeurs de l'empire mettrons promptement en eſtat pour les recouvrer, & prendrons à cœur la conſervation de noſtre reputation & de l'empire, enſemble la defence & manutention des eſtats, qui continueront la fidelité & obeyſſance qu'ils nous doivent, afin d'obvier à une plus grande calamité. Nous eſperons, que voſtre dignité ne permettra point, que l'affaire vienne à cette extremité; & ſelon qu'elle aura deferé à nos preſentes lettres imperiales, nous ſerons tres prompts & diſpoſez à luy faire paroiſtre par bons offices noſtre amitié & bien-veillance en ce qui luy ſera agreable. Donné à Ratiſbonne, le dix huictieſme Aouſt, mil ſix cens trente. D. V. D. couſin & affectioné,

FERDINAND.

## XIV.

### LETTRE du Roy de SUEDE à l'EMPEREUR*.

AU ſereniſſime & tres puiſſant prince Ferdinand II. de ce nom, empereur eſleu des Romains, d'Allemagne, d'Hongrie, Boheme, Dalmatie, Croatie, & Sclavonie, roy, archiduc d'Auſtriche, duc de Bourgogne, Stirie, Carniole & Virtemberg, comte de Habſbourg & Tirol, noſtre tres cher couſin & amy.

Sereniſſime & tres puiſſant empereur, couſin & tres cher amy. Nous avons (non ſans admiration) entendu par la lettre de voſtre ſerenité, datée du 18 d'Aouſt, & a nous renduë ſeulement le 6 de ce mois, en noſtre camp de Ribnitz, qu'elle s'emerveille beaucoup, que cet eſté paſſé nous ſoyons entrez avec noſtre armée en Allemagne, & que vous taſchez de nous rendre coulpables, tant de cette entrepriſe meſme, que de ce qu'elle ſoit faite ſans aucune denonciation ou defi public. Certainement nous ne penſions jamais que voſtre ſerenité euſt peu tomber en une ſi profonde oubliance des choſes paſsées, ny ſe meſprendre contre la perſonne de celuy qui a commencé d'offenſer l'autre par ſes armes, puis que nous nous ſommes tousjours promis de ſon equité, qu'elle n'imputeroit jamais à la partie innocente ce que la coulpable avoit commiſe, & ne chargeroit l'une de la faute de l'autre:

* Mercure François, tom. xvi. 347, &c.

attendu que c'eſt le maiſtre de camp de voſtre ſerenité, qui ſans aucune prealable denonciation (nous ne rapporterons icy par le menu une infinité de cruautez & de hoſtilitez contre nous exercées) nous a jetté ſur les bras és années paſſées une grande & puiſſante armée, tant de cheval que de pied, ſous les eſtendarts ou aigles de l'empire Romain. Ce qui eſt notoire, & autant manifeſte comme il eſt tres veritable que nous n'avons que trop experimenté les mauvaiſes intentions & violences de ladite armée, leſquelles, ny nous-meſmes, par noſtre innocence, ny le conſeil de noſtre royaume, par ſes remonſtrances bien fondées & tres equitables, n'avons peu faire arreſter ny revoquer. C'eſt pourquoy, bien que nous le pezions en gros, ou en detail, nous ne pouvons comprendre ſous quel pretexte ou titre on nous pourroit charger de la cauſe de cette guerre, & par quelle raiſon on pourroit preciſément demander de nous la denonciation, laquelle voſtre ſerenité a meſme negligée, eſtant certain que nous n'avons travaillé qu'à tenir pour noſtre ſeureté la guerre eſloignée de nous, ſans la faire à autruy. Nous ne voyons auſſi aucune raiſon, qu'on nous charge du crime commis contre le droict des gents, puis que ce droict contient en ſon vray ſens, qu'és guerres deffenſives les defits ne ſe font tousjours par des herauts ou rois d'armes, mais par la nature & qualité meſme de telles guerres, quand on ſe ſent contre le droict tout-a-fait offenſé, & ouvertement aſſailly: voire qui plus eſt, pour ne manquer à une denonciation, quoyque ſuperfluë, & pour ne donner ſujet de ſe plaindre de nous avec fondement, comme ſi nous euſſions trompé le monde par les projets d'une paix, au envahi l'empire à l'improviſte, nous nous ſommes ſervis de cette precaution d'eſcrire à deux diverſes fois aux electeurs de l'empire Romain, comme auſſi nous avons admoneſté voſtre ſerenité par un deputé de noſtre dit conſeil vers le general de voſtre ſerenité, que ſi l'on n'avoit eſgard à nos juſtes plaintes, en nous donnant ſatisfaction des fautes contre nous commiſes, nous ſerions conſtraints de pourvoir par autre voye à la ſeureté & conſervation de noſtre eſtat & dignité.

Voſtre ſerenité dit bien, que depuis ſon advenement à la dignité imperiale elle n'a commis ou permis aucune choſe tendante au prejudice ou danger de noſtre eſtat; que vos appareils & preparatifs par terre & par mer, n'ont jamais eu le but d'apporter aucun dommage à nous ou à nos eſtats, & que par des moyens paiſibles on euſt peu compoſer nos differents, n'eſtans pas d'une telle importance, qu'avec raiſon on ſe pouvoit formaliſer pour troubler l'empire. Mais ſur cela nous diſons que nous n'avons pas l'intention de debatre icy, ſi ces proteſtations ne ſont directement contraires

dires aux actes & effects ſi evidens, remettans tout au jugement libre de tout le monde. Et que nous ne ſcavons pas auſſi exactement, ſi voſtre ſerenité (dont les penſées nous ſont incogneues) ait eu quelque intention de nous faire du mal, ou de nous offencer : mais que ſous l'ombre & l'authorité du nom, & de la haute dignité imperiale, ſoit par voſtre commandement, ou par une grande connivence nous nous trouvons offencez, & outragez de beaucoup de dommages & affronts. Nous le ſcavons & ſentons, veu qu'il eſt auſſi manifeſte, que ſi quelqu'un ſe vouloit amuſer à en faire des demonſtrations ou deductions plus amples, ce ſeroit eſclairer le ſoliel en plein midy. Dont nous appellons ſans difficulté à la conſcience de voſtre ſerenité, laquelle nous prendrous pour teſmoin ou juge. Et quant à l'appareil de guerre, & de ce que nous en avons deu juger, nous rapportons à la cognoiſſance que tout le monde en a, & aux diſcours tant paſſez que preſents de vos miniſtres et officiers : mais principalement à leurs actes, traictez, entrepriſes, excez, deſſeins & conſeils, leſquels comme trop ſuſpects & apparents, deſcouvrent aſſez ce que nous en avons deu attendre. Et ſi tout cela n'eſtoit aſſez notoire, le duché de Pomeranie & les provinces voiſines pourroient teſmoigner, que ſous le faux pretexte de la crainte de nos armes, mais en effect à deſſein de nous deſplaire & faire du mal, les gens de voſtre ſerenité les ont tourmentez, pillez et entierment ruinez.

Nous advoüons bien clairement & ſimplement, que les differents ſurvenus entre nous pouvoient eſtre utilement terminez par autres moyens que par armes, d'autant qu'il ſeroit à ſouhaiter que vous n'euſſiez enterpreté ſiniſtrement, ains acunement ſouffert noſtre ſecours juſtement donné à la miſerable & trop injuſtement oppreſsée ville de Stralſund, ſans prejudicier en aucune façon à l'empire Romain, ains pluſtoſt pour garentir les decrets de voſtre ſerenité, comme nous avons de bon cœur, et d'un courage endurcy à la patience & conſtance, poſtpoſé à la commune tranquilitié, et au repos public de la Chreſtienté, toutes les indignitez et offences que noſtre couſin le duc de Holſtein, par voſtre commandement, et ſous les enſeignes de l'empire nous a faites. Par ainſi nous ne doutons point que nous n'euſſions peu venir à quelque accommodement, au lieu qu'au rebours on nous a contrains d'aſſembler avec grande deſpence une puiſſante armée, et la paſſer et loger en Allemagne, pour obvier en temps aux perils et dangers qui s'advancoient et nous menacoient trop evidemment. Mais puis qu'il a pleu a voſtre ſerenité de choiſir une voye contraire, et vos ſubdeleguez, lors preſens en la ville de Lubec, pour aſſiſter au traicté qui s'y faiſoit

avec

avec le roy de Dannemarc, s'eſtans enhardis, contre le droict des gens, de refuſer et defendre l'accez à nos embaſſadeurs y envoyez à cette fin, pour travailler à la compoſition de l'affaire de Stralſond; joinct auſſi que les armées de voſtre ſerenité ſe ſont ouvertement declarées de nous en vouloir, & l'ont confirmè par toutes ſortes d'hoſtilitez: nous avons cette grande confiance, qu'il n'y aura ame vivante, aimant le droict & l'equité, laquelle eſtant authoriſée pour juge ou arbitre, ne declare que la faute ou coulpe n'eſt pas en nous, mais bien en vouſmeſmes, qui avez mieux aimé de preferer la guerre à la paix par une certaine malveillance & inimitié conceue contre nous ſans aucun ſujet. Or combien que nous ſentons ſi iniquement & ſans aucune juſte cauſe provoquez nous voyans hors de toute eſperance de venir à quelque accommodement, eſtans bien certains qu'on ne nous imputera jamais aucun deſſein ou attentat inique, ny deſraiſonnable, pour lequel nous, pour eſtre plus exempts de tout ſiniſtre ſoupçon, ne ſerions plus obligez d'entendre à la paix, quon nous a voulu vendre trop chere: toutefois pour manifeſter à la Chreſtienté noſtre zele & ardeur au bien & tranquilité publique, nous n'avons point voulu deſiſter de nos conſeils & intentions dirigées à icelle, ains par nos ſerieuſes & aſſidues recherches, avons eſmeu le roy de Dannemarc, à ce que par ſon interpoſition, durant l'hyver paſſé, il nous preparaſt le chemin d'une amiable conference, qu'on feignoit devoir eſtre entamée entre nos commiſſaires de part & d'autre en la ville de Dantſick, ou nous avions envoyé, noſtre chancelier avec les adjoincts, bien munis de ſuffiſant pouvoir & inſtruction. Et afin que les factions de guerre ne troublaſſent ou empeſchaſſent les propoſitions & deliberations de paix, nous avons arreſté & dilayé de faire advancer noſtre armée, non ſans grande perte de temps, deſadvantage notable, & frais extraordinaries. Pour lequel ſoin particulier, qui ne viſoit qu'au repos univerſal de la Chriſtienté, nous avons pour recompenſe, que non ſeulement nos bonnes & ſalutaires penſees ont eſté aneanties par pluſieurs illuſions & ſubterfuges: mais que voſtre ſerenité oſe encores nous imputer la malheureuſe iſſue dudit traicté, au lieu qu'avec raiſon elle devoit pluſtoſt examiner les actions & procedures de ſon commiſſaire, par leſquelles voſtre ſerenité auroit cogneu, qu'il a empeſché que les mediateurs de cette affaire eſtans à Dantſick ne peuſſent meſmes venir à quelque entreveuë avec nos ambaſſadeurs, pour donner fondement a un traicté ſelon que la couſtume & la raiſon requierent en tel cas.— Voſtre ſerenité euſt auſſi outre cela mieux fait, de conſiderer que ledit traicté ſe pouvoit autant commodément & bien

bien faire en quelque autre lieu, qu'en la ville de Dantfick, puis que cette place, pour quelques differents ſurvenus entre nos officiers & ladite ville, s'eſtoit renduë ſuſpecte. Et voſtre ſerenité euſt deu quitter toute opiniaſtreté pluſtoſt que de cauſer au repos publique des prejudices & dangers ſi grands, ou de rompre totalement & à deſſein tout traicté ;— principalement à l'eſgard que nos commiſſaires eſprouverent aſſez clairement par des raiſons manifeſtes & urgentes, qu'il ne leur eſtoit plus loiſible ny poſſible de condeſcendre a aucun traicté au ſuſdit lieu de Dantfick, bien que voſtre commiſſaire fiſt des inſtances toutes contraires.

Quand donc tout cecy, tant en general qu'en particulier, ſera bien conſideré, nous pouvons fort librement laiſſer le jugement à toute perſonne ſincere & exempte de paſſion, lequel de nous deux a plus juſte cauſe de ſe plaindre ; & ſans aller plus loin, nous remettons tout à l'interieur de voſtre conſcience, afin qu'elle en ſoit juge, veu que la noſtre nous aſſeure fermement, que vous meſmes nous tenez pour incoulpables.

Voſtre ſerenité dit bien, qu'elle veut conſerver avec nous & noſtre royaume de Suede une amitié indiſſoluble, à condition que nous quittions & rappellions nos armées. Mais les choſes ſont venuës trop avant, & ne ſont plus en leur entier, puis que les dangers qui ont menacé & menacent tousjours nous & nos ſujets, ne ſont point imaginatifs, mais reels & effectifs : outre ce qu'on nous a, non par paroles, ains par armes, rudement attaqué, en exercant contre nous toute ſorte d'hoſtilité, tant par mer que par terre. Et pourtant nous eſperons que voſtre ſerenité nous excuſera, ſi pour noſtre ſeureté nous ne pouvons accepter telles offres & promeſſes, que vous appellez des ſinceratiōns, veu qu'icelles ne nous pourront jamais donner aucune ſatisfaction, parce que nous ſommes plus griefuement bleſſez & offencez en effect, que de ſimples paroles : & croyons que voſtre ſerenité ne prendra en mauvaiſe part noſtre reſolution, de tenir fermes nos armes, que la neceſſité inevitable, & vos outrages nous ont fait prendre ; & de ne ceder, ny ployer en aucune maniere, juſques à ce que nous ſoyons exempts par vrayes & parfaictes cautions, du peril trop evident qui penche ſur nous, & que les grandes offenſes, & violents affronts à nous faits, ſoient reparez par une ſolide & reelle ſatisfaction ſans aucune tache de noſtre reputation. En cette conſtante & tres-juſte intention, nous attendrons conſtamment tout ce qui nous arrivera de la main de Dieu, à la bonté duquel, comme à la juſtice

juſtice de noſtre cauſe, nous avons tout remis, & recommandé.

Mais ſi d'aventure voſtre ſerenité eſt cependant touchée d'un ſentiment, qu'il ſoit deſormais que le vaiſſeau de la Chreſtienté, agité & tourmenté par des orages de guerre, ſoit en fin conduit au port de la paix, autant ſalutaire & profitable, comme ſouhaitée de tant d'oppreſſez ſoubs le joug des miſeres, ſans l'abandonner plus aux tempeſtes furieuſes des ravages & deſolations, & que pour cet effect le renouëment d'un traicté de paix aggréera à voſtre ſerenité : nous donnons parole d'y vouloir promptement entendre, & d'y apporter tout ce qui ſera en noſtre pouvoir pour l'advancement & le progres d'un œuvre ſi ſainct & glorieux.

Ce qui aura lieu, ſi voſtre ſerenité promet & demonſtre, effectivement ; que les princes & villes d'Allemagne, comme reſpectivement nos tres chers couſins, beaux freres, parents, amis, alliez & voiſins, ſeront reſtituez en l'eſtat au quel ils eſtoient devant ces derniers troubles, en ſorte que nous puiſſions eſperer cy-apres de joüir d'une entiere ſeureté, pour noſtre eſtat, de ce coſté là : que l'amitié & bonne correſpondence entre noſtre royaume & ledites provinces ſoit reſtablie, & que nous ſcachions eſtre caſſez, aneantis, & revoquez, tous appareils & equipages de guerre par mer, comme nous eſtans trop ſuſpects & contraires à la prerogative que nous avons de protecteur de la mer Baltique : & que finalement les deſpenſes par nous faites pour noſtre defenſe, à laquelle nous avons eſté obligez & conſtraints par vos injures & offenſes, viendront en juſte deuë conſideration. Alors voſtre ſerenité n'aura pas ſi toſt de ſon coſté accomply ces choſes, que par effect elle trouvera que nous ferons voir à tout le monde combien nous ſommes pouſſez d'ambition à maintenir, tant avec vous qu'autres nos voiſins, une amitié inviolable, ſincere & conſtante, & que nous deſirons ſur toute choſe vous vaincre & ſurpaſſer par toute ſorte d'amitié & de bons offices, apres que la bonne intelligence entre nous ſera reſtablie, & tous mal-entenduës oſtes. Les choſes doncques eſtans remiſes en tel eſtat, nous ne voudrions veritablement donner aucun ſubjet à perſonne de ſoupçonner, ou de ſe plaindre juſtement que nous melaſſions impertinemment ou preſomptueuſement des affaires qui ne nous touchent point, ou peu. Car comme nous ne ſommes accouſtumez de nous ingerer aux affaires d'autruy, quand elles ne ſont tellement joinctes à nos intereſts, que celles là trainent ceux-cy avec elles : teſmoin nos deportements, durant le temps de la guerre par tout allumée en Allemagne, où nous n'avons ſongé qu'à ce qui concerne noſtre

noſtre royaume, & non à la Germanie juſques au temps que par outre evidence & iniquité de vos miniſtres, les affaires eſloignées nous ſont venuës ſur les bras, & par leur union, conſequence, & reflexion, nous ont pouſſé & engagé à prendre ſoin de celles d'autruy, comme des noſtres propres. Par ainſi l'on nous trouvera maintenant & à l'advenir en ſi bonne intention, que nous ne tenons, ny ne voudrions tenir, en aucune façon que ce ſoit, les affaires d'Allemagne, pour les noſtres, & vous aſſeurons de ne vouloir vous y donner la moindre faſcherie.

Nous concluons donc avec cette ſincere & ſaincte proteſtation, que tout cecy ſoit entendu, ou droictement, ou ſiniſtrement, & que cette affaire ſe tourne, ou en paix, ou en guerre: que nous ne couvons aucune inimitié ou hoſtilité contre l'empire Romain, jaçoit que vous taſchiez de vous ſervir de telles expoſitions pour voſtre deſcharge & excuſe, & pour nous charger de hayne & de blaſme. Mais tant s'en faut, que nous vouluſſions jamais ſonger à aucune choſe, tendante à ſon prejudice ou dommage; qu'au contraire nous declarons, de vouloir continuer & conſerver une pure & vraye amitié & correſpondence auſſi longuement, que de ſa part on s'abſtiendra de toute hoſtilité contre nous, & qu'on ne favoriſera par aſſiſtance nos ennemis, pour ne nous forcer de venir à des oppoſitions & revenges legitimes. Et tout ce que dit eſt vous ſuffra pour le preſent d'une declaration bien nette de noſtre affection & volonté ſur ce ſujet. Vous recommandant à la ſaincte grace de Dieu. Eſcrit à Stralſond ce dernier jour d'Octobre mil ſix cents trente. De voſtre ſerenité tres-affectionné couſin,

GUSTAVE ADOLPHE.

## XV.

HARANGUE de l'ambaſſadeur d'Angleterre (c'eſt à dire le chevalier ROBERT ANSTRUTHER) à l'empereur FERDINAND II: Prononcé à Vienne en mois d'Aouſt, 1630.

LE ſereniſſime, & tres puiſſant roy de la Grande Bretagne, mon ſeigneur & prince tres clement, ſalüe affectueuſement voſtre majeſté imperiale, luy ſouhaitant tout bonheur, proſperité & longue vie.

Comme ainſi ſoit que le ſereniſſime roy mon maiſtre ait appris tant par lettres & reſponce, de voſtre majeſté qui me furent miſes en main à Ratiſbonne, (touchant l'affaire du prince

prince Palatin:) Que par le rapport de bouche que je luy en ay fait, jusques ou il auroit esté procedé en traittant dudit affaire, à sçavoir que vostre majesté imperiale se seroit declarée, *Que si le prince Palatin accepte tout ce qui est contenu és quatre conditions prescrites en la responce de vostre majesté* & y consent *avec la submission requise*, & l'accomplit de bonne foy, que vostre majesté, *non par aucune obligation de droit, ains meüe de sa pure grace, & en consideration des intercessions tant du roy catholique, que de celuy de la Grande Bretagne, non seulement luy offroyeroit le pardon de toutes les choses passées, revoqueroit la sentence de son ban, mais aussi luy fourniroit son vivre & entretenement des revenus du Bas Palatinat*, & de ce que sereniſſime infante a sous sa puissance . . . . . & combien, que cette declaration & responce fut *telle* qu'elle auroit peu *justement* esmouvoir l'affection du sereniſſime roy mon maistre, & le porter *à embrasser & employer les autres moyens, qui pour lors luy estoient, & luy sont encores à present offerts & en main, il auroit toutefois mieux aymé preferer la voye d'un traicté amiable, & j'y tant de fois essayé*, se fiant & appuyant sur cette esperance & promesse donnée, tant de la part d'Espagne que d'ailleurs, à luy & à ses ministres, que par la continuation du traicté commencé, & par l'establissement de la paix entre sa majesté, & le roy d'Espagne, *Il viendroit en fin à bout de son juste & equitable dessein par le moyen d'une composition amiable: & que pour y parvenir il a une grande confiance, en la manſuetude & clemence de vostre majesté imperiale.*

Puis donc que par la singuliere grace & faveur de Dieu, l'affaire en est venu jusques là, que toutes occasions de guerre & dissentions estant de tout levées & assoupies, avoit esté faite & affermie une paix heureuse & reciproque entre le roy mon maistre, & le roy d'Espagne, l'incertitude de laquelle avant sa conclusion estoit alleguée, comme empeschement & retardement, à ce que cette affaire ne fut amené à une heureuse fin: il a maintenant jugé à propos & expedient de me deputer derechef comme son ambassadeur vers vostre majesté imperiale, pour faire paroistre à tout le monde par ce nouvel essay, qu'il ayme trop mieux obtenir ce que justement il desire & demande *par la voye douce (& sans guerre) d'une amiable composition.* Pourveu qu'il voye quelque apparence probable de n'en estre frustré de ces pretentions, *que d'embrasser les moyens & conseils plus violents, & remettre l'affaire au danger d'un hazard incertain & formidable.* Ce qui mesme ne se pourroit pas faire, sans faire esbranler ou rompre l'amitié & correspondence qu'il a eu jusqu' à present avec la maison d'Autriche.

Or

Or afin qu'il ne manque rien, de ce qui pourroit eſtre requis pour haſter & avancer l'affaire de queſtions, le roy mon maiſtre, comme chacun peut ſçavoir par clairs & divers teſmoignages qu'il en a donné, *a tant fait* qu'il *a perſuadé & diſposé* le ſereniſſime prince Palatin ſon beau frere, en ſorte qu'il eſt preſt de ſatisfaire aux *quatre conditions proposées & preſcrites* par voſtre majeſté, *autant qu'il ſe peut, avec ſon honneur & ſauve ſa conſcience*, & autant qu'il ſera trouvé convenable, à l'equité & à la raiſon: ſe promettant au reciproque, que voſtre majeſté imperiale, revoquant le ban dudit prince le recevra en grace comme auparavant, & le reſtablira en *ſes pays & droicts patrimoniaux & hereditaires*, apres tant de calamitez & l'exil de pluſieures années, qu'il a ſouffert & ſouffre encores, non ſans eſmouvoir à compaſſion tous ceux qui penſent à ſon eſtat & condition preſente.

Or en quelle ſorte & par quel moyen le prince entend de ſatisfaire auſdites conditions, je l'expoſeray plus amplement quand il aura pleu à voſtre majeſté imperiale (comme tres humblement je l'en requiers) de nommer quelques uns de gens de ſon conſeil, comme il fut fait dernierement à Ratiſbonne, pour ouyer & entendre le tout: car ſi je voulois preſentement expoſer leſdicts moyens en preſence de voſtre majeſté imperiale, ce ſeroit vouloir abuſer de la patience d'un ſi grand prince qui me donne une audience ſi favorable.

Ces choſes eſtant en ce poinct, & la declaration du prince Palatin eſtant telle, que l'on eſpere, que voſtre manſuetude & clemence s'en contentera & n'exigera *rien d'avantage ou de plus dur* de la part dudit prince: le ſereniſſime roy mon ſeigneur & maiſtre requiert inſtammement de voſtre majeſté imperiale, ayant en fin eſgard à ce qu'on s'eſt eſſayé par tant d'ambaſſades & de traictéz, & qu'en conſiderant tant de recommendations de roys & princes, comme auſſi tant d'autres raiſons & conſiderations tant de foys miſes ſur le tapis: & que mettant auſſi en conſideration l'eſtat tant preſent que futur des affaires d'Europe; & finalement en peſant en la douce balance de ſa clemence la ſuſdite declaration, . . . . . recoive ſon beau-frere en grace, & le retabliſſe ſelon la pourſuite qui en a eſté faite depuis tant d'années, avec tant d'ardeur, travail & ſoin, y eſtants meſmes intervenües les interceſſions preſque de tous les roys & princes de l'Europe; & que voſtre majeſté ne reſtreigne point ſi fort la grace qu'elle luy veut faire, que de la renfermer dans *de limites ſi eſtroits, que de ne luy vouloir accorder plus que ſon vivre*, ains qu'elle l'eſlargiſſe & amplifie autant qu'il eſt convenable à la grandeur & clemence imperiale du plus

plus grand prince de la Chreſtienté, & comme l'ont eſprouvée quelques autres, qui toutefois avoyent failli & choppé plus lourdement, à ce qu'il apparoiſſe & ſoit notoire à tant preſens qu' à venir, que voſtre majeſté imperiale, aura eu eſgard tant à ſa propre grandeur, & à ſa clemence renommée par tout le monde, ne voulant point que la ſplendeur & le luſtre de ſa grace ſoit obſcurci par le nuage d'une beneficence trop referrée, & qui ſeroit comme contre ſon naturel: comme auſſi qu'elle aura mis en conſideration, la dignité des roys & princes, comme eſtant choſe peu convenable à leurs qualitez, ſi apres une telle moderation, de laquelle ils ont uſé dès le commencement de ces mouvemens, apres tant de prieres & ſervices, apres tant d'ambaſſades, & apres avoir employée tants de labeurs & de deſpenſes, ils ne pouvoient encore rien impetrer en faveur de leur parent & allié, *ſi non ſon vivre ſimplement: ce qui toutefoys tant par la preſcription du droict, que par la loy de pieté ne peut juſtement eſtre denié à aucun*, & finalement que voſtre majeſté imperiale, aura eu eſgard à la condition & qualité du prince, en faveur de qui on intercede: comme eſtant iſſu d'une tres-illuſtre maiſon, & allié aux plus grands roys & princes de l'Europe. Conſideré meſme, qu' eſtant, pour lors, encore jeune & non en age de majorité, il auroit pluſtot eſté pouſſé par les conſeils precipitez des autres, que non point porté de ſon propre mouvement à faire ce qu'il a fait, & finalement qu'ayant un grand nombre d'enfants en tout ce fait innocens, il ſeroit digne d'eſprouver une d'autant plus favorable condition & grace plus liberale.

Si donc voſtre majeſté imperiale le reçoit en ſon ancienne bien vueillance, & le reſtablir en ſa premiere condition, elle donnera la parachef, & mettra la comble à tant d'illuſtres triomphes, & rendra la memoire de ſon auguſte nom, non ſeulement recommandable par tout le monde, comme ſur un haut theatre, mais meſme la rendra venerable, comme conſacrée au temple de la clemence & de la vertu, ayant atteint le faiſte des victoires, qui eſt de ſe vaincre ſoy meſme. D'avantage s'il eſt vray que les princes en pardonnant ſont rendus les plus ſemblables à Dieu, comme a dit quelqu'un: voſtre majeſté imperiale laiſſera un teſmoignage à toute la poſterité, & un exemple digne de loüange, monſtrant combien elle a eu à cœur, & s'eſt etudiée d'imiter les vertus divines en toutes ſes actions, ſur tout en s'eſlargiſſant à donner & conferer ſes graces. En outre, voſtre majeſté par ce moyen gratifiera à tant des roys & princes entremetteurs, & faiſant grace à un obligera tous les autres, & entre tous s'obligera le ſereniſſime roy mon ſeigneur & maiſtre d'un bien

bien de tant plus ferme d'une amitié inviolable: & obligera encore le prince ſon beau-frere, & ſes nepveux iſſus de ſa tres chere & unique ſoeur, à une obeyſſance & reverence perpetuelle: & avec tout cela affermira ſa puiſſance & ſon eſtat, & la grandeur de toute la tres illuſtre maiſon d'Autriche, comme d'un boulevard invincible d'amour, & la laiſſera aſſeurée pour ſes enfans & leurs deſcendans à touſiours.

D'abondant voſtre majeſté imperiale exaucera par ce moyen, & appaiſera les ſouſpirs, les doleances, les complaintes, les gemiſſemens & prieres du peuple innocent & foulé depuis tant d'années, & ſur lequel retombent toutes les incommoditez & les troubles qui naiſſent de la guerre, tandis que les plus grands & le plus puiſſans en demeurent exempts: reſtaurera auſſi & resjouïra pluſieurs milliérs de pauvres perſonnes tres affligées, & qui ne demandent autre choſe que d'eſtre fomentées par une douce paix, les garentira de la ruine qui leur pend ſur la teſte, & obligera chacun à prier continuellement pour la proſperité & conſervation & de voſtre majeſté, & de toute la maiſon d'Autriche.

Finalement voſtre majeſté imperiale empeſchera que ceux qui ſe ſentent intereſſez & auſquels il importe, perdans patience, pour ſe voir entretenus en vain par des longueurs & retardemens à deſſein, & par l'apparence de quelque eſperance douteuſe & ambigüe, ne viennent à ſe jetter dans les conſeils precipitez d'une dangereuſe neceſſité, & coupera les racines d'autres mouvements, & les pretextes de nouveauté que les voiſins & eſtrangers, prompts à en rechercher, & prendre les occaſions, pourroient facilement prendre de là: & en ſuite poſera un ferme fondement par lequel d'autant plus promptement & aſſeurement la paix ſera rendüe non ſeulement à l'Allemagne, mais auſſi à toute l'Europe, & ſeront auſſi d'autant plus aiſement appaiſez les autres mouvemens qui ſemblent s'eſlever & gliſſer à cette occaſion: & pour auſquels remedier il n'y aura aucun de tous ceux qui auront part au plaiſir & benefice; du reſtabliſſement & reconciliation du Prince Palatin, qui ne s'y employ promptement & volontiers, eſtant autrement à craindre que ſe ſentant offenſez au meſpris qu'on aura fait de leur interceſſion & priere, ils ne s'en eſmeuvent, & qu'ils n'ayment mieux, & n'eſtiment plus à propos de pourvoir à leurs affaires, en jettant de l'huyle ſur le feu, que de l'eau pour l'eſteindre.

Que donc voſtre majeſté imperiale daigne metttre en conſideration ſelon ſon incomparable bonté & ſageſſe, toutes telles & ſemblables raiſons, & ſe remette devant les yeux d'un coſté *les prieres interceſſoires faites les années paſſées de Philippe* III. *roy d'Eſpagne, & de l'archidac Albert* de glorieuſe me-

moire; & comme auſſi *la moderation* de laquelle a uſé le defunct roy de la Grande Bretagne *en la guerre de Boheme*, & ſes *merites non petits* envers la maiſon d'Autriche, & ſes diverſes ambaſſades, tant en Allemagne qu'en Eſpagne, avec de ſouvent reïterées proteſtations; & d'autre coſté qu'elle *ayt eſgard au moins à cette preſente ambaſſade* du ſereniſſime roy mon ſeigneur & maiſtre, appuyée d'une part du conſentement, authorité, & conjonction du roy catholique, & d'autre, comme comblée de la nouvelle interceſſion du roy de Dannemarc, comme pour mettre la derniere main à toutes les autres; & enſemble ait eſgard aux humbles prieres, ſi affectueuſes & tant de fois reïterées du prince, du fait duquel il s'agit, aux lettres eſcrites de ſa propre main avec tant d'humilité & de ſouſmiſſion, à l'affection & deſir qu'il a de ſe monſtrer tres prompt à rendre à voſtre majeſté imperiale toute fidelité & obeyſſance, conſtamment & inviolablement, & de recompenſer à l'advenir par un grand ſoin & diligence tous les devoirs & ſervices qui par injure du temps auroient eſté obmis.—Que voſtre majeſté imperiale daigne auſſi jetter *les yeux benins de ſa grace ſur une tendre numereuſe & innocente famille Palatine, & ſur une troupe d'autres leurs parents & alliez qui embraſſent en ſuppliant les autels de voſtre clemence & bonté imperiale!* & pour fin, que voſtre majeſté imperiale contemple la gloire, l'utilité, la felicité & le profit qui en redonderont à jamais ſur voſtre majeſté imperiale & ſur toute la maiſon d'Autriche, & s'eſpandront ſur tout l'empire, voire par toute la Chreſtienté!

C'eſt ce que j'ay eu charge & mandement de la part du ſereniſſime roy mon maiſtre de repreſenter à voſtre majeſté imperiale, attendant là deſſus avec toute humilité & devotion une favorable reſponſe.

## XVI.

### LETTRE du Roy de SUEDE au Roy Tres Chriſtien.*

TRES ſereniſſime, & tres puiſſant prince, frere, & couſin; l'ambaſſade que voſtre majeſté nous a envoyée, au mois de juin dernier, nous a eſté d'autant plus agreable, que par icelle, elle a declaré quelle eſtoit ſon amitié & ſa bienveillance envers nous, comme auſſi ſon affection loüable & conſtante, qui a regné ſi long temps entre les roys de l'un & l'autre royaume, nos predeceſſeurs, ſoit maintenant renouvellée;

* Mercure François, tom. xvi. p. 360, &c.

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voire plus eſtendüe & amplifiée pour ce qui concerne l'utilité de l'aſſeurance, & liberté mutuelle, des peuples des nos royaumes; ce qui eſtoit à deſirer ſingulierement en l'eſtat de l'Europe troublé & agité. Auſſi votre majeſté nous a elle tellement recogneu enclin & porté à cette affaire ſalutaire, en ce que nous nous trouvons maintenant conformes en meſmes deſſeins & deſirs. Mais pour ce que l'ambaſſadeur de voſtre majeſté le ſieur baron de Charnacé *a (pour quelque conſideration, qu'à peine pouvons nous comprendre) trouvé un ſcrupule en l'inſcription des patentes de noſtre traiſté d'alliance, & n'a peu agreer que nous miſſions nos titres & nom aux patentes expediées de noſtre part pour ledit traicté, ainſi qu'ont accoutumé de faire tous les autres roys: choſe, que nous avons trouvé fort eſtrange, de s'arreſter à un poinct de ſi peu d'importance, qui ne convenoit nullement à la diminution, ou augmentation de l'une ou l'autre majeſté! Toutesfois à peine avons nous eſtimer eſtre du devoir d'un roy de negliger les moindres choſes qui concernent la dignité royale; & plutoſt euſſions nous ſouffert la rupture de ce traicté, que de relaſcher aucune choſe de cette dignité que nous avons receüe de Dieu & de nos ancestres.* Mais pour ce que nous ne pouvons nous perſuader en quelle façon nous devons interpreter *ce faict dudit ſieur ambaſſadeur,* ne voulans croire que cela ait eſté fait de la volonté & par commandement de voſtre majeſté; pour ce que nous avons tousjours receu des bons teſmoignages de ſon amitié, & bons offices reciproques & eſperons encore les meſmes d'icelle; pour ce ſujet nous avons mieux aimé agir avec elle par toute ſorte de bienveillance & offices mutuels, que par aucuns prerogatives, & eſperons d'elle toute affection reciproque, & qu'elle recognoiſtra que nos majeſtez ne deſpendent que de Dieu ſeul, & ne voudra ſouffrir aucune choſe contraire à noſtre dignité.

Que ſi voſtre majeſté juge eſtre expedient pour le bien commun, & pour nos royaumes, que la traicté d'alliance ſoit encore continué entre nous & voſtre majeſté (afin que nous perſuadions que c'eſt nous, outre l'utilité commune qui le requiert, & ſur l'aſſeurance que nous avons de l'aſſiſtance à nous promiſe de voſtre majeſté, que nous nous employerons en cette guerre d'Allemagne) il ſera neceſſaire pour rendre plus facile l'effect de ce traicté, que nos ambaſſadeurs ſoient à l'advenir munis & inſtruits de bons & ſuffiſans pouvoirs, pour exprimer la force & intention des premiers en ce qui concerne cette alliance. Nous recommandons affectionément à la clemence & faveur de votre majeſté, les illuſtres perſonnes comte de Lenoue, & baron de Semur, porteurs des preſentes, qui nous ſemblent dignes de cette charge, & leſquels nous

desirons employer à lever des troupes, sous le bon plaisir & permission de vostre majesté, tant à eux qu'aux autres qui seront par nous envoyez en vos royaumes, *y faire levées des soldats pour nous & nostre armée*, & quoyque nous ne doutions nullement de sa bonne volonté, neantmoins nous demandons amiablement avoir d'elle quelque chose d'asseuré, surquoy nous puissions croire qu'il plaist à vostre dite majesté nous gratifier en cette affaire. C'est dequoy nous la prions, comme aussi de se vouloir persuader que nous userons de mesme promptitude, & tant en cette affaire qu'en toutes autres : & que nous sommes tres prests de luy tesmoigner toutes sortes d'affection & service, priant finalement Dieu tres puissant, qu'il donne à vostre majesté toute bonne & heureuse protection, ainsi que nous le desirons de tout nostre coeur.

Donné à Stralsund le 17 de Septembre 1630. GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

## XVII.

LETTRE du Roy de SUEDE au Cardinal de Richelieu *.

PAR vos lettres à nous rendües de la part de votre dignité illustrissime, le . . . . . ; Nous avons veu comme elle recognoissoit la digne estime, que nous faisons de ses rares & eminentes vertus, & comme nous magnifions sa grande & loüable affection pour le bien commun : aussi nous sommes nous persuadez, que vostre mesme dignité illustrissime recognoissoit quelle estoit nostre constante affection & intention ; & que non seulement elle conserveroit cette bonne opinion qu'elle en avoit conceüe, mais aussi la rendroit plus illustre pour meriter du bien commun, & du desir de la servir. Aussi ne doutons nous point que nous n'eussions perceu quelque fruict des soins qu'elle a pour la seureté, repos, & liberté publique, si le sieur baron de Charnacé, ambassadeur de sa majesté trés Chrestienne, *n'eust trouvé du scrupule, en ce que moins nous esperions y en avoir.* C'est pourquoy il sera advisé suivant les conseils tant estimez de votre dignité illustrissime, par quel conseil salutaire toutes les choses destinées au bien public pourroient estre conduites à la fin tant desirée, & oster toutes sortes de remises & delais à une affaire si salutaire & importante ; en quoy la sera deüe à votre dignité illustrissime, laquelle meritera grandement de nous, & de tous autres qui ont principalement interest en la

* Mercure François, tom. xvi. p. 363.

cause

cauſe dont il s'agit. Sur ce nous recommandons votre dignité illuſtriſſime, à la divine protection, & ſommes preſts de faire tout ce qui ſervira à ſa gloire.

Donné à Stralſund le 17 de Septembre 1630. GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

## XVIII.

HARANGUE du Sieur CAMERARIUS, Ambaſſadeur du Roy de SUEDE, aux Eſtats de HOLLANDE & PROVINCES UNIES.

[Pronounced in October 1630.]

ILLUSTRES & tres-puiſſants ſeigneurs, &c. Je ne doubte point que les lettres du roy mon maiſtre que je preſentay avant hier à M. le preſident, n'ayent eſté leües a voſtre aſſemblée: mais ayant charge expreſſe de ſa majeſté de vous deduire plus amplement de bouche ſes bonnes intentions, je ſuis venu pour m'en acquitter en peu de paroles, pour ne point prejudicier au bien public parmy vos grandes occupations.

Vous vous ſouvenez combien vous avez eu le ſoin du ſalut & de la ſeureté publique, depuis que par le changement des affaires d'Allemagne la maiſon d'Autriche en Allemagne eſt devenue puiſſante, a commencé à entreprendre ſur la liberté preſque de tous les roys & eſtats: *& avez depuis quelques années exhorté ſa majeſté par ambaſſadeurs exprés de donner ſecours aux oppreſſez.* Vous ſcavez auſſi que ſa dite majeſté vous a tousjours communiqué en confiance tous ſes deſſeins, & offert par pluſieurs fois ſon affection & ſecours: c'eſt ce qu'il fait encores à preſent, vous donnant à entendre, les cauſes & motifs qui l'ont fait reſoudre à paſſer la mer avec ſon armée.

Le vint-unieſme de Mars dernier, ſa majeſté vous avertit *que par l'interceſſion du roy de Dannemarc il s'eſtoit porté pour entendre à un traicté de paix à Dantzic*, vous donnant moyen, ſi le trouviez bon, d'y envoyer de voſtre part des perſonnes, qui par leur conſeil pourroient ſervir au bien public & au voſtre particulier. Ses lettres vous ont eſté rendües *un peu tard*; & je ne ſçay ſi à cauſe de cela vous n'aurez point *mal pris la bonne intention* du roy mon maiſtre; *mais vous avez recogneu par effet, que la retardement n'y a point fait de prejudice.* Mais je n'ay peu entendre ſi vous

*avez reſpondu*, & *quoy*, aus dites lettres de ſa majeſté, *qui ſe fachant de ce que je ne luy fait nulle mention d'une choſe de ſi grande conſequence*, je m'aſſeure que ſi je n'obtiens autre choſe, pour le moins vous me juſtifierez envers elle, de ne luy avoir peu eſcrire ce que je n'ay peu ſcavoir de vous.

Or eſpere-je que, comme ſa majeſté, ne vous a rien celé juſques icy de ſes deſſeins & conſeils, que vous auſſi ſelon l'amitié, qui depuis tant d'années a eſte contractée avec vous, traicterez ſa majeſté avec pareille confiance, afin qu'elle puiſſe prendre & executer ſes reſolutions plus promptement & ſeurement, ſoit pour la paix, ſoit pour la guerre, principalement quand il entendra, que vous vizez unanimement au meſme but de recouvrer la liberté publique?

Le dés en eſt maintenant jetté:—ſa majeſté a paſſé non ſeulement le Rubicon, mais la vaſte mer*, & s'efforcera, moyennant l'ayde de Dieu, d'acquerir par armes ſa ſeureté qui n'a peu juſques icy obtenir, ny par lettres, ny par ambaſſades, ny pour ſoy, ny pour autres: ou, pour le moins; de mettre l'affaire en tel eſtat que les armes facilitent la paix.

Et ſa majeſté ayant entrepris une telle charge, non point pour aucune utilité particuliere, mais ſeulement en conſideration de la calamité publique, & principalement pour remettre la mer Baltique (à la domination de laquelle l'Eſpagne & l'Autriche aſpirent il y a long temps pour voſtre ruine) en ſon premier eſtat: pour faire reflorir le commerce, & procurer voſtre bien & utilité; elle ſe perſuade que vous ſeconderez ſes genereux efforts, non ſeulement de vos vœux & faveurs, mais auſſi de voſtre conſeil & aſſiſtance. . . Sa majeſté *n'eſt point ignorante de l'incertitude des choſes humaines, & ſçait fort bien que les armées ſont journaillieres*, & partant elle eſpere qu'en tout evenement vous ne permettrez point qu'elle ſe voye du tout negligée & deſtituée de ſes amis, au peril & cauſe commune, elle ſe porte avec moins d'allegreſſe en ſa proſperité, ou que Dieu ne vueille, elle ſe trouve plus empeſchée à ſe relever en adverſité.

Si le bonheur, dont le ciel vous a comblé cette année paſſée par tant de victoires & emoluments, eſt ſi grand, que vos ennemis meſmes ne peuvent croire que vous ne vouluſ-

* One may take the liberty here to hazard a ſlight conjecture. The expreſſion of *vaſtemer*, conſidering the ſhort paſſage from Stockholm to the iſle of Rugen, cannot with any propriety be applied to the expedition of G. On the other hand, the Germans, if I miſtake not, uſually call the Baltic the *Eaſt Sea* [*die Oſt-ſee*] La Oëſt-mer; which the capital initial to *Vaſte* in the French copy, and the hyphen between *that* and *mer* ſeem to confirm. But a Frenchman thinks nothing deſerves orthography, which happens to be out of the limits of his own country.

ſiez

ſiez vous prevaloir de tant de favourables occaſions à leur ruine, en faveur de vos amis: ne permettez donc point que le fruict de vos victoires vous ſoit oſté & à vos amis, & retourne à vos communs ennemis: ce qui ne peut faillir d'arriver, ſi vous ne vous portez à rompre de plus en plus *les forces d'Eſpagne* deja fort ebranlées: ou pour le moins, aſſiſtiez vos amis, qui ſe portent courageuſement à les divertir de vous.

C'eſt ce que ſa majeſté m'a commandé de vous repreſenter, & ſerieuſement enjoynt de luy faire entendre voſtre reſolution *au plutoſt*, pour pourvoir de bonne heure à ſes affaires, ſoit pour la guerre, ſoit pour la paix. *Partant, je vous prie bien humblement de ne point differer voſtre reponſe, ſi d'avanture vous ne deſirez traitter de cecy particulairement avec moy par les deputez.* Je vous obeiray de tout mon pouvoir, comme meſſieurs, &c. &c.

## XIX.

TREATY of Confederation and Alliance for five years, between LEWIS XIII. King of FRANCE, and GUSTAVUS II. King of SWEDEN, for the re-eſtabliſhment of the Princes and States of Germany; concluded at BERNWALT in the Marquiſate of BRANDENBURG, Jan. 13, 1631*.

SERENISSIMI ac potentiſſimi principis domini, domini Guſtavi Adolphi, Suecorum, Gotthorum, Wandalorumque regis, magni principis Finlandiæ, ducis Eſthoniæ & Careliæ, nec non Ingriæ domini, domini noſtri clementiſſimi commiſſarii: nos infra ſcripti Guſtavus Horn, de Malla & Heringa, eques auratus, & exercitus Suecici campi mareſcallus, Joannes Bannerius militiæ generalis, regni Sueciæ ſenatores; & Carolus Bannerius de Hufſten, ſecretarius natus & pro tempore ad aulam Pomeranicam legatus, notum teſtatumque facimus:

Quod cum ad componendum bellum Sueco-Polonicum à ſereniſſimo ac potentiſſimo principe ac domino, domino

* The preſent copy is taken from a very curious work, entitled, Recueil des Traités de Confederation & d'Alliance, entre la Couronne de France, & les Princes & Eſtats Eſtrangers Depuis l'an MDCXXI, juſques à l'an MDCLXXII, *ſine loco*. Here are inſerted many pieces which the grand collectors of treaties in the French intereſts have been aſhamed to own.—We find another copy of the treaty of Bernwalt in the Swed. Intellig. Part I. 75.

Ludovico XIII. Galliæ & Navarræ rege Chriſtianiſſimo, miſſus eſſet illuſtriſſimus dominus Hercules baro Charnacæus, conſiliarius ſtatus & tribunus, ac poſt illud negotium feliciter peractum, non minorem ſacræ regiæ majeſtatis noſtræ zelum intelligeret, quam ſereniſſimi ſui regis voluntatem fœderis ineundi, in communium amicorum vicinorumque libertatem recuperandam.

Et quoniam conditiones quibus ejuſmodi libertas recuperari, & mutuum fœdus iniri poſſe videretur, à ſacra regia majeſtate domino noſtro, cui horum locorum conſtitutiones omnium optimé ſunt perſpectæ, antehac propoſitæ ſereniſſimo Galliæ regi per dominum legatum communicatæ, ipſi adeo placuerunt, ut mandata & plenipotentiam procuratoris domino legato dederit de iis tractandis ac concludendis; noſque ex parte ſacræ regiæ majeſtatis domini noſtri deputati eſſemus, ut cum eo de toto hoc negotio conveniremus.

Poſt acceptas igitur traditaſque utrinque legitimas principum noſtrorum plenipotentias, cum præfato domino legato Galliæ de dicto fœdere, nomine ſacræ regiæ majeſtatis domini noſtri, ſequentes articulos ſtatuimus & concluſimus, ſicuti & vigore harum ſtatuimus & concludimus.

I. Ut ſit fœdus inter præfatos ſereniſſimos Sueciæ & Galliæ reges pro defenſione ſuorum reſpectivè communium amicorum, ſecuritate etiam maris Balthici, & oceani, libertate commerciorum, nec non reſtitutione oppreſſorum imperii Romani ordinum; et ut fortalitia ac propugnacula quæ extructa ſunt in portubus ac littoribus alterutrius maris oceani aut Balthici vel in Rhœtia demoliantur, & in eum ſtatum reducantur in quo proximè ante hoc bellum Germanicum fuerunt.

II. Et quoniam adverſæ partis animus à juſta illatarum injuriarum reparatione in hanc uſque diem alienus fuerat, factaſque hactenus interceſſiones rejecerat, ideirco communium amicorum ſalus armata manu vindicator.

III. In eum finem rex Sueciæ pro tanta belli mole exercitum triginta mille peditum & ſex mille equitum ſuo ſumptu in Germaniam ducat & habeat. Rex Galliæ *quadringenta millia talerorum imperialum quotannis tribuito*, ejuſque ſummæ mediam partem 15 menſis Maii, alteram 15 Novembris Lutetiæ Pariſiorum vel Amſterodami in Hollandia (prout regis Sueciæ miniſtris videbitur) infallibiliter numerato ac tradito.

IV. Conſcriptio militum ac nautarum, exportatio navium ac rerum bellicarum in mutuis territoriis libera ſit, hoſtibus verò denegetur.

V. Delin-

V. Delinquentes in disciplinam militarem & fugitivi, domino suo pro administranda justitia in eos tradantur.

VI. Si deo placuerit regi Sueciæ felices successus concedere, in negotio religionis non aliter se geret in occupatis deditisque locis, quam secundum leges & constitutiones imperii, et in locis in quibus exercitium religionis catholicæ Romanæ reperietur, in integro remaneat.

VII. Ad hoc fœdus quicunque alii status vel principes voluerint, sive in Germania, sive extra eam, admittantur. Idque debitè caveatur, ut qui admissi fuerint, nec clam, nec palam, suo vel alieno nomine adversæ parti faveant, aut regibus præfatis, vel communi causæ noceant, quin potius singuli ad hoc bellum sumptus contribuant, quantos unicuique vires permiserint & interesse requirit, eaque peculiari conventione transigantur.

VIII. Cum duce Bavariæ & liga catholica in imperio Romano amicitia vel saltem neutralitas servetur, si illi reciprocum præstiterint.

IX. Quod si per dei gratiam occasio tractandi se offerat, ex communi fœderatorum consilio tractetur, nec ullus fœderatorum sine altero quid statuito pacemve inito.

X. Hoc fœdus quinque annos durato, à data nimirum præsentium usque ad primam diem Martii Stilo Veteri, anni supra millesimum sexcentesimum trigesimi sexti; intra quod tempus nisi secura pax obtineatur, ex communi rursus fœderatorum consilio prorogetur.

XI. Conventum est tandem ut quoniam præterito anno de hoc fœdere tractari cœptum, ut in sex annos concluderetur.

Et cum rex Sueciæ multos interea in hoc bellum sumptus contulerit, ideo pro priori illo anno jam ferè elapso nomine regis Galliæ ipso die subsignationis præsentis tractatus N. N. talerorum imperialium præstentur, quæ etiam per certas cambii literas à nobis recipientur, & ad cæterorum quinque annorum summam non pertinebunt.

In quorum omnium fidem, &c.

Actum in Stativis regiis Bernwaldi in Nova Marchia Brandeburgensi, decima tertia Januarii, anno 1631, stilo veteri.

XX. A short

## XX.

A ſhort NARRATION of the PROTESTANT DIET held at LEIPSICK: beginning February the 8th, 1630-1, and ending April the 3d, 1631. Printed at London 1632.

[N. B. In republiſhing this piece, we have altered here and there a few inaccuracies of ſtyle, and rectified *ſuch errors* in point of *fact* as occurred to us.]

THE imperial diet at Ratiſbon thus ending November $\frac{13}{23}$, left matters in a far worſe ſtate than it found them: for that men perceived now their very hopes to be taken away, as their liberties and goods had been before: and the proteſtant princes finding themſelves ſtartled by four things eſpecially, perceived it high time now for them to take the alarm. The firſt of the four was this: that whereas the duke of Saxony had, in the time of the diet, written advice unto the emperor, of the king of Sweden's approaching; the emperor tells him again, how he hoped that himſelf (the elector of Saxony) and Brandenburgh would well aid him with money, ammunition, and other neceſſaries. By which anſwer, the elector of Saxony perceived a new bill of charges coming upon the proteſtants next thoſe parts where the king of Sweden was landed. The ſecond was this: the compendious courſe taken by the emperor for the recovering of the church lands; which neither the elector of Saxony was able to ſtop by his letters unto the emperor, nor the elector of Brandenburg, and other princes, with their preſence at the diet *: but that even before their own faces, daily commiſſions were ſent out againſt them. A third was this: the rigid courſe (taken by advice of the jeſuits) for reformation of the proteſtant churches and ſchools, and the forbidding of the liberty of the Auguſtan confeſſion. The fourth was, that decree of the emperor (publiſhed four days before the breaking up of the diet, though projected long before) for the continuance of the wars againſt the king of Sweden: whereas the way had been propounded and adviſed upon before, how to compound the matter, rather than how to continue the troubles. And what aggravated the decree for the wars being, not only that the princes were to be at the charges of it, but that the levies were to be laid and collected, not by the conſent of thoſe who ſhould pay them, but at the pleaſure of the imperial commiſſaries: for the moderating of whoſe power,

* We have proved the contrary of this aſſertion, in the part of our hiſtory that relates to it: the two electors alleging, by way of excuſe for their perſonal abſence, that the imperial troops had rendered them unable to defray the expences of ſuch a journey. *See alſo Memoirs of the Houſe of Brandenburg.*

and

and repreſſing the numbers and inſolences of the ſoldiers notwithſtanding ſome ſlight promiſes were now made, yet how far they would be kept, was in their own pleaſures. The proteſtants by theſe arguments being not only made ſuſpicious, but ſenſible too, that there were not over many good intentions in the emperor towards them, their eſtates or religions, began to enter into a conſultation for their own ſafety. The plot for it was laid thus. That whereas there had been a conference between them and the catholics at the former diet, concerning the church lands, the further treaty thereupon was referred unto a diet (procured by the catholics) to be held at Francfort upon Mayn, in Auguſt following; the duke of Saxony ſhould write his letters unto the emperor (which was ſeconded by the mediation of the electors of Mentz and Bavaria), intreating liberty for the proteſtants to hold a diet by themſelves, in ſome convenient place; that ſo by their united councils they might be provided, for an anſwer at the future diet of Francfort.

The imperial aſſent being thus obtained, the proteſtant princes, by their letters and ambaſſadors, agree upon the diet: the place to be Leipſic, and the time the 8th of February. That the ſeveral princes and ſtates therefore might know beforehand, what inſtructions to give unto the ambaſſadors they were to ſend, the duke of Saxony, in his invitatory letters to each of them, lays open the purpoſe of the intended diet; fairly communicating the main propoſitions, both unto them and to the emperor. The contents whereof were, firſt, to conſult how the church might with a good conſcience be maintained in her ancient liberties and happy ſtate. Secondly, how to keep their due obedience to the emperor, and yet preſerve the ancient conſtitutions and peace of the empire. Thirdly, how to maintain correſpondency with the catholic princes. And, fourthly, what to anſwer for themſelves both in general and particular, as well concerning the maintenance of the reformed religion, as to the emperor's edict concerning the church lands, when they ſhould come to meet at the diet of Francfort.

The princes thus invited, and the time now come, upon the 4th of February 1631, the elector of Saxony enters Leipſic in great ſtate, and the elector of Brandenburg a little after him. Thither in perſon came theſe proteſtant princes alſo: Chriſtian, another marquis of Brandenburg, John, William, and Bernard, dukes of Saxe Weymar. William landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, Frederick marquis of Baden, Auguſtus prince of Anhault, Frederick count of Solmes, John, George, and Erneſt Lodowicke, counts of Mansfeilt, and

and the depoſed dukes of Mecklenburg. The following princes ſent their deputies, the duke of Deuxponts, John Erneſt, another duke of Saxony, Frederick Ulrick, duke of Brunſwick, the duke of Lunenburg. The ſeveral princes of the Circles of Suabia and Franconia*, the lady of the abbey of Quidlinburg, the biſhop adminiſtrator of Mecklenburg, the counts of Stolberg, the barons of Reuſſen and Schonberg. Theſe towns and ſtates ſent their agents alſo: Norimberg, Straſburg, Francfort, Lubec, Bremen, Brunſwick, Hildeſheim, Mulhauſen, and Northauſen†. Duke Lodowic Frederick, adminiſtrator of the dukedom of Wirtemberg, was newly dead, and duke Julius not yet ſettled; and therefore being not able to come himſelf, he ſent the vice-chancellor of the dukedom, called Dr. Loefler, and ſome other counſellors, as deputies for that duchy. And theſe are the proteſtant party in the empire: ſome whereof being Lutherans and ſome Calviniſts, they firſt of all agree to have that diſtinction of names (which had cauſed ſo much ſchiſm and hatred heretofore) to be utterly taken away, making a general decree, that both profeſſions ſhould from thenceforth be called by one name of Evangelical.

No man was ſuffered to ſtay within the town, whoſe buſineſs was not known: the ſtreets ends were chained up and barricadoed; guards ſet at the ſeveral ports; and the keys of the gates every night brought into the duke's chamber; and all this was to prevent ſpies and ſurpriſes. The duke, elector of Saxony (on whoſe greatneſs and countenance the party and action very much depended) makes a ſpeech firſt of all, which had reference unto his former letters of invitation unto them; proteſting withal, his own firmneſs and forwardneſs for the peace of the empire, and the maintenance of the Religion; and that he would be ready to venture both life and goods in the cauſe; ſo deſiring every man freely to give his counſel in ſuch manner as they might be able to render a fair account of it unto the emperor. Unto this meeting, the king of Sweden alſo ſends his ambaſſador, Dr. Chemnitius, who in his maſter's name delivers them this aſſurance: that his majeſty's intentions were no other, than to reſtore the empire to her ancient peace, the princes to their liberties, and to defend the church in her religion; telling them moreover, that the French king was newly entered into a league with him for

* Duke of Saxe-Altenberg; add likewiſe John Caſimir duke of Saxe-Coburg, Auguſtus count Palatine, and Auguſtus prince of Anhault.

† Add the deputies of the archbiſhoprick of Bremen.

five

five years to come. The ambaſſador had both ſpeedy audience and honourable entertainment. The diet, to be brief, broke up on Palm Sunday, the 3d of April following. The concluſions agreed upon, themſelves expreſs in their letters, in humble and complaining manner, enlarged in many ſheets of paper, ſent by an expreſs courier unto the emperor, in which their joint deſires were thus ſignified.

Their complaint and remonſtrance I reduce into theſe propoſitions:—

That the golden bull and conſtitutions of the empire had of late been all abuſed; that the emperor's late edict for reſtitution of the church lands, and his endeavours to root out the proteſtant religion, were the main cauſes of theſe late troubles. The firſt of theſe, breeding jealouſies and diſcontents betwixt the proteſtants and the papiſts, and the ſecond tending to the utter ruin of the two electors of Saxony and Brandenburg. Then they complain of injuſtice done unto particular princes and cities, ſome of which were injured by the violent taking away of their church lands: as the dukes of Wirtemberg and Brunſwick, the prince of Auhalt, the counts of Hohenloe, Stolberg, Lippe, Waldec, Werthimb, Erpach, &c. the town of Augſburg, and others; ſome hindered in the exerciſe of their religion, as Auguſtus and Frederick, princes Palatine, and younger brothers unto Wolfgang William, Palatine of Newburg, now turned papiſt. Others had their eſtates confiſcated, as the lady electreſs Palatine*, and her ſon Lewis, prince Palatine, the dukes of Mecklenburg, &c. for whom the whole college of electors had interceded in the late diet, but not prevailed. Others complain of the violent altering of the feods and tenures of their lands and lordſhips, as the laſt beforenamed princes and John Caſimir elector of Saxony, into whoſe lands the imperial commiſſaries have with force and arms intruded, changing the tenures of the tenants, and altering the religion. Erneſtus, marquis and elector of Brandenburg, complains of the ſame wrongs offered unto his pupils, the young marquiſes of Onſpach†. Ulme duke of Brunſwick complains, firſt, of the ravages of his lands done by Tilly, upon pretence of monies owing to the king of Denmark, and made over by the ſaid king unto the emperor, who employed Tilly thus to ſtrain for them. Secondly, of the ſeizure of his biſhoprick of Hil-

* The mother and brother of the king of Bohemia, Lewis being duke of Simmern.

† Which are of the houſe of Brandenburg: their lands lying by Nuremberg.

deſheim.

deſheim. And, thirdly, that the chief town of his own reſidence, Wolfenbuttle, had been forced to take an imperial garriſon.

Others complain, how they might not have the benefit of the law, but were driven away by threatenings and diſcourteſies. The electors and princes complain of contempts and indignities offered unto their perſons, ſome of them having been threatened the baſtinado by ſome of the emperor's ſoldiers. The cities and circles of the empire complain, that undue and exceſſive impoſitions and taxes had been laid upon them, not by the conſent of themſelves (as the imperial laws command) but at the pleaſure of any of the emperor's commiſſaries. That, under colour of protecting them, they have been forced to afford quarter and maintenance unto the imperial armies, who, when they ſhould indeed have defended them, moſt cowardly ran away. That when they would not endure the ſoldiers inſolencies, they have been declared enemies of the empire, and forbidden to defend themſelves; that their lands have been given to ſoldiers, as if they had been conquered. That they have been forced to contribute to imaginary companies of ſoldiers (perchance to four or five), as if they had been a complete band. That the commiſſaries have aſſigned quarters and paſſages unto the ſoldiers, without ever aſking leave of the princes or countries: that people have been tortured for their money, had their cattle driven away, their houſes fired, and all commerce driven out of their country. That the ſoldiers neither obſerved martial diſcipline nor moral honeſty, neither keeping the laws, nor fearing God; that virgins and women have been raviſhed upon the high altars; that if the weekly contributions were not paid at the commiſſaries abſolute pleaſure, the ſoldiers then ſpoiled the country. The marquis of Brandenburg complains, that notwithſtanding the king of Sweden had two parts of his country (the old and the new Mark) yet was he forced to pay a full contribution for the whole marquiſate to the Imperialiſts. That himſelf, by the ſoldiers being ſo long in his country, was left ſo poor, that he was not able to entertain a garriſon for the defence of his own palace, and was fain to abridge even the neceſſary proviſions of his own table and family; that the ſoldiers, entertained by the proteſtants for their own defence, have been turned againſt them, to take away the church lands; that trebly more contributions have been raiſed againſt no enemy, than ever were when the Turks were in Germany. That when the princes of the houſe of Saxony, as, namely, Altenburg, Weymar, and Coburg, had excuſed themſelves of diſability to pay each of them 1454

dollars a month, which the commiſſary Oſſa had required of them; then Tilly threatened to draw 10,000 more dollars a month out of them. That conſidering all this, they could perceive nothing elſe, but that the emperor had intended their utter ruin: whereas he had dealt more gently with thoſe of his own hereditary dominions. That all this is moſt contrary unto the oath of the emperor, and unto the laws of the empire, inaſmuch as ſuch hath been complained of by the ſeveral electors and princes, and by them proteſted againſt in the late diet of Ratiſbon; wherefore they now humbly petition to be relieved, proteſting otherwiſe that they are no longer able to endure, but ſhall be enforced to defend their perſons, conſciences, eſtates, and ſubjects; reſolving notwithſtanding to continue their due loyalty and obedience unto the emperor, humbly now deſiring a fair and gracious anſwer from him. Leipſic, March 18, 1631.

Their concluſions were anſwerable unto their propoſitions.

1. That conſidering it was their ſins which deſerved theſe puniſhments, they command public prayers to be made unto Almighty God for the diverting of theſe miſeries.

2. That means might be thought upon, and a friendly treaty appointed with the catholic princes, for removing all jealouſies, and reſtoring good terms and concord betwixt them, as for ſeventy years before it had been.

3. That when the time and place for this treaty were once appointed, the proteſtants ſhould there appear a little before, to prepare themſelves what to ſay in it.

4. And the more fairly to diſpoſe both Cæſar and the Catholics unto their intentions, that their grievances ſhould in humble manner be beforehand, by letter, preſented both unto the emperor and the three catholic electors.

5. That theſe grievances ſhould in thoſe letters be preſſed to be contrary unto the emperor's oath, the imperial laws, the privileges of the princes, the honour and ſafety of the empire. That the wars would undo all; the inſolencies of commiſſaries and ſoldiers were ſo inſufferable, as that it ſtood neither with their conſciences, their ſafeties, nor their honours, to ſuffer themſelves and ſubjects to be any longer thus abuſed; and that they would hereupon deſire the benefit of the emperor's ſo often promiſed protection.

6. That ſeeing theſe greater and fuller aſſemblies were both chargeable and tedious, they agreed, that certain deputies ſhould, as neceſſity required, be, in the names of all the reſt, appointed, both to treat and determine of what ſhould ſeem convenient for the common cauſe.

7. The

7. The decree of levies of ſoldiers (both of horſe and foot) to be made in their ſeveral dominions and diviſions, without croſſing the conſtitutions of the empire, or offence of any, and only in their own defence.

8. That whereas in a diet of the empire held 1555, it had been decreed, how that neighbouring princes ſhould live neighbourly, and if any oppreſſed others, the reſt ſhould relieve them; this relief they now promiſe one another, deſiring, that if in theſe troubleſome times, the levies and other carriages could not poſſibly be every way agreeable to the conſtitutions of the empire, that it might not be interpreted to be done on purpoſe.

9. They decree the continuance of their loyalty and obedience unto his imperial majeſty.

10. They agree alſo upon the proportion of the levies.

Thus the elector of Saxony engages himſelf to raiſe ſix regiments, Brandenburg three. The ſeveral Circles of Suabia, the Rhine, and Franconia, three regiments apiece; and the Circle of Lower Saxony agreed to furniſh monies for the raiſing and paying of one regiment. Each regiment of foot was to be 3,000 ſtrong, and of horſe 1,000. And thus the diet being ended upon Palm Sunday with a ſermon, Saxony diſplays his defenſive banner, beats up his drums, begins his levies, and ſo at their coming home do the reſt of the princes.

Theſe concluſions and reſolutions of the proteſtants were not a little boggled at at court, did not ſlightly diſpleaſe the emperor, and ſtartle the catholic leaguers, with their adherents. The proteſtants hear of it in both ears; for this are they, both by words and writings, threatened and reviled; yea, their new league and ſtrength were by ſome confidents not a little ſcoffed and ſcorned at. But they that had been uſed to hard deeds before, were ſufficiently hardened againſt foul words now; they were not to be diſcouraged this way, they did their buſineſs, and let the others talk their talks. Things going thus on, it was by the middle of May every where perceived, how that theſe leaguers of Leipſic were now in very good earneſt. For now upon the taking of Magdeburg, the proteſtants ſtrongly ſuſpecting by the inhuman cruelty there uſed by the imperialiſts, that it was not a heat of war alone, but that there was a core of malice diſcovered in it, not an imperial, but a popiſh ſpite, unto that city above others, for having been one of the firſt that harboured Luther and his religion; they begin to make it their own caſe, and that, for their religion's ſake, they

were

were all not likely to be much better uſed. Some therefore of the neighbour princes (thoſe, namely, of Saxony and Suabia) demand of the cities of Ulm and Memmingen, &c. ſituate in Suabia by the river Danube (which were of the proteſtant league with them) to entertain for garriſons ſome of theſe new levied forces. Memmingen conſents; but Ulm, being a greater city, relies upon her own ſtrength. Theſe things being done, command is given by the emperor unto Eggon count of Furſtenburg (appointed general of the Circle of Suabia) to employ thoſe 8,000 (lately come out of Italy, after that the wars of Mantua were ended) together with 8 or 10,000 more, againſt thoſe towns aforeſaid. Furſtenburg preſſes ſo hard upon Memmingen, that about the beginning of June, he enforceth it to renounce the new league, and to purchaſe the emperor's pardon at the rate of 50,000 florins ready pay, and 25,000 monthly contribution. The proteſtant league being now noiſed abroad, and another meeting at the latter end of May at the ſame Leipſic intended, thither come the ambaſſadors of England, Sweden, Saxony, and Brandenburg; there is the uniting of their forces with the king of Sweden propounded, but not concluded; only the paſſage of Wirtemberg, heretofore denied him by Saxony, is now yielded to, to be open for his army. M. Tilly about the ſame time diſpeeds a meſſage unto Saxony with overtures of a peace, promiſing ſhortly to come himſelf with ſufficient commiſſion to confirm it. This being ſuſpected to be a plot, either to divert or ſtagger the reſolution of the duke, or a trick to gain time, and that Tilly's commiſſion might perchance be in his ſcabbard, the meſſage was not accepted, notwithſtanding that Tilly did, in the mid June following, come in perſon indeed, and at Oldſleben had treaty with the duke's ambaſſadors.

When this would not do, and the emperor, by the duke's ſecond letters (dated the day after the end of the late diet), underſtanding the reſolution of the leaguers, which by their general levies he perceived them ready to maintain; and hearing withal, the king of Sweden to be victoriouſly already advanced quite through Pomerania and Mecklenburg, into ſome places of Brandenburg, out thunders he his imperial ban againſt the Leipſic leaguers, dated at Vienna, May 14, peremptorily forbidding any place of the empire to grant either relief, paſſage, or place of quarter, muſter, or rendezvous, unto any of their forces; commanding every man to deſtroy, kill, and perſecute them as enemies: and the eaſier to dehort the leaguers, his majeſty offers to releaſe them of their oaths taken in prejudice

of him at Leipſic, and to grant pardon to as many as ſhould come in: upon pain of death forbidding all their ſubjects either to contribute to their levies, or to ſerve under their enſigns, but to turn both their monies and perſons towards the advancement of his imperial ſervice, promiſing the freedom of conſcience and eſtates to all that ſhould thus obey him.

Divers people are naturally afraid of thunder; ſome of the leaguers, therefore, (and eſpecially the grave-headed burghers in the richer cities) began now to quake at the noiſe of this ſo hideous a proclamation: which fear of theirs much cooled their blood, made them the leſs zealous and warm in the reſolution; but he that hath not courage enough to fight, hath wit enough commonly to excuſe his cowardice. So fell it out here; divers of the backwardeſt palliating their own remiſſneſs with the news they pretended to have heard, of the mammering of the chief man in the action, the duke of Saxony. And this had like to have arreſted the whole deſign. Saxony hearing of all this, notwithſtanding he was at this inſtant hard laid at, by Hagenmüller, the emperor's ambaſſador, to come over to his maſter; yet (to prevent a jealouſy) would he not ſo much as once ſpeak with him, then at Torgau, but referred him for audience over unto his privy council.

Hagenmüller's propoſitions were theſe four:—

1. To conſult how the buſineſs about the church lands might beſt be compounded.

2. How the inconveniencies occaſioned by the wars might be eaſed.

3. That the agreement of Leipſic, for ſtanding upon their own defence, might be cancelled.

4. That he would adviſe how a peace might honourably be concluded with the Swede, and that the duke would mediate it.

The anſwer of the duke's council is too long to inſert; and, to be brief, the ambaſſador returns not well ſatisfied. Immediately hereupon, the duke diſpatches his letters unto the ſeveral leaguers, aſſuring them of his own conſtancy, and inviting them with all ſpeed to haſten their preparations.

Theſe letters of Saxony brought about the matter again; and he, to ſhew that he meant to do more than write letters, lays ſure guards upon his own frontiers ſome eight or ten thouſand men; proceeding warily hitherto, and all upon the defenſive. The proteſtant princes of Suabia (which lie along the Danube, between the dukes of Wirtemberg and Bavaria) do hereupon aſſemble at Eſſingen, reſolving to ſtick cloſe to the articles of Leipſic, reinforcing their levies thereupon. And

And now the fair city of Norimberg in the Upper Palatinate returns to her former reſolution, notwithſtanding the particular threatenings of the emperor, to give the ſpoil of it unto their great neighbour the duke of Bavaria. The city of Straſbourg arms alſo; and the city of Ulm, encouraged by the new adminiſtrator of Wirtemberg, duke Julius, refuſes to give paſſage to the late troops coming that way out of Italy, and ſends 300 muſqueteers to aid their neighbours of Memmingen againſt them.

The landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel (againſt whoſe country it was generally reported that Tilly would forthwith come, and that he was already for that purpoſe upon his march as far as Duringen) beſtirs himſelf all this while, levies men, and fortifies his frontiers. Tilly ſends before he comes to him, and that theſe four demands:—

1. To pay the arrear of the contribution due unto the emperor.

2. To give ſufficient hoſtages or ſecurity for the future; directly profeſſing him either a friend or a foe to the emperor.

3. Immediately to caſhier his army.

4. To lay open his paſſages for the emperor's forces, to receive imperial garriſons into Caſſel and Sichenheim, and to give quarter to five other regiments.

Hard terms all. Unto which the landgrave returns though a negative yet a modeſt anſwer. This way not ſpeeding, it ſeems the way of practice and of treachery was attempted, for the landgrave preſently upon this diſcovers ſome correſpondency entertained by two or three of his own chief lords with Tilly, for the delivering up his two chief towns of Caſſel and Sigenheym, for which they are executed. Tilly after this in a rage ſends three ſeveral troops into his country, his own intended expedition againſt him being diverted by news of the king of Sweden.

All this while (namely, until the latter end of June) was there no aſſurance of the proteſtant princes purpoſe to unite with the king of Sweden; but they all ſtood upon terms of neutrality, kept their obedience unto the emperor, ſtanding only upon the defenſive, without once offering any act of hoſtility, where they were not firſt provoked. Saxony had now 17,000 foot and 3000 horſe all in a readineſs. Upon the ſame terms ſtands the marquis elector of Brandenburgh, who, notwithſtanding the near alliance betwixt the king of Sweden and himſelf (the king having married the ſiſter of the ſaid marquis) yet that he ſeemed far enough from uniting with him, appears by an action of his, which had like to have

coſt him dearly: The elector denies a requeſt of the king's, for two paſſages for his army (now in the Brandenburgher's country), and eſpecially for that the marquis now deſired his town of Spandau again, which upon ſome terms had at the firſt been lent unto the king; which the king taking very unkindly, (divers circumſtances perchance occurring) all of a ſudden beſieges the elector's town of Berlin, bending his cannon upon the very palace, threatening to pillage it. The difference is at length appeaſed by the electreſs, together with the promiſe of 30,000 rix-dollars a month, and to have the town of Spandau (Cuſtrin he alſo deſired) again conſigned over unto him as before.

## XXI.

### Regis SUECICI de MAGDEBURGENSI excidio publica expurgatio.

*Quocirca rex culpam amiſſæ, nec ſervatæ urbis, publico ſcripto à ſe amolitus eſt:* [Chemnit. de Bello Sueco-Germ. tom. i. 134.]

ERRORE Magdeburgenſium, quo in ipſo turbarum limine, ad habendos delectus ſufficientem pecuniæ ſummam minime anticipando, impegerant, *ſub initium perſtricto, luculenter deinde, & ad oculum demonſtrans:* ſummis quidem viribus ad ſuccurendum Magdeburgo contendiſſe, nec quicquam in eo feciſſe reliqui: ſed ineluctabilia obſtacula objecta, quæ conatus ſuos remorata fuerint; nec, niſi in præſens exitium ſeque ſuoſque præcipitare voluerit, priuſquam, hoſte Viadri & Wartæ ripâ ad Francofurtum Landſbergamve depulſo, quæ e tergo erant, in tuto collocaret, iter maturare potuiſſe. Nihilominùs, utut hoſtis poſt Francofurtanam cladem ad Glogoviam majorem ſe recollegerit, plus obſeſſæ urbis ſalutem ipſi cordi, quàm pericula, quæ ab hoſte, vires integrante, imminerent, curæ fuiſſe, aut ſolicitudini: ideoque Cæſarianos, quos profligatos perſequi ratio belli dictitabat, ad præſens omiſſis, verſùs Havelam & Albim ſigna, liberandæ urbi, tranſtuliſſe. Quod autem propoſitum hoc effectu caruerit, electores vicinos unicè in cauſa. Quippe cum Saxo, cujus vel maximè interfuerit urbem ſervari incolumen, non modo arma regiis armis jungere, ſed & tranſitum, commeatum, tormenta, rem tormentariam flagitanti præbere detrectârit: Brandenburgicus verò, nec commeatum, naves, ſimilia, ad tentandam rei adeò momentoſæ aleam neceſſaria, quæ alibi reperire non erat, ſatis maturè ſubminiſtrarit aut ſubminiſtrare potuerit,

potuerit, nec idoneam cautionem, qua fisus rex ulteriùs progrederetur, præstiterit tempori; partim quoque de iis, quorum rex certus esse volebat, ac sensum suum eousque, dum Saxo mentem suam explicaret, suspenderit. Summatim, uterque ita se gesserint: ut rex, hostiline an amico in se essent animo, non satis nosset, nec quicquam solidi aut firmi de iis sibi posset polliceri.

## XXII.

TRAICTE de Confederation & d'Alliance pour huit ans entre LOUIS XIII. roy de France, & MAXIMILIEN electeur de Bavière, signé par le dit electeur à Munich, le 8 May 1631.

QUANDOQUIDEM rex Galliæ & elector Bavariæ amicitiam bonam ac defensionem reciprocam confirmare & inire desiderant, ideò in sequentes articulos sub fide data secretos consenserunt.

Sit inter regem & electorem Bavariæ sincera, bona & constans amicitia ac defensiva utrique firma obligatio ad octo annos, virtute cujus rex obligatur novem millibus equitum, cum convenientibus tormentis bellicis, & propriis sumptibus defendere electorum Bavariæ ejusque provincias hæreditarias & acquisitas, si hostiliter invadantur; possit tamen elector Bavariæ, in ejusque optione consistat, à rege vel militem, vel pecuniam tanto militi sufficientem petere.

Eodem modo elector Bavariæ obligatur tribus millibus peditum, et mille equitibus ac convenientibus tormentis bellicis propriisque sumptibus defendere regem Galliæ, ejusque provincias hæreditarias & acquisitas, si hostiliter invadanter: similiter tamen in arbitrio regis positum sit, ab electore Bavariæ vel militem ipsum, vel pecuniam tanto militi æquipolentem poscere.

Rex Galliæ promittit arma sua nullo modo applicare vel conferre contra vel in electorem Bavariæ ejusque supradictas provincias, nec directè nec indirectè assistere militibus aut pecunia iis qui volent electorem Bavariæ aut ejus provincias hostiliter invadere, nec eis permittere ut militem in regno Galliæ contra electorem & supradictas ejus provincias conscribant, aut illis arma, tormenta, vel pulveres tormentarii ab illorum amicis subditis regiis submittantur.

Vice versa elector Bavariæ promittit sua arma nullo modo applicare, & conferre in & contra regem ejusque provincias hæreditarias, sive acquisitas, nec directè, nec indirectè

aſſiſtere militibus, vel pecunia, nec permittere conſcriptionem militum in ſuis provinciis, vel extractionem armorum, & pulveris tormentarii iis qui volent regem ejuſque provincias invadere hoſtiliter.

Rex promittit agnoſcere, defendere & manutenere dignitatem electoralem in perſona ejuſdem electoris & domo Bavariæ, contra omnes qui voluerint vel tentaverint illam dignitatem eis auferre, aut eos in exercitio dictæ dignitatis impedire.

Quandoquidem ex urgentiſſimis cauſis neceſſarium eſt, ut hæc amicitia & defenſio hoc tempore tantum inter regem & electorem Bavariæ concluſa, nulli alii pateat, ſed ſecretiſſima maneat, ideo utrinque de ſecreto obſervando in ſpecie quoque cautum eſt.

Quos omnes articulos eò libentius rex Chriſtianiſſimas & elector Bavariæ inter ſe comprobarunt, & ſibi invicem promiſerunt, quia & jure naturali liciti, & regiæ majeſtati, & electorali dignitati convenientes ſunt: reſervat ideo tamen ac excipit hic elector juramentum ſuum imperatori & imperio præſtitum; reſervatione autem ſic excepta præfatus elector omnia, & ſingula quæ in hoc tractatu mutuæ amicitiæ & reciprocæ defenſionis continentur ſincerè, exactè, & bona fide ſe præſtiturum promittit, regemque Galliæ ejuſque provincias hæreditarias & acquiſitas adverſum quoſcumque defendere tenebitur, eo modo quo in ſupradictis articulis continetur.

Viciſſim verò quoque rex Galliæ omnia ea ſe denuo ſincerè, ac bona fide præſtare velle promittit quæ in ſupradictis articulis ſpopondit.

In fidem horum omnium elector Bavariæ propria manu ſubſcripſit, eaque proprio ſigillo communiri fecit.

Datum in urbe noſtra monachio 8 die menſis Maii, anno Domini 1631, ſubſignavit Maximilianus, & infra Gulielmus Jocher, cum inſignibus electoris Bavariæ.

*Il eſt ainſi en l'original, que j'ay mis entre les mains de monſeigneur le cardinal duc de Richelieu. A Paris, le* 10 *Juin*, 1634.

Signé, BOUTHILLIER.

*Il y en a un autre pareil ſigné par le roy à Fontainbleau, le* 30 *May*, 1631. Louis, *& plus bas*, Bouthillier: *avec les armes de France; dont l'original a eſté remis des mains dudit ſeigneur cardinal duc de* Richelieu.

XXIII.

## XXIII.

### HASSIÆ Landgravii cum Rege Fœdus, ejuſq; capita.

*Quod fœdus velut norma fuit, ad quam reliqua pleraque poſtmodum amuſſitata; idéoque plenius & articulatim hiſtoriæ noſtræ intexere, operæ pretium duximus.*
[Chemnitz. Bellum Sueco-Germ. tom i. ibid. &c.]

REX Landgravio in tutelam, protectionem, & clientelam recepto, quicunque offendere, aut armis impetere eum intenderent, pro hoſtibus haberet, non ſecus, ac ſi ipſimet, coronæve ſuæ injuriam ac bellum intuliſſent; pro virili parte, quantum occaſio permiſerit, hoſtiliter perſequeretur; landgravio conſilio, auxiliove adeſſet; nec cum quoquam alio, ſeu extra ſeu intra Romanum imperium, fœdus, quod huic deroget, iniret. Imprimis vero

2. Si landgravio aut ejus ſubditis vi hoſtiliti eripi quippiam, aut munitiones & arces ejus obſidio cingi contingeret, illis liberandis rex nil faceret reliqui; arma landgravii armis jungeret; ſummis viribus laboranti ſuccurreret, nec ulla cum ratione deſereret.

3. Cum Cæſare, & pontificii fœderis ſociis, aliiſve hoſtibus, de pace mininè gentium tranſigeret aut exueret arma; niſi landgravio pactis, & ita quidem incluſo; ut ei, ejuſque ſubditis nomine illorum, quibus, cum in conſcientia ſua, tùm aliàs gravatos ſe, juſtiſſimè, conquerebantur, ſatisfieret; de juſtitia adversùs quemcumque equaliter adminiſtranda caveretur; et is in ſtatum, quo landgraviorum ſtirpis Caſſellanæ familia ante Bohemicas & Palatinas turbas fuerat, omnino reponeretur.

4. Sicubi rex, ejuſve miles a landgravio in munitiones, arces, urbes, exigente neceſſitate reciperetur, nihil, quod regalibus, privilegiis, utilitati, juribus landgravii præjudicio eſſet, tentaret; ſed neceſſitate & causâ receptionis ceſſante, loca iſthœc landgravio iterùm in manus conſignaret.

5. Sin tormenta quoque, & alia belli gerendi inſtrumenta, regi è landgravii munimentis præberentur (id autem non, niſi cautione priùs de reſtituendo præſtitâ, factum iri) poſtquam pro tempore ſatis uſus, reſtitueret.

6. Quod ſi landgravius propriis viribus ac marte aliquem pontificiorum ordinum, qui regis hoſtes ultrò ſemet profeſſi, opprimere, ejuſve ditiones, urbes, loca occupare potis eſſet, perinde ac ſi ipſe patraſſet, rex id rati haberet, & landgravium, ſiquidem eo nomine infeſtaretur, regiè propugnaret.

7. Si ipſemet rex landgravio, ut fœderato ſuo, præſens adeſſe, & abſolutæ belli gerendi directioni, a landgravio

delatæ, vacare impediretur, egregium habilem expertæque prudentiæ ac virtutis ducem landgravio adjungeret: qui ipsius, ut capitis & principis in contracto fœdere, loco landgravii, copiis præesset, in militaribus, gerendove & continuando bello summi imperii clavum teneret, & hoc nomine data speciatim fide obstrictus, quæ belli ratio flagitat, ad communem fœderatorum scopum consequendum, communi consilio perageret ac exsequeretur. Quò rebus decenter & ordine gestis, confusioni, aliàs facilè irrepenti, omnis præcluderetur rima. Quos summi imperii fasces.

8. Rex ipsimet landgravio contulit ac permisit.

9. Quò dexteriùs autem omnia administrarentur, & aliquis exercitui afforet, observantiæ fœderis (ne, aut huic, aut regis imperio quicquam committeretur adversum) reique simul pecuniariæ intentus; utile visum, summo armorum imperatori fidelem & prudentiâ clarum consiliarum bellicum adjungere: qui illi, ut legatus ad confœderatos, adhæreret, consilio opeve juvaret, & providam, ut dictum, omnium rerum curam gereret; cum quo etiam imperator è secretioribus quibusque statum rerum concernentibus, communicatum iret.

10. Quod landgravius haud abs re fore arbitrabatur, id nec regi displicuit; videlicet, hominem candidum & rerum intelligentem, legati ordinarii seu residentis titulo ad regem a landgravio mitti; qui, ut individuus comes, nunquam non eundem sequeretur, landgravii petita, temporum successu emergentia, ad eum deferret, & mutuæ communicationi per literas daret operam. Tandem

11. Rex landgravio alios principes, comites, barones, civitates, ordines, universitates in fœdus hoc recipiendi potestatem contulit: iisdem illos legibus admittere, nec minùs, ac si cum ipsomet ea de re tractassent & transegissent, flagitantibus assistere pollicitus. Quod si alii eventum demùm rei operire, animum inducerent, & jam fœderatos cum belli periculis luctari solos finerent, post trium mensium decursum haud potituros ampliùs optimis his conditionibus, sed ad novos tractatus, & novas conditiones pacisscendas, remissum iri.

E contra Landgravius data fide recepit.

1. Eandem subire cum rege fortunam, nec eum deserere, nec ulli tractatui cum illius hostibus præbere aures, multo minùs de pace transigere; nisi præscio, volente, & consentiente rege: ita ut ipse, ejusve corona pactis simul includeretur; ea penitus calculo suo approbaret; tractatui adhibitus,

tus, deque eo certior tempore factus foret; et omnia rati habuisset.

2. Ut federatum regis & clientem, ejusdem, illiusve fœderatorum ac regnorum damnum avertere, commodum autem promovere; nulli consilio aut actioni immisceri, quæ regi, aut ejus regnis, principatibus, dignitati adversarentur; fideliter potius illi assistere, et pro virili, ad bellum hoc debellandum, milite pecuniave adminiculari: munimenta autem sua, quantum in se foret, communi fœderatorum bono conservare; hostes in ea nequaquam admittere; sed, quo inde excluderentur, laborare enixé & summis viribus.

3. Illa ipsa munimenta, provincias, arces, ac loca transitu opportuna, necessitate flagitute, regi, cum in adventu, tùm in receptu, absque tergiversatione referare, et permittere, ut aut singulatim, aut cohortatim & turmatim, aut integris legionibus pertransiret, nec circa illa modò, sed et in illis ipsimet hospitaretur. Militem tamen intromissum utrique fide audictum esse debere, et landgravio simul in fœderis hujus articulos sacramento obligandum: omnemve arrege ac regiis hac in parte captionem abfore.

4. Si quando rex landgravio e copiis suis subsidio mitteret, jungere se illis; eas suscipere; uterque pro alterutrius incolumitate laborare; et in communem hostem toto impetu ferri.

5. Exercitum aliquot millium, nulla interposita morâ, suis cogere impensis, eundem, quantum possibile, citiùs aut seriùs, prout occasio ferret, grandire; simul ac in procinctu staret, seve, suasve provincias tributo, hostibus pensitari solito, subtrahere; potentiam viresve eorum minuere ac supprimere; militem hostilitem, in territorio suo hospitantem, concidere; diribitoria hostium disturbare, et ubicunque fieri posset, tum exigendo tributum, tum urbes, arces, ac loca situ commoda occupando, præsidiove militari firmando, quinimò, si daretur occasio, personas eorum in potestatem redigendo, noxam illis inferre ac detrimentum.

6. Si, a rege clade affecti aut profligati in landgravii confiniis receptum quærerent, penitùs eos dissipare ac disjicere; ne coire illic locorum, aut gradum denuò firmare ullatenùs possent.

7. Comites, nobiles, alios quoscunque, seu fines ejus inhabitarent, seu extra fines haberent domicilium, vasallos, cum equestribus, ad quæ intuitu possessorum feudorum obstricti, servitiis, quotiescunque necessitas exigeret, ad regis postulatum & commune utriusque placitum convocare; imo subditos, ficubi videretur, viritim ad arma concire, militarive illorum opera, sub regis imperio uti. Quo in articulo rex landgravio

landgravio vice versa cavit: Si forte vasalli aut refractarii existerent, aut moratores, affore illi ope sua, in ordinem eos redacturum, pro hostibus habiturum, & privationis poenam exsecutioni adversùs commeritos daturum; ita quidem, ut landgravio tanquam domino directo, dominium sartum, tectum maneret; utilitas vero, seu reditus feudorum fisco & communi ærario inferrentur. Ubi tamen præstitutum scopum attigissent, aut maturiùs forsan, si inter utrumque de eo conveniret, utile quoque dominium ad dominum directum redundaturum, et cum proprietate consolidatum; landgravium autem a rege hoc in casu propugnatum, nec cuiquam, ejus ingratiis, veniam admissi concessum iri.

8. Cautum, ut neuter ab altero, sumtuum, qui bello gerendo, aut munitionibus exstruendis impenderentur, nomine, quicquam præter id, de quo expresse conventum, poscceret, sed uterque conventionis legibus, et communi ærario, brevi instituendo, acquiescerent: pacta quoque hæc reliquis omnibus fœderibus, quæ cum aliis magnatibus, electorumque ac principum familiis essent inita (si hi forte alterutri fœderatorum, hujus fœderis & piæ intentionis, animo illis propositæ, intuitu, hostes redderentur, aut ipsa fœdera, ut contraria, invicem se destruerent) quantum ipsorum scopum attinet, præferrentur, nec vetustiorum fœderum respectu alter ab altero resilire, nec nova, huic adversantia contrahere animum induceret.

9. Si rex landgravii munimenta, majoris securitatis ergò, novis adjectis operibus, munitiora reddi, è re communi arbitraretur, landgravius non permitteret hoc modò, sed subditos quoque, inevitabili necessitate flagitante, compelleret ad manus operi admovendum.

10. Regiis copiis landgravii ditionem transeuntibus, & illic divertentibus, pedes candelâ & ligno, eques stramine & fœno, serviturum, quæ vocant, nomine præbitis, contenti, nulla ulterioris flagitationis molestiâ hospites vexarent: modò alia sustentationis media in promtu forent. Extra vero hunc casum, & in hostico, alimenta sua exinde, secundùm commune utriusque arbitrium, miles quæreret.

11. Si in landgravii territorio militum diribitoria instituere ratio boni publici necessariò exigeret, id quod landgravium æquo passurum animo: ultra duos tamen cum dimidio avenæ modios in equos singulos, unà cum sex straminis mergitibus, & fœni vehe, ipsisque equitibus, equitumve ductoribus, cujuscunque conditionis, loco alimentorum, ultra duos Joachimicos, usque ad armilustrium, quot mensibus minimè præbitum iri.

12. Rege arma in Austriam, aut aliàs in hosticum transferente, et hostem illic, ne fœderatorum terras infestare posset,

occupante, landgravium tot militum millibus, quot ſecuritate propria ſalva liceret, ſubſidio ei affuturum; militemve hunc communi utriuſque impensâ ſuſtentandum.

13. Quod ſi a rege unum, alterumve locum, extra illa, que pertinerent ad landgravium, aut in quibus jus aliquod haberet, expugnari contingeret, regi, donec de expenſis eidem ſatisfieret, landgravium in manibus illa relicturum, & ne adverſarii rurſus evincerent, ſedulam unà cum rege daturum operam.

14. Controverſiâ aut lite intær federatos ſubortâ, duos a rege arbitros, & totidem neutri parti obnoxios, a landgravio nominandos; qui de tertio conveniant. Horum fidei negotium committendum: propoſita pactorum formulâ, & in medium adductis, quæ cauſæ deciſioni facere videantur. Quicquid autem hi æquum judicaverint, eo utrumque contentum fore, & acquieturum.

15. De transfugio utrinque conventum: ne quis alterius ductores, equites, pedites, aut facinoroſos etiam, transfugientes, in ſtipendia ſua reciperet, aut ullatenus toleraret; ſed ſi quis ejus notæ, ubiubi tandem, ſeu intra ſeu extra juriſdictionis terminos, deprehenderetur, cujuscunque ordinis aut dignationis, in vincula conjicerent, deliteſcentes quoque ſumma induſtria, quantum pote, indagarent, alter alterum de iis redderent certiores, & comprehenſos pœnis militaribus afficerent. Subditos autem, ſi qui, criminis hujus rei, pœnæ ſe ſubtrahere effugio niterentur, honorum, tribuum, jurium omnium ac bonorum privatione quiſque eorum mulctaret, nec ullum, niſi alterius conſenſu, in integrum reſtitueret. Demum, ultimo, landgravius pollicebatur, primo quoque tempore contra ſubditos ac vaſallos ſuos, hoſti ſtipendia merentes, acerrima promulgare mandata avocatoria, confiſcationis bonorum, tam allodialium, quam feudalium, amiſſionis inſuper vitæ ac honoris pœnâ præſtitutâ: illaque ſtricte & rigide exſequi, ſi unus alterve, cujuſcunque dignitatis aut conditionis, morem his gerere differret, præterlabi pateretur.

Werbenæ, pridié Iduum Auguſti, 1631.

XXIV.

## XXIV.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, Dei gratia Suecorum, Gothorum, Vandalorumque Rex, magnus Princeps Finlandiæ, Dux Eſtoniæ et Careliæ, nec non Ingriæ Dominus, Sereniſſimo & Potentiſſimo Principi Domino CAROLO Dei gratia Magnæ Britanniæ.

SERENISSIME princeps, frater, conſanguine & amice chariſſime. Cumque ſerenitatis veſtræ in rem communem et ergà nos conſtans propenſio eſt; certi ſumus ex illis, quæ nobis proſperè, et bono periclitantis rei Chriſtianæ evenirent, ſerenitatem veſtram partem ſibi quoque ſumere, intermittere noluimus, quin de memorabili quam divina benignitas nobis (hiſce diebus) largita eſt victoriâ, vos certiores rederemus. Poſtquàm armis noſtris ſua elector Saxoniæ junxit, nobis cum utroque exercitu contra hoſtem progreſſis, hoſtilis exercitus generalis illius univerſas copias ſuas è caſtris Lypſicis ad Mileſimum lapidem eductas, ſeptimâ die Septembris oppoſuit. Prælio incepto magnâ contentione per 4 amplius horas res utrimque acta eſt, donec ſingulari Dei beneficio, hoſtilis exercitus (virtute indefeſsâ noſtrorum) in fugam verſus diſſipatuſque eſt; noſtris fugientem ſub mœnia uſque urbis proſequis, tormenta ac res armamentariæ hoſtis nobis ceſſeret erepta ei vexilla derelicta à conturbato ad Lypſica caſtra cum impedimentis. Generalis accepto vulnere in epiſcopatum Halberſtadenſem diſceſſit; iis, quos deinceps inſequi ſumus gratiæ noſtræ et militiæ relictis. Occiſi ex hoſtibus in loco pugnæ jacuere plurimi, cum illis generalis vigilum, aliique apud hoſtem præfecti. Inter captivorum aliquot millia dux Holſtatiæ, & ex præcipuis alii, quorum ſucceſſuum laudes cum Deo optimo maximo tanquam authori debeantur, ejuſque divinæ benignitati tribuendum meritò ſit quod nunc non ſolum illa tot millium votis hactenus expetita reſtituendæ religionis et libertatis ſpes, ſed et erigendi afflictam regis Bohemiæ cauſam facilitas affulgeat. Non diffidimus quin ſerenitas veſtra non tantum gaudio et affectu proſequendam hanc victoriam, ſed etiam tam pulchrâ occaſione utendum, et omnia huc deinceps conferenda eſſe judicatura, atque ipſi rei Chriſtianæ ſuorumque ſaluti, heroicis ſuis conſiliis auxiliiſque conſultura regio ſtudio ſit. In nobis amplius aliquid deſiderari non patiemur, ſerenitatem vero veſtram divinæ protectioni ad auſpicata rerum omnium incrementa commendamus. Dat Halæ Saxonum, 13 Sept. 1631.

Bonus frater et conſanguineus,
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.

## XXV.

The famous *Armiſtice*, or *Treaty of Neutrality*, accorded by GUSTAVUS, at the interceſſion of France, to the *Princes of the League*.

[N. B. Having never been able to ſee the original of this treaty, we have thought it more proper to give the Engliſh tranſlation thereof, made in the year 1632, than render into modern language the French tranſlation, publiſhed in the ſame year, and preſerved by the author of the *Mercure François* (tom. xviii. p. 135, &c.); ſince that ed. only proves to be the verſion of a verſion, and might depart ſtill more and more from the firſt meaning.]

HIS ſacred majeſty of Sweden, taking ſpecial notice of the deſire which the duke of Bavaria and the Catholic Leaguers have for obtaining a Neutrality; although, by their making themſelves parties with the emperor in the wars, they have deſerved nothing of him but hoſtility: yet upon the earneſt interceſſion of the moſt chriſtian king, preſented by his ambaſſadors, and to teſtify withal his own brotherly affection unto him; he is contented to conclude the Neutrality upon theſe following conditions:

1. Let this Neutrality be religiouſly and inviolably kept with his ſacred majeſty of Sweden, his kingdoms, dominions and ſubjects, as well thoſe that are hereditary to him, as thoſe that have in Germany been conquered by him: as alſo with his confederates, the electors, princes, nobles, cities, commonwealths, commonalties, and ſtates, and with the elector of Saxony in particular; by the duke of Bavaria and his aſſociates the catholic princes and ſtates of Germany: who ſhall alſo give ſufficient caution unto his majeſty, for the ſure keeping of it.

2. Let the ſaid duke of Bavaria, and the catholic princes of Germany his confederates, forbear all acts of injury and hoſtility, both towards his ſacred majeſty of Sweden, his army and dominions now in his poſſeſſion, and towards his confederates the evangelical electors, princes, earls, nobles, cities, commonalties, ſtates, and all other evangelical profeſſors of what condition ſoever; and let them not by their ſoldiers be troubleſome hereafter unto them in their dominions, upon any pretext whatſoever, nor ſuffer them to be diſturbed by any forces of the emperor's.

3. Let the duke of Bavaria, and the ſaid catholic princes of Germany, as many as are of the League, reſtore unto the evangelical princes and ſtates, of what condition ſoever, all and ſingular ſtrengths, fortreſſes, caſtles, cities, territories and

and countries how many ſoever, which in all the time of this war, begun in the year 1618, they have taken and kept from the evangelics in the Lower Saxony: and leave them in the ſame ſtate they were in, before the beginning of the war.

4. Let the duke of Bavaria, with the catholic princes of Germany his confederates, withdraw all their armies out of the countries of the evangelical electors, princes, and ſtates, ſo ſoon as may be; ſending for the ſoldiers into their own territories.

5. Let the army of the duke of Bavaria, and of the catholic princes of Germany his confederates, be reduced to the number of 10,000 or 12,000 men: all the reſt being preſently caſhiered. Which army, let it be diſtributed and enquartered here and there among the cities and proper dominions of the ſaid princes, and not be kept together in one entire body.

6. The duke of Bavaria, and his aſſociates the ſaid catholic princes of Germany, ſhall not with the ſaid ſoldiers (being either caſhiered, or diſtributed among their territories) give aſſiſtance, either openly or underhand, unto the emperor or any other prince, enemy unto his ſacred majeſty of Sweden.

7. Nor let the duke of Bavaria, and his confederates the catholic princes of Germany, give leave unto the houſe of Auſtria or any other whatſoever enemy of his ſacred majeſty of Sweden, to raiſe ſoldiers, appoint places of muſter or rendezvous, buy up arms, or make any other military proviſions within their dominions: but let them every where obſerve an inviolate and ſincere Neutrality.

8. Let all their paſſages be without deceit either open to either party, or ſhut up, as it ſhall be agreed upon: provided it be without all injury and damage unto the owner.

9. His ſacred majeſty of Sweden, with his confederates, in like manner ſhall in no ways offend the duke of Bavaria, nor any prince or ſtate of the Catholic League, whoſe dominions he is not yet maſter of, excepting only the biſhop of Bamberg; nor ſhall he lay any other kind of military impoſitions upon them, but ſhall keep and obſerve a ſincere neutrality with them.

10. All thoſe places of the Lower Palatinate whatſoever, now taken away from the duke of Bavaria, will his ſacred majeſty reſtore unto the ſaid duke of Bavaria again, until, by the mediation of the kings of Great Britain and France, there be ſome friendly compoſition made betwixt the duke and the prince Palatine, for which ſome ſhort day ſhall be appointed. So likewiſe will his majeſty reſtore unto the archbiſhops of

Triers

Triers and Cologn, whatſoever places are taken from them, the city of Spiers, and the places now remaining unto it, being left* intire unto itſelf.

11. All other countries and places of the catholic princes and ſtates (beſides thoſe forenamed) already poſſeſſed by his ſacred majeſty, ſhall not the duke of Bavaria, nor the catholic princes of Germany his confederates, make demand of again, in any kind, either by themſelves or by others, but ſhall leave them in his majeſty's hands until ſome general treaty.

12. All ſtates, princes, earls, nobles, cities, and commonalties, evangelical, whoſoever will, may be under the protection of his ſacred majeſty of Sweden; nor ſhall they to the prejudice of the ſaid protection be diſturbed any manner of way, either directly or indirectly, by the ſaid catholic princes of Germany.

13. Let all commerce with his ſacred majeſty of Sweden, his ſubjects and evangelical confederates, on the one party, and with the duke of Bavaria and the catholic princes of Germany his confederates, on the other party, be free and open every where, and no ways hindered.

14. Let all priſoners on both ſides be delivered without ranſom; and in particular, let the adminiſtrator of Magdeburg, taken by Tilly, be forthwith ſet at liberty without prejudice.

15. For the better ſecurity, ſhall the moſt chriſtian king of France engage his royal word that the duke of Bavaria, and all other catholic princes, ſtates, and cities of Germany, his confederates, ſhall religiouſly obſerve this neutrality in all the articles of it; which if they ſhall infringe, then ſhall he declare himſelf for his ſacred majeſty of Sweden, and fall with all his power upon the violaters, until he hath compelled them unto ſatisfaction.

## XXVI.

### The Subſcription of the French Ambaſſadors to the *Treaty of Neutrality.**

NOUS ſoubſignez ambaſſadeurs de tres-chreſtien roy de France, ſçavoir faiſons, que le ſereniſſime & treſ-puiſſant prince & ſeigneur Guſtave Adolphe par la grace de Dieu roy de Suede, &c. ayant voulou comprendre dans le traicté

* *Salvâ civitate Spirenſi, ſibique relictâ.*

* Merc. Franç. tom. xviii. p. 139, &c.

public

publie de la neutralité avec l'electeur de Baviere, & la ligue catholique, que tout ce qui avoit eſté pris par droict de guerre par les dits electeurs & ligue catholique, ſur les princes & eſtats proteſtans & evangelique tant en la haute Allemagne qu'en la Baſſe Saxe, & qui eſt occupée par les garriſons des dits duc de Baviere & la ligue catholique, ſeroit rendu à tous les ſeigneurs & precedens poſſeſſeurs evangeliques: nous, pour eviter certains ſcrupules qui euſſent peu en provenir, & apporter difficulté, à l'entretenement du traicté de la dite neutralité, avons de faire retrencher des articles du dit traicté, la caution & l'aſſeurance promiſe au nom du roy tres-chreſtien noſtre ſeigneur, & que nonobſtant cette clauſe tout ce qui avoit eſté pri par droict de guerre & eſtoit occupé par les garriſons du duc de Baviere & de la ligue catholique, ſur les prince & eſtats evangeliques & proteſtans, comme s'il eſtoit nommement ſtipulé & accordé par les actes du dit traicté, ſeroit rendu, & reſtitué auſdits evangeliques & proteſtans, auſquels il auroit eſté oſté: & pourtant nous promettons au nom du roy tres-chreſtien noſtre ſeigneur, que ſa dite majeſté royale fera en ſorte, que la reſtitution deſdits lieux pris par droict de guerre ſur les princes & eſtats evangeliques, ſera faite tout ainſi que ſi le meſme avoit eſté promis par les articles de la neutralité: excepté toutes fois les lieux & places qui auparavant appartenoient au duc de Baviere en l'un & l'autre Palatinat. En foy de quoy, &c.

A Mayence le 19 de Jan. 1632, St. Vet.

## XXVII.

The KING's Letter to GUSTAVUS HORN (and probably to all his other Generals) concerning *the Armiſtice*.*

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, by the grace of God king of the Swedes, &c. Right truſty and well-beloved, &c. We will not conceal from you, how that the king of France hath made a kind, brotherly ſuit unto us, by his ambaſſadors, for a neutrality betwixt us, and the elector of Bavaria and the catholic league. Foraſmuch as we have thereupon framed certain articles, and delivered the ſame to the ſaid ambaſſadors, who have promiſed to bring us, within the ſpace of fourteen days, a plain declaration and confirmation thereupon; and in the mean while, by virtue of their power to take order, that Pappenheim ſhall forthwith withdraw himſelf with his troops out of Weſtphalia and the biſhoprick

* From the copy printed in London 1632, 4to.—*Mercure François*, tom. xviii. p. 134.

of

of Magdeburg, and likewiſe, that the forces of the electors of Bavaria and of the catholic league, ſhould forthwith be called and drawn out of Bohemia, if any there ſhould be. For this reaſon, and for the furtherance of ſuch a work, and to gratify withal our ſaid good brother the king of France, We have thought good to yield them ſo ſmall a time, and to abſtain from all hoſtility, during the ſaid fourteen days, againſt the ſaid catholic league and the duke of Bavaria; if ſo be that (according to the ſaid promiſe) they do behave themſelves in like manner, withdraw their forces, and uſe no hoſtility againſt us; whereof We do hereby give you notice: and withal do will and command you forthwith to publiſh this ſaid ceſſation of arms for fourteen days throughout the army which you do command (to which end we have diſpatched this trumpet unto you) and thereupon to ceaſe and abſtain from all hoſtility, pillage, robbing, and other deeds of enmity againſt the ſaid elector of Bavaria and the catholic league, and during the ſaid time to remain quiet.* But yet we have expreſsly excepted (as the ſaid ambaſſadors do know) and we do intend, that ſuch towns, places, and caſtles, which are now by us beſieged and blocked up, ſhall ſo remain beſieged and blocked up; and that the beſieged ſhall have liberty during the ſaid time, to treat, conclude, and compound with us, to deliver up the ſaid places, and to depart from thence according to the agreement that ſhall be made with them. This you are to obſerve, and to govern yourſelf accordingly. And if ſome one or other place be at this preſent by you beſieged, or blocked up, you are by no means to remove or depart from the ſame, but rather to continue and finiſh the deſign, with all your beſt endeavours, as being a thing no ways contrary unto the ſaid ceſſation of arms by us granted, &c. Given at Hoëchſt the 10th of January 1631.

* Pourvuque le duc de Bavière ſe comporte de meſme. *Merc. Franç.*

## XXVIII.

TRAICTÉ de Louis XIII. roy de France, &c. avec Philippes Christofle archevesque de Treves, electeur & evesque de Spire: Par lequel le roy s'oblige d'assister ledit electeur, contre ceux qui le voudront opprimer; *& de plus, de faire sortir desdits archéveché & evéché les gens de guerre du roy de* Suede. A Ehrenbreitstein, l'an 1632, le 9 Avril.

NOS Philippus Christophorus Dei gratia archiepiscopus Trevirensis, ac princeps elector, episcopus Spirensis, administrator Prumiensis perpetuus, & præpositus Weissemburgensis, & Ludovicus de Brianson de la Saludie, magister de campo christianissimæ regiæ majestatis Franciæ, cum plenipotentia missus legatus; notum facimus atque fatemur: postquàm christianissima regia majestas se intra sereniss imum & potentissimum regem Sueciæ, ac sereniss imos, illustriss imos ac reverendiss imos electores principes, aliosque catholicæ unionis status, pro salute ac pace publica in Germania reintegranda ac restabilienda uti mediatorem, fide jussorem ac sponsorem interposuit, illa intentione ut neutralitas in regiam majestatem Sueciæ, & prædictos unionis catholicæ status erigeretur, quæ neutralitas à parte utraque non fuerit conclusa, approbata & confirmata, sed potius contrariis factis cassata, ideirco nos cum regiæ majestatis Franciæ legato supradicto, sequentes pacis articulos conclusimus, approbavimus, sigillisque nostris & manuum subscriptione munivimus, sequentis tenoris.

1. Nos Philippus Christophorus archiepiscopus Trevirensis & princeps elector, in manus & custodiam christianissimæ regiæ majestatis Galliarum fortalitium de Ehrenbreitstein nostræ archidiœcesis Trevirensis primum deponemus eo usque donec pax generalis in Germania sit concluса; ex tunc enim christianissima regia majestatis militem abducat, ac dictum fortalitium in liberas nostras nostrorumque successorum manus in eo statu quo tempore depositionis inductionisque militis fuit, iterum tradat & restituat.

2. Pro qua custodia & assistentia christianissima regia majestas mille peditum & centum equitum selectorum Gallorum mittet, ut ingrediantur supradictum fortalitium.

3. Qua militia ita introducta ex Christianissimæ majestatis permissione & mandato, quod in simul transmittetur nobis jurabit.

4. Rogamus

4. Rogamus tamen chriſtianiſſimam regiam majeſtatem, ut eadem propter devaſtationem modernam archiepiſcopatus Trevirenſis, ad ſuſtinendum militem tertiam partem expenſarum & ſtipendiorum eo uſque exſolvere dignetur donec ſubditi noſtri contributiones neceſſarias præbere poſſint & valeant.

5. Et ad ſtatim atque depoſitum fuerit ſupra nominatum fortalitium, chriſtianiſſima regia majeſtas ex archiepiſcopatu Trevirenſi exturbabit, expulſabitque non ſolum copias regiæ majeſtatis Sueciæ, ſed & omnes alias quas tum inveniat; in quem effectum expreſſam ordinantiam ante ingreſſum pro majori aſſecuratione oſtendet, curabitque & omnia loca ſatrapiæ, civitates, pagi & territoria occupata quantocius deoccupentur, milites in totum abducantur, ac ad liberas noſtras manus tradantur; ac conditione ut iiſdem in locis ceſſis, aut deoccupatis nos uti ante occupationem diſponere, proprioque militi ibidem quarterium abſque ullo impedimento concedere poſſimus.

6. Eadem regia majeſtas chriſtianiſſima non ſolum prædicto modo noſtrum fortalitium Ehrenbreitſtein cuſtodiat, ſed etiam nobis noſtriſque ſubditis, contra hoſtilitates, oppreſſiones offenſioneſque reali aſſiſtentia ſuccurret, omnia quartiria & preſſuras avertet, omnibuſque quibus poteſt modis ac viis defendet.

7. Quo in caſu chriſtianiſſima majeſtas ex regia liberalitate ſumptus expendet, nec à nobis pluſquam ſubditi territoriumque noſtrum Trevirenſe in commeatu præſtare poſſint poſtulabit, neque ullam aliam actionem contra noſtram archidiœceſin, nos ac ſucceſſores noſtros in futurum prætendet.

8. Et quam primum fortalitium Ehrenbreitſtein prædicto modo cuſtoditum, & reliqua juxta articulos præmiſſos aſſecurata fuerint, tunc ſupra poſitis conditionibus eodemque plane modo nos fortalitium noſtrum Philipſburgum in chriſtianiſſimæ majeſtatis manus depoſitum, mille peditibus & centum equitibus ſelectis intromiſſis, quoque trademus; ita tamen ut ſupradicto modo totus epiſcopatus Spirenſis, ac omnia loca ſatrapiæ, civitates, pagi, & territoria ex tunc quantocius à regia majeſtate Sueciæ ejuſque adhærentibus deoccupentur, milites in totum abducantur, ac ad liberas noſtras manus tradantur, hoc modo ut nos iiſdem in locis ceſſis & deoccupatis uti ante occupationem diſponere, proprioque militi ibidem quartirium abſque ullo impedimento concedere poſſimus.

9. Eadem quoque chriſtianiſſima regia majeſtas non ſolum, uti predictum noſtrum fortalitium Philipſburgum cuſtodiet, ſed etiam nobis noſtriſque ſubditis contra hoſtilitates oppreſſioneſque quaſcunque reali aſſiſtentia ſuccurret, omniaque

quartiria & preſſuras avertet, omnibuſque quibus poteſt modis ac viis defendet.

10. Hæc tamen cum clauſula ut in utroque fortalitio cum aulicis noſtris, ordinaria guardia & cancellaria noſtra prolibitu noſtro manere, ibique rebus noſtris vacare poſſimus.

11. Ulterius caſu quo metropolis noſtra civitas Trevirenſis à milite regiæ majeſtatis Sueciæ occuparetur, tunc illa ad manus noſtras mediante chriſtianiſſima majeſtate tradenda erit, ac in eandem nullum aliud præſidium quam noſtrum prædicto modo plane iiſdem ſub conditionibus introducatur de ſuſtentetur.

12. Ultimo tranſitus omnes utrique parti militanti ſine fraude ſint aperti, ſine injuria & damno proprietarii.

Igitur nos Philippus Chriſtophorus archiepiſcopus Trevirenſis ac princeps elector promittimus obſervare, & obſervari facere ſincerè, realiter & cum effectu, abſque aliqua ſiniſtra interpretatione, & ego Ludovicus de Brianſon Baro de la Saludie, magiſter de campo chriſtianiſſimæ regiæ majeſtatis cum plenipotentia legatus miſſus, prædictos articulos nomine ejuſdem chriſtianiſſimæ majeſtatis totidem verbis pro more ſtipulatus ſum, polliceorque me certò effecturum chriſtianiſſimam regiam majeſtatem omnes & ſingulos articulos & conditiones, uti & hanc noſtram concluſionem, ſubſcriptionem ac ſigillationem, manu propria & ſigillo regio confirmaturam, realique aſſiſtentia adimpleturam. In quorum fidem has præſentes propriis manibus ſubſcripſimus, & ſigillo noſtro communivimus.

Acta conventaque hæc omnia in fortalitio noſtro Ehrenbreitſteiniano, die nona menſis Aprilis, 1632, ainſi ſigné, Philippus Chriſtophorus archiepiſcopus Trevirenſis, & la Saludie, avec le cachet dudit ſieur electeur.

XXIX.

## XXIX.

### ODE ſur la Mort du GRAND GUSTAVE.

Par M. *Arnaud d'Andilly.*

I.

PLUS vîte que l'eclair, plus craint que le tonnere
Portant avec moi la terreur & la mort,
J'ay paſsé comme un Mars des rivage du nord,
Par tout où m'appelloit la juſtice & la guerre.

II.

L'Allemagne m'a vû briſer comme du verre
Tout ce qui s'opoſoit à mon puiſſant effort;
Et mon ſecours fatal lui ſervit de ſuport
Lorſqu'il ne ſembloit plus qu'elle en eût ſur la terre.

III.

Le plus ſage au conſeil, le premier aux hazards;
Mes vertus ont terni le luſtre des Céſars,
Et rendu l'univers étonné de ma gloire.

Quel ſiècle vit jamais un ſi grand conquérant?
Vivant j'ay triomphé, je triomphe en mourant,
Et choiſis pour tombeau le champ de ma victoire.

---

TRANSLATED

By E. S. B.

SWIFT as the lightning, direful as the roll,
Around me ſpreading pale diſmay and blood,
I croſs'd the ſtreams that bind the icy Pole,
And won'dring nations hail'd me great and good.

Germania ſaw me, 'midſt her loud alarms,
Extermine all who dar'd my arms oppoſe;
Beheld me aid her with my fatal arms,
When aid ſeem'd vain, and hope was at its cloſe.

Diſcreet in council, ardent in the ſtrife,
My tow'ring virtues, Cæſar, tarniſh thine;
The world, aſtoniſh'd, views my glorious life;
What age can boaſt a victor ſo divine!

In death, as life, my triumph is attain'd;
I chuſe my tomb beneath the fields I gain'd.

# INDEX.

*N. B. Articles with these marks* * † ‡ § ‖ *after them, refer to the* Notes. *When figures follow* i. and ii. they refer to the reſpective volume.

## A.


*ADMINISTRATOR* of Magdeburg, i. 332.‡—Treats with GUSTAVUS, 274.—Well received by his people, 275.—Behaves gallantly during the ſiege, 336.—His bold ſpeech to TILLY - - - - - - - - - 337.

——— carried over the empire as a trophy, ii. 97.—Ungrateful to Sweden, and turns catholic, 139.—Attempts to reconcile GUSTAVUS and the Emperor - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 280

——— of Wirtemberg, treats with the Swedes, ii. 49.—Acts againſt Montecuculi - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 315.

*Ainſa* (don Joſeph) protects Theodanus and his wife, i. 347.—Killed - ii. 40.

*Albert* (prince of Poland) made biſhop of Warmia at twelve years old- i. 119.

*Aldringer* (John baron de) leads an army to join TILLY, ii. 3.—Account of his riſe and parts, ibid, &c.*—Unites with TILLY, 75.—Behaves gallantly at the battle of the Lech, 203.—His temples grazed by a cannon ball, ibid.—Overreaches GUSTAVUS by ſtratagem, 284.—Hiſtoriographer of the empire, Eſſay, xlviii.—Originally a valet de chambre - - - - - - Eſſay, liv.

*Aligheri*, conſpires againſt the king's life, i. 265, 266.—Has not courage to ſhoot him, ibid.—Eſcapes at Damin, 300.—Killed at Magdeburg - - 336.

*Altenberg*, (ſee Battles) attended with no one event - - - - ii. 292.

*Ambuſcades*. See Stratagems.

*Ancr*, a Saxon lieutenant, enters Francfort by ſcalado; well rewarded i. 309.

*Anhalt*, (Lewis prince of) made governor of Halle, &c. - - - - ii. 53.

——— (Erneſt) killed at Lützen - - - - - - - - — 373.

——— (Caſpar) grand maſter of the Teutonic order, flies - - - - — 59.

——— (princes of) treat with the king - - - - - - - - — 46.

*Anhaltine*, cancellaria, a book ſo called, and why? - - i. 203, — 134.

*Anholt*, (count) not to be confounded with Anhalt - - - - i. 231.†

*Anſtruther* (ſir Robert) ambaſſador to GUSTAVUS, i. 83, and Ferdinand the ſecond, 231.—In the Daniſh intereſts, 83.—Appears at Ratiſbon, and performs little, 233, 234, &c. 239, 376, ii. 130.—His abject oration at Vienna i. 236, 238.

*Appelman*, a Dantzic admiral, killed - - - - - - - - i. 150.

*Archers*, why uſed by GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - - — 149.

*Armies* (great ones) diſliked by GUSTAVUS, d'Alva, and Turenne, Eſſay, xxxviii.—Falſely encouraged by the French and Engliſh - - - - Eſſay, xxxix.

*Armiſtice*, of 14 days, ii. 156.—Its hiſtory - - - - - 156 & 158.

*Army* (Engliſh auxiliary) its number, i. 377.—Alarms Germany unduly, ibid.—Ill troops, that ſoon dwindled to nothing - - - - - - 390.

——— (Saxon) too fantaſtic in dreſs - - - - - - - ii. 13.

——— (Swediſh) remarks on its excellence - - - - - i. 210, &c.

*Arnheim* (John George) general and prime director to the elector of Saxony, inſincere to the Polanders, i. 172, 181.—Full account of his artifices, hiſtory, and character, 327, 328.*—Receives ſtrange orders from WALSTEIN about driving GUSTAVUS out of Poland, 172.—Withdraws his army, 181.—Joins Conoſpoliſki, and fights GUSTAVUS, 174, &c.—Negociates with GUSTAVUS, ii. 7, &c.—Suſpected as a ſoldier, 12.—As a ſtateſman, 48.—His fine retreat, ibid.

—Receives

—Receives vaſt rewards to become falſe, 329.—Overreaches Dubalt, 330.—His baſeneſs after the king's death, ibid.—Writes a ſuſpicious letter, 329.—Fearful to ſell his maſter, ibid.—Inſincere to Sweden in Bohemia, 232—and Sileſia, 302, 303, 304, 305.—Confers with OXENSTIERN at the diet of Torgau - - - - - - - - - - - - - 242.

*Arquebuſe a croc*; a ſort of muſquet about ten feet long, with a reſt or hook to faſten it.

*Articles* between GUSTAVUS and HAMILTON, App. V. - - 461. 463.

—— de confederation entre le Roy de Suede et le Duc de Pomeranie, App. IX. 470.

*Artillery*, the great quantity GUSTAVUS poſſeſſed, i. 225.—Leathern; ſee No. III. *Military Excellencies*; under the *Art.* GUSTAVUS.

*Auchi* (baron de) Spaniſh ambaſſador traverſes GUSTAVUS in Poland, i. 152, 153, &c.

*Augsburg*; its confeſſion - - - - - - - - - - ii. 212.*

*Auſtria*; rebellion of the peaſants there - - Eſſay, lx. ii. 299, &c.

*Auſtrians* encouraged Sigiſmond originally, i. 97.—Send him military aſſiſtances, 147, 189.—Ruined their affairs by diſbanding their veterans, 290, &c.—Again, ii. 38.—And after the peace of Utrecht - - - - - - ibid.‡

B.

*Bagni* (Cardinal) negotiates between France and Bavaria - - ii. 134.

*Bamberg*, a prelate of duplicity - - - - - - - - - — 59.

*Banier* reſcues GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - - - i. 96.

—— (John) knighted for his bravery, i. 111.—Commands a part of the fleet, 216.—Takes Dam, 259, and Gripſwald, 352, &c.—Blockades Wolgaſt, 265.—Aſſiſts at the treaty of Bernwalt, 294, &c.—Treats Hamilton haughtily, 386.—Blockades Magdeburg - - - - - - - - - ibid, &c.

—— Joins GUSTAVUS before the battle of Leipſic, ii. 12.—The heroiſm of his wife, 245.—His fine retreat, 251 and 295.†—Shot in the arm, 283.—Loved from a child by the king, and why? 303.—A conſummate general, 295.†—His whimſical marriage, ibid.—Raiſes the ſiege of Rayne - - - 344.

*Baptista* (John) beheaded for conſpiring againſt the king's life - - i. 265.

*Barre* (le) his hiſtory commended, ii. 174.‡—Highly commended - 352.‡

*Battaglia* (ſerjeant major di battaglia) his office and employment Eſſay, xlv.*

BATTLES.

—— between GUSTAVUS and young Sapieha - - - - i. 127.

—— between the ſame and old Sapieha at Walhoff - - - — 126.

—— between GUSTAVUS and Sigiſmond near Dirſchau - - — 138, &c.

—— Again - - - - - - - - - - - — 146.

—— Of Mew - - - - - - - - - - — 138, &c.

—— between GUSTAVUS and Conoſpoliſki - - - - — 149, &c.

—— Again at Marienverder - - - - - - — 174, &c.

—— Again - - - - - - - - - - — 180, &c.

—— two fought by Wrangle - - - - - - - — 156.

—— of Colbergen, ſtrangely circumſtanced - - - — 281, &c.

—— of Werben - - - - - - - - - — 371, 374.

—— of Leipſic - - - - - - - - - ii. 28. 40.

—— of Bamberg - - - - - - - - - — 179, &c.

—— of the Lech - - - - - - - - - — 196, 203.

—— of Freyſtadt - - - - - - - - - — 273, &c.

—— Altenberg - - - - - - - - - - — 284.

—— of Lignitz - - - - - - - - - - — 303.

—— of Maeſtricht - - - - - - - - - — 309.

—— Lützen - - - - - - - - - - — 355.

—— (Sea) between the Swedes and Dantzickers - - i. 148, 150, 155.

*Bavaria* (Maximilian, elector) not over-reached by France, i. 183.—Wanted to procure the whole Palatine library, 133, &c.—Some account of him, 250.*—a politician of the firſt claſs, 201.—Wrote Latin extremely well, 250.—His vaſt expences at the diet of Ratiſbon, 231.—Helps to degrade Walſtein, 250, &c.—Receives a letter from Pappenheim - - - - - 312.

*Bavaria* (Maximilian, elector)
——— Holds a diet at Ingoldſtadt, ii. 147.—Deſerts France, ibid.—Declines acting vigorouſly at the battle of the Lech, 204.—His artful manifeſto, 234.—Flies from the king at Munich, 224.—Enters the upper Palatinate, 249.—Diſſembles with Wallſtein, 336.—Complains of his vaſt expences - - ibid.
——— (Albert, duke of) treats fruitleſsly with the king - - ii. 214.
*Bauditzen*, makes a miſtake in a battle, i. 371, &c.—His bravery, ibid. and at Werben, ibid.—Storms Piritz, 295, and Werben, 364.—Takes Colbergen, 302.—Diſcovers an aſſaſſin againſt GUSTAVUS - - - - - - 369.
——— His fortunate marriage, ii. 54.‡—Diſgraced for plundering, 55.—His campaign in Lower Saxony, 313, &c.—Flies before Pappenheim, 334.—Compelled to raiſe the ſiege of Paderborn - - - - - - - - ibid.
*Baumgarten* (an imperial general) killed at Leipſic - - - - ii. 39.
*Birkenfelt* (Palatine of) commands when the king left Bavaria, ii. 331. 340.—Retakes Landſberg - - - - - - - - - - 344.
*Bernardi* (ſecretary to Tilly) treats with the Saxons, ii. 5.—Taken priſoner, 40.
*Bernſtein* (colonel) a brave officer, killed - - - - - - - i. 367.
*Bethlem* (Gabriel) brings the Turks on Poland, i. 97.—His capriciouſneſs, bizarrery, and unaccountable hiſtory, 213.†—Betrays the elector Palatine - 244.
*Blackſmith* (boldneſs of one) made burgomaſter of Landſberg - - i. 318.
*Boetius* (colonel) fortifies Colbergen - - - - - - - — 302.
——— killed at the battle of Altenberg - - - - - - ii. 289.
*Bohemia* (king). See Elector Palatine.
——— (queen). See Electreſs Palatine.
*Botvid*, firſt chaplain to GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - i. 140.
*Brahé*, (Tycho) his predictions concerning GUSTAVUS - i. 89.† ii. 341.
——— (count) behaves well at Dirſchau - - - - - - i. 137.
*Brandeis*, defends Hanau well - - - - - - - - ii. 82.
*Brandenburg* (George William elector of) his character, i. 103.†—Allowed by GUSTAVUS ſix months to conſider, 158.—Has a private interview with him, 321.—Again, 351, &c.—Makes difficulties about Cuſtrin and Spandau, 321.—Matters compoſed by the ladies, 321, 322.—Pleads poverty, 229.—Privately favours GUSTAVUS, 131.—Yet ſhy and cold, 321.—Re-demands Spandau, 350.—Sends Arnheim to treat - - - - - - - - - 351.
——— Withdraws before the battle of Leipſic, ii. 11.—His eſcape when a caſtle was falling - - - - - - - - - - - 302.
——— (electreſs) negotiates with GUSTAVUS, Eſſay, i. - - - i. 321.
——— (margrave) negotiates with the king - - - - - ii. 49.
*Braunborn*; his prophecy - - - - - - - - - — 341
*Bremen* (archbiſhop) treats with the king - - - - - i. 294.
——— Some account of his conduct - - - - - - ii. 73.*
*Breſé* (de) French ambaſſador, ſent to Mentz, ii. 130, 131.—Exaſperates the King, by propoſing an interview with Richelieu, 155.—Negotiates the armiſtice, 137, 155.—Intercedes for the Leaguers, 157.—Hath worſe intelligence than GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
*Brigade* or Column of GUSTAVUS, ii. 19, 21, 363.—New brigades made, 83.—Reduced in quantity, 84.—Expired ſoon after the death of GUSTAVUS - 365.
*Brulart*, French Ambaſſador at Ratiſbon, i. 231.—His buſineſs - - - 246.
*Brunſwic*, (duke) treats with Sweden - - - - - - - ii. 46.
*Bucela* (Innocentio) diſcovers the king's body - - - - - — 378.
*Buchanan*, his poems admired by GUSTAVUS - - - - - - i. 135.
*Buckingham* (duke) ſuppoſed to have made a romantic ſcheme of ſettling in the Weſt Indies under the protection of GUSTAVUS, i. 130.—Ambaſſador to the Hague, ibid.—Some anecdotes concerning his petulance, ibid.—Shows ſpirit in a letter to Richelieu - - - - - - - - - 130, 131.
*Burnet*, (biſhop) author apologiſes for diſagreeing with him - - i. 375.
*Butler* (colonel Walter) his brave behaviour at Francfort - — 311, 315.

## C.

*Cadretta*, his rhodomontade of a memorial - - - - - - ii. 86.
*Callenbach* (colonel) killed at Leipſic - - - - - - - — 40.

*Camerarius*, makes a fine ſpeech of the king's dictating at the Hague i. 278.
*Camiſado*, what - - - - - - - - - - - - — 79.*
*Camiſados*. See Stratagems and Surpriſes.
——— by the Danes on the Swedes - - - - - - - i. 79.
——— on an iſland by GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - — 69.
——— on Stargard - - - - - - - - - - — 259.
——— Ribnitz - - - - - - - - - - - — 270.
——— Rugenwalt - - - - - - - - - - — 269.
——— Malchin - - - - - - - - - - - — 295.
——— Ratzburg - - - - - - - - - - - — 276.
——— on the Imperialiſts by Braun - - - - - - — 296.
——— Havelberg, by Banier - - - - - - - - — 364.
——— of Horn on the Imperialiſts - - - - - - ii. 181.
——— of Dewbatel - - - - - - - - - - — 272.
*Campaign*, a good, a judicious prediſpoſition of events - - - - i. 368.
——— winter one preferred by GUSTAVUS - - - - - — 285.
——— what conſtitutes - - - - - - - - - ii. 319.
*Capitolationi*, dell 'Indie Orientali e occidentale App. III. - - 452.
*Capua* (Ferdinando di) his brave defence of Gartz, i. 287.—His ſuperſtition, ibid.
*Carlſbad*, its famous baths - - - - - - - - - - ii. 104.
*Carve* (Thomas) his itinerary - - - - - - - - - — 108 *.
*Cham* (a town in the upper Palatinate). The mock-Guſtavus takes the pſeudo-Tilly priſoner there - - - - - - - - - - - i. 362, &c.
*Chaplains*, two to each Swediſh regiment - - - - - Eſſay, xxxiii.
*Chappelle*, (the father) a Swediſh colonel - - - - - - i. 111.
——— (the ſon) killed at Riga - - - - - - - - - ibid.
*Charles I.* king of Great Britain, acts on his father's principles with reſpect to the Palatinate, i. 122, 189, &c.—His diffidence and fluctuation, 189, &c.—Sends GUSTAVUS the order of the garter, 147.—Allows the elector Palatine's eldeſt ſon to turn papiſt, 147, 148.—Gives timorous inſtructions to Anſtruther, 234, &c.—Offers propoſals, which GUSTAVUS rejects, 389.—Wants to collect pictures from Munich, 375, &c.—Thinks Roe over-warm, ibid.—Miſſes favourable moments, ibid.—Diſpirits the proteſtant princes by his coldneſs, 382, 390.—Uncertain whether he ſhall throw himſelf into the arms of France, 389.—Pays the German contingent remiſsly, 386.—Fearful in declaring for Sweden - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 387.
*Charles V.* ſome account of him - - - - - - - - - i. 195.
*Charles IX.* ſon of Guſtavus Erichſon, duke of Sudermania, and father of GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, i. 67, 95.—Replaces Sigiſmond as king of Sweden unwillingly, 95.—Propoſes GUSTAVUS to Elizabeth princeſs of England, (afterwards electreſs Palatine and queen of Bohemia,) 67.—Challenges the king of Denmark, 70.—His ſtrange anſwer to a Poliſh challenge, 71.—His character and ideas of trade and commerce, ibid.—Speech on his death-bed concerning GUSTAVUS, 72.—His offspring - - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
*Charles* (Philip), brother to GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, ſtands a chance to be choſen czar, i. 86.—Commands at the ſiege of Riga, 107.—Dies regretted - 113.
*Charnacé* (De) ambaſſador from France to GUSTAVUS—Negotiates with him—his hiſtory and inſolent behaviour to prince Frederic Henry of Naſſau, i. 182 †.—His petulance about a compariſon drawn from ſcarlet, 273.—Makes the treaty of Bernwalt - - - - - - - - - - 295, &c.
——— confers with GUSTAVUS at Mentz, ii. 130.—Exaſperates GUSTAVUS by attempting to alarm him, 155—and again, on diſliking the paſſage of the Rhine, ibid.—By a third impertinence, 157.—Allures Bavaria in vain - ibid.
*Chemnitz*, ſent by the king to the diet of Leipſic - - - - - i. 326.
——— ſent miniſter to Nurenberg, &c. - - - - - ii. 49, 50.
——— another—ſome account of his hiſtory - - - - - i. 215 *.
*Chodkievi*, a Poliſh general - - - - - - - - - — 107.
*Chriſtian II.* (the tyrant) king of Denmark - - - - - - — 66.
——— *IV.* See Denmark.
——— duke of Brunſwic, and biſhop of Halberſtadt, wore the queen of Bohemia's glove on his helmet - - - - - - - - i. 241.§.

*Chriſtina*

*Chriſtina* (mother to GUSTAVUS) reſigns in his favour, i. 73.—Her bold ſpirit, 82.—Generoſity to the univerſity of Upſal - - - - - - 117.
——— (daughter of GUSTAVUS) declared heireſs to the throne, i. 141.—Her character, ibid. and note—Some anecdotes concerning her - - 142.*
*Cochtitzki*, made *legatus ad exercitum*, ii. 330.—Out-negotiates Arnheim - ibid.
*Code*, (king's military) i. 155 - - - - - - - - Eſſay, xxxiv.
*Colbergen* deſcribed, i. 279.*—Its garriſon arreſted by way of repriſal - 302.
*Cologn* (Elector) receives a ſort of neutrality from Sweden, ii. 146.—Sends Pappenheim £. 9000. 158.—Favours him, and becomes thereby inſincere to Sweden, 308.—Makes ſubmiſſions for aſſiſting Pappenheim, 313.—Rejected by the Dutch, 333.—His duplicity - - - - - - - - - ibid.
*Colorado* taken priſoner at Leipſic, ii. 40.—Commands the right wing at Lützen, 282.—Behaves well - - - - - - - - - - - 372.
*Colours*, a misfortune in not carrying them - - - - - - i. 280.
*Column* of GUSTAVUS. See Brigade.
——— one erected on paſſing the Rhine - - - - - - ii. 126.
*Commanded* muſqueteers; what - - - - - - - - i. 222, 280.
*Commerce*, i. 84.—The king's great ſettlement thereof for his ſubjects to the Eaſt and Weſt Indies, 143, 144.—Confirms the ſame to his German allies - ii. 340.
*Commiſſary* general, uſeful when troops are ſent abroad - - Eſſay, lii.
*Condé*, a conſummate general, when young - - - - - - i. 84.
*Congreſs*. Vid. Lubec.
*Conojſpoliſki*, the ableſt commander in Poland, i. 115, 141.—Outwitted by GUSTAVUS, ibid.—Blockades Dantzic, 144.—Marches up to the king's lines, 149.—Beaten, 150.—Taken priſoner, 179.—Invents maſqued batteries - ibid.
CONTI (Torquato de) commands againſt GUSTAVUS, ſurnamed the Devil for his rapaciouſneſs, i. 225, *258.—Why he did not oppoſe the king at firſt, ibid.—Lays a plot againſt his life, 265.—Attempts to raiſe the ſiege of Wolgaſt, 225. Firſt perſon who diſcovered Mazarin's genius, ibid.*—His error in deſtroying the country in order to ſtarve the Swedes, ibid.—No great commander, 226.—Speaks contemptuouſly of GUSTAVUS, 226, 227.—Evaſive of fighting, 269.—Sues for his diſmiſſion - - - - - - - - - - 284.
*Contributions*, their enormity in the 30 years war - - - - Eſſay, lii.
*Conway* (ſir Thomas) wounded at Gartz - - - - - - i. 287.*
*Corbey*, account of its abbey - - - - - - - - ii. 73.†
*Cordova* (Gonſalvo-de) ſent ambaſſador to France—Refuſes the preſent, ii. 163.—A ridiculous ſtory concerning him, ibid.—Commands on the Rhine, ibid.*—Behaves ill in protecting Maeſtricht - - - - - - 308, 309.
*Coſſacks* invade Tartary, i. 128.—Their hiſtory - - - - - 128, 129.
*Courland*, duchy, its derivation - - - - - - - i. 125, 126.‡
*Court* of London, ſurnames GUSTAVUS the dragoon king - ii. 68, 373.*
*Cratz* (general) inveſts new Brandenburgh - - - - - - i. 303.
——— priſoner at Leipſic, ii. 40.—Offends GUSTAVUS, 227.—His extraordinary life and exit, 229, &c.—Surpriſes Ratiſbon - - - - - ibid.*
——— (young) killed at Landſberg - - - - - - - i. 318.
*Craven* (lord) enamoured of the queen of Bohemia—Builds her a magnificent houſe in Berkſhire - - - - - - - - - i. 241.
——— Behaves gallantly at the ſiege of Creutnach—careſſed by the king, ii. 175.
*Croatians*; king allows them no quarter, i. 268.—Their cruelty at Magdeburg - - - - - - - - - - - - 337, &c.
——— hated by the king, ii. 294.—Deſined - - - - - - ibid.
*Cronenberg* (baron) bravely reſcues Tilly at Leipſic, ii. 34.—Reſpected by GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - - - - - - 146.
*Craſs*, Burgundian, what - - - - - - - - - - ii. 32.
*Culmbach* (margrave) negotiates with GUSTAVUS - - - - - —49.
*Curtius*, imperial reſident in France - - - - - - - i. 360.
*Cuſtrin*, its ſtrength and ſituation, i. 289.*—Negotiation concerning it - 320.

## D.

*Dacoſta* (commiſſary general) eſcapes narrowly being taken priſoner - ii. 56.
*Damitz*, governor of Stetin, offends GUSTAVUS, i. 253.—Wounded - 311.

*Dantzickers*, aſſiſted by Walſtein, i. 150.—Inſincere to Sweden - 137.
*Darmſtadt*. See Heſſe.
*Denmark*, account of the war therewith - - - - - - - - i. 69.
——— Chriſtian IV. Jealous of Charles IX. GUSTAVUS's father, i. 70.—An artful and judicious commander, 80. 87.—Some account of him, 80.*—His beſt military performance, 83.—Offers troops to Sweden, which favour is declined, 93.—Has an interview with GUSTAVUS, 90.—Private ill-wiſher to GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 202.
——— Interpoſes as mediator, ii. 279.—Recals Holk in vain, 376.—Propoſes a general pacification to GUSTAVUS without ſucceſs, 209, 210.—Again - 226.
*Dewbatel* defends Sweinfurt gallantly, and Coburg - - - - ii. 336, &c.
———, his hiſtory, i. 209, 210.—His ingratitude, 209.‡—Attacks Landſberg, 317.—Doubts concerning his name - - - - - 209.‡ ii. 302.‡
——— promoted, ii. 83.—Beats the Imperialiſts near Lignitz, 303.—Taken priſoner, and reſtored without ranſom, 272.—His fine camiſado on Freyſtadt, 273, &c.—Behaves well - - - - - - - - - 337, &c.
*Diet* (a Polith one) - - - - - - - - - - - i. 119, &c.
—— of Ratiſbon - - - - - - - - i. 228, 235, ii. 106.‡ 130.‡
—— proteſtant, at Leipſic, App. XX. - - - - - - - - 506.
*Diſbanding* veterans always fatal, ii. 38.‡—Cauſed Eugene to ſhed tears - ibid.‡
*Diſcipline*, dreadful effects where it is wanted - - - - ii. 76, &c. 228.
*Ditrichſtein* (cardinal) ſucceeds Kleſel - - - - - - - i. 233.‡
——— raiſes troops, ii. 9.—Some account of him - - - - ibid.†
*Douglas* (afterwards ſir George) deſtined governor of Creützнach, ii. 176.—Affronts the king violently, 237, &c. 243.—Some account of him - 241.
*Drachſted*, (captain) defends Gripſwald, i. 356.—Violates the capitulation - 357.
*Dream* (the king's) before the battle of Leipſic - - - - - ii. 18.
*Dourlach* (Baden) young margrave killed by a cannon ball - - —217.
——— (Baden) old margrave, his remarkable ſpeech on his ſon's death, — 218.
*Dubalt* acts in conjunction with Arnheim, ii. 330.—Overreached by him, ibid.—Releaſed generouſly by Walſtein, ibid.—Clears Sileſia - - - 344.
*Duelling*, how prevented by the king, i. 154, &c.—Edicts againſt it, ibid. See Eſſay, xlvii.
*Dumain* (captain) exhorts GUSTAVUS to be leſs adventurous - - i. 299.
*Dutch* (ambaſſadors) diſoblige Poland by viſiting GUSTAVUS - - — 151.

## E.

*Edlinger*, (Chevalier) an excellent medaliſt, i. 104.—Device for GUSTAVUS, ibid.
*Effiat* (De) his campaign near the Rhine, ii. 258.—Dies - - - ibid.
*Eggenberg* (prince of) Imperial prime miniſter, raiſes troops for his ſovereign - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 9.*
*Electors* (Catholic) their letter to GUSTAVUS. See Appendix.
*Electreſs Palatin*. See Palatin.
*Eleonora*. See Queen of Sweden.
*Emperor* (Ferdinand II.) ſuccours Chriſtian IV. to the diſadvantage of Sweden, i. 78.—Wants to enſlave Germany, and make his ſon king of the Romans, 231.—His ambitious deſigns, 165.—Generoſity to Verdugo, Eſſay, li.—Walſtein and Tilly, ibid.—Requires aſſiſtance of the electors on the king's landing, 228, 249.—Acquits himſelf artfully at the diet, 228, 232, &c.—His magnificent entry, 229.—Inhumanity to the elector Palatine, 236.—To the ſtate criminals in Bohemia, 261, &c.—To the duke of Pomerania, 257.—Some account of him, 260, 197.†—His title ſet forth, 260.—His bigotry, 261, 262, 233.—Writes to GUSTAVUS, and diſobliges him, 260.—Reforms the immoralities of his army, 249.—Blamed for diſbanding his veteran troops, 252, &c.—Joins a mandate, with his letter to the Leipſic confederators, 360.—Abſolves them from their engagements to Sweden, ibid.—His acuteneſs in expounding Jeſſeu's prophecy, 263.—Marries his ſon Ferdinand to a princeſs of Spain, 267.—Magnificence of the nuptials, 268.—Condeſcends to call GUSTAVUS king - - - 319.
——— negotiates with Saxony, ii. 7.—Behaves modeſtly on the death of GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 392.

*Encampments.* Judicious ones.
——— at Marienverder, by GUSTAVUS, i. 177.—Again - 181, 182.
——— at Havelberg, by the ſame, i. 363, &c.—Another - 335.
——— at Werben, by the ſame - - - - - - i. 368, &c.
——— near Wurtzburg, by the ſame - - - - - ii. 80, 81.
——— a mixed one, where troops were variouſly ſtationed by the ſame - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 306.
——— at Menitz, by the ſame - - - - - - - ii. 129.
——— at Nurenberg particularly, by the ſame - - - — 263, &c.
*England* ſends GUSTAVUS £. 60,000. - - - - - - i. 284.
*Engliſh* miniſtry not diſpleaſed with GUSTAVUS's death - - ii. 382.
——— troops make a fine march, ii. 280.—They and the Scottiſh reduced to one brigade - - - - - - - - - - - - - 342.
*Erichſon*, (Guſtavus) otherwiſe Vaſa; ſome account of him - i. 66, 67, 94.
——— (his ſon) propoſed to queen Elizabeth, i. 94.—Marries meanly - ibid.
*Erwitz* (watch-maſter general) killed at Leipſic - - - - - ii. 39.
*Etienne*, the king's ſpeech to him, ii. 193.—Confers about Munich - 224.
*Etrees* (D') commands the French army on the Rhine - - - ii. 306.
*Eugene* (prince) diſliked irregular troops, i. 149.—Stunned by opening a poiſoned packet - - - - - - - - - - - 267.†
——— wept when his veterans were diſbanded - - - - - ii. 38.‡
*Exciſe*, invented by GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - i. 113.

## F.

*Fabritius*, (the chaplain) the king's famous ſpeech to him at Naumburg - ii. 351.
*Falconet*, a ſort of cannon ſix or ſeven feet long, calibre two inches, carrying a ball of two pounds weight, much uſed as eaſily tranſported, the weight of metal from 10 to 12 quintals; it kills point blank 280 yards. There was a half falconet: proportions exactly diminiſhed.
*Falkenberg* (colonel) ſent to defend Magdeburg, i. 275.—Behaves well, 331.—His anſwer to Tilly, 333.—Dies - - - - - - - - - 336.
——— (Maurice) kills GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - ii. 377.‖
*Farenbach* (colonel) his extraordinary hiſtory, i. 100, 102.—An excellent engineer formed by GUSTAVUS, 102, 225.—Abſconds with the king's levy money - - - - - - - - - - - - 101, 381.
*Ferdinand II.* See Emperor.
*Feria* (duke of) died with grief - - - - - - - ii. 3.* 259.
*Ferrari*, an inſolent coward.—His amazing ſpeech - - - - - i. 293.
*Fleming* (Claudius) a colonel - - - - - - - - — 106.
——— (Henry) an admiral - - - - - - - - — 107.
*Folard* corrected - - - - - - - - - ii. 361, &c.
*Fontaines* (marquis de) his gallant behaviour at Rocroy - - — 33.†
*Fowler*, his account of the quarrel between GUSTAVUS and Vane - —241, &c.
*Francfort* on the Oder, ſome account thereof - - - - - i. 306.*
*Franconia*, hiſtory of that circle - - - - - - - - ii. 54.
*Fugger* (general) invades Heſſe, ii. 2.—Killed at the battle of Altenberg.—His bold ſpeech - - - - - - - - - - - 290.
*Fulda* (Abbey) ſome account of it - - - - - - - - ii. 2.*
——— (abbot) killed on a windmill at the battle of Lützen, ii. 2.*—More on that ſubject - - - - - - - - - - - - 374.*
*Furſtenberg*, (count de) ravages Suabia - - - - - - - i. 363.
——— invades Heſſe, ii. 3.—Countermanded thence, and joins Tilly, ibid.—Againſt fighting at Leipſic, 27.—Beats the Saxons, 39.—Wounded - 40.

## G.

*Galas* (Matthias count) his hiſtory and character, ii. 6.—His cruelty in Saxony, 7.—Commands in Bohemia, 324, 339.—Inveſts Lauff - - - - 262.
*Gardie*

*Gardie* (James de la) military preceptor to GUSTAVUS, i. 72.†—Ambaſſador to Muſcovy, 88.—Serves under GUSTAVUS, 112.—The high idea he had of his maſter, 221.*—Fine hiſtorical pictures in the de la Gardie palace - 219.
*Gars*, the name aſſumed by the king when he made the tour of Germany, and why - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 102
*Gaſſion*, his firſt interview with GUSTAVUS, i. 391.—Some account of him, ibid.* and 392.—Military inſtructor to the prince of Condé - - - - 373.*
——— What he ſaid of Walſtein's campaign, ii. 267.—King's affection to him, 269, 275.—Firſt man to croſs the Lech, 202.—Has a wife propoſed to him by GUSTAVUS, 213.—His regiment ſurnamed the regiment of the pillow, 214.—Overturned near the king by a cannon ball - - - - - - 216.
*Generals*, numbers of them die of chagrin, ii. 259.—Their poſts and pre-eminence in the 30 years war, Eſſay, xliv. xlv.—Many roſe from common men; and moſt had carried a muſquet, Eſſay, liii. liv.—Their dreſs, liv. lv. (See Tilly, lv.)
*German-Swediſh* officers more avaricious and cruel than native Swedes - ii. 276.
*Geyſdort* (count) killed at Lützen - - - - - - - - — 373.
*Gildenheim* (admiral) i. 106, 256.—Natural brother to GUSTAVUS, ibid.—His generoſity to the univerſity of Upſal - - - - - - - 117.
*Goetz* ſurrenders Great Glogau - - - - - - - - - ii. 302.
*Gonſalvo de Cordova*, anecdote of, ii. 163.*—Sent ambaſſador to Paris, 162.—Fails in his purpoſe - - - - - - - - - 163.
*Gordon*, the aſſaſſin of Walſtein, ii. 118, &c.—His ingratitude, ibid.—Behaves gallantly in fighting againſt GUSTAVUS - - - - - - 274.
*Grebner* (Paul) his extraordinary prophecy - - - - - - ii. 328.
*Greenland* (major) manages the capitulation at Damin - - - i. 300.
*Gregory XV.* (pope) wanteth the Palatine library, i. 133.—Some idea of him, ibid.
*Grotius*, his opinion of GUSTAVUS, i. 324, 325.—GUSTAVUS's of him - 205.
GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, inducements to write the hiſtory of, xi.—His character, ibid.

## *GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS.*

### A characteriſtic Index of his LIFE and ACTIONS.

#### MILITARY PERFORMANCES.

The immenſity of his conqueſts, Eſſay, xxx. xxxiv. - - - i. 68.
A colonel of cavalry at ſeventeen years of age - - - - — 69.
His critical ſituation, as to his enemies - - - - — 75, &c.
Prudently declines beſieging Calmar - - - - - — 78.
Raiſes the ſiege of Jencop - - - - - - - - — 80, 81.
Makes a peace to improve his marine - - - - - - — 83.
A general of conſummate experience and coolneſs at twenty-three - — 81, 84.
Declares war againſt Muſcovy and Poland - - - - - — 88.
Offers good terms to both countries - - - - - - — 91.
Conquers Ingria - - - - - - - - - - — 90.
Beſieges Pleſko - - - - - - - - - - — 88.
Fulfils Tycho Brahe's prophecy - - - - - - - — 89.
Beſieges Riga - - - - - - - - - - — 106, 112.
Conquers the duchies of Livonia, Courland, &c. - - - — 125, &c.
Appears with a large fleet before Dantzick - - - - — 115.
Denounces war againſt Poland - - - - - - - — 126.
Invades Livonia, and conquers that vaſt duchy - - - — 125, &c.
Cuts to pieces a party of the enemy - - - - - - ibid.
Defeats young Sapieha - - - - - - - - - — 126.
Throws a bridge over the Dwina, enters Lithuania, and ſubdues the province, — 125.
Re-conquers Courland and Semigallia - - - - - - — 126.
Beats old Sapieha at the battle of Walhoff - - - - - ibid.
Aſtoniſhes all Europe by invading Pruſſia - - - - - — 131.
His great ſecrecy thereon - - - - - - - - ibid, &c.
Takes Pillau, Bramberg, Frawenberg, and Elbingen - - - — 134, &c.

Takes

Takes Marienberg, Stuma, Chriſtberg, Vormitz, Brodnick, and the iſlands of Verder - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 136.
Takes Mew and Dirſchau - - - - - - - - - — 138, &c.
His acumen in diſcovering a ſtratagem - - - - - - - ibid.
Beats a party of Polanders at Gluckſtadt - - - - - - - ibid.
Fights two days, and raiſes the ſiege of Mew - - - - — 138, 139.
Throws relief into Dirſchau, and ſaves the town - - - - - — 141.
Draſts (by means of each tenth militia-man) 40,000 new recruits - — 144.
Invades Pruſſia again, 145, and inveſts Marienberg - - - - ibid.
Fights and defeats the Poles who attacked his lines - - - - — 146.
Blockades the harbour of Dantzic - - - - - - - — 147, &c.
Beats the Dantzic fleet - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Makes a fine march over a moraſs - - - - - - - — 155, &c.
Defeats Conoſpoliſki - - - - - - - - - — 150.
Called a king of ſnow at Vienna - - - - - - - — 152.
New models his fleet, and beats the Dantzickers - - - - — 150.
Inveſts Dantzic - - - - - - - - - - — 151, 157.
Takes Neuberg, Straſberg, and Dribentz - - - - - - — 157.
Perceives that plunder debauches his army - - - - - - ibid.
Deſtroys the Spaniſh and Auſtrian fleet - - - - - - — 158.
Fights the battle of Marienverder - - - - - - - — 174, 181.
Engages hand to hand with Sirot, and loſes his beaver hat - - — 178, 179.
Embarks in 130 ſhips, and lands the firſt man at the head of 13,800 - — 221.
Finds nine ſeveral armies in the empire - - - - — 223, 225, &c.
Inveſts Wolgaſt - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Takes Schwein and iſland of Uſedom - - - - - - - — 227.
Sails for Stetin - - - - - - - - - - - — 253.
—— Leaves the town gates open out of gallantry - - - - — 256.
Takes Wolgaſt - - - - - - - - - - - — 264.
Invades the duchy of Mechlenberg - - - - - - - ibid.
Falls into Aligheri's ambuſcade - - - - - - - — 265.
Denies quarter to the Croatians - - - - - - - — 268.
Gives an artful bravado to de Conti's army - - - - - — 269, &c.
Blockades Roſtock - - - - - - - - - - — 272.
Finds Tilly employment near Magdeburg. The advantages thereof - — 274.
Returns to Straſſund - - - - - - - - - - — 277.
Haſtens to relieve Colbergen - - - - - - - - - — 283.
Takes Griffenhagen and Gartz - - - - - - - - — 285, &c.
Miſſes deſtroying the imperial army by the perverſeneſs of the elector of Brandenburg - - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Amazing increaſe of his army - - - - - - - - — 291.
Some idea of his German conqueſts in leſs than a year - - - ibid.
Takes new Brandenburg, Clemptno, Trepto, Loïtch - - - - — 292.
Beſieges and takes Damin - - - - - - - - — 296, &c.
His contempt for a military braggadocio - - - - - — 293, &c.
Beſieges and ſtorms Francfort on the Oder - - - - — 306, 311.
Gains much thereby in war - - - - - - - - — 315.
Expected a great deal from his officers - - - - - - ibid.
Admired the Scots as ſoldiers, but conſidered them as too proud to work - ibid.
Beſieges and takes Landſberg - - - - - - - — 316, &c.
Allows his generals when to be merry - - - - - - — 318.
Runs the utmoſt riſque for the ſake of keeping his word - - — 341, &c.
Beſieges Gripſwald - - - - - - - - - — 355, &c.
Invades the duchy of Mechlenberg again - - - - - — 358.
Conceives the idea of advancing ſouthwards - - - - - — 362.
Sacrifices glory to convenience - - - - - - - — 363.
Beats four of Pappenheim's beſt regiments - - - - — 365, &c.
Encamps at Havelberg, and at Werben - - - - - — 368, &c.
Repulſes Tilly, who attacked his intrenchments - - - — 369, &c.
Makes Hamilton and the Britiſh troops take an oath of obedience - — 378.
Allows the Saxons to do the ſame by their elector - - - - ibid.

Joins

Joins a military counſellor with the Britiſh general - - - - i. 378.
Offers the Engliſh an independent commander, if they will ſend 16,000 men, ibid.
Refuſes all participants in ſupreme military power - - - - ibid.
Convenes the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg to a council of war - ii. 11.
Sets a value on himſelf in the moſt dangerous criſis - - - — 11, 12.
Gains a march on Tilly - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Advances toward Leipſic - - - - - - - - - — 13.
Advice to his cavalry on attacking - - - - - - — 18, &c.
Plans and then arranges his army in perſon - - - - - ibid.
Sends a note to Tilly, propoſing a battle - - - - - — 20.
Firſt officer of infantry in the world - - - - - - ibid.
His brigade or column deſcribed - - - - - - - — 21, &c.
Tries to gain a point of wind and ſun - - - - - - — 29.
Divides troops into ſmaller portions than formerly - - - - — 24.
His fine idea of the circulation of aſſiſtances in the day of battle - - ibid.
Scientifically ſpeaking, could not ſuffer a total overthrow - - - ibid.
Overthrows Tilly, and purſues him - - - - - — 34, &c. 44, and 39.
Paſſes the whole night in his coach on the field of battle - - - — 41.
Strikes a modeſt medal upon the occaſion - - - - - - — 34.
His excellent method of dividing the ſpoil of the imperial campaign - — 39.
Allows the elector of Saxony to beſiege Leipſic - - - - — 43, 44.
His ſcheme of operations for his own troops, and the Saxons - - — 44, 46.
Poſſeſſes Erfurt by ſtratagem - - - - - - - - - — 50.
Enters Franconia—His idea of that circle and the enterpriſe - - — 54.
His fine march through the Duringer-Walt - - - - - — 56, &c.
His great anxiety about ſaving a ſmall body of men - - - — 79, 80, &c.
Oppoſes 50,000 Imperialiſts, &c. with 8,000 ſoldiers - - - - — 75.
Rarely changed a military diſpoſition - - - - - - — 81.
Forms more brigades - - - - - - - - - — 83, &c.
In doubt whether he ſhould march to Nurenberg or Francfort on the Mayne, 91.—
Prefers the latter, ibid.—His pacific march - - - - - — 92.
Takes Aſchaffenberg and Steinheim - - - - - - ibid.
Joined by the landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel - - - - - - — 96.
Croſſes the Mayne, 124.—And beſieges Oppenheim - - - - — 125.
Paſſes the Rhine in a ſmall wherry - - - - - - — 126.
Erects a triumphal column - - - - - - - - ibid.
Takes Mentz, and makes excellent fortifications there - - — 127, &c.
Makes himſelf maſter of Koningſtein caſtle - - - - - — 146.
Immenſity of his conqueſts at the end of the year 1631 - - - — 150.
Beſieges Creützmach, 174, &c.—Builds Guſtavuſburg - - — 178.
Inveſts Baccarah - - - - - - - - - - — 177.
Marches to ſupport Horn - - - - - - - - - — 184.
Changes his plan, and enters Bavaria, &c. - - - - - ibid.
Determines to beſiege Donawert - - - - - - - — 190.
Takes it by ſtorm - - - - - - - - - - — 192.
Examines the paſſages of the Lech - - - - - - — 196, 197.
His perſeverance whilſt the troops croſſed it - - - - — 199.
His compoſure and coolneſs, 203.—Again - - - - - — 266.
Takes Rayne - - - - - - - - - - — 210.
Beſieges Augſburg, and gains the town - - - - - — 211, 212.
Inveſts Ingoldſtadt - - - - - - - - - — 215, &c.
Raiſes the ſiege of Biberach - - - - - - - - — 235.
Always ſeized the critical moment - - - - - - - — 244.
Attempts to relieve Weiſſemberg - - - - - - - — 245.
His wonderful encampment againſt Walſtein - - - - - — 249.
Shows there the brighteſt part of his talents, ibid. and - - - — 262.
Offers battle by way of feint - - - - - - - - — 266.
Allows not the French army to enter the electorate of Tryers - — 258, &c.
Engages with Spar, and defeats the Imperialiſts - - - - — 273, &c.
Hates partizan-war, 271, 275.—His fine encampment at Nurenberg — 267, &c.
Takes Hertzoy-Aurach - - - - - - - - - - — 282.
Alarmed,

Alarmed, but not dejected - - - - - - - - - ii. 269.
Joins his ſeveral armies - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Fights the battle of Altenberg - - - - - - - - —284, 290.
Miſled by falſe intelligence - - - - - - - - — 284.
Hates the Croatians; cuts a regiment to pieces - - - - - —271, 294.
His great ſkill in chooſing his ground - - - - - - - — 295, &c.
Always walked and muſed when diſtreſſed and puzzled - i. 391. ii. 296.
Decamps firſt from Nurenberg, ii. 320.—Making Kniphauſen governor, ibid.—Diſdains to ſteal a march, 321.—Propoſes to enter Bavaria, 323—Over-perſuaded by OXENSTIERN in that reſpect, 324.—Recalled by a letter from him, ibid.—Returns to his point, ibid.—Joined by 5,000 Switzers - - ibid.
Plans all marches for his abſent generals - - - - - - ibid.
Croſſes the Lech a ſecond time - - - - - - - — 326.
Retakes Rayne and Landſberg - - - - - - - - ibid.
Beheads colonel Mitzval - - - - - - - - — 327.
Propoſes to beſiege Ingoldſtadt - - - - - - - — 328.
Haſtes to ſuccour the elector of Saxony - - - - - - ibid.
Reduces the Engliſh and Scots to one brigade - - - - - — 342.
Marches to join the elector of Saxony, and duke of Lunenberg - - ibid.
Deceived in the diſtance of Lützen - - - - - - - — 355.
Attacks an advanced poſt - - - - - - - - ibid.
Paſſes the night in his coach - - - - - - - - — 358.
Refuſes to breakfaſt and wear armour - - - - - - — 359.
His admirable plan of battle - - - - - - - - — 360, &c.
Begins the fight - - - - - - - - - — 365.
Engages too deeply amongſt the enemies troops - - - - — 367.
Murdered cruelly - - - - - - - - - — 377, &c.
A more circumſtantial account of his death - - - ibid. 379.
His quarrel with a duke of Saxe Lauenberg ſuſpected - - - — 380, &c.
His glorious exit - - - - - - - - - — 382.
Hath no monument at Lützen, but ſome rude miſhapen ſtones - - ibid.
Leaves a fine ſucceſſion of military diſciples behind him - - — 383.
Two characters of him by popiſh writers - - - - - — 373.*

WOUNDED.

By a falcon-ſhot in the elbow - - - - - - - i. 146.
By a muſket-ball in the belly - - - - - - - — 155.
At the ſiege of Damin, i. 300.—At the ſiege of Marienberg - - ii. 63.
By being overturned by a cannon-ball - - - - - - — 216.
By a contuſion preceding the battle of Lützen - - - - — 359.
Shot at Lützen through the arm, and through the body—Tranſpierced with a ſword—Received four more wounds and a ball through his head - — 376, &c.

ESCAPES.

From a moraſs near Blechingen - - - - - - - i. 69.
From another moraſs at Damin - - - - - - - — 299.
From a fire in Sweden - - - - - - - - — 99.
From a cannon-ball at the ſiege of Riga, 108.—Again - - - — ibid.
From a ſnare of Farenbach againſt his perſon - - - — 101, &c.
Receives five muſket-ſhots in his armour - - - - - — 179.
Has two horſes killed under him - - - - - - — 265.
Eſcapes being aſſaſſinated by a taylor, 267.—And a Jeſuit, 369.—From a Flemiſh prieſt - - - - - - - - - ibid.
From a ſtratagem of the French miniſter, ii. 29.‖—From Jeſuits at Augſburg—154.
At the ſiege of Mentz - - - - - - - - — 128, 129.
Eſcapes narrowly being killed at Wurtzburg - - - - - — 63.
At the ſiege of Creützbach - - - - - - - — 175.
At Ingoldſtadt - - - - - - - - - — 216.
At the battle of Altenberg - - - - - - - - — 289.

From being taken Prisoner.

Twice near Mew, i. 140.—At the battle of Marienverder, 174.—And in Aligheri's ambuscade - - - - - - - - - - - - 266.

II.

His Political Transactions, Affairs of Civil Life, &c.

Slight sketch of his character - - - - - - - - - i. 65.
His name anagrammatized into Augustus - - - - - - - - — 66.
Proposed to the princess Elizabeth, afterwards electress Palatine - - — 67.
His education civil and military - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Supposed to travel into Germany when a youth - - - - - - — 68.
His father's idea of him - - - - - - - - - - — 72.
And Spinola's, 81.—Sir Thomas Roe's - - - - - - - — 137.
Declines the throne - - - - - - - - - - - — 74.
Assents and gives a paper of assecuration - - - - - - - ibid.
His prudent method of filling up places - - - - - - - — 77.
Moderates his resentment against the king of Denmark when very young ibid.
Makes a peace with him contrary to the impetuosity of youth - - ibid.
Establishes a society of trade: reforms laws and makes new ones - - — 85.
Forbids studying metaphysics, and why - - - - - - ibid.
Allows no noblemen to travel without a passport - - - - - ibid.
Desired not to see his brother made Czar - - - - - - - — 86.
His studies and love of reading - - - - - - - - - — 87.
His idea of the ancients as soldiers - - - - - - - - ibid.
His great acumen as a speaker - - - - - - - - - — 91.
Abridges the laws - - - - - - - - - - - - — 87.
Makes a farther revision of them - - - - - - - - — 104.
Makes the peace of Stolba - - - - - - - - - - — 91.
His punctuality in payments - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Crowned king - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 93.
Erects new public offices and courts of business; and settles his kingdom in case of absence - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 91.
His magical sword - - - - - - - - - - - - — 96.
Establishes iron manufactures - - - - - - - - - — 100.
Publishes the famous constitution De administratione & incrementis civitatum, ibid.
Has an interview with the king of Denmark - - - - - ibid.
Takes umbrage at the Austrian progress in Bohemia - - - - ibid.
His and Sigismond's pretensions and quarrel fully considered - — 94, &c.
Regulates the university of Upsal - - - - - - - — 85, 117.
Passes through Germany under the name of M. Gars - - - - — 102.
Makes his addresses to the princess of Brandenburgh, and marries her — 103.
Some idea of his aspect and figure - - - - - - - - — 104.
Invades Poland without declaring war, and why - - - - - — 107.
Admired by the Poles for his clemency - - - - - - — 111.
Banishes the Jesuits from Riga, 112.—And from Frawenburg - - — 134.
Introduces an excise - - - - - - - - - - — 114.
Makes a second truce with Poland - - - - - - - — 121.
His esteem for Grotius, and his work De jure belli & pacis - - — 118.
——— Buchanan's poems - - - - - - - - — 135.
Parallel between him and Sigismond as to artifice and plainness - — 98, &c.
Kept always friends in the enemies cabinet - - - - - — 131.
Establishes a standing army (perpetuum militem subsidiarium) by consent of senate - - - - - - - - - - - - — 123.
Dislikes the cautious timidity of Charles I. - - - - - — 130.
His coolness, 65.—Again on invading Germany - - - - — 206.
Secures the elector of Brandenburgh privately - - - - - — 131.
His picture sought for from all parts - - - - - - - — 135.
Gives new laws to the Dantzickers - - - - - - - — 137.
Taxes

Taxes their navigation 30 per cent. - - - - - - i. 133.
Reſtrains their commerce with the Hanſe-towns - - - - — 134.
Eſtabliſhes a commerce to the Weſt Indies - - - - - — 143.
Affectionately beloved by his ſubjects - - - - - ibid. 187.
Receives the garter from England - - - - - - - — 184.
Takes an extraordinary ſtep to prevent duelling - - - — 155, 156.
Declines the aſſiſtance of the Muſcovites - - - - - — 174.
His deputies interdicted from the congreſs of Lubec - - - — 164.
Hears de Charnacé's propoſals - - - - - - - — 182.
Overlooks them a ſecond time - - - - - - - — 183.
Treats with the Dantzickers - - - - - - - - — 185.
Takes ſecurities from France, England, and Veniee, about the guarantee of a treaty - - - - - - - - - - - — 191.
Gives the ſenate its option of peace or war - - - - - ibid.
Whether the war of GUSTAVUS was purely a war of religion - — 202.
Cares not to part with Stralſund - - - - - - - — 163, &c.
Beloved by his ſenate and ſoldiers - - - - - - - — 221.
Conſidered by all as arbiter of Europe - - - - - — 205-6.
Publiſhes no declaration of hoſtilities, and why - - - - — 209.
Prodigies preceding his embarkment - - - - - — 215, 216.
Treats with the dukes of Mechlenberg and Pomerania - - - — 227.
Eſtabliſhes no bad government at Stettin for his own intereſts - — 275, &c.
Cauſes the Mechlenbergers to diſclaim Walſtein - - - — 271. 272.
Writes to the Emperor - - - - - - - - - - — 277.
The ſubſtance of his letter - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Receives 60,000 pounds from England - - - - - - — 264.
Negotiates with the archbiſhop of Bremen, duke of Lunenberg, and landgrave of Heſſe Caſſel, 294.—And again with the latter - - - - - ii. 1, 2.
——— With duke William of Saxe Weymar - - - - - i. 320.
A conjecture why he ſpoke ſo harſhly to the duke of Savelli - - — 301.
Has an interview with the elector of Brandenburgh, 321, &c. 354.—Again — 351.
Demands Cuſtrin and Spandau - - - - - - - - — 320.
——— And Deſſau bridge - - - - - - - - - — 330.
Invites the elector of Saxony to a treaty - - - - - - — 323.
His three ſenſible propoſals - - - - - - - - — 326.
His ill ſucceſs in his requeſts - - - - - - - - — 330.
Returns to Stettin. Gives audience to the Muſcovite ambaſſador - — 354.
Suſpects the king of Denmark, and alarms him - - - - - ibid.
Reinſtates the dukes of Mechlenberg with great pomp - - — 359, &c.
Negotiates with France and Veniee - - - - - - — 360, &c.
Requeſts the Dutch to continue their aſſiſtances - - - - — 392.
Preſſes hard to make Charles I. explicit - - - - - — 376.
Diſlikes Sir H. Vane, 387.—And Charles his maſter - - - — 382.
Treats with Arnheim concerning the elector of Saxony - - - ii. 7.
Independent of Oxenſtiern - - - - - - - - — 10.
His ſtrange dream before the battle of Leipſic - - - - — 18.
Receives from the Dutch 50,000 gilders a month - - - - i. 350.
Sacrifices glory to ſolid utility - - - - - - - — 363.
Why he liked not the Engliſh auxiliaries ſhould conquer Sileſia - — 386.
Tries to infuſe ſpirit into Charles I. - - - - - - ii. 36.
Enters into good underſtanding with the dukes of Brunſwick and Lunenberg, and the family of Anhalt - - - - - - - - - — 45.
Suſpects the elector of Saxony and Arnheim - - - - — 46, &c.
Negotiates with the margrave of Culmbach and duke of Wirtemberg - — 49.
Treats with the margrave of Bareith and the Nurenbergers - - - ibid.
His opinion of neutralities - - - - - - - - — 49, 50.
Treats with the dukes of Weymar - - - - - - - — 54.
Holds intelligence with the count de Hanau - - - - - — 81.
Concludes finally with the Nurenbergers - - - - - — 91.
Treats with the counts of Veteravia - - - - - - — 92.
Abſolves

Abſolves the Francforters from their allegiance, ii. 93.—Protects their commerce, 96.—Enriches them, ibid.—Signs a treaty with them - - - ibid.
Obtains Ruſſelheim with great art and difficulty - - - - ibid.
Opens a court in Mentz in form - - - - - - - - — 129.
Holds conferences with Anſtruther, Vane, de Charnacé, de Brezé, de Pau, Oxenſtiern, and the king of Bohemia - - - - - - - — 129, &c.
Superior to the chancellor in a political debate - - - - — 143, 144.
——— to France and Bavaria as a politician - - - - - — 135.
Confers with Sclavata the Palatine miniſter - - - - - — 144.
Diſlikes the ſlowneſs of Engliſh ſupplies - - - - - — 145.
Rejects the duke of Neuberg's propoſals - - - - - ibid.
Not intimidated by inſinuations from the elector of Treyers - - ibid.
Treats with the elector of Cologn's deputies - - - - — 145, 146.
Diſlikes Anſtruther's talents and inſtructions - - - - — 130.
Treats with the Hanſe-towns and Lower Saxony - - - - — 146.
Tranſacts in perſon, and finiſhes his whole buſineſs with Europe in a fortnight - - - - - - - - - - — 129, 146.
Deſires a conference with Louis XIII. - - - - - - — 154.
Teaſed by France into an armiſtice - - - - - - — 155.
Makes ſeveral plans of a neutrality - - - - - — 156, &c.
Meets his queen; their tender interview - - - - - — 159.
Terrifies the French miniſters - - - - - - - — 164.
His whole negotiation with Vane - - - - - - — 165, 168.
Reſents want of politeneſs in the landgrave of Heſſe Darmſtadt - - — 171.
Sincere to the elector Palatine - - - - - - — 165, 170.
Deviſes a new electorate - - - - - - - - - — 170.
The idea the pope had of him - - - - - - - — 188.
Perceives he had conquered too much - - - - - - — 208.
His ſpirited behaviour towards the king of Denmark - - — 209, 210.
To the duke of Neuburg and his neutrality - - - - — 210, 211.
His polite and chriſtian behaviour at Augſburg - - - — 211, 213.
Preſcribes an oath of fidelity to the inhabitants - - - — 213.
Treats with duke Albert of Bavaria - - - - - - — 214.
Hinders his troops from indulging in luxury at Augſburg - - - ibid.
His quarrel with Vane, 236, &c.—And Douglas - - - — 242, &c.
Interferes a little with the affair of Poland, 243.—Again - - - — 298.
Treats with Straſburg, 246.—With Ragotſki and the Turks, 264.—Again — 301.
Writes to the Switzers - - - - - - - - - - — 247.
Alarmed to ſee his troops grow rapacious and cruel - - — 275, &c.
His boldneſs and firmneſs on the occaſion - - - - - ibid.
His religious ſeverity - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Polite account of Walſtein - - - - - - - - - — 279.
Writes to Oxenſtiern in his ſeemingly bad ſituation - - - — 280.
Borrows money at 6 per cent. - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Miſunderſtanding between him and Hepburn - - - - — 287, &c.
Negotiates with Vane, 270.—Again - - - - - - — 292, &c.
His ſpeech on Engliſh treaties - - - - - - - - ibid.
Had many correſpondents in Great Britain, 271.—Suſpects he had falſe friends there - - - - - - - - - - - — 297.*
Foments a rebellion in upper Auſtria - - - - - - — 301.
Borrows money on the eſtates of the Teutonic knights - - - — 321.
Had a private inclination to poſſeſs Franconia - - - - — 323.
Why induced to invade Bavaria a ſecond time - - - — 324, &c.
Recalled by Oxenſtiern - - - - - - - - - — 324, 323.
Meets him, 340.—Confers with him on points of great importance, 341.—On admitting the Germans into the grand treaty of commerce, ibid.—Sends him directors to four circles - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Call to men's minds Tycho Brahé's prediction, and Braunborn's - - ibid.
Plans the future great treaty of Hailbron - - - - - — 342.

## III.

### His Military Excellencies.

#### Perfective, Eſſay, xxxiv.


Thins the depth of files - - - - - - - - - ii. 24.
His natural turn for improvements - - - - - - i. 119, 136, 137.
In battles - - - - - - - - - - — 135, ii. 205.
In the uſe of artillery in battle - - - - - - i. 108. ii. 19.
In bridges - - - - - - - - i. 109, 110, 148. ii. 129.
In batteries and heavy ordnance - - - i. 99, 224, 371. ii. 19, 249.
In clothing his army, feeding it, and paying it - - - - - i. 220.
In punctuality of pay, and what that pay was - - - - — 219, 220. Eſſay, xxxiii, xxxiv, xli, xlii.
In debarkations - - - - - - - - - i. 107, 216.
In encampments and intrenchments - - - - - — 119, 141.
In intrenchments - - - - - - - — 141, 154, 181, 319.
———————, particularly near Nuremberg — 250, 254, 255, 283, 284.
In mining - - - - - - - - - - — 109.
In marches. Vid. Marches.
In military architecture - - - - - - - - 256. ii. 129.
In fubſiſting an army - - - - - - - - i. 113, 157, 373.
In the camp near Nurenberg, corn not dearer there than at the ſame time in London - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 263.
In ſieges - - - - - - - - - - i. 107, 319.
Winter campaigns - - - - - - - - — 285. ii. 332, 339.
State of his army, i. 210, 218, 221, &c. ii. 362, 363.—Again, civil and religious, Eſſay, xxxi, xxxiv.
His exact diſcipline - - - i. 221, 248, 352, 354. ii 57, 189, 213.
Vane's account thereof - - - - - - - - - ii. 71.
Its induſtry and ſobriety - - - - - - - - i. 221. ii. 57.
His dominions and revenues - - - - - - - - i. 211, &c.
State of his navy - - - - - - - - - — 216, 221.


#### Other Improvements by Gustavus.


He reforms the land and ſea ſervice, i. 99.—Again - - - - 137.
Deviſes a new military code - - - - - - - — 100, 154.
Performs every duty of officer and ſoldier in his own perſon - — 108, 219. Eſſay, xxxii.
Indefatigable in exerciſing his men - - - - - - - ii. 225.
Aboliſhes long pikes and pike-reſts - - - - - - i. 100. ii. 20.
Rectifies the pike - - - - - - - - i. 100, 127. ii. 20.
Had no occaſion for bayonets - - - - - - i. 127. ii. 20, 25.
Reforms the matchlock - - - - - - - - - i. 100.
Shortens the muſkets of cavalry into carbines - - - - - ii. 20.
Regulates the fire of the cavalry - - - - - - — 20, 43.
Changes whole armour into head and breaſt-pieces - - - - — 20.
Improves the field ſervice of the horſe - - - - - - — 18.
Erects a manufacture of arms - - - - - - - i. 100.


#### Inventive, Eſſay, xxxvi.


In the brigade or column, ii. 20, 26, 42.—Again - - - 362, 364.
[A drawing thereof by lord Reay in 1631] - - - - - — 21.
In platoons - - - - - - - - - - — 25, 226.
In leathern artillery - - - - i. 148, 156, 157. ii. 25, 29, 42 *
In a ſea boom - - - - - - - - - - i. 111.


A new

A new partiſan - - - - - - - - - - ii. 22, 25.
Commanded men; (that is, drafting regiments for choſen ſoldiers, whereby entire corps were not ruined, and the beſt perſons ſelected) - - i. 222. 280.
Mixing infantry with cavalry - - - - 367. ii. 20, 23, 29, 43, 371.
Dragoons - - - - - - - - - - - i. 156.*
Evolutions - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 42.
Concludes that foot can reſiſt horſe - - - - - - i. 127.
Subſtitutes the pouch, &c. for the bandileer - - - - - - ii. 20.
Reduces the Tertia into ſmall fractions - - - - - - — 23.

## IV.

### His peculiar Notions and Practices in Politics and War.

His great art in caſing his ſubjects - - - - - - - - i. 90.
— Firm explicitneſs in all public tranſactions - - - - — 99, 119.
Hated irregular troops - - - - - - - - - — 149.
Affected ſecrecy and meditation before any great enterpriſe - - — 151.
That it was ſafer to invade than be invaded, 114. ii. 20. - Eſſay, xl.
That an enemy ſhould never be urged to a ſtate of deſperation - - i. 120.
That infantry (other things being ſuppoſed equal) could reſiſt cavalry - — 127.
Never complained after misfortunes had happened, but applied ſeriouſly to remedy them - - - - - - - - - - — 145, 151.
Loved early campaigns - - - - - - - - - — 145, 296.
And winter ones - - - - - - - - - ii. 140, 332. 339.
Always preſerved a reſource unſeen - - - - - - - i. 189.
His idea of conquering a country in the manner it was firſt peopled ii. 60, 61.
Choſe to prefer young generals - - - - - - - - — 143.
Sought to be reverenced by his officers, and be loved by his ſoldiers - i. 221. Eſſay, xxxii.
That no perſon in his army ſhould ever remain unactive - - - — 220.
Dictated all inſtructions to ambaſſadors - - - - - - - — 91.
Performed all in his own perſon - - - - - — 100. ii. 19.
Not fond of councils of war - - - - - - - - - i. 392.
Diſliked cuiraſſiers completely armed - - - - - - - ii. 19.
Preferred the right wing to the centre as the poſt of command - - — 25.
Gives no German (civil) employment to native Swedes - - - — 53.
Snatched the moments when troops were in ardour - - - — 13, 19.
Affected to ride war horſes of a particular colour - - - — 29. || 216 †
Deſertion rarely known amongſt his ſoldiers - - - - - - — 72.
That conqueſt ſhould never imply ſlavery - - - - - — 51. 66.
That all good men are God's workmanſhip; that a new, though better ſhoe pinches at firſt; applied to conqueſt - - - - - - — 66, 67.
That in his caſe Poland and Germany were to be entered without a declaration of war - - - - - - - - - - i. 106. 209.
That all neutralities were odious - - - - - - - - ii. 50.
Always encreaſed his army in a march - - - - - - - - ibid.
Conceived that Oxenſtiern was not his ſuperior in politics, ii. 143.—Again, Eſſay, xlviii.
That he was obliged to take his chance with the meaneſt ſoldier - ii. 94.
That towns were not taken by drawing diagrams in a tent - - — 129.
That Arnheim was a better Jeſuit than a general - - - — 144.
That Gustavus muſt be among the German princes, and the firſt man among them - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Why he marched not to Vienna immediately after the battle of Leipſic ibid.
His fine idea of augmenting the electoral college - - - - — 170.
That no king had been killed by a cannon-ball - - - - — 129, 216.
That a great general with a ſmall army could rarely be obliged to fight, 261 — Choſe never more than 40,000 men - - - - - Eſſay, xxxviii.
That critical moments were always to be known and ſeized - - ii. 244.
That the Engliſh were eternally in treaty, yet never concluded - - — 292.

Examined war-prisoners upon oath - - - - - - - - ii. 272.
Passed by seniority sometimes, Essay, xxxii, xlv.; ii. 288*, and birth - — 7.
Subdivided his armies - - - - - - - - - Essay, xxxix.
Entered the empire without declaring war - - - - - Essay, xl.
Augments the number of officers - - - - - - - Essay, xlii.
Not fond of wearing armour - - - - - - - Essay, lv.; ii. 359.
— Nor of armies of observation - - - - - - - - — 320.

## V.

### His Manifestos, more important Speeches, Letters, and Treaties.

#### Manifestos.

His grand one on entering Germany - - - - - i. 213, 215.
A second on his irruption into Mechlenberg - - - - - — 272.
On the loss of Magdeburg - - - - - - - — 234, 240.
On entering Franconia - - - - - - - - - ii. 78, 79.

#### More important Speeches.

To the Swedish senate - - - - - - - - - i. 74, 90.
At a private meeting on invading Germany - - - - - — 189.
Dictated to Camerarius, and pronounced at the Hague - - — 278, 279.
To the elector of Brandenburg, and duke of Mechlenburg, on their resolution - - - - - - - - - - - - — 322.
To the senate of Erfurt, containing an elucidation of his reasons for entering Germany - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 51, 52.
To Oxenstiern at Mentz - - - - - - - - — 143, &c.
To his generals, on being overturned by a cannon ball - - - — 216.
To Horn, on passing the Lech - - - - - - - - — 200.

#### Letters.

To the catholic electors - - - - - - - - i. 205, 206.
To sir John Merrick, on relinquishing the siege of Riga - - — 88, 89.
To the Emperor - - - - - - - - - - — 277, 278.
To Louis XIII. - - - - - - - - - - — 273, 274.
To cardinal Richelieu - - - - - - - - - — 273.
To Charles I. on the victory of Leipsic - - - - - ii. 36, 37, 38.
To the Nurenbergers, on neutralities - - - - - - — 49.
To Charles of Lorraine, 151.—The answer to it - - - - — 152.
To Horn, on the armistice - - - - - - - - — 158.
To the Switzers - - - - - - - - - - — 247.
A second letter to Louis XIII. - - - - - - - — 264.
To Oxenstiern, about a dangerous march - - - - - — 280.
To his other generals, on the same subject - - - - - — 270.
To Oxenstiern - - - - - - - - - - — 351, 352.

## VI.

### His extemporaneous Speeches, Replies, and Messages.

#### Speeches.

To his generals, who besought him not to hazard his person - - i. 146.
To the inhabitants of Riga, to whom he granted a capitulation from pure generosity - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 112.
To a soldier who had rescued him, and whom he afterwards rescued - — 140.
To his surgeon, on extracting a ball - - - - - - - — 146, 147.
On the Dantzickers being good seamen - - - - - - — 150.
To two duellers - - - - - - - - - - — 154.
On the rapaciousness of military men - - - - - - — 158.
To Sirot, who had engaged him hand to hand - - - - - — 180.

To

To his generals, on faying his prayers - - - - - - - i. 217.
To his foldiers, on entering Germany - - - - - - - ibid.
To the governor of Stettin, thrice - - - - - - - — 253, 254.
To the burgo-maſter - - - - - - - - - ibid
To his generals, on religion - - - - - - - - — 347
To the duke of Pomerania, on entering Germany, 254.—Again - - — 278.
A ſecond to him on the ſubject of neutrality - - - - - — 255.
On the ſucceſs and fidelity of his troops - - - - - - ibid.
On the ſucceſs at Rugenwalt - - - - - - - - — 268.
On the death of ſome brave ſoldiers - - - - - - — 266.
To a colonel who could not keep a ſecret - - - - - - — 267.
On confiſcating the wealth of an aſſaſſin - - - - - - — 300.
On excepting the Croatians from quarter - - - - - - — 268.
To an officer who did not chooſe to work - - - - - - — 284.
To the Lubeckers - - - - - - - - - - — 285.
On making Knipbauſen governor of Nurenberg - - - — 305.*
On Teüffel's being wounded - - - - - - - - — 307.
To his generals, who reſolved to fight without armour - - - — 308.
To Hepburn and Lumſdel before they ſtormed Francfort - - - ibid.
To the Brandenburg miniſter on neutralities - - - - - — 350.
To imperial officers on a point of honour and gratitude - - - — 357.
To ſome Imperialiſts who aſked for quarter after the maſſacre at Magdeburg — 363.
To Gaſſion, on preſenting him a war-horſe - - - - - — 391.
To Arnheim, on the elector of Saxony's diſtreſſes - - - - ii. 7.
To the ſame, on having no participant in command - - - — 8.
To Tilly, on calling him cavalier - - - - - - - — 13.
To his ſoldiers riding down the lines - - - - - - - — 32.
To colonel Callenbach - - - - - - - - - ibid.
To his army, before the battle of Leipſic - - - - - - — 17.
On reconnoitering - - - - - - - - - - — 32.
On the fire of cavalry - - - - - - - - - — 20.
On declining to engage Tilly - - - - - - - - — 34.
To the elector of Saxony, after the battle of Leipſic - - - - — 41.
To the Nurenbergers, on inſincerity and neutralities - - - — 49, 50.
To the abbot of St. Peter's at Erfurt, on the conduct of his maſter - — 52.
To the magiſtrates, who declined accepting a Swediſh garriſon - - — 50.
To the jeſuits, on their intrigues and love of blood - - — 52, 53.
On humanity in war - - - - - - - - - - — 55.
To the count de Schwartzenburg, who feared the king bore him ill will — 56.
On conquering countries in the ſame manner as nature renders them firſt populous - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 60.
On the women and children at Koeningſhofen - - - - - — 65.
To the Francforters, who valued their fairs more than their conſciences — 93.
To the ſubjects of the elector of Mentz, on abſolving their allegiance - ibid.
To the magiſtrates who aſked him to ſleep in Francfort - - - — 94.
To the landgrave of Heſſe Darmſtadt, who wanted politeneſs - - ibid.
On the recovery of the Palatinate, 126, 127.—Again - - - — 145.
To de Pau, who beſought him not to hazard his life - - - - — 129.
On the deficiency of Engliſh ſubſidies - - - - - - — 145.
To the Cologn deputies, who threatened him with France - - — 145, 146.
On an aſſaſſination that menaced him - - - - - - — 154.
On being aſked to meet Richelieu - - - - - - - — 155.
To de Charnacé, who aggrandized the forces of France, ibid.—Again, 156.—On the French king's limiting his conqueſts - - - - — 156, &c.
On the duplicity of the princes of the league - - - - - — 157.
On granting the armiſtice - - - - - - - - - — 164.
On the eccleſiaſtical electors - - - - - - - - - ibid.
On examining the fortifications of Creützbach - - - - - — 176.
To St. Etienne, about French interferences - - - - - — 193
That ſeeming impoſſibilities may be executed in war - - - — 200.
What he ſaid on paſſing the Lech - - - - - - - — 202, &c.

On having alarmed Europe too far - - - - - - - ii. 208.
To the duke of Neuburg's miniſter, who propoſed a neutrality - - — 210.
On furnaming Gaſſion's regiment, the regiment of the pillow - - — 214.
To Albert of Bavaria, who requeſted a neutrality - - - - ibid.
On being hurt by a cannon ball - - - - - - - — 216.
To St. Etienne, in interpoſing petulantly in behalf of the Elector of Bavaria, 221.
—Again - - - - - - - - - - - — 222.
To the populace, which kneeled to him - - - - - - - — 223.
To propoſals from the inhabitants of Augſburg - - - - — 224.
To thoſe who propoſed to plunder Munich - - - - - — 225.
To the elector Palatine, on entering the ſaid city - - - - ibid.
An apology for the warmth of his temper - - - - - — 239.
To the Nurenbergers, who invited him to their city - - - - — 248.
On the magnificent generoſity of Walſtein - - - - - — 279.
To the Germans in caſe they mutinied - - - - - - ibid.
On himſelf acting in the character of a colonel - - - - - — 291.
To a common ſoldier, whom he condemned for ſtealing a peaſant's only cow — 279.
On the elector of Saxony's danger - - - - - - - — 302.*
To his generals, &c. near Nurenberg, on the ſubject of avarice, plunder, exactions, &c. - - - - - - - - - - - — 276, 278.
On making Kniphauſen governor of Nurenberg - - - - - — 321.
On Mitzval's baſe ſurrender - - - - - - - - — 326.
To Kniphauſen, on going on a party - - - - - - - — 340.
To the magiſtrates of Augſburg - - - - - - - — 344.
On being adviſed to decline battle with Walſtein - - - - — 356.
To Dr. Fabritius, on being deified by the people - - - - — 351.
To the Swediſh ſoldiers before the battle of Lützen - - - — 359, &c
To the Germans, on the like occaſion - - - - - - ibid.
To his men, who gave ground at the battle of Lützen - - - — 366.
To Stalhaus about the imperial cuiraſſiers - - - - - ibid, &c.
On reading the Bible - - - - - - - - - - — 382.
To his men who perceived him wounded - - - - - - — 377.
To the duke of Saxe Lawenberg, on the ſame - - - - - ibid.
To the Imperialiſts who murdered him - - - - - - — 378.
His dying words - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
The peculiar and individuating caſts of all his ſpeeches - - Eſſay, xxxvii.

REPLIES.

To the Emperor - - - - - - - - - - i. 277, 278.
On being adviſed to except a traitor from the articles of capitulation - — 306.
To Tilly, on ſtyling him a cavalier - - - - - - - ii. 13.
To the king of Denmark, who propoſed a general peace - - — 209, 210.
To Hepburn, who adviſed him where to attack Walſtein - - - — 287.
To the congratulations of his chaplain after a victory - - - i. 140.
To OXENSTIERN, who blamed him for having too much fire - — 146, 151.
To the catholic electors, who had omitted his regal titles - - - — 273.
To the Pomeranian deputies - - - - - - - - — 227.
To the catholic electors, on calling him king - - - - — 272, 273.
To de Charnacé, on France's demanding precedency over Sweden — 273, 274.
Rejoinder on the ſame ſubject - - - - - - - - ibid.

MESSAGES.

To old Sapieha, before a battle - - - - - - - - i. 127.
To the governor of Stettin - - - - - - - - — 253.
To the elector of Saxony - - - - - - - - - ii. 7.

## VII.

OTHER SPEECHES, OF THE HUMOROUS, FACETIOUS, AND IRONICAL KIND.

On ſeeing the ladies in the caſtle windows of Stettin - - - i. 255.
On ſleeping in a hammock - - - - - - - - — 256.

On

On being reproved for going too near the enemy and ſinking into a moraſs, i. 302.
To the emperor, on being wounded by an eagle — — — — 260.
To the duke of Pomerania, who was childleſs — — — — — 255.
To the duke of Savelli, as more a courtier than a warrior — — — 301.
To his ſoldiers ſtorming Francfort — — — — — — 307, 308.
To the electreſs of Brandenburg, and her train of ladies, about paſſing a ſummer in Sweden — — — — — — — — — 333.
To captain Dumain, on falling into a moraſs — — — — — 300.
To a Saxon lieutenant who ſcaled a wall — — — — — 309.
To Monro, on hard drinking — — — — — — — ii. 44.
To his phyſician — — — — — — — — — i. 146.
On the loſs of his hat in Poland — — — — — — — ii. 52.
To court flatterers, 94.*—Again when they extolled his conqueſts — — 97.
On tranſporting the palace of Braunfels to Stockholm — — — 94.†
On the landgrave of Heſſe Darmſtadt — — — — — — 153.
To his friends, concerning an aſſaſſination threatened — — — 154.
On the French king's propoſing that Richelieu ſhould meet and confer with him — — — — — — — — — — 155.
On being threatened with a great number of French troops — — ibid.
To the Spaniards if they caught him on the weſtern banks of the Moſelle — 176.
To a colonel who ſtaid to be ſhaved — — — — — — ibid.
On Horn's loſing a battle — — — — — — — — 180.
To Banier, on a letter of ſummons — — — — — — — 187.
To colonel Spar, on twice taking him priſoner — — — — 274, 275.
To ſome generals who excuſed themſelves from reading — — Eſſay, liv.

## VIII.

### His perſonal Bravery, Preſence of Mind, and Firmneſs.

#### Bravery.

At the ſtorming of Blechingen — — — — — — — i. 69.
At the ſiege of Notteberg — — — — — — — — 90.
In the battle of Marienverder — — — — — — 180, 182.
In the engagement hand to hand with Sirot — — — — 179, 180.
In the camiſado near Wolmerſtadt — — — — — — 365, &c.
In Aligheri's ambuſcade — — — — — — — — 265, &c.
At the battle of Werben — — — — — — — — 370, &c.
In entering Elbingen alone, before it had capitulated — — — 134.
In perſiſting to invade Poland — — — — — — — 107.
On croſſing the Rhine — — — — — — — — — ii. 126.
To the Germans in caſe they rebelled — — — — — — 279.

#### Preſence of Mind.

Always ſeized the critical moment — — — — — i. 98, ii. 292.
Alarmed, but never dejected — — — — — — — 269, 296.

#### Firmneſs.

i. 76, 98, 118, 119, ii. 326. Before the battle of Lützen — — 354, &c.
In the long intended invaſion of Germany — — — i. 124, 204, 277.
Camerarius's idea of his perſeverance — — — — — — —279.
Unmoved in his ſituation at Wurtzburg, ii. 80.—and on the loſs of Lichtenau, 296.
On the infidelity of the armiſtice — — — — — — — 156.
When his allies grew jealous — — — — — — — 207, 208.
Towards Chriſtian king of Denmark — — — — — — 209, 210.
When Wallſtein oppoſed him with treble numbers, 246, 264.—His letters on the occaſion — — — — — — — — — — ibid. and 279, &c.
When he threatened his generals about avarice and plunder — — 276, 278.

## IX.

### His just Spirit, Resentment, and Sense of Honour.

To the king of Denmark, i. 122.—Again - - - - - - - i. 356.
To the elector of Brandenburg on his redemanding Spandau - - — 320.
To Tilly, who called him a cavalier - - - - - - - ii. 13.
To the same, for the slaughter at New Brandenburg - - - - — 6.
To de Charnacé twice, who wanted to abridge his titles - - i. 273, 274.
To the town of Magdeburg - - - - - - - - - — 341.
In not entering Saxony without permission - - - - - ii. 12.
In not stealing a march from Walstein - - - - - - - — 321.
In restoring Custrin and Spandau - - - - - - - i. 350.
In detesting duelling - - - - - - - - - — 154, 155.
To the landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt - - - - - - ii. 94.
On meeting Richelieu, and on threats from France - - - - — 164.
On the French king's assuming a pre-eminence - - - - — 156, 157.
To St. Etienne the French ambassador, 221.—Again - - - - — 222.
Demands a Bavarian velt mareschal to be given up to his justice - — 228.
His quarrel with sir H. Vane about Douglas - - - - — 236, &c.

## X.

### His Generosity and Bounty.

Allows two years truce to Sigismond in distress - - - i. 97.
Confers knighthood on Horn, Banier, 111, and Todt - - - — 149.
Grants all his patrimonial estates (except Lindholm) to the university of Upsal, 117.—Sends a library thither - - - - - - - — 133.
Founds two more universities, and erects schools in Lapland - - — 117.
Gratefully rewards his preceptor - - - - - - - - ibid.
Offers peace when he had conquered Livonia, Lithuania, and Courland — 125.
Again immediately after the victory of Walhoff, 126.—And again, 127, to Horn, Banier, and Todt - - - - - - - - - - — 174.
To the inhabitants of Francfort - - - - - - - - — 310.
Behaves generously to Braun, an ensign - - - - - - — 296.
To a poor blacksmith - - - - - - - - - - — 318.
To colonel Lesley - - - - - - - - - - - — 295.
To the dukes of Mechlenberg - - - - - - - - — 358.
To the English and Hamburg merchants - - - - - - — 351.
To Gassion, 391.—Again - - - - - - - - - ii. 213.
To colonel Teüffel - - - - - - - - - - i. 288.
To Lumsdel - - - - - - - - - - - - — 308.
To the English ambassador, sir Thomas Roe - - - - — 375, 376.
To Dewhatel - - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 83.
To the count de Hanau's mother - - - - - - - - — 91.
To colonel Lily - - - - - - - - - - - — 128.
Gives the elector of Mentz's library to Oxenstiern - - - - ibid.
To his soldiers on passing the Lech, 201.—On taking Munich - - — 225.
To old general Ruthven - - - - - - - - - - — 214.
His gratitude to Nurenberg - - - - - - - - - — 264.
His generosity to the enemy, and his own soldiery, 273, 274. - Essay, l, li.

## XI.

### His Humanity, Compassion, and Moderation.

To the town of Riga - - - - - - - - - i. 112, 113.
To the garrison, &c. of Mew - - - - - - - - — 139, &c.
To all distressed enemies - - - - - - - - - — 115.
To the senators of Lubec - - - - - - - - - — 285.
Makes a law merely to assist the poor - - - - - - — 124.
Plunders no man when he invaded Prussia - - - - - — 133.

Extremely beloved by his subjects, i. 114.—And soldiers - - i. 221, 256.
His unfavourable idea of rapacious soldiers - - - - - — 158.
His sincerity to the elector Palatine - - - - - - - — 244.
Beloved wherever he conquered, 288 - - - - - Essay, xxxiii.
Attracts great numbers of deserters - - - - - - - — 284.
Destroys not two bridges for any convenience - - - - - — 286.
Makes reprisals on Tilly's cruelty - - - - - - — 305, 309.
His protestation thereon - - - - - - - - - - — 331.
Lenity to the inhabitants - - - - - - - - - ii. 33.
To some soldiers who asked for quarter after the massacre of Magdeburg, i. 363.
To the elector of Saxony in distress - - - - - - - ii. 7, 8.
Relents on the interception of the Brandenburg ladies - - i. 321, 350.
Feeds and clothes the new-conquered inhabitants in the isle of Usedom — 217, 223.
Makes the invader more acceptable than the prince invaded—224, and 148, &c.
On storming Francfort, near the Oder - - - - - - - — 310.
Reproves duke Bernard and Bauditzen for their courage - - - — 373.
His humanity and lenity, ii. 243 - - - - - - - Essay, xliii.
His compassion to his poor soldiers - - - - - - - ii. 290.
To colonel Monro when wounded - - - - - - - — 291.
To colonel Horneck condemned by a court-martial, 255 - - Essay, xliv.
To Spar, a Walsteiner - - - - - - - - - ii. 275, 276.
To a spy who missed little of ruining him - - - - - — 284.
To a false or timorous commander - - - - - - - — 296.
His tenderness to Oxenstiern - - - - - - - — 351, 352.
To his mother and child - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
To Tilly's memory - - - - - - - - - - — 162.
To the inhabitants of Landshut - - - - - - - - — 168.
Sheds tears on a speech made by the old margrave of Baden Dourlach — 162.

## XII.

### His Politeness and Courtesy.

To the English nation - - - - - - - - - - i. 88, &c.
King of Poland, and his family - - - - - - - - — 115.
Inhabitants of Elbingen, and the governor - - - - — 135, 136.
People of Riga, that were in effect prisoners of war - - - — 112.
Ladies at Massovia, 157, 158.—At Berlin - - - - —322, 354.
Sirot, who fought him hand to hand - - - - - - — 180.
The burgo-master of Stetin - - - - - - - - - — 254.
A young count La Torre - - - - - - - - - — 288.
Gassion - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 391.
Colonel Damitz, who had displeased him - - - - - - — 254.
Elector of Saxony on the defeat of his troops - - - - - ii. 41.
To the inhabitants of Francfort - - - - - - - - — 93.
Makes several public entries bareheaded - - - - - - ibid.
Politeness to Pappenheim and Cronenberg - - - - - - — 147.
To the king of Bohemia - - - - - - - - - — 171.
To young Pappenheim - - - - - - - - - - — 186.
To the elector of Bavaria and the town of Munich - - - — 224, &c.
To a capuchin who wanted to convert him - - - - — 226, &c.
To Walstein - - - - - - - - - - - - — 280.
To Banier and other generals on leaving Bavaria - - - - — 340.
To his queen - - - - - - - - - - - - — 344.
To duke William of Weymar - - - - - - - - ibid.

## XIII.

### His Defects, mental, &c.

An hasty, inflammable temper - - - - i. 82, 266. ii. 238, &c.
His apology for it - - - - - - - - - ii. 139, 144.

Covetousness

Covetouſneſs objected improperly to him, as likewiſe arrogance - ii. 6‡.
The charge refuted - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.‡
Ambition. Proof uncertain - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Called by Vane an ill diſciplinarian, 71.—The charge refuted - - ibid.*
The ſubject again conſidered and anſwered - - - - - - — 271.
N. B. Contraſt this warmth of temper with coolneſs on other occaſions; e. g.—
In declining to beſiege Pappenheim, i. 364.—Again - - 369, 392.
When affronted by Hepburn, ii. 288, 290.—In decamping from Nurenberg, 297.
—Again - - - - - - - - - - - - - 320.

His Defect corporeal.

Shortneſs of eye-ſight - - - - - - - - - i. 308. ii. 376.

XIV.

His Religion, Piety, conjugal Affection, &c.

Erects a church for emigrating proteſtants - - - - i. 82, 143.
Caution about their good morals, 83.—Grants them immunity from taxes — 143.
—And a power of returning home - - - - - - - - ibid.
Inſtitutes a ſecular ſolemnity in honour of the reformation - - - — 104.
Patron of the refugees - - - - - - - - - - — 143.
Returns God thanks in St. Peter's church, the moment he entered Riga - — 112.
Pious reply to his chaplain - - - - - - - - - — 139.
Determined enemy to all irreligion and immorality - - - - - — 153.
And alſo to duelling - - - - - - - - —154, 155.
Speech to his generals on ſaying his prayers - - - - - — 218.
Makes expreſs prayers to God on account of a ſtorm - - - — 254.
Speech on the indiſpenſable obligation of religion in a ſoldier - - — 257.
On the marvellous ſucceſs at Rugenwalt - - - - - - — 308.
Ordains a ſecond general faſt - - - - - - - - — 279.
Adds new prayers to his book of diſcipline, 285 - - - Eſſay, xxxiv.
Private thankſgiving for the junction of his armies, ii. 282.—For the rencounter at Freyſtadt - - - - - - - - - - — 275.
Orders public prayers before the battle of Leipſic - - - - — 13.
Appoints a public thankſgiving for taking Francfort - - - - i. 310.
Again at Mentz - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 128.
Declines to fight advantageouſly on a Sunday - - - - - i. 365.
Grieves to ſee his men grow inſolent and vicious - - - 352, ii. 55.
Retires to his devotions, a whole morning preceding the battle of Leipſic — 13.
Inſcribes the word Emmanuel on all his enſigns - - - - - — 23.
His affection to his queen, 52.—Again - - - - - - — 159.
His idea of a ſoldier's clemency and humanity - - - - - — 55.
Zeal for the Lutheran religion - - - - - - - - — 171.
His fine behaviour at Augſburg - - - - - - - —210, &c.
Sees the Lutheran ſervice performed at Munich - - - - — 226.
Diſputes with the Jeſuits on communion *ſub utraq.* - - ibid. and 227.
His abhorrence of cruelty, rapine, and extortion in war - - —276, &c.
His diſintereſtedneſs and gratitude - - - - - - - —278.
Orders prayers before the battle of Lützen - - - - - — 359.
His final tender parting with his queen - - - - - — 344, &c.
Affection to his mother and daughter - - - - - - — 356.
His ejaculation when death-ſtruck - - - - - - - — 378.
His moral and religious diſcipline, — 71, &c. 363.†—His temperance ibid.
Averſion to luxury - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Guſtavus Burg; ſurnamed the prieſts ſcourge - - - - - — 178.

H.

*Hagenmuller* negotiates with Saxony for the emperor - - - ii. 4.
*Halt* (colonel) killed at Leipſic, ii. 32.—Another at Creützmach - - — 176.

*Hamilton* (Sir John) reſigns in diſguſt - - - - - - - ii. 66.
———, (marq.) levies an army for GUSTAVUS, i. 374.—Number of his troops, 383.—Sails for Germany, 382.—His magnificent retinue, 384.—Never could obtain a command in chief, 385.—Enraged at leaving Sileſia, ibid.—Joins Banier, who treats him with ſuperiority, 386.—Wants to fight, but over-ruled, 387. Serves as volunteer, 388.—Aſks in vain for a new army, 387.—Reſigns; diſmiſſed honourably - - - - - - - - - - 390.
——— returns to England - - - - - - - - ii. 297.
*Hanau* (count) hath intelligence with the king - - - - - - — 2.
———, (Amelia Elizabeth, of). See landgraveſs of Heſſe-Caſſel.
*Hanſe* towns ſecretly favour the Swedes - - - - - i. 153. ii. 146.
*Harangue* de Sir Robert Anſtruther à Ferdinand II. App. XV. - - 493.
——— du Camerarius, App. XVIII. - - - - - - - - 501.
*Harte* (Charles) made governor of Wurtzburg, ii. 67.—Defends Schweinfurt againſt Walſtein, 336.—Commands the white brigade at Lützen - — 370.
*Harvey* (William, ſon of the earl of Briſtol, a fine youth) drowned - — 283.
*Hatzfield* (colonel) ſtrangely aſſaſſinated - - - - - - — 86.
*Haydon* (colonel) killed at Francfort - - - - - - - i. 310.
*Heatley*, (George) behaves well at Damin, i. 298.—Scales Francfort - — 305.
*Heidelberg*, famous convention there 1629 - - - - - - — 229.
*Hepburn* (Sir John) behaves well in the battle of Dirſchau, i. 138.—At the ſtorming of Francfort, 308.—Wounded - - - - - - - - — 310.
——— thanked by the king for his ſervice at Leipſic, ii. 42.—Commands with Bauditzen, 54.—Quarrels with GUSTAVUS; unkind to his maſter, 287, &c.—Inflexible on the ſubject, 297.—Killed in a duel in France, ibid.—Conducts the private expedition to Oxenfurt, 79.—Thanked by GUSTAVUS: made governor of Munich - - - - - - - - - - - — 231.
*Herberſtein*, (colonel) killed at Franckfort - - - - - - - i. 309.
*Heſſe-Caſſel* (landgrave) ſucceeds on his father's reſignation, i. 271.—Suſpicious about the emperor, 186.—Treats with GUSTAVUS, 271, 320, 293.—Receives aſſiſtance - - - - - - - - - - - - - 373.
——— Raiſes the ſiege of Nurenberg, ii. 147.—Aſks aſſiſtance of GUSTAVUS, 1.—Concludes a treaty with him - - - - - - - - - - 2.
*Heſſe Caſſel* (Amelia, landgraveſs of) the firſt woman in her own century or any other, Eſſay, I.—Some account of her - - - - - - - — 207, &c.
*Heſſe-Darmſtadt*, inſincere to Sweden, ii. 90.—Affronts the king, 95.—A Proteus in politics, ibid.—Cedes Ruſſelheim, 96.—Styled ludicrouſly by GUSTAVUS pacificator general - - - - - - - - - - - — 279.
*Hildeſheim*, ominous pantomime there - - - - - - - i. 358.
*Hirchfield* (abbacy) ſome account thereof - - - - - - - ii. 5.
*Hiſtorians* (French) ſuperficial and inſincere - - - - - — 386.
*Hoe* (Dr.) a turbulent inſincere eccleſiaſtic - - - - - - i. 325.
*Holberg* (baron) travelled over Europe on a ſmall fund - - - - — 126.*
*Holk* (Henry) commands in Stralſund, i. 162.—Makes a great reſiſtance at Tangermond, 366.—Some account of him, his miſerable death, ibid.†—Invades Saxony; his cruelty, ibid.† ii. 5.‡—Invades it again, 372, &c.—Ravages Vogtland, 305.—Commands the left wing at Lützen - - - 361.
*Hollanders*, lend GUSTAVUS money, i. 92.—Allow him to raiſe men, and lend him a fleet, ibid.—Mediators in the peace at Stolba - - - - - ibid.
*Hollow ſquare*; an uſeleſs configuration, ii. 19.—Its folly - - 364, 365.
*Holſtein* (duke) ſent by the emperor to aſſiſt the Poles - - - i. 147.
——— behaves gallantly at Leipſic, ii. 30.—Killed there; his laſt words, 39.†
*Hongreline*; [a kind of ſhort waiſtcoat ſtiffened like jumps or ſtays, worn by the Hungarian ladies; its compoſition to us unknown. It was ſuppoſed to reſiſt a piſtol ball, or the point of a ſword. Mareſchal de Saxe always wore one. There was another ſort, of ſmall chain-work. *Memoirs communicated.*]
*Horn* (Everard) ambaſſador to Muſcovy, i. 88, and Poland - - 126.
——— (Guſtavus) knighted for his early valour, i. 111.—Counterworks Montecuculi, 280.—Commands the camp at Stetin, 364.—Blockades Colbergen, 283. Makes the treaty of Bernwalt, 294.—Negotiates with the elector of Brandenburg, 321.—Obſerves Schomberg's motions - - - - - - 364.

*Horn* (Guſtavus)
—— Joins the king at Wittemberg, ii. 12.—Thanked by GUSTAVUS for his behaviour at Leipſic, 42.—Watches Tilly near Bamberg, 147.—His great clemency to the inhabitants, 179.—Loſes the battle of Bamberg, 180, &c.—His fine retreat, 181, &c.—Gives a camiſado to two regiments, ibid.—His beautiful character; ſurnamed GUSTAVUS's right arm, 181.*—A religious officer and excellent diſciplinarian, ibid.—His emotion and tenderneſs on a petition from young ladies, ibid.*—Marries OXENSTIERN's daughter; his uncommon affection to her, 182.*—His fine campaign in Alſatia, 316.—Oppoſes the paſſing the Lech, 199.—Beats colonel Montbaillion, 317.—His merciful diſpoſition, 318.—Beſieges and takes Benfelden - - - - - - - - - - 319.
*Horneck* (colonel) conducts the attack at Riga - - - - - i. 100.
*Horſes*, romantic names given them in the 30 years wars - - Eſſay, li.
*Hungarians*, affect to be on good terms with Sweden - - - ii. 147.
*Hurts* (Richard) ſecretary to Anſtruther - - - - - - 95.

## I.

*James I.* (of England) makes an amicable peace between Sweden and Denmark, i. 76, &c.—Refuſes to be ſponſor with the infanta, 77.—Makes a peace between GUSTAVUS and the czar, 92.—The idea foreigners had of him, 122.—Acknowledges on his death bed his ill conduct about the Palatinate - - 123.
*Jaroſlaw*, a fatal fire there - - - - - - - - - i. 128.
*Jeſuits*, baniſhed by GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - —134.
—— well reprimanded by him, ii. 53.—Attempt to aſſaſſinate him, 154.—Commend his diſcipline - - - - - - - - - - —146.
*Jeſſen* (Dr.) his prediction on the emperor Matthias verified - - - i. 263.
*Imperialiſts*; their horrid cruelty to a child, i. 263.—Their inſolence and rapaciouſneſs, 230.—Great ſtrength when the king landed, 223, &c.—Half ſtarved by filling their camp with rabble, 318.—Vid. Auſtrians.—Their avarice, cruelty, and want of diſcipline, Eſſay, xli.—Pomp of their generals - Eſſay, xlii.
*Impreſe* and deviſes of chivalry - - - - - - - - Eſſay, li.
*Indies*. See Commerce.
*Infant* (cardinal) his generoſity to Gambacorta, Eſſay, l.—To Piccolomini, ibid.
*Intelligencer* (Swediſh); ſome account of that work - - - i. 307.*
*John*, ſon of Guſtavus Vaſa, i. 66.—Succeeds his brother who had been depoſed, 94.
*Joſeph* (father) appears at Ratiſbon; his buſineſs, i. 246.—His life and character from a curious manuſcript in the author's poſſeſſion, 247,* &c.—Makes a campaign, and turns capuchin at twenty-three, ibid.*—Travels into England: foments the grand rebellion, ibid.—Makes a treaty with the emperor in relation to Italy.—Directed the conſtable des Luynez and Richelieu.—Refuſes a mitre and cardinal's cap; affects to receive viſits from Richelieu in a private lodging - - - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
—— wants to make GUSTAVUS a piece of French mechaniſm - - ii. 154.
*Jour* (colonel) killed at Francfort - - - - - - - - i. 309.
*Irregulars*, hated by GUSTAVUS and prince Eugene - - - - —149.
*Iſabella* (infanta, Clara Eugenia) ſome account of her. Suppoſed to be rendered barren by art, i. 237.*—Breaks the truce - - - - - 152.
*Iſolani*, general of the Croatians, beaten, ii. 337.—His hiſtory, ibid.†—Errors of French authors concerning him - - - - - - - ibid.
*Julian*, (colonel St.) governor of Colbergen - - - - - i. 303.

## K.

*Kaplar*; his gallant ſpeech when condemned at Prague - - - i. 262.
*Keller* (captain) bravely defends Wurtzburg and Marienberg caſtle, ii. 70, &c.—His ſtratagem - - - - - - - - - - - - 71.
*Kevenhuller* (the hiſtorian) ſent to treat with the Auſtrian peaſants - —300.
*Kleſel* (cardinal) prime miniſter to Rodolphus and Matthias, i. 233.—Hiſtory of his fall ibid†.—His integrity and diſculpation, 234.—Helps to overturn Wallſtein; dies - - - - - - - - - - - - 291.

*Kniphauſen* (Dodo) made governor of the iſle of Uſedom, i. 225.—Fights the battle of Colbergen, 280, &c.—His billet to the commander of a town, 281.—Blamed unjuſtly for his great coolneſs, 282.—His character, 302.—Enemy to the Scots, ibid.—His fine defence of new Brandenburg, 303, &c.—Taken priſoner, 304.—Honoured highly by GUSTAVUS - - - - - 305.*

——— undertakes to defend Nurenberg, ii. 320.—The king's high idea of him, ibid.—Takes Lauff, 339.—Againſt engaging at Lützen, 353.—Propoſes a retreat, 360.—His fine behaviour and coolneſs in that battle - - 371.

*Kutnar*, a ſenator of old Prague; his ſpeech on being condemned to be hanged, i. 262.

——— ſpeech of another about being torn to pieces by wild horſes — 262.

——— of a third, becauſe a young man was to be executed before him ibid.

L.

*Ladron* (count) killed by his imprudence - - - - - i. 332.

*Lamormain*, confeſſor to the emperor, averſe to cruelty - - - — 261.

*Langfritz*, i. e. Longſides (captain) ſtrikes Tilly with his carbine - ii. 36, 40.†

*Laurea* Auſtriaca (a work ſo called); its character and great uſe in Engliſh hiſtory - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 92.*

*Lawenberg* (duchy) ſome account of it - - - - - - —276.*

——— (dukes of)

——— Auguſtus; the reigning prince eſpouſes the Swediſh cauſe - i. 276.

——— (Francis Charles) takes Ratzburg, and made priſoner by Pappenhein, i. 276.—Marries Gabriel Bethlem's widow, and Teüffel's - - ibid.*

——— (Rodolphus) ſerved under Tilly - - - - - i. 276.

——— reſcued him at the battle of Leipſic, ii. 40.—His gallant behaviour at Donawert - - - - - - - - - - - - 190, &c.

——— (Henry Julius) negotiates with Saxony for Emperor - ii. 235.

——— (Francis Julius) killed by peaſants - - - - - i. 276.*

——— (Francis Albert) ſuppoſed to have had a hand in the king's death, i. 276. ii. 304.—Conveys himſelf from the battle when the king fell.—Related to GUSTAVUS, 379, 380.—Serves the emperor in Italy.—His high ſpirit, ibid.—Reſigns and applies to GUSTAVUS, 380.—Suſpected by OXENSTIERN, ibid.—Neglected by the Swedes.—Serves the elector of Saxony, and then the Imperial court, 379.—Taken into new favour at Vienna, ibid.—Concerned with Walſtein, ibid.—Dies at the battle of Schweidnitz, 380.—Strange ſtory concerning his hatred to GUSTAVUS, ibid.—Alleviation in his favour - - 381.

*Learning*, generoſity towards it from the Iriſh army - - - - - i. 118.

*Lech* (the battle of the) alarms all Europe - - - - - ii. 208.

*Leipſic*. See Battles. Famous convention there, i. 324, 329.—Proteſtant princes there aſſembled, 324.—The concluſions they formed, 328, &c. and ſigned, 310.

——— ſeveral contributions raiſed on it by Tilly - - - - - ii. 10.

*Leopold* (archduke) well ſupplied with church preferments - - i. 186.*

——— dies of a broken heart - - - - - - - - ii. 317.

*Leſlie* (ſir Alexander, afterwards earl of Leven) commander of Stralſund, takes the iſland of Uſedom, i. 217.—Secures the ſiege of Gartz, 287.—Joins Hamilton, 382.—Alarmed at the marquis's conduct, ibid.—Nobly rewarded by his maſter, 295.—Made governor of Francfort - - - - 311.

*Leſlie* (another) one of Walſtein's aſſaſſins - - - - - ii. 120.

*Letter* from GUSTAVUS to Charles I. App. XXIV. - - - - - 524.

——— ——— Horn concerning the armiſtice, App. XXVII. - 528.

*Lettres* du duc de Pomeranie, App. X. 476; des electeurs Catholiques, XI. 478; du roi de Suede, XII. 480; XIV. 487; XVI. 498; XVII. 500; de l'Empereur, XIII. - - - - - - - - - - - - 485.

*Lignitz* (duke of) commands in Sileſia - - - - - - - i. 100.

——— hiſtory of that duchy - - - - - - - - ii. 303.†

*Lilly's* (W. the aſtrologer) letter to GUSTAVUS, App. II. - - - 451.

*Lily* (Axel) nobly rewarded by the king, ii. 128.—Made governor of Wurtzburg 91.

*Lindſey* (lieutenant-colonel) killed at New Brandenburg - - - i. 304.

*Lipſius* bequeaths his night-gown to the virgin of Loretto - - - —178.

*Liſle*, (enſign) his odd accident - - - - - - - —299.

*Loccenius*

*Loccenius*, some account of his history - - - - - - i. 71.*
*Lorrain* (Charles, duke of) marches 17,000 men to join Tilly, ii. 74.—His romantic expedition, 75, &c.—Aspires to be generalissimo, 101.—Answers the king's letter, 150.—His private motives and reasons, 152.—Extraordinary speech made him by a waggoner - - - - - - - - - 76.
——— troops; their amazing ignorance, ii. 76.—Their cruelty - 192.
*Louis XIII.* king of France, dreads a conference with GUSTAVUS, and flies from it - - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 91.
——— Again, ii. 154.—His astonishment on the king's passing the Lech - 207.
*Lubeck*; the congress there - - - - - - - - - i. 163, &c.
*Lumsdel* (colonel) storms Francfort, i. 308.—Takes 18 colours - - ibid.
——— wounded, ii. 40.—Thanked by the king - - - - - 44.
*Lunenberg* (George, duke of) sent by the emperor to assist the Danes, i. 78.—His history - - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.*
——— commands on the Weser, ii. 73.—Raises 12,000 men for GUSTAVUS, 146.—His campaign in Lower Saxony, 313, &c.—Attempts fruitlessly to join GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - - - - 345.
——— (duchy) its history, ii. 314.—Its library - - - - - ibid.*
*Luther*; some account of him - - - - - - - - - i. 192.
——— His gratitude for a draught of ale, ii. 313.§—Many excellent manuscripts relating to him, and the reformation: where - - - - 337.*

## M.

*Magdeburg*; one cause of contention in the 30 years wars, i. 170, &c.—Its famous siege, 331, &c.—Some account of its antiquities, ibid.†—Two narratives concerning storming the town, one by a clergyman, 343, &c. and one by a fisherman - - - - - - - - - - - - - 348, &c.
*Magdeburgensi* excidio regis Suecici, App. XXI. - - - - - 516.
*Man*; the religions most probably the bravest - - - - - - xii.
*Manifesto*. See Manifesto; sometimes a political anthology, ii. 170. in the characteristic Index of GUSTAVUS.
*Manifesto* of GUSTAVUS on invading Germany, App. VII. - - - 465.
*Mansfelt* (Ernest, count) found infantry equal to cavalry, but never reasoned thereon, i. 127.—Supposed by some to have introduced dragoons - i. 156.*
——— county; its history - - - - - - - - - - ii. 1.†
*Marazini* (colonel) his regiment thought by some fatal to GUSTAVUS - i. 291.
*Marble* (Bohemian) much commended - - - - - - - ii. 106.
*Marches*. Uncommon ones:
Of GUSTAVUS over a morass - - - - - - - - i. 148.
A second - - - - - - - - - - - — 156, &c.
A third, over a morass to the siege of Damin - - - - - - — 297.
To Francfort on the Oder - - - - - - - - — 305, &c.
From Werben to Leipsic - - - - - - - - ii. 11, 17, 21.
Of GUSTAVUS through the Thuringian forest - - - - - — 46, &c.
Of Hepburn and Monro's men, ii. 79.—Of Monro's regiment, 80.*—See Essay, xxxviii.
Of OXENSTIERN, ii. 79.—Of some English regiments, 281.—Of duke Bernard, ibid.—Banier, ibid. &c. to join the king, 282.—Extraordinary one of Pappenheim to and from Maestricht, 306, &c.—The latter part thereof considered again, 331, 335.—Fine one projected by GUSTAVUS, to form the junction before the battle of Lützen - - - - - - - - 350.
Rapidity of the king's marches in general, i. 112. 315. ii. 54, 67, 190.—See Essay, xxx.—Again, 322.—What was said on that subject - - 128.
*Marine* (Swedish) some account thereof - - - - - - - i. 218.
*Marradas* (don Baltazar) ii. 235.—An excellent courtier - - - ibid.
*Masses* of infantry, called Tertias; their folly, ii. 354.—Vid. *Tertias*.
*Matthew* (Sir Toby) an infant politician, ii. 69.†—Speaks disrespectfully of GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
*Matthias* (emperor) his history - - - - - - - - - i. 197.
*Maurice* (prince of Nassau) his beautiful character - - - - - i. 245.

*Mazarin*,

*Mazarin*; parallel between him and Oxenſtiern - - - - - i. 98, 99.
*Maximilian* (the emperor) ſome account of him - - - - - — 197.
*Maximilian.* Vide *Bavaria.*
*Mechlenberg* (dukes of) i. 227.—Recover their dominions, 358.—Their crimes againſt the emperor, 358.‡—Reſtored in great pomp to their duchies ibid.
*Medal*, on the victory of Leipſic - - - - - - - - - ii. 34.
*Melk*; his ſtratagem on Malchin - - - - - - - - i. 294.
*Menke* (profeſſor) juſt criticiſm of - - - - - - - - xi.*
*Mentz* (elector) ſome account of him, ii. 50.*—Incapacitated by GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 194.
*Merci*; the greateſt general ſince GUSTAVUS - - - - Eſſay, liii.
*Mercure Suiſſe*; its author and character - - - - - - i. 208.
——— François and Soldat Suedois; which author compiled from the other - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 178.‡
*Merode* (colonel) taken priſoner at Roſtock, i. 270.—Killed at the battle of the Lech - - - - - - - - - - - - - ii 205.
——— (colonel) another; enters Weſtphalia - - - - - — 331.
*Merodeurs*; why ſo called, and not *Marauders* - - - - - — 70.*
*Merrick* (ſir John) ambaſſador to GUSTAVUS, i. 83.—Receives a polite letter from him, 88.—Aſſiſts at the peace of Stolba - - - - - 91.
*Metaphyſics*; why diſcountenanced by GUSTAVUS - - - i. 86. 97.
*Metternich* (colonel) his odd demand for embalming a body - - ii. 316.
*Michaelovitzki*, a Bohemian nobleman, demands the precedency of age, to be beheaded firſt - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 262.
*Michna* (commiſſary general) eſcapes from Prague, ii. 88.—Subſcribes to the war - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 100.
*Military Men*; miſtaken notion of ſome - - - - - - - xiv.
*Mitzval* (colonel) ſome account of him - - - - - - - i. 110.
——— beheaded for ſurrendering Rayn - - - - - - ii. 325. 327.
*Monk* (A) attempts to aſſaſſinate GUSTAVUS - - - - i. 266, 267.
*Monro* (colonel Robert) takes Rugenwalt ſurpriſingly. i. 269.—His anſwer to Montecuculi when requeſted to capitulate, 281.—Some account of his book - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 317.*†
——— commended by GUSTAVUS, ii. 44.—No hard drinker, ibid.—The king's courteſy to him when wounded, 291.—Extraordinary marches of his regiment - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 339.†
*Montecuculi* (Erneſt) fights the battle of Colbergen, i. 281, &c.—Some account of him, 366.* 279. 280.*—Defends Francfort iii, 309, and flies into Sileſia ibid.
——— acts feebly againſt Horn, ii. 317.—Dares not diſpute the paſſage of the Lech with GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - - 324.
——— (Raymond, the nephew, opponent of Turenne) firſt man that formed New Brandenburg, i. 303.—Some anecdotes concerning him, 304.*—His book of war no ways perfect, and why - - - - - - ibid.*
*Monthly* pay of a Swediſh regiment of foot, App. VIII. - - - 468.
*Morval* (colonel) killed at Francfort - - - - - - - i. 309.
*Moſtyn* (colonel) behaves well at the battle of Dirſchau - - - — 138.
*Munſter*, the author's idea of that treaty - - - - - - ii. 384.
*Muſcovy*, ground of the quarrel between Sweden and the czar, i. 85.—Its ingratitude - - - - - - - - - - - - - 87.

## N.

*Naude*, ſome account of his coups d'eſtat - - - - - ii. 134.*
*Neuburg* (duke of) propoſes a neutrality fruitleſsly, ii. 210, &c.—Aſks Juliers from the infanta in vain - - - - - - - - - - — 353.
*Neutralities*, odius to GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - — 50.
*Nils* (count) killed at Lützen - - - - - - - - - — 373.

## O.

*Ode* fur la Mort de Guſtave, App. XXIX. - - - - - - - 533.
*Oglebÿ* (Father) treats with GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - ii. 69.
*Ognata* (the Spaniſh ambaſſador) wanted to pare the gowns of the eccleſiaſtical electors - - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 230.
*Omens*, preceding the deſtruction of Magdeburg, i. 342.—At Hildeſheim and Cham - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 361.
——— preceding the battle of Leipſic - - - - - - - ii. 14.
ORANGE (Maurice, prince of) his fine character - - - - - i. 243.
——— (Henry) beſieges Maeſtricht, ii. 306.—Fights a dreadful battle with Pappenheim - - - - - - - - - - - - 309, &c.
——— his fine ſpirit on de Charnacé's impertinence - - - - i. 182.†
*Oratio* Guſtavi Helſingfordæ, App. I. - - - - - - - - 443.
*Ortemberg* (count) ſent to treat with the elector of Brandenburg, i. 320.—Storms Werben, 364.—Dies much eſteemed by GUSTAVUS - - - - ibid.
*Oſſa*, beſieges Biberach - - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 178.
*Oſtrogothia* (John, duke of) in love with the king's ſiſter, i. 74.—His generous behaviour to GUSTAVUS, 72, &c.—Reſigns his pretenſions to the throne, 73.—Commands in Holland, 79.—Brother to Sigiſmond king of Poland, but a ſincere proteſtant, 66.—Dies - - - - - - - - - - 99.
OXENSTIERN (Axel) one of GUSTAVUS's guardians, i. 72.—The idea Urban VIII. had of him, 76.—Prime miniſter at eight or twenty nine years of age, ibid.—His character, ibid.—Sent ambaſſador to Denmark, 88.—Eſcapes from a fire, 99.—Parallel between him and Mazarin, ibid.—Serves as a general, 107.—His ſpirited behaviour at a Poliſh congreſs, 124, 126.—His ſpeech concerning queen Chriſtina, 142.—Beſeeches the king to be more cautious of his life, 146.—Blames his impetuoſity, 151.—Commands a ſeparate army in Pruſſia, 362. ii. 10.—Reproaches the Marquis of Hamilton and Charles I. i. 387.—Propoſes a league offenſive and defenſive between Sweden and England, 389.—His high ſpirit towards Vane - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
——— Had no hand in the important treaty with Saxony, ii. 10.—Recalled, and made Legatus ab exercitu, 47.—Marches 12,000 men to reinforce the king, 85.—Meets him at Mentz, 129.—Superior to Richelieu at Compeigne, 140.—Submits to GUSTAVUS through inferiority of parts, 143, 144.—After the king's death had the whole affairs of Europe upon him for 16 years, 140.—His lively reply to the Poliſh ambaſſadors, 141. and to his ſon, 142.—Wanted to marry that ſon to Chriſtina, and paves the way remotely to her abdication, ibid. His ideas of France relative to Sweden, 141.—Treats England with an high ſpirit, ibid.—Holds a conference with Arnheim, 142.—Confers with Arnheim at the diet of Torgau, 235.—Commands near the Rhyne, 255, &c.—Eſcorts the queen, 256.—Left as pledge with the Nurenbergers, 321.—Hangs up his votive armour, ibid.—Makes a fine march to GUSTAVUS, 280.—Recalls GUSTAVUS on Wallſtein's entering Franconia, 324.—Owes his greateſt political fame to his maſter, 341.—Great power given him as *legatus* and *fagatus*, 343.—Director to four circles, ibid.—Owed the treaty of Hailbron to GUSTAVUS, Eſſay, xlvii. ii. 341.—His fine countenance - - - - Eſſay, xlviii.
OXENSTIERN (Bernard) ſent ambaſſador to Lyons - - - - i. 378.

## P.

*Paderborn* (biſhop) proud to have the king of Sweden killed by one of his dioceſe - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 379.
*Paintings*; principal battles of GUSTAVUS, where painted - - - i. 217.†
*Palatine* (elector) more bold and explicit than his brother Charles I. i. 236.—Rejects the emperor's four propoſals with diſdain, 237.—His hiſtory, 238. 244.—Had excellent miniſters, 236.—The pomp of his marriage, 238.—Influenced by judicial aſtrology, 240.—A man of firmneſs, but no great warrior, 240, 241.—His political and military errors, ibid.—An hue and cry after him affixed on the gates of Prague, 240.—Subſtance of a fine pamphlet addreſſed to him, 242. 244.

244.—Dies of a broken heart on receiving the news of the king's death, 244. His public buildings and mild government, 245.—Loſes three armies and three deciſive battles in nine weeks, ibid.—Original copy of the diſmiſſion he gave his troops in 1622 - - - - - - - - - - 246.

——— Arrives at Mentz, ii. 129.—At Francfort, 170.—His noble works at Heidelberg, 171.—Generoſity to his enemies, 224.—Dies of grief, on hearing of the news of GUSTAVUS's death - - - - - - - - 332.

*Palatine* (electreſs, princeſs of England, and queen of Bohemia,) aſked for as wife to GUSTAVUS, i. 67.—Her heroical generoſity to young count Thurn, 241. Allows Chriſtian duke of Brunſwick to wear one of her gloves on his helmet, ibid.—Romantically adored by all the generals, ibid.—Her courage and firmneſs, ibid.—Her anſwer to Vane, who propoſed to make her ſon a papiſt, 290. —A fine houſe built for her in England by lord Craven, 242.*—Her great firmneſs - - - - - - - - - - - - Eſſay, xlix.

*Palatine* of Lautrech (Charles, prince) his death, i. 367.—Account of his family - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.‡

*Palatine* library, its fate - - - - - - - - - - i. 133, &c.

*Palatinate*, a picture of its mangled ſtate - - - - - - - ii. 130.

PAPPENHEIM (Godfrey Henry, count de) and GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, the greateſt heroes of the hiſtory, xiii.—i. 265, and note.—Takes Ratzburg by ſurpriſe, 266.—His letter on the ſtate of affairs when GUSTAVUS landed, 319.—His humanity to the adminiſtrator of Magdeburg, 331.—His peculiar boldneſs and perſeverance, 335, &c.—Storms Magdeburg, 336.—Recalls Tilly from the foreſt of Hartz, 254.—Adviſed Tilly to cruſh GUSTAVUS at firſt, 370.—Always magnified the number of his men - - - - - - - - - 387.

——— Surnamed Balafré, having received 100 wounds, ii. 13.†—Of the ſame age with GUSTAVUS, ibid.—Forces Tilly by his impetuoſity to fight the battle of Leipſic, 14, &c. 34.—Unhorſes Gaſſion, 30.—Attacks ſeven times, ibid. —Carries off the remains of the imperial army, 41.—Not well inclined to Tilly, ibid. and 41. 54.—Called by GUSTAVUS the Soldier, 13.†—Perplexes Tilly, 34, 35.—Neglects the truce, 155.—His ſtratagem on the king of Denmark, 251.—Hiſtory of his campaign in lower Saxony, ibid. &c.—Declines joining Walſtein, 283.—Deſpiſes the infanta's money, 306.—Has the golden fleece offered him, ibid.—His very fine march to and from Maeſtricht, 307, &c.—His great intrepidity, 309, 311.—Charges eight or ten times, 312.—Wounded in the belly, ibid.—Affected to imitate GUSTAVUS, ibid.*—A part of his hiſtory, ibid.—Eſteemed by GUSTAVUS, ibid.—His ſiege of and march to Maeſtricht reconſidered, 331. 335.—Managed the pen and ſword equally, 332.—Suſpects the Dutch, 331.—His power of perſuaſion, 347.—His dying meſſage to Walſtein, 369.—Expires with great tranquillity, ibid.—His character by Pietro Pomo, ibid.‖—Received fourteen wounds in the two battles of Leipſic and Prague - - - - - - - - - - - - 40. 369.

*Pappenheim* (young, the nephew) his defence of Wilſburg caſtle, ii. 186, 187.

*Papers*; poiſoned ones - - - - - - - - - - - i. 267.†

*Paradeiſer* (colonel) ambaſſador to Dreſden - - - - - - ii. 80.

*Parma* (prince of) outlived his glory - - - - - - - - — 15.

*Paſman* (cardinal) his embaſſy to Rome, ii. 99.—His ſpirited behaviour to the pope, ibid. 187.—What he ſaid of the battle of the Lech - - - — 206.

*Pau*, Dutch ambaſſador, exhorts GUSTAVUS to cheriſh his life - - — 129.

*Perazzi*, a ridiculous bragadocio, i. 293.—See the character of another - ii. 178.

*Perſecution* in Bohemia, its hiſtory - - - - - - - i. 260, &c.

*Perniſi*, his gallant defence of Gripſwald - - - - - — 354, &c.

*Peſtilence*, raged much in the Swediſh army - - - - - - ibid.

*Petard*, (for an exact account thereof, ſee that excellent work tranſlated from the German, called Le Dictionnaire Militaire.)

*Piacharſki*, attempts to aſſaſſinate the king of Poland - - - - i. 105.

*Piaſeccius*, ſome account of his chronicle - - - - - - - ibid.*

*Piccolomini* defends Stargard, i. 259.—His life and hiſtory, ii. 84.*—Performs wonders at Lützen, 370.—Wounded ſurpriſingly, ibid.—Prepares the Peace of Munſter,

Munſter, Eſſay, xlix.—Farther account of him, 375.†—Foiled in his endeavour to carry off the body of GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - 379.
*Pike* (of GUSTAVUS) preferred to the bayonet, ii. 25.—Deſcription of it, ibid.
*Plato* (colonel) - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 126.
*Poland* (king of). See *Sigiſmond*.
——— (queen of) embarraſſes her huſband by purchaſing the diſtrict of Zyweck - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 120.
*Polanders*, quarrel between them and Swedes about declaring war, i. 124.—Great refiners in controverſy, 96.—Their quickneſs of parts - - 119.
*Pomerania* (duke of) ſome account concerning him, i. 227.†—Attempts to conciliate GUSTAVUS to the empire, 162.—Deſires him to deſiſt, 227.—Submits through neceſſity, 256.—Secretly favoured the Swedes - - - 249.
——— (duchy) ſome account thereof - - - - - - i. 245.
*Pope*. See Urban VIII. and Gregory XV.
*Potley*, major, performs a gallant action - - - - - - — 299.
*Prague*, an odd incident concerning it, ii. 88.—Thirty years war began and ended there, ann. 1618, 1648 - - - - - - - - ii. 385.
*Priſoners*, paid a ranſom; rarely exchanged - - - - Eſſay, xliii.
*Profeſſors*, taken priſoners; how exchanged - - - - - ii. 294.
*Puffendorf*, anſwers Chanut's book well - - - - - - i. 273.†

## Q.

*Quedlingberg*, ſome account of the abbey and abbeſs - - - i. 323.§
*Queen* of Sweden (Eleonora) marries GUSTAVUS in ſixteen hundred and twenty-four, i. 103, 104.—Her perſon, 103.—Brings him two daughters, Chriſtiana and Chriſtina, 104.—Prepares to viſit Germany, 264.—Enters the empire, 369.—Her peculiar fortitude, ibid.—Conducts a reinforcement, ibid.—Arrives at Stetin; her heroical anſwer when invited to a bergamaſco, ii. 91.—Her fine ſpeech to her huſband at their interview, 159.—The ſpeech miſtaken by the Engliſh news-writer, ibid.—Her intrepidity when the Vaſa ſunk, ibid.—Attended by Oxenſtiern to Mentz, 256.—Intercedes for Mitzval, 327.—Takes her final leave of GUSTAVUS; their tender ſeparation - - - 345.
*Queſtenberg* (baron de) ſent to pacify Walſtein on his diſgrace, i. 251.—Beſeeches him to reaſſume the generalſhip - - - - - ii. 102.

## R.

*Rabata* (baron de) ambaſſador from Vienna to Venice - - - ii. 189.
*Rache* (chevalier) ambaſſador from GUSTAVUS to the Venetians, i. 359. ii. 324.—Again - - - - - - - - - - - - — 171.
*Radzivil* (prince) cannonaded by GUSTAVUS, i. 109.—Slow in relieving Riga, 112, &c.—Speaks coldly of GUSTAVUS, 113.—Becomes his friend, diſguſted with Poland, 121, &c.—Conceives an affection for GUSTAVUS - ii. 243, &c.
*Ragotſki*, alarms the emperor - - - - - - - — 274.
*Ramſay* (David) quarrels with lord Reay, i. 380.*—Their appeal - ibid.
——— (ſir James) ſhot before Marienberg-caſtle - - - - ii. 63.
*Ranſtadt*; houſe where the duke of Marlborough met Charles XII. — 347.†
*Ratiſbon*. Vide Diet.
*Reay* (lord) ſome account of him, i. 255.‡—Surpriſes Stetin, ibid. and Dam, 258.—Half his regiment maſſacred, 305.—His public appeal to Ramſay by way of duel - - - - - - - - - - 380.*
*Reformation*; its progreſs and hiſtory - - - - - - i. 192.
*Refugees* protected by GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - — 143.
*Religion*, (peace of) - - - - - - - - - i. 192,‡—199.
*Reſervatum* eccleſiaſticum, what - - - - - - - — 196.
*Reſtitution*, famous edict thereof - - - - - - — 166. 171.

RETREATS, (fine ones.)

Arnheim's before Walſtein - - - - - - - - - - ii. 251.
Banier's - - - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
A ſecond famous one by the ſame at Torgau, ii. 295.†—Which gave riſe to the expreſſion of Cul de ſac - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
The king's at Altenberg caſtle - - - - - - - - - — 290, &c.
Pappenheim's from Maeſtricht, 312, &c.—Reconſidered, - - — 331. 335.
Bauditzen's from Pappenheim - - - - - - - - — 334, &c.
Horn's before Tilly at Bamberg - - - - - - - - - — 181.
From the camp at Nurenberg - - - - - - - - - — 321.
The king's before the Polanders - - - - - - - - i. 180.
*Rhingrave*; his gallant behaviour - - - - - - - — 176, &c.
*Richelieu*; ſome curious accounts concerning him, ii. 136.* &c.—Alarmed with GUSTAVUS, 155.—Teaſes him into an armiſtice, ibid.—Wants to protract it, 164.—Aſtoniſhed at the paſſage of the Lech, 208.—Treats with the elector of Tryers, ibid.—Had a regiment of infantry in 1632, 306.—Not grieved when GUSTAVUS died, 382.—Aſſumed the baton - - - - - Eſſay, xlviii.
*Rivers*, part of the art of war conſiſted in poſſeſſing them - - Eſſay, xxxvii.
*Rodolphus* II. emperor; ſome account of him - - - - - i. 197.§
*Roe* (ſir Thomas) Engliſh ambaſſador; his high idea of GUSTAVUS, i. 137.—Sails from Stockholm home, 215.—His noble ſpirit in ſupporting GUSTAVUS, 375, &c.—His ſtate papers of great uſe, ibid.†—Suppoſed author of the king's entering Germany, 376.—The inſcription he deſired on his tomb, 377. ii. 68, and note, ibid.—His character compared with Vane's - - - 68, &c.
*Roſs* (captain) killed by a cannon ball, blowing tobacco - - - i. 298.
*Roy* (Gabriel le) Spaniſh ambaſſador into Poland; his buſineſs there - — 151.
*Rugen* (iſland of) its deſcription - - - - - - - - — 210.*
*Rugenwalt*; ſome account thereof - - - - - - - - — 268.‡
*Ruſdorf* (the palatine miniſter) arrives at Ratiſbon, i. 231.—His great abilities and character, 236.‡—His manuſcripts relating to Engliſh hiſtory, and his fine Latin elegy, ibid.—His Cancellaria Bavarica - - - - - ii. 134.
*Ruthven* (ſir Patrick) renowned for drinking, ii. 44.—His gallant letter and challenge to the earl of Northumberland, 177.†—Nobly rewarded by the king - - - - - - - - - - - - - 214.

S.

*Sadler*, negotiates about Stralſund, i. 162.—Ambaſſador to the German princes and Switzers - - - - - - - - - - - 208, &c.
*Salvius* (ſubdelegate to Oxenſtiern) the neceſſitude of his fortune - i. 146.*
*Sapieha* (the elder) too aged for a general, i. 122.—His ambition to fight GUSTAVUS, 127.—Beaten juſt before - - - - - - - - ibid.
——— (the younger) defeated by the king - - - - - - — 125.
*Sarraſin*, a lively but unfaithful writer, ii. 105.—A French agent - ibid.
*Savelli* (duke) defends the duchy of Mechlenberg, i. 272.—Tried for ſurrendering Damin, 300.—Reproached by GUSTAVUS, ibid.—Conjectures why 301.—His avarice and perſecuting ſpirit - - - - - - - ibid.
*Saxe Lawenberg*. See *Lawenberg*.
*Saxe Weymar*. See *Weymar*.
*Saxons*, acquit themſelves ill at Leipſic - - - - - ii. 31. 42.
*Saxony* (John George, elector of) his ſlyneſs and duplicity, i. 136.—Declines the diet at Ratiſbon, and why, 230.—Holds a convention at Leipſic, 324.—Some idea of his ſituation and character, 326, 328. ii. 8, &c.—Refuſes to GUSTAVUS the paſſage of Deſſau bridge, i. 330.—His ſenſible anſwer to Tilly's deputies, ii. 5.—Makes great ſhew of gratitude to GUSTAVUS, 7, 8.—Reaſons why he treated no ſooner, 9.—Writes to the emperor on the Leipſic concluſions, i. 344, and 354.—Invades Luſatia, ii. 44.—Suſpected by GUSTAVUS, 48.—Offers him the road to Vienna, ibid.—Dreads him, 4, 5.—Wanted the archbiſhoprick of Magdeburg for his ſon, i. 228.—Made colluſive campaigns, ii. 146.—Rejects all

all imperial ſolicitations, ii. 87, &c.—Enters Bohemia, 88.—Trifles there, 89.—Again, 236.—Suſpected by GUSTAVUS, 89.—Again, 232.—Finely characterized by Feuquieres, 304, 305, and by Daniel Eremita, 305.†—Suſpected again, 328.—Fulfils a prophecy of Grebner - - - - - - ibid.†

———, ſtates of Lower, aſſiſt GUSTAVUS - - - - - - ii. 145.

*Schevaliſki* (colonel) wounded at GUSTAVUS's elbow, ii. 69—Again - 318.

*Schlik* (count) his gallant ſpeech when condemned, i. 261, &c.—And to his confeſſor - - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.

*Schwartzenberg* (count) receives a courteous viſit from Guſtavus, ii. 56.—His family once ſettled in England - - - - - - - - ibid.

*Schomberg* (Otho) ſent to treat with the elector of Saxony - - - ii. 4.

——— (Annibal, count de) ſucceeds de Conti, i. 284.—Writes to Tilly on his ill ſituation, 285.*—Retires before GUSTAVUS, 288.—Retreats indiſcreetly 289.—Defends Francfort ill - - - - - - - - 389, &c.

*Scots*; a ſurpriſing enterpriſe of 700 Scots, i. 263, &c.—Too proud to work, 316.—Military jeſters - - - - - - - - - 307.

*Seaton* (colonel) leads the attack at Riga - - - - - i. 108, 110.

*Seni* (Baptiſta) aſtrologer to Walſtein - - - - - - - ii. 112.

*Seniority* and rank, not always minded by the king, Eſſay, xxxii. xlv. ii 373.*

*Service*, quitting one for another not unfrequent in the thirty years war, Eſſay, xliii.

SIEGES (of note.)

Pleſko - - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 88.
Notteberg - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 90.
Riga - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 107, &c.
Kokenhauſen - - - - - - - - - - - - — 125.
Birzen - - - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Elbingen - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 134.
Marienberg (in Poland) - - - - - - - - - - — 135. 146.
Dirſchau - - - - - - - - - - - - — 136. 154.
Neuberg - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 158.
Stralſund - - - - - - - - - - — 156, 160, &c. 225.
Dantzic - - - - - - - - - - — 147, 151, 156, &c.
Magdeburg (blockaded) by Walſtein - - - - - - - - — 171.
Wolgaſt - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 225.
Colbergen (blockaded) - - - - - - - - - - - — 279.
Its ſiege - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 284.
Griffenhagen - - - - - - - - - - - — 285, &c.
Gartz - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 288.
Loïtch (fort) - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 292.
Damin - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 297, 301.
Feldſberg - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 303.
Francfort upon the Oder - - - - - - - - - - — 306, 310.
Landſberg - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 317, 318.
New Brandenburg - - - - - - - - - - - - — 319.
Magdeburg - - - - - - - - - - - - — 331. 349.
Gripſwald - - - - - - - - - - - - — 355, &c.
Doëmitz - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 359.
Leipſic - - - - - - - - - - - - - — ii. 9.
Koënigſhofen - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 57.
Marienberg (in Franconia) - - - - - - - - - - — 73, &c.
Prague - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 88.
Hoechſt - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 95.
Oppenheim - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 125.
Mentz - - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 126.
Koëningſtein-caſtle - - - - - - - - - - - - — 146.
Creützнach - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 174. 177.
Baccharah - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 177.
Donawert - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 190, &c.
Augſburg - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 211, 212.

Ingoldſtadt - - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 215, &c.
Biberach - - - - - - - - - - - - — 231.
Great Glogau - - - - - - - - - - - - — 302.
Chemnitz - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 305.
Maeſtricht, - - - - - - - - - - - - — 309, &c.
Duderſtadt, - - - - - - - - - - - - — 313.
Eimbech - - - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Stolhofen - - - - - - - - - - - - — 318.
Offenberg-caſtle - - - - - - - - - - - - — 319.
Benfelden - - - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.
Lauff - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 324.
Rayne, 325.—Again - - - - - - - - - - - - — 327.
Landſberg - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 326.
Hildeſheim - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 335.
Schweinfurt - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 336.
Coburg-caſtle - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 337

*Sigiſmond*, king of Poland, ſecond ſon of John, ſon of Guſtavus Vaſa, i. 67, 94.—Admitted king of Sweden on certain conditions, and depoſed, 67. 95, 96.—Invades Carelia, 79.—No great warrior, 87.—Groundwork of the quarrel between him and GUSTAVUS, 94, &c.—Accuſations againſt him, 96.—His temper and character, 96, 99.—Troubleſome, malevolent, and a great libeller, 96.—Miſſes little of being aſſaſſinated, 105.—Addicted to muſic and chemiſtry, ibid.—Governed by German and Spaniſh jeſuits, 115.—His latin letter to the king of Spain, 116.†—Dies, ii. 243.—Thoroughly ſcrutinized by a Poliſh diet, i. 119, &c.—Styles GUSTAVUS an uſurper, 124.—Surpaſſed in genius by him in the Pruſſian invaſion, 131.—Beaten in raiſing the ſiege of Mew, 138, and Marienberg, 135.—Joins Conoſpoliſki, 154.—Dares not attack GUSTAVUS, ibid.—Secret ill-wiſher to him, ii. 46.—Diſlikes GUSTAVUS - - - 233.

*Sileſia*; ſome account of it - - - - - - - - - - i. 384.

*Sinclair* (major) ſcales Francfort - - - - - - - - - — 308.

*Sirot* (baron de) fights GUSTAVUS hand to hand, i. 177, 178.—Receives politeneſs from him, 180.—Attacks the king again - - - - - - 182.

*Skyt* (preceptor to GUSTAVUS) his benefaction to Upſal, i. 117.—An excellent orator - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ibid.

*Soldiers*; ruined by avarice and plunder, ii. 55.—Their generoſity to learning - - - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 118.

*Solmes* (count) made governor of Nurenberg - - - - - - ii. 96.

*Solre* (count) ambaſſador to Poland - - - - - - - i. 116.

*Spain*, furnamed ſignora di orecchi di Ceſare - - - - - - — 250.

—— (king of) his laconic military letter, i. 81.—His profane inſolence — 199.

*Spandau*, negotiations about it - - - - - - - - — 250, &c.

*Spaniards*; good diſſemblers; ſend Walſtein the golden fleece, ii. 101, &c. 103, 105.—Act a mock tragedy and make bonfires at the king's death - 382.

*Spar* (colonel) retreats unfortunately, i. 289.—Taken priſoner, 310.—Negotiates with Saxony, ii. 250. 329.—Beaten by GUSTAVUS, 273.—Taken priſoner, 274.—The king's pleaſantry thereon - - - - - - ibid. &c.

*Spence* (ſir James) Engliſh ambaſſador - - - - - - - i. 76, 83.

*Spinola* (marquis Ambroſio) his idea of GUSTAVUS, i. 81.—Some anecdotes concerning him, ibid.†—Dies of a broken heart;—His perturbation of mind, ibid.—A fine picture thereof - - - - - - ii. 15.* 259, &c.

*Stakelberg* (colonel) killed at the king's elbow - - - - - i. 108.

*Stalhaus* (general) originally a ſerving man, ii. 288.‡—Behaves well at the battle of Altenberg, ibid. and at Lützen, 367:—Recovers the king's body - 379.

*Sternſkeld* (a Swediſh admiral) taken priſoner - - - - - i. 150.

STORMING OF TOWNS.

Chriſtianopel - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 69.
Kexholm - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 88.
Ratzburg - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 276.
Foldsberg - - - - - - - - - - - - - — 303, &c.

Magdeburg

Magdeburg - - - - - - - - - - i. 336, &c.
Francfort upon the Oder - - - - - - - - - — 308, &c.
Werben - - - - - - - - - - - — 364.
Tangermond - - - - - - - - - - — 362.
Donawert - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 190, &c.
Oberſdorf-caſtle - - - - - - - - - - — 326.
*Stralendorf*, vice chancellor of the empire, ſubſcribes to the war - — 100.

STRATAGEMS (Military.)

Of Aldringer againſt GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - ii. 284, &c.
Of Horn againſt Montbaillon - - - - - - - - — 316.
Of count Embden againſt Oxenſtiern - - - - - - - — 254.
A boat laden with faſcines - - - - - - - - i. 131.
Againſt Todt in Grebin foreſt - - - - - - - - — 149.
Againſt the emperor's perſon - - - - - - - - — 166.
On the duke of Pomerania's - - - - - - - - — 256.
On the town of Stetin - - - - - - - - - — 255.
On Malchin, by Melk - - - - - - - - - — 295.
Of Aligheri againſt GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - — 265, &c.
On Berlin - - - - - - - - - - — 320, &c.
Againſt Peruſi - - - - - - - - - - — 355.
Againſt the life of GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - ii. 29.
Againſt Erfurt - - - - - - - - - - — 51.
Of a lifelander not intended - - - - - - - - — 64.
Of Ramſay, a Scot - - - - - - - - - — 62.
Of Keller to blow up a bridge - - - - - - - - ibid.
Of Walſtein, towards count Thurn - - - - - - - — 88.
Of GUSTAVUS againſt Hoëchſt - - - - - - - - — 94.
Of duke Bernard on Manheim - - - - - - - - — 150.
Of Arnheim againſt Walſtein - - - - - - - - — 250.
Of Cratz againſt Ratiſbon - - - - - - - - — 229.
Of the ſame, about ſurrendering Ingoldſtadt - - - - - - ibid.*

STRATAGEMS (Political.)

Of Arnheim to eſcape from Stockholm - - - - - - - i. 327.
Of the Imperial court againſt Walſtein - - - - - - - ii. 117.
Of the Imperial court againſt Walſtein - - - - - - - — 251.
Of Pappenheim towards the king of Denmark - - - - - - — 14.
*Superſtition*, of the Imperial army before the battle of Leipſic - - Eſſay, xxxv.
*Surgeons*, four to each Swediſh regiment, - - - - - -

SURPRISES.

Rugenwalt - - - - - - - - - - - - i. 269.
New Brandenburg - - - - - - - - - - - — 303.
Stetin - - - - - - - - - - - - — 255.
Landſberg - - - - - - - - - - - - — 317.
Ratiſbon, ii. 229, 231. See Camiſados.
*Suecici* Regiminis Conſtitutio, App. IV. - - - - - - - — 461.
*Swearing* diſcouraged and puniſhed by the king - - - - ii. 57, 58.
*Sweden*, a geographical account thereof in GUSTAVUS's time - - i. 212*
*Swedes*, their characters, i. 212.—Their obedience. 220, &c.—Their cavalry, ibid.
——— their rage and indignation on the king's death, ii. 368, 383, &c.—Their morality and diſcipline, Eſſay, paſſim.—Rarely deſerted, and why, Eſſay - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xxxii, &c.
*Sylva* (Don Philip de) his rhodomontade to the elector of Mentz - ii. 128.

T.

*Tangermond*, ſome account of that town - - - - - - - ii. 1.
*Teiffenbach* (general) helps to defend Francfort on the Oder, i. 305.—Flies, 309.

*Tertias.* Vide Maſſes.
——— a military configuration diſcommended, ii. 24.—See Eſſay, xxxv. and - - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 364.
*Tertſki* (colonel) brother in law to Walſtein, ii. 105.*—Suppoſed to be gefrorn, 120.†—Behaves well at Lützen, 370.—Aſſaſſinated; dies bravely - 120.†
*Teuffel* (Maximilian, baron de) behaves well at the battle of Walhoff, i. 127.—Defeated and taken priſoner on a march, 145.—Wounded; alarms the king - - - - - - - - - - - - 307.
——— killed at the battle of Leipſic, ii. 32. 40.—Some account of him - ibid.*
*Teutonic* knights; their luxury - - - - - - - - - i. 135.
*Theodoric*; his glorious idea of lenity in a conqueror - - - - ii. 66.
*Thurn* (Matthias count, the father) commands the right wing in the battle of Walhoff, i. 127.—Conducts the Swedes in the king's abſence, 147.—His uncommon hiſtory, 159.*—His piety to his ſon - - - - - - ibid.
——— created lieutenant general to GUSTAVUS, ii. 88.—Iſſues out a protection to the Bohemians, 89.—Repoſſeſſes his palace, ibid.—Releaſed nobly by Walſtein, 330.—A great negotiator - - - - - - Eſſay, xlviii.
——— (the ſon) enamoured of the queen of Bohemia, i. 241.—Behaves well in the battle of Dirſchau - - - - - - - - - - 138.
——— killed at Lützen - - - - - - - - - ii. 374.
*Tilly* (John Tſercläes, count de) ſends the Palatin library to the Vatican, i. 133.—Speaks reſpectfully of GUSTAVUS, 232.—Where employed when the king landed, 223.—Creature to the elector of Bavaria, 250.—Takes Feldſberg, and New Brandenburg by chance, 303, &c.—His cruelty there, 306.—At Magdeburg, 349.—and in Saxony, 180, &c.—Makes an error concerning Deſſaubridge, 352.—and in entering the foreſt of Hartz, 350, &c.—Attempts in vain to raiſe the ſiege of Francfort upon the Oder, 306, 307.—Loſes his influence and authority, 344.—Negotiates (ſay ſome) imprudently with Saxony, ii. 5, &c.—Diſculpated in that reſpect, 6.—Loſes four of his beſt regiments, i. 301. Attacks the king's lines at Werben unſucceſsfully, 306.—Eſcapes the ſtroke of a cannon ball, ii. 7.—Beſieges Leipſic and takes it, 10.—His ſtrange ſpeech to the Saxon deputies, 6.—Makes nine remarkable miſtakes in the battle of Leipſic, 25, &c.—His letter on loſing the battle of Leipſic, 35, &c.—Receives three wounds, 40.—Falſely accuſed of being *gefrorn*, 45.—Says nothing of ſome blows he received, 36.‡—Called by GUSTAVUS, the Old Corporal, 37.*—Hiſtory of his flight, 45.—Its amazing rapidity, 73.—Undertakes a wrong march, 54.—Ravages the margraviate of Anſpach, 97.—Coldneſs between him and Pappenheim, ibid. and 45, 46.—Projects in vain to beſiege Nurenberg, 97.—His narrow eſcape, ibid.—Breaks down the bridges that lead to Bavaria, and ſpreads his army along the Danube and Lech, 195.—Wins the battle of Bamberg, 179, &c.—Diſputes the paſſage of the Lech, 202, &c.—Receives his death ſtroke, 204.—Too old for a general, 206.—Generoſity to the old Walloons, Eſſay, li.—To the church at Oetinghen, ibid.—His ſtrange dreſs, Eſſay, lv.—His death, dying ſpeech, and character - - ii. 218, &c.
*Todt* (Achatius, general) beats the Poles in Grebin foreſt, i. 148, &c.—Knighted, 149.—Reduces all Pomerania - - - - - - - - 358.
——— behaves well againſt Pappenheim, ii 252.—His family, 85.*—Takes Wiſmar - - - - - - - - - - - - - 149.
*Ton* of gold; about £. 9000.
*Torre* (la) a fine young ſoldier - - - - - - - - i. 288.
*Torſtenſon* (Leonard) a conſummate general when young, i. 84.—Excellent in managing artillery, 317, ii. 64.‡—His humanity to captain Keller, ii. 64.—Embarks his cannon on the Mayne, ii. 92.—Executor to Banier in commanding his army - - - - - - - - - - - - 295.†

TREATIES. More conſiderable ones.

Between Sweden and Denmark - - - - - - i. 80, &c.
Of Stolba, between Sweden and Muſcovy - - - - - - — 91.
Between Sweden and Poland - - - - - - - — 116.
The ſame and the Dantziekers - - - - - - - — 185.

Between Sweden and the Duke of Pomerania, i. 257, App. IX. - - 470.
The fame and the landgrave of Heſſe-Caſſel, App. XXIII. - - — 519.
The ſame and the elector of Saxony - - - - - - - — 7.
The ſame and France at Beinwalt, App. XIX. - - - - - — 503.
The ſame and the marquis of Hamilton interchangeably, 377, &c. App. V. & VI. - - - - - - - - - - - - - 461.
Between France and the elector of Tryers, ii. 162. 193. 256. App. XXVIII. 530.
Between the ſame and Bavaria, 163, App. XXII. - - - - - 517.
Treaty of neutrality, or armiſtice, 155, App. XXV. - - - - - 525.
Its hiſtory, 158.—Subſcription of the French ambaſſadors thereupon, ibid. App. XXVI. - - - - - - - - - - - - - 527.
Of Vic; between France and Lorrain - - - - - - - 153.
*Treaty.* See Commerce - - - - - - - - i. 143, &c.
——— improved and extended to the Germans - - - ii. 342.
*Truce*, for two years, between Sweden and Poland, i. 97.—Another, 113.—A third. - - - - - - - - - - - - — 116.
*Tryers* (elector of) ſick of the Spaniards in 1630 - - - - — 229.
——— vainly attempts to intimidate GUSTAVUS, ii. 144.—Makes a ſeparate treaty with France, 162.—Publiſhes a manifeſto on the occaſion, ibid.—His negotiations with France, 257.—His chapter oppoſes him - - ibid.
*Turenne*, cenſured for cruelty in the Palatinate, ii. 6.—His lively ſaying to a miniſter about a map, 307.—Copied GUSTAVUS in adapting officers to places without ſeniority - - - - - - - - - - Eſſay, xlvi.
*Turnep*, Swediſh deſcribed - - - - - - - - - i. 72.*
*Turquaiſe* (GUSTAVUS's fine one) never appeared ſince the battle of Lützen, ii. 378.

U.

*Uladiſlaus* (ſon of Sigiſmond) reſcues his father from an aſſaſſin, i. 105.—Eſteemed by GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - - - - — 115.
*Ulric* (prince of Denmark) ſhot by Piccolomini's buffoon - - - — 359.*
*Ulſpar*, vice admiral of Sweden - - - - - - - - — 303.
*Upſal* (univerſity of) king's bounty to it - - - - - - — 85. 117.*
——— library of Wurtzburg ſent thither - - - - - - ii. 56.
*Urban VIII.* (pope) his high idea of Oxenſtiern, i. 76.—Some account of him, 134.—Generouſly diſculpates cardinal Kleſel - - - - - - 233.†
——— what cardinal Paſman ſaid of him, ii. 99.—Some other articles concerning him, ibid.‡—Secret friend to GUSTAVUS, 187, &c.—Grants a jubilee for meer form, 189.—His high idea of GUSTAVUS, ibid.—Dexterous management with the Auſtrians, ibid.—Laments the death of GUSTAVUS - - 383.
*Uſlar* (general) killed at Lützen - - - - - - - - ii. 373.
*Uſling* (a Fleming) propoſes a new ſcheme of commerce - - i. 143, &c.

V.

*Vandyk*, a Swediſh ambaſſador - - - - - - - - i. 84.
*Vane* (ſir Henry) ambaſſador from England, a ſycophant to the meaſures of the miniſtry. i. 377 —Supplants Roe, ibid.—Tampers fruitleſsly with the electreſs Palatin, 382.—Roughly uſed by Oxenſtiern - - - - 389.
—— his character compared with Roe's, ii. 68, &c.—Hiſtory of his firſt audience with GUSTAVUS, 70, &c.—Commends him with venomous nicety, 72, paſſim.—Parts on ill terms, ibid —A great teaſer, 240.—Diſculpates the king's warmth of temper, 243.—Confers with GUSTAVUS at Mentz.—They diſagree.—Hiſtory of the conference, 165, 170.—His quarrel and outrageous behaviour to GUSTAVUS, 237, &c.—Negotiates fruitleſsly about the Palatinate, 270, &c.—His letter on that ſubject, ibid.—Traduces the king, 271.—Again, 292.—Always ſhifting propoſals - - - - - - - - - - - 297.*
*Velt-Marechal*; an expreſſion miſunderſtood by French hiſtorians - ii. 281.*
*Venetians* decline a war with great artifice - - - - - - i. 360.
*Verdenberg* (Auſtrian chancellor) ſent to pacify Walſtein on his removal — 250.
*Vienna* (biſhop of) ſubſcribes to the war - - - - - - ii. 151.*
*Vogheſi* (mountains) - - - - - - - - - - — 258.*

W.

*Walloon*, infantry, their glorious behavour at Leipſic, ii. 33.—At Rocroy, i. 92.*
——— (one eyed captain) puts the king into a feigned paſſion - - ii. 59.*
WALSTEIN (Albert, count) duke of Friedland, Sagan, Glogau, and Mecklenburg, &c.—Aſſiſts the Dantzickers, i. 147.—His profane expreſſion about Stralſund, 163. ii. 114. and Altenberg caſtle, 112. and 286. and about great armies, Eſſay, xxxix.—His rhodomontades about ſcourging GUSTAVUS out of Poland, i. 172. and out of Germany, ii. 113.—Again, 265.—Anſwers not GUSTAVUS's letter, i. 192.—Where employed when the king landed, 222, &c.—Surnamed the German dictator, 230.—Why hated, 170.—His magnificent entrance at Ratiſbon.—Hiſtory of his diſmiſſion, 251.—Influenced by judicial aſtrology, ibid.—His affected humility and profound diſſimulation, ibid. ii. 269.—Condeſcends to write to the emperor, 101.—His vaſt demands on him, 102, &c.—His idea of maintaining a vaſt army without money, 104.—Draws the old officers and ſoldiers to him, 104, &c.—Creates twelve new generals, 105.—His magnificence, palace, and particularities, 105, &c.—His life and education, 108, 109.—Oppoſes the Bohemian inſurgents, 109.—Saves himſelf at court by a ſeaſonable application of money, 110.—Marries Harrach's daughter, ibid.—Makes the peace of Lubec, ibid.—Severe in martial diſcipline, 111, &c.—Reſerved to his generals, ibid, and 275.—Hates noiſe, 111, &c.—His uncommon generoſity, ibid, &c.—To Piccolomini, ibid.—Captain Reiſchel, 279.—And Iſolani, 112.—To colonel Dewbatel, 272.—To Baptiſta Seni, 112.—To Torſtenſon, 245.—To a captain, 212.—To another perſon, 113.—Wanted true greatneſs of parts, 114.—Military jeſt on his money carriers, 173.—Takes the field againſt GUSTAVUS, 232.—Negotiates with Saxony, ibid.—Inveſts Prague, 233.—And Egra, 245.—Generoſity of a lady who loved him, ibid.—Unwilling to aſſiſt Bavaria, 259, &c.—Eſcapes from a ſudden danger, 261.—A profound diſſembler, ibid. and 269.—Encamps over againſt GUSTAVUS, 262.—His idea of numbers in war, 261.—Excellent at ſubſiſting an army, 265. Retrenches his table, 268.—Rendered modeſt and diffident by GUSTAVUS, 267.—Outdone in the art of ſubſiſting an army, 268, &c.—Torments the duke of Bavaria, 269.—Convenes the empreſs's couſin before a court martial, 274.—Surrounds GUSTAVUS, 280.—Fears to fight the king, 282, &c.—Entrenches doubly and trebly, 284.—Suppoſed to be diſturbed in his intellects, 286.—Hath a horſe killed under him, 289.—Eſcapes being made a priſoner, 294.—Puzzled by GUSTAVUS, 296.—Fears to obſtruct the king's retreat, 322.—Loſes many men and horſes, 323.—Invades Franconia, 336.—Quits the duke of Bavaria with exquiſite diſſimulation, 335, &c.—Beſieges Schweinfurt in vain, ibid.—And Coburg caſtle, ibid.—Outdone in military genius by the king, 338.—Detaches Holk and Galas again to ruin Saxony, 339.—Encamps at Weida in Vogtland, ibid.—Miſcarries at Torgau bridge, 346.—Wiſhed to decline the battle of Lützen, ibid.—His irreſolutions and fluctuations on that head, &c. ibid. &c.—Reaſons why he diſpatched Pappenheim from himſelf, 348, &c.—Thunderſtruck on the king's preſenting battle, ibid. 357.—Makes all imaginable preparations, 362.—His order of battle inferior to the king's, ibid.—Appears in a ſedan chair during the fight, 362. 375.—Erects a ſevere court martial at Prague, ibid.—His generoſity to his officers who behaved well, ibid.—Gives up the field of battle at Lützen, 372.—How far guilty of conſpiracy, 115.—Doubts thereon, ibid.—His aſſaſſination deſcribed at large, 118, &c.—His ſuppoſed epitaph - - - - - - - - - - - - 124.
*Waſtein* (a kinſman of the general) eſcapes narrowly from GUSTAVUS - i. 270.
——— (colonel) killed at Francfort - - - - - - - — 310.
——— another at Lützen - - - - - - - - ii. 375.
——— Maximilian, ſent to perſuade his uncle to accept the command in chief - - - - - - - - - - - - — 102.
*War*, art of it, expired partly with GUSTAVUS, Eſſay, xxxvi. (On the continent) its propriety debated, Eſſay, xl. - - - - - - i. 188.
—— (of thirty years) its riſe and occaſions - - - - —191, &c.
—— Engliſh not obliged to declare war againſt France - - - — 209 †
*Weiſſenberg* (count) killed at Lützen - - - - - - ii. 373.

*War*

*Wart* (John de) attacks the Auſtrian peaſants - - - - ii. 300.
*Weymar* (Bernard, duke of) ſome curious anecdotes concerning him, i. 372.* — The youngeſt of eleven ſons, ibid. of whom all that lived bore arms againſt the emperor, ibid.—His ſiege of Briſac, a fine action, 372, 373.—Engages hand to hand with John de Wert, ibid.—His noble anſwer to Richelieu, ibid.—Surnamed the ſucceſſor of GUSTAVUS, ibid.—His manly behaviour at Verſailles, ibid.—His exemplary death and generoſity to his army, 373.*—His idea of marrying the landgrave of Heſſe, ibid.—Suppoſed to be poiſoned by the French, ibid.—Preceptor (as it were) to Turenne, ibid.—Surpriſes Manheim, ii. 244.—Beats Oſſa, ibid.—Commands near the lake of Conſtance, ibid.—Gave great hopes at the battle of Altenberg, i. 372.—With 12,000 men obſerves Walſtein in Franconia, ii. 336.—His fine conduct, ibid.—Saves Coburg, 337.—Hoped to enſnare Pappenheim, 340, &c.—Confuted by GUSTAVUS before the battle of Lutzen, 353.—Always for fighting, ibid.—His ſpeech occaſioned by a miſt, ii. 372.—Surpriſing legacies to his colonels and ſoldiers - - - - - - - - - - - - Eſſay, li.
*Weymar*, William, duke of, treats with GUSTAVUS, ii. 53.—Beloved by him, ibid.
——— (Erneſt, duke of) made governor of Koeningſhofen - ii. 57.
*Wildeſſein* (lieutenant-general) examines the fortifications of Griffenbagen, i. 286. —Wounded by miſtake, 287.—Killed at Lutzen - - - - ii. 373.
*Wirtemberg* (duke of) ſubmits to the edict of reſtitution - - - i. 228.
——— (adminiſtrator) treats with the Swedes - - - - - —323.
*Wrangel* (general) ſerves at the ſiege of Riga, i. 107.—Firſt man to croſs the Lech - - - - - - - - - - - - - ii. 202.
*Wurtſburg* (biſhop of) who he was, ii. 67.—Flies from GUSTAVUS.—His duplicity, ibid.—Ambaſſador to France.—His curious motto on his eſtigns.

Z.

*Zamoſki* challenges Charles IX. - - - - - - - - i. 71.
——— another, who breaks through the ridiculous ſolemnity of a congreſs.—His high idea of GUSTAVUS - - - - - - - - - - — 140.
*Zuirega* (a capuchin) makes great offers to Walſtein - - - ii. 101.

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

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